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**JOINT FORCES STAFF COLLEGE
JOINT ADVANCED WARFIGHTING SCHOOL**

LATIN AMERICAN INSTABILITY: A MAJOR THREAT TO THE US

by

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**A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Joint Advanced Warfighting School in
partial satisfaction of the requirements of a Master of Science Degree in Joint
Campaign Planning and Strategy**

**The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily
endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense**

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ABSTRACT

Latin America is a neighbor to the US within the western hemisphere. The close proximity and the economic reliance between the US and Latin America make its development essential to our national interests of security and prosperity. Traditionally Latin America has faced political, economic, and social instability that threatens not just a single country but the entire region. Any one or a combination has the capability to destabilize not just one country but the entire region. Any combination of instability provides opportunities for non-state or sub-state actors to flourish. Non-state and sub-state actors are seen in two forms within Latin America. Narco-terrorist and drug cartels are the most predominant form which has been a problem area for the US for years. The second form is Islamic fundamentalists who have a history in the region and the capability to increase their operation if they chose to do so.

The US has traditionally applied diplomatic, information, military, and economic instruments of national power to address security and stability in Latin America. However, these instruments have been applied haphazardly. As the threat of instability grows in Latin America, the US must apply these elements in a coherent manner. By integrating all instruments of national power into a consolidated approach to the entire region, the US will be able to counteract the effects of instability within Latin America.

The integration of all the instruments of national power must be enacted at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. In order to accomplish this integration, the USG should create a strategic level organization, the Latin America Interagency Department (LAID). This organization will be responsible for creating and managing US policy for the region and will have the authority to act on behalf of the USG. At the

operational level, the USG under the Department of Defense already has Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) in place to fulfill this role. It will be the necessary conduit between the LAID and the tactical arm within Latin America. Utilizing the Joint Interagency Coordination Group, SOUTHCOM will be able to assist with the interagency requirements for the region. The tactical level requires a new agency, designated the Joint Interagency Task Force – Latin America (JIATF-LA), which will integrate the current capabilities within the Joint Interagency Task Force – South and Special Operations Command South. The JIATF-LA will be responsible for a combined maritime and land mission within the region to assist the various governments in cracking down on narco and Islamic terrorist organizations. Once all three organizations are in place and operational, they will have the ability to counteract the effects of instability across all of Latin America through a combined and consolidated approach.

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LATIN AMERICAN INSTABILITY: A MAJOR THREAT TO THE US

I. INTRODUCTION

The thesis of this paper is: regional instability in Latin America is a major threat to US interests and the US must act in a more comprehensive way to mitigate and neutralize this threat. Latin America is becoming increasingly important to US interests. Not only is the region a hemispheric neighbor, but it also accounts for over 19.2% of US total trade.¹ The US must actively engage with all elements of national power (diplomatic, information, military, and economic (DIME)) to support economic, political, and social stability to the region. For the purpose of this paper, Latin America includes South America, Central America, Mexico, and the Caribbean. There are a total of 21 countries in Latin America and 20 countries or territories in the Caribbean. The research questions this paper attempts to answer are: 1) Does instability exist in Latin America? 2) What forms are the most predominate? 3) Will instability in Latin America promote terrorism, which could become a threat to the US in the future? 4) What can the US do to alleviate the problems? 5) What are the strategic, operational, and tactical solutions to this problem? 6) Is there a real threat of terrorism from Latin America? I approached this research using a combination of historical study, comparative analysis, case examples, and analytical discovery.

Historically, Latin America has suffered from economic, political, and social instability. Without these factors in place, no government can function. Instability in any of these three areas can not only destabilize a county can also have potential implications

¹ U.S. Congress, House, *CRS Report for Congress U.S. Latin American Trade: Recent Trends*, 110th Cong. 2008, 2.

throughout the entire region. Even more important is the fact that the economic, political, and social facets of a country are also interdependent.

The most important aspect of Latin American instability, as it relates to the US security, concerns the ability of terrorist networks to form within the area. Latin America has two forms of terrorism currently operating in the region. 1. For the purpose of this paper, Islamic fundamentalism is defined as a religious ideology seen that advocates literalistic interpretations of the texts of Islam and Sharia law and uses violence and terrorism as tools to achieve its objectives; and 2. Narco-terrorism: while no formal definition exists, it is generally used to describe activities by groups that use drug trafficking to fund terrorism.² For the purpose of this paper we will broaden the definition of narco-terrorism to include any type of drug traffickers including those whose sole purpose is to earn money through these illicit activities. Islamic fundamentalist groups include Al Qaeda, Hamas, and Hezbollah. Organizations such as Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias Colombianas (FARC) and Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) can be considered Narco-terrorists.

This research used the DIME model for this analysis because it is a common, well known reference as well as an effective method to employ all instruments of national power to achieve US objectives in the region. The USG has always applied the DIME model in foreign policy, to include Latin America, but the problem has been a lack of a coherent strategy that focuses on the entire region. One of the toughest problems facing the US is the level of engagement through the DIME model at a country level. Each country within the region will have individual needs that must be considered when

² U.S. Congress, House. *CRS Report to Congress Transnational Organized Crime: Principle Threats and U.S. Responses*, 109th Cong., 2006, 3.

designing an overall US strategy for the region. Some countries will need more economic support while others need a dramatic overhaul of their political and judicial systems.

Bringing stability to Latin America is a monumental, but essential, task for the US. The scale of the problem directly relates to the diversity and number of problems facing all the countries within Latin America. To address the problems in Latin America, a three pronged approach must be used. The instability must be addressed at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels to provide a consolidated approach to the problems facing the region. The first step is setting up a strategic level interagency program based out of Washington, DC, to be called the Latin American Interagency Department (LAID) as the strategic level organization. This office will be responsible for integrating all elements of national power into an effective plan to stabilize the region. The DIME has been applied largely to one country at a time – Chile in the 1970s, Brazil in the 1980s, and Venezuela in the 1990s but little has been done to examine a regional strategic approach. This strategy does not take into account the linked nature of all the countries within Latin America. The USG also has, up to this point, been unable to work collectively to support US strategic objectives. Each agency pursues their objectives separately. The lack of coordination cripples US efforts at applying the DIME.

The second step is to address the instability at the operational level defined as the intermediary between the strategic missions and the tactical application within Latin America. This organization already exists within the Department of Defense (DOD). The DOD has an established regional command structure known as Southern Command (SOUTHCOM). Within this organization is an interagency process called the Joint

Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG). All that is required to make this organization the operational arm of the LAID is the formalization of missions and tasks beyond just a military perspective that will take it beyond just a DOD function and the establishment of a chain of command through the LAID as well as the Secretary of Defense.

The third step is to set up a Joint Interagency Task Force-Latin America (JIATF-LA) as the tactical arm of the LAID whose responsibility will be the implementation of certain facets of national policy as directed by the LAID and SOUTHCOM. The DOD already has an organization in place to provide the maritime capability within the region: Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-S). In order to accomplish more than just a maritime role this organization must be folded into the JIATF-LA and operate under one commander for the entire tactical region, to include both land and maritime. The best organization to house and develop this JIATF will be Special Operations Command South (SOCSOUTH). They have the inherent capability within the DOD to ensure an effective force structure to accomplish the tactical mission of the LAID.



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II. LATIN AMERICAN INSTABILITY

The diverse nature of Latin America poses a number of challenges in terms of regional stability. The small size of each country and lack of resources per country requires a large amount of interdependence between the states. This reliance on other countries can cause instability in one country to have immediate and potentially cascading effects on the entire region. As globalization continues to expand across the world, there are two effects. The first, globalization tends to enhance stability through open markets allowing easy access to multiple competing markets. Second, globalization provides a negative effect on stability by allowing easy access for illegal organizations to

³ Journey Latin America. "Latin American Maps," <http://www.journeylatinamerica.co.uk/Map.aspx> (accessed 25 October, 2007).

coordinate their activities. For the purpose of this paper, the instability researched and documented will focus on South and Central America. The Caribbean will not be addressed due to the complexity of this island chain but will still be included as an area of responsibility for the LAID.

Economic Instability

A strong economy is arguably the most important factor for any country's stability. Economic strength provides the foundation for government functions such as law enforcement, military, social programs, and a functional government. This stability in turns creates jobs and increases Gross National Product as well as the individual wealth of its citizens. Economic stability can be determined through an examination of a country's Gross National and Domestic product, a country's growth rate and a distribution of wealth. Table 1 contains data from Country Watch reports that shows a breakdown of the economic standings within Latin America by country.

Table 1: Economic Data

Country	Economic Performance Index ¹	GNP Growth % 2007 ²	GDP 2006 ³	GDP Growth Rate % 2006 ⁴
SOUTH AMERICA				
Argentina	58.7	4.3	110.137	8.5
Bolivia	31.0	4.0	7.682	4.5
Brazil	62.0	3.5	529.951	3.7
Chile	67.9	3.5	100.997	4.0
Colombia	48.4	2.6	72.149	6.8
Ecuador	41.3	2.3	25.665	4.2
Guyana	29.3	3.7	0.6856	4.8
Paraguay	32.6	3.9	5.431	4.0
Peru	46.7	4.5	75.559	8.0
Suriname	58.2	4.3	0.8724	5.8
Uruguay	57.1	4.6	11.984	7.0

Venezuela	60.9	4.6	50.136	10.3
CENTRAL AMERICA				
Belize	55.4	3.6	1.115	5.0
Costa Rica	56.5	3.0	16.332	7.9
El Salvador	44.0	3.5	1.786	4.2
Guatemala	44.6	4.0	25.086	4.6
Honduras	35.3	4.5	6.406	5.5
Nicaragua	27.7	4.2	3.669	3.7
Panama	59.8	5.3	15.129	8.1
NORTH AMERICA				
Mexico	69.6	4.0	611.616	4.8
United States	96.7	3.8	11,651.15	3.3

1. Economic Performance Index is based on criteria including sustained economic growth, monetary stability, current account deficits, budget surplus, unemployment and structural imbalances. Scores are assessed from 0 to 100 with 0 being the worst and 100 the best.⁴
2. GNP (Gross National Product)⁵
3. GDP (Gross Domestic Product) is related in billions of US dollars.⁶
4. Real GDP growth rate % determines if the economy is climbing or falling.⁷

As can be seen from Table 1, there is a great deal of economic variation within Latin America. The Economic Performance Indicator shows only nine countries above 50% indicating a lack of economic growth and monetary stability throughout the entire region. One possible conclusion is that the economic stability and prosperity, which is needed to bring the countries out of their current status, is lacking and if these conditions do not improve, Latin American countries may regress. This disparity between the have and have-not's lead to unequal economic distribution and greater gaps in society. There is some economic growth as seen from the GNP and GDP growth rate percentages. This

⁴ Country Watch – Country Reports, “Economic Performance Index,” http://www.countrywatch.com/Cw_topic.aspx?type=topic&type=text&vcountry=6&topic=MANPIN (accessed November 1, 2007) .

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Country Watch – Country Reports. “Macroeconomic Data,” http://www.countrywatch.com/cw_topic.aspx?type=data&vcountry=7&dics=1&tablied=1 (accessed November 1, 2007).

⁷ Ibid.

indicates that most of the region is progressing in a positive direction. If Latin America is able to continue their upward growth while managing inflation they will be able to provide stability to the region. This is a big “if”; there are numerous examples in the region where inflation became so rampant that the World Monetary Fund needed to step in and take control of the situation. Additionally, analysis of economic trends on most countries showing high GDP growth has only occurred in the last 1-5 years. This indicates that the economy, although on the rise, is still very weak and could degenerate without proper management. In addition, this rise in many of the GDPs’ within Latin America is based on the petroleum boom over the last 5 years. Once this market stabilizes there is a strong potential that the growth will cease and may even regress.

Globalization can be a driver for economic prosperity if properly applied throughout all of Latin America. Its effects must reach to the lowest level of society, beyond just the upper class, to have the positive effects envisioned for stabilization. Globalization in Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s was expected to bring more money into the region and to begin the leveling of the economic distribution. Unfortunately this has not been the case. In fact, the perception of globalization in Latin America is that it has negatively affected the majority of the population and has resulted in income inequality.⁸ This has led to distrust in the system and situation throughout Latin America. The President of the Inter-American Development Bank said: “In general, there is a widespread sense of disenchantment: 75% of the people in our region believe that poverty has increased during the 1990s. 67% see the distribution of income

⁸ Humanglobalization.org. “Globalization in Latin America,” <http://humanglobalization.org.latinam.htm> (accessed October 29, 2007).

as unfair, and a similar proportion considers that their countries are not making social or economic progress.”⁹

Economics is the primary driver for all forms of stability. At the heart of economic stability is the even distribution of wealth across the entire region. Rectifying the unequal distribution is contingent upon regional efforts and can directly be improved through proper integration into world markets through globalization.

A good case study for economic instability is Paraguay. Corruption, lack of progress on structural reforms and failing infrastructure in Paraguay, for example, has led to years of economic stagnation and periodic economic crisis. As seen in Table 1, Paraguay is and has been one of the poorest countries in Latin America for years, maintaining one of the lowest GDP and lowest average GDP per person. The economy is based primarily on agriculture, hydroelectric power generation, and informal trade with Argentina and Brazil. For years the economic strength of Paraguay has resided in the rich minority creating a very unequal distribution of wealth. To capture the significant factors contributing to Paraguay’s instability one must study their economic policy, performance, trade, banking system, and money laundering.

The economic policy of Paraguay has had varying degrees of success. Paraguay has lagged behind the other countries in the region in terms of economic reform. Public finances have deteriorated since the mid 1990s and GDP growth has been weak. On the macro-economic side, things have improved since 2003 when the new president began concerted efforts to reform. His efforts, however, focused primarily on public investments without cutting current spending. These policies were successful in reducing

⁹ Ibid.

interest's rates from 25.6% in 2002 to 6.6% in 2004.¹⁰ Unfortunately, high inflation in 2005-2006 led to a reversal and the interest rates climbed back to 9.6% in 2006. This fluctuation has created a great deal of instability in Paraguay's economy. The government's policy problems were exasperated by its spending plan. The government policy was slanted towards salaries and pensions at the expense of other investments that could have been used to promote economic growth. The country's deficit began to widen as a result of weak tax policies and ineffective administration leading to a deficit of 3.6% of GDP in 2000.¹¹ As a result of the deficit the government undertook a system of tax reforms and attempted privatization. The tax reforms had moderate success but privatization was abysmal. Previous attempts at privatization had not gone well. The result was widespread discontentment towards privatization which led to the government backing away from any further attempts to capitalize on the benefits of privatization.

Paraguay suffered from a series of recessions and weak recoveries during 1998-2002 which were brought on by poor agricultural conditions, regional instability that damaged exports, and a recession in the construction sector causing the GDP to contract by 2% over the period.¹² The economy began to recover over the next 3 years until a drought hit Paraguay in 2005, drastically affecting the agricultural industry by reducing yield and dramatically causing yet another drop in GDP.

Inflation has been another problem for many years. It was rampant during the 1980s and early 1990s but was brought under control in 1995. Unfortunately, the depreciation of the Real (Brazilian currency) in 1997 which led to a 34% depreciation of

¹⁰ Economist Intelligence Unit, *Country Profile 2007 Paraguay*. (London: EIU, 2007), 23

¹¹ Ibid 23.

¹² Ibid 23.

the Guaraní (Paraguayan currency) in 2002 caused inflation to spike into the double digits again in 2002-2003. This shows the linked nature of economics between multiple countries and how the effects of instability on one can have dramatic repercussions on another. The up and down trends continued for various reasons; 2004 saw inflation at 2.4%; in 2005 it reached 9.9%; and at the end of 2006 it was at 12.5%. This fluctuation affects all aspects of the economic environment causing imbalances in the worth of their exports and imports.

