

EXAMINING THE CAPACITY OF THE PHILIPPINE ARMY'S ENLISTED CORPS
TO ACCOMPLISH THE GOVERNMENT'S COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGY:
SHARPENING THE TOOL

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ABSTRACT

EXAMINING THE CAPACITY OF THE PHILIPPINE ARMY'S ENLISTED CORPS TO ACCOMPLISH THE GOVERNMENT'S COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGY: SHARPENING THE TOOL, by Major Adolfo B Espuelas Jr, 174 pages.

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ACRONYMS

ACC	Area Coordinating Center
AFP	Armed Forces of the Philippines
AIM	Asian Institute of Management
ALPS	Army Literacy Patrol System
AOWC	Advance Operational War-fighting Capability
AQ	Al-Qaeda
ASEAN	Association of South-East Asian Nations
ASG	Abu Sayyaf Group
BAS	Barangay Area Study
BIN	Barangay Intelligence Net
CAFGU	Citizen Armed Force Geographical Unit
CMO	Civil Military Operations
COC-IS	Cabinet Oversight Committee on Internal Security
COIN	Counterinsurgency
CPP	Communist Party of the Philippines
CRAMP	Citizens' Responsibility Awareness and Motivation Program
DA	Department of Agriculture
DENR	Department of Environment and Natural Resources
DEPED	Department of Education
DIME	Diplomatic, Informational, Military, & Economic
DOH	Department of Health
DPWH	Department of Public Works and Highways

DSWD	Department of Social Welfare and Development
DT	Dissident Terrorists (other name for communist insurgents)
EP	Enlisted Personnel
EXECOM	Executive Committee
FC	Front Committee
FM	Field Manual
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GF	Guerilla Front
GRP	Government of the Republic of the Philippines
HUMINT	Human Intelligence
IATWG	Inter- Agency Technical Working Group
ILE	Intermediate Level Education
INCOAC	Infantry Non-Commissioned Officer Advance Course
INCOBC	Infantry Non-Commissioned Officer Basic Course
IOAC	Infantry Officer Advance Course
IOBC	Infantry Officer Basic Course
IPO	Ideological, Political and Organizational
ISO	Internal Security Operation
ITDS	Integrated Territorial Defense System
JI	Jemaah Islamiyah
LGA	Local Government Agency
LCM	Local Communist Movement
LGU	Local Government Unit

MDMP	Military Decision-Making Process
MILF	Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MTT	Mobile Training Team
NDF	National Democratic Front
NDSC	National Development Support Command
NGO	Non- Government Organizations
NISP	National Internal Security Plan
NPA	New People’s Army
NPS	Naval Post-Graduate School
NSC	National Security Council
OB	Order of Battle
PA	Philippine Army
PEFTOK	Philippine Expeditionary Forces to Korea
PEMI	Political, Economic, Military & Informational
PHILCAG	Philippine Civic Action Group
PMA	Philippine Military Academy
PO	People’s Organizations
POI	Program of Instructions
PSYOP	Psychological Operations
SHA	Strategy of Holistic Approach
SOCOM	Special Operations Command
SOT	Special Operations Team
TRADOC	Training and Doctrine Command

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this study is to determine the weaknesses of the Philippines' counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy utilized against the country's long-running communist insurgency in order to determine possible solutions. Identifying these loopholes is important because it will enable policy makers to know which parts of the program needed to be changed or reinforced in order to improve the chances of success for future Philippine COIN operations.

National Security Threats

The Philippines is confronting three main threat groups. These are:

1. The *Communist Party of the Philippines/ New People's Army (CPP/NPA)* which espouses a communist ideology;
2. The *Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)*, which is fighting a secessionist struggle in the south; and,
3. The *Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)*, an Islamic fundamentalist group said to have links with Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and Al-Qaeda (AQ).

Among these threats, the CPP/NPA is considered the most dangerous because of the breadth of its influence and the seriousness of its political struggle.¹ On the latest count, the CPP/NPA maintains 87 Guerilla Fronts (GF) situated in 70 out of 81 total provinces countrywide.² It has approximately 6,300 regular fighters dispersed in the different Guerilla Fronts, not to mention its force multipliers in the form of part-time

¹ Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, G2, Philippine Army, Intelligence Assessment, 2007, (Internal Document).

² Armed Forces of the Philippines Year-End Report 2007.

auxiliaries provided by the local militias and organizations. However, in an article published in *The Manila Times* on January 13, 2008, the above AFP claims have been disputed by the CPP Chairman, Jose Maria Sison himself.³ Sison argues that the NPA Guerilla Fronts have in fact fluctuated between 120 and 130 as opposed to 87 as claimed by the military report. On the political front, the CPP has reportedly gained 7 seats in Congress along with various local-level positions since the 2004 elections.⁴

The MILF and the Abu Sayyaf concentrate only in certain parts of Mindanao Island. Because of this localization, their operations do not substantially affect the entire country. While the MILF and the Abu Sayyaf threats create considerable noise, the CPP/NPA still commands a wider influence and is therefore considered the primary threat. Zachary Abuza, an expert in the United States funded Institute of Peace, who has studied the various leftist and Moro secessionist groups fighting against the Philippine government, echoes the same assessment. He says, “*Despite all the attention given to the Abu Sayyaf rebel movement in past years, the single greatest threat to the Philippine state continues to come from the CPP/NPA.*”⁵

Factors Aggravating the Threat Situation

From the national perspective, three major factors affect the ability of the government to address the above mentioned threats. These are the weak economy,

³ Nora O. Gamolo, Senior Desk Editor & Anthony A. Vargas, Reporter, “Rebels belie AFP claims of destruction of bases”, *The Manila Times*, January 13, 2008.
http://127.0.0.1:4664/cache?event_id=28802&schema_id=6&q=Rebels+belie+AFP+claims+of+destruction+of+bases&s=zffF5FjVt3KBBAariQbcqz01wys [accessed January 13, 2008].

⁴ Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, G2, Philippine Army, Counter-Intelligence Report 2006, [Internal Document].

⁵ Herbert Docena, “Killing Season in the Philippines”, *Focus on the Global South*, June 2, 2006.
<http://www.focusweb.org/killing-season-in-the-philippines.html?Itemid=27> [accessed February 26, 2008].

perceived corruption in government and political instability caused by military adventurism.

Reviewing the economy, based on 2007 estimate, the Philippines' Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is P298.9 billion Philippine Peso (US\$6.97 billion) with a GDP growth of 7.3%.⁶ The GDP per capita is P3,300 (US\$76.99). Its public debt amounts to P316.65 billion (US\$7.389 billion) which is equivalent to 62.3% of its GDP.⁷ Based on a 2007 estimate, its revenue was P23.96 billion (US\$559 million) while the expenditure rose to P25.24 billion (US\$883 million).⁸ Unemployment rate is 7.3% and 30% of the population (approximately 24 million) is below the poverty line.⁹ This dire economic condition of the country has fueled anti-government sentiments that breed insurgency.

On corruption, the Philippines rank number 131 out of 150 countries in the Transparency International Ranking in Corruption based on 2007 survey.¹⁰ Despite government efforts to curb it, corruption remains a serious problem for the country. It is considered as one of the most serious barriers in overcoming poverty which is a root cause of insurgency. It jeopardizes good governance resulting in the depletion of government resources intended for rural development, thus compounding the military's difficulty in dealing with insurgency. Corruption is one of the causes of public

⁶ CIA World Fact Book. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rp.html#Econ> (accessed May 12, 2008). As of this writing, the exchange rate is P43.24 – US\$1.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Transparency International Corruption Perception Index 2007. <http://64.233.167.104/search?q=cache:X70AIGPbw14J:www.transparency.org/content/download/23972/358236+Philippines+rank+number+131+out+of+150+countries+in+the+Transparency+International+Ranking+in+Corruption+based+on+2007+survey.&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=3&gl=us> [accessed May 15, 2008].

dissatisfaction that pushes people to join the insurgency movement. However, if such is the case in the government, the CPP/NPA is also plagued by corruption. This is the reason why internal squabbles constantly happen within the CPP/NPA leadership causing its organization to splinter. Corruption in the CPP/NPA is even worse than that of the Philippine government. This prompted Victor Corpus (a Philippine Army Second Lieutenant who defected to the NPA) to surrender back to the government after having been disillusioned with corruption within the CPP/NPA hierarchy.¹¹

Aside from weak economy and corruption, the Philippines is also hounded by political instability due to the emergence of military adventurism. Several times factions of the military have attempted coups to overthrow the government over allegations of corruption and legitimacy. To a large extent, addressing this threat from within has somehow distracted the Armed Forces of the Philippines' focus on counterinsurgency, as it had to divert its attention and resources in order to suppress the recurring military upheaval.

The Primary Threat – CPP/NPA

The CPP/NPA has been waging a Maoist style insurgency against the Philippine government since 1968. Its ultimate goal is to overthrow the legitimate government of the Philippines through the conduct of protracted guerilla warfare. The concept is to mobilize many of the masses (or the lower strata of society, considering that many Filipinos live in poverty). In fact, the disparities of wealth in the Philippines are quite striking. The wealthiest 10% of Filipino families control more than a third of the

¹¹ Asia Times Online, "Victor Corpus and Jose Almonte: The righteous spies", under Southeast Asia, August 31, 2001. <http://www.atimes.com/se-asia/CH30Ae02.html> [accessed May 15, 2008].

country's Gross Domestic Product.¹²

The CPP/NPA intends to overthrow the Philippine government through a combination of political and armed struggle using three main forces and two major strategies. The three main forces are:

1. The *Communist Party of the Philippines* (CPP) - serves as the organizational brain of the revolution. It provides the political leadership to the entire revolutionary movement. Likewise, it controls and provides direction to the New People's Army (NPA) and the National Democratic Front (NDF).
2. The *New People's Army* (NPA) - is the military arm of the party tasked to carry out the protracted war through the conduct of armed struggle. The CPP believes that while the NPA complements the ideological, political and organizational efforts, its ultimate role is to deliver the final blow when the political struggle has ripened.
3. The *National Democratic Front* (NDF) - is the shield of the revolution. As an umbrella organization to the CPP/NPA, the NDF seeks to organize the various sectoral groups, non-government organizations (NGO) and other people's organization (PO) with the task of advancing its legally disguised programs. It also runs the insurgency-based propaganda machinery.

In addition to the CPP/NPA's three main weapons, there are two major insurgency strategies to consider. These are:

1. *Strategy of Protracted War* – This is based on the premise that given their current size (insurgent numbers) and strength (relative firepower), launching a major

¹² *The Manila Times*, "Rich-poor gap widens", January 13, 2008, under Top Stories. <http://www.manilatimes.net/national/2008/jan/13/yehey/metro/20080113met3.html> [accessed January 13, 2008].

conventional armed offensive against the Philippine government at this time would lead to disaster for the insurgency. Thus, the strategy is for its forces to avoid decisive confrontation with government forces until such time that they have mustered the requisite number of forces and equipment to match the latter's might. In the meantime, they have to buy time to allow their forces to grow. They only engage government forces when they are in a completely advantageous situation and when they deem it necessary to help advance their psychological campaign and coercive diplomacy. On the other hand, buying time will also allow their ideological, political and organizational efforts to take root. Cultivating the necessary influence in the countryside through IPO activity widens grassroots support for the insurgency, which will support their roving units. The other purposes for their limited engagement policy are to selectively project an image of strength and to accumulate additional manpower, money, and equipment.

2. *Strategy of Encircling the Cities from the Countryside.* The purpose of this insurgent strategy is to isolate the government centers, which are located in urban areas, from the people out in the countryside. This strategy is based on the premise that vast remote areas of the country are still underdeveloped and loosely governed. Invariably, people in these rural areas barely feel the government's presence, if any. As such, that neglect of the government provides a fertile ground for recruitment by the revolutionary movement. If effectively mobilized, the combined strength of these rural people can easily topple the local government powers, and ultimately those at the national-governmental level. Aside from driving a wedge between the ruling class and the masses, the other purpose of the NPA's strategy is to establish guerilla bases from which their armed groups can effectively operate. Specifically, this concept follows a "gradual

constriction” manner by which massive insurgent IPO efforts in the countryside are conducted first before slowly and methodically moving towards the cities. The NPA leaders believe that first securing the support of outlying barangays will make the job of overthrowing the national government that much easier. A barangay is the smallest administrative division in the Philippines. It is a native Filipino term for a village. Municipalities and cities are composed of the barangays. The barangay is headed by a Captain with an 8-member council as his legislative arm.

Battle for Control of the Barangays

The NPA’s twin strategies of protracted war and encircling the cities from the countryside suggest that their central efforts will be focused on battling for control of the barangays. This incremental step is important in forming the building blocks for the insurgency’s political and military growth. Indeed, the barangay is also important because it symbolizes life and sustainment for the armed insurgent group. The barangay is where insurgents get most, if not all, of their logistical needs. Insurgents can also obtain protection from barangay sympathizers who occasionally serve as “eyes and ears”, forewarning them of any advancing government troops. The barangay also serves as a recruitment and training base. Likewise, the militias imbedded in the barangays also serve as force multipliers. Even in providing simple support services such as messengers, the barangays provide the insurgents with essential manpower. Thus, every guerilla will naturally gravitate to the barangays for their survival. It is the umbilical cord that connects the insurgents to a particular barangay.

In controlling the barangays, the CPP/NPA establishes a “shadow government” parallel to the legitimate barangay government. In a clandestine manner, it runs the

affairs of the barangay, dispenses requisite justice, and extracts revolutionary taxes from its people.

It can be deduced that the strength of the CPP/NPA is measured not only in terms of the size of its armed regulars but by the extent of its political influence as the number of NPA-influenced barangays would indicate. The challenge therefore is on how to effectively isolate the insurgents from the barangays and deprive them of that critical source of support.

The Special Operations Team (SOT) Concept

The SOT concept is the government's response to the NPA's strategy of controlling the barangays. It was conceived as a major Civil Military Operation (CMO) offensive to counter the spread of insurgency in the countryside. SOT's key objectives are: to dismantle the politico-military structure of the enemy in the barangays; to establish Barangay Intelligence Net (BIN); to set up counter organizations to prevent CPP/NPA resurgence; and to facilitate the implementation of the delivery of projects and services for the development of the barangay. In order to accomplish those established objectives, required training and education programs within the military must be developed and implemented.

The NPA uses agitation propaganda as a tool to influence communities from a range of socio-economic issues confronting the government. The strength of their recruitment campaign therefore lies in the government's weaknesses and shortcomings in governance. The NPA can easily exploit the people's grievances into their advantage, a strategy that has worked for them in winning grassroots support.

While the other government agencies have their common agenda for poverty alleviation and conduct pro-poor programs indirectly supporting counterinsurgency, the Armed Forces of the Philippines employ the SOT as a means to clear affected barangays. SOT operators engage the population in a healthy dialogue and cooperation while achieving the military objectives of dismantling enemy politico-military structure and neutralizing armed insurgents. SOT is the AFP's contribution to the overall national effort to address the root causes of insurgency. SOT has become the AFP's method to address the people's grievances. The process of communicating with the populace and listening to their grievances become the basis for action for SOT operators. SOT is an effective solution mechanism by itself because it is the goal of SOT operators to win the hearts and minds of the people by addressing their grievances. It is the process of addressing these grievances that will make SOT operators' lives busy as they now have to make the necessary coordination and linkage with other government agencies in order to ensure that those grievances are heard and acted upon. Informally, their intervention in the barangays serves as an extension of local governance. SOT operators not only serve as ambassadors of goodwill, they represent the government in areas where government presence is hardly felt thus bringing the government closer to the people.

The SOT's primary objectives are the dismantling of the CPP/NPA/NDF barangay political infrastructure, setting-up of counter-insurgent organizations, organizing clandestine barangay intelligence nets (BIN), and the organization of village defense forces. It employs the strategy of collaboration, linking and networking to get the cooperation of other government agencies (including the private sector) to go against the insurgent-based efforts. Specifically, the SOT calls for a close collaboration between

the local government units (LGU), line government agencies (LGA), and the population. Significant to its success is the technical know-how of every SOT member. SOT personnel must possess a superior level of skills and patience to be able to undertake the various SOT activities, many of which are not standard Philippine Army practices. Another vital factor is the ability of SOT operator to harness the collective resources of LGU\LGA in order to create the desired impact.

The strength of the SOT program however lies in its immersion phase, in which SOT operators are fully imbedded in communities for extended periods of time. The goal is to assist the community in going about their daily lives without the fear of insurgent harassment and intimidation. This will give the SOT operators the opportunity to interact with the people and gain firsthand knowledge on the most pressing issues facing the barangay, which will be the basis for their subsequent action. Aside from pursuing their intelligence, combat and psychological operations mandate, they can innovate on whatever activities they see fit to mingle with the people in order to gain their trust and confidence. The process continues until the objectives of the SOT are met. The end state is the dismantling of the revolutionary structure found within the barangays and subsequent neutralization of the enemy insurgents within them. However, the mere dismantling of the barangay revolutionary structure will not guarantee a 100% neutralization of the enemy. The long-term solution would be a follow-on effort that effectively addresses the deeply rooted problem of poverty. Such initiative will ensure sustainability of the SOT gains.

In essence, the SOT is a holistic solution towards addressing the problems and unique aspects of an insurgency, and thus focuses on non-traditional or asymmetric

approaches. It is founded on the premise that an insurgency, being more of a political problem rather than primarily military in nature, requires a complex solution far beyond purely force-on-force military action. It clearly demonstrates the importance of winning (and maintaining) the hearts and minds of the people.

Prior to the conception of SOT, the AFP was fighting the insurgency using a heavy-handed, conventional-force approach. Government forces have, for several years, been engaged in the conduct of attrition warfare with little regard for its political undercurrent and long-term negative effects. Its focus was based mainly on body counts and firearms recovery. Since its start in 1969, the fighting has claimed 40,000 lives on both sides. While the fighting has succeeded in draining the government's resources, it has also failed to suppress the NPA's growth and failed to bring peace. Ironically, the harsher the measures employed by government, the stronger the NPA became as more civilians were drawn to its side. Apparently, the government had become entangled in a vicious cycle of a never-ending fight, with no end in sight. Only after the government recognized the fact that kinetic warfare alone does not solve an insurgency problem did the strategy begin to change. The killing of more insurgents only served to alienate the government from the people, further fuelling anti-government sentiments.

This realization ultimately led to the birth of the SOT strategy.

Credited for the decline of the CPP/NPA in the late 1980s, SOT then became the main weapon against the CPP/NPA, as stipulated in the AFP Campaign Plan and continuing to this day.¹³ It has been proven effective in bringing back into Philippine

¹³ Armed Forces of the Philippines OPLAN Bantay-Laya II, 2007.

government control those barangays that had previously been under CPP/NPA control. SOT operations effectively held the CPP/NPA movement at bay despite the country experiencing political turbulence at that time, even undergoing two People Power Revolutions in a row.¹⁴

Slowdown of SOT and the CPP/NPA Resurgence

Having found and applied SOT continually for the past several years, AFP units continue in failing to meet their stated goals. For 2007, for the 18 out of 100 NPA guerilla fronts targeted for dismantling, only 13 had been cleared. This represents a 72% success rate.¹⁵ This moderate level of progress was achieved partly due to some corrective measures such as appropriations of additional support funds.

Along with this unimpressive SOT level of accomplishment is the reported increase in the number of NPA-perpetrated atrocities that are conducted throughout the countryside. This was accompanied by an increase in the number of newly insurgency-influenced barangays. Amid this alarming situation, military authorities have had to review the SOT concept for determining reasons why these events are occurring. Studies were conducted to re-evaluate the program, with numerous areas coming into concern. The study identified four major areas of concern, which included:

- a. Lack of adequate funding for military SOT operations.
- b. Perennial problem of the delay in the release of SOT funds to subordinate units.
- c. AFP officer's lack of appreciation and commitment towards supporting

¹⁴ People Power Revolution (also known as EDSA Revolution) was a series of nonviolent and prayerful mass street demonstrations in the Philippines that led to the ouster of President Ferdinand Marcos in 1986 and of President Joseph Estrada in 2001.

¹⁵ Armed Forces of the Philippines Year-End Report, 2007.

and fully implementing the SOT concept.

d. The number and length of SOT missions conducted.

In addition, some quarters also blame deficiencies among the operational capabilities exhibited by the AFP enlisted personnel.

The Problem

The emerging issue now centers on the overall operational effectiveness of the SOT program. What caused the SOT to go from being very effective in addressing and neutralizing the insurgent problem to what they are experiencing now, a declining operational effectiveness? In analyzing the issue, it is only natural to revisit the existing doctrine as well as look to the implementers of the program in order to identify shortcomings. The implementers of the SOT program are primarily the AFP Enlisted Corps. They are the pointy tip of the government's counterinsurgency spear.

The Research Question

Given the problem as described, it is then imperative that the AFP determines the factors that have contributed to the decline in SOT operational effectiveness in recent years. Recognizing the significant role of enlisted personnel on this program, my primary question will be *“Do the Philippine Army Enlisted Personnel (EP) have the necessary capacity to conduct the SOT program successfully?”* As the personnel engaged on the front line, the enlisted personnel are the backbone in the COIN campaign. Examining their capability helps determine whether their change in capability has had an effect in the SOT's shortcomings over the past years.

In examining the enlisted personnel's capacity, the researcher will look at the five elements of: SOT training, current SOT doctrine, the leadership factor in SOT, resources

dedicated to SOT, and the interagency support devoted to SOT. I believe these are the tools necessary to empower the enlisted personnel to be able to conduct successful SOT operations.

Considering the five components, it is also necessary to ask: *“Does the current career development training program for officers and enlisted personnel sufficiently integrate the learning of the SOT Concept?”* This question will determine the extent of the SOT’s integration into the Army’s training system in order to expose some of the gaps that may have caused the SOT backlog. Officer training will also be looked at because of the criticality of their role in providing direction, supervision and support to SOT missions.

With training, we also need to look at the doctrine. *“Is the current AFP doctrine for counterinsurgency sound and consistent with international theories? Are the enlisted personnel comfortable with it?”* This question will examine the relevance of the SOT concept in relation to the COIN lessons of other insurgencies. Likewise it is intended to identify how adept the EPs are in adopting such doctrine.

It is also important to know the officers’ awareness and participation in the SOT program. *“Is the officers’ participation in SOT operations found to be wanting?”* Although EPs are the workhorses in SOT operation, the leadership factor still is crucial and so knowing how committed and enthusiastic they are definitely affects the SOT program.

As in any operation, resources play a critical role. Talking about resources, I will touch on manpower and logistical issues. *“Does the AFP provide enough manpower and logistical support to carry out a robust SOT program?”* The answer to this question will

show the feasibility and sustainability of the SOT program.

Lastly, as to the success of any COIN program it highly depends on outside support, meaning the cooperation of the other agencies of government, to include the private sector. Therefore, it is necessary to ask “*Are the enlisted personnel equipped with the needed skills to be able to harness these resources outside of the AFP?*” This will tell whether there was adequate preparation on the part of EP to implement the SOT program.




Figure 1. Conceptual Framework

Assumptions

- A. That for the next five years, the Philippine government's COIN strategy remains the Strategy of Holistic Approach (SHA).
- B. That for the next five years, the SOT remains at the forefront of the AFP's counterinsurgency strategy.
- C. That no peace agreement has been reached between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the CPP/NPA until after the completion of this study in mid-2008.
- D. That for the next two years, the AFP's parameter for measuring success of SOT operations remains unchanged.
- E. That a steady flow of funding to the AFP for the conduct of SOT activities continues.
- F. That the current setup in AFP operations, in which the EPs serve as the primary level of effort against the insurgency, in the conduct of SOT operations, holds true throughout the next two years.
- G. That the CPP/NPA strategies will remain the same for the next five years.

Limitations

The study spans a 10-month period tied to the CGSC curriculum model. As such, proper management of time and essential focus was of the essence, considering that the author's research agenda was with ILE/AOWC demands. To a certain extent, accessibility to data sources had also posed some difficulty, taking into consideration the distance from study location to the researcher's home country where most of the data currently exists, or must be generated. Besides, the attendant research survey had as its

respondents the students currently undergoing military training at the 3rd Army Training Group, Training and Doctrine Command, Philippine Army based in Cebu City, Philippines. As such, the survey questionnaires' distribution and consolidation had taken a considerable time to turn around. However, the author ensured that collection of the survey feedback and pertinent documents did not hinder the ultimate completion of this study.

The researcher's professional experience has been built on 10 years of extensive exposure to COIN operations. Although this may be viewed as a plus, it may also prove to be a perceived personal bias to the conclusion of this study. To withstand perceived biases, the author endeavored to ensure fair treatment of all data, allowing evidence to stand on its own notwithstanding any previously-formed personal inclination.

Scope and Delimitations

This study specifically assessed the military capacity of the Enlisted Personnel in their performance of duties in support of the SOT Strategy. The EPs constitute a very important segment of the military organization, and serve as the backbone of the AFP. Although Officers come and go from units, the EPs remain in the same unit for the most part, providing not only the institutional memory but stability and continuity of the unit's programs. Therefore in the government's COIN fight which the Philippine Army has been spearheading, the role of EPs cannot be over-emphasized. As the SOT front-liners, they are the tip of the spear, so to speak. The author believes that sharpening the edge, through better training and resourcing, will serve to enhance and increase their lethality against the insurgent threat, thus increasing the relative overall effectiveness of the SOT program.

Significance of the Study

This study seeks to find significant gaps that may have stalled the implementation of the SOT program. It is important for the AFP leadership to identify such gaps in order to make the necessary adjustments needed to regain program momentum. Although the CPP/NPA has regained strength with SOT's minimal output in recent years, SOT's reputation as an effective tool for COIN remains strong. Therefore, continuing to find solutions to perceived SOT problems will be useful in the current and future counterinsurgency fight.

The conduct of this study may also have an impact on the current training curriculums for both enlisted and officer training and education programs conducted by the AFP. As current operational environment constantly changes, the ways of doing things and of training people must also change to meet the ever-changing needs.

Lastly, the lessons derived from this study may serve as a mirror for other countries facing their own insurgency problem. Although each situation is unique, many of the processes and approaches in solving it are often similar in nature.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

In this chapter, other aspects of the SOT concept will be further discussed. This will be followed by the discussion on existing literature that is relevant to the issues confronting the SOT operation. These are studies made by previous graduates of Master of Military Arts and Science (MMAS), Naval Post Graduate School (NPS), US Army War College and the Asian Institute of Management (AIM), Philippines. Related publications and articles will also be discussed.

It is interesting to note that in the library of the Philippine Army Command and Staff School (CSS, PA), very few SOT studies are to be found. This is in spite of the fact that SOT has been in existence for over 20 years. This shows the low degree of attention that had been given at senior officer's level courses on the study, practice and more so senior leader perception of SOT. On the other hand, some Filipinos who graduated from the US Army Command and General Staff Officer Course tackled SOT-related topics during their American studies. Some of these are useful background for this study. Each one of these papers will be examined per its effect on the SOT program.

Counterinsurgency is emerging as a global security concern (Cassidy 2004, p1; Morgenstein and Vickland 2008, p2). For this reason, it is also imperative to include the opinions of some important authors in the discussion. These persons have developed very keen interests in COIN operations. They have looked at various COIN models of the past to include those of the Philippines, Malaya and Vietnam (Donnelly and Serchuk 2003, Simpson 1999, Komer 1972, Nagl 2002). They have also investigated contemporary COIN circumstances in Afghanistan and Iraq in the light of these past

experiences (Petreaus, 2006; Barno, 2007; Metz, 2003). Having seen insurgency in a broader context, their views offer a clearer understanding on the intricacies of conducting COIN operations and help provide a better appreciation for the current Philippine situation.

Lastly, this chapter will investigate a related study that has so far presented the strongest argument with respect to the development of the SOT concept. Its strength and weaknesses are evaluated in contradistinction with the other studies. Along the entire SOT spectrum, these multiple points of views will be presented to help one recognize aspects of SOT that had already been addressed and why there is still a need for this study.

The SOT Organization and Employment

The SOT teams are carved out from the regular Infantry Battalions of the Philippine Army. They are not part of the Special Operations Command (SOCOM) which handles the elite Scout Ranger and the Special Forces Regiments. While SOCOM forces serve as the national maneuver force to be deployed only for highly sensitive missions, the Infantry Battalions which constitute the mainstream Army are in charge of conducting the Internal Security Operations of which counterinsurgency is a part.

