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PROJECT CHECO SOUTHEAST ASIA REPORT

**RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
NOVEMBER 1969 - SEPTEMBER 1972**

1 MARCH 1973

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Contemporary

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Examination of

Current

Operations

REPORT

**RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
NOVEMBER 1969 - SEPTEMBER 1972**

1 MARCH 1973

HQ PACAF

**Directorate of Operations Analysis
CHECO / CORONA HARVEST DIVISION**

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Prepared by:

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Capt Peter J. Melly

Project CHECO 7th AF (CDC)

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14. ABSTRACT Project CHECO was established in 1962 to document and analyze air operations in Southeast Asia. Over the years the meaning of the acronym changed several times to reflect the escalation of operations: Current Historical Evaluation of Counterinsurgency Operations, Contemporary Historical Evaluation of Combat Operations and Contemporary Historical Examination of Current Operations. Project CHECO and other U. S. Air Force Historical study programs provided the Air Force with timely and lasting corporate insights into operational, conceptual and doctrinal lessons from the war in SEA.						
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PROJECT CHECO REPORTS

The counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare environment of Southeast Asia has resulted in USAF airpower being employed to meet a multitude of requirements. These varied applications have involved the full spectrum of USAF aerospace vehicles, support equipment, and manpower. As a result, operational data and experiences have accumulated which should be collected, documented, and analyzed for current and future impact upon USAF policies, concepts, and doctrine.

Fortunately, the value of collecting and documenting our SEA experiences was recognized at an early date. In 1962, Hq USAF directed CINCPACAF to establish an activity which would provide timely and analytical studies of USAF combat operations in SEA and would be primarily responsive to Air Staff requirements and direction.

Project CHECO, an acronym for Contemporary Historical Examination of Current Operations, was established to meet the Air Staff directive. Managed by Hq PACAF, with elements in Southeast Asia, Project CHECO provides a scholarly "on-going" historical examination, documentation, and reporting on USAF policies, concepts, and doctrine in PACOM. This CHECO report is part of the overall documentation and examination which is being accomplished. It is an authentic source for an assessment of the effectiveness of USAF airpower in PACOM when used in proper context. The reader must view the study in relation to the events and circumstances at the time of its preparation--recognizing that it was prepared on a contemporary basis which restricted perspective and that the author's research was limited to records available within his local headquarters area.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Robert E. Hiller", is positioned above the typed name.

ROBERT E. HILLER
Director of Operations Analysis
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FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

Alfred A. Picinich

ALFRED A. PICINICH, Colonel, USAF
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FOREWORD

(U) The Rules of Engagment (ROE) are the controls governing the conduct of all U.S. military operations in Southeast Asia (SEA). On the grand scale they represent the operational interpretations of U.S. policies and goals with respect to the limited SEA conflict. On the operating level, they are a detailed set of rules to be followed closely by all commanders, air planners, control personnel, and combat crewmembers in the actual planning and flying of combat missions.

(U) At the time of this writing the ROE were in the limelight in the United States because of possible deviations authorized by the military command in SEA. In April 1972, the Seventh Air Force (7AF) Commander, General John D. Levelle, was removed from command amid allegations that he personally had permitted air strikes not authorized under the ROE in North Vietnam (NVN) from November 1971 through March 1972. Senate Armed Services Committee hearings on these charges were continuing into the fall of 1972.*^{1/}

(U) This report presents the ROE for air operations in SEA from November 1969 through September 1972. It is the third in a series of CHECO reports on ROE. The first report traced the evolution of the air

*The ROE for the November 1971-March 1972 period in NVN are presented in Chapter V under "Protective Reaction Strikes."

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ROE from 1960 through 1965.^{2/} The second report discussed the changes in the ROE for SEA from 1 January 1966 through 1 November 1969.^{3/}

(U) All ROE are essentially restrictive in nature and, as such, they increase the difficulty of conducting an overall air war. The purpose of this report, however, is not to analyze the impact of the ROE on the ability and success of commanders in conducting military operations. Rather, this report presents the significant events and changes pertaining to the ROE since the last report and, whenever possible, relates them to the political or military conditions which produced the requirements for the changes.

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CHAPTER I

OVERVIEW

(U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) promulgated authorizations for the conduct of all military air operations in SEA in message form as Air Operating Authorities. These messages to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC) essentially identified an air resource that could be used for a specific purpose in a given area for a specified period of time. The air authorities provided the guidelines from which CINCPAC, in consultation with his subordinate commanders in SEA, synthesized the detailed Basic Operation Orders for air operations in SEA.^{4/}

(S) Ordinarily CINCPAC assigned nicknames to the basic operation orders identifying the operations with the various geographical areas of SEA. CINCPAC Basic Operation Order BARREL ROLL/STEEL TIGER/YANKEE TEAM divided Laos into five operating areas and outlined the various responsibilities for the accomplishment of air operations in those areas. CINCPAC Basic Operation Order FREEDOM DEAL governed U.S. air interdiction operations in eastern Cambodia. The air campaign in North Vietnam prior to the bombing halt in November 1968 was nicknamed ROLLING THUNDER / BLUE TREE. The defensive air operations during the bombing halt were eventually termed "protective reaction strikes," but after the resumption of strategic bombing in May 1972, the campaign in NVN was named LINEBACKER. The protracted air operations in South Vietnam had no general nickname.^{5/}

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(U) The Rules of Engagement were grounded in the JCS Air Operating Authorities and promulgated in the CINCPAC Basic Operation Orders. They were never more permissive than the JCS authorities but could be made more restrictive by lower echelon commanders in response to special situations or conditions.^{6/} For example, representatives of the National Armed Forces of Cambodia, the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF), and the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (USMACV) negotiated the ROE for Cambodia within the JCS guidelines. They then were made a part of the FREEDOM DEAL operation order.^{7/}

(U) In South Vietnam, where no single operation order governing air operations existed, the ROE for both air and surface operations had been specified in MACV Directive 525-13, dated 12 Oct 1968, and subsequent revisions. Seventh Air Force reiterated the ROE for air operations alone in 7AFR 55-49, 14 Nov 1968. Thus, for all of SEA, the air operations planners and the aircrews had to refer to at least four basic sources and subsequent change messages to find the applicable ROE. Seventh Air Force corrected this situation on 6 December 1971 when it published 7AF Operation Order 71-17 as the single source document providing ROE for conducting air operations in all areas of SEA.^{8/}

(U) By the time 7AF Operation Order 71-17 was published, the ROE had evolved into an extensive, detailed set of rules--not a set easily committed to memory. Still, 7AF required all strike aircrews, Forward Air Controllers (FACs), air liaison officers, mission control, and mission

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planning personnel to demonstrate a thorough knowledge of the ROE before assuming operational duties.^{9/} In the Tactical Air Control Center (TACC) which allocated all 7AF strike sorties, the Target Management Officer (TMO) compiled the ROE as they were promulgated at higher echelons and distributed them to the operational units via 7AF OPORD 71-17 supplements. Also, mission planners coordinated requests for air strikes with the TMO to insure that the targets were within the ROE before allocating sorties.^{10/}

(U) In the operational units, the ROE formed an integral part of the training given newly arrived aircrew members, as well as refresher training for experienced airmen. Seventh Air Force required all strike controllers and crew members to complete a written examination on the ROE applicable to the individual's operational areas. In the 432d Tactical Reconnaissance Wing at Udorn Royal Thai AFB, for example, the Standardization and Evaluation Section conducted a two-hour block of training on ROE, usually each week. The wing ROE officer, an F-4 strike pilot, presented the ROE and administered a 50 question examination. Each pilot received the training as a new arrival and quarterly thereafter.^{11/}

(U) Besides their own ROE training, the strike crews' most important safeguard against violations of the ROE was communication with their controllers. FACs, for example, after flying over the same limited areas for many hours, were intimately familiar with the ROE in their areas. Since FACs controlled most air strikes in South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia,

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the likelihood of an ROE violation was further diminished. Even so, strike pilots were to abort the mission rather than chance a violation of the ROE, regardless of the FAC's instructions.^{12/} In addition, to prevent border violations, 7AF defined positive control areas and required aircraft directed into the areas to establish positive radio contact with radar control agencies before entering. The radar control agencies monitored aircraft positions and transmitted border warnings as necessary.^{13/}

(U) The training, procedures, and safeguards to prevent ROE violations reflect the important role the ROE played in the SEA air operations. During the period from late 1969 until September 1972 those operations expanded to include, for the first time, Cambodia and, again, all of North Vietnam. The expansion was in response to the increasing North Vietnamese threat to the Vietnamization program and to the dwindling U.S. forces in South Vietnam. Accompanying this expansion were the significant modifications in the ROE which are presented in this report.

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CHAPTER II

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT - SOUTH VIETNAM

(U) The ROE for South Vietnam were designed primarily to avoid injury to noncombatants and friendly troops. The 30 December 1971 revision of MACV Directive 525-13 emphasized this point in relationship to U.S. withdrawals from South Vietnam.^{14/}

The changing nature of operations in the RVN [Republic of Vietnam/South Vietnam] has necessitated a new approach to the ROE for the employment of firepower. The shift to predominantly Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) operations supported and advised by U.S. forces, coupled with a civilian populace that is less inclined to observe curfews and restricted areas, makes it imperative to ensure against the indiscriminate use of firepower. While the goal is maximum effectiveness in combat operations, every effort must be made to avoid civilian casualties, minimize the destruction of private property, and conserve diminishing resources. Accomplishment of these objectives requires that the ROE be adhered to by all friendly armed forces.