Trade policies within Paraguay have not developed as well as many of its neighbors within Latin America. This may be a result of being a land locked country but more than likely it relates to the trade policies of the country itself. Paraguay has always been dependent on its neighboring countries, Brazil and Argentina, as the largest trading partners which led to Paraguay entering into a trade agreement with these two countries. As a result, over 50% of Paraguayan trade is between Brazil and Argentina. Over the last 5 years, trade between Paraguay and the US increased, but Paraguay is still reliant on its neighbors as their primary trading partners. One of the problems Paraguay faces is that 50% of all registered imports to Paraguay are re-exported illegally to Argentina and Brazil causing a big strain among trading partners. Paraguay can make great strides if it is willing to crack down on the illegal markets and increase trade between other nations within Latin America.

The banking system in Paraguay has experienced a great deal of turbulence over the last fifteen years. Deregulation of the banking industry in 1991 led to the failure of 14 banks and 11 financial companies between 1995 and 1999. The problem arose due to the infusion of illegal money laundering activities which led to the creation of an inflated

banking market. Once this market stabilized and then began to decline it left a vacuum. In addition, due to the large infusion of money and new banking structures, the banks made a number of unsecured loans hoping to increase their capital. Unfortunately most of the loans went into default and “In 1997 the country’s largest bank collapsed and was followed in 1998 by several others that had suffered liquidity problems as monetary policy was tightened.”¹³ The government attempted to infuse money into the banking structure and was able to stop some of the cascading effects but not before the majority of the damage had been done.

By the mid 1990s, Paraguay had become the repository of an extensive money laundering industry, infusing the banking structure with an inflated amount of money. During this period, banking transactions between Paraguay and the US far outstripped transactions with both Brazil and Argentina despite the fact that its overall economy was a fraction of the size of their neighbors.¹⁴ Due to pressure from the US in the late 1990s, new laws were passed requiring banks to report unusual transactions that looked like money laundering. Unfortunately, these laws are seldom enforced and attempts in 2003 to increase the severity of retribution for this type of criminal activity have been blocked in the Paraguayan Congress possibly due to corruption within the political system.

All of the factors above prove a case for economic instability in Paraguay but the systemic problem is not limited to this country. Inflation, wide variances between the rich and poor, taxes, inflation, and corruption have caused problems for all the countries within Latin America. Unless these problems are addressed throughout all of Latin America, economic stability will not be attained.

¹³ Ibid 31.

¹⁴ Ibid 34.

Political Instability

Over the last 20 years the world has seen a dramatic shift in political alignment within Latin America with a very strong democratic push throughout the region. These fledgling democracies have made large strides towards political stability. The very nature of their youth, however, has shown that the democratic principles are still a work in progress. Table 2 shows a political evaluation by country within Latin America.

Table 2: Political Data

Country	Political Stability 2004 ¹	Political Risk ²	Freedom in the world ³			Voice and Accountability 2004 ⁴	Perceived Corruption Level 2004 ⁵
			PR	CL	Freedom Rating		
SOUTH AMERICA							
Argentina	-0.24	6	2	2	Free	0.49	2.8
Bolivia	-0.65	5.5	3	3	Partly Free	-0.01	2.5
Brazil	-0.13	8	2	2	Free	0.34	3.7
Chile	0.89	9	1	1	Free	1.09	7.3
Colombia	-1.69	7	3	3	Partly Free	-0.47	4.0
Ecuador	-0.83	5	3	3	Partly Free	-0.19	2.5
Guyana	-0.53	4	3	3	Partly Free	0.62	2.5
Paraguay	-0.71	7	1	2	Free	-0.23	2.1
Peru	-0.68	6	3	3	Partly Free	-0.04	3.5
Suriname	0.36	6	2	2	Free	0.60	3.2
Uruguay	0.49	7.5	1	1	Free	1.00	5.9
Venezuela	0.53	5.5	4	4	Partly Free	-0.46	2.3
CENTRAL AMERICA							
Belize	0.65	7.5	1	2	Free	0.91	3.7
Costa Rica	0.98	7	1	1	Free	1.11	4.2
El Salvador	-0.23	6.5	2	3	Free	0.26	4.2
Guatemala	-0.85	6	4	4	Partly Free	-0.39	2.5
Honduras	-0.69	6	3	3	Partly Free	-0.02	2.6
Nicaragua	-0.15	5	3	3	Partly Free	0.06	2.6
Panama	0.29	7.5	1	2	Free	0.54	3.5
NORTH AMERICA							
Mexico	-0.13	7.5	2	2	Free	0.36	3.5
US	0.47	9	1	1	Free	1.21	7.6

1. Political Stability measures the likelihood of credible threats to, or changes in, the government in power. The estimate is measured on a scale of -2.5 to 2.5, with the higher scores indicating better governance and lower scores indicating poor governance in the countries.¹⁵
2. Political Risk is based on stability, democratic accountability, economic risk. A score of 0 marks the highest political risk, while a score of 10 marks the lowest political risk.¹⁶
3. Freedom in the world quantifies political freedom or shown s political rights (PR) and civil liberties (CL) into a single combined index of freedom rating. A PR and CL number of 1 represents the most free counties and the number 7 represents the least free.¹⁷
4. Voice and Accountability is a measure of the level of political, civil, and human rights in each country. The estimate is measured on a scale of -2.5 to 2.5, with the higher scores indicating to better governance in the countries.¹⁸
5. The 2005 Perceived Corruption Level relates to the degree of corruption as seen by business people, academics, and risk analysis and ranges between 10 (highly clean) to 0 (highly corrupt).¹⁹

As Table 2 shows, only seven countries have a positive rating in terms of their political stability. In addition, nine countries are rated as only partly free. Finally, only two countries, Chile and Uruguay, could be considered stable based on perceived political corruption. These numbers indicate how volatile the political landscape is within the region.

Government corruption can lead to a lack of faith in the government and can cause the people to believe that the interest of the citizens of the country is not the primary motivation of their elected officials. The level of corruption required for this to occur is dependent on multiple factors outside the scope of this paper and will be different for each country in Latin America. Any level of corruption, however, provides

¹⁵ Country Watch – Country Reports, “Political Stability,” http://www.countrywatch.com/Cw_topic.aspx?type=topic&vcountry=6&topic=POSTB&GL (accessed November 1, 2007) .

¹⁶ Country Watch – Country Reports, “Political Risk Index,” http://www.countrywatch.com/Cw_topic.aspx?type=topic&vcountry=6&topic=PORIK&GL (accessed November 1, 2007) .

¹⁷ Country Watch – Country Reports, “Freedom in the World,” http://www.countrywatch.com/Cw_topic.aspx?type=topic&vcountry=6&topic=POFRE&GL (accessed November 1, 2007) .

¹⁸ Country Watch – Country Reports, “Voice and Accountability,” http://www.countrywatch.com/Cw_topic.aspx?type=topic&vcountry=6&topic=POVAC&GL (accessed November 1, 2007).

¹⁹ Transparency International. Global Corruption Report 2006 (Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto Press, 2006), 294-295.

a permissive environment for illegal elements to become entrenched in the political process. To amplify the problem, there are large scale ungoverned regions in Latin America. They are ungoverned due to lack of governmental resources, harsh terrain, and a lack of desire by the populace to expend resources on areas with little economic value. These areas provide a very unique challenge to a stable government whose goal is to bring rule of law to the entire country. Ineffective political policies only increase the negative effect of ungoverned areas on a country. They allow and at times support the illegal activities that occur. This is either due to a lack of political capability to deal with the situation or a lack of desire to stop it because of supplemental funding coming from illicit activities.

One of the most disturbing problems that can arise from political instability comes in the form of radical shifts in the political landscape. We have seen Venezuela go from a fledgling democracy to a Marxist construct based on the working class. The reason for this shift was a combination of a corrupt political situation and lack of economic development with limited social priority by the previous governments. President Chavez was democratically elected and has subsequently begun transforming the country into a Socialist party system. This has begun to spill over into other countries in the region. We have started to see similar shifts in Bolivia and Ecuador. The trend could continue unless the countries in Latin America refine their political systems and bring equality to the process as their constitutions require.

Another facet of political instability deals with the military and their capability for integration into the political process. There are four areas that contribute to the level of

instability: 1) strength of the military; 2) roles of the military; 3) improper involvement of the military into the political arena; and 4) lack of civilian control of the military.

Military instability can be viewed from two sides. A military that is too integrated into the political process can lead to an uneven distribution of power which in turn could weaken civilian control of the military. A military that has no voice in the political process leads to a lack of discipline and may be the catalyst for challenging civilian control or increased corruption within the government. Finding an equal distribution is paramount. The military needs to be strong enough to maintain good order and discipline. It also must be strong enough to fulfill its military role as dictated by the civilian government. This is a fine line to tread but an important one nonetheless. Deborah Norton put it very succinctly, “A highly rational military structure does not encourage military insurrections, but it does facilitate it. In contrast, a less rational organization may encourage dissent movements, but may also block their success.”²⁰

The roles of the military must be firmly established in order to identify the boundaries and limits placed on them. One large error seen by civilian governments in Latin America has been the tendency to think of military policy primarily or exclusively in terms of stripping the military of its current prerogatives.²¹ This is usually done without rationalization or future opportunities thus causing different levels of dissent within the military structure. Countries in Latin America have also failed to establish lines between the roles of the military and that of the police, often using the military as a

²⁰ David Pion-Berlin ed. *Civil-Military Relations in Latin America*. (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 111.

²¹ Samuel J. Fitch. *The Armed Forces and Democracy in Latin America*. (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1998), 166.

robust form of police infrastructure for which they are not trained. This further blurs the lines between civil and military authority.

Improper involvement in politics by military members compromises the integrity of an unbiased military. This does not mean that the members of the armed forces cannot participate in the political process to a limited extent but they must not actively use their position or station within the military to push a political agenda. If a cadre of superior officers becomes politically active, this may result in a loss of military professionalism, thus diminishing the armed forces' capacity to provide a nation with security.²² Once senior military members become actively engaged in the political process they can influence subordinates as well as lend weight to one candidate's push for political relevance.

Lack of civilian control of the military is one of the most critical areas of potential instability. It can be difficult to detect as well as control once it has been identified. Challenges to civilian control can emanate from two areas: first, competing sources of authority between the civil and military sectors and second, contacts with the external environments that draw military away from the democratically elected government availing the military to engage improperly within the political spectrum.²³

There are a number of ways that a government can lose the confidence and support of the military. One of the most prevalent is civilian policies that antagonize the

²² David Pion-Berlin ed. *Civil-Military Relations in Latin America*. (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 91.

²³ Ibid 113.

armed forces and may weaken military confidence in civilian competence to govern effectively.²⁴ Samuel Fitch sums up the concept:

Latin American military autonomy from civilian control has traditionally been based on two sources of threat. Societies and government in the region have historically identified internal opponents as “enemies,” so it is no surprise that the military would also. Nationalists, including the military, have also historically identified neighboring countries as potential security threats. As a result, military leaders and their civilian allies could argue powerfully that on matters concerning national security, the armed forces were entitled to an independent voice. In this context, civilian control of the military was neither possible nor even desired by many sectors of society.²⁵

The most clearly recognized facet of the Latin American military conflict with civilians is seen in the various manifestations of the coup d'état.²⁶ A coup can occur due to any one or a combination of the reasons mentioned above. The first step of a successful coup requires achieving dominance over the armed forces so as to take control of the government.²⁷ Once this occurs the coup is made possible based upon the popular opinion of the citizens of the country. As long as the majority of the population does not participate in politics or remains neutral in the face of a coup, coup conspirators should need relatively few participants.²⁸ These combined factors make the threat of coup in an unstable country quite possible. Instability in political, economic, or social sectors can cause the perfect storm and result in the removal of the current government in the form a coup d'état. Compounding this problem, the potential threat can be seen from the sides of both a weak and strong government that does not take into account the needs of its armed forces. This dynamic is succinctly put by Samuel Fitch,

²⁴ Samuel J. Fitch. *The Armed Forces and Democracy in Latin America*. (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1998), 135.

²⁵ David Pion-Berlin ed. *Civil-Military Relations in Latin America*. (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 223.

²⁶ David Pion-Berlin ed. *Civil-Military Relations in Latin America*. (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 98.

²⁷ Ibid 115.

²⁸ Ibid 115.

Broadly speaking, the more serious the threat of military intervention to overthrow the government, the more constrained that government will be to avoid adding to the threat by trying to curtail military prerogatives. Conversely, the more politically secure the civilian government is, the greater its potential margin to attempt reforms even at the cost of antagonizing the armed forces.²⁹

An example of political instability in Latin America is that of Guatemala.

Guatemala gained its independence from Spain in 1821. Between 1821 and 1944 the country was governed by dictatorial regimes with strong military background and ties. In 1944, we saw the entrance of the first progressive leader who, for the next ten years, actively pursued progressive reforms in hopes of modernizing the country. His efforts, however, were hampered by strong opposition from the rich minority. In 1954 President Arbenz was overthrown by a US backed coup due to his attempts to reduce the power of the rich minority. The coup was led by Col Armas who assumed the presidency with US backing.³⁰ Once in office Armas instituted policies designed to repress the people of Guatemala which ultimately led to his assassination in 1957. Armas was replaced by Gen Fuentes who maintained the same policies as his predecessor. These activities led to the creation of guerrilla movements across the country because a portion of the civilian populace no longer had a voice in the government. Between 1966 and 1982, Guatemala saw a series of military or military dominated governments during which tens of thousands of Guatemalans were killed.³¹

The 1980s decade proved to be critical years for Guatemala. It saw the three leading guerrilla groups join forces, gaining strength from the poverty stricken rural

²⁹ Samuel J. Fitch. *The Armed Forces and Democracy in Latin America*. (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1998), 162.

³⁰ Country Watch – Country Reviews “Political Conditions,” http://www.countrywatch.com/Cw_topic.aspx?type=country&country=6&topic=PORIK&GL (accessed February 25, 2007) , 1.

³¹ Ibid 1.

areas, to become the Unida Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG)³². In the same year General Montt seized power through a military coup and he immediately began a counter-insurgency campaign that was brutal and plagued with human rights violations. General Montt was also ousted by a military coup in 1983. His successor, General Cerezo restored electoral democracy to the country. For the rest of the decade, none of the elected officials had the capability to enact major reforms because they lacked the political capital and had little control over the military.

Throughout the 1990's, Guatemala's turmoil continued but the world saw a number of strides in the correct direction. In 1993, President Serrano, due to low public appeal and strong ties to the military, dissolved Congress and the Supreme Court, and assumed near dictatorial powers.³³ Fortunately domestic and international pressure forced his resignation later that year. In 1996, President Aruz successfully concluded peace negotiation with the URNG ending 36 years of armed conflict between the government and the guerrilla group. President Aruz also took effective steps to gain civilian control over the military and initiated a large anticorruption campaign. He oversaw the firing of almost 200 corrupt police officials and uncovered large smuggling rings involving a number of government officials, military and police officers.³⁴

In 2000, Mr. Portillo won the election but his entire presidency was hamstrung by allegations of corruption, politicizing the judiciary, weakening accountability, and human rights violations.³⁵ President Berger took office in 2004 and immediately began a new anticorruption initiative. One of his first acts was to indict numerous members of the

³² Economist Intelligence Unit, *Country Profile 2007 Paraguay*. (London: EIU, 2007), 6.

³³ Ibid, 5.

³⁴ Country Watch – Country Reviews “Political Conditions,” http://www.countrywatch.com/Cw_topic.aspx?type=country&country=6&topic=PORIK&GL (accessed February 25, 2007) 1

³⁵ Economist Intelligence Unit, *Country Profile 2007 Paraguay*. (London: EIU, 2007), 5.

Portillo presidency on charges of corruption. Unfortunately for President Berger, he did not gain a majority in congress. In order to get elected he formed a coalition of parties which collapsed shortly after he took office making more notable institutional revisions difficult at best due to a lack of consensus throughout his term to date.