The size of an SOT force varies depending on the commander's appreciation of the level of threat in an area. A Nine-man (9) team is the minimum size which consists of a Team Leader, Assistant Team Leader, two (2) Psychological Operations (PSYOP) Specialists/Medics, two (2) Intelligence Specialists, a Radio Operator, and two (2)

Security element.¹⁶ For a platoon-sized SOT force, it must have a Platoon Hqs, Intel Squad, PSYOP Squad and Security Squad.¹⁷ Each squad is trained to perform the functions of the other squads. The Intelligence team is composed of an Intel Sgt, Interrogator/Investigator and Order of Battle Specialists.¹⁸ The PSYOP team is composed of a Team Leader, Assistant Team Leader and Propagandist/Speakers Bureau.¹⁹ The Security Team is composed of a Team Leader, Assistant Team Leader and Riflemen.²⁰ When the targeted area is heavily infested with insurgents, a company-size SOT force may be deployed. This is organized from the rifle companies of an Infantry Battalion composed of a Company Hqs, one Special Operations Platoon, one Stay-behind Platoon and one Strike Platoon. The conduct of SOT operation consists of the following phases: Planning and Preparation, Immersion, Mobilization / Empowerment, and Maintenance phase.²¹

¹⁶ SOT Manual, Series 2007, 24.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid., 27.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid., 25.

Phase 1								
	Planning and Preparation							
Phase 2								
	Immersion							
Phase 3								
	Mobilization and Empowerment							
Phase 4								
	Maintenance							
Evaluation	Internal				Ext			
Week	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	6th		
31 days								

Figure 2. Timeline in the Conduct of SOT Operation
Source: SOT Manual, Series 2007, 25

In Phase 1 (Planning and Preparation), the objectives are to engage populace of the target area in order to gain a clear situational awareness picture, to establish initial linkage with other civilian agencies (LGU, LGA, NGO, etc.), and to destroy the armed group operating in the target area.²² These will be done by conducting a Barangay Area Study (BAS) which will help in developing the necessary plans and estimates.²³ Simultaneously at this stage, the SOT operators will establish communication with the different organizations and agencies that will likely be involved in the SOT proceedings.²⁴ Likewise, SOT operators will also conduct security operations in the target area and its periphery in order to destroy the armed insurgent group operating in

²² SOT Manual, Series 2007, 26.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid.

the target area or, at least, isolate the target area from the actions of the armed insurgents.²⁵

In Phase 2, (Immersion), the objectives are to develop an informed and aware community, to establish credibility of the SOT force, to identify key communicators and leaders, to identify issues, to conduct tactical interrogation, documentation and exposure of the identified members of the insurgent's local political infrastructure, and to identify probable projects.²⁶

This phase consist of various psychological operations (PSYOP by Deeds, PSYOP by Words, or Counter PSYOP) in order to endear the SOT force to the populace while obtaining the needed information.²⁷ A program called the Army Literacy Patrol System (ALPS) which seeks to educate illiterate adults in the community will be conducted if warranted by the situation. This phase should culminate in the identification of projects to be introduced into the barangay.²⁸

In Phase 3 (Mobilization and Empowerment), the objectives are to establish the Integrated Territorial Defense System (ITDS), and the Barangay Intelligence Net (BIN), to neutralize the enemy barangay political infrastructure, to educate the people on the functions and programs of the government, and to convey the people's grievances to the appropriate agencies.²⁹ One of the concerns of the barangays is the absence of a left-

²⁵ SOT Manual, Series 2007, 26.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid., 27-28.

²⁸ Ibid, 27.

²⁹ Ibid., 28.

behind force to protect them from NPA resurgence and harassment as the SOT operators leave upon the completion of the SOT operation. This issue has caused so much debate among commanders because it is impossible for the Philippine Army to generate troops to fill the requirements of the left-behind forces. If all demands for left-behind force in every barangay where SOT has been conducted were satisfied, it would saturate the countryside with CAFGUs. Having many CAFGUs or firearm holders in the community is not a guarantee for peace. On the contrary, it may only lead to more security problems. However, the subsequent discussions only led to the exposure of some SOT malpractices by field commanders.³⁰ The ultimate objective of an SOT operation is the proper neutralization of the armed components, based on the established and accepted practices of the military. Its tedious processes are all meant to drain the pond in order to make it easier to catch the fish (armed insurgents). The demand for left-behind forces arises due to the fact that the armed insurgents have not been neutralized. If SOT operators fail to neutralize the armed components, then it should not be considered a successful SOT operation. The purpose of establishing the Integrated Territorial Defense System (ITDS), and the Barangay Intelligence Net (BIN) is to serve as counter organizations to prevent the NPA resurgence.³¹ The idea is to make the locals put up a fight for their own defense pending the arrival of government forces. This is to develop the spirit of “vigilantism”, whereby locals are eager to take up the cudgel in fighting against the NPA rebels. This scheme has worked in several occasions in the past and it depends on how SOT operators have molded the people to be self-reliant and less dependent on regular troops.

³⁰ SOT Summit 2004.

³¹ SOT Manual, Series 2007, 29.

It is also in Phase 3 where the major projects identified in Phase 2 will be implemented to be orchestrated by optimizing community involvement. Also within this stage, constant dialogue (formal and informal) will be conducted to gather feedback on various issues affecting the community. SOT operators then will try to address these issues as best they can, according to their priority of importance. This stage will culminate in the completion of the major projects, the conduct of an information drive, medical and dental civic action programs, and social events.

In Phase 4, the objectives are to maintain the goodwill, to ensure the continued existence of the counter organizations, and to deny the re-entry/ re-introduction of insurgents.³² If there are left-behind forces available, they will be turned over to the nearest security force within the vicinity. If there are none, the counter-organizations and contingency measures must be set-up properly to ensure that communication links are maintained for continued monitoring. Evaluation will also be conducted at this stage to validate SOT operations in order to prevent false reporting from tainting the correct picture of SOT progress.³³

Roots of the Philippines' COIN Strategy

The Philippine military's use of the soft approach in counterinsurgency can be traced back to the book "*Silent War*" written by Victor N. Corpus. Corpus was a Lieutenant of the Philippine Army and while serving as instructor at Philippine Military Academy (PMA), he led a treacherous raid at the PMA armory and defected to the communist insurgents. He served in various positions in the NPA hierarchy and rose to

³² SOT Manual, Series 2007, 30.

³³ Ibid., 31.

become a member of the Central Committee, the highest political organ of the Communist Party. In 1976, having been disenchanted with the communist movement, he surrendered to the government and served 10 years in prison for his crime of treason.

When Corazon Aquino became president, Corpus was released along with several political prisoners at that time. Such freedom gave him a new lease on life and his career. He was reinstated back into the military, and still managed in being promoted to a general officer rank, manning the top intelligence post as Chief of Intelligence Service, AFP prior to his retirement. While in prison, he started to write a book about the NPA movement and had it published in 1987 upon his release. His book, the “*Silent War*”, discusses many facets of the NPA movement and exposes some trade secrets. His main argument is that the military alone cannot solve insurgency by itself and the best way to solve insurgency is to address its root cause which is directly related to the socio-economic problems confronting the masses.³⁴

Corpus’ recommendation prompted the AFP to adopt a new approach to counterinsurgency soon to be called a Strategy of Holistic Approach (SHA) as introduced earlier.³⁵ It suggests that the key in COIN is to attack right at the heart of the problem (root cause), which is beyond the military’s sole capacity to solve. The AFP’s campaign plans have since been re-tailored to accommodate Corpus’ prescriptions.³⁶ Subsequently, they have undergone many changes but the form and substance of the program remain the same.

³⁴ Victor N. Corpus, *Silent War*, VNC Enterprises, Quezon City, Philippines, 1989.

³⁵ OPLAN “*Lambat-Bitag*”, Armed Forces of the Philippines, 1995.

³⁶ Ibid.

State of the Philippines' COIN Campaign

Despite the government's confidence in SOT's capability to address the insurgency problem, it has not been making headway at the desired rate. SOT has fallen short of its targets which are expressed in terms of the number of guerilla fronts dismantled. For example, in the year 2007, the AFP's goal was to dismantle 18 NPA Guerilla Fronts (GFs) out of the remaining 100 GFs nationwide.³⁷ These NPA GFs are situated in 70 of the 81 Philippine provinces.³⁸ By the end of the year 2007, only 13 GFs were cleared, representing a 72.22% success rate for the targeted goal that year. This indicates that the military, as currently structured and employed, is not gaining enough ground to attain strategic victory against the insurgent threat.³⁹

The failure of the current COIN strategy is attributed to several factors involving administrative and doctrinal issues. On the administrative side, the problems identified pertain to the support fund allocation for each targeted area and the timeliness in the release of such funds to field units. However, these concerns were partially addressed by the government during the SOT summit held in 2004 and should no longer pose as a major obstacle to SOT progress.⁴⁰ However, on doctrinal aspect, there are several contending issues to deal with. In particular, there are those who believe that the SOT implementation has engendered confusion among the rank and file because of the difficulty in adapting to the new role, one that calls for non-military approaches

³⁷ Armed Forces of the Philippines Oplan "Bantay-Laya II", 2007.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Armed Forces of the Philippines "Year-End Report", 2007.

⁴⁰ SOT Summit Report, 2004.

demanding of SOT.⁴¹ The comfort of maintaining the old practices lingers on within the military and thus a strong tendency exists to revert back to the tried ways of conventional types of operations. Therefore, adapting to these doctrinal changes poses a major challenge, and issuing of directives and a palliative training program will not be enough to deal with the challenges.

Strategy of Holistic Approach and the Minimum Use of Force

In a thesis entitled “*An Analysis of the Communist Insurgency of the Philippines*,” the author recommends that the counterinsurgent should achieve the right mix of the instruments of national power.⁴² Parlade finds nothing wrong with the AFP’s current COIN strategy and doctrine. He argues that the problem lies in its implementation.⁴³ The AFP may have a sound plan and strategy to fight insurgency, but it is not properly carried out on the ground.⁴⁴ Parlade identifies 10 areas where the government can focus their efforts in order to achieve that degree of synergy among government agencies necessary to defeat insurgency. These include the need to dominate the human terrain, maintain a highly disciplined force, ensure better law enforcement, implement a national identification system, neutralize enemy key leadership, address the enemy’s parliamentary struggle, shift to a federal system, attend to the people’s welfare, stamp out government corruption, reengineer information operations, and passing of enabling laws

⁴¹ SOT Summit Report, 2004.

⁴² LtCol Antonio G. Parlade, Philippine Army, “An Analysis of the Communist Insurgency in the Philippines”, MMAS Thesis, United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS. 2006, 108.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Parlade, “An Analysis of the Communist Insurgency in the Philippines”, 108.

by the Philippine Congress.⁴⁵ Noticeably, of the ten recommendations, only three have implications for the military.⁴⁶ The bulk of the tasks are intended to address the root causes of insurgency that rightfully belong to other government agencies. This implies that of the four instruments of national power, namely the Diplomatic, Information, Military and Economic instruments (DIME), the “M” piece should be de-emphasized to that of “m” in the overall perspective.⁴⁷ Instead, more weight should be given to the D, I and E, which will require a new mindset and doctrine: a shift towards non-combat endeavors.

Renowned French counterinsurgency specialist, Lt. Col. David Galula further corroborated the idea of the minimum use of military power suggested by the two previous authors. In his classic 1962 book “*Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*,” he emphasized the primacy of the political power over the military power stating further that a revolutionary war must be 20% military action and 80% political.⁴⁸ He adds that conventional military forces are too prone to emphasize offensive actions like the capturing and killing of insurgents.⁴⁹ Such action, though appearing to be tactically gainful, turns out to be counterproductive in the long run. Writing decades later Greg Mills, who heads the Johannesburg-based Brenthurst Foundation and was later seconded to the ISAF HQ in Kabul as Special adviser to the Commander, wrote an article

⁴⁵ Parlade, “An Analysis of the Communist Insurgency in the Philippines”, 108-114.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 115.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ David Galula, “Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice”, Hailer Publishing, U.S.A, 2006, 89.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

entitled “*Ten Counterinsurgency Commandments from Afghanistan*” which expresses a similar view. Looking at the past counterinsurgency campaigns such as in Algeria, Zimbabwe, Malaya and Vietnam, he finds that the most important lesson in counterinsurgency is to win the hearts and minds of the people through public diplomacy, developmental pursuits and the need for close cooperation between the government and non-governmental communities.⁵⁰

A parallel opinion regarding the use of military force was expressed in an article “*Professor Nagl’s War*” written by Peter Maass for the New York Times. He says that “during the American experience in Vietnam, the Americans resorted to indiscriminate firepower and showed little concern for its effect on the civilian population.”⁵¹

He demonstrates that the key issue for a counterinsurgency army is “to calibrate correctly the amount of lethal force necessary to do the job with the minimum nasty, counterproductive side effects.”⁵² Likewise, the same observation is reflected in a US Marine Corps Gazette article, “*On Restraints in War*”, by LTC Lance McDaniel.⁵³ Major M. W. Shervington of the British Army, who also studied counterinsurgency warfare, also offers the same views (Shervington 2005). A consistent theme in all these

⁵⁰ Greg Mills, “Ten Counterinsurgency Commandments from Afghanistan”, *Foreign Policy Research Institute*. April 10, 2007, 2. <http://www.fpri.org/enotes/200704.mills.afghanistancounterinsurgency.html> [accessed January 15, 2008].

⁵¹ Peter Maass, “Professor Nagl’s War”, *New York Times*, January 11, 2004, 1. <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9902E6D61531F932A25752C0A9629C8B63> [accessed April 30, 2008].

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ LtCol Lance McDaniel USMC, “On Restraints in War”, *Marine Corps Gazette*, Professional Journal of U.S. Marines, November 1, 2006, 1. <http://www.mca-marines.org/Gazette/webarticle1.asp> [accessed December 16, 2007].

studies is that the minimum use of kinetic military force in counterinsurgency tends to be the most successful approach in the long term.

Parlade's suggestions are also aligned with the national policy guidance which emphasizes the employment of diplomatic means to deal with the insurgency problem and validates the emerging view that the solution to the insurgency requires a total collaborative approach, one which involves the employment of all instruments of power. However, this needs greater interagency cooperation, and requires a leader who can orchestrate the collective effort of many different governmental agencies. The task of coordinating several efforts is an exceptionally difficult challenge. At times, the solution is to simply leave everything to the military. The military, left on its own, can be pushed to take the lead role in the government's COIN program. This expanded function entails constant coordination and a great deal of collaboration with other government agencies to facilitate projects and activities in the affected areas.⁵⁴ Although they are trained to be flexible, soldiers are ill-prepared and equipped to adequately perform the coordination mission. Appropriate training is necessary to equip soldiers with new skill sets suited for this extraordinarily demanding role. Parlade fails to address this. His study does not tackle the fundamental issue on capability building which must be at the very heart of a successful SOT program.

Strategy of Kinetic Warfare

The other contentious issue about SOT is the military's failure to curb the growth in the number of armed insurgents, at the rate that the government has directed. Based on

⁵⁴ SOT Manual, Series 2007, 2.

the 2007 National Intelligence Report, the strength of the enemy is approximately 6300 active insurgents. This is only a 9% drop from a 2006 report which identified 7000 active insurgents.⁵⁵ However, the government wants the NPA to be defeated by 2010. In order to accomplish this goal, the government must have a strategy that results in reducing the enemy strength by at least two thousand active insurgents per year for the next three years. At the current success rate against active insurgents, the defeat of the insurgency by 2010 is no longer feasible. By good estimates, the insurgency will continue on until 2018 before the enemy's strength can be substantially reduced if no corrective measures are instituted. What then could be the reasons for such failure? In a thesis entitled "*An Assessment of the Philippine Counterinsurgency Operational Methodology*," Roy Devesa pursues the concerns about the slow progress.

He says that the AFP's shift to SOT operations has affected the military component of the counterinsurgency strategy because most Army Battalions are now tied up with mostly SOT-type missions.⁵⁶ He argues that too much emphasis on SOT has ironically allowed the NPA to gain strength.⁵⁷ In line with this, he recommends cutting those peripheral activities brought about by SOT, and which fall under the functions of other government agencies, from the military. Freeing the military from additional tasks enables it to consolidate manpower and carry out its primary function of hunting down

⁵⁵ Armed Forces of the Philippines, Annual Accomplishment Report, 2007.

⁵⁶ LtCol Roy Devesa, Philippine Army, "An Assessment of the Philippine Counterinsurgency Operational Methodology", MMAS Thesis, 2005, United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 69.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

terrorists.⁵⁸ Devesa's paper further implies that SOT operation is meaningless if the armed insurgents remain free. This is because the rebels can regain lost ground through the employment of intimidation tactics as soon as the military leaves the area.⁵⁹ Thus, the armed insurgents must be first neutralized to ensure sustainable SOT gains.

For the military to do less SOT, the civilian government agencies have to assume a much larger role. However, such an arrangement is not acceptable with the civilian agencies because of the issue of ownership of the mission. SOT is the brainchild of the military, hence, it is widely perceived to be chiefly within the military's domain. In addition, for reasons of security, personnel of other government agencies are afraid to go to SOT sites, which are mostly located in far-flung areas. This explains why even if they are largely non-military in nature, SOT activities still remain within the purview of the military. Transferring SOT responsibility from the military to civilian agencies entails risks that may jeopardize the entire program. Likewise, allowing the AFP to revert back to its old tricks by pouring its resources back to its kinetic efforts rather than on SOT could put the government's overall counterinsurgency campaign in great peril.

Eliminating the Armed Insurgents

It can be noted that Devesa considers the military aspect of counterinsurgency as far more important than the SOT, a reflection of the old paradigm. While it is true that neutralizing the armed part of the insurgent organization is critical to counterinsurgency success, Devesa fails to capture the dynamics of insurgency in which the life of the armed

⁵⁸ Devesa, "An Assessment of the Philippine Counterinsurgency Operational Methodology", 70.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 69.

insurgents greatly depended on population support.⁶⁰ Cutting off that line of communication effectively weakens the guerilla movement.

Counterinsurgency is not just about the application of lethal means but it must also be balanced with non-military means.⁶¹ It is an accepted fact that the more insurgents are killed by the military, the harder it is to win the hearts and minds of the people. A heavy-handed approach alienates the government forces from the population and leads to the spiraling of anti-military sentiments. Chances are very likely that the insurgents will sensationalize casualties, which effectively serves to generate more sympathizers and induce others to take up arms. This will then entangle the military in a vicious cycle of waging a costly war of attrition, which is fighting battles, which is highly counterproductive towards winning the war.

While SOT is involved in non-kinetic activities, it is not purely about humanitarian works.⁶² It has a security component which calls for a carrying out combat operations as a pre-condition to the immersion phase.⁶³ The activities of the immersion phase, which includes daily interrogations and elicitation, not only help in dismantling the enemy political structure, but serve as a means to obtain intelligence that can be useful for combat operations. SOT operations are not considered fully successful unless they succeed in neutralizing the armed insurgents operating in that particular barangay. This criterion was stipulated in a directive issued by then-AFP Chief of Staff General

⁶⁰ David Galula, "Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice", Hailer Publishing, U.S.A., 2005, 8.

⁶¹ FM 3-24, U.S. Counterinsurgency Manual, 2006, 1-21.

⁶² SOT Manual, Series 2007, 26.

⁶³ Ibid.

Narciso Abaya that “SOT is meant to drain the pond, but we are after the fish”.⁶⁴ SOT operations, while aimed at winning the populations’ support, should ultimately facilitate the capture or elimination of insurgents.

Enhancing Intelligence Operation

Devesa argues that the AFP should concentrate on intelligence if it is to enhance the operational effectiveness of the SOT program. This comes from the basic principle of warfare that operations must be intelligence-driven. While this may be true, human intelligence derived from the population is still the best source of information. John Nagl in his foreword for Galula’s *“Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice”* says “the key to success in COIN is massing intelligence derived from the local population to identify the enemy; the counterinsurgent is literally dying for that information.”⁶⁵ Furthermore, a number of successful combat operations of past campaigns were offshoots of high-quality intelligence which the locals provide. In particular, during the Pacification Campaign of the Philippines from 1898-1901, the US Army enlisted the support of the local inhabitants called the “*Macabebes*” which enabled them to obtain good intelligence that led to the capture of Filipino Insurgent government President Emilio Aguinaldo.⁶⁶ Such a feat could not have been possible without indigenous support. Even with the current COIN campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, the

⁶⁴ Armed Forces of the Philippines, GHQ Directive on the Conduct of SOT Operations, 2004.

⁶⁵ John Nagl, *“Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice”* by David Galula under Foreword, 2005, Hailer Publishing. U.S.A.

⁶⁶ Robert D Ramsey III, “Savage Wars of Peace: Case Studies of Pacification in the Philippines, 1900-1902. The Long War Series Occasional Paper 24. Combat Studies Institute Press, U.S. Army Combines Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. 2007, 19.

contribution of the locals in terms of providing information is essential.⁶⁷ In short, it does not follow that the military must concentrate less on SOT so it can strengthen its intelligence efforts. Intelligence operations can be enhanced even without necessarily departing from SOT.

Intensifying Psychological Operation

Devesa asserts that the military should concentrate on psychological operations in order to enhance operational effectiveness. In his view, SOT operations have somehow deflected the security forces from its primary function of war fighting. On the contrary, psychological operations cannot be undertaken independently because their target audience is not only the armed insurgents, but, most importantly, the mainstream population.

Counterinsurgency is the battle for population support; the people being the strategic center of gravity.⁶⁸ Since most activities under the SOT program are Civil Military Operations (CMO) in nature, they inherently carry a psychological undertone. It is even more effective to run a psychological operation under the cover of SOT. Therefore, it makes little sense to suggest that to be more effective, intelligence, psychological and combat operations must be divorced from SOT.

The preceding arguments enable one to have a deeper appreciation of the role that SOT plays in the COIN fight. It is not a liability, as some have argued, but instead serves as an enhancement to the triad functions of intelligence, psychological and combat

⁶⁷ LtGen David W. Barno, *Fighting "The Other War" Counterinsurgency Strategy in Afghanistan 2003-2005*, 2007, <http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/SepOct07/barnoengseptoct07.pdf> [accessed December 15, 2007].

⁶⁸ FM 3-24, U.S. Counterinsurgency Manual, 2006, 3-13.

operations.

Employing Paramilitaries as Force Multipliers

One of the problems facing the Philippines' COIN program is the scarcity of security forces.⁶⁹ Although the country has a standing army of approximately 70,000, this number is not enough to cover the country's vast territories consisting of 7,100 islands. As stated earlier, the NPA movement is active in 61 provinces and is currently maintaining 87 guerilla fronts. Besides, it is not only the NPA that the government is confronting. The Abu Sayyaf and the MILF in Mindanao also pose another threat. In responding to all these threats, government forces have to be strategically deployed and end up being thinly dispersed throughout the area of operations.

According to current government estimates, the strength of NPA armed regulars numbers around 5,500 as of 2007 but this is disputed by the CPP/NPA Chairman Jose Maria Sison and its spokesman Ka "Roger" Rosal. They claim that NPA numbers have increased to cover the 173 congressional districts in the provinces and 44 districts in the cities.⁷⁰ The number of NPA sympathizers cannot also be discounted. This is a key segment of the population which the government must try to win over.

With the current AFP SOT capabilities it is not feasible to clear these guerilla fronts at the desired rate set by the government. In an interview with the incumbent

⁶⁹ *The Manila Times* "General: Philippine Army lacks strength to defeat Communists", October 2, 2007. <http://www.manilatimes.net/national/2007/oct/02/yehey/metro/20071002met1.html> [accessed October 2, 2007].

⁷⁰ Nora Gamolo & Anthony Vargas, "Rebels belie AFP claims of destruction of bases", *The Manila Times*, January 13, 2008. http://127.0.0.1:4664/cache?event_id=28802&schema_id=6&q=Rebels+belie+AFP+claims+of+destruction+of+bases&s=zFf5FjVt3KBBAariQbcqz01wys [accessed January 13, 2008].

Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, General Fojas, admitted the AFP's lack of manpower and resources to defeat communists by 2010.⁷¹ To compensate for this deficiency, the government has organized a paramilitary unit called the Citizen Armed Force Geographical Unit (CAFGU) whose membership is voluntary.

CAFGU units function as territorial (i.e., Reserve home guard) forces and serve as the first line of defense against insurgents. The strength of CAFGUs lies in their familiarity with the local populace and terrain, perfectly matching the advantages which the insurgents previously enjoy.⁷² The thesis "*Counterinsurgency: The Role of Paramilitaries*" reports that although other countries are hesitant to employ paramilitary forces because they question the long-term loyalty of the force to the government, the Philippines has been able to effectively use their local militias as force multiplier.⁷³ This is especially true in remote villages where security forces' presence is minimal.⁷⁴ Currently there are approximately 60,000 CAFGU members posted in the different conflict areas within the archipelago.⁷⁵ CAFGU forces prove to be vital in filling the void of the regular troops' absence in the countryside. Such strategy to use indigenous forces for counterinsurgency also coincides with Galula's viewpoint reflected in his book

⁷¹ *The Manila Times* "General: Philippine Army lacks strength to defeat Communists", October 2, 2007. <http://www.manilatimes.net/national/2007/oct/02/yehey/metro/20071002met1.html> [accessed October 2, 2007].

⁷² Citizen Armed Force Geographical Unit Primer.

⁷³ Ireneo C. Espino, "Counterinsurgency: The Role of Paramilitaries", Thesis. Naval Post Graduate School. Monterey, California, December 2004, v. <http://stinet.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA429863> [accessed November 10, 2007].

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, J3, Armed Forces of the Philippines, "Disposition of Troops", 2007.

“Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice”.

Interagency Cooperation

The strongest argument in the study of enhancing SOT can be found in the study entitled *“Enhanced Special Operation Team Concept through the Citizen’s Awareness and Motivational Program”* (A Strategy for the Philippine Army to Counter Communist Insurgency). It argues that the weakness of the SOT lies in its being too “state-security centered”.⁷⁶ This means that the military is monopolizing the burden of undertaking the various activities under SOT and includes little participation from the other government agencies. He suggests that all governmental efforts be synchronized to make an impact. The need for interagency support is highlighted in the paper *“Interagency Support for the Tactical Commander”* which demonstrates the need for US forces to harness interagency support in order to be effective in its stability operations.⁷⁷ However, it is not easy for units to be doing interagency cooperation without acquiring the needed skills. Such skills can be attained through the conduct of formalized educational programs on interagency cooperation, to be jointly developed by the agencies concerned.

⁷⁶ Cpt Jacob Thaddeus M. Obligado, Philippine Army, “An Enhanced Special Operations Team Concept through the Citizens’ Responsibility Awareness and Motivation Program” (A Strategy for the Philippine Army to counter Communist Insurgency), Thesis for Master in Development Management. *Asian Institute of Management*. Eugenio Lopez Foundation, April 20, 2004, Makati, Philippines, 7.

⁷⁷ Leo D. Blunck, “Interagency Support for the Tactical Commander”, March 30, 2007, Strategy Research Project, Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, 6-7.
<http://stinet.dtic.mil/oai/oai?&verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA468449> [accessed January 5, 2008].

Private Sector Involvement

While the military's initiative and leadership are needed at the onset, private sector participation must also be solicited to lighten up the load. Responsible citizens should also take part in nation building. Obligado sees the private sector's potential as he proposes for a "*Total Development and Participatory Strategy*".⁷⁸ Total involvement is indeed very vital. However small, each sector must have a role to play. In essence, Obligado recommends mobilizing the entire citizenry utilizing all government apparatus with soldiers acting as facilitators, which he terms as "bridging leaders". This recommendation is encapsulated in what he calls as Citizen Responsibility Awareness and Motivation Program (CRAMP). CRAMP seeks to advance two strategies: namely, the improvement of the Army's delivery systems through capability building, and the people's mobilization and empowerment through collaboration, networking, and coalition building.⁷⁹

Under the first strategy, Obligado talks about increasing the awareness of troops on the SOT concept and CRAMP. He also advocates equipping the troops with necessary skills to deal effectively with the community and suggests the need to restructure the infantry battalions purposely to imbed an SOT team in each platoon in order to increase the capacity of units to conduct the SOT mission. This can be achieved by organizing more Mobile Training Teams (MTT) to be deployed wherever SOT training is needed. These recommendations have been partly realized. In 2004, the Army reconfigured its infantry battalions and designated specific units for maneuver

⁷⁸ Obligado, "An Enhanced Special Operations Team Concept through the Citizens' Responsibility Awareness and Motivation Program", 82.

