Defend the Approaches!

Abstract

A large number of embarkation sites where Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) could be loaded on vessels bound for the United States exist. Unfortunately, there are insufficient U.S. Navy assets to interdict such vessels unless extremely reliable and highly detailed intelligence were available. Consequently, effective defense against ocean-borne WMD requires U.S. Navy assets operating closer to the mainland and U.S. territories to provide for better discrimination by Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO). This paper argues that given the nature of the WMD threat, the United States will be better defended by forces operating closer to U.S. shores than by traditionally deployed forward forces. A brief overview of naval strategy since the Cold War and a description of the current threat environment and adversaries are presented. Recommendations for effectively responding to the WMD threat are offered as are recommendations for maintaining a viable U.S. presence around the world through maritime alliances and Theater Security Cooperation Plans (TSCPs).

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
May 09, 2008
Accession Number
ADA486738

Entities

People

  • Mark A. Patterson

Organizations

  • United States Army War College

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Counter WMD
  • Energy and Power Technologies
  • Ground and Sea Platforms
  • Human Systems
  • Space

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Aircrafts
  • Commerce
  • Governments
  • Maritime Domain Awareness
  • Maritime Security
  • Military Science
  • Military Training
  • National Security
  • Naval Operations
  • Navy
  • Nongovernmental Organizations
  • Political Systems
  • United States
  • Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
  • War Colleges
  • Warfare
  • Weapons Of Mass Destruction

Fields of Study

  • Environmental science

Readers

  • Maritime Security/Maritime Homeland Security
  • Naval Architecture and Marine Engineering.
  • Strategic Security Studies