Over the last 30 years Guatemala has been plagued by political instability and there does not seem to be any end in sight. There are a number of issues that continue to divide the country at its core. The most important are the human rights violations that have occurred over the last 20 years. A Truth Commission in 1998 estimated that there were 42,000 human rights abuses including 626 massacres.³⁶ There have also been numerous riots and protests within the country concerning the lack of government investment in social reform. Organized crime is rampant throughout the country and has been tied to numerous assassinations of government officials and civilians. All of these factors center on the inability of the government to fulfill its role and can be directly tied to weak governing bodies. This instability has and will continue to destabilize the country unless drastic measures are taken to solve Guatemala's numerous problems.

Social Instability

Social instability impacts the basic standard of living of the citizens. There are a number of factors that apply to this type of instability such as education standards, poverty levels, economic distribution, infrastructure, property rights and health care. In order to bring social stability to Latin America, the governments of each country must address these issues in order to help stabilize the region. The US has a responsibility to assist with the development in these areas from a basic humanitarian concept as well as to assure this instability does not lead to the furtherance of organized crime or terrorism.

³⁶ Ibid, 7.

Table 3: Social Data

Country	Life Expectancy at Birth ¹		TB Rates ²	% Children <5 yrs Under Weight ³	% Access to improved drinking water ⁴		% Access to Improved Sanitation ⁵		Total % of GDP spent on Health ⁶
	Male	Female			Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	
SOUTH AMERICA									
Argentina	72	78	41	2.3	98	80	92	83	9.6
Bolivia	63	67	211	5.9	95	68	60	22	6.8
Brazil	68	75	60	3.7	100	90	83	37	8.8
Chile	74	81	15	0.8	100	58	95	62	6.1
Colombia	71	78	45	5.1	99	71	96	54	7.8
Ecuador	70	75	131	6.2	99	97	86	58	5.5
Guyana	63	64	149	11.9	83	83	86	60	5.3
Paraguay	70	76	68	ND*	99	68	94	61	7.7
Peru	70	74	172	5.2	89	65	74	32	4.1
Suriname	66	71	65	11.4	98	73	99	76	7.8
Uruguay	71	79	28	6.0	100	100	100	99	8.2
Venezuela	72	78	42	4.8	85	70	71	48	4.7
CENTRAL AMERICA									
Belize	67	74	49	ND*	100	82	59	11	5.1
Costa Rica	75	80	14	ND*	100	92	89	97	6.6
El Salvador	69	74	51	6.1	94	70	77	39	7.9
Guatemala	65	71	78	17.7	99	92	90	82	5.7
Honduras	65	70	78	8.6	95	81	87	54	7.2
Nicaragua	68	73	58	7.8	90	63	56	34	8.2
Panama	74	78	68	6.3	99	79	89	51	7.7
NORTH AMERICA									
Mexico	72	77	23	3.4	100	87	91	41	6.5
United States	75	80	5	1.1	100	100	100	100	15.4

1. Life expectancy from birth by country.³⁷
2. Tuberculosis rates per 1000 people per country.³⁸
3. Percentage of children underweight rates per country.³⁹
4. Depicts percentage of population that has access to improved drinking water.⁴⁰
5. Depicts percentage of population with access to improved sanitation.⁴¹

³⁷ World Health Organization, "WHO Statistical Information System," <http://www.who.int/whosis/whostat2007/en/index.html> (accessed February 24, 2008).

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Ibid.

6. Depicts percentage of Gross Domestic Product spent on health care.⁴²

* ND = No Data exists

Table 3 provides data concerning social instability in Latin America. It is apparent that each country is on a different level when it comes to their social capabilities. Looking at the life expectancy rates, they are much higher than some regions of the world such as Africa but to have a country like Guyana in the western hemisphere with an average life expectancy 12-16 years lower than that of the US is a cause for concern. The Tuberculosis (TB) rates within Latin America reveal a startling correlation to immunization standards within the region in comparison to the US. The country with the lowest TB rate, Costa Rica is almost 3 times higher than the US while the highest country, Bolivia, has a TB rate 42 times higher than the US. The percentage of underweight children born in Latin America is on average 6 times higher than that of the US. All of these indicators point to a health care system that needs to be improved in order to reduce the social instability in the region. William Easterly puts this concept into a very realistic light “The typical infant mortality rate in the richest fifth of countries is 4 out of every 1,000 births; in the poorest fifth of countries, it is 200 out of every 1,000 births.”⁴³ Although the countries in Latin America are not among the poorest fifth this highlights the necessity of proper health programs within the region.

Table 3 also shows some of the deficiencies within the infrastructure of Latin America and the disparity between urban and rural areas. When you analyze the access to improved drinking water and improved sanitation you see a huge gap between the urban and rural areas. The average percentage of population that has access to improved

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ William Easterly, *The Elusive Quest for Growth: Economists' Adventures and Misadventures in the Tropics* (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2001), 8.

drinking water within Latin America in the urban area is 96.1% while the rural areas are only 78.45% creating a delta of 17.65%. In terms of access to improved sanitation, the average is 83.7% in the urban areas while the rural areas are just 55.05% creating a delta of 28.65%. This data is a very realistic depiction of the differences between the standard of living of the urban majority (middle to upper class) and the rural population (lower to middle class). This leads directly to the disparity between the class structures within Latin America.

Today, the richest one tenth of the population of Latin America and the Caribbean earn 48 percent of the total income, while the poorest tenth earn only 1.6 percent. In industrialized countries, by contrast, the top tenth receive 29.1 percent, while the bottom tenth earns 2.5 percent.⁴⁴ No matter how strong the economic growth of a country, an unequal distribution of wealth creates social inequality and leads to illicit activities. Scholars have identified income inequality as the strongest predictor of violent crime rates.⁴⁵ Gang violence, related to crime rates, may threaten political stability, inhibit social development, and discourage foreign investment in Latin America.⁴⁶ Donald Schultz says “Unless rural areas can be rejuvenated and made economically viable for their inhabitants, problems of lawlessness and land poverty will continue to provide the raw materials for insurgency and urban migration.”⁴⁷ If these areas can’t be rejuvenated, the governments within Latin America will be unable to mitigate the influence from illegal organizations thus causing an increased strain on the social situation.

⁴⁴ United States Southern Command “Command Strategy 2016.” March 2007.

⁴⁵ U.S. Congress. House. CRS Report to Congress Gangs in Central America. 110th Cong. 2007, 2.

⁴⁶ Ibid 1.

⁴⁷ Donald E. Schultz “The United States and Latin America a Strategic Perspective,” *Security and Civil-Military Relations in the New World Disorder*, 1999.

The final area of interest in terms of social instability is the education levels and capability within Latin America. Education is one of the building blocks for social stability. It allows follow-on generations of lower income families to break out of the poverty mold and begin to climb the economic ladder. In addition, an educated population lends itself to understanding the political and economic situation of each country and thus has the ability to vote for political parties based on educated analysis versus word of mouth. In terms of Latin America, the primary driver in identifying the education capability of each country is the access and availability for all of the citizens to attend as a minimum; primary school. Latin America has made great strides in terms of education over the last 20 years but there is still a lot of room for improvement. In Guatemala for example, only 78.52% of the population has access to education.⁴⁸ The average across Latin America is 89.67% of the total population has access to primary education. This data only indicates the access to education; the percentage of the population that actually graduates from primary school will be lower but is beyond the scope of this paper.

Social instability has many different factors that play into its equation. Latin America has made significant improvements over the last 10 years to decrease the disparities mentioned above but more improvement is critical to the successful execution of US national policy in the region. The bottom line as addressed by the Research and Policy Committee of the Committee for Economic Development says, “Poverty and underdevelopment are in part a consequence of a lack of education and good health.

⁴⁸Global Education Database, “Rapid Assessment Summary Scores” http://gesdb.usaid.gov/cgi-bin/broker.exe?_program=gedprogs.calctable.sas&_service=default&coname=0LAC+&option=1&ACCESS=1&GOVERNANCE=1&CONTEXT=1&INFRASTRUCTURE=1&INVESTMENT=1&ECONPER=1&PERFORMANCE=1&POVERTY=1&QUALITY=1&WORKPLACE=1&output=1&Input=Submit+Query (accessed October 28, 2007).

Investments in these areas, especially when directed at girls and women, generally have a very high rate of return and in many cases are preconditions for the success of other economic policies.”⁴⁹

Nicaragua’s current social conditions provides a great example of the social instability problems facing many of the countries within Latin America. Looking at the three primary drivers within social stability, poverty, education, and health care we can develop a picture of the level of social instability.

Poverty within Nicaragua is one of the highest in the region. According to the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), the poverty level in 2005 was 46.3% of the population, up .5% from 2001.⁵⁰ Poverty levels are based on earned income compared to the cost of a minimum diet and other consumption items. Since less than half the country is below the poverty line, this indicates a disparity in income distribution within Nicaragua. In addition, the EIU also cites that the distribution of national consumption is unequal. The top 20% of the population consumed 47.2% of goods in 2005.⁵¹

Looking at the educational standards within Nicaragua also shows a lack of capability within the country. The literacy rate in Nicaragua in 2005 was 78% of the country but the average school attendance among adults was only 5.2 years.⁵² The EIU further cites that the education system is both fragmented and inadequate in coverage with approximately 35% of children between the ages of 3-18 outside the educational system all together.⁵³ The rural areas within Nicaragua are hit the hardest. They have

⁴⁹ Committee for Economic Development, *A Shared Future Reducing Global Poverty*. (New York: CED, 2002), 3.

⁵⁰ Economist Intelligence Unit, *Country Profile 2007 Nicaragua*. (London: EIU, 2007), 15.

⁵¹ Ibid, 15.

⁵² Ibid, 15.

⁵³ Ibid, 16.

less access to schools and children will generally leave school early in order to help augment their family's income.

In terms of health care, Nicaragua also shows an inadequate distribution of services with 40% of the population excluded from the system.⁵⁴ As shown in Table 3, there is a large disparity between the urban and rural areas within Nicaragua. Looking at the infrastructure issues that lead to good health, only 63% of the rural population has access to improved drinking water versus 90% in the urban areas. Access to sanitation is only 34% in rural areas but is also very low in the urban population as well with only 56% having access. There have been some improvements in the health care capacity within Nicaragua as seen in the infant mortality rate which has dropped from 121 per 1000 in 1979 to 31 per 1000 in 2002.⁵⁵ Unfortunately this number is still one of the highest in the region.

This brief consideration of the situation in Nicaragua exemplifies the social instability in the region. In order for Nicaragua to dig itself out of this situation, it will require a large investment from their government as well as assistance from other countries around the globe. This depiction also shows how incredibly tightly linked the political, economic, and social systems are.

Latin American Instability Conclusion

Political, economic, and social instability is seen throughout Latin America. The case examples provided were chosen to highlight how delicate and intertwined the problems of instability can be. Every country in Latin America has significant levels of instability, not just the three chosen as case examples. Instability is indicative of weak

⁵⁴ Ibid, 16.

⁵⁵ Ibid, 16.

states and can turn into failed states with minimal additional external influences from non-states and sub-state actors. The worst case scenario for the US is the development of numerous failed states within Latin America. The threat from narco-terrorists and Islamic fundamentalists may be the most critical from a safety and security perspective but is just the tip of the iceberg. The linked nature between the various countries within Latin America as well as the effects on the US are critical to economic prosperity, security, social equality, and rule of law.

III. Terrorist Threat in Latin America and Impacts to the US.

Instability is a leading cause of terrorist networks. The inability of weak states to govern effectively allows terrorist networks to form. The best example of this is seen in the Tri-Border Area (TBA) in Latin America. The TBA is the seam between Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay and has been the focus of anti terrorism efforts in Latin America since September 11, 2001. The TBA has been a hot bed for years due to the inability of the three countries to effectively execute any form of control in the region. It is predominately rugged terrain making efforts in the areas difficult. In addition, the ability for these networks to cross between the countries at will make apprehension incredibly difficult.

Both Islamic fundamentalism and narco-terrorism are present in some form in Latin America. The two groups can directly impact the safety and security of the U.S. Since 9/11, the U.S. has a heightened sense of its own vulnerability to terrorist actions. Narco-terrorists have been operating throughout our country for over 30 years. Drug related deaths in the U.S. in the year 2000 were approximately 17,000⁵⁶ in comparison to

⁵⁶ U.S. Congress, House, *CRS Report for Congress: Transnational Organized Crime: Principle Threats and U.S. Response*, 109th Cong., March 20, 2006, 5.

the 2,726⁵⁷ deaths resulting from the terrorist attack on the world trade center. Narco-terrorists are bringing an estimated 380 metric tons of cocaine through the Mexican border with the average seizure rate amounting to only 36 metric tons.⁵⁸ This highlights just how porous the borders to the U.S. really are. It also shows how easy it would be for Islamic fundamentalist to infiltrate our country, bypassing all Transportation Security Administration security measures seen in airports and seaports. The reliance comes down to Customs and Border Patrol agents who only have 11,000⁵⁹ border agents assigned to monitor the 6,000⁶⁰ miles of Mexican and Canadian borders not to mention over 12,000⁶¹ miles of general coastline. With drug routes already in place and an identified low seizure rate, it would not be difficult to imagine Islamic fundamentalist piggybacking on the existing drug networks.

Is there a real threat of terrorism in Latin America? The existence of narco-terrorism is well documented due to groups such as the FARC and the Shining Path. The level of Islamic fundamentalism is not. The Congressional Research Service has stated that Hezbollah and Hamas terrorist cells are operating in the Tri Border area along the borders of Argentina, Paraguay, and Brazil.⁶² This area is largely uncontrolled and has a significant Muslim population.

There is also evidence that in the late 1990's, members of Al Qaeda visited the area soliciting funding and support. The next logical question revolves around the

⁵⁷ CDC, "Deaths in the World Trade Center"

<http://www.cdc.gov/mmwrR/preview/mmwrhtml/mm51SPa6.htm> (accessed October 28, 2007).

⁵⁸ United States Government Accountability Office. Testimony before the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Committee on Foreign Affairs. Drug Control, 7.

⁵⁹ U.S. Customs and Border Protection. "Border Patrol Overview" http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/border_Patrol/border_patrol_obs/overview.xml, (accessed February 24, 2008).

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Infoplease, "Coastlines of the United States," <http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0001801.html> (accessed October 28, 2007).

⁶² U.S. Congress, House. *CRS Report to Congress Latin America: Terrorism Issues*. 110th Cong., 2007, 3.

possibility of Islamic fundamentalists obtaining a larger hold in the region. If there is enough instability in any one of the countries in Latin America, it can lead to varying levels of permissiveness on which Islamic fundamentalists can capitalize.

Latin American instability can be a primary driver for terrorist networks to form within the region. Instability allows a freedom of action for the terrorist groups because the government does not have the political power to curb their expansion. Economic and social instability allows terrorist networks to obtain a strong foothold by infusing large sums of money into a poor region and buying the peoples' support. A politically unstable government does not have the capacity to intercede when terrorist groups begin to take root in their country. Political instability in the form of military control leaves the country virtually incapable of dealing with the insurgent networks due to lack of resources, wrong priorities, and limited training. Once the foothold is gained by the terrorist networks, the job of dislodging them becomes exponentially more difficult.

Narco-Terrorism

Narco-terrorism is very prevalent throughout Latin America. For years the US and its Latin American partners have been actively engaging the large drug cartels throughout the region but with limited success in actually curbing the infusion of drugs into the US. There is a disparity between the amount of cocaine being interdicted and the volume being produced. For example, the overall Andean coca cultivation in 2006 may have reached its highest level in 20 years with a point estimate of 157,200 hectares.⁶³ In contrast the volume of drugs interdicted has not increased proportionally.

⁶³ Washington Office on Latin America, "Reality Check on Coca in the Andes." http://www.wola.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=viewp&id=457&Itemid=2 (accessed October 10, 2007), 1-3.