This guidance pertained to both ground and air firepower, but as more and more U.S. ground forces were withdrawn from South Vietnam, the thrust of the MACV directive was increasingly focused on the application of U.S. air power. U.S. air units flying from Thailand bases and offshore aircraft carriers were continuing to provide air support to South Vietnam through September, 1972.

(C) "Short rounds," the inadvertent air delivery of munitions onto friendly or noncombatant positions, was a continuing problem. Although

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short rounds did not necessarily result from violations of the ROE, strict adherence to the ROE was certainly one factor that could help prevent them. COMUSMACV focused on the problem on 17 September 1970.^{15/}

I am becoming increasingly concerned over the significant increase in the number of incidents in which friendly Vietnamese civilians have been killed or injured by U.S. aircraft. Since 2 September 1970, seven incidents have been reported. Six involved U.S. Army aircraft and one involved a USAF aircraft. Such incidents are counterproductive to U.S. goals in SEA. The alarming number of incidents occurring since 2 September 1970 indicates a need for more thorough target evaluation and clearance prior to engagement. ROE applicable to the operation of U.S. aircraft are clearly defined in MACV Directive 525-13. To impose further restriction on the tactical employment of U.S. aircraft could have an adverse effect on combat operations and jeopardize the safety of air crewmembers and passengers.

(TS) The ROE for the DMZ were modified in 1970 in response to the North Vietnamese military build-up there. After the 1968 cessation of offensive air operations against NVN, the ROE prohibited U.S. aircraft operating in South Vietnam from entering the DMZ except in hot pursuit of hostile aircraft or in immediate response to firings of surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and antiaircraft artillery (AAA).^{16/} Thus, the enemy was essentially free to move men and equipment into the DMZ. To counter this threat against Allied forces in South Vietnam, tactical air support and B-52 strikes were authorized in the southern half of the DMZ beginning in August 1970.^{17/} However, the enemy preparation continued in and above the DMZ and culminated in the Spring 1972 offensive against South Vietnam.

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(U) There were no other significant changes in the ROE in South Vietnam. The specific rules are given in the previous Project CHECO report on ROE and in 7AF OPORD 71-17.

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CHAPTER III

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT - LAOS

(S/NF) The dual U.S. goals in Laos were to support the neutrality of Laos and to hinder the infiltration of North Vietnamese men and supplies into South Vietnam via the many-fingered Ho Chi Minh Trail in eastern Laos.^{18/} While supporting these goals, the U.S. was trying to keep a low profile in deference to the 1962 Geneva Accords and to avoid damage to Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma's image among the Lao people.^{19/} Complicating the American task were the ostentatious Chinese Communist road construction effort in northern Laos and a sensitive Thai ally to the west.^{20/}

(S) The seasonal nature of the conflict in Laos further added to the complexity of the situation. The North Vietnamese transported most of their men and supplies through eastern Laos during the dry season (approximately November through April). During the wet season when large portions of the Ho Chi Minh Trail became impassable, the enemy stockpiled materiel,^{21/} improved and expanded routes, and prepared for the next dry season. These dry season surges of NVN men and equipment down the Ho Chi Minh Trail were accompanied in Northern Laos by North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and Pathet Lao offensives onto the Plaine des Jarres where they were met by the government forces of General Vang Pao's Meo guerrillas.^{22/}

(S) The role of U.S. air power in northern Laos during the dry season was interdiction of NVN supply routes and close air support of Vang Pao's guerrillas; during the wet season, it was strategic bombing of the NVN

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staging areas and harassment of the roadwork crews.^{23/} This was to be accomplished without focusing unwanted attention on the U.S. presence in Laos.^{24/}

(S) In consonance with the delicate political and military situation, theater responsibility for all U.S. military operations in Laos was vested in the American Embassy, Vientiane (AMEMBV), which validated all targets and areas of operation. To permit immediate air strikes, the Ambassador to Laos had delegated part of his authority to the Air Attache in Vientiane, to Forward Air Guides (FAGs), and to FACs with Laotian observers aboard (Raven FACs).^{25/} However, he retained validation authority for some air operations, primarily B-52 drops, use of area denial munitions, and pre-planned targets not in specifically prevalidated areas.^{26/}

(S) In efforts to make the air support of U.S. goals in Laos compatible with the various conditions, AMEMBV and U.S. air planners had partitioned Laos into various configurations of named areas, each of which had its own ROE, the most recent realignment completed in September 1969. It designated five operating areas: BARREL ROLL North, BARREL ROLL West, BARREL ROLL East, STEEL TIGER East, and STEEL TIGER West.^{27/} (See Figure 1.)

(S) The ROE in each operating area reflected the logic of the subdivision. BARREL ROLL (BR) North was a convenient buffer zone between active Allied operating areas and the People's Republic of China (PRC). The southern boundary of BR North was slightly south of the Chinese-built

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


FIGURE 1

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road across northern Laos, at least as far as the road had progressed in 1969.^{28/} Accordingly, the ROE were the most restrictive in that area. Any U.S. air strikes or tactical air reconnaissance missions required JCS approval. Even ground fire could not be returned without specific ANEMBV approval.^{29/}

(S) The ROE in BR West and STEEL TIGER (SL) West were similar, reflecting relatively moderate military actions, the presence of friendly troops, cities, and noncombatants, and their common borders with Thailand. In line with these realities, modified by the necessity for air support of the friendly troops and interdiction of infiltration routes into Thailand, the ROE were less restrictive than in BR North but more restrictive than in BR East and SL East where the enemy presence was greatest. In general, all air strikes in BR West and SL West, including the return of ground fire, had to be under FAC/FAG control. This was not so in BR East and SL East where the ROE authorized ground fire to be returned against any location (except the town of Sam Neua) without FAC/FAG control and armed reconnaissance without FAC/FAG control within 200 meters of *all* lines of communication (LOCs) up to the buffer zone along the NVN border. Strikes outside the 200 meter limit, however, had to be FAC/FAG controlled.^{30/} The ROE for these areas are detailed in the preceding CHECO report on ROE and in 7AF OPORD 71-17.

(TS) BR East contained the buffer zone along the Laos/NVN border and the staging areas from which the NVA moved across the Plaine des Jarres

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during the dry season.^{31/} (See Figure 2) The buffer zone was 10 NM wide extending from 19°N to the BR North boundary. All strikes there required JCS approval.^{32/} At the end of 1969, the Ambassador to Laos, G. McMurtrie Godley, wanted to strike the enemy LOCs in the buffer zone as supplies were being transported from NVN to the staging areas.^{33/} While the JCS had approved some strikes, Ambassador Godley, supported by CINCPAC, wanted an extension of the authority. The JCS quoted Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird as not wanting to grant broader authority "to conduct military operations that have political sensitivity, e.g., an adverse impact on U.S.-NVN discussions in Paris, international or domestic political repercussions, or possibilities of significant adverse publicity." Any expansion of existing authorities would have to be extremely well justified.^{34/}

(TS) In his justification, Ambassador Godley described the Plaine des Jarres as "an important objective in which airpower will again play a vital role." He considered the "risks worth the gamble to destroy 100,000 lbs/day of enemy ammunition and supplies that transit LOCs in the buffer zone."^{35/}

(TS/NF) The result of the Ambassador's efforts was a special operating zone established within the buffer zone. The zone, initially approved until 28 February 1970, essentially reduced the southern half of the buffer zone to a four NM strip along the Laos/NVN border.^{36/} Strikes were also authorized in the northern half of the buffer zone along Route 65 east of Sam Neua to within four NM of the NVN border.^{37/} The JCS extended these buffer zone authorities until 31 March 1970, and permitted armed reconnaissance within

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


FIGURE 2

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200 meters either side of Route 7 to a point 2600 meters from the NVN border. In all cases, the targets had to be validated by AMEMBV and the strikes conducted under FAC control. The ROE directed U.S. pilots to take every feasible precaution to preclude the inadvertent penetration of the NVN border.^{38/} However, the rules permitted laser illuminator aircraft and aircraft delivering laser guided bombs to overfly NVN within three NM of the border in order to guide ordnance onto targets in Laos.^{39/} IRON HAND SAM/AAA suppression aircraft were also allowed to cross the NVN border from Laos to position themselves between SAM/AAA sites in NVN and the strike aircraft delivering ordnance in Laos.^{40/}

(S) The buffer zone rules were later relaxed to include armed reconnaissance within 2000 meters either side of Route 7 up to four NM from the NVN border, FAC controlled armed reconnaissance and tactical air strikes within 200 meters of Route 7 (including all connecting roads) up to 200 meters of the border, and air strikes in support of temporary aircraft landing sites.^{41/} Actually, with the resumption of the interdiction bombing of NVN, the buffer zone existed in name only. In May 1972, the JCS authorized air strikes against all AMEMBV validated targets in the BARREL ROLL East buffer zone effective until the termination of the LINEBACKER campaign in NVN.^{42/}

(S) An increase in the number of Special Operating Areas (SOAs) throughout Laos accompanied the changes in the ROE along the Laos/NVN border. SOAs were areas validated by AMEMBV for air strikes without FAC control

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against all forms of enemy military activity. At the end of 1969, there^{43/} were only two SOAs--located just inside the western boundary of BR East. By June 1972, the list had been expanded to seven areas. (See Figure 3.) The ROE differed slightly in each SOA, primarily regarding the type of ordnance that could be used. The differences in allowable ordnance generally involved napalm, mining munitions, and area denial munitions, all of which would be hazardous to friendly troops in the typical see-saw ground action in Laos.^{44/}