⁷⁹ Ibid., 92.

missions while the majority of battalions focus on conducting SOT operations. Along this line, MTTs were also created purposely to expand the SOT training program. The impact of these twin measures to the continuing SOT program shall be determined in the latter part of this study.

Under the second strategy, Obligado envisions to get the maximum participation of the civilian sector through CRAMP. It will have some serious implications for the military being the implementer of the program. Can the military manage to undertake this task of educating the civilians and organizing them to get involved in SOT activities? If yes, can the military sustain the effort?

Empowering the Force

All the counterinsurgency strategies will remain useless if they are not accompanied by appropriate training packages to transform and re-tool the force that implements them. In the face of the new operational environment such as insurgency, a change is needed not only in terms of technology and organization but more importantly on doctrine, training, and educational programs. The paper “*Counterinsurgency: Relearning How to Think*”, which examines the adequacy of the US counterinsurgency strategic policy, operational concepts and doctrines, reflects similar view. It finds that the existing capability gaps in counterinsurgency are the results of shortfalls not just of technology but also of training, education and doctrine.⁸⁰ Likewise, the study “*Light Infantry Battalion: Facing the Dilemma of War fighting and Operations Other Than*

⁸⁰ Gerald E. Galloway, “Counterinsurgency: Relearning How to Think”, Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, 2005, 17. <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display-papers.cfm?q=181> [accessed January 20, 2008].

War”, also recognizes the importance of mission focused pre-deployment training and the integration of the staff and leader training into the unit training cycles.⁸¹

⁸¹ Viet X. Luong, “Light Infantry Battalion: Facing the Dilemma of War fighting and Operations Other Than War”. MMAS Thesis. 1999, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. Fort Leavenworth, KS. <http://stinet.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA368256> [accessed January 20, 2008].

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This chapter discusses the means of analysis and data collection necessary to arrive at a workable solution. The methods used are an analysis of the pertinent documents that reference SOT operations, interviews of selected individuals, and the conduct of a random survey. The first section examines some critical documents to include a review of existing policies, guidelines and directives that relate to the government's management of the insurgency situation. The next section discusses the conduct of interviews of certain individuals selected on the basis of service reputation and their knowledge of SOT organizations and operations. The third section discusses the conduct of a random survey employed to obtain data about soldier's perceptions of SOT.

Counterinsurgency Policies

The most important documents relating to national policies concerning counterinsurgency are found in the national strategic guidelines crafted by the National Security Council (NSC), which is chaired by the President of the Philippines. The NSC sets the broad objectives and programs for the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to follow in line with the government's counterinsurgency strategy. The NSC Strategic Guidelines also allow the AFP to know the responsibilities of other government agencies in terms of what they can contribute in the counterinsurgency campaign. In the National Internal Security Plan (NISP) prepared by the NSC, the government embraces the Strategy of Holistic Approach (SHA). This means that the other government agencies

must come up with parallel programs to complement the efforts of the military. This document allows one to see the much larger picture in which all subordinate programs of the civilian agencies of government must be aligned. This document also lays out the government's priorities and directions which the Armed Forces of the Philippines must pursue.

In addition to the NSC documents, this study will review government press releases containing policy statements made by the President. One important recent document is President Arroyo's pronouncement expressing her ambitious desire to crush the CPP/NPA insurgent movements by the end of her term in 2010. This tall order mandates the AFP to effectively double its COIN efforts in order to accelerate the process of bringing the NPA insurgency problem to a satisfactory end. The status of the implementation of ongoing programs is definitely affected by such a pronouncement which can force major alterations to the original plan.

Nevertheless, such pronouncements and other adjustments in the national political strategy need to be examined for their role in coordinating agencies under the intent of the Commander-in-Chief. Keeping track of presidential policy enables the AFP to coordinate security matters in conjunction with the National Internal Security Plan (NISP).

Another document important for this study is the AFP Campaign Plan dubbed as OPLAN "Bantay-Laya" (Guard-Freedom), which serves as the AFP's Bible. The AFP mission and intentions are summed up in this document. This document reflects the AFP's implementation plan based on the national strategic guidance as stipulated in the NISP. Because the CPP/NPA is considered to be the main threat to national security, this

document contains mostly COIN-oriented goals. It defines short-, medium-, and long-term goals following a prescribed timeline set forth by the national leadership and in accordance with the AFP's capabilities. Awareness of this document helps the researcher to evaluate whether or not the AFP's plans and programs are properly attuned to the National Strategic Plans. This document will also provide insight as to the level of fidelity that the AFP devotes to the accomplishment of the government's desired goals and its effectiveness in utilizing its manpower and resources. Moreover, evaluating this document will also test the soundness of AFP plans in order to ensure validity of the premises upon which this study is anchored.

Another document to be reviewed is the Special Operations Team (SOT) manual. The manual illustrates the concepts, strategies, and the processes that have been proven effective in the conduct of SOT operation in the past. As a solution to counterinsurgency, it encapsulates the various techniques and procedures that are uncommon to conventionally-trained soldiers. Despite its long-term presence and acceptance as the standard by many within the COIN community, the SOT manual has still not been perfected and there is considerable room for improvement. Some prior processes are no longer applicable to current situations and the times require interagency operations and cooperation. Thus, a new set of tools for the trade is required. This study will examine the different facets of the program to identify its strengths and weaknesses as well as its consistency with the national and AFP priorities. Furthermore, this study allows readers to scrutinize the SOT doctrine in its entirety viewed against the backdrop of what SOT practitioners on the ground are saying about the program. Such scrutiny will reveal potential gaps in the SOT program which necessitates the conduct of this study.

Another document to be reviewed is the Assessment Report for CY 2007 SOT Operations. This document summarizes the SOT accomplishments of the different infantry battalions nationwide and indicates whether field units have been able to meet their stated goals for the given year. This document also highlights the shortcomings of the SOT program and its corresponding causes. The reasons for SOT shortfalls are reflected in the “Lessons Learned” portion of the document which will form the basis for future planning adjustments and further study. The SOT accomplishments of units will be analyzed vis-à-vis its resource allocation. In addition, this report allows key military leaders to monitor and evaluate the progress of the program to ensure that its effectiveness is sustained and corrective measures are taken to solve identified problems. For the purpose of this study, this document shows the rate at which the SOT program is proceeding under the present set-up. This will help the researcher make an assessment of whether the AFP’s current SOT capabilities and its battle rhythm satisfies the criteria set forth by the Chief Executive to terminate the insurgency problem by 2010.

Next to be examined are the latest intelligence reports on CPP/NPA. Intelligence provides the basis for coming up with the list of affected barangays based on its regular quarterly “Order of Battle” (OB) validation. In this sense, the SOT is intelligence-driven since intelligence dictates what locations within the country require an SOT. After each SOT operation, intelligence again comes into the picture for the evaluation and monitoring and serves as a quality-control mechanism to ensure that before a particular SOT operation is terminated, specific goals were accomplished and certain criteria met. Through a set of established parameters and indicators, the intelligence assessment reveals the extent of the individual SOT’s effectiveness in terms of its ability to de-

influence CPP/NPA-affected areas. In specific terms, it accounts for the number of affected barangays and the dissolution of enemy political front committees. It also counterchecks the claims of infantry units on SOT accomplishment, thereby confirming the officially reported gains and deleting false claims. The discrepancies between the “rate of de-influencing” conducted by government troops and the “rate of influencing” waged by the CPP/NPA can be determined by such intelligence analysis. This will also tell what areas need particular focus and where the government efforts need to be reinforced. The emerging development on the ground as revealed by intelligence estimates serves as the basis for the necessary adjustment in terms of the tempo and volume of SOT operation to be conducted.

Finally, this study examined the current Program of Instruction (POI) for the four infantry courses in order to find out whether the development of skills set peculiar to SOT operation is adequately integrated into the training curriculum. These courses are the Infantry Non-Commissioned Officer Basic Course (INCOBC), Infantry Non-Commissioned Officer Advance Course (INCOAC), Infantry Officer Basic Course (IOBC) and the Infantry Officer Advance Course (IOAC). SOT operations entail demanding tasks and require new ways of thinking. So it is necessary to ask *“Does the current curriculum fully support the SOT and are there mismatches between the current POIs and skill sets needed in the SOT realm?”* Reviewing the POIs seek to answer this question. The study attempted to discern the level of competences concerning SOT operations among the Army officers and the enlisted corps.

Conduct of Interviews

The second section of this chapter consists of interviews conducted with selected

officers in the Philippine Army (see Appendix A). The conduct of interview follows a purposive sampling in which the interviewees were chosen on the basis of their service reputation and knowledge of SOT organizations and operations. The questions asked focus on the validity of the SOT Doctrine and some of its processes. The intent was to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the program. Observations on the behavior and capability of the officers and enlisted personnel conducting SOT was obtained to help discover the root causes of the problems surrounding the SOT. The suggestions of those interviewed were employed to help develop the SOT training program in order to make it more responsive and realistic. Along this line, the data provides input towards the overall enhancement of the SOT program. In addition, the views of these officers serve to check and verify the feedback gathered from the survey, whose respondents consist mostly of Non-commissioned Officers (NCOs) and enlisted military personnel.

Conduct of Survey

The third and last section of this chapter discusses the last method used in obtaining data which is the conduct of the survey (see Appendix B). For this purpose, one hundred (100) survey questionnaires were distributed. The students of the ongoing courses at the 3rd Army Training Group based in Camp Lapu-lapu, Cebu City, Philippines served as respondents. These students are fresh from the field so they carry with them firsthand experiences of their units' involvement on SOT operations. Coming from the different units in the archipelago with unique experiences, it was expected that their experience will vary significantly. So their feedback were valuable in order to corroborate the findings of the documentary analysis as well as to cross-check the opinions offered by the commissioned officers during the interviews.

There are five groups of questions asked in the questionnaire. The first set of questions is aimed towards determining the respondents' level of knowledge of SOT operations obtained through formal training, by association, and by actual experience or involvement in any activity associated with SOT. The first set also asks respondents to assess their level of competency on SOT following the Likert scale. The Likert scale is a rating scale measuring the strength of agreement with a clear statement in a questionnaire used to gauge attitudes or reactions. The answers could range from *strongly disagree*, *disagree*, *neither agree nor disagree*, *agree*, and *strongly agree*. The second set of questions is intended to assess the respondents' general perceptions on SOT as a counterinsurgency strategy. The NCOs and enlisted men within the units conducting SOT operations are bearing much of SOT burden, so it is important to know their sentiments. The third set of questions is designed to determine the respondents' appreciation of the different perceived problems confronting the SOT implementation. Their views are vital in developing the solutions to problems encountered with the conduct of SOT operations. The fourth set presents a list of probable solutions to the SOT problems for them to agree or disagree on. This process enlightens decision-makers in shaping up the preferred solutions to the SOT problems. Lastly, results of the survey were thoroughly interpreted using established statistical methodologies. The essence was to infer, generate relationships, and find correlations from a set of responses that can be used to draw conclusions relevant to the study. Viewed in contrast with the findings drawn from the documentary analysis and the interviews, the survey results should serve to further elucidate the validity of the problem at hand thereby lending credibility to whatever conclusion can be derived from this study.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

This chapter presents the evidences relevant to this study. The first step is to evaluate current government policies relative to the national counterinsurgency program. This is followed by the discussion of the interviews and the survey and their relevance to the counterinsurgency program. Analyzing this material helped in determining whether or not the five questions proposed by this study have been sufficiently answered. The chapter centers on five critical areas: training; doctrine; leadership; logistics; and interagency support. These areas constitute the five secondary questions previously propounded. At the end of this analysis, the author aims to answer the primary question, whether the enlisted personnel are able to successfully carry out the SOT program as currently trained and organized.

Counterinsurgency Policies

The President of the Philippines realizes the need to synergize the operations of its existing government structures to address the insurgency problem. To further this necessary synergy, the President issued Executive Order No. 21 dated 19 June 2001 creating the Cabinet Oversight Committee on Internal Security (COC-IS).⁸² This committee is tasked to undertake the following functions:

⁸² Alberto G. Romulo, Executive Secretary, "Executive Order No. 21" Creating a Coordinative and Integrative System on Internal Security", *Official Gazette*, Malacañang, Manila, September 10, 2001, 5449.

1. *Formulate a National Internal Security Plan (NISP) to implement the “Strategy of Holistic Approach” taking into account the statutory mandates of the government departments and agencies and their pertinent plans and programs;*
2. *Recommend policies to ensure the coordination and integration of government efforts in the execution of the NISP;*
3. *Develop and implement advocacy programs to encourage and facilitate the active participation of government-owned or controlled corporations, local government units, the business sector and civil society, in the execution of the NISP;*
4. *Monitor and evaluate the implementation of the NISP by the individual departments and agencies; and,*
5. *Identify the areas where sub-national and/or local Internal Security Committees need to be established in accordance with Section 4 hereof, on account of serious threats to national security and public order, subject to the approval of the President.⁸³*

The COC-IS also established the Executive Committee (EXECOM) in order to carry out its mandated functions.⁸⁴ Along with the EXECOM, an Inter-Agency Technical Working Group (IATWG) composed of the representatives of the members of the COC was also established to ensure inter-agency coordination and consultation.

The National Internal Security Plan (NISP), as formulated by the COC-IS, is based on the Strategy of Holistic Approach (SHA) that makes use of political, security, socio-economic and psycho-social components. It aims to decisively defeat the insurgent armed groups through the Left Hand–Right Hand framework of government response to

⁸³ Romulo, “Executive Order No. 21” Creating a Coordinative and Integrative System on Internal Security”, 5450.

⁸⁴ Ibid., 5449.

be implemented in two phases following the Clear-Hold-Consolidate-Develop Methodology. It is a methodology very similar to the U.S. Army counterinsurgency doctrine currently being used in Iraq. The NISP is a comprehensive national plan that will involve all government agencies in internal security operations. To give impact to the plan's implementation, Area Coordinating Centers (ACCs) will be established at the regional, provincial and municipal levels. These will be chaired by local officials; with the military representatives serving as vice-chairmen in order to ensure that the efforts of both the military and civilian sectors of government work in tandem to apply the "Strategy of Total Approach" against the insurgency.

Based on the NISP, the Armed Forces of the Philippines crafted the National Military Strategy (NMS) with the following strategic-level objectives:⁸⁵

1. *Decisively defeat all armed internal security threat; Maintain territorial integrity and defend national territory;*
2. *Protect the EEZ;*
3. *Contribute to regional peace and stability;*
4. *Support and assist lead government agencies within the AFP's capabilities as directed by national authorities in the conduct of socio-politico-economic development programs;*
5. *Response to national emergencies; and,*
6. *Enforcement of maritime laws*

The NMS embraces the four strategic elements of: the proactive posture, focus and contain, leverage alliances, and retool the force. It also includes concepts of strategic flexibility, asymmetric warfare, comprehensive approach, and total force.

⁸⁵ SOT Manual, Series 2007, 11.

Aside from the NMS, the Armed Forces of the Philippines also refer to a National Policy Guidance as directed by the President of the Philippines which consists of the following:⁸⁶

1. *AFP supports Peace Initiatives and lead in confidence-building measures to maintain an environment conducive for the advancement of the peace process;*
2. *Be prepared to decisively apply force, when necessary;*
3. *Lead agency in promoting transparency and accountability;*
4. *Unify and harmonize its efforts to attain crime free society with different law enforcement agencies; and*
5. *Enhance operational readiness and pursue the Modernization program.*

The creation of the Cabinet Oversight Committee on Internal Security with its implementing arms, the EXECOM and the IATWG, is a clear manifestation of the government's resolve to give counterinsurgency a special attention. It shows the government is sincere in finding a solution to the long-running insurgency problem. It also recognizes the necessity to forge a "whole of government approach" to insurgency by involving all government agencies. It effectively raises the level of urgency for all agencies that have a role to play in the COIN program. It clearly expresses the government's desire for civilian agencies of the government to assist in the COIN fight by coordinating and integrating their efforts with the security forces. While they have their own statutory mandates to follow, civilian agencies of the government such as the Department of Public Works and Highways, Department of Health, Department of Social

⁸⁶ Ibid., 12.

Welfare and Development, Department of Agriculture, Department of Natural Resources and the Department of Interior and Local Government have been directed to apportion some of their efforts towards contributing to the government COIN program. These agencies will now coordinate with the other agencies for convergence of their operations in conjunction with the military.

The NISP sets the condition for the crafting of the National Military Strategy. Although the NMS presents a wide-ranging variety of missions for the Armed Forces of the Philippines to undertake, the NMS also clearly illustrates the current thrust of the government, that of dealing the insurgency problem using the “Strategy of Holistic Approach.” Apart from the traditional role that the military has to play, it is clearly understood that the military will be more engaged in activities that support nation building in collaboration with other government agencies. The NMS now calls for the synergistic application of all instruments of government power through interagency cooperation. It provides for the overarching guidance of coordinating and integrating all government efforts in the execution of the NISP.

On top of the policy directions as described in the NISP, NMS, and the National Policy Guidance, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo expressed her intention to crush the insurgency by the end of her term in 2010.⁸⁷ This same pronouncement was echoed by the current Chief of Staff General Hermogenes Esperon and the Army Chief Lt General Alexander Yano. Such an order indeed poses a big challenge to the AFP leadership, as it means having to fast track all of its COIN program well above its current rate. It is only

⁸⁷ *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, “Military report says it can’t defeat NPA by 2010” November 14, 2007. http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/nation/view_article.php?article_id=100769 [accessed November 14, 2007].

made worst by the fact that the other ingredients necessary to resolve the insurgency conflict lie in the other agencies and therefore beyond military control.

What is unclear is on how the interagency process will play out. Although the NISP mentions other government agencies, there seems to be no definitive mechanism to make the entire interagency process work. This will leave the military in a position to carry out the instruments of government power singlehandedly, which is not the aim of the “Strategy of Holistic Approach.”

On Training

With respect to the question as to whether or not the learning, understanding, and implementation of the SOT concept have been fully integrated into the training program for enlisted personnel, it is important to examine the current program of instruction (POI) for enlisted personnel courses. Since the leadership factor also affects the conduct of SOT operations, officer training courses will also be discussed. SOT operations mostly involve personnel specializing on infantry skills. The four infantry courses are:

1. *The Infantry Non-Commissioned Officer Basic Course (INCOBC);*
2. *The Infantry Non-Commissioned Officer Advance Course (INCOAC);*
3. *The Infantry Officer Basic Course (IOBC); and,*
4. *The Infantry Officer Advance Course (IOAC).*

These four courses are considered to be the most critical in developing the kind of enlisted personnel and officers who will be tasked to handle the SOT operations.

SOT’s key objectives are to dismantle the politico-military structure of the enemy in the barangays and to establish Barangay Intelligence Net (BIN) and counter

organizations to prevent resurgence. In order to accomplish those objectives, required training and education programs within the military must be developed and implemented.

The INCOBC is a 12-week course designed to train enlisted personnel (from the rank of Private First Class to Corporal) on war fighting and service-support skills, with the mission to prepare them for their future role as squad and section leaders. The POI for INCOBC consists of two phases, which are the Common Module Phase and the AFOS Phase. The entire course consists of 510 training periods, equivalent to 1000 points. A training period is equivalent to 1 hour. Out of the allotted training periods and its equivalent points only 4 training periods, equivalent to 4 training hours, are devoted to the study of SOT. These are conducted during the Common Module Phase under the subject “Internal Security Operations” (ISO) (see Appendix C). This represents a mere 0.78% of the entire training time and just 0.5 % of the total possible points. Teaching the SOT concept for 4 hours during the entire course of 510 training hours is negligible.

On the other hand, INCOAC is a 14-week course intended to train mid-level enlisted men with the rank of at least Sergeant to prepare them to become platoon sergeants or company, battalion, or brigade staff NCOs. The POI for INCOAC also consists of two phases, the Common Module and the AFOS Phases. However, their subjects are quite different, in the sense that they are now introduced into the higher level of learning particularly on the subject “Military Decision Making Process” (MDMP) at battalion and brigade level operations which are partially the same as that of the officers. INCOAC consists of 550 training periods which is equivalent to 1000 points value. Again, out of the allotted training periods and its equivalent points, only 4 training periods (or 4 training hours), consisting of 5 points total course value, are allotted for the

study of SOT. This is tucked within the subject “Internal Security Operations” (see Appendix D). Such a number represents only a small percentage of 0.72% from the entire training periods and the 0.5% from the total points. Just as in the INCOBC, teaching the SOT concept for only 4 hours out of the total 550 training hours is very insignificant.

On officer courses, the Infantry Officer Basic Course (IOBC) is a course designed to train officers with the rank from Second Lieutenant to First Lieutenant to serve as platoon leaders as well as to prepare them to serve as company executive officers and assistant battalion staff officers. This 14-week course will also give them a preview on how to lead and manage an infantry company. The Program of Instruction (POI) for IOBC consists of the Common Module Phase and the AFOS Phase. The entire course consists of 560 training periods, equivalent to 1000 points. Similarly, out of the allotted training periods and their equivalent points, only 4 training periods with 5 equivalent points are dedicated for the study of SOT. It is covered under the subject “Civil Military Operations” during the Common Module Phase (see Appendix E). This shows a minimal percentage of 0.71% of the entire training periods and 0.5 % of the total points. Teaching the officers on the SOT concept for only 4 hours out of the total 560 training hours is tantamount to downplaying the importance of the SOT program.

Finally, the Infantry Officer Advance Course (IOAC) is a course for company-grade officers in order to prepare them as Company Commanders or Battalion Staff Officers or Assistant Brigade Staff Officers. This course spans fourteen (14) weeks and consists of the Common Module Phase and the AFOS Phase. In terms of training duration and structure, this course is quite similar to the IOBC. The main difference is the level at which the Military Decision-Making Process is being applied. The focus of

IOAC is more on brigade and battalion operations while the IOBC focuses on company and platoon operations. In addition, the whole course consists of 560 training periods which is equivalent to 1000 points, just like the IOBC. Out of these allotted periods and its equivalent points, only 4 training periods with 5 equivalent points are given for the study of SOT. The SOT instruction is inserted as part of the “Civil Military Operation” subject under the Common Module Phase (see Appendix F). This indicates a token amount of 0.71% of the training periods, and 0.5 % of the total equivalent points. With only 4 hours of instruction, it can be said that the SOT program has not been given ample time and emphasis in the officer training courses.

Table 1. Percentage Time of SOT Instruction in the Four Infantry Courses						
Course	Total training periods	Total points allocation	Total period allotted to SOT (hours)	Equivalent points of SOT period	Percentage of SOT period to the course	Percentage of SOT points to the course
INCOBC	510	1000	4	5	0.78%	0.5%
INCOAC	550	1000	4	5	0.72%	0.5%
IOBC	560	1000	4	5	0.71%	0.5%
IOAC	560	1000	4	5	0.71%	0.5%

It should be noted that in terms of its design and duration, these four courses are almost identical in scope, especially in the manner by which the teaching of the SOT concept is integrated. Apparently, these courses are patterned to the conventional warfare, in that most of its subjects are still focused on kinetic types of operations. With respect to the training periods, 99.29% are oriented to conventional warfare which is equivalent to 99.5% in equivalent points. The allotted period for the teaching of SOT, which at its highest (INCOBC) only amounts to 0.78% of the total training periods, indicates a big disparity between training and operational thrusts. The current Programs of Instructions are still predominantly reflective of past curriculum models which are oriented towards conventional warfare. Despite several reforms in policies and doctrines that were initiated with the emergence of the SOT concept, it appears that the teaching and propagation of the SOT concept in military schools has not been properly institutionalized as reflected in these four major courses. This fact tells us that the current operational thrust has not been matched with appropriate curriculum change and that the

army training system has yet to adopt the changes that should go with the full implementation of the SOT program.

How much time then should be allotted for the teaching of the SOT concept? Based on the latest guidelines issued by the AFP Special Operations Team (SOT) Center, a comprehensive program of instruction on the SOT concept should last for about one month. This time period would equate to 176 hours of training time. This can expand to another 15 days if an actual immersion is included which is very essential in the learning process. Such duration is sufficient to allow for an exhaustive discussion and internalization of the various SOT strategies and processes followed on by actual application. In 2006 year-end SOT assessment, one of the findings is that the longer an SOT team stays in a particular barangay the better the results achieved.⁸⁸


The impact of allocating more time for the teaching of SOT in career development courses for enlisted personnel and officers will be on its training duration. Unless some of the subjects which are considered irrelevant to the present challenges of the AFP are stricken out, the resulting course duration will be much longer. There will also be implications with regards to its funding, because the longer the training duration, the higher the cost.

Outside of the formal career development courses for enlisted personnel and officers, there were training courses on SOT that were randomly conducted at different Army units depending on the initiative of Battalion Commanders. In such cases, SOT training was merely treated as an adjunct subject or a side show. It is however difficult to account for this type of training as these courses were not officially imbedded in the unit

⁸⁸ SOT Year-End Assessment, 2006.

training programs. In order to measure the enlisted personnel's depth of familiarity and understanding on the SOT concept, the researcher devised a set of questions in the survey questionnaire which will attempted to display a general picture of SOT within the Philippine Army.

Each question can be thought of as a random variable with two possible choices: 1 if it is true (success) and 0 if it is not (failure). Hence each question can actually be represented by a Binomial distribution with 100 replications and an unknown probability of success. The best estimate of this probability is the proportion of respondents who indicated a positive response to the question. To determine whether this question has a significantly positive response, we want to test if this probability of success is different from 0. One way to determine this is if 0 is contained within the 95% confidence level for each proportion.



- | | |
|---|---|
| 1. <i>have heard but still do not understand SOT</i> | 2. <i>graduated from a formal SOT training</i> |
| 3. <i>have never been involved in SOT operations but in associated activities</i> | 4. <i>did not have a formal SOT training</i> |
| 5. <i>had SOT subject during his entry training</i> | 6. <i>need to know more about SOT</i> |
| 7. <i>learned about SOT from fellow soldiers</i> | 8. <i>had an actual SOT experience</i> |
| 9. <i>has been assigned to an SOT-mission even without the knowledge of SOT</i> | 10. <i>involved in SOT as security elements</i> |
| 11. <i>familiar with SOT nominally</i> | 12. <i>believed that officers in their unit are as ignorant as themselves</i> |

Figure 3. Enlisted Personnel's Knowledge on the SOT Concept

Note that zero is not contained in any of the confidence intervals. Hence, all of the proportions significantly vary from zero. Consequently, the positive responses, i.e., the reasons the respondents indicated are valid.

Based on the survey, out of 100 respondents, only 32% said they have heard and

understand about SOT. Twenty eight (28%) of same number of respondents claim to be graduates of a formal SOT training, while 46% say they did not have a formal SOT training. On the other hand, 56% say that their only SOT background was during their basic soldier training where SOT was one of the subjects taught. Twenty percent (20%) received informal training on SOT from their fellow soldiers. Forty-five percent (45%) say they know what SOT means, but they don't have a full grasp of its concepts, processes and the details of doing it correctly. Likewise, of that number, 72% said they felt they need to know more about SOT. The median score for how they would rate themselves on their knowledge of SOT is 3, but with an inter-quartile range (IQR) of 1 and 4; an indication that at most 50% of them would say that their knowledge is just between adequate and average.