The Mexican–American border has become the largest conduit for smuggling illegal drugs into the US. In 2000, 66% of all cocaine entering the US came through Mexico. This number rose to 90% by 2006.⁶⁴ As the volume of cocaine entering through our southern border has increased we would expect to see an increase in seizures along this border. This has not occurred. In fact from 2000-2006 only 13% of estimated cocaine arriving in Mexico was seized.⁶⁵

What is causing this increase? Many would argue it is a measure of demand. As long as there is a demand in the US, the drug smugglers will continue to find ways to counteract any measures in place. Take for example the use of fumigation as a method of destroying the coca plants before they can be harvested. Unfortunately the fumigation process has not reduced the level of coca being cultivated. As seen in 2006, there was a record high of coca being grown in the Andean region but we also saw record highs in fumigation being done in the area as well. As related by John Walsh from the Washington Office on Latin America, “Fumigation is clearly not deterring coca growing”⁶⁶ which goes to show that these efforts are relatively ineffectual in solving the systemic problems facing the region.

Another large problem that is directly related to drugs is the development of organized crime. Scholars have identified income inequality as one of the strongest indicators of the development of violent and organized criminal elements.⁶⁷ Taking the economic and social instability into account there is no doubt that Latin America has the

⁶⁴ United States Government Accountability Office. Testimony before the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Committee on Foreign Affairs. Drug Control, 2.

⁶⁵ Ibid, 7.

⁶⁶ Washington Office on Latin America, “Reality Check on Coca in the Andes.” http://www.wola.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=457&Itemid=2 (accessed October 10, 2007), 1.

⁶⁷ U.S. Congress. House. CRS Report to Congress Gangs in Central America. 110th Cong. 2007, 2.

key ingredient for the development of these types of organizations. This, in turn, can increase the chances of regional instability. According to the CRS report to Congress the estimated murder rate per 100,000 people in 2004 was 45.9 in Honduras, 41.2 in El Salvador, and 34.7 in Guatemala. In comparison, the US figure was only 5.7.⁶⁸ These figures can be directly attributed to criminal gangs such as the 18th Street Gang (M-18) and Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) that have developed into transnational gangs built upon money acquired through drug sales. These organizations can be seen throughout Latin America and have also developed large organizations within the US.

Islamic Fundamentalists

Islamic fundamentalism is indeed a global problem. Islamic fundamentalism develops out of a basic desire to spread, by any means necessary, the beliefs of Islam. This type of Islam can manifest itself in any country of the world as recent events such as 9/11, the Madrid bombing, or the subway bombing in England have proven. In order for Islamic fundamentalism to take a firm hold and grow, there must be a certain level of instability as seen in Latin America.

There is documented intelligence that terrorist leaders from Al Queda (AQ), Hamas, and Hezbollah have made trips to the Tri Border area. The Paraguayan Daily cites examples to include a visit in 1995 by Khalil Shaykh Mohamed, previous AQ operations chief, and in 2002 Hezbollah deputy Abdallah Kassir. These are not isolated cases. Each visit has specific purposes, usually in terms of garnering support and funding for their particular movement.

Hamas and Hezbollah have the largest influence in the area but there is also ample evidence to support Al Qaeda's desire to increase their presence in the region. Recent

⁶⁸ Ibid, 1.

documents obtained during an anti-terrorist operation in Pakistan revealed that AQ has developed plans to build upon the regional instability in Latin America. They also include evidence that AQ has established links with the FARC in Columbia and the Shining Path in Peru. Even more revealing is the fact that AQ has links with thousands of students in the Dominican Republic.⁶⁹ Although there have been no confirmed use of these networks by AQ, the threat exists and they have the capacity to use them if they are allowed to operate unchecked within the region.

There is also documented evidence of active terror campaigns in Latin America. The most well-known are the two terrorist bombings in Argentina. Both bombings, one against Argentina's Israeli embassy and the second against a Jewish community center, were directed against the Jewish population living in Buenos Aires. Between the two bombings, 116 people were killed and 350 injured.⁷⁰ Both bombings could be traced back to Hezbollah as well as Iran. In fact, a telephone call intercepted from the Iranian embassy in Argentina proved that Iran had been directly involved with the bombing of the Israeli embassy.⁷¹

From a financial aspect, all three terrorist groups have shown a desire to engage in the trafficking of drugs in order to fund their operations worldwide. According to the Paraguayan Daily, at least \$20 million is sent from the tri-border to Hezbollah every year. AQ's involvement in Latin America's illegal drug trade was preceded by activities of Afghan and Pakistani heroin traffickers who had worked with the Colombian Cali cartel

⁶⁹ U.S. Congress, House. Committee on International Relations, *Review of the State Departments Annual Report on Terrorism*. 109th Cong., March 11, 2006.

⁷⁰ House Congressional Resolution 469, HR 469, 108th Cong., 2D Session., (July 6, 2004) http://thomas.loc.gov/home/gpoxmlc108/hc469_ih.xml (accessed February 25, 2008).

⁷¹ Jewish Virtual Library Jewish Virtual Library. "Terrorist Bombings in Argentina (1992-1994)," <http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsourc/Terrorism/argentina.html> (accessed October 27, 22008).

and the FARC.⁷² There are numerous examples of all three Islamic Fundamentalist groups operating in Latin America using the drug trade to further their goals. Illegal drugs provide large sums of money and allow the formation of ties with Narco-terrorist groups in the region allowing Islamic fundamentalists the needed access to establish an infrastructure.

Effects on the US

Illicit drugs have dramatic social and economic consequences in the US. The CRS report to Congress says that “every year illegal drugs kill about 17,000 Americans. Illegal drugs are estimated to impose about \$160 billion in social and economic costs and \$67 billion in direct costs to the United States annually.”⁷³ Narco-trafficking has also led to increased gang activity within the US. MS-13 alone has an estimated 8,000 – 10,000 members operating in 33 states within the US.⁷⁴ The Narco-terrorist networks continue to develop new and innovative methods of transporting their product to the US. Advanced networks of go-fast boats and submarines are used to defeat maritime interdiction efforts. In addition, there are extensive tunnel systems under the Mexico/US border making it extremely difficult to find and interdict the smugglers.

Intelligence sources have established a link between Islamic fundamentalist groups within Latin America but is there a real threat to the US from these groups? When you add the ease of access to the US as seen through the Narco-terrorist drug routes as well as the limited control in numerous regions in Latin America there is a

⁷² Ehrenfeld, Rachel. “Terrorism’s Drug Money,” Benador Associates. January 8, 2004. <http://benadorassociates.com?article/1073>. (accessed November 24, 2007).

⁷³ U.S. Congress, House. *CRS Report to Congress: Transnational Organized Crime*. 109th Cong., March 20, 2006, 5.

⁷⁴ U.S. Congress, House, *CRS Report to Congress: Gangs in Central America*, 110th Cong., January 11, 2007, 2.

viable threat to the US. Documents recovered from Pakistan show links between AQ and Mexico's popular revolutionary army, EPR. The documents revealed that AQ sees EPR as a collaborator in attacks in Mexico on foreign targets, especially those from the US and Britain. The same documents say that the EPR could play a key role in allowing AQ operatives to enter the US through the US/Mexican border, although there are no documented cases that the EPR has assisted AQ in this area yet.⁷⁵ Ease of access to the US alone shows there is more than enough justification for concern towards terrorist networks in Latin America. Compounding this issue is the limited ability of Latin American governments to control sparsely populated areas within the region.

IV. Application of the Elements of National Power (DIME)

Utilizing all elements of national power, Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic (DIME) is the only way to combat this threat. This combined approach will achieve the results necessary to effectively deter both narco and Islamic terrorists. If the focus of effort is only on one or two areas of the DIME model, large gaps in the strategy will appear and the effectiveness will be diminished if not destroyed.

There are two documents that lay out the strategy of the US. The first is the National Security Strategy 2006 which states "the goal of our statecraft is to help create a world of democratic, well-governed states that can meet the needs of their citizens and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system."⁷⁶ There are nine essential tasks listed that the US must accomplish in order to meet this goal. The second is most applicable to this paper, "Strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to

⁷⁵ House Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation, *Review of the State Departments Annual Report on Terrorism Hearings*, 109th Cong., 2d sess., May 11, 2006, 13.

⁷⁶ United States National Security Strategy, March 2006, 1.

prevent attacks against us and our friends.”⁷⁷ The second document is the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism. It states that the strategic vision for the war on terror is:

In the short run, the fight involves the application of all instruments of national power and influences to kill or capture the terrorist; deny them safe haven and control of any nation; prevent them from gaining access to WMD; render potential terrorist targets less attractive by strengthening security; and cut off their sources of funding and other resources they need to operate and survive. In the long run, winning the War on Terror means winning the battle of ideas.⁷⁸

These two documents provide the overarching guidance for the execution of national objectives. Unfortunately they leave a great deal of flexibility in the execution of these objectives thus allowing every department within the government to interpret how to achieve these goals. This leads directly to a conflict of priorities within the government and a lack of synergy in their approach.

For a detailed description on the utilization of the DIME model in Latin America reference Appendix A.

V. Strategic Solution - Latin American Interagency Department

There is no question that instability exists throughout Latin America and that the best solution to assist the region is an effective use of the DIME model but whose responsibility is it to coordinate and accomplish the various requirements each country needs? In reality, it does not exist in one agency but throughout a variety of agencies whose efforts must be consolidated to effectively meet the various and diverse challenges within the region. The requirement to build and maintain stability in Latin America is incredibly dynamic. An effort in one country could very easily have negative consequences in another. The value of a department designed to look at the “big picture”

⁷⁷ Ibid, 1.

⁷⁸ National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, September 2006, 7.

will ensure that the US government is looking at the effects of all actions across a much broader perspective. This would be the primary purpose of the new department: to harness the entire USG efforts to implement stability in the region.

The ability to look past isolated country issues and determine the effects across the region will also provide a balancing effect for the US. It will ensure that a disproportionate amount of resources are not being used on one country, leaving minimal resources available for other countries. This new agency is the Latin American Interagency Department (LAID).

The LAID, as seen in chart 1, will have the same level of authority as the other governmental departments currently under the USG. It will work through the National Security Council (NSC) but will be reportable to the President. The secretary will be nominated by the President and will be confirmed by Congress. As a minimum, the secretary would be a sub-cabinet level position. The preference would be a cabinet level position allowing the secretary to work directly with the NSC on the Principals Committee. If the Secretary of the LAID does not warrant a seat in the Principals Committee, the secretary must be allowed a vote on all matters concerning Latin America.




Chart1 – USG Structure

The department will be authorized an administrative staff but all of their subject matter experts will be provided from the other USG agencies. For example, the Department of State will be a force provider to the LAID. Most of their Latin American Foreign Service officers will be transferred to the LAID with the exception of a small contingent of officers who will remain in the department to assist the Secretary of State on Latin American matters. All individuals transferred to the LAID will be under their control while assigned and the duration of their tours will be between 2-5 years. A 2-5 year assignment will have a number of benefits. First, it will ensure continuity because there will not be a quick turnover of personnel. Second, this will not allow individuals to homestead in the department. It will force them back into their original department and always ensure recent experience from each of the other departments. In order to accommodate the new department, they would need a facility within Washington DC that is capable of integrating all the agencies. The LAID will be functionally structured, as seen in Chart 2. Each directorate will focus on its particular field but will have a great deal of interface with the other directorates within the agency to capitalize on the unique dynamic of the organization.



Chart 2 – LAID Structure

Diplomatic Directorate




Chart 3 – Diplomatic Directorate

The Diplomatic Directorate’s primary responsibility would be to develop a consolidated diplomatic strategy for the entire region. This strategy will be approved by the secretary and the LAID will work with the Ambassadors of each country to establish the most effective regional strategy.

Department of State (DOS)

The DOS is the diplomatic arm of the US government. Its stated mission is to “Advance freedom for the benefit of the American people and the international community by helping to build and sustain a more democratic, secure, and prosperous world composed of well-governed states that respond to the needs of their people, reduce widespread poverty, and act responsibly within the international system.”⁷⁹ The DOS has a diverse set of tools to accomplish this mission. From Foreign Service Officers working in embassies across the world to their sister organization, USAID, they have the capability to directly influence governments and their citizens throughout the region.

⁷⁹ U.S. Department of State: U.S. Agency for International Development, *Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2007-2012*, May 7, 2007, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/86291.pdf> (accessed December 10, 2007), 1.

The DOS will have a lead role in the LAID. It would be recommended that the secretary of the department have, as a minimum, experience in the DOS and best case be a previous Ambassador to one of the countries in the region. The current structure of the DOS is primarily country focused but they do have numerous offices and desks that focus on particular regions within Latin America. These regional departments have the responsibility to consolidate information on those particular areas. In order to be more effective, integrating these offices into the LAID will ensure a larger and more consolidated regional focus and provide much needed manpower to accomplish its mission.

The responsibility of the DOS personnel within the LAID would be to integrate and consolidate the various diplomatic missions within the region. The Ambassadors of each country would still report to the President of the United States but would work with the LAID versus the Secretary of State to integrate their requests into the regional focus the LAID would bring to the region. This will allow the Ambassadors to remain the primary diplomatic arm in each country but will now allow an integrated approach to resource requirements. The Secretary of LAID would be able to take each request and prioritize it based on a regional strategy.

US Agency for Information Development (USAID)

USAID is a government agency that receives its foreign policy guidance from the Secretary of State, supports long-term and equitable economic growth and advances US foreign policy objectives. This is done through their support in three areas: 1) economic growth, agriculture and trade, 2) global health, and 3) democracy, conflict prevention and

humanitarian assistance.⁸⁰ They manage a worldwide network of country programs for economic policy reforms that generate sound economic growth, encourage political freedom and good governance, and invest in human resource development. “USAID focuses much of its efforts on six areas of special concern: agriculture, the environment, child survival, HIV/AIDS, population planning, and basic education.”⁸¹

USAID will have an important role within the LAID. They will be responsible for recommending programs that will improve the social conditions within the various countries of Latin America. Social program improvements are integral to the development of Latin America and will increase the stability in the region. The cost associated with these programs can consume a great deal of resources; recommendations from the members of USAID will assist in their prioritization. USAID can also work with the various countries within the region to get them to assist with funding the recommended programs.

Country Teams

The country teams at US Embassies overseas are made up of the collection of US civilian and military personnel who are serving the USG in-country under the authority of the Chief of Mission. They include all personnel in-country except uniformed military personnel reporting to a Combatant Command. The typical make up of a Country Team at a US Embassy includes: Ambassador, Deputy Chief of Mission (DOS), Political Counselor (DOS), Political-Military Counselor (DOS), Economic Counselor (DOS), Public Affairs Counselor (DOS), Management Counselor (DOS), Counsel (DOS), Regional Security Officer (DOS), Defense Attaché (DOD), head of office of Defense

⁸⁰ USAID, “About USAID,” http://www.usaid.gov/about_usaid/ (accessed 20 Jan 08).

⁸¹ Joint Publication 3-08 *Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organizations Coordination During Joint Operations Vol II* (March 17, 2006), A-M-1.

Cooperation (DOD), and Commercial Attaché (DOC), and Legal Attaché (DOJ/FBI).

This diverse make up allows the Country Teams to pursue a fairly diverse USG approach to the country in which they are operating. The Country Teams enact policy through a number of different facets of the USG. Depending on the issue, the Country Team will work with the President of the US, the NSC, the Principles Committee, the Deputies Committee, or their various departments (DOS and DOD). The LAID will offer the Country Teams a streamlined approach to address their individual country issues and will be folded into an overall regional strategy.

Under the current embassy – country teams structure, the country teams work for and report to the ambassadors of each country. This will need to be modified. The country teams will still work for the ambassador but will report to the LAID. The ambassador will not retain total control of the actions of the country teams. This will be essential to guarantee a regional focus from the LAID even if it means bypassing the ambassador and going directly to the country teams. The other option would be have the ambassador's report to the LAID versus the president. They would still be selected by the president but would relinquish their direct access to the president and will have to address all concerns through the LAID. Under this construct, the country teams would report to the ambassadors.