(S) Following the ebb and flow of the ground conflict, the boundaries of the SOAs varied, especially in the case of SOA #2 which encompassed the northern half of the Plaine des Jarres and the sites of the seasonal clashes between the NVA and the Meo guerrillas.^{45/} The fluctuation of the SOA boundaries simply reflected the tie between the ROE and the support of ground troops. This also applied to the creation, expansion, and contraction of the Raven control boxes, where friendly ground forces were operating. Raven FACs, or FAGs, or fixed wing gunships in contact with FAGs controlled all air strikes within the boxes. The AMEMBV had authorized FAGs and the Laotian observers flying with Raven FACs to validate targets of opportunity.^{46/} Since Raven boxes and SOAs were contiguous, changes in any single area's boundaries usually led to changes in adjoining areas. Raven boxes advanced and retreated with the friendly troops while the SOAs moved in the opposite way. At one time during February 1972, a special night SOA existed within the Raven box on the southern half of the Plaine des Jarres. There, the ROE for SOA #2 governed air operations at night

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but the rules for the Raven box applied during daylight hours.^{47/} Figure 3 shows the location of the Raven boxes and SOAs as of 14 September 1972.^{48/} The Raven box and SOAs in southern Laos encompass the major LOCs from Laos into Cambodia.

(TS) At the same time that the ROE in BR East were becoming less restrictive, those in BR West were being tightened. The Chinese had begun a southwesterly spur from the east-west road they had been constructing within the southern boundary of BR North. Late in 1969, the spur began to emerge from BR North into BR West in the Nam Beng Valley where U.S. air operations were authorized. While the Royal Laotian Government was deciding its policy toward the road, an interim ban was placed on low level reconnaissance and combat strikes within five kilometers either side of the road.^{49/} Apparently the Laotian policy was to avoid the road because, early in 1970, the restriction became permanent from Muong Sai to Muong Houn.^{50/} (See Figure 3) Later, in July 1971, rather than continually extend the restriction as road construction progressed and new Chinese positions appeared, the JCS simply extended the restrictive BR North ROE to encompass all known or suspected Chinese positions in northern Laos. No air operations were permitted within 5000 meters of those positions unless specifically requested by AMEMBV and approved by CINCPAC and the JCS.^{51/} By September 1972, the road had progressed to within 25 miles of Pak Beng on the Mekong River--20 miles from the Thai border.^{52/}

(TS) Consistent with the policy to avoid attracting attention to the U.S. air operations in Laos and damaging Souvanna Phouma's image,

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there were altitude and radii restrictions around certain cities, mainly in SL West and BR West. The ROE generally authorized air strikes within 200 meters either side of the enemy's LOCs, sometimes with validation and FAC control required and sometimes without, depending upon the area. Air strikes more than 200 meters from a LOC and not in an SOA required validation and FAC control. Validation authority and permissible ordnance varied depending upon the five main operating areas and the SOAs within them. Strikes could not be made within 500 meters of an active village unless ground fire was received from the village.^{53/} In October 1971, this last restriction was modified for SL West to require that the ground fire be of 14.5 caliber or higher before strikes could be made within 500 meters of a village.^{54/}

(S) From 1970 through 1972, the most significant changes in the ROE for Laos were the gradual elimination of the BR East buffer zone and an increase in the number of SOAs. As in the past, many of the changes involved the BR East operating area where the enemy and his logistic networks were concentrated. However, the appearance of the Raven box and SOAs just north of the Cambodian border were evidence of the increased U.S. involvement in Cambodia.

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


FIGURE 3

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CHAPTER IV

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT - CAMBODIA

(S) Since 1966, Prince Norodom Sihanouk had permitted the North Vietnamese to ship supplies into Cambodia through the port of Sihanoukville. The North Vietnamese transported the supplies to the Cambodia/RVN border and stockpiled them at bases there for later use in South Vietnam.^{55/} At the same time, Prince Sihanouk refused the use of Cambodian airspace for U.S. air operations. Consequently, the ROE for Cambodia hinged upon the often emphasized "requirement of a military commander to defend his forces against armed attack with all means at his disposal."^{56/} The ROE permitted U.S. ground commanders in RVN who came under fire from enemy positions in Cambodia to employ all available artillery and air strikes against positively identified sources of fire. The responsive fire was to be delivered in a "timely manner" and reconnaissance by fire was strictly forbidden.^{57/}

(S) On 18 March 1970, a group of Cambodian generals led by Prime Minister Lon Nol deposed Prince Sihanouk. Lon Nol had stated earlier that he intended to follow a strictly neutralist policy. Therefore, the Viet Cong (VC) and the NVA, with Sihanouk's blessing, initiated pro-Sihanouk demonstrations and began military operations to protect their LOCs and to jeopardize the Lon Nol government. When it became obvious to Lon Nol that his national army (Forces Armées Nationales Khmer) could not stand alone against the VC/NVA, he requested help from the United States.^{58/}

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(S) Lon Nol's request for help dovetailed conveniently with U.S. military advisors' desires to clean out the VC/NVA sanctuaries in Cambodia which represented a threat to the Vietnamization program in South Vietnam. Therefore, with the dual objectives of supporting a non-communist government in Cambodia and of enhancing our efforts in Vietnam, President Richard M. Nixon authorized the 1 May 1970 incursion into Cambodia. ^{59/}

(TS) The Cambodian incursion plan was a closely held secret timed to coincide with the President's announcement. It was not until 27 April that 7AF was told to start definitive planning. Thus, there was no time to coordinate a new set of ROE for Cambodia. Instead, 7AF instructed its pilots to follow the normal rules for South Vietnam and to exercise extreme vigilance to avoid dropping ordnance on the noncombatant populace. ^{60/}

(TS) Support of ground troops along the RVN/Cambodia border was the initial role of air in Cambodia. However, within the first two weeks of May, "higher authority" requested the JCS prepare an outline plan for air interdiction operations in eastern Cambodia. This apparently was motivated by intelligence estimates that the enemy would attempt to consolidate his positions in northeastern Cambodia and extend his LOCs from Laos into Cambodia in preparation for renewed efforts in South Vietnam. ^{61/}

(TS) The plan drafted by JCS called for interdiction against enemy base areas, stored supplies, and movements of men and materiel along the LOCs; air support of friendly troops in contact; and reconnaissance. The

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JCS had patterned the target validation procedure after that for Laos in that the U.S. Embassy in Phnom Penh, or its designated representatives, was to validate all targets and areas of operation. The JCS specified some ROE but there were few specific ones. Phnom Penh would be a restricted area. Ordinarily, FACs would control all strikes but fighter aircraft would be allowed to strike any sites in Cambodia firing at U.S. aircraft. ARC LIGHT strikes would be conducted against targets a minimum of one kilometer from the nearest noncombatants and not less than three kilometers from friendly troops. B-52 target areas could not contain monuments, temples, or other historical landmarks.^{62/}

(TS) In a message to CINCPAC regarding the JCS outline plan, General Creighton Abrams, COMUSMACV, envisioned validation and FAC procedures much like those in South Vietnam, except that U.S. FACS might require FANK (Forces Armées Nationales Khmer) to fly with them to eliminate any language problems. He reasoned that the expanded air operations would entail more close air support than interdiction because the Allied forces had overrun the majority of the enemy base areas in the incursion and the enemy had not yet established new ones. Finally, General Abrams recommended a meeting between FANK, RVNAF, and MACV representatives be held in Saigon to implement target validation procedures.^{63/}

(TS) The JCS transmitted the execute message for the operation plan on 24 May. The interdiction area, later nicknamed FREEDOM DEAL, was that part of Cambodia bounded by a line 200 meters west of the Mekong River on

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the west, the Laotian border on the north, the RVN border on the east, and Route 13 on the south.^{64/} (See Figure 4) Strikes outside that area would require prior approval of the JCS. The plan as transmitted in the execute message was still an interdiction plan but the JCS had modified it to reflect General Abrams' recommendations. Thus, the American Embassy was removed from the normal target validation procedure. The JCS concurred in the requirement for a coordination meeting between FANK, RVNAF, and MACV representatives to develop target identification procedures and means to prevent noncombatant casualties.^{65/} Such a meeting was held on 29 May 1970 in Saigon. The result was a memorandum of agreement, "Rules of Engagement - Cambodia."^{66/}

(TS) The ROE promulgated in the memorandum were very similar to those for South Vietnam. FACs would control all tactical fighter strikes except for properly cleared radar controlled attacks. The FANK would validate all targets. Aircraft could return ground fire immediately if not from an urban area, town, village or hamlet, in which case FANK approval was required. In general, air strikes could not be directed at an inhabited area unless the area contained only enemy forces and was validated for strike by the FANK. As in South Vietnam and Laos, the ROE provided for special operating areas wherein all targets were prevalidated by the FANK and aircraft could attack any enemy target without further approval.^{67/}

(TS) Unique to Cambodian ROE were prevalidated Category A and B lines of communication along which enemy targets could be attacked without

