

JOINT FORCES STAFF COLLEGE
JOINT ADVANCED WARFIGHTING SCHOOL



PARTNERING WITH PAKISTAN; A SHIFT OF STRATEGIC PRIORITIES

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Joint Advanced Warfighting School in partial satisfaction of the requirements of a Master of Science Degree in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy.

The contents of this paper reflect our own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.

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ABSTRACT

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INTRODUCTION

*The turmoil in the Muslim world arises primarily because of unresolved, long-standing political disputes that have created a sense of injustice, alienation, deprivation, powerlessness, and hopelessness in the masses. ... Political deprivation, combined with poverty and illiteracy, has created an explosive brew of extremism and terrorism.*¹

President Pervez Musharraf

The United States is at war. There were prior indications such as the attack on the World Trade Center in 1993, the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombing in East Africa, and the attack on the USS Cole in 2000. However, Al-Qaida's declaration of war had not been fully understood until the attack on 11 September 2001. The world saw first hand the images on television and few would dispute it was war. This reflects a new nature of war, shifting from relatively short duration and high intensity aspects of the traditional




Figure 1 Shifting Capabilities

This diagram depicts the Department of Defense shift toward developing capabilities to address irregular, catastrophic and disruptive challenges while sustaining capabilities to address traditional challenges.

type conventional war to a more continuous but lower intensity irregular warfare (see Fig 1).²

With this shift of focus also comes the necessity to shift to a more indirect approach to leveraging capabilities.

The current priorities for the U.S.

military are on the Iraq and Afghanistan

campaigns. The War on Terror must maintain a

long term global focus on defeating Al-Qaida at

¹ Pervez Musharraf, *In the Line of Fire* (1230 Avenue of the Americas New York, NY 10020: Free Press A Division of Simon & Schuster, Inc., 2006), 354. pg 297

² U.S. Secretary of Defense, "Quadrennial Defense Review Report," (February 6, 2006) pg 19,

its roots if the U.S. is to ultimately win. The United States, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia, supported the mujahideen in the neglected Federally Administrated Tribal Area (FATA) during the Cold War. Al-Qaida's roots can be traced to this Cold War remnant located within Pakistan along the Afghan border.³ Partnering with Pakistan as a member of the international coalition fighting terrorism is crucial to defeating Al-Qaida.⁴ One of the strategic objectives of the National Defense Strategy is to help partners increase their capacity to defend themselves and collectively meet challenges of common interests.⁵ However, what happens when common priorities are not the top tier efforts of either nation because the perceived immediate threat differs? Progress may be achieved but it is limited, slow, or inefficient at best.

Long term stability in Pakistan requires a mutual shift in strategic priorities on the part of Pakistan and the U.S. is the thesis. Strategy is a method of creating strategic effects that are favorable to the nation by applying end, ways, and means while considering its risks.⁶ The purpose of this study is to highlight the critical issue preventing Pakistan from becoming more effective in the War on Terror, identify the historical causes, and outline a strategic concept for Pakistan to become more secure by

³ Musharraf, *In the Line of Fire*, 354. pg 208

⁴ "Fact Sheet: United States and Pakistan: Long-Term Strategic Partners," [cited 2007]. Available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/03/20060304-4.html>.

⁵ U.S. Secretary of Defense, *The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America* March 2005), [database on-line]; available from <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Apr2005/d20050408strategy.pdf>, pg i

⁶ Harry R. Yarger, Strategic Studies Institute, *Strategic Theory for the 21st Century : The Little Book on Big Strategy* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2006), 83. The word "strategy" pervades American conversation and our news media and is most often used as a general term for a plan, a concept, a course of action, or a "vision" of the direction in which to proceed at the personal, organizational—local, state, or federal—levels. Such casual use of the term to describe nothing more than "what we would like to do next" is inappropriate and belies the complexity of true strategy and strategic thinking.

considering more effective employment of all elements of power as a potential way ahead.

There are virtually two wars going on simultaneously from Pakistan's perspective: a limited cold war with India, as well as an internal war on terrorism that also has destabilizing effects on government institutions. The U.S. priority for Pakistan is focused on a desire for it to become a stable, secure, and democratic nation in order to effectively control terrorism within its borders.⁷ Conversely, Pakistan's primary focus is on its perceived regional threat of Indian aggression along its eastern border. Historically it perceives a greater external threat to any internal threat that can also be squelched by its military if necessary. Pakistan's military is the force that continues to hold the country together on all fronts. Pakistan has invested in its security by weighting its resources with its military as its ultimate law enforcement tool rather than with its civil law enforcement and judicial controls.

The U.S. has avoided getting entangled in the Pakistan and India dispute, leaving it up to them to work out their differences.⁸ In the mean time a terrorist cancer emanating from Pakistan threatens the world body. The key to winning war is to identify the enemy's center of gravity and then concentrate efforts toward defeating it. The center of gravity is defined as "The source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act."⁹ The dispute over Kashmir remains the center of gravity for achieving normalized relations between Pakistan and India. Shifting the focus

⁷ "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America," March 2006 [cited 2007]. Available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/>. pg 39

⁸ Dennis Kux, *The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000 Disenchanted Allies*, Woodrow Wilson Center Press ed. The John Hopkins University Press, 2001), 470.

⁹ United States. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for Joint Operations 3-0* (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2001)

from Pakistan's internal terrorist threat to providing a strong commitment for normalizing relations with India will ultimately provide for the long term stability desired.

The means to win in the long term is increased employment of the non-kinetic elements of national power (Diplomatic, Economic, and Informational) to win the hearts and minds thus championing aspirations for human dignity to prosper.¹⁰ Diplomatically the U.S. is more in a position to bring resolution to Pakistan's traditional type of threat than it is for directly shaping its internal stability. The U.S. remains focused on bringing quick stability to the region by primarily supporting Pakistan's military employment in the FATA, while the center of gravity for defeating Islamic extremists resides within the faith of Islam. Pakistan has been receiving substantial economic support for their part in the war on terror through U.S. and coalition assistance but little seems to have changed since the beginning of the War on Terror. A recommendation to shift how the funding is applied will be examined later. Non-Muslims from Western cultures attempting to inform or exert influence on Muslims cultures directly can inflame the internal instability of Pakistan. This study briefly examines why Islamic extremism is the center of gravity for ultimately defeating Al-Qaida. The world perception views nation building and humanitarian assistance as positive influences for championing human dignity. By focusing these positive efforts on the next generation, it can provide the strategic communications message, not simply in words but also deeds, to shape the environment and prevent recruitment of future terrorist. The use of military intervention is absolutely necessary against the terrorist within Pakistan but will primarily serve as a defensive mechanism keeping terrorism from spreading out of control.

¹⁰ *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, 49. pg 2

Pakistan does not have the ability to take on two simultaneous wars but does have the ability to deal with the irregular terrorist threat, if not distracted by its perceived traditional threat. This paper examines the key issue of the U.S. using a more indirect approach for shaping the stability of Pakistan.

The Long War within Pakistan

*“If a campaign is protracted, the resources will not be equal to the strain.”*¹¹

Sun Tzu

A long war is never popular and the mood of the nation wants the war to end. However, this war is unlike past wars and may take a generation to achieve recognizable victory. It is the hearts and minds of the next generation that must be won as it is not likely that the extremist enemy will be persuaded.

Carl Von Clausewitz explained that the purpose of war is a means to achieve political objectives.¹² The War on Terror is **not** a war between countries, cultures, or religions but a war between ideologies of good and evil.¹³ Some might consider this an extreme view but the extremist enemy has an equal vote as to why he chooses war over other means.

Historically, Pakistan and India have been fierce adversaries, although recently there has been an atmosphere of civility where both have a desire to end the sibling type

¹¹ Dallas Galvin and Lionel Giles, *The Art of War Sun Tzu* (122 Fifth Avenue New York, NY 10011: Barnes & Novle Books, 2003), 273. pg 11

¹² Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. Michael Eliot Howard, Paret, Peterd ed. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), 717.