Information Directorate




Chart 4 – Information Directorate

The Information Directorate will focus on the strategic communications mission within Latin America. It will be responsible for developing and implementing the plan once approved by the secretary.

Department of State

The DOS will be integral in developing the strategic communications plan and will have the capability to work closely with the Diplomatic Directorate. The Information Directorate will take the diplomatic policies from the Diplomatic Directorate and decide which messages must be folded into the strategic communications master plan for the region. This message will be tailored for each country but must carry the legitimacy of the USG. The various messages can't be contradictory and must maintain the regional integrity of the US goals and missions in Latin America.

Department of Defense

The DOD has several unique capabilities in the area of information operations (IO). They have the five core capabilities: 1) psychological operations, 2) military deception, 3) operations security 4) electronic warfare and 5) computer network

operations.⁸² Some of these capabilities are significantly more effective at the operational and tactical levels and will be used in these structures. The two focus areas the LAID should utilize are operations security and computer network operations. Further IO needs will be pulled from the operational and tactical units.

The first important focus area is operations security (OPSEC). OPSEC identifies critical information and analyzes friendly actions and other activities to limit the information available to the adversary.⁸³ In terms of Latin America, there is no defined adversary, but the sensitivity of the master regional plan needs to be protected and only released to appropriate governments that will assist in the mission. The second important aspect of the LAID's IO is computer network operations (CNO). CNO is used to attack, degrade, disrupt, deny, exploit, and defend electronic information and infrastructure.⁸⁴ The CNO personnel attached to the LAID will help develop a computer strategy to defend the countries within Latin America. Reducing the computer threat becomes a very important mission given the globalized capabilities of drug networks. The CNO personnel will work through the Information Directorate to obtain approvals from the various countries in Latin America to attack and degrade the capabilities of the drug traffickers.

⁸² Joint Publication 3-13, *Information Operations*, (February 13, 2006) II-1 – II-4.

⁸³ Ibid, II-3.

⁸⁴ Ibid, II-4 – II-5.

Military Directorate




Chart 5 – Military Directorate

The DOD has five primary missions: war fighting, humanitarian aid, peacekeeping, disaster relief, and homeland security.⁸⁵ In order to accomplish these roles the President exercises authority and control of the armed forces through two branches of chain of command. The first branch runs from the president, through the Secretary, to the Combatant Commanders (regionally focused) for missions and forces assigned to the command. The second branch is used for purposes other than operational control of forces and runs from the President, through the Secretary of Defense to the Secretaries of the military departments (Army, Navy/Marines, and Air Force).

The LAID will require representation from each service as well as liaisons from Special Operations Command, Defense Intelligence Agency, and National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. The last two agencies will be attached to the LAID intelligence cell, see chart 8. The LAID will utilize SOUTHCOM, the geographic combatant command for Latin America (excluding Mexico), for most DOD required integration. It should also include liaisons from each of the services with Latin American policy. The best way to gain this level of experience is to have the liaisons transfer to the LAID for two years of service following one year of work in SOUTHCOM. This will ensure the

⁸⁵ United States Department of Defense, “DoD 101 An Introductory Overview of the Department of Defense,” <http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/dod101/dod101.html#whatwedo> (accessed January 20, 2008).

selected officers are current on SOUTHCOM requirements and missions and will bring their service specific experience to the job as well.

Economic Directorate




Chart 6 – Economic Directorate

The Economic Directorate will be responsible for formulating a consolidated economic plan for Latin America. This plan will focus beyond the simple infusion of money into the region. It will evaluate current capabilities, trade plans, and any other factors that affect the region.

Department of Commerce

The Department of Commerce mission is “to foster, promote, and develop the foreign and domestic commerce of the United States”.⁸⁶ One of the major roles of the department is to promote and assist international trade between the US and foreign governments. This is an integral aspect of economic stability and will be beneficial to the US and Latin America. There are two bureaus within the department that will be critical to the LAID.

⁸⁶ US Department of Commerce, “Mission and Organization of the Department of Commerce” <http://dms.osec.doc.gov/cgi-bin/doiit.cgi?204:112:f23c40e440fd58af1c94886dafa2a0115c34e0e318d0b74b9aa67fc54ea5be:288>, (accesses January 12, 2008).

Economic and Statistics Administration (ESA)

The ESA provides economic data, analysis and forecasts for the USG and civil sector. It also develops domestic and international economic policies.⁸⁷ They will be the primary focal point for all economic analysis of Latin America. This information will be used by the secretary of the LAID to identify courses of action to help arrest negative economic trends as well as to build upon the Department of Treasury's economic plan for Latin America. The personnel attached to the LAID will be the primary advisors to the secretary and will design economic assistance packages that keep the US ahead of future trends and requirements within the various countries of Latin America.

International Trade Administration (ITA)

The ITA's mission is "to promote prosperity by strengthening the competitiveness of U.S. industry, promoting trade and investment, and ensuring fair trade and compliance with trade laws and agreements."⁸⁸ The ITA acts primarily as a domestic agency designed to help US industry gain access to foreign markets but they also play a significant role in ensuring fair trade in foreign markets. This knowledge and expertise will be critical to the economic prosperity in Latin America.

The personnel from the ITA attached to the LAID would be responsible for evaluating and assisting the countries within Latin America in opening new global markets and making them more competitive worldwide. Increasing trade within Latin America is one of the most viable methods to increase economic prosperity throughout the region. This would be a great step towards building economic and social stability.

⁸⁷ Economic and Statistics Administration, "ESA's Mission," https://www.esa.doc.gov/about_esa.cfm (accessed January 12, 2008).

⁸⁸ International trade Administration, "About the International trade Administration," <http://trade.gov/about.asp> (accessed January 12, 2008).

Department of Transportation (DOT)

The mission of the DOT is to “serve the United States by ensuring a fast, safe, efficient, accessible and convenient transportation system that meets our vital national interests and enhances the quality of life of the American people, today and into the future.”⁸⁹ The DOT’s main focus is centered on infrastructure support and directly impacts economic prosperity. There are three agencies within the DOT that would assist the LAID in accomplishing its mission.

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)

The mission of the FAA is to “provide the safest, most efficient aerospace system in the world.”⁹⁰ Increasing safety and throughput are integral aspects of the FAA’s roles. Being able to take this experience and apply it to Latin America will have direct impact on the region’s economic potential. The personnel from the FAA attached to the LAID will be responsible for evaluating the aviation infrastructure within the various countries in Latin America and providing recommendations for improvements to increase their capability and capacity.

Federal Highway Administration (FHWA)

The FHWA is “charged with the broad responsibility of ensuring that America’s roads and highways continue to be the safest and most technologically up-to-date.”⁹¹ The FHWA has a significant role in maintaining our country’s infrastructure and ensuring future infrastructure growth as our country continues to develop. This would be the

⁸⁹ U.S. Department of Transportation, “Mission and History,” <http://www.dot.gov/mission.htm> (accessed January 20, 2008).

⁹⁰ Federal Aviation Administration, “Mission,” <http://www.faa.gov/about/mission/> (accessed January 20, 2008).

⁹¹ U.S. Department of Transportation Federal Highway Administration, “Who We Are,” <http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/whoweare/whoweare.htm>, (accessed January 20, 2008).

primary task of personnel from the FHWA attached to the LAID. They would be responsible for evaluating the road infrastructure within Latin America and making recommendations to increase capability and capacity as each country continues to grow. This will ensure a more economically prosperous region due to an increased ability to move and transport products for sale within the region. It will also decrease social instability by allowing easier access to schools and hospitals.

Federal Railroad Administration (FRA)

The FRA is responsible for building and enforcing rail safety regulations, administer railroad assistance programs, and develop improvement programs for our national railway programs.⁹² The FRA's purpose in Latin America will be very similar to that of the FHWA. Their role within the LAID would be to evaluate the rail systems and determine any recommendations for necessary improvements. This will also go directly towards increasing economic prosperity within Latin America by increasing their means to transport trade goods within the region.

Department of Agriculture (USDA)

The USDA's mission is to "provide leadership on food, agriculture, natural resources, and related issues based on sound public policy, the best available science, and efficient management."⁹³ They are the foremost US experts on building and implementing sound agricultural programs. They also have a great deal of experience in promoting food safety, a program lacking in many Latin American countries.

⁹² Department of Transportation Federal Railroad Administration, "About the FRA," <http://www.fra.dot.gov/us/content/2>, (accessed January 20, 2008).

⁹³ United States Department of Agriculture, "About USDA," http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/!ut/p/_s.7_0_A/7_0_1OB/.cmd/ad/.ar/sa.retrievecontent/.c/6_2_1UH/.ce/7_2_5JN/.p/5_2_4TR/.d/0/_th/J_2_9D/_s.7_0_A/7_0_1OB?PC_7_2_5JN_navid=MISSION_STATEMENT&PC_7_2_5JN_navtype=RT&PC_7_2_5JN_parentnav=ABOUT_USDA#7_2_5JN12, (accessed January 12, 2008).

The principal focus for USDA personnel assigned to the LAID will be to evaluate the agricultural policies and procedures within Latin America and to assist with upgrading the agricultural capability within the region. These personnel will come primarily from the Farm and Foreign Agricultural Services department within the USDA bringing their knowledge of agriculture to increase the yield and output of the farm industry in Latin America. The secondary function of the USDA would be to assist with food safety in the region. Safer foods not only increase the health and well being of the populace but also improve the chances that their product will be exportable to other countries, thus increasing trade within the region.

Department of Treasury (DOT)

The Department of Treasury mission is to “serve the American people and strengthen national security by managing the U.S. Government’s finances effectively, promoting economic growth and stability, and ensuring the safety, soundness, and security of the U.S. and international financial systems.”⁹⁴ The DOT has the responsibility of ensuring that the economic arm of the US remains strong. Most consider this a domestic agenda only but they also have a large role in developing economic strategies globally through their advice to the President. They also serve as facilitators of economic sanctions and can freeze any foreign money within the US.

The responsibilities of the personnel from the DOT attached to the LAID will be to build a financial strategy for the entire region, a task which is no small undertaking. A financial strategy includes aid requirements for each country, a continuing evaluation of the economic stability of each country, analysis of trade policies, and if needed, the

⁹⁴ United States Department of the Treasury, “Duties & Function,” <http://www.ustreas.gov/education/duties/> (accessed January 12, 2008).

development of concise economic sanctions that will include support from other countries within the region. Developing a regional strategy that incorporates each of these areas will require substantial commitment of manpower resources to the LAID from the DOT. In addition, these individuals must be familiar with international and not just domestic economic policies.

Law Enforcement Directorate




Chart 7 – Law Enforcement Directorate

The Law Enforcement Directorate will combine all law enforcement capabilities within the LAID to focus on two areas. The first is border security and the safety of the American people. Their ability to work directly with domestic agencies will ensure a consolidated foreign and domestic approach which will be especially effective at eliminating drug routes to the US. The second mission will focus on the evaluation of their Law Enforcement capabilities and determine what training requirements are needed for each country. This training program will focus on Law Enforcement, capacity, proficiency, human rights, and rule of law.

Department of Justice (DOJ)

The Department of Justice mission is “to enforce the law and defend the interests of the United States according to the law; to ensure public safety against threats foreign and domestic; to provide federal leadership in preventing and controlling crime; to seek just punishment for those guilty of unlawful behavior; and to ensure fair and impartial administration of justice for all Americans.”⁹⁵ The DOJ has authority over all criminal and civil suits in which the US has an interest. It is also the central agency for the enforcement of federal laws.

The DOJ members attached to the LAID will be the focal point for judicial matters between the US and the various countries within Latin America. The authority and direction they would bring to the organization would be an essential link to the judicial process. They would be able to provide advice, recommendations, and insight to the Secretary of the LAID forming a coherent legal strategy for Latin America. Being subject matter experts, they would also be called upon to assist the various countries within Latin America develop stronger judicial processes and weed out the corruption seen in these countries.

Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)

The mission of the DEA is to enforce the controlled substances laws and regulations of the US and bring to the criminal and civil justice system of the United States organizations involved in the growing, manufacturing, or distribution of controlled substances appearing in or destined for illicit traffic in the US.⁹⁶ The DEA is the leading

⁹⁵ United States Department of Justice, “Mission Statement,” <http://www.usdoj.gov/02organizations/> (accessed January 12, 2008).

⁹⁶ U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, “DEA Mission Statement,” <http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/agency/mission.htm> (accessed January 12, 2008).

law enforcement agency within the US to counter drug trafficking. For years, they have fostered international ties with countries like Mexico to help stem the illegal flow of drugs to the US.

The function of the attached DEA agents would center on narco-terrorism. They would have the lead role in developing a department strategy to counter the drug routes from Mexico to the US. In addition, they will coordinate with law enforcement agencies within the US to assist with the apprehension of drug traffickers once they cross the border. The DEA will also be responsible for evaluating the drug enforcement capabilities of the various countries within Latin America and establishing training programs for those countries needing assistance.

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

The FBI's mission is "to protect and defend the United States against terrorist and foreign intelligence threats, to uphold and enforce the criminal laws of the United States, and to provide leadership and criminal justice services to federal, state, municipal, and international agencies and partners."⁹⁷ The FBI has a wide range of investigative capabilities at its disposal. Their responsibilities are primarily focused on domestic federal law enforcement but they also assist and coordinate with foreign governments when activities in these countries might impact the US.

The attached FBI agents would provide a necessary bridge between the LAID and domestic law enforcement agencies. One of the LAID missions will be to protect the US from attacks by terrorist organizations operating within Latin America. The link to the FBI will ensure that intelligence received from other partners within the LAID has a

⁹⁷ Federal Bureau of Investigation, "About Us – Quick Facts," <http://www.fbi.gov/quickfacts.htm> (accessed January 12, 2008).

coordinated federal response if there is a threat to the US. They will also team up with Customs and Border Patrol, Drug Enforcement Administration, and other law enforcement agencies within the LAID to assist in securing the borders especially from narco-terrorism.

Department of Homeland Security (DHS)

The mission of the DHS is to “lead the unified national effort to secure America. We will prevent and deter terrorist attacks and protect against and respond to threats and hazards to the nation. We will ensure safe and secure borders, welcome lawful immigrants and visitors, and promote the free-flow of commerce.”⁹⁸ The DHS is a diverse organization that can bring a large number of resources to assist the LAID in accomplishing its mission. There are five departments within the DHS that will be needed.

Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC)

The FLETC is the primary interagency law enforcement training organization providing support to more than 80 federal agencies. They also have oversight and program management responsibilities for the International Law Enforcement Academy.⁹⁹ Personnel from the FLETC will be able to evaluate the stability of the law enforcement agencies in Latin America and determine what support, if any, the US should provide to the various countries. The FLETC will then be responsible for training any of the counties identified in need.

Transportation Security Administration (TSA)

⁹⁸ Homeland Security, “Mission,” <http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/strategicplan/index.shtm> (access January 12, 2008).

⁹⁹ Federal Law Enforcement training Center, “About FLETC,” <http://www.fletc.gov/> (accessed January 12, 2008).

TSA is responsible for protecting the nation's transportation system to ensure freedom of movement for people and commerce.¹⁰⁰ TSA runs numerous law enforcement programs related to layered security for transportation networks. Their knowledge of safety and security especially as it applies to air travel would be a very important aspect of homeland security to bring to Latin America.

The personnel attached to the LAID will be responsible for evaluating the security of the transportation systems within Latin America and assisting in developing programs to enhance their capabilities. The ability to provide security in this area will increase commerce and have a direct impact on economic prosperity. Their efforts will also help reduce potential avenues for terrorist activities within Latin America and abroad.

United States Customs and Border Protection (CBP)

The CBP's primary mission is to protect the nation's borders and enforce the laws of the US.¹⁰¹ The CBP is also responsible for shipping container security as well as screening high-risk imported food. With almost 20,000 miles of coast lines and borders to protect, an integrated effort is the only possible solution to protect the US. The LAID would be able to assist the CBP in protection of the Mexico/US border as well as the southern coastlines of the US.