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


FIGURE 4

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further approval. Category A LOCs were those along which there were no friendly personnel, traffic, installations, or dwellings. Along those LOCs, aircraft could expend ordnance on targets or suspected targets within 1000 meters on either side of the road or waterway. Category B LOCs were those used by friendlies as well as the enemy. Within 500 meters either side of Category B LOCs, aircraft could strike motor vehicles or moving watercraft at night and motor-powered boats and vehicles during the day. Prior to the first strike on a Category B LOC and periodically thereafter, psychological warfare aircraft were to drop leaflets and use loudspeakers to warn friendly personnel not to travel at night and not to use motor-powered vehicles or boats at any time. As an added safety measure, the ROE prohibited strikes within 500 meters of an inhabited village or hamlet. The rules permitted the use of area denial munitions along Category A LOCs and in special operating areas.^{68/}

(TS) To facilitate target validation outside special operating areas and not along Category A/B LOCs, a FANK liaison officer with validation authority was always on duty with the TACC at Hq 7AF. Also, at least three English speaking FANK liaison officers were stationed at Pleiku AB, RVN. They rode as observers with the U.S. FACs and, with the authority to validate targets of opportunity, they facilitated immediate attacks against fleeting enemy targets.^{69/} Later, 7AF further tightened the validation procedure for strikes against built-up areas by requiring that all such strikes be approved

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by 7AF TACC *only*. In that case, a Cambodian observer's on-the-spot validation authority was considered as merely a recommendation--the 7AF TACC retained the final say.^{70/}

(C) With the beginning of U.S. military operations in Cambodia, the Secretary of State had received inquiries showing concern over possible damage to art and archeological treasures in Cambodia. Secretary Rogers obtained a preliminary list of such sites through the American Embassy in Phnom Penh and asked that an effort be made to protect them even though the enemy would probably use them as sanctuaries. Cambodian cultural authorities initially identified 15 such sites, which were incorporated into the memorandum of agreement on ROE.^{71/} Forty-three new sites were added in June 1970; eventually, they totaled 98.^{72/} When they incorporated the original 15 site restrictions into the ROE on 29 May, the drafters of the memorandum stated that the sites would not be struck *unless* the strikes were requested and the targets validated by the FANK.^{73/} Within two weeks, however, the rule was changed to direct that no aircraft would make any strikes within 1000 meters of cultural properties. Aircraft were to depart such areas rather than return ground fire.^{74/}

(TS) The original interdiction mission in FREEDOM DEAL was to prevent the VC/NVA from using certain waterways and overland infiltration routes to deliver war material and personnel to their forces conducting aggression against South Vietnam and Cambodia and to strike enemy forces and base camps located in Cambodia.^{75/} The JCS had authorized U.S. air

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power for that purpose effective until 30 June 1970.^{76/} Since late May, U.S. aircraft had conducted reconnaissance missions east of the Mekong River except in the vicinity of Phnom Penh.^{77/} On 9 June, the JCS authorized tactical reconnaissance of all Cambodia through 30 June 1970.^{78/} In mid-June, President Nixon met with his White House Staff Advisory Group to consider future courses of action in Cambodia. According to Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, Acting Chairman, JCS, the President felt that Cambodia could be saved from a communist take-over and that a U.S. effort for that purpose was worth the risks. Since U.S. ground forces were to be out of Cambodia by 1 July, the President wanted U.S. air planners to be as imaginative as possible in the employment of air power in the critical period following the ground withdrawal.^{79/}

(TS/NF) Seventh Air Force received the following guidance on the Cambodian ROE on 24 June 1970:^{80/}

U.S. air power will be employed within Cambodian territory to maintain surveillance of enemy activities in Cambodia east of the Mekong River and attack those activities as necessary to protect U.S. forces in the Republic of Vietnam.

Further, the JCS directed that tactical air interdiction be employed in any situation involving a serious threat to major Cambodian positions whose loss would be a serious military or psychological blow to Cambodia. Adding emphasis, the JCS requested COMUSMACV to conduct an aggressive U.S. and VNAF air campaign.^{81/} At that time, however, the authority for any and all air operations in Cambodia was due to expire in just one week.

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(S) Finally, on 30 June, 7AF received a revised authority specifying air operations in Cambodia subsequent to 30 June 1970. The FREEDOM DEAL interdiction area was the same as before. A new area, called FREEDOM DEAL Extension, was defined south of and adjoining FREEDOM DEAL. (See Figure 4.) Operations in FREEDOM DEAL Extension were to be against "identified, highly lucrative targets that pose a substantial threat to Allied forces." The ROE authorized reconnaissance and search and rescue throughout Cambodia although armed reconnaissance was permitted in the FREEDOM DEAL area only. Otherwise, the ROE for Cambodia remained the same as in June.^{82/}

(TS) By the first week in November, the JCS had further expanded the interdiction area, primarily to the west (see Figure 4) to encompass new enemy build-up areas. Because of the denser population there, strikes below Route 13 were still limited to highly lucrative, threatening targets. However, the ROE permitted armed reconnaissance throughout the interdiction area.^{83/}

(S) From November 1970 through the writing of this report, the interdiction area remained constant. The total area and the CINCPAC Basic Operation Order were again nicknamed FREEDOM DEAL. There were few significant changes in the ROE within the area during the next two years. In May 1971, the FANK validated all motorable land routes and waterways in the *original* FREEDOM DEAL area (bounded by Route 13 on the south, the Mekong River on the west, and the Cambodian border on the east and north)

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as Category B LOCs in order to permit a rapid response against lucrative targets. This ROE change did not affect the status of existing Category A LOCs.^{84/} The first two special operating areas entered the ROE in February 1972.^{85/} Their approximate locations, both below Route 13, are shown in Figure 5.

(TS) Significantly, SOA #1 was partially outside the interdiction area. Until May 1971, strikes outside the FREEDOM DEAL area had required JCS approval except 7AF had discretionary authority to conduct air strikes in certain areas, in particular to support FANK ground elements defending the Kirirom Plateau and Route 4 areas.^{86/} Then, in May 1971, the JCS granted COMUSMACV discretionary authority to employ U.S. TACAIR interdiction *anywhere* in Cambodia in any situation that posed a threat to major Cambodian positions, such as a provincial capital, whose loss would be a military or psychological blow to the country. The FANK had to validate all targets and the ROE for FREEDOM DEAL applied to all discretionary strikes. COMUSMACV delegated the authority to the Commander, 7AF, in June 1971.^{87/} The authority gave 7AF the needed flexibility to more effectively counter the enemy's increasing belligerence in Cambodia through 1972. In particular, it was used to provide TACAIR and gunship protection for Khmer convoys throughout Cambodia.^{88/}

(TS) At the end of September 1972, then, there were two basic areas of operation in Cambodia. FREEDOM DEAL, the interdiction area, encompassed the eastern one-third of the country. There, TACAIR, gunship, and B-52

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interdiction strikes were authorized against enemy troops and supplies. In the rest of the country 7AF had discretionary authority to employ TACAIR and gunship interdiction in any situation that posed a threat to major Khmer positions. The growth of the interdiction area from the original FREEDOM DEAL to the area as it existed in September 1972 and the discretionary authority granted 7AF reflect the spread of NVA activity in Cambodia.

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


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CHAPTER V

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT - NORTH VIETNAM

(TS) The U.S. terminated offensive operations against NVN on 1 November 1968, but continued unarmed reconnaissance missions. The ROE established at that time permitted U.S. aircraft to enter North Vietnamese territorial airspace in pursuit of any enemy aircraft or vessel which had taken hostile action against Allied forces or had demonstrated by its actions that it was operating in support of VC/NVA insurgency in South Vietnam. Attacks were authorized against SAM/AAA weapons, installations, and supporting facilities south of 19°N immediately after such weapons were fired at Allied aircraft operating over South Vietnam or Laos. The JCS further authorized armed escorts to provide protection to manned reconnaissance aircraft below 19°N in the event those aircraft were attacked. However, in all cases, aircraft engaged in immediate response strikes were not authorized to attack other unfriendly forces or installations encountered, except in response to attack by them.^{89/}

(TS) Although immediate defensive actions were still authorized at the end of 1969, the reins were tight on military operations that could be politically sensitive, e.g., operations that could jeopardize the Paris peace discussions or cause adverse publicity. An 11 December 1969 memorandum from Secretary of Defense Laird promulgated policy guidance on politically sensitive operations and directed that the following information be provided to justify any such operations:^{90/}

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What sequence of military actions will occur if the request is approved and what broader implications might be involved?

What are the military risks of these actions?

What are the costs or penalties, respectively, if the proposed actions are authorized or not authorized?

What are the alternative means of accomplishing the objective and the cost of each alternative?

What specific results will the proposed actions achieve that the alternatives will not?

Later in December a 7AF request to conduct reconnaissance and retaliatory strikes against a belligerent AAA site above 19°N at Barthelemy Pass (see Figure 6) indicated that such strikes were considered politically sensitive and outside the existing authorities. Although U.S. pilots reported that the site had been firing at U.S. aircraft operating in Laos, the JCS required 7AF to justify its reconnaissance and strike request within the context of a politically sensitive operation.^{91/} Approval for such strikes was not easy to obtain.

