Project CHECO Southeast Asia Report. Reconnaissance in SEAsia, Jul 1966 - Jun 1969. Part 2
Abstract
The traditional interpretation of the tactical reconnaissance mission as a highly mobile, self-sufficient operation prepared to "know continuously the enemy's capabilities and location" has been reemphasized by the recent military experience in Southeast Asia. A premium has been placed by several factors on the element of surprise, on detection of an enemy able to conceal himself more effectively than ever before, and on the most rapid possible response to requirements established by ground and air forces. Many axioms guiding reconnaissance organization and operations in the past have been reexamined and questioned in the light of conditions encountered in Southeast Asia. The task of providing "needed intelligence information during all phases and for the full spectrum of conflict" has created special problems yet to be fully resolved. This report reviews the expansion and growth in sophistication of the tactical reconnaissance mission in Southeast Asia (SEA) conducted by the United States Air Force from June 1966 to June 1969, noting at the same time the salient problems involved. Tactical reconnaissance emphasizes flexibility in its organization and operation; it can be deployed in package units or through various combinations of reconnaissance aircraft, sensors, and other detection devices as required by the joint force. The Wing, therefore, constitutes the basic tactical unit, small enough to fulfill mobility requirements and still provide from its own resources all the services of a tactical reconnaissance system. The broad scope of the Wing's mission can be seen in a summary of the work of the 432d Tactical Reconnaissance Wing (TRW) at Udorn Royal Thai Air Force Base (RTAFB).
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jul 15, 1969
- Accession Number
- ADA486461
Entities
People
- Edward P. Brynn
Organizations
- Pacific Air Forces