The personnel for the CBP attached to the LAID would primarily act as liaisons. They will be able to utilize intelligence gained through the LAID's efforts to help interdict both terrorists and individuals trafficking humans who attempt to cross into the US illegally. The LAID will be able to utilize the experience of the CBP to help Latin

¹⁰⁰ Transportation Security Administration, "Mission," http://www.tsa.gov/who_we_are/mission.shtm, (accessed January 12, 2008).

¹⁰¹ U.S. Customs and Border Protection, "CBP Mission Statement and Core Values," <http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/toolbox/about/mission/guardians.xml>, (accessed January 12, 2008).

American countries develop border security programs of their own. This will go a long way towards helping root out traffickers and terrorists living and operating in the ungoverned areas within Latin America.

United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)

The ICE is responsible for eliminating vulnerabilities in the nation's border along with economic, transportation and infrastructure security.¹⁰² ICE was created in 2003 to combine the efforts of the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and US Customs service. This new agency plays a large role targeting gang and criminal organizations as well as complementing the capabilities of the Customs and Border Patrol. They are also the second largest federal law enforcement contributor to the Joint Terrorism Task Force making their roles essential to both Homeland Security and the LAID.

The personnel attached to the LAID from ICE will be responsible for tracking gang activity crossing into the US from Latin America. As previously discussed, Latin American gangs are permeating the US. MS-13 and M-18 have wide influence throughout the US. An integrated approach starting with an effective crack down within Latin America and ending with a disruption of their efforts in the US is the only way to ensure that these gangs are eviscerated from American society. The ICE personnel would also have a supporting role to the CBP and their training efforts within Latin America in educating Latin American countries in effective methods to combat gang activity.

United States Coast Guard (USCG)

¹⁰² U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, "About Us," <http://www.ice.gov/about/operations.htm> (accessed January 12, 2008).

The USCG protects “the public, the environment, and U.S. economic and security interests in any maritime region in which those interests may be at risk, including international waters and America’s coasts, ports, and inland waterways.”¹⁰³ The USCG has five fundamental roles 1) maritime safety, 2) maritime security, 3) maritime mobility, 4) national defense, and 5) protection of national resources. The USCG focus within the LAID would center on maritime security and national defense. The USGC with Title 14 responsibility has maritime law enforcement capabilities that the DOD, through the Navy, cannot provide. There are methods in place that allow the US Navy to act in the role of maritime security but this is usually done with USCG Title 14 observers on board.

The USCG personnel attached to the LAID would have a planning and advisory role within the LAID. In addition, they would be the conduit for approval of USCG action under the direction of the JIATF established under SOCSOUTH. This will be discussed in depth in the following sections.

Intelligence Directorate




Chart 8 – Intelligence Directorate

The Intelligence Directorate will be responsible for collecting and analyzing the strategic level intelligence requirements for Latin America. In utilizing a diverse range of

¹⁰³ United States Coast Guard, “Missions,” <http://www.uscg.mil/top/missions/>, (accessed January 12, 2008).

the intelligence capabilities at the disposal of the USG, the directorate will be able to develop a concise picture from which the secretary can make good policy decisions.

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

“The Central Intelligence Agency is an independent US Government agency responsible for providing national security intelligence to senior US policy makers.”¹⁰⁴

The CIA is responsible for the collection of national intelligence outside the US. The primary method of intelligence gathering the CIA uses is human intelligence. Through this method, the CIA operates worldwide and has the ability to gain insight into each country’s real aims and goals. This type of information will be the critical link in developing an effective strategy for use in the Latin American region. It will fold the “hard” intelligence gathered through normal means into a realistic picture from the ground perspective.

The personnel from the CIA attached to the LAID will be the conduit for this information and will assist in consolidating the intelligence gathered to determine recommended courses of action. The clandestine capability of the CIA will also provide a unique capability within Latin America. The LAID will be the approval authority for all clandestine operations within Latin America. This will ensure that any missions conducted in the region will be fully integrated into the overall US mission objectives and will not run counter other objectives in the region.

Department of Defense (DOD)

The DOD will be able to staff the intelligence fusion cells from three areas: Military services (Army, Navy/Marines, and Air Force), DIA, and NGA. Each of the

¹⁰⁴ Central Intelligence Agency, “About CIA,” <https://www.cia.gov/about-cia/index.html> , (accessed January 12, 2008).

services will provide intelligence analysts to the LAID. In addition to supplying manpower, these analysts will bring their own unique intelligence perspective from each of their services.

Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)

The mission of the DIA is to “provide timely, objective, and coherent military intelligence to warfighters, defense planners, and defense and national security policy makers.”¹⁰⁵ The DIA’s intelligence capabilities will be integral to the intelligence fusion cell designed to track and identify threats within Latin America. The resources of this agency will be critical in identifying both fundamentalist and narco-terrorist organizations within Latin America as well as other regional threats.

National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA)

The NGA’s mission is to “provide timely, relevant, and accurate geospatial intelligence in support of national security.”¹⁰⁶ Geospatial intelligence will be used to assess, and visually recognize physical features and geographic references in an effort to identify ongoing activities within Latin America. This is critical information that can be used to detect narco and Islamic fundamentalist terrorist encampments as well as any individual country’s aggression within the region. They will work hand in hand with all intelligence agencies to assist in identifying potential threats within the region.

National Security Agency (NSA)

The mission of the NSA is to “deliver responsive, reliable, and effective Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) and Information Assurance, and enable Network Warfare

¹⁰⁵ Defense Intelligence Agency, “Mission,” <http://www.dia.mil/thisisdia/mission.htm>, (accessed January 12, 2008).

¹⁰⁶ National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, “National System for Geospatial Intelligence (NSG) Statement of Strategic Intent,” March 2007, http://www.nga.mil/NGASiteContent/StaticFiles/OCR/nsg_strategic_intent.pdf (accessed January 12, 2008), 1.

operations, for National Security under all circumstances”.¹⁰⁷ The NSA’s ability to collect and process SIGINT will be an important facet of the intelligence fusion cell within the LAID. SIGINT information is derived from the signals environment and encompasses communications intelligence (intercepted signals between people) and electronic intelligence (signals between machines). Being able to intercept and monitor information from illegal organizations is a critical capability required to understand the threat emanating from Latin America.

The NSA personnel within the LAID will be responsible for coordinating with the NSA to provide collection and analysis of any SIGINT determined mission critical to the LAID. NSA personnel will be integrated into the fusion cell to ensure that all intelligence gathering is coordinated between intelligence agencies in order to develop a concise and consolidated intelligence picture.

International Directorate



Chart 9 – International Directorate

The LAID should evaluate the participation of foreign governments within their structure. Liaisons from the countries within Latin America would provide a unique non-US opinion of the current status within country. In addition, these liaisons would have the capability to reach back to their home countries and assist the LAID in the

¹⁰⁷ National Security Agency/Central Security Service, “NSA/CSS Strategic Plan (June 2006),” <http://www.nsa.gov/about/about00006.cfm> (accessed January 20, 2008).

implementation of policies to reduce regional instability. This would essentially provide firsthand knowledge of county politics that could affect the mission of the LAID. Each of these Latin American country liaisons would be reportable their respective embassies within Washington.

Other Participation

The agencies listed above represent a starting block for the LAID. This is an initial assessment of what is required to bring regional stability. There are a number of additional organizations within the USG that may be effective contributors to the LAID and can be integrated as necessary to build the cohesive strategy.

Several of the Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) also have vested interests in the region. The LAID should identify the principle players within the NGO community and evaluate the benefit of integrating them into its organizational structure. Some NGOs may be invited to the LAID on a temporary basis due to a regional crisis while others should be invited as permanent. In doing this, the LAID will be able to apply more than just a USG perspective on the issues relating to Latin America.

VI. Operational Solution – SOUTHCOM JIACG

The LAID will be the strategic level planning and execution forum for a Latin American strategy. The next step is to develop an operational arm of the department to assist with the national strategy. Some of this organizational structure is already in place. Currently there are several organizations that would be effectively folded into the LAID mission. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) is the military combatant command responsible for most of Latin America (excluding Mexico). Assigned to SOUTHCOM is a Joint Interagency Coordination Group. In addition, under the command of

SOUTHCOM is the Joint Interagency Task Force – South, responsible for maritime interdiction activities primarily focused on drug trafficking. A combination of the resources currently assigned to SOUTHCOM, along with some modification will make the operational arm of the LAID extremely effective at meeting its mission goals.

United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM)

SOUTHCOM's mission is "to conduct military operations and promote security cooperation to achieve U.S. strategic objectives."¹⁰⁸ SOUTHCOM's command strategy 2106 lays the foundation to bring stability to the region. The document identifies four primary challenges facing Latin America. First, poverty and inequality presents concerns because they create conditions from which security challenges arise to threaten democracies throughout the region. Second, corruption is a threat because it impedes the rule of law and creates insecurity. Third, crime is a concern because it is a growing threat that transcends borders and affects numerous countries in the region. Finally, terrorism is a threat because areas with lower levels of economic, investment, development, and growth, provide a breeding ground for terrorism and the full range of criminal activities.¹⁰⁹ SOUTHCOM has recognized the inherent instability problems facing the region and has taken measures to combat the threat. Unfortunately, these efforts are too few to be anything more than patches to the systemic problems thought the region.

In order to accomplish its wide-ranging mission, SOUTHCOM has set up a Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) to assist with the interagency process. The JIACG is designed as a "full-time, multifunctional advisory element of the combatant

¹⁰⁸ United States Southern Command, "Our Mission," <http://www.southcom.mil/AppsSC/pages/ourMission.php> (accessed January 20, 2008).

¹⁰⁹ United States Southern Command, "Command Strategy 2016 Partnership for the Americas," (March 2007), 8-9.

commander's staff that facilitates information sharing throughout the interagency community. Through habitual collaboration, it provides a means to integrate campaign planning efforts at the strategic and operational levels and throughout all U.S. government agencies.”¹¹⁰ As the US military continues to incorporate larger roles and missions, it becomes essential that the interagency community is involved in executing national policy at this operational level. The level of collaboration is currently encouraged at SOUTHCOM and must continue. Neyla Arnas, Charles Barry and Robert Oakley from the Center for Technology and National Security Policy say, “The SOUTHCOM JIACG facilitates coordination, enhances information sharing, and integrates planning efforts between SOUTHCOM and the interagency community.”¹¹¹

The JIACG's primary mission is to inform the combatant commander and keep him apprised of the essential policies and capabilities within the interagency. The JIACG is also responsible for coordinating requests from the combatant commander through their various agencies. The JIACG is composed primarily of civilian personnel with a vast amount of experience conducting interagency operations and they are required to formulate, articulate, advocate, and implement the combatant commander's policies.¹¹²

Currently assigned to the SOUTHCOM JIACG there are nineteen interagency partners. The interagency structure is integrated into the joint staff for the combatant commander. This ensures that all the relevant interagency requirements are addressed

¹¹⁰ United States Joint Forces Command, “Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG),” <http://www.ndu.edu/ITEA/storage/683/Fact%20Sheet%20JIACG%20-%20Jan%2005.pdf> (accessed January 20, 2008).

¹¹¹ Neyla Arnas, Charles Barry, and Robert B. Oakley, “Harnessing the Interagency for Complex Operations,” Center for Technology and National Security Policy National Defense University, (August 2005), 13

¹¹² United States Joint Forces Command, “Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG),” <http://www.ndu.edu/ITEA/storage/683/Fact%20Sheet%20JIACG%20-%20Jan%2005.pdf> (accessed January 20, 2008).

through the appropriate channels. The current model is very effective at integrating the interagency process. Under the LAID, the JIACG would be responsible for carrying out the goals of the LAID. All issues that need coordination within the interagency would be funneled through the LAID. For both SOUTHCOM and the JIACG, the LAID would be the “horse power” within the interagency community to accomplish its overall objectives. In addition, the JIACG is an essential link between the LAID and the Joint Interagency Task Force – Latin America (JIATF-LA), an organization that is defined later in section VII below.

SOUTHCOM has a great deal of imbedded capability but it may need additional manpower from the interagency community to effectively execute its mission.

SOUTHCOM will also require a more robust authority in order to act outside of just the military forum. The level of authority required is beyond the scope of this paper but should be reviewed.

VII. Tactical Solution – Joint Interagency Task Force

With the establishment of a strategic and operations capabilities focused on Latin America, all that remains is the tactical arm of the organization. The Joint Interagency Task Force – Latin America (JIATF-LA) will incorporate the current mission of the JIATF-S, a strictly maritime mission, and a land mission responsible for all of Latin America. This integration will increase the capability of the tactical arm of US policy within Latin America.

Joint Interagency Task Force – South (JIATF-S)

The mission of JIATF-S is to “conduct counter illicit trafficking operations, intelligence fusion and multi-sensor correlation to detect, monitor, and handoff suspected

illicit trafficking targets; promotes security cooperation and coordinates country team and partner nation initiatives in order to defeat the flow of illicit traffic.”¹¹³ In order to accomplish this mission, they utilize a concise interagency process incorporating members of the CBP, CIA, DEA, DOD, DIA, FBI, ICE, NSA, and NGA.

The JIATF-S is an effective organization whose basic building block is the utilization of information provided by law enforcement agencies or tactical analysis teams that work within U.S. Embassies in country.¹¹⁴ This link is essential for this DOD run agency to effectively meet its mission goals. Since JIATF-S is a DOD command, it does not have any law enforcement authority. Due to this fact, JIATF-S relies heavily on the interagency process to ensure that they have the legal authority to follow through with their mission. This also includes working closely with international partners from various countries within Latin America in order to gain the legal authority to prosecute targets within each country’s territorial waters.

JIATF-S has been an organization in the making for seventeen years. At its inception, the USG identified the need for a consolidation of efforts to combat drug trafficking. One agency alone was not enough to accomplish this mission and the need for information sharing was essential between the applicable agencies in order to get ahead of the established drug networks. As a direct result of their interagency coordination, their efforts in 2007 netted the seizure of over 200 metric tons of cocaine. JIATF-S continues to evolve and post 9/11, they have started taking an active role in counter terrorism efforts.

¹¹³ Joint Interagency Task Force – South, “Mission,” <http://www.jiatfs.southcom.mil/cg/mission.htm>, (accessed January 20, 2008).

¹¹⁴ Richard M. Yeatman, “JIATF-South, Blueprint for Success,” Joint Forces Quarterly, no. 42 (3rd Quarter 2006): 26-27

Unfortunately their efforts are limited and insufficient in scale. They have only a partial capability to engage narco-terrorists at their source within Latin America as a direct result of their primarily maritime role. The JIATF-S usually relies on individual countries to engage on their own soil with their own forces or go through other avenues within SOUTHCOM. In order to become the tactical arm of the LAID, the mission of the JIATF-S needs to be expanded to incorporate more than just the maritime role. This involves the creation of a new interagency that folds in the current roles of JIATF-S. This new organization, JIATF-LA will continue to work directly for SOUTHCOM through Special Operations Command South (SOC SOUTH) but will be answerable to the LAID.

Joint Interagency Task Force – Latin America (JIATF-LA)

A combined approach for the tactical arm of the LAID must have a capability to impact mission requirements both from a maritime and land aspect. Currently under SOUTHCOM is the sub-unified command SOC SOUTH. The mission of SOC SOUTH is to “plan, prepare for, and when directed conduct special operations in support of US Commander in Chief Special Operations strategies, plans and operations.”¹¹⁵ Special Operations Forces have nine core tasks.

1. Direct action (DA) – short duration strikes and other small scale offensive operations to seize, destroy, capture, recover, or inflict damage on designated personnel or material.

¹¹⁵ Special Operations Command South, “Mission,” <http://www.socso.southcom.mil/index.html>, (accessed January 21, 2008).