Protective Reaction Strikes

(TS) At the end of 1969 and in the early part of 1970, then, the necessary criteria for strike authority into NVN were (1) the strike had to be below 19°N and (2) the strike had to be an *immediate* response against enemy aircraft or SAM/AAA which had first taken aggressive action against Allied aircraft. In a 4 February 1970 message to General George Brown, Commander of 7AF, concerning the ROE for the DMZ, General Abrams clarified

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the second criterion, emphasizing that U.S. aircraft could attack *only* the SAM/AAA or aircraft which had first fired at them--attacks on other unfriendly forces or installations encountered were prohibited. ^{92/}

(TS) During the same time period, however, 7AF was becoming more and more concerned over the increasing threat to B-52 and strike aircraft operating in Laos near the NVN border and to manned reconnaissance flights in NVN below 19°N. The threat was in the form of SAM units deployed in the vicinity of Mu Gia and Ban Karai passes below 19°N and Barthelemy Pass above 19°N. (See Figure 6.) Seventh Air Force wanted authority to conduct reconnaissance and preplanned retaliatory strikes against these sites. ^{93/}

(TS) In March 1970, the JCS authorized 7AF to conduct tactical reconnaissance and a one-time preplanned attack on occupied SAM sites and logistic targets in NVN along Route 7 east of Barthelemy Pass. The authority for the one-time strike suggested a slight relaxation of the ROE, for later that month the JCS advised 7AF that *preplanned* attacks against SAM sites in the Route 7 area of NVN and Laos could not be made *unless* a site fired at U.S. forces during the course of normal U.S. operations. Then on 1 April, CINCPAC advised that strikes against SAM/AAA sites in NVN south of 20 degrees were authorized if the site(s) fired at manned reconnaissance missions over NVN. ^{94/} This afforded added protection to aircraft flying tactical reconnaissance below 19°N. ^{95/}

(S) At the beginning of May 1970 the JCS authorized armed reconnaissance and strikes against logistic targets in the Route 1036/1039/1032 complex in

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NVN within 20 NM of the Laotian border. They also permitted a few strikes along the routes in NVN leading to the Mu Gia and Barthelemy passes and against routes north of the DMZ.^{96/} Secretary of State William Rogers described the May strikes as suppressive fire to protect reconnaissance flights over NVN. He explained that such strikes were part of an arrangement with NVN dating from the 1968 bombing halt. The U.S. would conduct reconnaissance flights over NVN and, if the enemy attacked, the U.S. aircraft would respond. It was not a new policy at all.^{97/} The term "protective reaction" was not mentioned. However, that term was applied to the next "special mission" conducted in November 1970 under the nickname FREEDOM BAIT.^{98/}

(TS) On 21 November, 7AF executed Operation FREEDOM BAIT against SAM sites, POL storage areas and truck parks in NVN below 19°N. The plan also called for armed reconnaissance along heavily used infiltration routes.^{99/} A Department of Defense spokesman described the operations as "protective reaction strikes" in response to enemy attacks on our unarmed reconnaissance aircraft. He noted that these strikes were consistent with earlier Secretary of Defense statements that the U.S. was ready to take appropriate action in response to attacks on unarmed U.S. reconnaissance aircraft, to major infiltration across the DMZ, and to the shelling of major South Vietnamese cities. Saigon and Hue had been shelled in November.^{100/}

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


FIGURE 6

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(TS) Operation FREEDOM BAIT was followed by a series of protective reaction strikes against an increasing SAM threat to B-52 and other aircraft operating over Laos, and to reconnaissance aircraft over NVN. These operations, conducted below 19°N, each included an armed reconnaissance effort followed by a one-time strike on the site of any SAM/AAA associated equipment and installations located by the reconnaissance. ^{101/} The series of operations was nicknamed LOUISVILLE SLUGGER.

(TS) The LOUISVILLE SLUGGER authorities were originally for strikes against SAM/AAA sites in the Ban Karai/Route 137 area and were to expire on 11 January 1971; however, they were extended on a case by case basis through February. ^{102/} Most of the targets were located in Route Package 1 (RP 1)* where the ROE permitted reconnaissance escorts to strike only in response to hostile fire. However, the LOUISVILLE SLUGGER authorities permitted armed reconnaissance to locate and destroy SAMs and SAM associated equipment in that area of RP 1 within 25 NM of the Laotian border. The 7AF interpretation of these conflicting rules was that escort aircraft could strike SAM targets without first being fired upon *only if* those escorts were directed into the authorized area on one of the special armed reconnaissance (LOUISVILLE SLUGGER) missions. ^{103/}

(TS) There were other preplanned protective reaction strikes similar to LOUISVILLE SLUGGER during 1971. FRACTURE CROSS in March was against air

*RP 1 includes most of that area of NVN below 18°N. (See Figure 7.)

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defense and logistic targets south of 18°N and within 30 NM of the Laotian border. ^{104/} Others were PRIZE BULL in September against all military and logistic targets in most of RP 1 and PROUD DEEP ALPHA in December against SAM sites and radar sites near the Mu Gia and Barthelemy Pass areas. ^{105/}

The ROE for PRIZE BULL were typical: ^{106/}

(1) *Protective reaction strikes north of the described arc [northern boundary of operations] are authorized when SAM/AAA defenses pose a threat to the strike force.*

(2) *Necessary precautions will be taken to avoid endangering third country shipping. Aim points will be located no closer than 400 meters to any third country shipping in the Dong Hoi transshipment point area.*

(3) *Air-to-air combat is authorized against all hostile aircraft.*

(4) *SAR operations in NVN are authorized as requested for recovery of aircrews.*

(5) *Attacks will be conducted so as to minimize danger to the civilian populace to the extent feasible without compromising effectiveness.*

(6) *No strike will be targeted against third country shipping.*

(7) *To counter a MIG threat TALOS/TERRIER [U.S. Navy ship-launched] missiles and fighter forces may engage in accordance with current operating authorities.*

(8) *Attacks will avoid known POW compounds (minimum distance of 500 meters for visual strikes, 3000 meters for all weather strikes).*

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


FIGURE 7

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(TS) As U.S. aircraft were conducting preplanned protective reaction strikes to neutralize the SAM/AAA threat in eastern RP 1, the MIG threat to B-52s, gunships and other "soft" aircraft was increasing. In the first two months of 1971, COMUSMACV, CINCPACAF, and CINCPAC collectively submitted requests to engage MIGs (airborne or on the ground), airfields, and Ground Controlled Intercept (GCI) sites in NVN below the 20th parallel. ^{107/} In April 1971, Admiral Moorer, now Chairman, JCS, recommended to the Secretary of Defense that the MIG defensive authority should be modified to permit attacks against any MIG which was (a) operating in NVN below 20°N, or (b) operating within 20 NM of the BARREL ROLL East area of Laos, or (c) deployed in NVN below 20°N. ^{108/} However, Secretary Laird disapproved the request, stating that he believed the then existing authorities were adequate to handle the NVN air defense threat. ^{109/}

(TS) Throughout the spring and into the summer of 1971 the Secretary of Defense disapproved all requests for one-time preemptive strikes against the maturing NVN air defense system south of 20°N. When he turned down a request at the end of July, just a week before General Lavelle took command of 7AF, Secretary Laird said, "as stated previously in similar circumstances by the SECDEF on 15 and 19 May and 17 June, existing authorities are considered to be adequate." ^{110/} Admiral Moorer passed the Secretary's statement on to Admiral John S. McCain, CINCPAC, with the message, "Given the above response, I am certain that you will continue to take full advantage of current authorities." ^{111/} In relaying the message to General Abrams, Admiral McCain made additional comments: ^{112/}

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The current air operating authority allows immediate protective reaction strikes upon any SAM or AAA site which fires at, or is activated against, our aircraft. I urge you to make maximum use of this existing authority for immediate reaction to SAMs and AAA in NVN, as our requests for retaliatory strike authority have consistently been denied.

On 1 August General Abrams advised General Lavelle, who had been in command for three days, to make the armed escort of sufficient force level to protect U.S. aircraft and to achieve the impact desired for fully punitive response to the enemy air defense tactics under the current authorities. He further advised that "interlocking and mutually supporting NVN air defenses constitute an unacceptable hazard to air crews attempting to identify a particular SAM/AAA firing site" and that it was "considered appropriate for escort forces to direct immediate protective reaction strikes against any identifiable element of the firing/activated air defense complex."^{113/} Later, after an attempt by a MIG to shoot down a B-52, Admiral Moorer in November 1971 interpreted hostile intent of enemy aircraft as follows:^{114/}

In my view there is no question that MIG aircraft which depart NVN airfields south of 19° North are suspect and if all source collateral information correlates with B-52 or other US/Allied air operations in NVN/Laos border area this would constitute prima-facie evidence of hostile intent.

These messages, then, had the effect of broadening the interpretation of what might be done within existing authorities.

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(TS) Although Operation PRIZE BULL had been executed in September, the enemy threat to U.S. unarmed reconnaissance aircraft and American forces remaining in South Vietnam continued to grow. After a 4 December 1971 conference on ROE, Admiral McCain advised that the reconnaissance escort package could be enlarged and structured for increased protective reaction capability and that every effort should be made "to so employ our current authorities as to maximize protective reaction against elements of the MIG threat."^{115/}

(U) By mid-December the NVN air defense system had reached a new level of sophistication. In addition to using their GCI radars to guide MIGs on intercepts of U.S. aircraft, the North Vietnamese had linked the GCI radars with the lock-on radar capability of SAM sites. Since few U.S. aircraft were equipped to detect GCI tracking as they were SAM tracking, the enemy aimed SAMs undetected until the instant of firing. According to General Lavelle, the system eventually accounted for the loss of two aircraft and crews.^{116/} The new enemy achievement was threatening 7AF's aerial reconnaissance mission in RP 1 as well as air operations in the border areas of South Vietnam and Laos.