¹³ This statement was posed and affirmed by President George W. Bush on 5 Mar 2006 at the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan by author. President Bush responded agreeing that he believed the War on Terror is a war between ideologies.

rivalry.¹⁴ This traditional type adversarial relationship between nations also lies along Thomas Barnett's fault line between a "functioning core" and "the non-integrated gap." (see Fig 2)¹⁵




Figure 2. The Pentagon's New Map

"The [functioning] core consists of economically advanced or growing countries that are linked to the global economy and bound to the rule-sets of international trade. The rest of the world is the non-integrated gap – outside the global economy, not bound to the rule-sets of international trade."

Fault line wars go through processes of intensification, expansion, containment, interruption, but rarely resolution.¹⁶ Shifting this fault line to Pakistan's west and integrating Pakistan into the functioning core is paramount to stabilizing Pakistan as a

¹⁴ Dennis Kux, *India-Pakistan Negotiations : Is Past Still Prologue?* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2006), 87. pg 57

¹⁵ Thomas P. M. Barnett, *The Pentagon's New Map : War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 2004), 435.

¹⁶ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, 367. pg 266

nuclear power.

The U.S. can assert its authority as a world leader by bringing the international community together to apply a pressure bandage to heal the conventional fault line type threat centered on the Kashmir dispute. The deep wound of Kashmir that has torn the two countries apart has been a catalyst for two of the three full scale wars between India and Pakistan, as well as the Kargil Conflict of 1999. The resolution or relaxing of the conventional external Indian threat thereby shifting the fault line west must be accomplished before any lasting long term progress can be achieved and the U.S. is in a position to lead the international effort.

KASHMIR DISPUTE - PAKISTAN'S STRATEGIC PRIORITY

...the nuclear flashpoint of Kashmir, needs urgent resolution if there is to be permanent peace in south Asia.¹

President Pervez Musharraf



Figure 3. Kashmir

Pakistan has a large military but its priorities are split between fighting terrorism along its western border and deterring Indian aggression on its eastern border. The unresolved fate

¹ Musharraf, *In the Line of Fire*, 354. pg 298

of the former princely kingdom of Kashmir and Jammu has been a primary cause for international tension and the deeply scarred relationship between the two neighbors. The Kashmir Dispute is the center of gravity for Pakistan's Cold War with India.²

Kashmir lies in the northernmost corner of the South Asian subcontinent between Pakistan, India, China, and Afghanistan. Kashmir refers to the Indian administered regions of Kashmir valley, Jammu and Ladakh, the Pakistani administered regions of the Northern Areas and Azad Kashmir, and the Chinese administered region of Aksai Chin. The dispute is an ethnic, religious, and territorial issue with potential strategic and economic gains to both Pakistan and India.³ Pakistan has had three full scale wars with India (1947-1948, 1965, 1971) and the Kashmir dispute served as a catalyst for the first two wars. The 1999 Kargil War or Conflict also initiated by the Kashmir dispute had the potential for escalation into a nuclear war between the two nuclear powers.⁴ In addition there have been other instances that have led to an increase in tension that required external pressure to calm the crises.

External pressure has brought temporary stability between Pakistan and India in crisis situations but it has failed to bring the Kashmir dispute to final resolution. Pakistan and India have not been able to agree on the details despite mutual diplomatic efforts to end the dispute. Both nations have an aversion to compromise asserting both legal and

² Alan K. Kronstadt, *CRS Report for Congress Pakistan-U.S. Relations* Congressional Research Service, 24 Aug 2007), [database on-line]; available from <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/91857.pdf>,

³ A. Z. Hilali, "Kashmir: A Dangerous Flashpoint in South Asia," *Questia* 2007, no. 12/31/2007 (Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, Vol. 31, 1999), [journal on-line]; available from <http://www.questia.com/googleScholar.qst;jsessionid=H56PhG7PjkdG4H45KkNXX82zvrMK2mvv9QMw1V0CkQzcx2sRZb4y!563035830?docId=97729840>; Internet; accessed 12/31/2007.

⁴ Adrian Levy and Cathy Scott-Clark, *Deception : Pakistan, the United States, and the Secret Trade in Nuclear Weapons*, (New York: Walker & Company : Distributed by Holtzbrink Publishers, 2007), 586.

moral claims.⁵ However, since April 2003 a peace initiative has brought major improvements in the bilateral relationship.⁶ The time for resolution is now while there is an atmosphere of civility.

Background

In March 1947, Lord Louis Mountbatten became viceroy of India, with the mandate to end the British Empire within a year's time. He devised a plan which came to be known as the Mountbatten Plan for the partitioning of British India. The plan to partition British India into two new sovereign states, India and Pakistan, was accepted by the leaders of the Muslim League, representing Pakistan and the Indian National Congress and announced on 3 June 1947.⁷ The British Government, the Muslim League, and the Indian National Congress signed the agreement on 14 August 1947 and the British departed.⁸ The acceleration of Pakistan's independence by the departure of the British only allowed for seventy-two days. It did not provide sufficient time to complete the many required tasks for the development of two independent states.⁹ Under Lord Mountbatten's plan the Indian princely states were expected to regain their independence

⁵ A. Z. Hilali, "Historical Development of the Kashmir Problem and Pakistan's Policy After September 11," *Center for Strategic Research IX*, no. June - Aug 2004 (2004), [journal on-line]; available from <http://www.sam.gov.tr/volume9b.php>; Internet; accessed 12/31/2007.

⁶ Kronstadt, *CRS Report for Congress Pakistan-U.S. Relations*

⁷ Abdul Sattar, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy, 1947- 2005 : A Concise History* (Karachi ; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 329. pg 5

⁸ Dutta and Suvrokamal, "If Kashmir is Disputed so can be Pakistan?" *Enzine Articles* , no. 22 May 2007 (2007), [journal on-line]; available from <http://ezinearticles.com/?If-Kashmir-Is-Disputed-So-Can-Be-Pakistan?&id=574369>; Internet; accessed 12/6/2007.

⁹ Sattar, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy, 1947- 2005 : A Concise History*, 329. pg 6

but were urged to join either Pakistan or India in accordance with their location and population.¹⁰

Kashmir was largely Muslim but ruled by a Hindu maharajah, Hari Singh who proposed a Standstill Agreement with India and Pakistan thereby temporarily remaining independent. On August 12, 1947, the Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir sent identical communications to the Government of India and Pakistan which read;¹¹

"Jammu and Kashmir Government would welcome Standstill Agreement with Union of India/Pakistan on all matters on which there exists arrangements with the outgoing British India Government."

According to Pakistan, the ruler of Kashmir was placed under pressure by the Indian government to accede to India as had been done with other princely states such as the Nawab of Jugandah and the Nizam of Hyderabad.¹² These predominately Hindu princely states had Muslim rulers but were coerced to accede to India. It was expected that Kashmir would accede to Pakistan due to the large Muslim majority and the fact that the state's transportation and economic links were entirely within Pakistan.¹³ The rise of Hindu-Muslim violence leading up to the partition ended up spilling over when the maharajah jailed leaders of two major political groups. Muslim rebels proclaimed the state of Azad (Free) Kashmir and attempted to take down the maharajah.¹⁴ The Hindu maharajah then fled to New Delhi and signed an accession after agreeing to turn over the

¹⁰ Kux, *India-Pakistan Negotiations : Is Past Still Prologue?*, 87. pg 12

¹¹ "Jammu & Kashmir A Historical Perspective," [cited 2007]. Available from <http://jammukashmir.nic.in/profile/jkhist.htm>.

¹² "Country Profile: Pakistan," *Library of Congress - Federal Research Division*, no. Feb 2005 (2005), [journal on-line]; available from <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Pakistan.pdf>; Internet; accessed 12/31/2007.

¹³ Kux, *The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000 Disenchanted Allies*, 470. pg 21

¹⁴ Ibid. pg 22

administration to the head of the Indian National Conference, Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah, a popular figure in Kashmir. Pakistan asserts that the ruler acceded to India on the basis of a fraudulent document.¹⁵ India then invaded and occupied a large part of Kashmir.

Indo – Pakistani War of 1947-48

According to India, Pakistan implemented an economic blockade and sent Pashtun tribesmen as well as their own forces to capture Kashmir.¹⁶ India responded to an appeal from Maharaja Hari Singh for assistance but only after the maharajah acceded to India on 25 Oct 1947. Indian forces then entered Kashmir via airlift to Srinagar airfield on 27 Oct which the rebel forces failed to seize. The rebel forces were then quickly pushed out of the region. It was India's intent to allow a plebiscite to determine Kashmir's fate once the fighting ended.