Table 2. Confidence Interval for the Proportion of Positive Responses for How the Knowledge of SOT is Acquired

Question	Lower Limit	Proportion	Upper Limit
1	0.23	0.32	0.41
2	0.19	0.28	0.37
3	0.32	0.42	0.52
4	0.36	0.46	0.56
5	0.46	0.56	0.66
6	0.63	0.72	0.81
7	0.15	0.23	0.31
8	0.45	0.55	0.65
9	0.29	0.39	0.49
10	0.35	0.45	0.55
11	0.35	0.45	0.55
12	0.13	0.21	0.29

These figures clearly show the status of the enlisted personnel's level of awareness on the SOT methodology which best reflects the way SOT instruction has been incorporated into the training system. Programs must be supported not only by logistics, but also by capability development to enable personnel to acquire the know-how in applying the new tools of the trade. This has not been adequately addressed by the Army. The mere infusion of four hours of SOT instructions into the career courses out of over 500 total hours of training time will not suffice. Obviously, there is a need to redesign courses in order to accommodate the comprehensive teaching of the SOT concept among enlisted personnel. More training periods should be allocated to SOT commensurate to the level of attention that it has been given in the counterinsurgency fight. Filipino soldiers are not new to these types of operations and they have been doing

Irregular Warfare-type operations since the 1950s. Two such cases were the Philippine Expeditionary Forces to Korea (PEFTOK), and the Philippine Civic Action Group (PHILCAG) to South Vietnam. In its own territory, the AFP successfully ended the “Hukbalahap” insurgency. Besides, for the Philippines to be facing an external threat




Figure 4. Pie-Chart Showing the Enlisted Personnel’s Knowledge on SOT

is a very remote possibility. It is expected that the insurgency problem that the country faces will continue to be the main security challenge for the Philippine government for many years ahead. Considering this unique situation, it is reasonable for the AFP to adopt a paradigm shift in training to focus more on SOT rather than on purely conventional types of operations. Thus, the answer to the first question is that the learning and understanding of the SOT concept has not been properly integrated into the training curriculum for enlisted personnel.

On Doctrine

The government's counterinsurgency strategy is solely anchored on the conduct of the SOT program. This was proven very effective in the early stage of its implementation. Despite the slowdown of SOT effectiveness in recent years, still many have trusted in the ability of the program to prove successful in eliminating the insurgency problem. Even if the AFP was willing to eliminate the SOT program, no other alternative solution exists to replace it. SOT remains the best, most widely recognized counterinsurgency tool available. To check the validity of this perception, pertinent questions were included in the survey as well as in the interviews.

On enlisted personnel feedback, when asked on the proposition that SOT is good but poorly implemented, the median response is 4 with an inter-quartile of 4 and 4 which indicate a completely consistent response. When the same question was asked, but phrased in a different fashion as to if anyone saw SOT as a useless activity deserving abolition, the median response is 2 with an inter-quartile range of 1 and 2. These responses would indicate that the enlisted personnel surveyed do not see the SOT as a useless activity, but misunderstood or mis-utilized by their leaders. It is an expression of faith that the SOT program is worth continuing. On SOT's ability to clear the barangays from NPA influence, the median response is 4 with an inter-quartile range of 4 and 5. This means that the respondents agree on SOT's viability to clear barangays from enemy control. Similarly, when asked of a related question on whether a successful SOT operation effectively weakens the NPA, the median response is 4 with an inter-quartile range 4 and 5 which corroborates the preceding statement.

When asked to comment on whether the AFP must concentrate on war fighting

rather than on SOT, the median response is 3, with an inter-quartile range of 2 and 4 which signals uncertainty of their answers. This means that enlisted personnel are not sure of their answer to such a question which could mean that they are still confused as to the focus of the AFP's counterinsurgency program. A supporting question to check this apparent dilemma faced by the enlisted personnel was asked whether it is more preferable to kill insurgents than to conduct SOT operations. The median response is 3 with an inter-quartile range of 2 and 4. This validates the state of confusion faced by enlisted personnel. A confused enlisted force does not speak well of the SOT program. The explanation for this phenomenon can be attributed to many factors. One probable cause could be the failure of its leadership to provide clear cut guidance and direction. Another probable cause could be the lack of proper training and orientation. Conversely, such a vacuum in understanding the supposed direction of the Armed Forces of the Philippines can very well be compensated with good leadership, as long as the leadership themselves are completely aware of the program, but perhaps chose to do nothing to rectify it.

It can be deduced that from the enlisted men's viewpoint there is a consensus on the effectiveness of SOT as an effective counterinsurgency tool. However, most of the respondents experienced some sort of crisis of orientation as to where the AFP should focus its efforts. This seeming confusion could also suggest the need for balance in the application of kinetic and non-kinetic approaches to the insurgency problem, rather than a complete departure from the kinetic options which could also be possible.

In one interview, a battalion commander opined that one of the greatest challenges that he faced in the conduct of SOT was the ability of SOT operators to connect and solicit the involvement of other stakeholders. These are the Local

Government Units and other government agencies. They find it hard to reconcile that SOT, which is supposedly the by-product of the “whole of government approach” to insurgency, remains largely executed by the military personnel. The nature of SOT puts the military in a situation whereby it serves as the principal facilitator and orchestrator of all activities. This is often overly burdensome to the military. For the military to be held responsible for conducting such initiatives and coordination sometimes touches on the sensitivities of local officials and other government agencies, which at times leads to friction. Crossing paths and mingling with the other domains may not always be convenient for the military personnel. Other battalion commanders even say that their entire SOT experience has somehow civilianized the military establishment. Since SOT operators are engaged with the community life, they cannot help but become politically involved. Although battalion commanders appreciate the value of SOT, there seems to be confusion on their parts as how to implement the program without necessarily diluting the military character of their enlisted personnel, and while placing less of a burden on the military. A doctrine which allows greater participation by the other stakeholders would help avert this perceived civilianization of the military character as a result of SOT.

As mentioned in the methodology chapter, this study also intends to analyze the soundness of the SOT concept. One way to test it is to compare the SOT concept with the recently revised FM3-24, *U.S. Army Manual for Counterinsurgency*. Many argue that FM 3-24 has captured the most important elements in conducting counterinsurgency operations.

SOT goes by the dictum of “live, eat and sleep with the people.” This is the most

salient feature which calls for troops to be immersed in and fully interact with the barangay. Some observers though may criticize it as an act of interfering with the affairs of the barangay which, in a strict sense, is legally assailable. But the security forces' intrusion is justified by the existence of CPP/NPA influence in these areas.

SOT's key objectives are to dismantle the politico-military structure of the enemy in the barangays and to establish Barangay Intelligence Net (BIN) and counter organizations to prevent resurgence. The final phase is to introduce a major project that addresses the most pressing need of the barangay. However, during the entire stay, troops undertake various minor and major activities on a daily basis to endear themselves and their actions to the people, develop relationships, and get traction with the community life. It also aims in developing intelligence networks on insurgent activity in order to support combat operations if an opportunity presents itself. The little things that troops do every day lubricate the process of attaining the four main objectives which is the most grueling part of the SOT operation. Engaging the community in a constant interaction requires great patience and commitment on the part of the military, while ensuring discipline within the ranks to prevent the slightest of abuses from undermining SOT gains. This technique is in line with the doctrine of FM 3-24, concerning the Army's requirement for having culturally savvy military personnel, and in promoting dialogue with key communicators in the community. However, the author finds SOT to be more engaging, more in-depth and more personalized in its approach than the measures suggested in FM 3-24.

The major principles outlined in FM 3-24 hold true with SOT. This is the battle for population support, restraint in the use of force, use of indigenous forces, role of

human intelligence (HUMINT), interagency involvement and the need for adaptation and innovation.

According to one interviewee, Lt Col Cornelio H. Valencia, currently assigned at the Office of the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines, SOT is a sound concept and will be relevant to any insurgency situation. He further stresses that its components: Political, Economic, Military and Informational (PEMI) address the multifaceted problem. The concept is broad enough that it can be re-interpreted to adjust to the changing norms of the times. However, he argues that the Political part is not simply the desire for legitimacy or having good leaders, but that the political aspect must also provide the people the means of stating their grievances and receiving some positive outcome.

SOT is implemented through the strategy of Clear-Hold-Develop. Lt Col Valencia would describe this process using the analogy of a wound. Simply put, CLEAR is a direct action to remove any threat (debris such as a bullet left within the body would ultimately lead to infection) to allow you to enact the cure. It is like applying alcohol to the wound in order to sterilize it. HOLD is preserving your gains in clearing and building on this advantage to prevent the threats' return or resurgence. In the wound analogy, it is leaving the wound dry and clean until the right medication arrives. On the other hand, DEVELOP is often interpreted as physical economic development. It is the direct action to address the root cause of the problem, whatever is the problem may be. Thus for the wound analogy, applying antibiotics ointment may be the solution. Like any insurgency, it takes time to heal or solve the underlying problem. Thus Clear and Hold are just phases for one to implement the solution – in Philippine setting, the wound is poverty.

On Leadership

As stated in earlier chapters, the enlisted personnel, the tip of the spear in the government's COIN campaign, play a critical role in the implementation of the SOT program. They bear the brunt of conducting SOT operations. At the same time, a major contributing factor to the success of their operations is in the leadership aspect. The officers in charge, ranging from the battalion commander down to the company and platoon leaders, provide the necessary direction and supervision to SOT teams for mission accomplishment. Although it is difficult to gauge the extent of participation of officers in the conduct of SOT operations, qualitatively it can be deduced by obtaining the sentiments of the SOT operators themselves. To this effect, the researcher propounded questions in the survey questionnaire that seeks to gain feedback from the enlisted personnel.

Out of 100 respondents, 21% believe that officers of their unit are even as ignorant as themselves on the SOT concept. This implies that some of the SOT operations are being run by officers who know very little about SOT. Considering the number of SOT operations that each unit has to conduct each and every year, one can only imagine the compounding effect as the quality of SOT operations will naturally suffer. This explains why some areas of the Philippines, where SOT operations were previously conducted, have fallen back again into the hands of the CPP/NPA. Haphazard SOT operations are likely very due to weak leadership.

To further develop the enlisted personnel's perception towards their officers, particularly the Battalion Commanders, a question was also asked using the Likert scale of whether they believe that there is lack of appreciation, commitment and sincerity by

Battalion Commanders towards the conduct of the SOT program. From a range of 1 to 5 where 1 is “Strongly Disagree” and 5 is “Strongly Agree”, the median response was 4 with an inter-quartile range of 3 and 4. This means that the respondents agree on the premise as propounded, that indeed there is lack of appreciation, commitment, and sincerity on the part of the battalion commanders in the conduct of SOT. One possible explanation for this behavior is because most incumbent Battalion Commanders have not really undergone an SOT training program. The SOT program was conceived in 1987, long after the career stage when these officers attended their officer career courses. This has somehow resulted in a vast generational gap on officer training and education on SOT.

In like manner, a question was also asked to check the level of enthusiasm of commanders for the adoption of SOT as the main counterinsurgency tool, as opposed to purely kinetic operations. The median response is 4 with an inter-quartile range of 3 and 4 which means that the respondents agree on said premise. Again, this data supports the preceding finding that commanders are less enthusiastic about implementing the SOT program as observed by the enlisted personnel.

Another supporting question of the survey is whether the enlisted men agree that the conduct of SOT is oftentimes relegated to the enlisted personnel with little officer participation. The median response is 4 with an inter-quartile range of 3 and 4. This means that the respondents generally agree on such a premise which further strengthens the previous findings of the apparent negligence committed by some commanders in not providing adequate leadership to SOT operations.

In the interviews, two participants expressed dissenting views, particularly on the

question of whether battalion commanders believe in that SOT is an effective tool to address the Philippines' insurgency problem. This indicates that although the SOT program has been adopted by the entire Philippine Army to be its main counterinsurgency tool, some commanders continue to believe and cling to the kinetic ways of solving the problem. This reality fully corroborates the findings of the survey.

There are other aspects of the SOT operation which can be mitigated or aggravated with better leadership. This pertains to the management of SOT funds. The researcher asked the question to the respondents on whether they have experienced SOT operational funds being misused or diverted to other purposes. The median response is 4 with an inter-quartile range of 3 and 5. This means that most respondents agree that indeed such a problem occurs in their respective units. No one can be blamed for this occurring other than the leadership. A related question was also asked if there was any problem in the timely release of SOT funds. The median response is 4 with an inter-quartile range of 4 and 4.25. This means that the respondents agree that the delayed releasing of funds is also a factor. The narrow inter-quartile range indicates homogeneity of opinion on this matter. This is another aspect which can be attributed to weak leadership. Leadership can do something to facilitate the timely release of funds to SOT units.

SOT operations require the tapping of resources of other government agencies, especially in the development phase of the program. These agencies are the Department of Health, the Department of Public Works and Highways, the Department of Education, Department of Agriculture, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, the Philippine National Police, and the Local Government Units. The representatives or

congressmen are key players as they have the capability to dole out projects out of their pork barrel allocation, which is officially called the Country-wide Development Fund. Thus, SOT operators, especially those leaders, have to coordinate closely with the above mentioned agencies in order to obtain necessary support. There is no established mechanism for this except the initiative of SOT operators and its leaders themselves. In the survey, the median response is 4 with an inter-quartile range of 4 and 5. This data denotes a strong agreement on the premise that, for the most part SOT requires maximum interaction with the different government agencies and various peoples' organizations to be able to obtain projects and other benefits for an SOT area. A question was also asked if there was any difficulty in obtaining funding support for projects they have identified. The median response is 4 with an inter-quartile range of 4 and 5. Again, this means that the enlisted men agree on such a difficulty. Both concerns can be mitigated if there is dedicated leadership that properly orchestrates the conduct of SOT operation.

Considering this serious weakness in leadership as the evidence shows, one must consider the possible steps that can be taken to solve this shortcoming. In the survey, the researcher proposed to promote an SOT advocacy at all levels of command in order to revolutionize an SOT-oriented mentality across the AFP organization. The median response is 4 with an inter-quartile range of 4 and 5 which denotes an agreement. This means that there is a consensus to support such a scheme if only to have a uniform understanding of SOT. Likewise, a question was also asked if they would like to see senior leaders be required to undergo SOT refresher courses in order to wield the same level of appreciation and enthusiasm of the SOT program from top-to-bottom. The median response is 4 with an inter-quartile range of 4 and 5 which denotes a strong

recommendation by enlisted personnel to have senior leaders undergo SOT refresher training courses.

On Resources

On logistics, as in any other endeavor, resources always play a critical role. The third question talks about whether or not the government provides sufficient resources to run the SOT program. Even if the enlisted personnel had the skills and the dedication to conduct SOT operations, they are only as good as the resources provided to the program. The resources needed means not only the operational expenses that SOT operators need for the entire duration of the SOT operations but, more importantly, the funding required to make possible the various projects and associated activities to be implemented in a target barangay. Availability of such resources will define the sustainability of the SOT program.

In the survey conducted, one of the major issues identified is on funds. The delay or lack of funds hampers the implementation of SOT. Compounding the problem is the availability of funds intended for the various projects and other associated activities. Likewise, the same concern was aired by most Battalion Commanders I interviewed. They say that the most challenging part in the conduct of SOT at leadership level is on how to obtain funding to support the various projects. After dismantling the barangay revolutionary military-political structures, the introduction of projects serve to punctuate and establish credibility in the aftermath of the SOT operation. It is so critical to sustain the gains and fortify the barangay from any NPA resurgence.

Operational fund support for the conduct of SOT amounts to P30, 000 (roughly US\$700) per barangay. This is apart from the provision for fuel for vehicles. These are

fixed support allocation regardless of the duration of the SOT operations. When situations call for it, some SOT operations are extended. In the event that a Battalion Commander nominates more barangays for SOT operations, it has to be approved by Higher Headquarters, whose decision is largely influenced by the budget ceiling for such programs. In other words, for a given year, the Armed Forces can only conduct so many SOT operations due to budgetary constraints. Of course, other factors affect the limitation in the conduct of SOT, such as the number of available SOT-trained and qualified personnel.

The intent of President Arroyo to crush the insurgency problem before the end of her term in 2010 has put the Armed Forces of the Philippines in a dilemma. It seems impossible to solve such a daunting problem by approaching it on the cheap. The AFP leadership knows pretty well that such a directive should be matched by a significant increase in the military's budget and the allocation of additional troops. Currently, the budget for defense is P49.47 billion (US\$1.13 billion) which is the lowest budgetary allocation for defense in relation to the gross domestic product (GDP) among member-countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Although the AFP leadership echoes the intent of the Commander-in-Chief, some generals express their reservations. In an article published on October 2, 2007 in "*The Manila Times*", Major General Fojas, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, J3, AFP, himself said that the military lacked the manpower and equipment needed to defeat the nation's communist insurgents.⁸⁹ Realizing this need, the Department of National Defense has asked

⁸⁹ *The Manila Times*, "General: Philippine Army lacks strength to defeat Communists", October 2, 2007. <http://www.manilatimes.net/national/2007/oct/02/yehey/metro/20071002met1.html> [accessed October 2, 2007].

Congress for additional funding of P11.7 billion (US\$26.74 million) for the year 2008 to carry out President Arroyo's desire to put an end to the communist insurgency before she leaves office in 2010.⁹⁰ This amount is over and above the increase to the defense budget of P51 billion (US\$1.16 billion) for 2008. Such increases will surely impact SOT operation on the ground, the SOT being the focal point of the AFP's counterinsurgency program as outlined in the OPLAN Bantay Laya II.

In a speech at the graduation rites at the Philippine Military Academy, President Arroyo said that she has allotted P1 billion (US\$2.28 million) from the P1.227 trillion (US\$2.8 billion) national budget for 2008 to fund military community-building projects aimed at denying communist insurgents the access to civilian support.⁹¹ Aside from the increases to the AFP budget, this separate funding will certainly have a huge impact on the conduct of SOT operations, especially in carrying out the various developmental projects for the barangays.

Another potential source of support that SOT operators can count on is from the Local Government Units (LGUs). The LGUs are the immediate government unit that can provide all sorts of support if properly tapped, but the assumption must be made that it is not automatic. Practically, it requires a great deal of coordinative and representation skills and sometimes pleading for access to the LGUs to obtain their cooperation. Some commanders do not feel comfortable having to deal with politicians in order to plead for

⁹⁰ Fel V. Maragay, "Defense asks for 12 billions to wipe out insurgents". September 27, 2007, *Manila Standard Today*, http://www.manilastandardtoday.com/?page=politics1_sept27_2007 [accessed September 27, 2008].

⁹¹ Joel Guinto, "Arroyo allots P1B for community building vs insurgency", *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, March 18, 2008. http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/nation/view_article.php?article_id=125514 [accessed March 18, 2008].

support. Sometimes, political partisanship makes it more difficult too. This again poses another challenge to every SOT operator.

Aside from funding, there is another major concern if the AFP is to fulfill the mandate to crush the NPA by 2010, and that is its shortage of military manpower. The present strength of the AFP is 120,000 total personnel with 61,148 members constituting the Citizen Armed Force Geographical Units (CAFGU). Of this total number of the AFP, the Army has 70,000 personnel authorized, which are distributed within 81 battalions. Only a third of these, for a total of 27 battalions, are directly involved in SOT operations. This is due to the composition of every brigade, which has three battalions, with the required designation of one battalion as the sole maneuver battalion, one battalion as administrators for CAFGU units and one battalion responsible for the conduct of SOT. This number of SOT battalions is not adequate to cover the numerous barangays that need to be cleared of insurgents.

In the latest national government report, a NPA presence is felt within 70 out of the 81 provinces nationwide. They have varying levels of influence in over 800 out of the 1500 municipalities, or within 10,000 out of the 42,000 barangays nationwide. The NPA has 100 guerilla bases to cover this wide area. If the AFP wants to render the NPA inconsequential by 2010, it must dismantle at least 80 out of the 100 bases that are currently operational. However, in a span of 5 years from 2002 until 2007, the AFP has removed a total of less than 20 guerilla bases. Given that historical performance over five years, and with the same amount of dedicated military manpower, it will prove very difficult for the AFP to successfully clear four times the number of guerilla bases within a three-year period. According to the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, if the

military continues its operations at the current rate, it is projected that the communist insurgency will not be defeated until the year 2018.⁹²

Looking at the claims of the other side, Jose Maria Sison, Chairman of the CPP/NPA discloses that the number of NPA guerilla fronts have fluctuated between 120 and 130, not 100 as claimed by the military. He also points out that the military is capable of concentrating only on less than 10% of the guerilla fronts at any given time.⁹³ This indicates that the target of defeating insurgency by 2010 is unrealistic, given the current state of the AFP, unless the manpower of the Army is dramatically increased.

Field commanders, at the receiving end of this directive, have expressed their concern for more troops to be placed into the SOT fight. In the Manila metro area alone, the military commander, Col Buenaventura Pascual, has asked for additional battalions to be deployed in poor communities in the metropolis.⁹⁴ The Philippine Army Commander, LtGen Alexander Yano has also asked for 6,000 additional troops for Manila.⁹⁵ To this effect, LtGen Yano even requested a supplemental budget for the activation of 12 additional battalions. In response, President Arroyo approved a P1 billion (US\$2.28 million) increase in the AFP budget in order to create six more Army battalions, a new Marine battalion, and 25 companies of militiamen to better fight the rebels and terrorists.

⁹² *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, "Military report says it can't defeat NPA by 2010", November 14, 2007. http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/nation/view_article.php?article_id=100769 [accessed November 14, 2007].

⁹³ Nora Gamolo & Anthony Vargas, "Rebels belie AFP claims of destruction of bases", *The Manila Times*, January 13, 2008. http://127.0.0.1:4664/cache?event_id=28802&schema_id=6&q=Rebels+belie+AFP+claims+of+destruction+of+bases&s=zffF5FjVt3KBBAariQbcqz01wys [accessed January 13, 2008].

⁹⁴ *The Manila Times*, "AFP wants 2 additional Battalions for Metro Areas", January 15, 2008. <http://www.manilatimes.net/national/2008/jan/15/yehey/images/front.pdf> [accessed January 15, 2008].

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

However, this number was but half of what was requested by the military leadership.⁹⁶

In a separate interview, the AFP Chief of Staff, Gen Esperon also confirms that as part of the strategy to successfully defeat the insurgency by 2010, the plan calls for the creation of 12 additional Infantry Battalions, the enlistment of 600 more Marines, and the recruitment of additional technical administrative personnel, including medical workers and lawyers.⁹⁷ On top of these, the AFP also plans to recruit 8,400 more CAFGUs in addition to its current strength at 61,148. CAFGUs are territorial forces that serve as force multipliers and their familiarity with the people, terrain and the enemy immensely helps in the successful conduct of SOT.

The recruitment of more soldiers and CAFGUs also addresses the problem of the fatigue factor affecting most SOT operators. It can be noted that under the current system, enlisted personnel get deployed for SOT operation relentlessly with no replacement forces to provide relief from constant operations. The addition of more troops gives commanders the flexibility to implement a rotation policy, whereby enlisted personnel can get rested before being fielded again to conduct subsequent SOT operations.

Generally, the above mentioned actions show that there is a conscious effort on the part of the government to match its policies with corresponding resources. Whether the creation of new units and infusion of more resources would be sufficient enough to

⁹⁶ Joyce Pangco Pañares, "Palace OKs bigger AFP, revives national ID plan", January 8, 2008, *The Manila Standard Today*. http://www.manilastandardtoday.com/?page=homepage_jan8_2008 [accessed January 8, 2008].

⁹⁷ Fel V. Maragay, "Defense asks for 12 billions to wipe out insurgents", September 27, 2007, *Manila Standard Today*. http://www.manilastandardtoday.com/?page=politics1_sept27_2007 [accessed September 27, 2008].

meet the requirements is another question. However, since these initiatives take time to implement, the effect of this surge cannot be felt immediately if one considers the limited time between now and 2010, the deadline set by the President to defeat the insurgency. Nevertheless, such measures will definitely bear a huge impact on the overall security equation in the long run.

On Interagency Support

Ideally, SOT is the by-product of the “whole of government” approach, of which the military is just one of its many components. Thus its success greatly depends on the collective effort of all government agencies working in concert with one another, against a common problem. In reality, however, this is not the case, because the military generally does it alone with minimum participation from the other players. Civilian counterparts tend to shun away from those tasks, for reasons of security or bureaucratic issues within their respective agencies. Unlike the military where people can move quickly on orders, things are different in the civilian world. The level of commitment that civilian agencies offer to the government’s counterinsurgency program is not as intensive as that of the military. Organizational culture is also a factor. SOT operators then are left to their own devices and have to be creative and resourceful in order to obtain the needed resources.

Realizing the predicament faced by SOT operators in obtaining the necessary levels of support for development projects, the AFP created a new major unit called the

National Development Support Command (NDSC).⁹⁸ The mission of this new command is to assist all SOT operations nationwide in the development phase of their SOT programs. However, the unit is still skeletal in nature and its capabilities are still being developed and refined. It will take time before the actions of these units can trickle down to the barangays.

Another parallel program established by the current AFP leadership is the “Kalayaan Barangay” (Freedom Village) program. The program aims to generate funds for various sources to be funneled down to the barangays in furtherance of SOT objectives. Again, this is considered by many as a step in a right direction and places a premium on the significance of engaging the enemy on their favorite turf, the barangays, by bringing in developmental projects. As starting seed capital, President Arroyo recently announced the commitment of P500 million (US\$11.43 million) towards the said project.⁹⁹ A Battalion Commander offered the comment that SOT, as a concept, is in reality an interagency paradigm. That is the reason why the AFP fails to maximize the concept’s potential because the military is just one part of the interagency process and yet the military wields it as if it is entirely theirs.

When asked what major challenges have confronted them during the implementation of SOT, some of the respondents say that SOT fails because commanders and operators fail to quickly innovate or adjust their tactics according to the idiosyncrasies of the people within the area of operation. The effort to standardize SOT

⁹⁸ Ma. Cecilia Rodriguez, Mindanao Bureau, “AFP chief says war on Reds wholistic”, *Inquirer.net*, January 30, 2008. <http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/inquirerheadlines/regions/view/20080130-115814/AFP-chief-says-war-on-Reds-wholistic> [accessed January 30, 2008].

⁹⁹ Loel Guinto, “Arroyo allots P1B for community building vs insurgency”, *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, March 18, 2008. http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/nation/view_article.php?article_id=125514 [accessed March 18, 2008].

is only good for accounting purposes. At times, the standard action becomes a hindrance to the effectiveness of the effort. It fails when SOT is done solely by the military. What the AFP needs are advocates from the other governmental agencies that should be involved, and those individuals representing the private sectors. Thus, linking with other stakeholders is really a key in obtaining success in SOT. Commanders and SOT operators lacking in this skill will not maximize effects.

It can be deduced that although the SOT is designed for interagency cooperation, its implementation remains highly problematic. It has become the weakest link of all the variables in the overall counterinsurgency formula. How to resolve this unwieldy interagency dilemma is the challenge that policy makers must try to address.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

As stated in the opening chapter, the purpose of this study is to determine the weaknesses of the counterinsurgency strategy utilized against the Philippine's long-running communist insurgency. Identifying these weaknesses is important because such information enables policy makers to determine which parts of the program need to be changed in order to make future success possible. This chapter will present a brief summary of the findings highlighted in Chapter 4 to include the five critical areas of training, doctrine, leadership, resources and interagency support. The summary will focus on how the findings have addressed the questions proposed at the start. The chapter will include a set of recommendations based on the study results.

Counterinsurgency Policies

The Philippine counterinsurgency policies show that the national government is indeed serious about bringing the problem of insurgency to a satisfactory end. This is manifested by the creation of the Cabinet Oversight Committee on Internal Security, which orchestrates a synergized and collaborative response to insurgency under the "Strategy of Holistic Approach," otherwise characterized as a "whole of government" approach. This body also formulates the National Internal Security Plan which serves as the COIN roadmap to be followed by all concerned government civilian agencies and from which the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) draws its National Military Strategy. It can be noted that the Armed Forces of the Philippine's strategy, though

largely oriented towards its constitutionally-mandated external defense posture, seriously attempts to accommodate the demands of internal security. This is evident in a slight incongruence that exists between the National Military Strategy and the National Policy Guidance. While the former focuses more on the external security posture, the latter deals with internal security. Nevertheless, it can be generally said that the government's COIN policies from the strategic level down to the Armed Forces of the Philippines are properly aligned. The AFP's plans and programs support the national plan. As enshrined in its campaign plan "OPLAN Bantay Laya 2," the Armed Forces of the Philippines embraces the "Strategy of Holistic Approach" as manifested by the launching of the Special Operation Team program which it considers to be its main counterinsurgency tool.