(TS) On 5 January 1972, two F-105G aircraft of the 388th Tactical Fighter Wing, Korat Royal Thai AFB, expended anti-radiation missiles against EW/GCI radars in NVN north of the 20th parallel.^{117/} When a 388th TFW message referred to it as a "special mission," the strike caught the attention of the JCS who requested immediate details of the mission. Both

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Admiral McCain and the JCS concurred in General Abrams justification for the mission and his request for further strike authority based on the recent and continuing aggressive MIG harassment of U.S. aircraft operating in northern Laos. ^{118/} In an 8 January message to his subordinate commanders, Admiral McCain quoted Admiral Moorer on the matter: ^{119/}

[I] appreciate the logic contained in [the] references relative to the need and justification for continuation of such activity. A strong case for modifying existing authorities to permit such operations was made to higher authority using the information you provided. As of this date we have not been successful.

The urgency of the situation we are faced with is recognized and we will continue our efforts to obtain the needed authorities. In the meantime, however, we are constrained by the specific operating authorities as written: e.g.,

A. Enemy EW/GCI sites in NVN are not authorized to be attacked at any time, unless included as approved targets in operations such as PROUD DEEP.

B. SAM/AAA sites and associated equipment in NVN may be struck in immediate protective reaction only when south of 20 degrees north.

C. Incursions of NVN airspace north of 20 degrees North are not authorized without JCS approval except when in immediate pursuit of hostile enemy aircraft as provided for in the basic Rules of Engagement for Southeast Asia. Immediate protective reaction against SAM/AAA activity during such authorized flights north of 20 degrees north is authorized under the prudential rule.

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Request you continue to take all possible actions within the current rules and authorities to minimize the risk to friendly forces. I will keep you advised of any progress we may make in the area of additional authorities.

At the beginning of 1972, then, the ROE for NVN were the same as they were in April 1970 except for the interpretations regarding the hostile intent of activated SAM/AAA sites and airborne MIGs.

(TS) In December 1971 and January 1972, 7AF had applied the "more vigorous protective reaction posture" adopted by the SEA commanders at the 4 December 1971 conference on ROE. By intensifying the escort reconnaissance activity over NVN, 7AF employed the protective reaction authority to achieve what the JCS referred to as "several highly successful protective reaction strikes, examples being the attack on Quan Lang by U.S. Naval air elements on 18 Dec 1971 and the recent U.S. Air Force protective reaction strikes on Dong Hoi on 23 January."^{120/} At the same time that he praised these strikes, Admiral Moorer advised Admiral McCain and General Abrams on 26 January that the developing threat of an NVA offensive had been fully discussed at the highest levels in Washington and that Admiral McCain's desire for full standby authorities to deal with individual threats was understood. He again advised that current protective reaction authorities permitted attacks on airfield defenses when unarmed reconnaissance aircraft reconnoitering these facilities were brought under enemy attack. He said that "should the expected ground campaign develop, you are authorized to intensify the reconnaissance

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activity in the vicinity of Dong Hoi, Vinh, and Quan Lang airfields, as well as associated protective reaction strike activity when such aircraft are fired on" and "appropriate escort and defense suppression force should be utilized to insure effective results." With regard to enemy GCI radar activity, he said "current operating authorities permit anti-radiation missile attacks against SAM or AAA fire control radars below 20 degrees N when activated against friendly aircraft" but "because it is anticipated the enemy will attempt to employ MIGs directed by GCI radars, as well as SAMs and AAA to disrupt our air activity in support of friendly forces in the event of a major attack, you are authorized until 1 May 1972 to employ anti-radar missiles against primary GCI sites (BAR LOCK/SIG BAR and associated height finders) outside RP 6* when MIGs are airborne and indicate hostile intent."^{121/} On 29 January, Major General Alton D. Slay, 7AF DCS/Operations, informed all Air Force and Navy air strike forces of this major new (IRON HAND) authority.^{122/}

(TS) Early in February General Abrams passed to General Lavelle the authority to intensify reconnaissance and protective reaction strike activity in the vicinity of the Dong Hoi, Vinh, and Quan Lang airfields. (See Figure 7.) MIG aircraft airborne from those airfields were to be assumed hostile and could be engaged whenever encountered below the 18th parallel.^{123/}

*RP 6 is that area of NVN north of 20°32'N and east of 105°20'E. It contains the Hanoi/Haiphong areas.

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(TS) In spite of the recent broadening of the protective reaction strike authorities, the SEA commanders did not consider them adequate. General Abrams and Admiral McCain continued to request broader operating authorities to counter the increasing enemy air and ground threat above the DMZ; however, no changes in the ROE were forthcoming through February and March. Then, on the 21st of March, rather than broadening the authorities, Admiral Moorer sent a message to Admiral McCain and General Abrams, information to General Lavelle, implying that recent air strikes against the enemy air defenses may have been outside the protective reaction authorities. After referencing the initial 1968 authorities for use of armed escorts to protect reconnaissance aircraft and the various changes to the authority through February 1972, the Admiral said in part: ^{124/}

The increased number of protective reaction strikes since 1 January 1972 has attracted a considerable amount of high level interest here [Washington] and is receiving increasing attention from the press. Although it is recognized that these strikes are directly related to the increasing tempo of enemy air defense activity it is extremely important that such protective reactions be conducted strictly according to current air operating authorities.

In view of the extreme sensitivity of this subject and the attention it is receiving, request you insure that all crews are thoroughly briefed that current authority permits protective reaction to be taken only repeat only when enemy air defenses either fire at or are activated against friendly forces.

General Abrams on 24 March requested General Lavelle to insure that all air crews were thoroughly briefed on the current ROE for protective reaction. ^{125/}

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(U) The high level interest proved to be more intense than Admiral Moorer's message had implied. During the last week of March, General Lavelle was recalled to Washington and relieved of duty for allegedly ordering unauthorized air strikes in NVN during the period November 1971 through March 1972. The General was accused of conducting 28 raids against NVN airfields and radar sites in violation of White House rules and at a time when the Administration was engaged in delicate peace negotiations with Hanoi. Furthermore, he was accused of having strike reports falsified to conceal the unauthorized strikes. After his actions were investigated by the Senate Armed Services Committee, General Lavelle was reduced in rank and retired. ^{126/}

(U) During the same week in March that General Lavelle was recalled, Hanoi initiated a major offensive against South Vietnam. The rules which General Lavelle had transgressed were soon obsolete.

(TS) The VC/NVA launched a major invasion south of the DMZ on the night of 29/30 March 1972. On 1 April Admiral McCain sent a strong plea for broader operating authorities to the JCS. The result was authority to use tactical air strikes against SAMs, artillery, and other military and logistic targets within 25 NM north of the DMZ and authority to use B-52 strikes within the DMZ. ^{127/} The 25 NM limit was extended to 17°30'N on 3 April and then to 18°N on 4 April. ^{128/}

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(TS) On 4 April, the JCS advised Admiral McCain that the conflict had entered a new phase in Vietnam, and requested recommendations for new initiatives, authorities, and resources required.^{129/} Subsequently, the JCS authorized tactical air operations in NVN below 18°N which began on 6 April under the nickname FREEDOM TRAIN. Air strikes south of 18°N would be categorized as FREEDOM TRAIN missions, while any above 18°N would be protective reaction strikes.^{130/} On 9 April, FREEDOM TRAIN operations were extended to 19°N.^{131/}

(TS) All through April the JCS steadily broadened the air operating authorities for NVN in response to requests from 7AF, COMUSMACV, and CINCPAC. The JCS granted authority to attack any NVN military aircraft, including helicopters, south of 20°N. During any U.S. air operations in NVN north of 19°N beginning one hour before the first time over target and ending with the last aircraft egress, U.S. aircraft could attack airborne enemy fighter aircraft anywhere in NVN exclusive of the PRC buffer zone* and employ anti-radar missiles against primary GCI sites throughout NVN. TACAIR was authorized below 20°N.^{132/} After 20 April, 7AF began B-52 and TACAIR strikes against the Thanh Hoa area, Routes 1A and 7, and the Hanoi-Vinh railroad south of 20°N under the nickname FREIGHTER CAPTAIN.^{133/} On 2 May, the JCS authorized manned tactical reconnaissance south of 25°25'N. Then, on 9 May in conjunction with President Nixon's announcement

*The PRC buffer zone was that area within 30 NM of the Chinese border from the Laotian border east to 106°E and thence within 25 NM of the Chinese border to the Tonkin Gulf.