India referred the matter to the UN Security Council on 20 December 1947 with Lord Mountbatten's insistence.¹⁷ The US was asked to take a lead in the resolution but declined due to other issues in dealing with the after effects of WWII and the potential Soviet interest U.S. involvement might attract.¹⁸ The U.S. followed the British lead, and the Indian expectation was that the Security Council would direct Pakistan to withdraw

¹⁵ Ayaz Daudzai, "Kashmir – Historic Facts can't be Altered," *Pakistan Think Tank*, no. 12/31/2007 (2007), [journal on-line]; available from <http://www.pakistanthinktank.org/default.php/p/articles/pk/396>; Internet; accessed 12/31/2007.

¹⁶ Bal Raj Madhok, "Accession of India: Role of Pakistan, RSS & Sheikh Abdullah," *Kashmir Information Network* Chapter 6, no. 12/31/2007 (2007), [journal on-line]; available from <http://www.kashmir-information.com/storm/chapter6.html>; Internet; accessed 12/31/2007.

¹⁷ "Kashmir: The View from New Delhi," *International Crisis Group* Asia Report N°69, no. 4 Dec 2003 (2003), [journal on-line]; available from <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=2408&CFID=32143146&CFTOKEN=93437074>; Internet; accessed 12/6/2007.

¹⁸ Kux, *The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000 Disenchanted Allies*, 470. pg 23

its forces. In March 1948 the Security Council's draft resolution called for a ceasefire and the withdrawal of Pakistan troops followed by the withdrawal of Indian troops. The resolution also called for a plebiscite which India favored but Pakistan did not because it left Sheikh Abdullah in office while it was to be conducted. The Security Council adapted a modified resolution supported by the U.S. Britain, Belgium, Canada, and China on April 21, 1948 in which neither Pakistan nor India were satisfied and resulted in a cease-fire but no settlement on Jan 1, 1949. Both countries maintained control of the areas they occupied. The mechanisms and conditions for conducting a plebiscite and resolution of the dispute were never possible due to a deep emotional mistrust and a non-compromising attitude when attempting to work out the details leaving a stalemate in place.

Indo – Pakistani War of 1965

In August 1965 Pakistan initiated a plan known as Operation Gibraltar infiltrating into India controlled Kashmir.¹⁹ The operation was based on flawed assumptions that they could draw the U.S. and international community to intervene and force a resolution to the Kashmir dispute. When the insurgency began to fail Pakistan President Ayub crossed the Line of Control into Indian held territory to cut off Indian troops from Kashmir. On September 6, 1965 India struck back against Pakistan in the Punjab to relieve pressure on Kashmir. Very quickly Pakistan used up the bulk of their means to continue the fight and requested U.S. support. Pakistan claimed it was a victim of naked aggression and demanded the U.S. abide by a 1959 mutual defense agreement and

¹⁹ Ibid. pg 160

immediately come to its aid.²⁰ However, the 1959 agreement did not commit the U.S. to aid Pakistan against an attack by India. This continues to be misunderstood as a betrayal of Pakistan by President Lyndon Johnson's administration. President Johnson suspended military and economic aid to both countries and supported a UN-brokered ceasefire. The war ended with Pakistan's President agreeing to a cease-fire. India and Pakistan held widely divergent claims on the damage they have inflicted on each other and the amount of damage suffered by them.^{21 22}



Figure 4. Kargil

Kargil War

The Kargil War, also known as the Kargil conflict took place in the Kargil district of Kashmir between May and July 1999. India accused Pakistan of supporting a separatist rebellion beginning in 1989 but Pakistan only admits to lending moral and political support to what it calls “freedom fighters” resisting Indian rule and human rights

²⁰ Ibid. pg 161

²¹ "Grand Slam - A Battle of Lost Opportunities," [cited 2008]. Available from <http://www.defencejournal.com/2000/sept/grand-slam.htm>.

²² "Indo-Pakistan War of 1965," [cited 2008]. Available from http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/indo-pak_1965.htm.

abuses in the region.²³ Pakistan and India seemed to be making progress at a strategic level summit in Lahore on Feb 20-21, 1999 but any progress was negated by the tactical level maneuvering of Pakistan hardliners across the Line of Control into Indian controlled area in May 1999. Pakistan believed India was poised to build up their capability upon reoccupying abandoned forward posts during the winter months in the extreme mountainous region. Pakistan preempted the perceived Indian move with a plan to plug gaps in their defensive position.²⁴ Rebels and/or Pakistani soldiers infiltrated across the Line of Control in order to gain a high ground advantage before India reoccupied the territory. Encounters between the two armies began on May 2 and then again on May 7 with the Indian's suffering significant casualties. India responded with Operation Vijay and mobilized 20,000 troops as well as elements of the Indian Air Force.²⁵ The U.S. stepped in to stem the rapid escalation of the two nuclear powers and negotiated a cease-fire on July 4, 1999. However, the fighting did not actually cease until July 26. The additional time was needed in order to bring some extremist groups into compliance that refused to abide by the cease-fire.

Recent Tensions

Pakistan has a history of having to deal with extremism and tends to blame India for their difficulties. India does the same in response to the situation whether or not it is accurate. In 2001, India blamed Pakistan for the terrorist attacks on the Indian Parliament

²³ Alan K. Kronstadt, *CRS Report to Congress India-U.S. Relations* 13 Feb 2007), [database on-line]; available from <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/80669.pdf>, Order Code RL33529

²⁴ Musharraf, *In the Line of Fire*, 354. pg 87-90

²⁵ Malik and VP Gen (Retd), "Lessons from Kargil," *BHARAT RAKSHAK MONITOR* 4 (6) May-June 2002, no. 12/6/2007 (2002), [journal on-line]; available from <http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/ISSUE4-6/malik.html>; Internet; accessed 12/6/2007.

complex in New Delhi.²⁶ India responded with a massive military mobilization and the two adversaries were poised once again for a possible full scale war. Again, it took an immediate diplomatic effort from the U.S. to avert another major conflict. In 2006 Pakistan President Musharraf openly accused India of supporting Baloch and Pashtun rebel fighting in the Baluchistan area.²⁷ Although there remains a passionate hatred between the two countries, they come from the same cultural lineage, similar to two brothers in a heated dispute but there remains an undercurrent of desire to normalize relations.

Current U.S. Relations

The US does not share Pakistan's concern with regards to India but rather views India as a major power and "natural partner" of the United States.²⁸ The Bush administration believes relations with India and Pakistan are not mutually exclusive but can be dealt with separately.²⁹ This assumption requires validation as currently it appears that any gain for India will continue to have an opposite but equal reaction within Pakistan until relations can be normalized.

Within the Pakistan military there remains a deep rooted mistrust of India that cannot easily be removed. Senior Pakistani officers that directly served during the 1965 or 1971 wars with India are becoming rare. However, many senior officers have been directly affected by the wars with India and still carry physical and emotional scars of the

²⁶ Kronstadt, *CRS Report for Congress Pakistan-U.S. Relations*

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Kronstadt, *CRS Report to Congress India-U.S. Relations*

²⁹ *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, 49.

conflicts. Although they seek peace with India, little has changed from their point of view to put much faith in their neighbor. The Line of Control, a cold war type Berlin wall, remains. Until this barrier can be torn down normalized relations between Indian and Pakistan will not be likely.

Several attempts to normalize relations between Pakistan and India have started off with promising beginnings only to be negated by the escalation of tactical maneuvering. The latest framework for comprehensive bilateral talks called the “composite dialogue” was initiated in 1996 by India.³⁰ The major success of the Lahore Summit in 1999, as one of the dialogues, was quickly negated by the Kargil Conflict shortly thereafter. In 2001, India invited President Musharraf for a visit with much public excitement but only to once again be disappointed because the agenda failed to establish expectations of what was to be achieved by the visit.³¹ In July 2006, another attempt to subvert the composite dialogue was made when two bombs exploded on an Indian express train.³² The train ran between Delhi, India and Lahore, Pakistan. India refused Pakistan’s request to undertake a joint investigation into the attack. The most recent composite dialogue round met in March 2007 in Islamabad. Although no new agreements were reached, a desire to “move from problem and dispute management to resolution of issues” on the Kashmir dispute was reported.³³ However, based on their history, getting both Pakistan and India to simply meet to discuss the issues keeps it

³⁰ Kronstadt, *CRS Report for Congress Pakistan-U.S. Relations*

³¹ Kux, *India-Pakistan Negotiations : Is Past Still Prologue?*, 87.