On Training

The finding of this study reveal that, while the Armed Forces of the Philippines have been engaged in Special Operations Team operations since 1987, it has failed to properly incorporate the teaching of the SOT concept in its current training curriculum, as evident in the critical four infantry courses mentioned in Chapter 4. These courses allocate only an insignificant amount of training devoted to SOT (4 hours), out of their total training time (over 500 hours), which is essentially a palliative. Apparently, the traditional type of training which is oriented to conventional warfare endures in most of these courses despite of the fact that the Army's policies and doctrine have long shifted towards counterinsurgency operations. There is a glaring inconsistency between the current operational and training thrusts, clearly established as 72% of the respondents confess the need for more knowledge on the Special Operation Team concept. This

figure suggests that enlisted men have been deployed repeatedly to perform tasks for which they have not been properly trained. While the Army policy has evolved, the training system has stagnated. This helps to explain the declining effectiveness of Special Operations Teams in recent years. It is therefore imperative for the Armed Forces of the Philippines' leadership to re-examine the training curriculum for both officers and enlisted personnel in order to ensure that training packages are responsive to the needs of the times, and properly attuned to the Army's counterinsurgency thrust. The needed changes should push the training system to adapt and modify all types of career courses in order to ensure a uniform understanding of the SOT concept across the board. It is also expected to affect both the duration of courses and the training costs and will require enormous adjustment in the overall training program and budget. The above finding should therefore answer the first proposed question of: *"Does the current career development training program for officers and enlisted personnel sufficiently integrate the learning of the SOT Concept?"* Indeed, most of the Army's enlisted force lack the necessary training essential for the successful implementation of the SOT program.

On Doctrine

The study shows a wide consensus from both the battalion commanders and enlisted personnel on the efficacy of the SOT concept as a counterinsurgency tool. Commanders strongly believe that SOT will be effective in providing for a countervailing mechanism to the CPP/NPA's skillful ideological, political and organizational infiltration at the grassroots level. Compared with FM 3-24, the *U.S. Counterinsurgency Manual*, SOT is a sound concept that professes most of the universally recognized COIN principles such as: the primacy of population support; restraint in the use of force; the

training and use of indigenous forces; emphasis on HUMINT; and the need for adaptation and innovation. SOT is even more extensive and intensive compared to FM 3-24 in the sense that SOT requires a highly intricate and comprehensive engagement with community life. However, the emergence of SOT has also produced a state of confusion in the minds of the enlisted force. Many have experienced a crisis of orientation in terms of where the AFP is headed in its counterinsurgency thrust. Some segments of the force still resist change and cling to the old kinetic means of resolving the insurgency conflict. This seeming confusion suggests the need for balance in the application of kinetic and non-kinetic approaches, rather than a complete departure from kinetic options.

In essence, the SOT concept is an interagency paradigm predominantly run by the military. This explains why the military continues to struggle with SOT, because it generally acts as if it is their singular property. In fact, it is a well-established interagency infrastructure, and not just a de facto body, that should be running the show. The SOT exposes military personnel to politics, which upsets their usual way of thinking. This is something viewed by some as one reason why some military personnel have developed a tendency for military adventurism as a reaction to frustrations which they have personally experienced in the conduct of SOT.¹⁰⁰

The AFP must fine-tune its doctrine in order to clearly determine whether to focus on a full blown SOT-centric campaign, or to strike a working balance between the kinetic and non-kinetic types of operations. This must be explained to all personnel in order to avoid confusion among subordinates. In addition to resolving the confusion issue, the interconnectivity issue with civilian government agencies has to be addressed. The

¹⁰⁰ Colonel Allan F Martin, interview by author, March 15, 2008.

military should decide whether to keep the status quo of having to bear the brunt of the SOT operations, or share the burden equally with other stakeholders by forging an effective system that allows for greater participation from the non-military components of the program.

With respect to the second question: *“Is the AFP COIN doctrine being used sound and consistent with international theories? Are the enlisted personnel comfortable with it?”* it can be said that the ambiguity of the AFP doctrine and the lack of built-in mechanisms for the proper functioning of SOT in conjunction with civilian agencies have placed the enlisted personnel in a dilemma. This has worked to hamstring personnel effectiveness in the conduct of SOT.

On Leadership

The study reveals that the vast majority of enlisted personnel lament the lack of leader involvement in the conduct of SOT. Ideally, while the enlisted personnel do the legwork, the officers should do the higher-level coordination and linkages with other government agencies. The parallel coordinative efforts of officers are critical to enable the SOT operators to perform their daily activities in the barangay. However, at present, this is not the case. Too often the entire SOT process is relegated to the enlisted personnel with minimum officer participation. The lack of participation is due to the widely varying degrees of appreciation and understanding of the SOT concept in the officer corps. This can be attributed to the superficial education of the SOT among officers. Some current battalion commanders did not undergo SOT training during their career courses. To rectify this deficiency, there is a need to institute an aggressive re-education of the SOT concept among officers at all levels of command in order to create

a uniform understanding and appreciation of SOT. This is a move that the enlisted force would most welcome. A program to do this will enhance the high-level coordination that SOT operators expect from their officers. Likewise, better SOT education for officers will also create a positive climate that should motivate enlisted men to perform well in their assigned tasks, knowing that their officers are fully behind them. However, implementing such a change may find resistance from certain segment of the officer corps, especially those not completely convinced of the value of the SOT program.

As regards the third question “*Is the officers’ participation in SOT operations found to be wanting?*” it can be deduced that the enlisted men who are at the forefront of the SOT program have not been properly led. They have been waging a lonely war with minimal supervision and support.

On Resources

The Armed Forces of the Philippines, which spearhead the government’s counterinsurgency program, lack the wherewithal to successfully implement the SOT program at a rate desired by the present administration. President Arroyo wants to accelerate the process of successfully defeating the insurgency by the end of her term in 2010, a policy that puts the AFP in a dilemma. Consequently, the AFP is pressured to deliver much more than its current capability. Such a directive puts a strain to the already stretched organization. This forces the AFP to set unrealistic goals. Given the current budget, logistics and manpower, the AFP is definitely in no position to be able to comply with the new directive unless the Army manpower and associated budgetary requirements are dramatically increased. Even with infusion of more resources, the goal of ending the insurgency by 2010 may not be feasible within the remaining two-year period due to the

time needed to make the necessary changes. The answer to the fourth question “*Does the AFP provide enough manpower and logistical support to carry out a robust SOT program?*” is that the government’s recent actions to augment the field commanders’ logistical and manpower requirements by creating more units and providing more developmental funds has definitely empowered the enlisted personnel and greatly impacted the SOT program. This will expedite the conduct of SOT and increasing the rate of influencing pro-NPA barangays. However, the 2010 deadline to end insurgency remains too ambitious a goal.

On Interagency Support

Although SOT is seen as an interagency paradigm in itself in which success greatly depends on the contribution of all government agencies, the study shows that it remains largely a military undertaking. To enlist the participation of other stakeholders is a challenge that SOT operators constantly face. Bringing in developmental projects has always been the stumbling block for conducting successful SOT operations. This problem prompted the AFP leadership to create the National Development Support Command in order to have a force solely dedicated to conducting activities related to nation building. Along with this, a program called “Kalayaan Barangay” (Freedom Village) was also launched to undertake projects that directly support the conduct of SOT operations.

Hopefully, the twin measures may achieve greater participation from the other stakeholders. While this could be seen as a welcome development on the part of the SOT operators, on the other hand there is also a danger of having these initiatives interpreted as just another move by the AFP to militarize the interagency process. This has the

potential of sending the wrong signals to the other civilian government agencies and gives them a justification to abrogate their responsibilities in the SOT program instead of getting them to participate more actively. In other words, while these twin measures may have immediate tactical benefits, it could also have a negative strategic effect in the sense that this may only prolong the process of resolving the murky issue of interagency support as its unintended consequence. Also, militaries do not administer long-term economic development well. It is not their core purpose or strength. Focusing on it only highlights the absence of non-military agencies resourced and committed to doing it.

We come to the fifth question “*Are the enlisted personnel equipped with the needed skills to be able to harness these resources outside of the AFP?*” The study shows that the enlisted force lacks the necessary skills and the competence to harness the resources outside of the AFP. Although the AFP recognizes the need for interagency support by creating the NDSC and the “Kalayaan Barangay” program, still there is no established interagency mechanism to speak of that makes the job of conducting the SOT operations easier for the enlisted personnel.

In the course of the study, what turns out to be especially revealing is the fact that the majority of the enlisted personnel lack in-depth knowledge of the SOT program in spite of the fact that this program has been going on for over two decades. Worst yet, the enlisted forces are confused on whether the Armed Forces of the Philippines’ counterinsurgency orientation should focus on SOT operations or stick to their tried and true kinetic ways. Definitely, this confusion resonates not only within the enlisted corps but also within the officer corps. What then can be expected from an organization which is lacking in focus and concentration?

In the final analysis, the capacity of enlisted personnel to successfully conduct the SOT program is severely handicapped due to substantial inadequacies found in each of the five critical factors that make up the fabric of a fully empowered SOT force. However, the problems identified are not insurmountable. They can effectively be addressed through focused and unified government effort using the “Strategy of Holistic Approach” or the “Whole of Government Approach” provided that these strategies function as originally envisioned. Applying radical changes to fix these identified deficiencies will directly impact on the enlisted force’s capacity to successfully fight insurgency using the SOT tool, thus effectively sharpening the pointy tip of the spear.

Recommendations

To sum it up, these are the recommendations that embody the major lessons derived from this study:

Specific Recommendations 1-5

1. The Armed Forces of the Philippines must review its plans and programs to ensure that, while it truly reflects the national strategic agenda, its goals must be realistic and supportable with its current capabilities. Setting unrealistic goals in order to satisfy political whims does not give justice to the program implementers – the enlisted force. With unrealistic goals, the battle has only been half-won.

2. The AFP must re-tailor its doctrine to suit to the peculiarity of the Philippine operating environment, which is predominantly a communist-based insurgency. This major doctrine must be made to decisively engage the insurgency problem to arrive at a successful outcome. Moreover, such a doctrinal re-orientation must be supported by

radical changes in organizational structure, deployment and tactics. It must also have a safety net to protect the integrity of the force while reaching out to other players within the counterinsurgency fight.

3. The AFP must overhaul its training program to make it more responsive and attuned to the needs of its counterinsurgency doctrine. The purpose is to institutionalize the teaching of SOT in all career courses, in order to ingrain SOT consciousness into the very core of each soldier's professional development right from the very start. This will also promote awareness, cultivate enthusiasm and improve performance. The training must include officers across the board to wield a uniform understanding and to enhance the all-important aspect of leadership in the conduct of SOT operations.

4. The AFP must vigorously pursue its expansion program "while the iron is still hot." The administration's intention to end insurgency by the year 2010 which is deemed serious is a great opportunity for the AFP to make its demand for more troops and resources in order to meet the capability needed to fulfill this goal. As the AFP is one of the most under-resourced militaries in Asia, such expansion is badly needed to bolster the counterinsurgency campaign in terms of manpower and logistics. On manpower, this expansion will allow the AFP to implement a rotation policy for SOT-deployed troops in order to sustain their morale as well as ensure quality of output. On logistics, this will provide SOT operators wide latitude of support to satisfy its developmental requirements. Other morale boosting initiatives for SOT operators are also highly recommended, such as career incentives like leverage for promotion, priority for schooling and/or monetary rewards.

5. The AFP must forge joint arrangements with other government agencies such as “Memorandum of Agreement” or Memorandum of Cooperation” to formalize multilateral efforts in delivering developmental services and activities to NPA-affected areas. This will provide the needed relief to SOT operators. Although there is an overarching guidance for interagency cooperation, it does not come easy. It has been proven that an ad hoc structure is usually not effective. There has to be a system that will compel concerned agencies to willingly participate in the SOT program without every time having to be drawn into the task by SOT operators themselves.

Recommendation for Further Study

In furtherance of this study and as pointed out by one interviewee, the author would like to recommend exploring ideas on how to possibly convert or elevate the AFP’s SOT concept into a national program. This will certainly revolutionize the SOT concept into the national consciousness, thus potentially resolving the lingering issue on interagency and ultimately achieving a mammoth effect larger than the Armed Forces of the Philippines can achieve alone.

GLOSSARY

Affected Barangays – villages subjected to CPP/NPA infiltration including those that have not yet been fully influenced

Barangay – the smallest local government unit in the Philippines equivalent to a village and headed by a Barangay Captain

Clearing – the process of regaining government control of a previously NPA-influenced area through a combination of combat and SOT operations

Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) – a Maoist-communist based organization organized to violently overthrow the legitimate government of the Philippines and instill a socialist-based organization.

Enlisted Personnel (EP) – soldiers of any rank below a commissioned officer. This includes the non-commissioned officers within the AFP.

Gradual Constriction – a strategy employed by the CPP/NPA which prioritizes influencing and gaining control over remote villages as a pre-condition before finally taking on the urbanized areas

Influenced Barangay – a village where a CPP/NPA political structure (a shadow government) with an armed militia has already been established

Jemaah Islamiyah – an Indonesian-based terrorist organization linked with Al Qaeda

Macabebe scouts – native of Macabebe, Pampanga, Philippines who aided the American soldiers that led to the capture of Emilio Aguinaldo

NPA Sympathizers – villagers who sympathize with the insurgents and provide any sort of support like giving information, food or doing errands

Protracted War – an NPA strategy to avoid decisive confrontation with government forces in order to buy time to build-up their forces while expanding political clout. It does not preclude attacking target of opportunities deemed necessary to project an image of strength and accumulate firepower

Rate of Influencing – the annual percentage rate of increase in the number of NPA-influenced barangays

Rate of De-influencing – the annual percentage rate of decrease in the number of NPA-influenced barangays that had been successfully cleared by the military

Sectoral – various civil society groups such as the women's, farmers, business, youth, education, religious, peasants, out- of-school youth, senior citizens, etc

Shadow Government – a clandestine CPP/NPA political organization that runs parallel to the legitimate political structure in the barangays

Special Operations Team – a minimum of 9-man military team capable of conducting a prolonged intelligence, psychological, and combat operations through a process of immersion within communist influenced community

Strategic Stalemate – that stage of the armed struggle whereby insurgents have achieved balance of forces with government forces

Strategic Offensive – that stage of the armed struggle whereby the insurgents have gained the upper hand in terms of operational accomplishments forcing the government to be on the defensive

United Front – consists of various sectoral and NGOs operating under the umbrella of the National Democratic Front (NDF) which shield the armed revolution

APPENDIX A

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

The purpose of this interview is to generate feedback from past and present battalion commanders towards the SOT program. The following questions were asked:

1. What do you think about the Special Operation Team concept as the Armed Forces of the Philippines's main COIN tool? What are its good and bad points?
2. From a scale of 1 to 10, what level of understanding do officers of your unit have on the SOT concept?
3. From a scale of 1 to 10, what level of understanding do enlisted personnel of your unit have on the SOT concept?
4. As a Battalion Commander, what are the major challenges you have encountered in the conduct of SOT operations?
5. Do you think something is wrong with the current COIN doctrine and the associated training requirement?
6. What can you say about the Presidential Directive to end insurgency by 2010?
7. Will the creation of the National Development Support Command (NDSC) solve the problem of interagency support?
8. Will the establishment of the "Freedom Village" program ease up the burden of SOT operators in obtaining developmental projects?
9. Are you willing to undergo a refresher course on SOT?
10. What can you suggest to improve the SOT program?

APPENDIX B

SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE

Thanks for your service in the Philippine Army. This survey is aimed to identify some of the problems affecting the SOT. The answers you provide will help shape the recommendations that will be drawn out of this study and, possibly, will contribute to the overall improvement of the SOT program. So try to answer each item as best as possible. Your answers shall be treated with confidentiality.

I. On the knowledge and background on SOT. If you think the statement is true, check the space provided.

- | | |
|--|--|
| ☐ I heard about SOT but I do not really understand it. | ☐ I learned SOT from my buddies only. |
| ☐ I am a graduate of a formal SOT training. | ☐ I have already experienced doing an actual SOT operation. |
| ☐ I have never been involved in any SOT operation but I did participate in some of its related activities like the conduct of medical/dental outreach, etc. | ☐ I was assigned to an SOT-mission before although I only had little knowledge about SOT. |
| ☐ I did not have a formal SOT training. | ☐ My only involvement with SOT was being part of the security elements. |
| ☐ My only background of SOT is during my basic training where SOT was one of the subjects. | ☐ I know what SOT means but I don't have the full grasp of its concepts, processes and the details of doing it correctly. |
| ☐ I feel I really need to know more about SOT. | ☐ I believe even officers in my unit are as ignorant as I am on SOT. |

How would you rate yourself on your knowledge about SOT?

- | | | | | |
|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ |
| poor | adequate | average | good | knowledgeable |

II. Overall perception on SOT.

- | | Strongly Disagree | Disagree | Neither Agree or Disagree | Agree | Strongly Agree |
|---|-----------------------|-----------------------|---------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| 1. SOT is good and useful but it is not properly implemented. | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ |
| 2. SOT is a useless activity. It must be abolished. | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ |

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither Agree or Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree
3. SOT is effective in counterinsurgency especially in clearing NPA- affected barangays.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
4. AFP must concentrate on war-fighting rather than on SOT.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
5. SOT must be vigorously pursued to win the hearts and minds of the people.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
6. Killing insurgents is preferable than conducting an SOT.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
7. SOT is a lot of work but not rewarding (i.e., no incentives)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
8. A successfully conducted SOT operation effectively weakens the NPA.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
9. SOT is a hard thing to do so I am avoiding it as much as I can.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

III. Perceived problems surrounding the SOT.

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither Agree or Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree
1. The delay in the release of SOT funds or the lack of it is one of the issues that hinder its implementation.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
2. Funds intended for SOT are misused or diverted to other projects.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
3. There is lack of appreciation, commitment and sincerity on the part of the Battalion Commander and staff.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
4. There are not enough skilled personnel in our unit who know how to conduct SOT.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
5. SOT is oftentimes relegated to the Enlisted Personnel with little involvement from the officers.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
6. For the most part, SOT requires maximum interaction with the population, e.g. coordinate with LGUs, LGAs, NGOs and POs on various activities and projects.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
7. It is difficult to get funding for high impact projects to be implemented in an SOT area.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

- | | | | | | |
|--|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| 8. SOT activities require good communication, representation, and interpersonal skills which most soldiers are not trained to do | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ |
| 9. Some commanders are not enthusiastic about SOT. | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ |
| 10. SOT subject needs to be developed. | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ |

IV. What makes for a successful SOT program?

- | | Strongly
Disagree | Disagree | Neither
Agree or
Disagree | Agree | Strongly
Agree |
|---|-----------------------|-----------------------|---------------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| 1. Ensure that SOT funds go to its intended purposes. | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ |
| 2. Motivate SOT-assigned personnel by giving them special incentives for their personal and professional advancement (i.e. awards, promotion, schooling, privileges, monetary or material incentives, etc). | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ |
| 3. Revolutionize an SOT-oriented mentality across the AFP organization by promoting an SOT advocacy at all levels of command. | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ |
| 4. Propagate the correct teaching of a comprehensive SOT operation in all AFP schools to ensure that SOT-mindedness is imbedded in each new recruit or graduate. | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ |
| 5. Incorporate the teaching of SOT in all career courses to improve the skills of every soldier on SOT. | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ |
| 6. Let all senior leaders undergo SOT refresher courses in order to wield the same level of appreciation and enthusiasm of the SOT program from top-to bottom. | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ |
| 7. Make SOT easier by encouraging higher units support it in terms of coordinating and prodding political leaders and other government agencies to get their support especially in the developmental phase of the program,. | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ |
| 8. Redesign the SOT course to make it more responsive to the skill sets needed for the successful conduct of SOT. | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ |

V. If indeed going back to basic or training will address most of the issues concerning SOT, aside from funds, then what particular areas of disciplines need to be emphasized in order to achieve the skills set needed by an SOT operator? Rank the following.

- | | |
|---|---|
| ____Barangay Module or “knowing the enemy” | ____Dealing with political leaders, LGUs, LGAs, NGOs, and POs |
| ____Community organizing and social work | ____Civil military operation/psychological operation |
| ____The art of communication, negotiation and mediation | ____Interrogation and elicitation |
| ____Cultural training and interfaith dialogue | ____Practicum (Immersion) |

APPENDIX C

POI – INF NCO BASIC COURSE

COMMON MODULE PHASE

PERIODS: 202 TRNG HRS (5-WKS)

PTS ALLOC: 310 PTS

A. ACADEMICS

	MODULE/ SUBJECTS/EVENTS	SCOPE	PDS	PTS ALLOC	REFERENCE
1).	LEADERSHIP MODULE		(14)	(30)	
	a. Military Leadership	Leadership Principles; Leadership in Action; Leadership in Battle; Leadership Styles; Leadership Traits; Maslow Theory & Hierarchy of Needs; Types of Follower.	2	10	FM 22-100 SPL TEXT
	b. Military Courtesy & Discipline	Definition of military courtesy and discipline, Application and its need in the military service; Hand Salute, Courtesy Calls & other forms of courtesy.	2	5	SPL TEXT
	c. Military Customs & Traditions	Customs and Traditions in the service; Behavior during socials and ceremonies; Ranks and procedures, seating arrangements, during honors & ceremonies. Article VI of AFP Code of Ethics.	2	5	SPL TEXT (AFP CODE OF ETHICS)
	d. Communicative Skills	Off POI	(4)	10	
	(1) Effective Writing	Review on Grammar; Review on parts of speech; and part and construction of a sentence and paragraph.	2	2.5	SPL TEXT
	(2) Effective Speaking	Definition; How does public speaking as a communication works; How to organize speech; Reasons why a subject interests the audience; How to make outline of a speech; Relationship between the speaker and the audience; Types of Speech; Aspects of delivery; Develop a pleasing voice; Ten commandments in speech delivery and some habits to be avoided.	2	2.5	SPL TEXT
	(3) Mil/Non-Mil Correspondence	Effective Correspondence (Definition, purpose, types); Military Letter; Endorsement; Routing Slip; Disposition Form	2	5	SPL TEXT

	e. Written Examination/Critique	All Lessons covered.	2		
2)	GENERAL MILITARY SUBJECTS		(38)	(35)	
	a. Map Reading and Land Navigation			(25)	
	(1) Fundamentals	Introduction; Maps; Marginal Info's & Symbols; Grids; Scale and Distance; Direction; Intro to Land Navigation; Navigation Equipment and Methods; Elevation and Relief; Terrain Association; use and Care of Compass; Field Expedient Method - Use of Constellations as an aid to navigation. Use of shadow method in determining directions.	20	10	FM 21-25 ATSH 21-21 ATSH 21-22
	(2) Global Positioning System (GPS)	Intro to use of GPS; Nomenclature & Parts; Functions, Care & Maintenance; Use of GPS during day/night navigation.	4	5	SPL TEXT
	(3) Orienteering/GPE (Off-POI)	Day/Night Navigation with time limit.	8	10	
	b. Phil Military History	Intro to Phil Mil History; (In Retrospect/Summary) Resistance against Spain; The Phil Rev, Filipino-Am War, WWII Exploits; Vietnam & Korea Involvement, Background & History of Anti-Dissidence Campaign. (Give examples of recent heroic exploits of a NCO in Cbt, i.e., Medal of Valor Awardees)	2	5	Mil History of the Phil. (BACLAGON)
	c. Laws of Land Warfare			5	
	(1) Rules of Warfare (Geneva Convention)	Conference covering the Geneva Convention, agreement for the amelioration of the sick, wounded and shipwrecked. Treatment of prisoners of war, and the responsibility for protection of civilian in time of war.	1		TF19-1732
	(2) Tactical Rules of Engagement (TACROE)	Code of conduct for combatants.	1		ICRC TEXT (Booklet)
	d. Written Examination/Critique	All Lessons covered.	2		
3)	PA BASIC DOCTRINE		(24)	(55)	
	a. AFP Organization	AFP Organization and Mission in support to national strategy and	2	5	SPL TEXT

		objectives. Discussion of key personalities, relationships, disposition and location of the three major service commands. (DND, GHQ, PA, PAF, and PN)			
	b. Army Operations	PA Mission; Air Land Battle Doctrine; Tenets of ALB; ALB Imperatives; Principles of War; Battlefield Framework; Combat Power.	2	5	PAM 1-96 FM 100-5
	c. Fundamentals of Offense	Purpose; Characteristics; Type of Tactical offense; Forms of Maneuver; Offensive Framework; METT-T Factors; Planning, Preparations, Executions, Consolidation & Reorg in Offense; Control Measures.	2	5	PAM 1-96 FM 100-5
	d. Fundamentals of Defense	Purpose, Characteristics, Defensive Framework, Control Measures; Planning, Preparations, Executions and Terminating the Defense.	2	5	PAM 1-95 FM 100-5
	e. Fundamentals of Retrograde	Purpose, Types of Retrograde Ops; Preparations and Executions of Retrograde Operations.	2	5	PAM 1-95 FM 100-5
	f. Special Operation Force	History, Mission, Organization, Capabilities and Limitation, Concept of Employment.	2	5	
	g. OOTW				
	1) Fundamentals of OOTW	Intro and Fundamentals of OOTW	2	5	
	2) Peace keeping Ops	Intro and Fundamentals of Peace keeping Ops under Military Operations Other than War; Principles; UN Functions and Responsibilities; size and Types of Peace Keeping Force; Types of Peace Keeping Missions.	2	5	FM 100-5S93 SPL TEXT
	3) Combating Terrorism	Intro & Fundamentals of Combating Terrorism under MOOTW; Principles; Anti-Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism Measures.	2	5	FM 100-5S93 SPL TEXT
	4) Disaster Relief & Rescue Ops	Intro & Fundamentals of disaster Relief and Rescue Ops under MOOTW; Principles; Types of Humanitarian Relief of Assistance; national, Local Gov't, IRC and other Major Services' Coordination.	2	5	FM 100-5S93 SPL TEXT
	h. PA Doctrine Development	Background, Role of Unit Commanders and Individual Soldiers	2	5	
	i. Written Examination/Critique	All Lessons covered.	2		

4)	BATTLEFIELD OPERATING SYSTEM (BOS)		(46)	(90)	
	a. Fundamentals of Maneuver		(4)	(10)	
	(1) Infantry Ops	Infantry (Light) Organization; Capabilities and Limitations; Mission; Concepts of employment; Wpns System.	2	5	DIV TOE FM 7-10/20
	(2) Armor Ops	TOE of PA Armor units; Mission; Capabilities and Limitations; Types of Armor Assets; employment of Armor Units in the offense, defense and built-up areas; different techniques in working with armor units.	2	5	MECH TOE FM 71-1/2
	b. Fundamentals of Fire Support		(6)	(15)	
	(1) Fire Support	Types of Fire Supt; FA Mortar Sys and Ammunitions; Capabilities and Limitations; Standard and Non-Standard FA Unit Orgns; FIST Organization and Employment; Target Acquisition.	2	5	DIV TOE FM 6-20
	(2) Naval Gunfire Support	Intro to naval Ops; Types of Naval Assets; PN's Mission and Employment; Planning, Executions and Procedures of Naval Gunfire Support Ops.	2	5	SPL TEXT
	(3) Close Air Support	Intro to CAS Ops; Types of Air Assets; Pre-planned & immediate close air support' Command, Control and Support relationship; Target selection; Air Strike control; Marking targets and location of friendly positions.	2	5	SPL TEXT
	c. Fundamentals of Intelligence		(6)	(15)	
	(1) Enemy Update	Current Threats to National Scty; Tactics and Personalities of DT's, SPAG's and other threats groups.	2	5	SPL TEXT
	(2) Tactical Intelligence	Intro to tactical intelligence; Definitions; Intel Axioms; Intel Cycles & Principles; Importance of Intel in Cbt Ops.	2	5	SPL TEXT
	(3) Mil Scty/Counter-Intel	Intro to Mil Scty; Physical Scty, Personnel Scty, Document & Info Scty, Commo Scty, Operational Scty, Physical Scty; Intro to Counter-Subversion; Counter-Sabotage; Counter Espionage.	2	5	AFPM 2-2 SPL TEXT
	d. Fundamentals of Command & Control		(10)	(25)	
	(1) TLP/Estimate of Situation	Eight (8) Steps of TLP; Estimate of the Situation; Its application in the BFDMP at squad and platoon level.	4	10	FM 7-8