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of the mining of Haiphong Harbor, the JCS authorized offensive air operations throughout NVN below the PRC buffer zone. This marked the resumption of the interdiction bombing in NVN. ^{134/}

LINEBACKER

(TS) The air interdiction campaign, nicknamed LINEBACKER, was initiated on 10 May 1972 against the NVN transportation and supply system. ^{135/} The overall goal of the new LINEBACKER, like the old ROLLING THUNDER, was to bring sufficient pressure on the government of NVN to cause it to stop open aggression and support of insurgent operations in South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. ^{136/}

(TS) The air operations against NVN had been developed during April under FREEDOM TRAIN. Therefore, the initiation of LINEBACKER was primarily a name change rather than a massive increase in the breadth of air operations. The JCS authorized TACAIR and B-52 support "to destroy and disrupt enemy POL and transportation resources and LOCs in NVN, e.g., POL storage and pumping stations, rails and roads, bridges, railroad yards, heavy repair equipment, railroad rolling stock and trucks." The JCS further authorized air attacks to neutralize the enemy's defenses, and armed reconnaissance throughout NVN against choke points and other time-sensitive transportation/interdiction targets outside of restricted areas. ^{137/}

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(TS) The restricted areas were the PRC buffer zone and the areas within 10 NM of the centers of Hanoi and Haiphong, although the JCS could validate targets within these areas. Indeed, on 2 June the JCS authorized attacks against rail lines, bridges, and tunnels to within 10 NM of the PRC border.^{138/} There were also special category targets which were restricted, such as prisoner-of-war compounds, foreign shipping, dikes and dams, fishing boats, hospitals, and shrines. Otherwise, CINCPAC had the authority to choose fixed targets with the provision that the JCS be advised of them. Strikes and armed reconnaissance missions were to be planned so that the flight paths of U.S. aircraft would approach no closer than 20 NM to the PRC border unless, of course, the strike was authorized against one of the JCS validated targets there. Aircraft could transit the Hanoi and Haiphong restricted areas as necessary to conduct air operations.^{139/}

(TS) The ROE permitted attacks against all airborne enemy fighter aircraft anywhere in NVN except the PRC buffer zone.* Aircraft engaged in hot pursuit were authorized to pursue enemy fighter aircraft into the buffer zone up to 20 NM from the Chinese border and air attacks on military airfields were permitted when there were no third nation aircraft present. The use of anti-radar missiles was authorized against GCI sites and associated height finders throughout NVN but the tactics

*The authority to engage helicopters below 20°N had been granted in April 1972 but was later rescinded.

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employed were to preclude the impact of missiles in the territory of the PRC. ^{140/}

(TS) The ROE also specified that waterway targets could be struck if the targets were positively identified as NVN mine-clearing vessels located in NVN internal and claimed territorial waters (12 NM). Air attacks against merchant ships and third country vessels, however, were prohibited except in self-defense or with the specific approval of the JCS. The rules permitted the use of area denial munitions in NVN inland waterways and coastal waters within the three NM limit, as well as against land targets south of the PRC buffer zone. ^{141/}

(U) The LINEBACKER interdiction operation, under the 7AF command of General John W. Vogt, Jr., continued essentially unchanged through September 1972. A comparison of the air operating authorities for ROLLING THUNDER and LINEBACKER is presented in the Appendix. According to the Hq USAF ROLLING THUNDER - LINEBACKER Preliminary Comparative Analysis, LINEBACKER appeared to be the more effective interdiction campaign. ^{142/}

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APPENDIX

COMPARISON OF LINEBACKER WITH ROLLING THUNDER AIR OPERATING AUTHORITIES AND RESTRICTIONS*

ROLLING THUNDER-1968

- A. U.S. armed reconnaissance was authorized throughout NVN with the following areas excluded:
1. PRC buffer zone: The area within 30 NM of the Chinese border from the border of Laos eastward to 106°E longitude and within 25 NM of the Chinese border from 106°E longitude to the Gulf of Tonkin.
 - a. Except, strikes were authorized against railroad rolling stock on the north-east rail line and against vehicle traffic on Route 1A to a point no closer than 15 NM of the Chinese border.
 - b. Except for strikes authorized in the buffer zone, missions were to be planned so that flight paths of U.S. aircraft would approach no closer than 20 NM to the Chinese border

LINEBACKER-1972

- A. U.S. armed reconnaissance was authorized throughout NVN with the following areas excluded:
1. Same as ROLLING THUNDER.
 - a. Except, attacks were authorized against certain RR lines, bridges and tunnels to within 10 NM of the PRC border during specified time periods.
 - b. Same as ROLLING THUNDER.

*Information extracted from ROLLING THUNDER-LINEBACKER: A Preliminary Comparative Analysis, prepared by Hq USAF (DCS/P&O), Jun 72, Tab 3.

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| 2. Hanoi prohibited area:
the area within 10 NM
of the center of Hanoi. | 2. N/A in LINEBACKER. |
| 3. Haiphong prohibited area:
the area within four NM
of the center of Haiphong. | 3. N/A in LINEBACKER. |
| 4. Hanoi/Haiphong restricted
areas: the areas within
30 NM of the center of
Hanoi (excluding the Hanoi
prohibited area) and within
10 NM of the center of
Haiphong (excluding the
Haiphong prohibited area). | 4. Hanoi/Haiphong restricted
areas: the areas within
10 NM from center of each
city. |
| a. Transit of Hanoi/
Haiphong restricted
and prohibited areas
was authorized as
necessary in conducting
air operations. | a. Transit of Hanoi/
Haiphong restricted
areas was authorized
as necessary in con-
ducting air operations. |
| b. Armed reconnaissance
against LOCs and LOC-
associated targets,
including associated
ferries, fords, by-
passes, choke points
and transshipment
points, was permitted
along designated segments
of road, rail, and inland
waterways of LOCs in the
Hanoi restricted area from
the limits of the 10 NM
Hanoi prohibited area to
the periphery of the 30 NM
Hanoi restricted area and
in the Haiphong restricted
area from the limits of
the four NM Haiphong pro-
hibited area to the peri-
phery of the 10 NM Haiphong
restricted area. | b. N/A to LINEBACKER |

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| <p>c. Dispersed POL and SAM support areas within the Hanoi/Haiphong restricted areas (excluding prohibited areas) could be attacked after positive identification and after notification to Washington of the plan to attack.</p> <p>B. Attacks against JCS-numbered targets that had not been authorized were prohibited; however, attacks were authorized against POL collocated with such targets provided</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. They were in military barracks categories.2. They were outside the PRC buffer zone, Hanoi/Haiphong restricted areas, and Hanoi/Haiphong prohibited areas. <p>C. All JCS targets which had been assigned in previous ROLLING THUNDER strikes were authorized targets for armed reconnaissance.</p> <p>D. Recognized military targets of opportunity in the authorized armed reconnaissance area and craft or units which fired upon U.S. aircraft enroute to or from missions could be destroyed.</p> <p>E. Collateral damage was to be kept to a minimum consistent with desired results.</p> | <p>c. The only fixed targets in NVN which required validation by JCS were those which were in the Hanoi/Haiphong restricted areas, PRC buffer zone, or special category targets.</p> <p>B. No corresponding restrictions. Target validation requirements are in paragraph A.4.c.</p> <p>C. N/A in LINEBACKER</p> <p>D. Same as in ROLLING THUNDER.</p> <p>E. Same as in ROLLING THUNDER.</p> |
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- F. Aircraft could engage in combat operations, including SAM suppression, required to protect the strike forces.
 - G. When engaged in immediate pursuit of hostile aircraft, U.S. forces were not authorized to attack NVN air bases from which attacking aircraft were operating, except those air bases authorized for attack.
 - H. Extreme caution was required in conducting air strikes so as to avoid endangering foreign shipping.
 - I. Every feasible precaution was to be exercised in conducting air strikes, including flak/SAM suppression, in the Haiphong area to
 - 1. avoid endangering foreign shipping.
 - 2. minimize civilian casualties and collateral damage.
- F. Defense suppression was authorized as required to support air operations
 - G. Attacks were authorized against all airborne enemy fighter aircraft, but not helicopters and transports, anywhere in NVN except the PRC buffer zone. Aircraft engaged in immediate pursuit were authorized to pursue enemy fighter aircraft into the PRC buffer zone, but in no event closer than 20 NM to the PRC border.

Military airfields could be attacked; however, no NVN airfield on which third nation aircraft were present was to be attacked.
 - H. All possible precautions were to be taken to minimize civilian casualties and avoid damage to foreign shipping.
 - I. Included in "H" above.

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- J. Special coastal armed reconnaissance was authorized from 24°42' N to the PRC buffer zone. In this area, armed reconnaissance of the NVN coast and offshore islands within three NM of NVN territory, avoiding a 10 NM radius from the center of Haiphong, was authorized against
1. positively identified NVN attack-type naval craft.
 2. NVN cargo-carrying craft.
 3. craft which fired upon U.S. aircraft.
- K. Naval craft north of 24°42' N and outside of the three NM limit of the NVN coast and offshore islands were not authorized for attack.
- L. In the interest of obviating charges of escalation, either from foreign or domestic sources, the following additional authorities were to be exercised in a measured manner:
1. Attacks on newly authorized ROLLING THUNDER targets were to be scheduled at the rate of no more than three targets per day.
 2. Concentration of armed reconnaissance effort inside the 30 NM Hanoi restricted area was to be avoided.
- J. Attacks were authorized against vessels or craft positively identified as NVN which were actively engaged in, suspected of, or configured for performing mine clearing operations in NVN internal and claimed territorial waters. This provision did not permit armed actions against vessels of any nation other than NVN unless in self-defense or with the specific approval of the JCS. Extreme caution was to be exercised to avoid attacking, damaging or harassing and the appearance of attacking or harassing any third country shipping in the vicinity of the mine fields.
- K. Same as "J" above.
- L. No comparable LINEBACKER restrictions.