³² "Anti-Terrorism Accord," *The News; A Pakistan Premir News Organization*, 2007, [database on-line]; available from http://www.thenews.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=46159, ISSN 1563-9479.

³³ "TEXT OF FOREIGN SECRETARY'S REMARKS AT JOINT PRESS CONFERENCE," *Pakistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs* PR. No.81/2007, no. 14 Mar 2007 (2007), [journal on-line]; available from http://www.mofa.gov.pk/Press_Releases/2007/March/PR_81_07.htm; Internet; accessed 12/6/2007.

moving in a positive direction.

There remains hope that the series of composite dialogues will continue supporting peaceful relations between Pakistan and India, even though the Kashmiris have thus far rejected any settlement that excludes them.³⁴ Although, there appears to be the required willingness between the two governments, limited cross border fighting continues in the Kashmir region as there appears to be little incentive for the Kashmiris to accept the status quo.³⁵ Growing international pressure in light of the rise of terrorism has not provided for the necessary incentives to motivate serious considerations from the Kashmiris.

As the stronger nation, India sees little need to compromise, and Pakistan, the weaker one, views it is unable to compromise.³⁶ However, the two adversaries are capable of resolution particularly when external assistance makes it possible for all parties to claim victory; for example the Pakistan – India Water Basin Treaty of 1960. Pakistan and India share the Indus water basin which contains the Indus River and five main tributaries. A dispute over sovereign water rights with its roots dating back to British Indian rule became international upon partition of Pakistan and India. A lack of a water sharing agreement led India to stem the flow of tributaries to Pakistan on 1 April 1948. The resulting water shortage in Pakistan took over a decade to resolve. The Water Basin Treaty of 1960 was brokered with the collaboration of the World Bank which called for construction of a series of dams and canals that ensured neither Pakistan nor India lost in the deal. However the U.S. had to make a significant commitment to

³⁴ Kronstadt, *CRS Report for Congress Pakistan-U.S. Relations*

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Kux, *India-Pakistan Negotiations : Is Past Still Prologue?*, 87. pg 57

provide half of the necessary funding. A similar solution may be possible by providing the necessary incentives to the Kashmiris to reach a compromise which will be discussed later.

The Kashmir and Jammu wound is diverting the attention and the necessary resources needed for Pakistan to effectively fight the terrorist cancer which not only threatens Pakistan but the world body. It will likely take several years to normalize Pakistan and India relations even after an agreed upon resolution. Now is the time to normalize the India – Pakistan relationship in order to bring a sense of security to Pakistan so it can begin to shift its primary focus from the Indian threat to doing more in defeating Al-Qaida and winning the long War on Terror. Implementing a viable detailed resolution with the ingrained mistrust from more than fifty years of strife will not easily be dispelled. However, with the U.S. leading, the international community can overcome this obstacle.

PAKISTAN'S INTERNAL STABILITY – U.S. STRATEGIC PRIORITY

“In World War II we fought to make the world safer, then worked to rebuild it. As we wage war today to keep the world safe from terror, we must also work to make the world a better place for all its citizens.”¹

President George W. Bush

The focus of the U.S. is on defeating Al-Qaida, including the Taliban within the borders of Pakistan. This may ultimately prove to be the center of gravity for the War on Terror. Al-Qaida's roots are located in the FATA located within Pakistan along the Afghan border. Terrorism is an evil that has been thrust upon the body of the free world similar to a cancer invading the human body. Al-Qaida can be compared to leukemia in the world body. An over simplification of leukemia is that it is a cancer that attacks the blood and is carried throughout the body. Al-Qaida operates within sixty countries through out the world and poses a major threat to the civilized world.²

The Al-Qaida leukemia found refuge deep inside a neglected part of the world body in Afghanistan. OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM was initiated to surgically remove Al-Qaida. The Taliban provided the primary refuge and means of spreading the terrorist cancer and also has to be removed. The Al-Qaida network and its Taliban support in the deep recess of the FATA of Pakistan continues to act as a breeding ground for the terrorist cancer.

Success for the U.S. in Pakistan is defined as, “a democratic, stable and

¹ "Expand the Circle of Development by Opening Societies and Building the Infrastructure of Democracy," in The White House [database online]. 14 Mar 2002 [cited 2008]. Available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss7.html>.

² "Dr. Rice Briefs Press on President's Trip to NATO Summit," in The White House [database online]. 15 Nov 2002 [cited 2007]. Available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/11/20021115-6.html>.

prosperous Pakistan that is a full and reliable partner in the struggle against the Taliban, Al Qaida, and other terrorist groups, and is a responsible steward of its nuclear weapons and technology.”³ Defeating Al-Qaida, including Taliban elements, in Pakistan does not mean the total elimination of terrorism. However, it does mean eliminating by force those hard core elements that cannot be deterred or reformed and cutting off the institutions that sustain them.⁴ The strengthening and transforming of Pakistan’s internal organization to help local law enforcement maintain law and order in the FATA is vital to bring justice to individual remnants and prevent future growth of the Al-Qaida cancer.⁵

Nature of the Islamic Terrorist Threat

Clausewitz believed the cause of war stems from differing motives of hostile feelings and hostile intentions.⁶ He goes on to say that savages are ruled by passion and civilized people by the mind. War stems from a basic conflict of merging philosophical ideals and values. Sun Tzu realized that war was “of vital importance to the State” and cautioned leaders not to place reliance on military power alone. He considered moral law, wisdom of commanders, and circumstantial elements of war to be more important than the physical.⁷

Islamic terrorism is a combination of savage passion and ideological values which attempts to legitimize itself by exploiting the faith of Islam. The passion of the Islamic

³ House, *House Resolution 1 Section 2042 Pakistan*, 12/6/2007 sess., (2007) : [database on-line]; available from <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?c110:1:./temp/~c110wZNvQt:b803880;>

⁴ *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, 49. pg 12

⁵ Kronstadt, *CRS Report for Congress Pakistan-U.S. Relations*

⁶ Clausewitz, *On War*, 717.

⁷ Galvin and Giles, *The Art of War Sun Tzu*, 273.

terrorist drives him to total war, however he is limited in both his physical ability to wage war and his mental ability for logical reasoning as passion and logic are at opposite ends of the spectrum. Although currently the enemy may be limited in his ability, he has a say in defining terms of why war is waged whether it be a nation state, terrorist organization, or individual suicide bomber.

Total war involving nuclear powers is a frightening prospect to the world body. The physical destruction capability of war has matured to a point where it is possible to virtually annihilate mankind from earth with weapons of mass destruction. No civilized nation wishes to impose their will by use of weapons which could bring about their own annihilation. Therefore other forms of more limited power, such as the development of precision weapons, with the ability to prevent unnecessary destruction have become the preferred means to influence belligerent nations. Similar to Sun Tzu's rational, with great power comes great responsibility and the ability to reason logically in order to control it.

The goal of the suicide bomber, currently the most extreme of enemies, not only wishes to inflict his will on others but also desires martyrdom. Unlike Clausewitz' assumption that war is an extension of politics; this provides a paradigm shift for a different purpose of war. A suicide bomber may be motivated by several factors. One factor may be that he has given up on the aspect of being able to control his own environment because he sees evil has taken control and surrounds him in all aspects of his existence. He has given up on this world and looks forward to the next. He is looking for a "cause" that assures his place and acceptance into paradise. His intent may not be to particularly influence but to destroy this world or some part of it which he

perceives as evil. He desires martyrdom, which he believes can also serve to resolve the evil of his own past sins, assuring acceptance in the next life.