	(2) Cbt Plans & Orders	General; Definition of Term; Formats of OPLAN, OPORD & FRAGO's Characteristics, Application and purpose.	2	5	FM 101-5 FM 7-8
	(3) Overlay Techniques	Intro to Operational Terms and Mil Symbols; Overlay Techniques, Uses and Preparations.	2	5	FM 101-5-1
	(4) Signal Support	Types of AFP/PA Tactical Radio Commo; Communication Support in the Offensive, Defensive and Special Operations; Field Expedient Methods, Techniques and Maintenance of Tactical Radio Commo.	2	5	FM 11-59 FM 21-60 AFP Signal Book
	e. Fundamentals of Air Defense	Organization and Employment of Air Defense System; Priorities of Air Defense Protection; Principles and Guidelines of ADA Wpns Employment; Defense Air Warning and Wpns Control Status; Command and Support Relationship; Different Air Threats; Small Unit Air Defense Tactics and Techniques.	(2)	(5)	FM 7-10/20 FM 44-3 DIV TOE
	f. Fundamentals of Engr Support	Mission, Organization and Equipment of Combat Engr Units of Infantry (L) Div; Capabilities and Employment Considerations for Cbt Engr Equipment in Mobility , Counter-Mobility and Survivability; Types of Mines; five Functional Areas of Engr System; Support relationship between Engr and Maneuver Units.	(2)	(5)	FM 20-32 FM 5-102 FM 5-103 SH 7-206887 DIV TOE
	g. Fundamentals of CSS		(16)	(15)	
	(1) Pltn CSS	Fundamentals; Planning of Pltn CSS; Resupply Ops; Resupply Techniques; Aerial Resupply; Maintenance; Trans; Soldier's Load; Pers & Health Svcs.	2	5	FM 7-8
	(2) First Aid & Personal Hygiene	Fundamentals of First Aid; Importance and Application of First Aid & Self-Aid during realistic situations and training; Transportation of the sick and wounded; Purpose and uses of the emergency medical treatment unit; classification and control of casualties; Purpose of Sanitation and Personal Hygiene; Sanitation/Personal Hygiene in the Field of Garrison.	4	5	FM 21-11 FM 21-10
	(3) Enlistment/ Reenlistment	General eligibility for entrance to the service, processing and filing of enlistment record.	1		CIR 17-S CIR 13-S

	(4) Mil Benefits/Privileges	Separation, retirement and death benefits, laws governing military benefits, beneficiaries, maintenance and updating of family documents; Pay & Allowances; Authorized Leaves and Absences.	1		AFPRG131 SPL TEXT
	(5) Promotion/Reduction	Rules and Regulations concerning promotion and reduction of EP.	1		RA 91 CIR 68-S
	(6) Awards/Decoration	Importance of the AFP Awards Systems; Eligibility requirements and manner of wearing medals and ribbons.	1		AFRP131
	(7) PA Preventive Maintenance System	Intro to PA maintenance system; Levels and Factors of Maintenance; Maintenance Principles, Maintenance Inspection. (Practical Exercises).	2	5	SPL TEXT
	h. Written Examination/Critique	All Lessons covered.	4		
5)	ISO MODULE		(26)	(45)	
	a. Local Communist Movement	History of CPP/NPA/NDF, Concern and S Infiltration, CPP/NPA/NDF Structure and Organization	6	15	
	Secessionist Movement	History of MNLF/MILF/ASG, Strategies and Tactics	4	10	
	c. AFP/PA Campaign Plan	Current Concept, AFP/PA strategies	4	10	
	Civil Military Ops(CMO)	Pillars of CMO	4	5	
	d. SOT Integrated Approach Concept	Overview of LCM Insurgency, Brief Review of SOT & MSOT, Executive Order # 21	2/2	5	
	f. Written Exam	All lectures taken.	4		
6)	WEAPONS TRAINING		(20)	(25)	
	a. Small Arms Weapons Cal. 5.56mm M16A1 Rifle Cal. 7.62mm M14 Rifle M203/M79 Grenade Launcher Sqd Asslt Rifle (SAW) M249 Cal. 7.62mm M60 (US) GPMG Cal. .30 inch (US) GPMG)	Nomenclature; General Data; Characteristics; Functions and Characteristics, function and operations, stoppage, malfunctions, and maintenance.	2	5	FM 23-9/8 FM 23-31 SPL TEXT FM 23-67/65
	b. Artillery Weapons 60mm Mortar 81mm Mortar	Nomenclature; General Data; Characteristics; Functions and Characteristics, function and operations,	2	5	FM 23-90/11 SPL TEXT

	4.2 inch Mortar 57mm Recoilless Rifle (RR) 90mm Recoilless Rifle (RR)	stoppage, malfunctions, and maintenance.			
	b. Ammunition/ Explosives Ammunitions Hand and Rifle Grenade Claymore Mine M18A1 Explosives and Other Mines Pyrotechnics (Improvised Bombs, Traps, Flares)	Classification & identification; Parts, components & functions; Care, handling and safety considerations, Firing systems, arming, testing and disarming procedures.	2	5	SPL TEXT
	d. Marksmanship Training	Fundamentals of marksmanship, different basic positions, range procedures, dry firing techniques.	4		FM 23-9
	e. Record Firing (Off- POI)	Record Firing on five (5) basic positions.	8	10	FM 23-9
	f. Written Examination/Critique	All Lessons covered.	2		
7)	RESOURCE SPEAKERSHIP		(14)		
	a. Human Rights	Intro to Human Rights (4 Hrs); IHL/LAC (6 Hrs); Control of Armed Conflict (2 hrs); Conduct of Operations (6 Hrs).	8		POI ON HUMAN RIGHTS
	b. Environmental Awareness & Protection	National Gov't Environmental Program; MOU between DENR and DND on Environment Protection. To be provided by guest lecturer from PENRO/CENRO.	2		SPL TEXT
	c. PA Sgt major's Lecture	Two (2) periods between opening and closing ceremonies. Discussion of current command policies and relationships between officers and NCOs, expectation of officers and civilian to NCO corps.	2		SPL TEXT
	d. Best EP/Valor/GC Awardees' Lecture	Two (2) periods between opening and closing ceremonies. Discussion of the guest lecturer's personal account surrounding his meritorious achievements or accomplishments. Objective of the lecture is to motivate and to inspire the students on the lecturer's experiences.	2		SPL TEXT
8)	ETHICS MODULE		Off		

			POI		
	a. AFP Code of Ethics	Articles I, II, III, V & VII of the AFP Code of Ethics.	-do-		AFP Code of Ethics
	b. The Family and Filipino Family	Autonomous society; Domestic church; The father in the Filipino Family; The mother in the Filipino family; The children in the Filipino family; Duties of Husband, Wife and Children; Gods order for the Filipino family	-do-		Spl Text
	c. Financial Consideration in Marriage	Financial consideration in marriage	-do-		Spl Text
	d. Fundamental Demand, Sins & Virtues, Gambling	Fundamental demands; Seven capital sins/virtues; Gambling; Negative effects of gambling; positive vision	-do-		Spl Text
	e. Filipino Values of Integrity and Mentality	Colonial Mentality; Relax lang mentality; Filipino Time; Walang Tiwala sa Sarili; Compadre System; Walang Bigayan, Walang lamangan mentality; Tayo-tayo lamang mentality; Paggalang; Tungkulin ng Panganay sa Pamilya; Ningas Cogon; The “awa” mentality; The Go-Between; Lack of Sportsmanship; Mañana Habit; The Belief of Filipinos about the Indolence of Filipinos; Bahala Na; Lakad System; The Bata System; Machismo; Querida System; Pagpapahalaga sa Kababaihan; Filipino value of integrity or Kabuuan ng Loob	-do-		Spl Text
9)	COMPREHENSIVE EXAMINATION	All lessons covered in the CMP	(2)	(20)	
	TOTAL		184	300	

B. NON-ACADEMICS

1)	PT/PFT/ATHLETICS	Three (3) periods weekly training & athletics, army dozen and other physical exercises. Inclusion of sports fest in the PFT program. Conduct of PFT (2x) (3 rd week - diagnostic & middle week of training period).	5	10	
2)	DISMOUNTED DRILL	One (1) period of dismounted drill weekly.	4		
3)	CEREMONIES & INSPECTION	One (1) period each every Wednesday and Friday to ceremonies and inspection.	4		
4)	FUNDAMENTALS OF SELF-DEFENSE	Intro to Self/personal defense; Intro to threat situation analysis; principles of self-defense; characteristics of knife gun fighting; unarmed combat skills; demonstration & practice of the different unarmed combat skills/techniques such as striking points, etc.			
5)	RIFLE-BAYONET TRAINING	Demonstration & practice of the different bayonet fighting techniques of an army soldiers.			
6)	COMMANDANT'S TIME	One (1) period during common module phase.	1		
7)	OPENING CEREMONIES/CRSE ORIENTATION	Four (4) periods (1-pd opening ceremonies; 3-period course orientation)	4		
	TOTAL		18	10	
	OVER-ALL TOTAL		202	310	

R E C A P I T U L A T I O N

	NR OF PERIODS	POINTS
A. ACADEMICS	184	300
B. NON-ACADEMICS	<u>18</u> 202	<u>10</u> 310

AFOS PHASE

PERIODS: 308 TRNG HRS (7-WKS)

PTS ALLOC: 550 PTS

A. ACADEMICS

	MODULE/ SUBJECTS/EVENTS	SCOPE	PDS	PTS ALLOC	REFER ENCE
1).	OPERATIONS		(54)	(75)	
	a. Ops Overview	Intro to Concept of strategic, tactical & operational structure of modern warfare; Dynamics of Cbt Power; Close, Deep & Rear ops, C2; Review on ALB Doctrine, Imperatives.	2	5	FM 101-5 SPL TEXT
	b. Light Inf Bn/ Coy TOE	Inf Coy/Bn Orgn (current) command and control system, Capabilities and employment of Light Inf Coy/Bn; Study on TOE of the Coy/Bn; Identify and describe resources that are organic, attached or in support of Inf Coy/Bn; The Hqs echelon level; Advance. Rear & Tactical Command Posts, Alternate CPs.	2	5	SPL TEXT (PA TOE)
	c. Inf Bn/Coy Wpns Tactical Employment	Discussion of Coy/Bn wpns systems (60mm & 81mm mortar, GPMG, anti-tank wpns); Tactical considerations and employment techniques of Coy/Bn wpns systems both in offense and defense (C2, Positions, Camouflaging).	2	5	SPL TEXT FM 7-8 FM 7-10
	d. Operational Environment	Discussion on terrain analysis of the country. Effects of tropical climate on the human body, communicable and non-communicable diseases.	2	5	FM-101-5-1
	e. Operational Terms and Symbols	Intro to operational Terms & Mil Symbols; Definition of Terms; Development of Mil Symbols; Locating and contents of fields.	2	5	FM 21-18
	f. March Planning and Bivouacs	Classification of Ground Troop movements; Foot Marches; Planning & Considerations of undesirable sites, occupation, sanitation in the Bivouac area. (Off-POI GPE)	4	10	SPL TEXT
	g. Combat Plans and Orders	General; Definition of Terms; Format of OPLAN, OPORD & FRAGO's, Characteristics, application & purpose.	4	5	FM 101-5 FM 7-8
	h. Operational Records and Reports	Preparation and disposition of different operational records and reports (Spot Rpt, Sit Rep, Program Rpt, DOR, etc) Maintenance of range cards and log books.	2	5	SPL TEXT

	i. Field Security Measures	Intro to FSM, FSM during movement, halt, harboring, or against enemy violent actions to minimize casualties in the field.	4	5	FM 6-20
	j. Written Examination/Critique	All lessons covered.	4		
	k. BFDMP-TLP/EOS (Sqd/Pltn level)		(26)	(25)	
	(1) Fundamentals	Intro to TLP/EOS in the sqd & pltn level; Application of the 8 steps (TLP)/5 steps of EOS in formation of plans for sqd/pltn ops and preparation and execution for cbt ops.	16	10	FM 7-8
	(2) Terrain Modeling	Intro to development and use of terrain model in the offense and defense (sqd/pltn level); construction and techniques of a terrain model, etc	2	5	SPL TEXT
	(3) GPE (Company Offensive Ops)	Students are required to apply all the principles covered in BFDMP by executing a Coy Ops (Sqd/Pltn Level Execution).	8	10	
	l. Written Examination/Critique	All Lessons covered.	2		
2)	COMBAT SUPPORT OPERATIONS		(18)	(20)	
	a. Field Artillery Ops	Intro to FA Ops/FA assets in cbt ops. Missions and types FA support types of fire support. Fire planning techniques, preparation of fire support and fire plans; target acquisition and engagement. FA support in offensive and defensive ops.	4	5	SPL TEXT FM 6-20 6-30 6-40 6-60
	b. Naval Spt Ops	Intro to Naval Spt Opns/Naval assets/Types of Naval Spt Ops, SEA Lift, Naval Gun fire spt, PN's mission and characteristics of deployment. Planning and conduct of naval spt ops in the offense and defense; Naval spt ops in COIN ops.	2	5	SPL TEXT
	c. Cbt Engr Ops	Intro to Cbt Engr Ops/its mission, mobility and counter mobility and survivability. Topographic Engr and general engineer and construction ops. Capabilities and orgn for engr planning and employment.	4	5	SPL TEXT FM 5-20/34 5-102
	d. Close Air Support Ops	Intro to CAS Ops/Air assets available, support planning; Types of Aircraft; pre-planned and immediate close air support, command and control systems; target selection, air strike control, marking targets and location of friendly positions.	4	5	SPL TEXT FM 1-101

	e. Written Examination/Critique	All lessons covered.	4		
3.	CBT SVC SPT OPNS (INF BN/COY LEVEL)		6	15	
	a. Inf Bn/Coy CSS Ops	Discussion on the key sustainment function, sustainment imperatives, management of logistics support, operational sustainment, tactical sustainment, sustainment control; CSS as deception instrument; maintenance and planning support ops.	4	10	FM 7-8/10 7-20/72
	b. Ops of Inf Bn/Coy Trains	Employment of Coy/Bn Trains in attack (offense) & in the defense; withdrawal and delay ops. (retrograde Ons)	2	5	FM 7-8/10 FM 7-20/72
	c. Written Exam/Critique	All lessons covered.			
4.	INDIVIDUAL CBT TASKS/SKILLS TRNG		(42)	(95)	
	a. Cover and Concealment	General concept; Definition of terms; Techniques camouflaging on the exposed parts of the human body, fighting position and equipment, etc.	2	5	FM 5-20
	b. Field craft and Survival	General concept; Definition of terms; Discussion & demonstration of the different field craft and survival techniques in the field. (Parts/animals-identification and snaring)	2	5	FM 5-103
	c. Individual Scouting Skills	General concept; Definition of terms; Discussion and demonstration of scouting skills and techniques, etc.	2	5	FM 21-75 SPL TEXT
	d. Individual Movement Techniques	General concept; Definition of terms; Discussion and demonstration of individual mvnt techniques (Crawls, Rushes, etc.) with or without enemy fire	2	5	FM 21-75 SPL TEXT
	e. Individual Field Fortification	General concept; Definition of terms; Discussion and demonstration of Individual 2-man, & 3-man fighting positions (Construction and Camouflaging techniques).	2	5	FM 5-103 5-20
	f. Locating the En by his fire	General concept; Definition of terms; Discussion and demonstration of techniques in locating the enemy through his fire. (crack and thump method)	2	5	
	g. Target Indication	General concept; Definition of terms; Discussion and demonstration of target indication techniques (hand/fingers distance estimate, etc.)	2	5	FM 7-8 6-30 21-75

	h. Observation and Deduction Techniques	General concept; Definition of terms; Discussion and demonstration of observation and deduction techniques applicable in the field.	2	5	SPL TEXT
	i. Techniques of Fire	General concept; Definition of terms; Discussion and demonstration of different types of fires, fire commands, and techniques.	2	5	FM 21-75 6-30 SPL TEXT
	j. Observed Fire Procedures	General concept; Definition of terms; Discussion and demonstration on how to request for indirect fires, adjust fires, role as an FO, etc.	8	10	FM 6-30
	k. Air to Ground Tactical Procedures	General concept; Definition of terms; Discussion and demonstration on how to guide an aircraft for landing and delivering fires, air to ground commo procedures and other techniques.	4	10	SPL TEXT
	l. Inf Tactics in Fortified & Built-up Areas	General concept; Definition of terms; Discussion and demonstration on how an infantry fights through with an enemy in fortified (trenches, foxholes, tunnels, and bunkers) & built-up areas (houses & buildings); vice-versa.	4	10	FM 90-10 SPL TEXT
	m. Inf-Armor Tactics & Procedures	General concept; Definition of terms; Discussion and demonstration on how an infantry-armor units fight in combined arms ops; Signal Commo Procedures & Coordination between inf-armor; loading procedures, etc.	4	10	FM 71-1
	n. Written Exam/Critique	All lessons covered.			
5.	COLLECTIVE COMBAT TASKS SKILLS TRNG		(22)	(45)	
	a. Rifle Fire Team/Squad/Pltn TOE	Inf Rifle Tm/Sqd/Pltn TOE (Current) Discussion and demonstration through static display of a rifle tm/sqd; Duties and responsibilities of each members and key leaders in a rifle tm/sqd/pltn.	2	5	FM 7-8
	b. Fire Team/Squad/Pltn Formation and Movement Techniques	General Concept; Definition of terms; Discussion and demonstration of the different types of rifle team/squad/pltn formations and movements techniques. Practical applications of the subject by students in the ground.	2	5	FM 7-8

	c. Field Hand Signal	General concept; Definition of terms; Discussion and demonstration of the different types of field hand signals used in the field. Practical application of FHS by students in the ground.	2	5	FM 7-8
	d. Fire Team/Squad/Platoon Obstacles Crossing Techniques	General Concept; Definition of terms; Discussion and demonstration of the different rifle fire tm/sqd/pltn obstacles crossing techniques, types of obstacles; Practical application by students on the ground.	4	10	FM 7-8
	e. Squad/Pltn Harboring Techniques	General Concept; Definition of terms; Discussion and demonstration of the squad/pltn day and night harboring techniques; Stand-up procedures, etc; Practical application by students on the ground.	4	10	FM 7-8
	f. Sqd Pltn Situation Trng Exercise	Students are organized into squads must undergo a squad military stakes covering subjects on individual/collective task/skills trng and other relevant subjects such as Map Reading, First Aids, etc., with time limit.	8	10	FM 7-8
6	SQD/ PLTN BATTLE DRILL TRNG (IAD)		(44)	(100)	
	a. React to Contact	General Concept; Definition of terms; Discussion and demonstration on how a rifle sqd/pltn reacts to contact (contact front); practical application of the subject drill by students on the ground.	4	10	FM 7-8
	b. Attack	General Concept; Definition of terms; Discussion and demonstration on how a rifle sqd/pltn conducts an attack (hasty/deliberate). Practical application of the subject drill by students on the ground.	4	10	
	c. Break Contact	General Concept; Definition of terms; Discussion and demonstration on how a rifle sqd/pltn breaks contact against an enemy (disengaged): Practical application of the subject drill by students on the ground.	4	10	FM 7-8
	d. React to Ambush	General Concept; Definition of terms; Discussion and demonstration on how a rifle sqd/pltn reacts to enemy initiated ambush (near or far ambush); Practical application of the subject drill by students on the ground.	4	10	FM 7-8

	e. Knock-out Bunkers	General Concept; Definition of terms; Discussion and demonstration on how a rifle sqd/pltn knock-outs an enemy's bunkers or foxholes; Practical application of the subject drill by students on the ground.	4	10	FM 7-8
	f. Enter a Bldg/Clear Room	General Concept; Definition of terms; Discussion and demonstration on how a rifle sqd/pltn enters a bldg or clears a room. Practical application of the subject drill by students on the ground.	4	10	FM 7-8
	g. Enter/Clear a Trench Line	General Concept; Definition of terms; Discussion and demonstration on how a rifle sqd/pltn enters and clear enemy trenches. Practical application of the subject drill by students on the ground	4	10	FM 7-8
	h. Conduct Initial Breach of a Mined Obstacles	General Concept; Definition of terms; Discussion and demonstration on how a platoon identifies & reacts to enemy's wire or mined obstacles that cannot be bypassed. Actions of pltn ldr, pltn sgt, RATELO, pltn FO and the leading sqd, etc; Practical application of a pltn (3 sqds) drill by students on the ground	4	10	FM 7-8
	i. Clear an Enemy Camp	General Concept; Definition of terms; Discussion and demonstration on how a platoon clears an enemy camp. Actions of pltn ldr, pltn sgt, sqd ldrs & members in clearing an enemy camp. Safety and tactical considerations etc; Practical application of a pltn (3 sqds) drill by students on the ground	4	10	FM 7-8
	j. Squad Situation Trng Ex's (STX-GPE)	Students are organized into sqds & are required to demonstrate or apply the various sqd/pltn drills with a given situation or scenarios by the instructor.	8	10	
7.	SQUAD/PLTN MISSION TACTICS TRNG		(44)	(55)	
	a. Movement to Contact	General Concept; Definition of terms; Discussion on planning, preparations, and other tactical considerations for a sqd/pltn as part of a larger force to conduct movement to contact mission	4	5	FM 7-8

	b. Attack	General Concept; Definition of terms; Discussion on planning, preparations, and other tactical considerations for a sqd/pltn as part of a larger force to conduct a sqd/pltn attack; Hasty & deliberate Attack; Attack during limited visibility; Actions at the objective; etc.	8	10	FM 7-8
	c. Defend	General Concept; Definition of terms; Discussion on planning, preparations, and other tactical considerations for a sqd/pltn as part of a larger force to conduct a sqd/pltn defense; Scty, CP & Commo, Types, Sector Sketches, Fire Control Measures, etc.	8	10	FM 7-8
	d. Raid	General Concept; Definition of terms; Discussion on planning, preparations, and other tactical considerations for a pltn as part of a larger force to conduct a raid mission; Organization, Tasks to subordinate units, Leader's recon of the objective, etc.	4	5	FM 7-8 SPL TEXT
	e. Ambush	General Concept; Definition of terms; Discussion on planning, preparations, and other tactical considerations for a sqd/pltn as part of a larger force to conduct an ambush mission. Organizations, Task to subordinate units, leader's recon of the objective, etc: Hasty & deliberate Ambush; Area & Point Ambush.	4	5	FM 7-8
	f. Retrograde	General Concept; Definition of terms; Discussion on planning, preparations, and other tactical considerations for a sqd/pltn as part of a larger force in the conduct of a retrograde ops. Withdrawal, Delay, Retirement, etc	8	10	FM 7-8
	g. Platoon Military Stakes	Students are organized into pltns (3 sqds) & undergo an STX covering pltn mission tactics with a given situation or scenario by the instructor.	8	10	
	h. Written Examination/Critique	All lessons covered.	2		
8	OTHER PLTN MSN RQRNG SPL TACTICS, TECHNQS AND PROCEDURES		(10)	(45)	
	a. Break-out from Encirclement	Intro to Concept; Definitions; Tactical & Planning considerations, organizing a Break-out; Conduct of a break-out.	2	5	FM 7-101 7-20 7-71/72

	b. Link-up Operations	Intro to Concept Definitions; Tactical & Planning considerations, procedures & Conduct of a link-up ops.	2	5	FM 7-101 7-20 7-71/72
	c. Passage of Lines	Intro to Concept Definitions; Tactical & Planning considerations, procedures & Conduct of a passage of lines.	2	5	FM 7-101 7-20 7-71/72
	d. Relief in Place	Intro to Concept Definitions; Tactical & Planning considerations, procedures & Conduct of a relief in place.	2	5	FM 7-101 7-20 7-72/8
	e. Written Examination/Critique	All lessons covered.	2		
9.	PATROLLING		(12)	(25)	
	a. Fundamentals	General Concept; Definitions of terms; Purposes; Types of Patrol; Planning, preparations & tactical considerations for Patrol missions.	2	5	FM 7-8
	b. Recon Patrol	General Concept; Purposes; Planning, preparations & tactical considerations For a recon patrol missions.	2	5	FM 7-8
	c. Combat Patrol	General Concept; Purposes; Planning, preparations & tactical considerations For combat patrol missions.	2	5	FM 7-8
	d. Tracking Patrol	General Concept; Purposes; Planning, preparations & tactical considerations For tracking patrol missions.	2	5	FM 7-8
	e. Patrol Bases	General Concept; Purposes; Planning, preparations & tactical considerations For establishing patrol bases.	2	5	FM 7-8
	f. Written Examination/Critique	All lessons covered.	2		
10.	FIELD TRAINING EXERCISES (FTX)	Application of all the lessons covered with a given scenarios (Pltn Offense/ Defense/Retrograde). Focus on the common individual tasks/skills, duties & responsibilities of a fire tm ldr/sqd ldr/pltn sgt. If possible, FTX to combine with other INF/AFPOS courses as combined arms operations.	(24)	(50)	
11.	COMPREHENSIVE EXAMINATION	All lessons covered in Common Module & AFOs Phases, (4 periods review; 4 periods examination)	4	50	
	TOTAL		280	550	

B. NON-ACADEMICS

1)	PHYSICAL TRAINING (Off POI)	Four (4) period's weekly training, athletics & other types of physical exercises. Inclusion of Battle PT & sports in the PFT.	16		FM 21-20
2)	CONFIDENCE TRAINING(Off POI)				
	a. Obstacle Course	Students must undergo an obstacle course to develop their confidence in balancing, individual or group movement techniques, climbing, leadership & teamwork, etc. This activity must be with time limit and be conducted two times (during opening & before graduation) in order to monitor their progress.			
	b. Bayonet Training	Demonstration & practice of the different bayonet fighting techniques of an infantry soldiers.			
	c. Unarmed Combat Skills	Demonstration & practice of the different unarmed combat skills/techniques such as against arms holds, arms locks, body striking points.			
	d. Rope Skills & Rappelling	Demonstration & practice of the different types of rope tying skills/techniques & techniques of using ropes in obstacle crossing and in rappelling.			
	e. River Crossing Technique (Poncho Raft)	Demonstration & practice of preparation using the poncho as an improvised raft in river crossing. This is a two man effort.			
	f. Instinctive Firing	Demonstration & practice of instinctive firing techniques as an infantry soldiers especially when acting as a lead scout. Ammo requirement must be included in the total ammo support training requirement. (Double tap and an aimed shot technique).			
	g. Sqd/Pltn Endurance Run	Students must undergo a sqd & pltn endurance run to develop their stamina, leadership & teamwork. Suggested distance for sqd endurance run is not more than eight (8) kms and for pltn run is not more than ten (10) kms. Time limit depends on the training unit standard & must be done in cross country terrain avoiding as much as possible roads.			
3)	PHYSICAL FITNESS TEST (PFT)	Conduct of last PFT on the last week of AFOs Phase for one (1) period.	2	60	FM 21-20
4)	DISMOUNTED DRILL	One (1) period of dismounted drill weekly.	4		

5)	CEREMONIES AND INSPECTION	One (1) period each every Wednesday & Friday to ceremonies and inspection.	4		
6)	STUDENT ADMINISTRATION				
	a. Conduct			50	
	b. Aptitude			30	
7)	COMMANDANT'S TIME	One (1) Period to Commandant's time	1		
8)	OUT PROCESSING				
9)	CLOSING CEREMONIES		1		
		TOTAL	28	140	
		OVER-ALL TOTAL	308	690	

RECAPITULATION

INCOBC AFOS PHASE

	<u>NUMBER OF PERIODS</u>	<u>PTS ALLOCATION</u>
A. ACADEMICS	280	550
B. NON-ACADEMICS	28	140
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TOTAL =	308	690

OVERALL RECAPITULATION

	<u>NUMBER OF PERIODS</u>	<u>PTS ALLOCATION</u>
A. COMMON MODULE	202	310
B. AFOS	308	690
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TOTAL =	510	1000

APPENDIX D

POI – INF NCO ADVANCE COURSE

A. COMMON MODULE PHASE

Duration: Six (6) Weeks (232) Training Periods

Points Allocation: 310 Points

MODULE/SUBJECTS /EVENTS	S C O P E	PDS	PTS	MOI/REF
1. LEADERSHIP MODULE		(24)	(30)	
a. Military Leadership	Leadership; principles; leadership in action; leadership in battle; leadership styles; leadership traits;; Maslow Theory & Hierarchy of Needs; types of follower	(4)	(5)	FM 22-100 Spl Text
b. Mil Customs and Tradition	Customs and traditions in the service; behavior during socials and ceremonies; ranks and procedures; seating arrangements during honors and ceremonies.	(2)	(5)	Spl Text AFP Code of Ethics FC 1-17
c. Mil Protocol and Social Graces	Service Etiquette (Intro, Cocktails, Formal Dinner, Informal Dinner, Dancing Etiquette).	(2)	(5)	Spl Text
d.. Communicative Skills		(16)	(15)	
1) Effective Speaking & Writing	Intro to communication; types of speeches including its nature and dynamics; art of listening; review on grammar; review on part of speech (nouns, pronouns, verbs, adverbs, etc); parts and construction of a sentence and paragraphs.	4	5	L/DP Spl Text
2) Methods of Instructions w/ GPE	Duties and responsibilities of an instructor; ten steps of development of instructors; lesson plan preparation and arrangements of training aids; MOI delivery techniques.	6	5	L/DP Spl Text
3) Mil Briefing (Sqd/Pltn level) w/ GPE	Fundamentals; purposes and uses; types of mil briefing; parts and preparations/presentation techniques of military briefing.	6	5	L/DP Spl Text