2. Counterterrorism (CT) – includes antiterrorism, counterterrorism, recovery of hostages or sensitive material from terrorist material from terrorist organization, attacks of terrorist infrastructure, and reduction of vulnerability to terrorism.
3. Foreign internal defense (FID) – FID is participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any program designed to free and protect the society from lawlessness, subversion, and insurgency.
4. Unconventional warfare (UW) – a broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations normally of long duration predominately conducted by indigenous forces.
5. Special reconnaissance – Information gathering of strategic or operational significance.
6. Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) – planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals.
7. Civil affairs operations (CA) – are activities that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, government, and non-government civilian organizations, and the civilian populace in friendly, neutral, or hostile areas of operations in order to facilitate military operations and consolidate and achieve US national objectives.
8. Information operations (IO) – involves actions taken to affect adversaries information and information systems while defending one's own information and information systems.

9. Counter proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (CP) – actions taken to seize, destroy, render safe, capture, or recover weapons of mass destruction.¹¹⁶

These core tasks are the essential elements of an active engagement plan within Latin America and need to be folded into an integrated LAID approach to encompass both land and maritime efforts.

The unique SOF capabilities are essential to combat the instability in the Latin American region; SOCSOUTH has the imbedded resources to be the facilitator. Beyond the nine core capabilities SOF brings to Latin America, they also have assigned ground forces that are language-capable in the region. In terms of forces available, SOCSOUTH has 7th Special Forces Group, Naval Special Warfare Unit, and Special Operations Aviation Regiment at their disposal. SOCSOUTH also has the capability to tap into additional SOF and conventional assets to execute its mission. As a result, SOCSOUTH has access to a detailed list of ground and air assets that can be integrated into the overall concept for operations in Latin America.

If JIATF-LA is established under SOCSOUTH, not only would they bring the unique capabilities of SOF forces but they would easily be able to integrate JIATF-S into their construct. Combining the maritime component inherent in JIATF-S and the current capabilities under SOCSOUTH is not enough. In order to be effective as the tactical arm of the LAID it will need a more robust interagency dynamic. The minimum requirements of JIATF-LA are listed below.

The final argument for SOCSOUTH to be the lead agency for this mission is the fact that SOCOM has the lead role in the current global war on terror. They are

¹¹⁶ Joint Special Operations University, *Special Operations Forces Reference Manual*, (Florida: The JSOU Press, 2006), 1-5 through 1-7.

responsible for integrating actions between the seams of the various combatant commanders to combat terrorism. This gives SOCSOUTH the authority to cross between the lines of SOUTHCOM and NORTHCOM (responsible for Mexico) to ensure a consolidated military/tactical focus.

Department of State (DOS)

The DOS will be an essential link between the JIATF-LA and the embassies of Latin America. It will be responsible for assisting the LAID and the various embassies in achieving strategic objectives within Latin America. From the perspective of the JIATF-LA, the embassies will be the primary focal point for the commander on policy issues and impacts that affect operations in the region. In addition, it will be the coordinating arm for diplomatic and country clearances within Latin America. This will ensure a streamlined execution of tactical objectives especially on short notice mission requests from the LAID.

US Agency for Information Development (USAID)

USAID will have an integrating role within JIATF-LA. Due to the nature of the work the USAID will be conducting in the area, it will be critical that they have access to manpower and resources within the JIATF-LA. In addition, having a representative within the JIATF-LA will ensure the commander has a clear picture of social programs in the region and the potential impact it will have on future operations.

Department of Defense (DOD)

The DOD will be the largest contributor to the JIATF-LA. The resources available to the DOD will make it the lead agency at this tactical level. Most of the efforts will come from SOCSOUTH and JIATF-S, as previously mentioned, but the DOD

will also need to provide liaisons from each of the separate services to provide the integration of the conventional capabilities within the DOD. SOCSOUTH does not have detailed knowledge of maritime operations and will thus be reliant on the Navy and Coast Guard to provide the functional expertise to ensure the maritime mission continues to be very productive. The Air Force liaisons will be able to provide critical planning for air operations especially in terms of transport, air refueling, and tactical fighter planning. The Army and Marines will be used as a force provider to SOCSOUTH when needed to ensure there are enough forces to accomplish the regional ground missions.

Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)

Similar to the LAID, the DIA within JIATF-LA will be integrated into an intelligence fusion cell designed to track and monitor hot spots within the region. They will also have the ability to reach back to their headquarters in Washington and the LAID. This reach back will allow the JIATF-LA the most current and up to date information. The difference between the LAID and JIATF-LA intelligence requirements is the type of information required and their focus. The LAID looks at the strategic intelligence needs to accomplish its mission while the JIATF-LA needs more detailed tactical information in order to prosecute targets and missions.

National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA)

The NGA, similar to the DIA, will integrate into the intelligence fusion cell within the JIATF-LA. They will provide geospatial intelligence for the tactical application run by the JIATF-LA.

Department of Justice (DOJ)

The DOJ attached to the JIATF-LA will assist with legal aspects of tactical actions in both the maritime and land role. They will provide direction on all legal matters especially those pertaining to the various sovereign countries within Latin America. They will be responsible for advising the commander on legal implication based on variances in each individual country's legal systems. They will also provide a legal link between the JIATF and the LAID to ensure that efforts at the tactical level will not have repercussions at the strategic level.

Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)

The DEA has an integral role within the JIATF-LA. As the legal arm of the USG to combat drug trafficking, this agency contributes legal authorities to track and apprehend narco-terrorists. Operating in the tactical arena, it will monitor and track suspected traffickers and assist or execute operations to detain and apprehend these offenders. Its current role within the JIATF-S will be expanded to include the Mexican-US border.

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

The FBI's current role with the JIATF-S will be increased beyond just the maritime mission. The FBI will bring a great deal of knowledge and experience to the JIATF-LA. As an integral member of the law enforcement process, it will be able to achieve the tactical implementation of LAID policy. FBI integration within the JIATF-LA will ensure that intelligence derived from the JIATF will be prosecuted real-time within the US once the criminals cross the border. This interaction will increase the

security of the US and allow for the apprehension of a larger percentage of illegal border crossings.

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

The CIA liaison to the JIATF-LA will be the focal point for all human intelligence coming from Latin America. It will also be responsible for coordinating and integrating all CIA operations directed from the LAID. It will integrate into the intelligence fusion cell in the JIATF-LA to build an accurate picture of the situations within the various countries. The CIA will have direct liaison authority to any operatives working within the region and will be the coordinator of those actions.

Department of Homeland Security (DHS)

The DHS will have a large role within the JIATF-LA. Currently under the JIATF-S the DHS provides members from CBP, ICE, and USCG. This will be sufficient for the execution of the new JIATF-LA.

United States Customs and Border Protection (CBP)

The CBP will maintain its current role of drug interdiction within the JIATF –S but its roles and responsibilities will go beyond just maritime interdiction to include efforts along the Mexican border. It will be able to track and monitor known drug routes on land and sea and funnel that information through the LAID, the appropriate offices within the CBP, and other law enforcement agencies. This tactical information will be a critical handoff to law enforcement agencies within the US and will provide real time apprehension of criminals.

United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)

The members of the ICE will maintain the same duties they currently have within JIATF-S but will also extend their efforts along the Mexico border. In addition, the SOCSOUTH members of the ICE will coordinate training efforts within Latin America to ensure continuity of effort among the various countries. This combination will create a synergistic effect at the tactical level.

United States Coast Guard (USCG)

The USCG already has a defined mission under Title 14 which is utilized as part of JIATF-S. This mission would continue. It would also maintain the training and coordination mission with the various countries within Latin America. Its law enforcement capability and the resources it brings to the fight will be critical to maintaining the current drug interdiction mission. The expanded role of JIATF-LA to include the Mexican border will allow the USCG to apply a more focused and timely handoff of information to prosecute targets trying to transition from the maritime to land.

Nation Security Administration (NSA)

The NSA will be integrated into the intelligence fusion cell within the JIATF-LA and provide a direct link to the SIGINT capabilities within its parent organization. This again is a tactical intelligence resource to be utilized by the JIATF-LA to plan, coordinate, and execute tactical missions within Latin America.

Other Participants

The JIATF-LA will need to incorporate the liaisons of the various countries within Latin America in order to execute its mission. Currently in JIATF-S, there are a number of international partners attached to the organization to assist with the

accomplishment of the maritime mission. These partners will be folded into the JIATF-LA but the number of partners must be increased to include as many countries within Latin America as possible. This direct link to the various countries will allow the tactical arm to achieve its objectives with a streamlined approach to the problem.

VII. Conclusion

Instability in Latin American is a great cause for concern to the US. As a regional partner we have a vested interest in its stability and in each country's ability to develop into a first world nation. The only way this will ever be accomplished is through a regional approach utilizing the DIME model to accomplish our national objectives. The case studies of Paraguay, Nicaragua, and Guatemala have provided a compelling case for instability within Latin America. They also show the linked nature of the economic, political and social sectors within a country. The impacts in one area of instability have effects in the others areas of instability.

This is true between countries as well. The devaluation of the Brazilian currency had severe consequences to Paraguay because of the close economic ties between the two nations. Further research would likely prove that the devaluation of the *Real* affected numerous countries within Latin America. The problem facing the US is the linked nature of the different forms of instability and the fact that all must be addressed simultaneously. It is imperative that all three areas be addressed simultaneously. If they are not, whatever is gained through a limited approach will be short-lived and may have negative impacts on other aspects of the DIME model for the individual country and possibly other counties within the region.

Due to the instability in Latin America, Latin America has become a prime location (hotbed) for both narco and Islamic fundamentalist terrorist networks. There are numerous examples of narco-terrorism, the “war on drugs” has been draining resources from the US since the late 1970’s. Even with all the manpower and funding the US has diverted to the problem, drug consumption in the US has not decreased and the volume of drugs entering the US has actually increased over the years.

Additionally, the presence of Islamic fundamentalists has been documented in Latin America; it is clear that they are attempting to increase their footprint within the region. If they decide to open a new front in Latin America, the US must be prepared to engage this threat. But the US should not act upon intelligence gathered in Latin America without the consent and support of the governments within Latin America. If we can assist the countries in Latin America to deal with the different forms of terrorism without US support we have multiplied the deterrent capability in terms of the Global War on Terror. Stopping these organizations is a paramount concern for the US. In order to accomplish this, a consolidated approach from the strategic, operational, and tactical level must be utilized.

The LAID will be the facilitator of this integrated approach to regional stability. If manned and resourced properly, it will have the ability to execute national policy that will influence the strategic mission within Latin America. An integrated approach ensures both the allocation of resources to the countries that really need them as well as ensuring there is no duplication of effort. It will also guarantee that through the DIME model, all elements of national power are put forth to execute our national objectives of regional stability.

The LAID must have the power and authority to act on behalf of the US. In order to accomplish this, the secretary should be either a cabinet member or, at a minimum, a sub-cabinet member. This will ensure that the secretary of the LAID has the authority and ability to execute national policy. The LAID must also be fully resourced from all the agencies identified above and even this is not an all-inclusive list. The bottom line is that the LAID must be given the tools to accomplish the mission it has been given. If this does not happen, the effectiveness of the organization will be minimal and the security of our national interests in Latin America will be compromised.

SOUTHCOM, which is the operational arm of the LAID, will provide the necessary link between the LAID and its tactical arm, the JIATF-LA. This link will assist in filtering the national objectives meted out by the LAID and ensure that they are operationally feasible for the JIATF-LA. The new authority vested in SOCSOUTH will also ensure that their efforts have a proper chain of command and the executable authority to ensure policy directives are acted upon appropriately and concisely. The JIACG within SOUTHCOM is an effective tool but SOUTHCOM itself must be given authority beyond simply the military Title 10 responsibilities. They must have the means to organize and execute the policies the LAID sets down for them.

The tactical arm of the LAID, the JIATF-LA, will fold into both the current maritime role of JIATF-S and a ground role under SOCSOUTH. Combining the maritime and ground missions will better suit the diversity of the problems facing Latin America and their potential implication to the US. With an interagency approach to this problem they will have the capacity to accomplish their mission, as established by the LAID, in order to bring stability to the region.

This interagency at the tactical level is essential to provide the countries within Latin America the ability to train their personnel and become self sustaining. This goes beyond just anti-terrorism but includes law enforcement as well. The basic premise is simple. Once you train the countries to accomplish these capabilities on their own, the need for US intervention and resources are reduced. The ability of SOCSOUTH as a component of Special Operation Command will give it the authority to operate between the seams between Latin America and the US.

The military has divided the world into geographical sections. Under this division, Mexico falls under Northern Command, not SOUTHCOM. In terms of the global war on Terror, Special Operations Command has been given the authority to conduct operation between all combatant commanders as necessary to fulfill its mission. SOCSOUTH falls under the Special Operations Command and because of this structure, it has the authority to operate within the whole of Latin America to include Mexico. This capability at the Tactical level will be essential especially while tracking terrorist organization.

The US has always approached Latin America on an “as needed” basis. Unfortunately the conditions and stakes have changed especially since 9/11. Latin America, because of its proximity to the US along with its instability, is the largest current threat to the US. It all comes down to a simple concept: Pay for the security now at a relatively small cost to the US or pay for it later at a much higher cost in terms of American lives and security.

Appendix A – Use of the DIME Model to Combat Instability

I. Diplomatic

Among diplomatic circles, you will often hear the term preventative diplomacy. This is the goal of all diplomats: prevent a situation from becoming problematic or escalating. There are three broad categories that an effective diplomat can focus on in Latin America. The first is preventative diplomacy to promote development.¹¹⁷ The concept is very simple. A developed country does not have high levels of instability and creates a synergistic effect in the region, helping the stability of other countries. The second is preventative diplomacy through worldwide education.¹¹⁸ In the context of Latin America, citizens who previously participated in drug related activities but are educated and understand the ramifications of their actions are less likely to engage or support illicit behavior. From the standpoint of Islamic fundamentalists, preventative diplomacy centers on driving the fundamentalist teachings out of their madrasas and other institutions.¹¹⁹ The third area is preventative diplomacy and human rights. The ability of all people to live in a safe and secure environment ensures human rights are respected. The primary cause of human rights violations is economic underdevelopment. This statement hinges on the definition of development and Carol Lancaster and Ann Van Dusen have very accurately given as:

Asked how they would define development today, most policymakers and practitioners would probably emphasize three things: increases in per capita income that lead to a sustained reduction in poverty; an expansion in the physical infrastructure and public services (such as education and health) that are both the means and the ends of social and economic progress; and the increasingly capable

¹¹⁷ Mohammed Bedjaoui. *Preventative Diplomacy: The Fundamentals of Preventative Diplomacy*. Ed. Kevin M. Cahill (New York: Routledge, 2000), 35.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid*, 40.

¹¹⁹ Carnes Lord. *Loosing Hearts and Minds? Public Diplomacy and Strategic Influence in the Age of Terror*. (Westport, CN: Praeger Security International, 2006), 49

and effective government that provides for security, the rule of law, responsible economic management, social inclusion, and political freedom that are also means as well as the ends to improving the human condition.¹²⁰

The Department of State (DOS) is the overt diplomatic arm of US foreign policy but is not the only agency that engages in diplomacy. Any agency of the US operating in a foreign country has a diplomatic mission even if it does not define it as such. Members of the military deployed on exercises with other countries serve a diplomatic role in the way they present themselves to the host nation. There are multiple forms of diplomacy that can be effectively used to achieve a nation's objective. The first, Bilateral Diplomacy encompasses the negotiation between two states. The second, Multilateral Diplomacy refers to the cooperation between multiple nations. Third is Regional/Associative Diplomacy or the diplomacy among geographic regions. Fourth, Virtual Diplomacy uses information technology in diplomatic relations; this is another term for Information discussed in its own section. Fifth, economic diplomacy is the use of diplomacy to protect economic interests or using economic factors as incentives to obtain what one country desires. Finally, Public/Personal diplomacy encompasses the way one country communicates with the citizens of another society also addressed in the Information section.¹²¹ Analyzing the applicability of each form of diplomacy can also tell us what agencies have the leading role and how to integrate with other agencies and countries.