The philosophical battle for the hearts and minds becomes the preeminent battlefield in the War on Terror. One should note that as conflict becomes more limited, such as insurgencies and police type actions, the trend becomes more continuous in nature. This brings us to the geneses of the next or fourth generation type of warfare.⁸

The fourth generation of warfare uses all available elements of power (Diplomatic, Informational, Military, and Economical - DIME) to convince the enemy's political decision makers that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit.⁹ The inability of the enemy to reason logically increases the necessity to employ military power primarily as a defensive force and to utilize diplomatic, information, and economic power directed toward the next generation of potential terrorist as the offense. Military power uses surgical strikes to remove more conventional congregated enemy masses, such as terrorist training camps, while diplomatic, information, and economic power strikes at the hearts and minds.

The nature of the terrorist threat has required the U.S. to shift from a tradition of relying on military power to confronting an extremist ideology. Although Pakistan and the U.S. may share some common goals on how to defeat terrorism, the use of military power is limited in what it is able to accomplish.

⁸ Thomas X. Hammes, *The Sling and the Stone : On War in the 21st Century* (St. Paul, MN: Zenith Press, 2004), 321.

⁹ Ibid.

U.S. Goals

The common U.S. – Pakistan goals that became Public Law 110-53 on 3 Aug 2007 are as follows:¹⁰

- curbing the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology;
- combating poverty and corruption;
- enabling effective government institutions, including public education;
- promoting democracy and the rule of law, particularly at the national level;
- addressing the continued presence of Taliban and other violent extremist forces throughout the country;
- maintaining the authority of the Government of Pakistan in all parts of its national territory;
- securing the borders of Pakistan to prevent the movement of militants and terrorists into other countries and territories; and
- dealing effectively with violent extremism.

What is not expressed in this list of common goals is the amount of effort attributed to them by each nation. It mentions securing the borders of Pakistan, but the U.S. effort is weighted toward containing cross border incursions in the west while Pakistan efforts are weighted toward the east. A shift of focus from containing cross border incursions in the west to increasing bilateral interactions with India to normalize relations will increase the efficiency and effectiveness of effort; thus allowing Pakistan to “do more”¹¹ in dealing with violent extremism and achieving our common goals.

Although the U.S. and Pakistan share some vital common goals, the relationship

¹⁰ Library of Congress, *House Resolution 1 Section 2042 Pakistan*

¹¹ Caren Bohan, "Do More Against Taliban, Al Qaeda, Cheney Asks Pakistan," *Reuters*, Feb 26 2007,

currently has a large “trust deficit” due to an on-again off-again relationship that Pakistan views as a lack of commitment from the U.S.¹² The following section shows the U.S. has not changed its strategic approach which has been a more hands off approach allowing Pakistan and India to normalize relations themselves. Without a shift in this type approach a similar up and down relationship as was realized during the Cold War era can be expected to continue for the War on Terror. Throughout Pakistan’s history, which primarily coincides with the Cold War era, U.S. presidential administrations since Harry Truman have embarked on strategies that have not been able to shift Pakistan’s focus from their primary threat by use of either the carrot or the stick. President Eisenhower stated in Nov 1953 “That [India and Pakistan] is one area of the world where, even more than most cases, emotion rather than reason seem to dictate policy.”¹³

The U.S. commitment to Pakistan has been derailed several times by diverging and sometimes conflicting expectations. U.S. policy toward Pakistan must also maintain a strong commitment that will be consistent through each Presidential administration. Current U.S. policies, attitudes, and expectations toward Pakistan are similar in nature to those it held during the war on communism. The U.S. – Pakistan relationship was key to the defeat of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan which was ultimately a factor for victory in the Cold War. With regards to the current War on Terror, a number of U.S. officials on

¹² David O. Smith, "Facing Up to the Trust Deficit," *Strategic Insights* VI, no. 4 (2007), [journal on-line]; available from <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2007/Jun/smithJun07.asp>; Internet; accessed 29 Aug 2007.

¹³ *The Papers of Dwight D Eisenhower to John Foster Dulles* Dwight D Eisenhower Memorial Commission, 1953), [database on-line]; available from <http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/presidential-papers/first-term/documents/543.cfm>,

Capitol Hill view the road to success in Afghanistan will again lead through Pakistan.¹⁴

On the other hand, others view the U.S.-Pakistan relationship as a temporary marriage of convenience due to doubts about Pakistan's commitment to some core U.S. interests.¹⁵

The U.S. - Pakistan relationship has been like traversing over a path in Pakistan's Northern Area along the Himalayan Mountain Range with its alternating steep peaks and valleys. This path has lead to the current "trust deficit" between the Government of Pakistan and the policy makers in Washington, DC.¹⁶ Washington believes Pakistan has the means to "do more" but is lacking in their commitment to stop cross-border incursions of Al-Qaeda and Taliban terrorist into Afghanistan and allowing terrorist camps to operate within the FATA. The FATA borders Afghanistan to its west and is marked by the Durand Line established in 1893.¹⁷ Previously it was not controlled by either Pakistan or Afghanistan thus defaulting control to the mostly Pashtun tribes of the region that did not recognize an established border. The Pakistan military serves as the ultimate law enforcement mechanism which is more reactive than proactive to squelch mass disturbances. Since 9/11 and the beginning of the War on Terror, Pakistan has been receiving financial reimbursement from Coalition Support Funds to secure the poorly defined border region with a large build up of military troops. Six years later there

¹⁴ Craig Cohen and Derek Chollet, "When \$10 Billion is Not enough: Rethinking U.S. Strategy Toward Pakistan," *The Washington Quarterly* 30, no. 2 (2007), [journal on-line]; available from http://www.twq.com/07spring/docs/07spring_cohen-chollet.pdf; Internet; accessed 12 Sep 2007.

¹⁵ Kronstadt, *CRS Report for Congress Pakistan-U.S. Relations*

¹⁶ Smith, *Facing Up to the Trust Deficit*, 1.

¹⁷ The **Durand Line** is the term for the poorly marked 2,640 kilometer (1,610 mile) border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. After reaching a virtual stalemate against the Afghans the British forced Amir Abdur Rahman Khan of Afghanistan in 1893 to come to an agreement under duress to demarcate the border between Afghanistan and what was then British India (now North-West Frontier Province (N.W.F.P.), Federally Administered Tribal Areas (F.A.T.A.) and Balochistan provinces of Pakistan). The Durand Line is sometimes referred to as the "Zero Line".in two wars

continues to be cross border incursions and it concerns the U.S. that terrorism in Pakistan does not appear to be subsiding but may be on the rise.

U.S. POLICY (COLD WAR ERA AND WAR ON TERROR)

The “trust deficit” had its roots in the Cold War era of the U.S. – Pakistan relationship from 1947 thru 2001. Pakistan’s alliance with the U.S. was initially focused on providing for its security against India. Later it was tailored to also include non-regional threats such as the expansion of communism. However when Pakistan believed it could no longer count on the U.S. for support Pakistan could not be persuaded from pursuing threatening capabilities, most importantly nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them.¹ The U.S. did not fully realize the passion that drives Pakistan to total war with India. The threat of communism was both a conventional and nuclear threat which provided for significant unity of effort to both Pakistan and the U.S. Once communism was no longer a common threat, rather than attempting to remove Pakistan and India’s Berlin wall, the Line of Control, the U.S. focus shifted towards Pakistan’s internal proliferation of nuclear weapons as the threat destabilizing the Southwest Asia region.

Rather than the U.S. continuing to traverse the path that supports a “trust deficit” another path offers opportunity. The governing dynamics theory of *The Wealth of Nations* written by an 18th century philosopher and political economist, Adam Smith, could serve as a basic principle for the necessity for the shifting of strategic priorities. Adam Smith’s theory was based on a group dynamic of an economic principle that in competition individual ambition serves the common good.² This theory on group dynamics was made famous by Russell Crowe playing John Nash, an American

¹ Khan, Brig. Gen. (ret.) Feroz Hassan, Clary, and Christopher, "Dissuasion and Regional Allies - the Case of Pakistan," *Strategic Insights* III, no. 10 (2004), [journal on-line]; available from <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2004/oct/khanOct04.asp>; Internet; accessed 12/6/2007.