2. GENERAL MILITARY SUBJECTS		(52)	(35)	
a. Map Reading and Land Navigation		(28)	(20)	
1) Fundamentals	Introduction; maps; marginal info and symbols; grids; scale and distance; directions; intro to land navigation; navigation equipment and methods; elevation and relief; terrain association; use and care compass; field expedient method-use of constellations as an aid to navigation. Use of shadow method in determining directions.	16	10	L/DP SP 8-032 FM 21-26 ATSH 21-21 ATSH 21-22
2) Global Positioning System (GPS)	Intro to use of GPs; nomenclature and parts; functions; care and maintenance; use of GPS during day/night navigation.	2	5	L/DP Spl Text
3) Orienteering/ GPE	Day/Night navigation with time limit.	10	5	
b. Investigative Procedures w/ GPE	Procedure of investigation. (Off-POI) Tactical Intro/Methods of Investigation.	(4)	5	L Spl Text SP 1-101
c. Laws of Land Warfare		(4)	5	
1) Rules of Warfare (Geneva convention)	Conference covering the Geneva Convention; agreement for the amelioration of the sick, wounded and shipwrecked. Treatment of prisoners of war, and the responsibility for protection of civilian in times of war.	2		L TF 19-1732
2) Tactical Rules of Engagement (TACROE)	Code of conduct for combatants	2		L ICRC Text (Booklet)
d. Human Rights	To be provided by the guest lecturer from Commission on Human Rights during the three (3) days seminar.	(4)		L Spl Text
e. Environmental Awareness & Protection	Nat'l Gov't Environmental Program; MOU between DENR and DND on Environment Protection. To be provided by guest lecturer from PENRO/CENRO.	(4)		L Spl Text
f. Military Justice and	Provisions and punitive measures in			

Procedures	the AW's; Court Marshals and procedures; Intro to Revised Penal and civil Codes; Human Rights and OESPA Case proceedings.	(4)	5	L Spl Text ST-021
g. Written Examination/Critique	All lessons covered.	(2)		
3. PA BASIC DOCTRINE		(23)	(55)	
a. AFP Organization	AFP orgn & mission in support to national strategy and objectives. Discussion of key personalities, relationships, disposition and location of the three major service commands. (DND, GHQ, PA & PN)	(2)	5	L Spl Text
b. PA Modernization Program	Organization; units' tactical employment; weapons acquisition program; total defense concepts.	(2)	(5)	L Spl Text
c. Army Operations	Organization; units tactical employment; weapons acquisition program; total defense concepts.	(2)	(5)	L Spl Text
d. Fund of Offense	Purpose; characteristics; types of tactical offense; forms of maneuver; offensive framework; METT-T factors; planning, preparations, executions, consolidation and reorganization in offense; control measures.	(2)	(5)	L Spl Text PAM1-95 FM100-5
e. Fund of Defense	Purpose; characteristics; defense framework; control measures; planning; preparations, executions and terminating the defense.	(2)	(5)	L PAM 1-95 FM 100-5
f. Fund of Retrograde	Purpose; types of retrograde ops; preparations and executions of retro operations.	(2)	(5)	L PAM 1-95 FM 100-5
g. Special Operations Force (SOF)	History; organization; mission; tactics.	(2)	(5)	L
h. PA Doctrine Development	Background, role of unit commanders and individual soldiers.	(2)	(5)	L
i. Ops Other Than War (OOTW)		(6)	(15)	
1) Fund of OOTW	Intro and fundamentals of OOTW; the Environment; principles; activities under OOTW; operational spectrum.	2	5	L FM 101-5 (S93) PAM 1-96
2) Peacekeeping Ops	Intro and fundamentals of			

(PKO)	Peacekeeping Ops under military ops other than war; principles; UN functions and responsibilities; size and types of peace keeping force; types of peace keeping missions.	2	5	FM 100-5 (S93) Spl Text
3) Disaster Relief & Rescue Ops	Intro and fundamentals of disaster relief and rescue ops under MOOTW; principles; types of humanitarian relief of assistance; national, local gov't, IRC and other major services' coordination.	2	5	FM 100-5 (S93) Spl Text FC7-031
j. Written Examination/Critique	All lessons covered.	(2)		
4. INTERNAL SCTY OPNS MODULE (ISO)		(24)	(45)	
a. LOCAL COMMUNIST MOVMENT	History of CPP/NPA/NDF' concern and strategies, infiltration, CPP/NPA/NDF structure and organization.	6	15	PAM3-001 FC2-001
b. SECESSIONIST MOVEMENT	History of MNLF/MILF/ASG, strategies and tactics	4	10	PAM3-001 ST-031
c. AFP/PA CAMPAIGN PLAN	Current concept, current AFP/PA strategies.	4	10	
d. Civil Military Operations (CMO)	Seven (7) Pillars of CMO	4	5	PAM7-00
e. SOT Concept and Integrated Approach	Overview of LCM Insurgency, brief review of SOT & MSOT, Executive Order #21	2/2	5	SOT Handbook EO21
f. Written Examination/Critique	All lectures taken.	2		
5. BATTLEFIELD OPERATING SYSTEM		(68)	(115)	
a. Maneuver System		(4)	(10)	
1) Infantry Operations	Infantry (Light) organization; capabilities and limitations; mission; concepts of employment; weapons system.	2	5	L FM 7-10 FM 7-20 PAM 3-01
2) Armor Operations	TOE of Pa Armor units; mission; capabilities and limitations; types of armor assets; employment of armor units in the offense, defense and built-up areas; different techniques in	2	5	L MECH TOE FM 71-1 FM 71-2

	working with armor units.			PAM 3-02
b. Fundamentals of Fire Support		(6)	(15)	
1) Fire Support	Types of fire support; FA Mortar system and ammunitions; capabilities and limitations; FIST organization and employment; target acquisition.	2	5	L Spl Text PAM 3-04
2) Naval Gunfire Support	Intro to Naval Ops; types of naval assets; PN's mission and employment; planning; executions and procedures of naval gunfire support ops.	2	5	L Spl Text PAM 3-04
3) Close Air Support	Intro to CAS ops; types of air assets; pre-planned and immediate close air support; command, control and support relationship; target selection; air strike control; marking targets and location of friendly positions.	2	5	L Spl Text PAM 3-04
c. Intelligence System		(8)	(15)	
1) Enemy Update	Current threats to national security; tactics and personalities of DT are SPAG's and other threats groups.	4	5	L Spl Text
2) Intel Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB)	Intro to dev't and use of IPB, its process, threat integrations, threat evaluation, terrain analysis (OAKOC) battlefield area evaluation, weather analysis, doctrinal and situational templates.	4	5	L FM 34-130
3) GESCON	Intro to GESCON, definitions, conduct and preparations of GESCON; templates; importance of GESCON in COIN/Cbt Ops.	2	5	L Spl Text FC2-012
d. Command and Control System		(18)	(30)	
1) Troop Leading Procedure/Decision Making Process	Eight (8) steps of TLP; estimate of the situation; METT-T analysis; its application in BFDMP at Coy level and up.	8	10	L FM 7-8 FM 7-10
2) Staff Functions, Responsibilities and Procedures	Functions of the different Bn/Bde Staffs; duties and responsibilities of key staff personnel; preparations and formats of different staff records and reports.	4	5	L Spl Text FM 101-5 SP3-003
3) Combat Plans and Orders	General; definition of terms; formats of OPLAN, OPORD, and FRAG-O's,	2	5	L

	characteristics, application & purpose.			FM 101-5
4) Overlay Techniques	Intro to operational terms and military symbols; overlay techniques, uses and preparations.	2	5	L FM 101-5-1
5) Signal Support	Rifle company and Bn communications; signal units; types of AFP/PA tactical radio comms; communications in the offensive and defensive operations; field expedient methods/techniques.	2	5	FM 11-50 FM 21-60 AFP Signal Book TOE Signal Unit PAM11-00
e. Fund of Air Defense	Organization and employment of air defense system; priorities of air defense protection; principles and guidelines of ADA weapons employment; defense air warning and weapons control status; command and support relationship; different air threats.	(2)	5	L FM 7-10 FM 7-20 FM 44-3 Div TOE PAM 3-05
f. Fundamentals of Engineer Support	Mission, organization and equipment of combat engr units of infantry (L) Div; capabilities and employment considerations for cbt engr equipment in mobility, counter mobility and survivability. Types of mines; five functional areas of engr system; support relationship between engr and maneuver units.	(2)	5	L FM 20-32 FM 5-102 FM 5-103 SH 7-206S87 Div TOE PAM 3-06
g. Combat Services Support System		(20)	(35)	
1) Company CSS	Fundamentals, planning of coy CSS; re-supply ops; re-supply techniques; aerial re-supply; maintenance; trans.	2	5	L FM 7-10 PAM 4-01
2) Bn CSS	Fundamentals; planning of Bn CSS; re-supply ops; re-supply techniques; aerial re-supply; maintenance; trans.	2	5	L FM 7-20 PAM 4-01
3) Bde CSS	Fundamentals; planning of Bde CSS; re-supply ops; re-supply techniques.	2	5	L FM 7-30 PAM 4-01

4) Mess Management	Objectives and importance of mess management; functions of mess management and mess organization; definite duties and responsibilities of mess personnel; shift of mess personnel; training.	4	5	L Spl Text
5) PA Maintenance System	Directives and procedures (SOP's) on PA Maintenance System.	2	5	L Spl Text
6) Weapons Update	Review on Inventory of PA Weapons System; Nomenclature; General Data; Characteristics; Function and operations of PA new weapons system.	4	5	L Spl Text SP4-0311 SP4-0312 SP4-0313 SP4-0314
7) Company Administration	Duties and responsibilities of key personnel; Coy admin records and reports; coy supply and SOP's; maintenance of coy personnel strength; morale and welfare; personal family documents.	4	5	L Spl Text FC 1-011
h. Written Exam/ Critique	All lessons covered.	(8)		
6. ETHICS MODULE				
a. AFP Code of Ethics	Articles I, II, III, V & VI of the AFP Code of Ethics	Off POI		L AFP Code of Ethics
b. The Family and Filipino Family	Autonomous society; Domestic church; The father in the Filipino family; The mother in the Filipino family; The children in the Filipino family; Duties of Husband, Wife and Children of the Filipino family; Gods order for the Filipino family.	-do-		L Spl Text
c. Financial consideration in marriage	Financial consideration in marriage	-do-		L Spl Text
d. Fundamental demand, Sins & Virtues, Gambling	Fundamental demands; Seven capital sins/virtues; Gambling; Negative effects of Gambling; positive vision	-do-		L Spl Text
e. Filipino values of Integrity and Mentality	Colonial Mentality; Relax lang Mentality; Filipino Time; Walang Tiwala sa Sarili; Compadre System; walang Bigayan, Walang Lamangan Mentality; Tayo-tayo lamang	-do-		L Special Text

	Mentality; Paggalang; Tungkulin sa Panganay ng Pamilya; Ningas Cogon; The “awa” Mentality; The Go-between; Lack of Sportsmanship; Mañana Habit; The belief of Filipinos about the indolence of Filipinos; Bahala Na; Lakad System; The Bata System; Machismo; Querida System; Pagpapahalaga sa Kababaihan; Filipino value of integrity or Kabubuan ng loob.			
7. COMPREHENSIVE EXAMINATION	All lessons covered in the common Module Phase	(4)	(20)	
	TOTAL = = = = =	198	300	

B. NON-ACADEMIC		(34)		
1. Physical Trng/PFT Athletics	Two (2) periods weekly training and athletics; Army dozen and other physical exercises, inclusion of sports fest in the PFT program. Conduct of 1 st PFT – Diagnostic and middle of the course.	10	10	L/D/P FM 21-20 SP 8- 037
2. Dismounted Drill		10		L/D/P
3. Ceremonies & Inspection		10		L/D/P FC 1- 131
4. Commandant's Time		1		L
5. Sgt Major's Time		1		
6. Opening Ceremonies		2		
	TOTAL = = = = =	34	10	
	OVER-ALL TOTAL = = = =	232	310	
R E C A P I T U L A T I O N				
	NR OF PERIODS	POINTS		
A. ACADEMIC	198	300		
B. NON-ACADEMIC	34	10		
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	232	310		

AFOS PHASE

Duration: Eight (8) Weeks (318)Trng Pds

Points Allocation: 690 Points

A. ACADEMICS

MODULE/SUBJECTS EVENTS	S C O P E	PDS	PTS	MOI/REF
1. OPERATIONS		(50)	(90)	
a. Operations Overview	Intro to Concept of Strategic, Tactical & operational structure of modern warfare; Airland doctrine; Imperative of War; Operational Art.	2	5	FM 100-5
b. Battalion Organization	Inf Bn Orgn (current) command and control system; Describe resources which are organic, attached or in support of Inf Bn; seven (7) functional system; Operations.	2	5	FM 7-10
c. Bde Organization/Staff Ops	Inf Bde and Separate Bde orgn (current TO & E) & function; Command and Control System; Identify resources that are organic, attached or in support of Inf Bde and/or allocated by higher Hqs.	2	5	FM 7-20 7072 SP 3-003
d. Organic Wpns System in Coy/Bn Bde/Div	Weapons System organic at Coy/Bn/Bde level and in support thereto; Characteristics; Deployment	2	5	Special Text
e. Movement Formation & Techniques	Fundamentals, formations, techniques, location of key leaders & wpns systems control measures, Security.	4	10	FM 7- 10/20/30
f. Combat Plans and Orders	Formats of OPLAN/OPORD, Warning Order, FRAG-O; Characteristics of Cbt Orders; Types & Purposes; Preparation of Orders.	2	10	FM 7- 10/20/30
g. Mil Symbols & Overlay Technique	Intro to Opn'l Terms & Mil Symbols; Definition of Terms; Development of Mil Symbols; Locating & Contents of Fields, etc Overlay Techniques; Description of Overlay and its importance; Scope of preparing Map Overlay.	4	10	FM 6-30
h. Observed Fire Procedure	General Concept; Definition of Terms; Discussion & Demo on how to request for indirect fire, adjust fires, role as an	8	10	FM 6-30

	FO, etc.			
i. Battlefield Decision Making Process (BFDMP)	Eight (8) steps of the TLP/Estimate of the Situation and applying them in the formation of tactical plans; Problem Solving process and BFDMP process in Bn/Bde level.	20	30	FM 7-20/30
j. Written Examination	All lessons learned	4		
2. INTRO TO COMBINED ARMS OPNS		(14)	(30)	
a. Infantry and Armor Operations	Fundamentals in the conduct of Inf and Armor Ops; Synchronized ops of a mix force of Inf and Armor elements.	4	10	FM 71-1/2 Spl Text
b. Amphibious Operations	Definition of Terms; Landing Force, Site Area, beach and beachhead; Types/phases of ops and planning/conduct of ops.	4	10	Spl Text
c. Air Assault Operations	Fundamentals of Air Assault (Airmobile) Ops; Tactical Considerations; Basic plans, table for air movement; Number/type of aircraft in each serial and aircraft allocation.	4	10	FM 90-4
d. Written Examination	All Lessons learned	2		
3. COMBAT SUPPORT OPERATIONS		(28)	(30)	
a. Field Artillery Operations	Fundamentals of FA Ops/FA assets in combat ops; Missions & types of FA support; Types of Fire support; Fire planning technique, preparation of Fire support & fire plans; Tgt acquisition & engagement; FA support in offensive & defensive ops.	4	5	Spl Text FM 6-20/ 30/40/60 PAM3-04
b. Naval Support Operations	Fundamentals of Naval support ops/Naval assets; Types of Naval support ops; Sea Lift; Naval Gunfire Support; PN's mission and characteristics of deployment; Planning & conduct of Naval support ops in the offense and defense; Naval support in COIN operations.	4	5	Spl Text
c. Combat Engineer Operations	Fundamentals of Cbt Engr ops/its mission; Mobility, Counter mobility &	4	5	Spl Text FM 5-

	Survivability, Topographic Engr & general engr& construction ops; Capabilities & orgn for engr planning & employment.			20/34 FM 5-102/103 PAM3-06
d. Close Air Support Operations	Fundamentals of CAS Ops/Air assets available, support planning, types of aircraft, pre-planned & immediate CAS; Command & Control system; Tgt selection, Air strike control, marking tgts & location of friendly positions.	4	5	Spl Text Fm 1-101
e. Commo Electronics Ops		(8)	(10)	
1) Tactical Commo Doctrine	Definition of Terms; Requirement, responsibilities & characteristics, employment of critical signal commo.	2	2	FM 24-1 PAM11-00
2) Inf Bn/Bde Commo System	Msn, Orgn, Capabilities & Commo System in Inf Bn/Bde.	2	3	FM 7-10/20 7-72/24-16 PAM11-00
3) Battle Employment of CE Cbt Power	Commo support for various tactical situations, OPORD entry to COMMEL/Signal Paragraph.	4	5	FM 24-16 PAM11-00
f. Written Examination	All lessons learned	4		
4. CBT SVC SUPPORT OPERATIONS		(12)	(30)	
a. Inf Bn/Bde Cbt CSS Operations	General; Logistics management, personnel svc, maintenance, planning, support ops in Bn/Bde level; OPORD entry to para 4.	4	10	FM 100-5/10 PAM 4-01
b. Logistics Support Operations	Definition of Terms, sustainment planning considerations.	2	10	FM 100-10 PAM 4-01
c. Operation of Combat Trains	Determining trains orgn; Employment of combat trains; Trains management during attack & defense ops; Calculating the required supply rate; Single & dual location of trains.	4	10	FM 100-10 PAM 4-01
d. Written Examination	All lessons learned	2		
5. WEAPONS SEC/PLTN OPNS		(8)	(30)	

a. Mortar Section/Platoon Employment		2	10	SP8-0337
b. Anti-Armor Section Employment		2	10	
c. Scout Platoon Employment		2	10	
d. Written Examination		2		
6. INFANTRY (L) COMPANY OPNS		(58)	(100)	
a. Intro to Company (L) Operations	Inf Coy mission, capabilities, characteristics, limitations, operating system; Inf Coy (L) organizational set-up, personnel manning, equipment and duties & responsibilities of key personnel.	2	10	FM 7-10 DIV TOE
b. Infantry Company in the Offense	Offensive ops doctrine, purpose, Fundamentals, characteristics, phases of offensive ops, forms of maneuver & the offensive framework in formulating coy tactical plan using TLP & Cmdrs Estimate at Inf Coy/Coy Team level.	2	10	FM 7-10
c. Company Deliberate Attack	Coy planning factors in the offense, deliberate decision making process, OPORD & TEWT.	16	20	
d. Infantry Company in the Defense	Defensive ops, doctrine, purpose, fundamentals, characteristics, framework of defensive ops & defensive techniques in formulating coy tactical plan using TLP & Cmdrs estimate at Coy level. Break-out from encirclement is added as part of this subject.	2	10	FM 7-10
e. Inf Coy Deliberate Defense	Coy planning factors in the defense, deliberate decision making process, OPORD & TEWT.	16	20	
f. Inf Company Retrograde Ops	Fundamentals of Retrograde, types planning factors; Coy retrograde execution, CS, CSS factors in retrograde movements.	2	10	FM 7-10
g. Coy Retrograde Ops	Coy planning factors in Coy retrograde decision Making process, OPORD & TEWT.	16	20	

h. Written Examination/Critique	All lessons covered.	2		
7. INFANTRY BN OPNS		(58)	(100)	
a. Introduction to Bn Ops	Inf Bn mission, capabilities, characteristics, limitations, operating system, Inf Bn (L) organizational set-up, personnel manning, equipment & duties & responsibilities of key personnel.	2	10	FM 7-10/20
b. Infantry Bn in the Offense	Offensive ops doctrine, purpose, fundamentals, characteristics, phases of offensive ops, forms of maneuver & the offensive framework in formulating coy tactical plan using TLP & Comdrs Estimate at Inf Bn/TF Tm level.	2	10	FM 7-10/20
c. Battalion Deliberate Attack	Bn planning factors in the offense, deliberate decision making process, OPORD & TEWT.	16	20	
d. Infantry Bn in the Defense	Defensive ops, doctrine, purpose, fundamentals, characteristics, framework of defensive ops, and the defensive techniques in formulating coy tactical plan using TLP & Comdrs estimate at Inf Bn level. Break-out from encirclement is added as part of this subject.	2	10	FM 7-10/20
e. Battalion Deliberate Defense	Bn planning factors in the defense, deliberate decision making process, OPORD & TEWT.	16	20	
f. Inf Bn in Retrograde Ops	Fundamentals of Retrograde, types planning factors; Bn retrograde execution, CS, CSS factors in retrograde movements.	2	10	FM 7-10/20
g. Battalion Retrograde Ops	Bn planning factors in Bn retrograde decision making process, OPORD & TEWT.	16	20	
h. Written Examination/Critique	All lessons covered.	2		
8. OTHER COY/BN MSNS REQUIRING SPECIAL TECHNIQUES, TACTICS &		(6)	(20)	

PROCEDURES				
a. Break-out from Encirclement	Concept, planning considerations, organizing a break-out, Conduct of Inf Bn/Coy break-out.	1	5	FM 7-10 7-20 7-72
b. Link-up Operations	Concept, planning considerations and conduct of link-up ops by Inf Bn & Coy.	1	5	FM 7-10/20 7-71/72
c. Passage of Line	Concept, planning considerations and conduct of passage of line ops by Inf Bn & Coy.	1	5	FM 7-10/20 7-71/72
d. Relief in Place	Purpose, planning & conduct relief in place by Inf Bn/Coy level.	1	5	FM 7-10/20 7-71/72
e. Written Examination/Critique	All lessons covered.	2		
9. INFANTRY BRIGADE/DIVISION OPNS		(10)	(20)	
a. Intro to Inf Brigade Ops	Inf Bde (L) Mission, capabilities, limitations, characteristics, battlefield operating system; Inf Bde (L) orgn, Bde C2 facilities, function In the field.	2	5	FM 7-30 7-31 SP 3-012
b. Intro to Inf Bde Offensive/Defensive Ops	Fundamentals, purposes, characteristics, frameworks, types, forms of maneuver, planning considerations & concepts in the conduct of link-ups; (Bde Offensive Ops) planning considerations in the conduct of Bde defensive & retrograde ops; purpose, planning considerations & concept in the conduct of feints, ruses and demonstrations.	2	5	FM 7-30 7-31 SP 3-012
c. Intro to Inf Div Operations	Inf Div mission, capabilities, limitations, characteristics, battlefield operating system; Inf Div organization, Div C2 facilities functions in the battlefield.	2	5	FM 7-31
d. Intro to Inf Div Offensive/Defensive Ops	Fundamentals, purposes, characteristics, frameworks, types, forms of maneuver, planning considerations & concept in the conduct of link-ups; (Div Offensive ops) planning considerations, purposes in the conduct of Div defensive and retrograde ops; Purpose, planning	2	5	FM 7-31

	considerations & concept in the conduct of feints, ruses & demonstrations.			
e.Written Examination/Critique	All lessons covered.	2		
10. COMMAND POST EXERCISE (CPX)	Offense and Defense, Multi echelon/parallel planning and execution (Bde OPORD, Bn Planning, Coy Execution).	24	50	
11. COMPREHENSIVE EXAM	All lessons covered. (Common Module & AFOS). 4 periods-review; 4 periods – exam.	8	50	
	SUB - TOTAL	276	550	

B. NON-ACADEMICS

1.	PHYSICAL TRAINING (OFF-POI)			FM 21-20
2.	PHYSICAL FITNESS TEST (PFT)	4	60	SP8-037
3.	DISMOUNTED DRILL	12		
4.	CEREMONIES AND INSPECTION	14		FC 1-131
5.	STUDENTS ADMINISTRATION	(12)		
	a. Out-processing	8		
	b. Conduct		50	
	c. Aptitude		30	
	d. Closing Ceremonies	3		
6.	COMMANDANTS TIME	1		
	SUB-TOTAL	42	140	
	OVER-ALL TOTAL	318	690	

RECAPITULATION

AFOS PHASE

	<u>NR OF PDS</u>	<u>PTS ALLOC</u>
C. ACADEMICS	276	550
D. NON-ACADEMICS	42	140
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TOTAL =	318	690

OVER-ALL RECAPITULATION

	<u>NR OF PDS</u>	<u>PTS ALLOC</u>
A. COMMON MODULE	232	310
C. AFOS	318	690
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TOTAL =	550	1000

APPENDIX E

POI – INF OFFICER BASIC COURSE

Subjects	Scope	PD	PT
	COMMON MODULE PHASE		
ACADEMICS			
A. COMMUNICATION SKILLS MODULE		16	10
1. Military Correspondence	Preparation of military correspondence; subject to letter; endorsement; personnel action form; messages; investigation report; morning report; Spot Report; etc.	2	
Graded Practical Ex	Actual preparation of report of Mil Correspondence.	2	5
2. Military Briefing with Methods of Instruction	Types of Military Briefing; Staff Briefing; Information Briefing; Decision Briefing; Mission Brief Techniques of Delivery; Steps in Lesson Preparation; Techniques of presentation; Lesson Plan Preparation Learning Strategies.	4	
GPE (exclusive of off-POI periods)	Oral Presentation.	8	5
B. GENERAL SUBJECTS MODULE		32	50
1. Phil Mil History	Evolution of PA; Campaigns During the Spanish Regime; Filipino-American War; Japanese period; Anti-Insurgency; SPT's; Foreign Missions; Role of PA in Nation Building	2	5
2. Mil Customs and Traditions	Mil Traditions, Mil Customs (Salute, Flag Ceremony , the 3 Volleys Over Graves, The White Flag on Truce, Wearing of Decorations; Trumpet or Bugle Call, Courtesy Calls)	1	5
3. Military Benefits, Leaves & Privilege	Leave; Collateral Entitlements; Health Services; Burial Services.	2	5
4. OESPA	Discussions on the Army Core values (Honor, Loyalty, Valor, Duty, Solidarity); Values and Ethics	2	5
5. Social Graces and Protocol	Service Etiquette (Intro, Cocktails, Formal Dinner, Informal Dinner, Dancing Etiquette).	1	5
6. Human Rights Seminar/ Law of Land Warfare/ ROE	To be Conducted by Representative from Commission on Human Rights.	4	5
7. Peace Process	To be conducted by a representative from Office of the Presidential Adviser on Peace Process	4	5

8. Environmental Protection Seminar	Basic Concept of Ecology; Ecology in Relation to Other Services; Ecosystem and the Environment; Government Programs Being Promoted which are Related to Ecological Preservation; World Ecological Update.	4	5
9. Career Management	Procurement; AFOS and MOS; Classification and Assignment; Promotion; Reduction; Separation and Retirement; Schooling; Interaction/Open Forum; Role of the APMC.	2	5
10. First Aid (GPE)	First aid procedures	4	5
Written Examinations	Covered lessons without practical exercises	6	
C. LEADERSHIP MODULE		6	10
1. Leadership Development	Definition of leadership; Principles and factors of leadership; Values; and Traits of a Leader.	2	5
2. Counseling	Definition; counseling techniques; four steps to the conduct of normal counseling sessions	2	5
3. Case Study		2	
D. MAP READING MODULE		16	40
1. Applied Map Reading	Introduction to maps, grids, scale and distance; directions; methods of point location; elevation and relief; navigational equipment methods. GPS utilization	4	
Written Examination		4	20
2. Land Navigation	Day and night navigation	8	20
E. COMBAT SUPPORT AND COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT MODULE		10	15
1. Fundamental of Signal Support	Definition of Terms; Principles of Signal Commo; Means of Signal Commo; Advantages & Disadvantages of each means; COMSEC; Phonetic alphabet; Passwords and their meanings; Radio-Tel Basic Message Format; Establishing a Radio Net; Radio Check	2	5
2. Fundamentals of Engineer Support	Engineer missions; equipment; organization; doctrine; TTPs; Mission, Capabilities, Concept of Employment, Organization and Equipment of Combat Eng'r Units of Infantry (L) Div; Five Functional Areas of Engr System; Support relationship between Engr and Maneuver Units.	2	5
3. Fundamentals of Combat Service Support	Fundamentals; Planning of Bn Coy CSS; Resupply Ops; Resupply Techniques; Aerial Resupply; Maintenance; Trans;	4	5
Written Examination		2	
F. STAFF SUBJECTS		44	55
1. Officer Evaluation Report and NCOER (GPE)	Orientation and accomplishment of reports	1	5
2. Basic Admin Records (GPE)	Admin records at the platoon, company and battalion level	2	5