Bilateral diplomacy is primarily the responsibility of the DOS and selected members of the executive branch, in particular the ambassadors to each respective

¹²⁰ Carol Lancaster and Ann Van Dusen, *Organizing U.S. Foreign Aid: Confronting the Challenges of the Twenty-first Century*, (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institutions, 2005), 5

¹²¹ Hwa Chong Institute., "Types of Diplomacy," <http://hwachong.edu.sg/~y04chs026/doors/diplomacyTypes.htm>, (accessed November 25, 2007).

country. The main issues addressed in this form of diplomacy are free trade agreements, embassies, and state visits. This form of diplomacy is the direct relationship between the leaders of each country. It is also the forum to create a lasting political approach to an issue or problem. This is an essential element to combat the regional instability because it ensures a level of commitment to achieve the desired results. One-on-one engagement promotes the agenda of each country and allows a free exchange of ideas and issues to develop strong and lasting ties.

Multilateral diplomacy is the most relevant form used to combat instability in most regions in Latin America. This form of diplomacy falls under the same auspice as bilateral diplomacy except it includes numerous countries and leaders. To effectively combat instability, you require the assistance from numerous countries and a consolidated approach involving as many countries within the region as possible. This is essential to reduce the red tape between countries and allows the creation of synergy of effort. It also produces, through mutual agreements, the capacity to police and control the seams found at the borders of each country which directly impact the ability of organized crime or terrorists to avoid law enforcement by crossing between countries.

Regional diplomacy piggybacks on multilateral diplomacy and further nullifies the seams that are seen between each country's differing approach to crime and terrorism. This allows the actions of one to country to carry an effect into the others. It also sets the stage for multilateral actions taken against the criminal and terrorist threats seen in the region.

Public/personal diplomacy is arguably the most important form of diplomacy. This is the message that is viewed and seen by the citizens of each country through

personal and lasting contact and it reaches the full spectrum of a population. If the US presents a positive image of itself then the political desire to side with the US on its national interests will not be politically problematic for the current government. Any member of the US government that visits a country plays a role in this type of diplomacy. From the lowest soldier working with indigenous forces to the ambassador through his public appearances/conduct, this impression holds more weight than any information operations campaign the US could launch in the region.

Diplomacy has the potential to influence all forms of instability but its main focus tends to be centered on political and economic instability. Proper diplomacy intertwines with the other elements of national power using military training, information campaigns, and economic incentives and reforms. It is the base upon which all other forms of power are built.

II. Information

We live in the information age, an age dominated by rampant use of telephones and internet. An age where the entire span of information one could ever hope to obtain is at the touch of a button or the click of a key board. “There are over 2.7 billion searches performed on Google each month, the number of text messages sent and received everyday exceed the population of the planet, it is estimated that a week’s worth of New York Times contains more information than a person was likely to come across in a lifetime in the 18th century.”¹²²

Next consider the fact that we are at the beginning of the information age. Where will technology take us in the next 10 years? This paints a very clear picture that the US

¹²² Karl Fisch. “Shift Happens” Albino Blacksheep Video Files, <http://www.albinoblacksheep.com/Video/shifthappens> (accessed November 16, 2007).

needs to invest in its Information Operations campaign (IO) across the globe. The problem the US faces is the information environment exists outside the ability of any one country to control it: the global information environment (GIE). Captain (ret) Christopher Nemeth describes the GIE very succinctly,

The GIE is a combination of both civilian and military information networks and technologies. This environment exists separate and apart from the boundaries of geography or statehood. It includes national global and defense infrastructure, national and foreign industry, joint systems, international organizations, political leaders, other government, and elements of the editorial media such as the Cable News Network (CNN) and the internet. It is the GIE that electronically links organizations and individuals around the globe.¹²³

It is obvious to even the casual observer that the information superhighway cannot be controlled by any nation, but it can be influenced. In order to accomplish this, the US needs to engage in an active campaign within Latin America to ensure the proper message is being received. There are three areas that need to be addressed: the civilian role, military role, and the use of soft power.

The First Amendment has achieved iconic status in the US, particularly as it relates to civilian media sources, making it uncontrollable from the government's perspective.¹²⁴ What can be done is to present a clear picture of the goals and mission of the US government within Latin America. This requires the US to be upfront and forthright about what it is doing and how it intends to do it. The DOS and embassies will have a lead role in providing the host nations an accurate picture to present to their citizens. This directly ties into the diplomatic mission within the region.

¹²³ Christopher Nemeth. "The Winds of Change: The Role of Public Information in the Era of Information Operations" *Journal of Peace, Conflict & Military Studies* Vol 1, No 2 November 2000. <http://ics.leeds.ac.uk/papers/vp01.cfm?outfit=pmt&folder=66&paper=826>, (accessed November 10, 2007).

¹²⁴ Carnes Lord. *Losing Hearts and Minds? Public Diplomacy and Strategic Influence in the Age of Terror*. (Westport, CN: Praeger Security International, 2006), 57

The military also plays a role in the IO campaign through the use of civil affairs (CA), psychological operations (PSYOP), and public information (PI).¹²⁵ CA typically involves the creation and management of social systems (e.g., elections) in order to restore a society to order. PSYOPS represent a method to change or reinforce attitudes and behaviors that are favorable to US objectives. PSYOPS can, at times, rely on deception to achieve a tactical goal. PI, on the other hand, is similar to PSYOPS but relies solely on the truth to obtain its objectives. When we talk about military use of information in Latin America, I want to stress that the use of CA and PI is the best method. Using PSYOPS with partial truths or outright deception has a way of coming back to haunt the originator in a permissive environment.

The final aspect of IO is the use of soft power. Soft power's basic premise is to "get others to want the outcome you want – co-ops people rather than coerces them."¹²⁶ Soft power, unlike hard power, is a fickle mistress. It is a commodity that can increase and decrease based on a single decision within a country. It is also hard to predict and measure. Joseph Nye, a leading soft power expert says, "The soft power of a country rests primarily on three resources: its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they seem legitimate and have moral authority)."¹²⁷ Soft power in Latin America can be one of the largest benefits with which the US can work. Capitalizing on the cultural similarities based on similar values and political desires should be the goal.

¹²⁵ Christopher Nemeth. "The Winds of Change: The Role of Public Information in the Era of Information Operations" *Journal of Peace, Conflict & Military Studies* Vol 1, No 2 November 2000

¹²⁶ Joseph S. Nye. *Soft Power: The means to Success in World Politics*. (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 5.

¹²⁷ *Ibid*, 11.

The message the US wants to present in Latin America is essential to the success in combating the instabilities in the region. All forms of IO should focus on the fact that US involvement in the region is justified and its mission is to bring stability and equality to each country. This will, in turn, increase the wellbeing of everyone living in the western hemisphere, not only the US.

III. Military

The use of a country's military is the best method to degrade the military form of political instability in Latin America. Formal exchange programs and military exercises provide a forum for mid-level and senior military members to understand how the US conforms to civilian control of the military. This stresses the importance of civilian control and can provide an understanding of the importance of this relationship along with the need to remain unbiased. The more frequently exercises occur, the greater numbers of officers learn the importance of this relationship. Once this is instilled in the Latin American militaries as part of their culture, the civilian arm of the government will not need to be concerned about coup attempts and can focus on proper governance.

Military operations have multiple purposes in the war on terror as they relate to Latin America. Direct actions and engagements of military force are what most people think of as the M in DIME. In Latin America this is a relatively small part of how the US armed forces should be employed. They may have a role in this capacity and should train and prepare for this type of approach if called upon. The military is very well versed in operations of this nature and this resource can be utilized if requested by any country in the region. The question that needs to be addressed is which effects we are trying to

achieve with the use of force? These effects can range from search and destroy to nation building.

A more important role of the US military in Latin America is its capability to train and equip the armed forces within the various countries of the region. A Chinese proverb aptly captures this concept “Give a man a fish and you feed him for a day. Teach a man to fish and you feed him for a lifetime.” Combating instability and terrorism in an area the size of Latin America and with its numerous countries cannot be unilaterally done by the US. The most effective method is to train the indigenous forces within Latin America to combat the threat of instability and terrorism. This will not only provide a lasting capability within each country but will also afford legitimacy to the action having been done by the native forces.

Examples of this method’s effectiveness was seen recently in the Philippines. Members of US Special Operations Command deployed to the Philippines starting in 2002 to train the Philippine army on tactics to combat the Abu Sayyaf group which has strong ties to Al Qaeda.¹²⁸ There was some initial skepticism among Philippine citizens thinking this was a throwback to colonial days of US occupation. Through effective training of foreign nationals, the US forces have built a military capable of defeating the insurgent threat, therein making the region safer. During the entire operation, all accolades were given to the Philippine forces thus providing legitimacy to the operation which has been very successful in defeating the Islamic fundamentalists in their own country.

¹²⁸ Marites Sison. “Welcome Back, GI Joe,” Worldpress.org, (February 19, 2002), <http://www.worldpress.org/Asia?401.cfm>, (accessed November 25, 2007).

IV. Economic

Economic support to Latin America may be the most tangible aspect to assist regional stability. It encompasses more than just the infusion of money into the region. It also deals with trade, banking policies, distribution of wealth, debt relief, and the most dominant hard-power capability that the US can use in the region. Carol Lancaster and Ann Van Dusen provide some insight into the use of aid:

Aid can be provided as cash grants, concessional loans, debt cancellation or relief, or in the form of commodities such as food or medicine. It can fund discrete projects, such as road construction; it can be used to finance research, technical assistance and training for individuals in recipient countries; or it can be provided as an incentive for recipients to adopt policies favored by the donor country.¹²⁹

As discussed earlier, unequal economic distribution within a country is one of the leading factors for economic instability. A combined approach using all elements of economic power is the best method to ensure stability in the region. Foreign aid to a country has one major goal: to develop that country's stability.

Infusion of money into Latin America from the US may be the best way to build stability but it also happens to be the most difficult to acquire due to congressional oversight. In addition, a blank check from the US to every country in the region will break our bank. It can also be very difficult to gauge the amount of funding each country requires and what it should be spent on.

Based on this assessment, economic aid in the form of hard currency needs to be evaluated on a case by case basis. The US can't be the only contributor in this area. Engagement with the International Monetary Fund whose mission is to strengthen the international financial system is an excellent way to offset the economic burden to the

¹²⁹ Carol Lancaster and Ann Van Dusen, *Organizing U.S. Foreign Aid: Confronting the Challenges of the Twenty-first Century*, (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institutions, 2005), 7

US. Luckily we have seen recent trends among the international community to support economic aid to Latin America. We have also seen a large increase in venture philanthropists, individual and corporate aid givers, the social entrepreneurs, small businesses, and NGOs in developing countries that engage in a large array of development related activities.¹³⁰ The US needs to encourage these organizations to more actively engage in Latin America.

There is one final area of economic support worth mentioning: remittances or private transfers from immigrants in rich countries to their families in poor countries. Remittances to Latin America were \$30 billion in 2003 and have increased to over \$61 billion in 2006.¹³¹ The economic support from the immigrant back to Latin America represents a significant economic infusion that is helping alleviate some of the poverty issues seen in the region.

Addressing trade imbalances is another important aspect of economic stability. The creation of free trade agreements can go a long way towards fostering economic prosperity. One step has already been taken with the creation of the Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA). This agreement allows for the elimination of almost all restrictions and subsidies between the Dominican Republic and all Central American countries as well as with the US. DR-CAFTA was also sponsored by the World Bank and has approved loans totaling \$1.4 billion to bolster investments and reforms, financing for infrastructure development, improvements in the investment climate, investments in rural development and in strengthening governance

¹³⁰ Ibid, 46

¹³¹ Inter-American Development Bank, "Remittances to Latin America and the Caribbean 2006 (US\$ millions)," http://www.iadb.org/mif/remesas_map.cfm (accessed December 1, 2007).

and institutions.¹³² Many economists have argued about the advantages and disadvantages of a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). This would encompass DR-CAFTA, North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA – includes Canada, US, and Mexico) and an agreement with South America and the Caribbean (except Cuba). FTAA strategy has three aspects: 1) increased trade with Latin America; 2) increased trade with large markets such as the US; 3) increased foreign investment.¹³³

The idea for FTAA began in 1994 and has yet to be realized primarily due to priority differences between the US and key Latin American countries, making a balanced and acceptable agreement difficult to define.¹³⁴ If these issues are ironed out and the agreement goes into effect, this would open up all markets within the Americas creating an economic boom within Latin America. Trade is the cornerstone of economic development and the benefits are not limited to Latin America. The benefits for the US are astronomical: “the world bank estimates that the abolishment of trade restrictions in both developing and developed countries could boost income in the developing countries by \$1.5 trillion, over ten years.”¹³⁵

Effective utilization of the DIME model requires all aspects to be used simultaneously because they are all intertwined. Diplomacy reaches into economics, economics play a large role in military, military is part of the information campaign, and information is heavily used during diplomacy. This is just one of many different ongoing cycles within the DIME model. Creating overall stability in the region and furthering the

¹³² The World bank Group. “The World Bank and the DR-Central American Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA).” <http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/LAC/LAC.nsf/ECADocbyUnid/9E56B2DC8514948085256DB20073248F?opendocument>, (accessed December 1, 2007).

¹³³ U.S. Congress, House. *CRS Report to Congress: A Free Trade Area of the North Americas: Status of Negotiations and Major Policy Issues*, 107th Cong., March 12, 2004, 2

¹³⁴ Ibid, 3.

¹³⁵ Committee for Economic Development, *A Shared Future Reducing Global Poverty*. (New York: CED, 2002), 4.

development of individual Latin American countries is dependent on addressing all forms of instability simultaneously. Due to the nature and complexity of the issues, a requirement exists for a strong interagency partnership that will bring cohesion to the efforts of the US government.

Appendix B - Acronym List

AQ – Al Qaeda
 AUC – Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia
 CA – Civil Affairs
 CBP – Customs and Border Patrol
 CIA – Central Intelligence Agency
 CNO – Computer Network Operations
 CP – Counter Proliferation
 CT – Counterterrorism
 DA – Direct Action
 DEA – Drug Enforcement Administration
 DIA – Defense Intelligence Agency
 DIME – Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic
 DHS – Department of Homeland Security
 DOC – Department of Commerce
 DOD – Department of Defense
 DOJ – Department of Justice
 DOS – Department of State
 DOT – Department of Transportation
 DOT – Department of Treasury
 DR-CAFTA – Dominican Republic Central America Free Trade Agreement
 ESA – Economic and Statistics Administration
 FAA – Federal Aviation Administration
 FARC – Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias Colombianas
 FBI – Federal Bureau of Investigation
 FHWA – Federal Highway Administration
 FID – Foreign Internal Defense
 FLETC – Federal Law Enforcement Training Center
 FRA – Federal Railroad Administration
 FTAA – Free Trade Area of the Americas
 GDP – Gross Domestic Product
 GIE – Global Information Environment
 GNP – Gross National Product
 ICE – Immigration and Customs Enforcement
 IO – Information Operations
 ITA – International Trade Administration
 IACG – Joint Interagency Coordination Group
 JIATF – LA – Joint Interagency Task Force – Latin America
 JIATF – S – Joint Interagency Task Force – South
 LAID – Latin American Interagency Department
 M – 18 – 18th Street Gang
 MS – 13 – Mara Salvatrucha
 NAFTA – North America Free Trade Agreement
 NGA – National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
 NGO – Non Governmental Organization

NSA – National Security Administration
OPSEC – Operations Security
PI – Public Information
PSYOPS – Psychological Operations
SOUTHCOM – Southern Command
SOC SOUTH – Special Operations Command South
TB – Tuberculosis
TSA – Transportation Security Administration
USAID – US Agency for International Development
USDA – United States Department of Agriculture
USCG – United States Coast Guard
USG – United States Government
URNG – Unida Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca
UW – Unconventional Warfare

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