² "Adam Smith," Available from <http://phoenix.liu.edu/~uroy/eco54/histlist/smith/smith.htm>.

mathematician and winner of the 1994 Nobel Prize in Economics, in the movie *A Beautiful Mind*. An oversimplification of the Nash equilibrium as portrayed in the movie is: where two or more players in game theory collude to produce a situation to achieve greater gains than each is able to do with unilateral strategies. The building of relationships upon the foundations of common ideals must also include what is good of the whole in order to win the long war.

The following sections of *Alignment and Realignment*, *Tilt and Commitment*, and *Disenchantment and Anticipation of Disenchantment* provide a review of U.S. policy during the Cold War era which has led to the current relationship with Pakistan. The nature of the U.S. – Pakistan relationship can be characterized by alignment, tilt, and disenchantment.³ The next sections will compare the initial stages of alignment during the Cold War era with the relationship at the beginning stages of the War on Terror. Then the policy of the Nixon administration, characterized by a “tilt” toward Pakistan as apposed to India, will be contrasted with regard to the stages of disenchantment involving periods of sanctions. This supports a perception by Pakistan that the U.S. cannot be trusted when it comes to long term commitments going beyond presidential administrations. Then the final section of this chapter will address Pakistan’s skepticism of the long-term support the Bush administration promised in light of the upcoming U.S. presidential elections thus possibly anticipating disenchantment once again.

Alignment and Realignment

Shortly after independence, Pakistan aligned with the West against the expansion of communism even though the spread of communism was not of immediate concern for

³ Kux, *The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000 Disenchanted Allies*, 470.

them at the time. Pakistan saw the beginning of the Cold War as a potential way to increase its own security against India. Pakistan did not fully realize its level of importance in comparison with the level of US commitment to Europe after WWII. A large gap developed and continued between perceptions of Pakistan's level of importance and the amount of assistance the US was willing to provide for a particularly perilous beginning. In 1947 Pakistan requested an assistance loan for \$2 billion over a five year period.⁴ Pakistan felt it was thrown a bone of \$10 million relief grant from the War Assets Administration, only .5 percent of the request.⁵ The rebuff did not make for initial good relations.

Pakistan has been willing to do what is necessary to assist the international community so long as it does not jeopardize their internal security. In 1950 Pakistan supported the UN collective security system against the North Korean invasion.⁶ The U.S. asked Pakistan to send troops to Korea to which Pakistan responded favorably and was willing to send an entire division but requested that the US provide a commitment to reassure the people of Pakistan against India. President Truman would not make a commitment because he felt it would alienate India and Afghanistan and limit US freedom of action in the area. During the Eisenhower administration, Pakistan was a partner in the highly secret use of the Peshawar airport for basing the U-2 all-weather surveillance plane used for operations against the Soviet Union.

At the end of the Carter administration and the beginning of the Reagan years the Soviet Union invaded and occupied Afghanistan. Pakistan expanded their Inter-Services

⁴ Ibid. pg 20

⁵ Ibid. pg 21

⁶ Ibid. pg 37

Intelligence (ISI) capabilities with U.S. covert support to provide weapons and ammunition to the mujahideed in Afghanistan. In 1993 Pakistan served with the UN in Somalia and assisted when American soldiers came under fire in the Madina Bazaar area of Mogadishu. The episode was made famous in the movie *Blackhawk Down*.

The War on Terror also started off on shaky ground but fortunately Pakistan once again aligned with the West, even though a large portion of Pakistanis remain opposed to Western values. Shortly after 9/11 Dick Armitage, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, threatened to “bomb Pakistan back into the stone age” if Pakistan did not immediately side with the U.S.⁷ This reestablished the relationship from a dominating U.S. position. Pakistan had continued their commitment of support for the Taliban from the time of the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan. Now it was necessary to bring them to justice for supporting terrorism against the U.S. Although Pakistan could hardly refuse, they would only agree to a few of the initial U.S. demands.

The priorities between the U.S. and Pakistan may not be in sync but there has been mutual benefit to both. Unlike initial relations with Pakistan in 1947, Washington provided substantial funding to Pakistan for its efforts in the War on Terror, thus far almost \$10 billion. In response Pakistan has captured or killed more al Qaida operatives than any other country.⁸ It has also made great sacrifice of life but there remains a significant gap of expectations on both sides. Washington continues to apply pressure for Pakistan to “Do More” toward stopping the infiltration of Al-Qaeda along their western

⁷ Musharraf, *In the Line of Fire*, 354. pg 201

⁸ "United States Central Command Posture for 2006," 14 Mar 2006 [cited 2007]. Available from <http://www2.centcom.mil/sites/uscentcom1/General%20Abizaid%20Statements/PostureStatement2006.htm>

border into Afghanistan.⁹ In return, Pakistan continually seeks more military and economic assistance from the U.S. In 2004 Pakistan was given Major Non-NATO Ally status by the Bush administration and the promise of a long term commitment for continued assistance.¹⁰

Pakistan has maintained standing relations with their northern neighbor China. During the sanction years of 1990 to 2001 Pakistan aligned with the Chinese and sought military assistance to fill the void. Pakistan required an alternate means for a nuclear delivery system when military equipment sales of the F-16s were stopped.¹¹ It is suspected that Pakistan collaborated with China and North Korea by support in their nuclear deterrence by sharing missile and nuclear technologies. Pakistan continues to look to China for bargain purchases of a significant amount of military equipment. The China - Pakistan relationship with regard to India as the common regional threat is similar to the initial U.S. relationship with Pakistan in the early 1950s during the Truman administration, friends but not allies.¹² This friendship has endured for some time now, as it was this relationship that provided the connection for President Nixon's visit to China in 1972.

Pakistan, like other poor countries, is looking for external support for their security and will take whatever measures it can to acquire that support even if it means

⁹ Hilali, *Kashmir: A Dangerous Flashpoint in South Asia*

¹⁰ Major non-NATO ally is a designation given by the U.S. government to exceptionally close allies who have close strategic working relationships with American forces but are not members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. While this status does not automatically include a mutual defense pact with the United States, it does confer a variety of military and financial advantages that otherwise are not obtainable by countries not in NATO.

¹¹ Khan, Brig. Gen. (ret.) Feroz Hassan, Clary, and Christopher, *Dissuasion and Regional Allies - the Case of Pakistan*, 21 Sep 2007.

¹² Kux, *The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000 Disenchanted Allies*, 470.

giving up long-term strategic benefits for short term gains. But unlike other poor countries Pakistan has a nuclear capability that must not be jeopardized by falling into extremist hands. If the U.S. will not provide the necessary commitment, Pakistan will surely look elsewhere and most likely to its northern neighbor, China for its support.

Tilt and Commitment

Individual relationships between government leaders and the two militaries have not always been in sync with the political relationships which provide a mixed message to Pakistan. The personalities of the U.S. and Pakistani leaders have been the key factor of the relationships between the two countries. President Truman considered Pakistan a friend but would not commit to them as an ally for fear of disenfranchising India. Pakistan became “Americas most allied ally in Asia” during the Eisenhower years.¹³

During President Johnson’s administration the alliance fell apart with the Pakistan – India war in 1965. Pakistan lost faith in the commitment of the U.S. when the expectation of support from its most “allied ally” was not forthcoming but instead received sanctions due events leading up to the 1965 war with India. Pakistan suffered from U.S. sanctions from 1965 to 1975 and 1990 to 2001 after aligning its military with the U.S. for its sustenance therefore forming the basis of the “trust deficit”.

Tilt

The policy of the Nixon administration was characterized by a “tilt” toward Pakistan particularly in the build up to and during the 1971 war with India. President Nixon found Pakistan easy to deal with as opposed to India and did not want to

¹³ Ibid. pg 114

complicate matters while also dealing with Vietnam. However the instability of South Asia would force the U.S. to commit to Pakistan as a non-regional force. East Pakistan was partitioned from Bengal based on a plebiscite from British India upon Pakistan's independence. At the time of the Nixon administration West Pakistan actions against East Pakistan was characterized as a "reign of terror" with refugees fleeing to India.¹⁴ The 1971 India – Pakistan war also known as the Bangladesh Liberation War was initially an internal conflict that escalated into a regional conflict and had the potential of escalating into a global conflict. The Soviet Union supported India and the U.S. "tilt" toward Pakistan provided a superpower counterbalance as non-regional parties. India inserted itself into the conflict between East and West Pakistan intending to dismember Pakistan and destroy its armed forces.¹⁵ However, as a regional threat to India's north, China tipped balance of power, thus discouraging India from invading West Pakistan. The war ended with East Pakistan gaining its independence as Bangladesh.