3. Military Justice	Terminologies; Preliminary Provisions; Court Martial Procedures; Punitive Provisions; Miscellaneous Crimes and Offenses.	4	5
4. Unit Supply Procedures	Classes of Supply; Supply distribution; Accountability/Responsibility; Supply economy; Duties and Responsibilities of Supply personnel. Platoon level inventories and supply procedures; assumption of responsibility for platoon equipment	4	5
5. Financial Management	TBD by guest lecturer	2	5
6. Response to Security Threats	NISP; AFP and PA campaign plans	5	10
a. National Internal Security Plan	To be presented by DND/J3 rep	(2)	(5)
b. AFP & PA Campaign Plans	To be presented by J3/G3 rep	(3)	(5)
7. Intelligence	Situation updates; GESCON; Barangay Module	16	15
a. Situation Updates	To be presented by J2/G2 rep. Include resource speakers - former CPP/NPA/NDF, CPLA and SPSG cadre.	(8)	(10)
1) Communist Terrorist Movement	To be presented by J2/G2 rep. Include resource speakers - former CPP/NPA/NDF and CPLA Cadres.	2	
2) SPSGs	To be presented by J2/G2 rep. Include resource speakers - SPSG cadre.	2	
3) Local and International Terrorist Groups	To be presented by J2/G2/PNP rep.	2	
4) Other Threat Groups	To be presented by J2/G2/PNP rep.	2	
b. Barrio Module	To be presented by G2, PA/Div G2	(8)	(5)
8. Civil Military Operations	Scope determined by CMO school. Emphasis on SOT	4	5
Written Examination		6	
G. ARMY DOCTRINE AND TACTICS		20	40
1. Army Operations	PA Mission; ALBD; Tenets of ALB; Imperatives of ALB; Principles of War Combat Power; Battlefield Framework, Future Battlefield (film showing)	2	5
2. Combat Plans & Orders	Warning Order; Fragmentary Orders; OPORD/OPLAN; OPORD Preparations (emphasis on forms)	3	5
3. Overlay Techniques	Definitions of Terms; Situation Map; Ops Map; Overlays; Use of Overlay; Importance of Overlay; Standard Color Coding; Operational Terms and Military Symbols.	2	5

4. Offensive Operations	Concepts and fundamentals of offensive operations in a field environment; movement techniques; movement formations; movement to contact; decisive point; main and supporting efforts, offensive operational terms and graphics, fundamentals of the offense	3	10
5. Defensive Operations	Fundamentals of Defensive Operations; Purpose; Characteristics; Defensive Patterns & Framework; Control measures; METT-T Factors; Planning the Defense; Preparing the Defense; Conducting the Defense; Terminating the Defense.;	3	10
6. Retrograde	General Concepts; Definition of terms; Discussion on planning, preparations, and other tactical considerations for a platoon/company as part of a larger force in the conduct of retrograde operations; Withdrawal, Delay, Retirement	3	5
Written Examination		4	
H. COMPREHENSIVE EXAMINATION		4	30
1. Review	Off POI		
2. Examination		4	
SUB-TOTAL: ACADEMICS		148	250
NON-ACADEMICS			
A. PHYSICAL FITNESS TRAINING		9	7
1. Athletics		8	
2. Physical Training/PFT-1ST	To be conducted by Non ACAD Dept and CSSO	1	7
B. APTITUDE		1	15
C. COURSE ADMINISTRATION		2	
1. Commandant's time	Dialogue with students	2	
2. Educational Tour	To be determined		
SUB-TOTAL: NON ACADEMICS		12	22
TOTAL: Common Module Phase		160	272

Subjects	Scope	PD	PT
	AFPOS PHASE		
ACADEMICS			
A. WEAPONS FAMILIARIZATION MODULE		13	25
1. Mortar 60mm (GPE)	Characteristics; employment	2	5
2. 90mm RR (GPE)	Characteristics; employment	2	5
3. M203 (GPE)	Characteristics; employment	2	5
4. MG Theory/ Machine Gunnery (GPE)	Characteristics; employment	2	5
5. Organic weapons (Coy/Bn/Bde)	Discussion of Coy/Bn/Bde weapons systems tactical consideration in employment both in Offense and Defense	4	5
Written Examination		1	
B. COMBINED ARMS MODULE		35	70
1. Mechanized Infantry Operations	Familiarization with mechanized infantry operations; Capabilities and the Army's current thrust.	2	
Practical Exercise	To be conducted by LABDE rep	4	10
2. Engineer Operations	Mobility/Counter-mobility/Survivability; Review on definition of terms; Planning considerations on M / CM / S; Mobility Tasks; Planning a Preparation; Breach tenets; Organization and Equipment; Obstacle Graphics; Survivability Tasks; Checklist	2	10
3. Fire Support Operations	FA Operations, Elements of call for fire; rules of direction; methods of target location; elements of message to observer (MTO); Corrections; preparation of call for fire; CAS, Close coordination attack using attack aviation assets, Basic of air to ground operations;	2	
Graded Practical Exercise	To be conducted in conjunction with artillery units	6	10
4. Close Air Support	Close coordination attack using attack aviation assets, Basic of air to ground operations.	2	
Graded Practical Exercise	To be conducted in conjunction if possible with PAF Units	6	10
5. Platoon/ Company Fire Planning (GPE)	Organization and equipment available for fire support at the platoon, company, battalion, brigade and division levels; the concepts of fire planning, and defensive tenets of fire planning; fire support coordination measures; tenants of offensive fire plan	4	20
6. Aircraft Procedures (GPE)	Capabilities and limitations of the UH-1H helicopter; procedures to load and unload a UH-1H helicopter;	2	

	Airmobile operations		
Graded Practical Exercise	To be conducted in conjunction if possible with PAF units	4	10
Written Examination		1	
C. ARMY DOCTRINE AND TACTICS		84	145
1. Troop Leading Procedures (with Quiz)	Review and application of Overlay Techniques and Plans and Orders; 8 steps of TLP; application of TLP;	8	20
2. GESCON (Coy Level) (GPE)	Definition; features; uses; GESCON Process; Development of Templates	4	10
3. IPB (GPE)	Definition; Discussion of the steps in IPB; Development of Templates	4	10
4. MOUT	Definition; Discussion on the conduct of MOUT operations; considerations;	4	5
5. Link up operations	Definition; Planning Consideration; Conduct of Link Up Operations	3	5
6. Passage of lines	Definition; Purpose; General and Specific Considerations; Conduct of Forward and Rearward Passage of Lines	3	5
7. Relief in Place	Definition; Purpose; Planning Considerations; Conduct of the Relief	3	5
8. Breakout from Encirclement	Purpose; Preparation; Organization; Conduct of Breakout	3	5
9. Movement Formations and Techniques (GPE)	Application of concepts and fundamentals of movement formations and techniques; command and control of fire teams, squads and platoons; execution of the proper movement techniques for fire teams, squads and platoons in a tactical environment.	8	20
10. Battle Drills (GPE)	Proper movement techniques for squad and platoon movements in a tactical environment; Attack; React to Contact, Break Contact, React to Ambush, Knock out bunkers, Enter and Clear a Trench and Conduct Initial Breach of a Mined Wire Obstacle; Enter Building/Clear Rooms	32	40
11. Patrolling	Definition; Planning Considerations; Types of Patrol (Recon, Combat, Tracking, and Patrol Bases);	8	20
Written Examination		4	
D. PLATOON AND COMPANY OPERATIONS GPE		216	260
1. Platoon Operations GPE		80	80
a. Platoon Offensive Operations Planning GPE	Mission analysis; COA preparation; preparation of tentative plan; leader's recon plan; TEWT; conduct of offensive operations; conduct of over watch and support by fire; platoon battle drills; platoon operations; battle	(40)	(40)

	drills and collective tasks FTX.		
1) Conduct of detailed mission analysis and briefing	Mission concept of higher HQ (2 levels up); Specified and implied tasks; limitations/constraints; mission essential task, task and purpose tree, timeline, terrain analysis, weather analysis, civil analysis, enemy analysis, troop analysis, enemy COA		
2) Course of action preparation and sketch	Decisive point; main and supporting efforts; form of maneuver; other mission critical information and requirements; sketch to include: objective, boundaries, main and supporting attack axes, support by fire plan, adjacent units, control measures		
3) Preparation of tentative plan	Enemy situation/ disposition; mission/plan of higher HQ; mission statement for the platoon; concept statement and sketch		
4) Preparation of leader's recon plan	Enemy situation/ disposition; security considerations; recon party composition; priority of recon effort; route; contingency plans; special equipment		
5) Offensive Tactical Ex W/O Troops	Students proceed to the AO and make final refinements in their COA. They are required to brief their final COA through the use of a terrain model.		
6) Completion of OPORD/Briefing			
b. Platoon Defensive Operations Planning GPE	Mission analysis; COA preparation; preparation of tentative plan; leader's recon plan	(40)	(40)
1) Conduct of detailed mission analysis	Mission concept of higher HQ (2 levels up); Specified and implied tasks; limitations/constraints; mission essential task		
2) Course of action preparation and sketch	Decisive point; main and supporting efforts; form of maneuver; other mission critical information and requirements; sketch to include: objective, boundaries, main and supporting attack axes, support by fire plan, adjacent units, control measures		
3) Preparation of tentative plan	Enemy situation/ disposition; mission/plan of higher HQ; mission statement for the platoon; concept statement and sketch		
4) Preparation of leader's recon plan	Enemy situation/ disposition; security considerations; recon party composition; priority of recon effort; route; contingency plans; special equipment		
5) Offensive Tactical Ex W/O Troops	Students proceed to the area of operation and make final refinements in their COA. They are required to brief their final COA through the use of a terrain model.		
6) Completion of			

OPORD/Briefing			
2. Company Operations GPE with Map Board		80	80
a. Offensive Operations Planning GPE/TEWT	Mission analysis; COA preparation; preparation of tentative plan; leader's recon plan; TEWT; conduct of offensive operations; conduct of over watch and support by fire; platoon battle drills; platoon operations; battle drills and collective tasks FTX.	(40)	(40)
1) Conduct of detailed mission analysis and DMA briefing	Mission concept of higher HQ (2 levels up); Specified and implied tasks; limitations/constraints; mission essential task, task and purpose tree, timeline, terrain analysis, weather analysis, civil analysis, enemy analysis, troop analysis, enemy COA		
2) COA preparation and sketch	Decisive point; main and supporting efforts; form of maneuver; other mission critical information and requirements; sketch to include: objective, boundaries, main and supporting attack axes, support by fire plan, adjacent units, control measures		
3) Preparation of tentative plan	Enemy situation/ disposition; mission/plan of higher HQ; mission statement for the platoon; concept statement and sketch		
4) Preparation of leader's recon plan	Enemy situation/ disposition; security considerations; recon party composition; priority of recon effort; route; contingency plans; special equipment		
5) Offensive Tactical Exercise Without Troops	Students proceed to the area of operation and make final refinements in their COA. They are required to brief their final COA through the use of a terrain model.		
6) Completion of OPORD and OPORD Briefing			
b. Defensive Operations Planning GPE/TEWT	Mission analysis; COA preparation; preparation of tentative plan; leader's recon plan	(40)	(40)
1) Conduct of detailed mission analysis	Mission concept of higher HQ (2 levels up); Specified and implied tasks; limitations/constraints; mission essential task		
2) Course of action preparation and sketch	Decisive point; main and supporting efforts; form of maneuver; other mission critical information and requirements; sketch to include: objective, boundaries, main and supporting attack axes, support by fire plan, adjacent units, control measures		
3) Preparation of tentative plan	Enemy situation/ disposition; mission/plan of higher HQ; mission statement for the platoon; concept statement and sketch		

4) Preparation of leader's recon plan	Enemy situation/ disposition; security considerations; recon party composition; priority of recon effort; route; contingency plans; special equipment		
5) Offensive Tactical Ex W/O Troops	Students proceed to the area of operation and make final refinements in their COA. They are required to brief their final COA through the use of a terrain model.		
6) Completion of OPORD/Briefing			
3. Write for Life (Company GPE)	DMA; Preparation, analysis, comparison, sketch of COA; preparation of tentative plan; preparation of leader's recon plan; TEWT; completion of OPORD and brief	16	50
4. Culmination FTX (GPE)	Company Offensive and Defensive Operations	40	50
E. LEADERSHIP AND COMPANY MANAGEMENT MODULE		12	50
1. Visioning	Providing Direction; The Visioning Process; Developing Vision and Command Philosophy; Pointers for Visioning; (*) Case Study	2	5
2. Taking Command of a Company	Challenges of a Company Commander; Duties and responsibilities; Pointers for taking Command of a Company; Command Transition; (*) Case Study	2	10
3. Administrative Responsibilities of a Company Commander	Personnel and Administration; Training; Supply; Maintenance; Counseling; Other Command Matters.	2	5
4. Tactical Proficiency	Proficiency in Combat Operations; Proficiency in Intel Operations; Proficiency in CMO	2	10
5. Developing Unit Cohesiveness	Filipino Soldier's Behaviors and Traits; Communication; Rewards and Punishments; Feedback System; (*) Case Study	2	10
6. Team Building	Definition; Foundation of Effective Teams; Relevance of Team Building in the Military; Team Building Sessions/Workshop; Team Building within Pltn, Team/Squad Level; Facilitation Skills for Team Building; Pointers for Team Building; (*) Case Study	2	10
F. COMPREHENSIVE EXAMINATION		4	50
1. Review	Off POI		
2. Examination		4	
TOTAL: ACADEMICS		364	600

NON-ACADEMICS			
A. PHYSICAL FITNESS TRAINING		23	63
1. Athletics		20	
2. Physical Training/PFT (2nd-4th)	To be conducted by Non ACAD Dept and CSSO	3	63
B. CONDUCT			50
C. APTITUDE		1	15
D. COURSE ADMINISTRATION		12	
1. Commandant's time	Dialogue with students	2	
2. Educational Tour	To be determined	8	
3. Closing Ceremony		2	
	TOTAL: NON ACADEMICS	36	128
TOTAL: AFOS Phase		400	728
RECAPITULATION			
Academics		512	850
Non-Academics		48	150
Total		560	1000

APPENDIX F

POI – INF OFFICER ADVANCE COURSE

Subjects	Scope	PD	PTS
	COMMON MODULE PHASE		
ACADEMICS			
A. PA BASIC DOCTRINE		15	45
1. Introduction to Army Operations	Environment of Operations; Foundations of Full spectrum Operations	3	10
2. Fundamentals of Offensive Operations	Purposes; conduct at the operational and tactical levels of war; characteristics; conduct within the operational framework; forms of maneuver; types; conducting offensive operations; impact of technology	2	10
3. Fundamentals of Defensive Operations	Purposes; characteristics; types; conduct within the operational framework; conducting defensive operations; impact of technology	2	10
4. Retrograde Operations	Review on the purpose of retrograde operations and the types of retrograde operations	2	5
5. Fundamentals of Stability Operations	Engagement and Response; Characteristics; Types; Considerations	2	5
6. Fundamentals of Support Operations	Characteristics; Types; Forms; Considerations	2	5
7. Written Exam	All Subjects taken	2	
B. GENERAL INFORMATION		12	
1. Human Rights, International Humanitarian Law Sem/ Workshop	Updates on human rights principles, international and national perspectives, the CHR vision, mission, powers and functions, and programs and services, and the international humanitarian law.	4	
2. Ethical Standard and Public Accountability (ESPA)	Update on organization of the OESPA, AFP professionalism, the legal and moral forces, graft and corruption, the functional code and integration and role classification. Includes discussions on Army Core philosophy.	4	
3. Environmental Protection and Awareness	To be presented by DENR representatives.	4	

C. LEADERSHIP		8	20
1. Leadership Counseling	Counseling and counseling techniques to reinforce or change behavior in a subordinate and use developmental counseling instruction and techniques.	4	10
2. Leadership Development	A review on basic leadership principles and group discussion on leadership issues. A leadership symposium will be conducted with invited Bn & Bde commanders as guest speakers.	4	10
D. COMMUNICATIVE SKILLS		36	50
1. Personality Enhancement and development	Develop a winning personality through effective interpersonal relationship & oral communication	8	15
2. Mil Briefing	Types of Military Briefings; Staff Briefing; Info Briefing; Decision Briefing; Mission Brief Techniques and Delivery/Format of OPORD, WARNO, FRAGO, Characteristics of Combat Orders, Types and Purposes. Prep of Orders	8	15
3. Battle Review Analysis/Staff Study Writing	Lessons learned from selected battles and campaigns/ Staff Study topics relevant in the present organizational set-up and environment	20	20
E. BATTLEFIELD OPERATING SYSTEM MODULE		37	85
1. Fundamentals of Maneuver			
a. Infantry Operations	Inf (L) Organization (Coy, Bn, Bde); Capabilities; Army TOE (Coy, Bn, Bde); Limitation; Mission; Concept of Employment (Coy, Bn, Bde)	2	10
b. Armor Operation	Organization (Coy, Bn, Bde); Capabilities; TOE of PA Armor Unit; Limitations; Types of armor assets; Employment of Armor units in the offense, defense, built-up areas; Different techniques in working with Armor units.	2	10
2. Fundamentals of Intelligence			
a. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB)	Introduction to IPB, conducting IPB, war-gaming and intelligence synchronization, and general guidelines and rules of thumb for use of IPB.	4	10
b. Graphical Estimate of the Situation in COIN Operations (GESCON)	Steps in the GESCON process, to template of opposing forces, weather and terrain, community situation, economic and events.	2	5

c. Fundamentals of Information Superiority	Characteristics; environment; contributors; planning and preparing to achieve information superiority; execution; impact of technology	3	5
3. Fundamentals of FS	A review on the fire support operating system and its standard control measures, fire support planning considerations and concepts, FA organizations, and the capabilities and limitations of the fire support system.	2	10
4. Fundamentals of Air Defense	The air defense battlefield operating system and its standard control measures, air defense planning considerations and concepts, the ADA organization, and the capabilities and limitations of the air defense system.	2	5
5. Fundamentals of Engineer Support	A review on the mobility, counter-mobility, and survivability operating system and its standard control measures, its planning considerations and concepts, the combat engineer organization, and the capabilities and limitations of the combat engineer system	2	5
6. Fundamentals of Combat Service Support	Purposes; characteristics; functions; planning and preparation; CSS in offensive operations, defensive operations, stability operations, and support operations; tactical CSS; Army CSS within Joint Operations; impact of technology	4	5
7. Command and Control			
a. Troop Leading Procedure	A review on the tactical decision making process at the company level and below	2	5
b. Military Decision Making Process	Decision making process at battalion level and above	2	5
c. Staff Organization and Functions	The commander, staff roles and relationship, and staff activities. The duties and responsibilities of the staffs and their relationship with each other and staff estimate preparation.	4	5
d. Signal Support	A review on the organization, mission, functions, command and control of the signal battalion, and the capabilities and limitations of the signal system.	2	5
8. Written Examination	In 3 parts (a. Fundamental of Maneuver & of Intel; b. Fundamentals of FS, AD ES, & Log Support; c. Command & Control)	4	
F. STAFF SUBJECTS		18	20
1. Response to Security Threats	National Internal Security Plan; AFP and PA campaign plans	4	5
2. Intelligence	Situation updates; GESCON; Barangay Module,	4	5

	Communist Terrorist Movement, SPSG, Local and International Threat Groups, Other threat Group.		
3. Civil Military Operations	Scope to be defined by CMOS. Emphasis on SOT	4	10
4. PA Modernization	PA Modernization Program from G5.	4	
5. Written Examinations		2	
G. COMPREHENSIVE EXAM		4	30
	TOTAL: ACADEMICS	130	250

NON-ACADEMICS			
1. Athletics	To be conducted by Non ACAD Dept and CSSO	12	
2. Commandant's Time	Dialogue with students	2	
3. Orientation	CG, G5, School, Non ACAD, Course Director briefs	8	
4. Command directed Activities		8	
5. PFT (1st)			7
6. Aptitude			15
	TOTAL: NON-ACADEMICS	30	22
TOTAL: Common Module Phase		160	272

Subjects	Scope	PD	PTS
	AFOS PHASE		
ACADEMICS			
A. INTRO TO COMBINED ARMS OPNS		15	40
1. Movement Formations & techniques	Fundamentals, formations, techniques, location of key leaders & weapon systems, control measures, security.	2	5
2. Mechanized Infantry Operations	Fundamentals in the conduct of infantry and armor operations. Synchronize operations of a mix force of infantry & armor elements.	2	5
3. Organic Weapon Systems in Coy/Bn/Bde	Identification of PA Coy/ Bn/ Bde weapons inventory, capabilities and employment considerations.		
a. Coy/ Bn Mortar	Mortar system, manning, organization, ammunition	2	5

Employment	and employment considerations.		
b. Coy/ Bn Anti-Armor Employment	Manning, organization, employment concept and tactics, fire control procedures, protection consideration, field expedient weapons for armor killer.	1	5
c. Coy/ Bn Machine Gun Employment	Manning, organization, employment concept and tactics, support by fire, minimum safe distances and surface danger zone considerations	2	5
4. Amphibious Operations	Definition of terms, landing force, site area, beach and beachhead, types/phases of ops and planning/conduct of ops.	1	5
5. Air Assault Ops	Basic plans, table for air movement, Number / type of aircraft in each serial and aircraft allocation	2	5
6. Military Operations in Urban Terrain	Fundamentals in the conduct of infantry and armor operations in urban terrain.	2	5
Written Examination	All subjects for Combined Arms Module	1	
B. COMBAT SUPPORT OPERATIONS		11	25
1. Fire Support Planning	Fire support planning considerations and concepts, FA organizations, and the capabilities and limitations of the fire support system at Co/Bn offensive/defensive operations.	2	5
2. Mobility/ Counter mobility/ Survivability Planning	The Engineers msn, organization, capabilities and employment consideration in the Co/Bn defensive/offensive ops.	2	5
3. Scout Pltn Employment	The Scout Pltn's Msn, organization, capabilities, types of reconnaissance and security missions and employment consideration in the defensive/offensive ops.	2	5
4. TAC Air Support	Use of TACAIR, CAS, Planning and employment; suppression of en ADA & air asset capabilities and limitations.	2	5
5. Army Aviation Support	Msn, organization of the Army Aviation Bn, capabilities & limitations, air asset available, & employment considerations in the offense & defense.	2	5
7. Written Examination	All subjects within the Module	1	
C. COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT OPERATIONS	Review of tactical logistics functions; CSS symbols and graphic control measures; Status and assessment charts; Combat effectiveness graphics	2	5
D. LT INF COY OPNS		127	180
1. Intro to Lt Co Ops	Inf Coy mission, capabilities, characteristics limitations, operating system. Lt Inf Coy organizational set-up, personnel manning,	1	5

	equipment and duties & responsibilities of key personnel.		
2. Troop Leading Procedure	Review on the 8 steps of decision making process at company level	4	5
3. Light Infantry Co Offense	Offensive ops doctrine, purpose, fundamentals, characteristic, phases of offensive ops, forms of maneuver and the offensive framework in formulating coy tactical plan using troop leading procedure and commander's estimate at Inf Coy /Coy tm level. Effective planning for employment of FS, M/CM/C and CSS assets in a light Inf Bn Ops.	40	40
GPE with TEWT (Coy Deliberate Attack)	Coy planning factors in the offense, deliberate decision making process, OPORD & TEWT. Instructor assisted exercise through the steps of TLP		
4. Inf Coy/ Tm Defense	Defensive ops doctrine, purpose, fundamentals, characteristics, framework of offensive operations, and defensive techniques, in formulating coy tactical plan using troop leading procedure and commander's estimate at coy level. Breakout from encirclement is added as part of the subj.	32	40
GPE with TEWT Coy /Tm Deliberate Defense)	Coy planning factors in the defense, deliberate decision making process, OPORD & TEWT.		
5. Inf Coy/Coy Tm MOUT	Definition, purpose, characteristics of urban area, planning considerations in the MOUT Offensive/Defensive ops	32	40
Graded Practical Ex w/ TEWT (Coy Tm MOUT GPE)	Coy planning factors in a defensive ops in MOUT, quick decision making process w/ TEWT		
6. Coy Tactical OPORD Writing (TOW)	Practical exercise on OPORD writing based on a given scenario for a Coy Team.	16	50
7. ACE Evaluation	Class participation, quizzes, leadership		
8. Written Examination	All subjects for Inf Coy Ops	2	
E. LT INF BN/TASK FORCE OPNS		126	185
1. Intro to Inf Bn/Task Force Ops	Inf Bn/TF mission, capabilities, characteristics, limitations, operating system, Lt Inf Bn organizational set-up, personnel manning, equipment and duties & responsibilities of key personnel, C2, system, and facilities.	2	5
3. Military Decision Making Process	Essential elements of the planning process within an Inf Bn and BDE level operation.	3	10
4. Inf Bn/Task Force Offense	Fundamentals, purposes, characteristics, framework, types, forms of maneuver, planning consideration.	40	40

	Purpose & concept in the conduct of forward passage of lines. Effective planning for employment of FS, M/CM/C and CSS assets in a light Inf Bn Op.		
GPE with TEWT (Inf Bn Offense)	Inf Bn planning factors in the offense applying deliberate decision making process (step 1 and 2), OPORD & TEWT.		
5. Inf Bn Defense	Fundamentals, purposes, characteristics, framework, types, categories of defense, planning considerations. Purpose, planning considerations & concept in the conduct of relief-in-place.	32	40
GPE with TEWT (Inf Bn Defense)	Bn/TF planning factors in the defense, deliberate decision making process thru step 3, OPORD & TEWT.		
6. GPE Light Infantry Battalion ISO Implan Formulation	Bde planning factors in the offense, deliberate decision making process, OPORD & TEWT. Offense multi-echelon/parallel planning and execution.	32	40
7. Bn Tac OPORD Writing (TOW)	Quick decision making process, OPORD writing IAW a given scenario.	16	50
8. ACE Evaluation	Class participation, quizzes, leadership		
9. Written Examination	All subjects within the Module	1	
F. LIGHT INF BDE OPNS		67	65
1. Intro to Light Inf Brigade Ops	Inf (L) Bde Mission, capabilities, limitations characteristics, battlefield operating system. Inf (L) Bde Organization. Brigade C2 facilities functions in the battlefield. Fundamentals, purposes, characteristics, framework, types, forms of maneuver, planning considerations. Purpose, planning, considerations & concept in the conduct of link-ups.	2	5
2. Inf Brigade Operations (Command Post Exercise)	Simulated command level combined arms operational exercise orchestrated by the Headquarters TRADOC, PA. Application and evaluation of the student's over-all knowledge in a conventional military operation.	40	30
3. Inf Brigade ISO (Command Post Exercise)	Simulated command level combined arms operation orchestrated by the Headquarters TRADOC, PA in ISO setting. Emphasis on GESCON.	24	30
4. ACE Evaluation	Class participation, quizzes, leadership		
5. Written Examination	All subjects within the Module	1	
G. Comprehensive Exam		2	100
	TOTAL: ACADEMICS	350	600
NON-ACADEMICS			

A. PHYSICAL FITNESS TRAINING		30	63
1. Athletics		30	0
2. Physical Training/Physical Fitness Tests (2nd-4th)	To be conducted by Non ACAD Dept and CSSO	off- poi	63
B. CONDUCT		0	50
C. APTITUDE		0	15
D. COURSE ADMINISTRATION		20	
1. Commandant's time	Dialogue with students	2	
2. Educational Tour	To be determined	16	
3. Closing Ceremony		2	
	TOTAL: NON-ACADEMICS	50	128
TOTAL: AFOS Phase		400	728
RECAPITULATION			
Academics		480	850
Non-Academics		80	150
Total		560	1000

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