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3. Approximately a constant level of effort in Route Package 6 was to be maintained.
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| <p>M. Strikes on Cam Pha and Hon Gai ports were authorized only when there were no ships berthed in the docking areas or within 2000 yards of the docking areas.</p> | <p>M. Both Cam Pha and Hon Gai were validated targets. Authorization included only those areas that could be targeted with aiming point not closer than 800 feet to non-NVN shipping for TACAIR; not closer than 250 feet from non-NVN shipping for EO/LGB weapons.</p> <p>N. Other fixed targets could be added to the JCS validated target list at CINCPAC's discretion, the only proviso being that JCS be advised of this action.</p> |
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FOOTNOTES

1. Stars and Stripes (Pacific Edition), 17 Sep 72, p. 24.
2. Project CHECO Southeast Asia Report (TS), Evolution of The Rules of Engagement for Southeast Asia 1960-1965, 30 Apr 66.
3. Project CHECO Southeast Asia Report (TS), Rules of Engagement 1 January 1966-1 November 1969, 31 Aug 69. (Hereinafter cited as CHECO Report, ROE, Aug 69.)
4. Intvw (TS), 1st Lt Peter J. Melly, CHECO Historian, with Lt Col George W. Grill, 7AF/TACC, 8 Mar 72.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Memorandum of agreement, "Rules of Engagement-Cambodia," signed by Lt Col Bu Tith, National Armed Forces of Cambodia, Col Tran Dinh Tho, Army of the Republic of Vietnam, Joint General Staff/RVNAF, and BGen S. Jaskilka (USMC), USMACV, in Saigon, 29 May 70. (Hereinafter cited as Memorandum, ROE, Cambodia.) Located on CHECO microfilm roll (CMR): TS-155.
8. 7AF Operation Order 71-17, "Rules of Engagement Southeast Asia," 6 Dec 71. (The ROE for B-52 ARC LIGHT operations (S) were specified in MACV Directive 95-14.)
9. 7AF OPORD 71-17, 6 Dec 71, Sec. I, p. 2.
10. Intvw, apt Paul W. Elder, CHECO Historian, with Cmdr Norman E. Knapp, USN, Chief, TMO, 7AF/TACC, 20 Sep 72.
11. Intvw, Capt Paul W. Elder, CHECO Historian, with Capt Keith W. Jones, USAF, ROE Officer, 432d TRW, Udorn RTAFB, 26 Sep 72.
12. 7AF OPORD 71-17, Change 1, 14 Jan 72, Sec. I, p. 10.
13. 7AF OPORD 71-17, Change 2, 31 Jan 72, Sec. II, p. 7; Sec. IV, p. 15.
14. MACV Directive 525-13 (C), 30 Dec 71, para 3a.
15. Quoted in USMACV Command History 1970, Vol. I (S), Ch VI, p. 20.
16. CHECO Report, ROE, Aug 69, pp. 42, 43.
17. Msg (TS), COMUSMACV to CDR, 7AF, et. al, 311048Z Aug 70. CMR: TS-137.

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32. Msg (TS), 7/13AF to CAS, Vientiane, 101037Z Oct 69.
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36. Msg (TS), 7AF to 7/13AF, 060530Z Feb 70. CMR: TS-75.
37. Msg (TS), 7AF to 8TFW, et al, 081214Z Jan 70. CMR: TS-75.
38. Msg (TS), 7AF to 7/13AF, 081040Z Mar 70. CMR: TS-75.
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45. Msg (S), 7AF to AIG 789, Ops Supplement #20 to 7AF OPORD 71-17, 281810Z Feb 72; msg (S), 7AF to AIG 789, Ops Supplement #50 to 7AF OPORD 71-17, 301535Z Apr 72; msg (S), 7AF to AIG 789, Ops Supplement #76 to 7AF OPORD 71-17, 300735Z Aug 72.
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59. Ibid., msg (C), COMUSMACV to CDR, 7AF, 6 Aug 70.
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61. Msg (TS), JCS to CINCPAC, 161728Z May 70.
62. Ibid.
63. Msg (TS), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 191547Z May 70.
64. Msg (TS), 7AF to 3TFW, et al, 291435Z May 70; msg (TS), COMUSMACV to CDR, 7AF, 011139Z Jun 70. (Subsequent msgs gave the southern boundary as a line 200 meters south and west of Route 13 from Kratie to the border of South Vietnam.) CMR: TS-77.
65. Msg (TS), CJCS to CINCPAC, 240136Z May 70. CMR: TS-77.
66. Memorandum, ROE, Cambodia.
67. Ibid.
68. Ibid.
69. Ibid.
70. Msg (TS), 7AF to 3TFW, et al, 291435Z May 70; msg (TS), 7AF/TACC to II DASC, Pleiku AB, 091215Z Jun 70. CMR: TS-77, 85.
71. Msg (C), COMUSMACV to CG, DMAC, et al, 201037Z May 70; msg (C), AMEMBASSY, Phnom Penh, to SECSTATE, 180845Z May 70. CMR: TS-85.
72. Msg (C), 7AF/TACC to 3TFW, Bien Hoa, et al, 280945Z Jun 70; 7AF OPOD 71-17, 6 Dec 71, Sec. III, pp. 5-9. CMR: TS-85.
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74. Msg (C), 7AF/TACC to 3TFW, et al, 191015Z Jun 70. CMR: TS-85.
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81. Msg (TS), 7AF to COMUSMACV, 261340Z Jun 70. CMR: TS-85.
82. Msg (S), 7AF to CG, I MAF, Da Nang AB, et al, 061115Z Jul 70. CMR: TS-85.
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92. Msg (TS), COMUSMACV to CDR, 7AF, 041040Z Feb 70. CMR: TS-102.
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99. Msg (TS), COMUSMACV to CJCS 211716Z Nov 70. CMR: TS-94.
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102. Msg (TS), CJCS to ACJCS, 111135Z Jan 71; msgs (TS), subj: LOUISVILLE SLUGGER, 1 Jan-3 Mar 71. CMR: TS-94.
103. Msg (TS), 7AF to 432 TRW, 070725Z Jan 71; RP 1 definition located in 7AF OPORD 71-17, 6 Dec 71, Sec. V, p. 2.
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106. Msg (TS), 7AF to 8TFW, et al, 191445Z Sep 71. CMR: TS-110.
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110. Msg (TS), JCS to CINCPAC, 241609Z Jul 71, cited in Protective Reaction Strike Authority, p. 3.
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113. Msg (TS), COMUSMACV to CDR, 7AF, 010940Z Aug 71, cited in Protective Reaction Strike Authority, p. 3.
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117. Msg (TS), CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, et al, 080053Z Jan 72. CMR: TS-125.
118. Protective Reaction Strike Authority, pp. 1, 5.
119. Msg (TS), CINCPAC to CDR, 7AF, et al, 080354Z Jan 72. CMR: TS-125.
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123. Msg (TS), COMUSMACV to CDR, 7AF, 290145Z Feb 72. CMR: TS-137.
124. Msg (TS), JCS to CINCPAC and COMUSMACV, 212257Z Mar 72. CMR: TS-137.
125. Msg (TS), COMUSMACV to CDR, 7AF, 240940Z Mar 72. CMR: TS-137.
126. Time, "Armed Forces: The Lavelle Case," 25 Sep 72, p. 24.
127. Msg (TS), JCS to CINCPAC, 021702Z Apr 72. CMR: TS-137.
128. Msg (TS), JCS to CINCPAC, 031716Z Apr 72; msg (TS), JCS to CINCPAC, 042325Z Apr 72. CMR: TS-137.
129. Msg (TS), CINCPAC to CJCS, 070510Z Apr 72. CMR: TS-137.
130. Msg (TS), 7AF to 366 TFW, et al, 061025Z Apr 70. CMR: TS-129.
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135. Msg (TS), CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, 090447Z May 72; msg (TS), JCS to CINCPAC, 092307Z May 72. CMR: TS-137.
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137. Msg (TS), JCS to CINCPAC, 092356Z May 72. CMR: TS-137.
138. Msg (TS), CINCPAC to CINCPACAF, 030200Z Jul 72. CMR: TS-140.
139. ROLLING THUNDER-LINEBACKER, Tabs 3, 4.
140. Ibid., Tab 3; helicopter authority rescinded in msg (TS), CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, 012242Z Jun 72. CMR: TS-137.
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142. Ibid.

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GLOSSARY

AAA	Anti-aircraft Artillery
AMEMBV	American Embassy, Vientiane
ARC LIGHT	(S) B-52 operations in Southeast Asia
BR	BARREL ROLL
CINCPAC	Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Command
CINCPACAF	Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Air Forces
COMUSMACV	Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
DCS	Deputy Chief of Staff
DMZ	Demilitarized Zone
EO/LGB	Electro-optically/laser guided bomb
EW	Electronic Warfare
FAC	Forward Air Controller
FAG	Forward Air Guide
FANK	Proces Armees Nationale Khmer (Cambodian Army)
GCI	Ground Controlled Intercept
IRON HAND	(S) SAM and radar-controlled AAA suppression flown by specially equipped F-105F aircraft
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
LOC	Line of Communication
MACV	Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
MIG	Soviet-built jet fighter aircraft
NM	Nautical Mile
NVA	North Vietnamese Army
NVN	North Vietnam
POL	Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants
POW	Prisoner of War
PRC	People's Republic of China
ROE	Rules of Engagement
RP	(S) Route Package - numbered interdiction areas in North Vietnam
RVN	Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam)
RVNAF	Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces

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SAM	Surface-to-Air Missile
SEA	Southeast Asia
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense
SL	STEEL TIGER
SOA	Special Operating Area
TACAIR	Tactical Air
TACC	Tactical Air Control Center
TALOS/TERRIER	U.S. Navy ship-launched surface-to-air missiles
TFW	Tactical Fighter Wing
TMO	Target Management Officer
USMACV	United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
VC	Viet Cong
VNAF	Vietnamese Air Force (South Vietnam)

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