There has been a shift from the historical period of the Bangladesh Liberation War of the Nixon era to the current War on Terror. The non-regional conventional threat of Soviet communism has been replaced by a regional unconventional terrorist threat to Pakistan. This regional terrorist threat primarily continues to be a non-regional threat to the U.S. In the 1971 war Pakistan's actions resulted in the U.S. having to side with it even though it was unpopular with the American public. With the War on Terror, it was the U.S. that pushed President Musharraf into a "tilt" toward joining the coalition while it was unpopular with the Pakistani populous. The global conflict of the War on Terror is

¹⁴ U.S. Department of State, "Foreign Relations 1969-1976, South Asia Crisis, 1971," *Foreign Relations of the United States* XI, no. 11199 (2005), [journal on-line]; available from <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/nixon/xi/index.htm>; Internet; accessed 12/6/2007. Item 13

¹⁵ Ibid. Item 246 & 251

primarily an internal conflict within the borders of Pakistan. However, the fear of a nuclear catastrophe is common to both periods. The global nuclear power of the Soviets backing India against the U.S. supporting Pakistan had the potential of escalating out of control. Now the greater potential of a nuclear catastrophe has shifted to the regional nuclear powers of Pakistan and India.

In the late 1970s of the Carter administration the relationship hit another low point with the souring of U.S. relations in the Middle East and the burning of the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan in 1979. The Reagan years of the 1980s were the culminating point of the relationship with the U.S. and Pakistan cooperating to push the extra-regional threat of Southwest Asia, the Soviet Union, out of Afghanistan. Although the relationship was good during the 1980s, Pakistan was also developing nuclear weapons which would quickly turn a positive relationship into a strained one once a common enemy was no longer a threat and the focus would once again shift back toward Pakistan's eastern border. In Oct 1990 President George H.W. Bush did not certify that Pakistan did not have nuclear weapons by signing the Pressler amendment to the military and economic assistance program for 1991. The Pressler sanctions would remain in place until the beginning of the War on Terror in 2001 when once again the U.S and Pakistan would be confronted with a common enemy.

Although the Cold War era and War on Terror relationships between the U.S. and Pakistan did not start off on the right foot, the individual relationship between U.S and Pakistani leaders kept things moving in a positive direction during their administration. With the change in administrations comes the uncertainty of renewed relationships. The Washington bureaucracy for the most part has not fully understood or appreciated

Pakistani reasoning due to a difference in rationale coming from a Western perspective.

Commitment

The Pakistani view of commitment can be seen similar to a marriage bond in the Muslim faith. It may not necessarily be exclusive but never the less it is expected to be enduring. However, if not exclusive then all must be treated equally.

Pakistanis can be very hospitable and friendly people. *Melmastia* is the requirement of giving refuge to anyone, even an enemy, as long as the person remains within the protection of one's home. This prevalent Pashtun value in Pakistan is related to the concept of honor as the host gains honor by serving his guest. Pakistani's consider one who has placed himself under another's protection, a refugee and a guest to be protected to the point of sacrificing ones own life.¹⁶

When Pakistan aligned itself with the U.S. after emerging from WWII, it was recognizing its weakness as well as honoring the U.S out of need for its own survival against the enemy. However, there are some within the Pakistan military that felt the realignment with the West in the War on Terror was not done out of honor but initially out of dishonor. There was a realization they were not strong enough to oppose the U.S. thus becoming a de-facto ally against the Taliban. However since this time some have communicated a belief that it is Pakistan that has a position of authority. There is a belief that the U.S. needs to be invited as a friend into its house, similar to a melmastia commitment, but not pushed.

The disenchantment of U.S. assistance to support Pakistan in the 1965 war with

¹⁶ Peter Blood, "*Pakistan: A Country Study*," *GPO for the Library of Congress*, no. 12/6/2007 (1994)[database on-line]; available from <http://countrystudies.us/pakistan/>,

India still resonates within the Pakistan military as a lack of commitment by the U.S. due to a perception of a breach in the bilateral security agreement signed in 1959. The perception is reinforced by the fact that the U.S. subsequently emplaced sanctions on Pakistan as well as India. By U.S. reasoning, Pakistan's expectations of the U.S. have been consistently unreasonable in scope. The U.S. was also viewed by Pakistan's military as lacking in commitment by not fully supporting them against the Indian invasion or liberation of East Pakistan in 1971. The Nixon "tilt" toward Pakistan was simply not enough to prevent them from loosing East Pakistan. Pakistan felt they could not count on a U.S. commitment to meet their security requirements and therefore began to pursue a nuclear deterrence capability to offset India's nuclear capability. Pakistan was willing to jeopardize relations with the U.S. and look to other sources for military assistance to acquire a capability that was perceived necessary for their own survival. However, by increasing their deterrence at the strategic level sanctions dramatically reduced their traditional military deterrence capability at the operational and tactical level.

Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice stated,

"I would say to the people of Pakistan that the United States will be a friend for life, that we understand that at one time in our history we did not maintain and continue a deep relationship with Pakistan after having shared strategic interests during the Cold War. I believe that we paid a price for that in the United States and that Pakistan paid a price. And so we remain and will remain committed to this relationship for the long term."¹⁷

It may sound like a marriage proposal but Pakistanis remain skeptical of what the definition of a friend for life means coming from an American. Does it mean an

¹⁷ U.S. Department of State, "Interview with Quarrina Hosain Currim of Pakistan Television," (2005), [journal on-line]; available from <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/43604.htm>

individual life long pledge or the duration of the War on Terror or possibly something more? The standard Pakistani Army phrase about Americans is “They used us like a condom.”¹⁸ The interpretation from Pakistani soldiers is the U.S. will act like they intend to marry you until they get what they want and then it is over.¹⁹

Pakistan’s focus has been on survival in the near term and may not have fully appreciated the long term strategic impact of its short term tactical decisions. However, now it seems that the pendulum is beginning to swing the other way and it is the U.S. that needs Pakistan’s support in the War on Terror.

Disenchantment and Anticipation of Disenchantment

While many on Capitol Hill may understand Pakistan’s importance to the War on Terror, they see its military commitment lacking. Former U.S. Senator Max Cleland stated, “Pakistan is currently the most dangerous place in the world.”²⁰ It appears Pakistan may be apprehensive with the up coming U.S presidential elections that current relations may have peaked and are we now getting ready to head once again into a valley. This attitude can be seen with Democratic Presidential Candidate Senator Barack Obama’s comments regarding Pakistan in that he stated ““There are terrorists holed up in those mountains who murdered 3,000 Americans. They are plotting to strike again,...If we have actionable intelligence about high-value terrorist targets and President Musharraf

¹⁸ Elizabeth Rubin, "In the Land of the Taliban," *The New York Times Magazine* , no. Oct 2006 (2006), [journal on-line]; available from http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/22/magazine/22afghanistan.html?_r=2&pagewanted=1&oref=slogin&oref=slogin; Internet; accessed 6 Oct 2007.

¹⁹ This point was directly confirmed by author in casual conversation with several Pakistani officers from 2005 to 2007.

²⁰ Comment made by former Senator Max Cleland at Regents University during Clash of the Titans debating the topic “Should America Bring Democracy to the World?” on Oct 26, 2007

will not act, we will." ²¹ It is this type of short term tactical view that undermines the U.S. long term strategic objective of a stable South Asia.

Initially in the war on communism and currently with the war on terrorism the U.S. and Pakistan relationship has been built upon different and sometimes conflicting reasons. The current relationship between President Bush and President Musharraf as well as the military to military relationship remains strong.²² However, the Bush administration has sought to separate its dealings with India from that of Pakistan. Currently this remains virtually impossible until relations can be naturalized because what action is taken for one there is an opposite but equal reaction from the other. The "India Deal" is a U.S. initiative to embrace India as a strategic partner by giving them nuclear recognition. The U.S. can ill afford the possible perception of a possible "tilt" toward India.²³ Any possible gains achieved by posturing against China with an India Deal would likely be offset by an increase in its relationship with Pakistan. Attempting to deal with India without understanding the effects in Pakistan will only serve to heighten the possibility of disenchantment.

Pakistan was on the verge of becoming a failed bankrupt state before President Musharraf was forced to assume control. He walks a tight rope with his country divided on several fronts. He continues to face major crises almost on a daily basis whether it is

²¹ Munir Ahmad, "Pakistan: Obama Comments 'Irresponsible'," *The Washington Times*, Aug 3, 2007, [database on-line]; available from <http://www.washingtontimes.com/article/20070803/FOREIGN/108030107/1003>,

²² "President Bush and President Musharraf of Pakistan Discuss Strengthened Relationship," in The White House [database online]. 4 March 2006 [cited 2007]. Available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/03/20060304-2.html>.

²³ Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, *The India Deal: Looking at the Big Picture*, Nov 2 2005, [database on-line]; available from <http://www.senate.gov/~foreign/testimony/2005/CarterTestimony051102.pdf>,

dealing with economic, political, military, diplomatic issues or trying to stave off assassination attempts. Washington pushes President Musharraf to institute measures to ensure democracy. In October 2007 he won reelection by a wide margin but his critics considered the election as eyewash so long as America continues to back him.²⁴ He subsequently took off his uniform as the Chief of Army Staff. President Musharraf's critics routinely rebuke him for being America's puppet by siding with the West.²⁵

The War on Terror relationship has been built upon conflicting goals with the anticipation that it will not last. The Government of Pakistan and policy makers in Washington are both skeptical of how long the current positive relationship will last. Pakistan is skeptical particularly in light up the upcoming U.S. elections in 2008. The U.S. deal with Indian regarding nuclear-recognition for a strategic partnership is perceived by Pakistan as a possible "tilt" of the U.S. toward India, whereby the U.S. is hedging on its verbal long-term commitment possibly anticipating disenchantment. In order to stop the anticipation of disenchantment the promised long-term U.S. commitment is going to need a level of assurance Pakistan can count on that will transcend through Presidential administrations.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Rehan Rafay Jamil, "Pakistan's President Musharraf Walking a Tightrope," *Worldpress.Org*, Nov 15 2006, [database on-line]; available from <http://www.worldpress.org/2564.cfm>,

SECURITY ASSISTANCE

Security Assistance plays a critical role in shaping the environment for a stable Pakistan. Defined by the Security Assistance Maintenance Manual:

Security Assistance is a group of programs, authorized by law that allows the transfer of military articles and services to friendly foreign Governments. Its intent is to increase the ability of friends and allies to deter and defend against possible aggression, promote the sharing of common defense burdens, and help foster regional stability. Security Assistance can be the delivery of defense weapon systems to foreign Governments; U.S. Service schools training international students; U.S. personnel advising other Governments on ways to improve their internal defense capabilities; U.S. personnel providing guidance and assistance in establishing infrastructures and economic bases to achieve and maintain regional stability; etc. When we assist other nations in meeting their defense requirements, we contribute to our own security.¹

Security Assistance can be separated into two categories: a diplomatic offense and a military defense. The diplomatic offense provides guidance and assistance to build infrastructure and improve the economic foundations leading to more stable governments. The military defense focuses on providing weapons systems, military training and advice to improve the internal national defense capabilities. History has shown that focusing primarily on providing assistance for internal defense without employing sufficient offensive measures to build upon a stable foundation is ineffective in the long term.

The Eisenhower administration was the first to provide military assistance to Pakistan in 1954. Pakistan was disheartened by an initial one time package of \$29.5 million offer by the Department of Defense. However, a continued defense build-up was

¹ Defense Security Cooperation Agency, *Security Assistance Management Manual*, DoD 5105.38-Md ed.[database on-line]; available from <http://www.dsca.mil/samm/>,

Pakistan's expectation of an integral part of the defense concept.² Pakistan President Ayub said "if Pakistan was to get no more than ... indicated in the nature of military assistance, it would be better for Pakistan not to be involved in a defense agreement with the United States."³ The State Department had not coordinated well with the reluctant Defense Department and pushed through the military assistance package. The Defense Department was responsible for implementing the sales but was trying to get by with a more modest program. On May 1954 Pakistan and the US signed a Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement and was the first bilateral agreement between the two countries.

Shortly after signing the agreement to provide assistance to Pakistan, a Joint Strategic Plans Committee conducted a study of the defense concept in March 1955.

Dennis Krux writes the following about the study:

The [defense] concept, the U.S. military planners concluded, would not "result in any significant reduction of the area's vulnerability." Because of Pakistan's intrinsic weakness, the study indicated that Karachi was unlikely to deploy forces beyond its borders for the foreseeable future. Thus, a year after the United States had decided to give arms aid to Pakistan to bolster Middle East defense, the Pentagon found that the concept had little military validity because a significant Pakistani contribution to the defense of the Middle East was unlikely. Despite this frank admission, the decision to help Pakistan was history and could hardly be reversed without major political embarrassment and loss of face for the United States.

The aspect of continuing to provide Pakistan with traditional military equipment supports its Cold War build up against India with a secondary effort toward terrorism. Between 1954 and 2002 the U.S. provided approximately \$12.6 Billion in economic and military assistance to Pakistan. In 2002 President Bush promised Pakistan an aid package of \$3 billion in assistance over a five year period. Pakistan elected to have half of the assistance toward their military and the other toward economic assistance. In addition to

² Kux, *The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000 Disenchanted Allies*, 470. pg 67

³ Ibid.

the \$600 million a year in assistance, Pakistan has also been receiving approximately \$70 to 90 million a month in coalition support funds as reimbursement for deploying a significant part of their military along their western border to stem the flow of cross border incursion of Al-Qaida into Afghanistan.⁴ Since 9/11 the United States has provided approximately \$10 Billion in assistance to Pakistan of which most of it has gone toward military support.⁵

In June 2007, Pakistan announced a \$26.5 billion federal budget plan for FY2007-FY2008.⁶ However, defense spending and interest on public debt consume two-thirds of the total revenues leaving little for economic development. Pakistan's external debt was almost \$39 billion in 2005 and remains well above \$37 billion. Attempts at economic reform historically have floundered due to political instability.⁷

It is estimated that approximately 80% of U.S. assistance directly or indirectly supports Pakistan's traditional military programs.⁸ The U.S. has made available to Pakistan more than \$8.5 Billion worth of military hardware since 9/11. Although the notice of a potential sale is required by law, it does not necessarily mean the sale has been concluded. Most of the following sales are still in various stages of implementation and

⁴ U.S. Embassy, Islamabad Pakistan SAO office

⁵ Cohen and Chollet, *When \$10 Billion is Not enough: Rethinking U.S. Strategy Toward Pakistan*, 7.

⁶ Kronstadt, *CRS Report for Congress Pakistan-U.S. Relations*

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ U.S. Embassy Islamabad, Pakistan SAO office

have not been finalized. The following are the major items notified to congress since 9/11 and approximate cost:⁹

- 36 F-16 C/D Block 50/52 aircraft	\$3,000 Million
- F-16 A/B Mid-Life Update Modification Kits	\$1,300 Million
- Weapons for F-16C/D Block 50/52 Aircraft	\$650 Million
- F-16 Engine Modifications and Structural Upgrades	\$151 Million
- P-3C Aircraft	\$970 Million
- Harpoon Block II Anti-ship Missiles	\$370 Million
- Harpoon Block II Missiles	\$180 Million
- Aerostat L-88 Radar System	\$155 Million
- *TOW IIA Anti-Armor Guided Missiles	\$185 Million
- *Harris High Frequency/Very High Frequency Radio Systems	\$160 Million
- C-130 Hercules Cargo Aircraft	\$75 Million
- *Bell 407 Helicopters	\$235 Million
- *HF/VHF Radio Systems	\$78 Million
- AN/TPS-77 Air Surveillance Radars	\$100 Million,
- PHALANX Close-In Weapon System	\$155 Million
- AIM 9M-1/2 SIDEWINDER Missiles	\$46 Million
- M109A5 155 Self-propelled Howitzers	\$56 Million
- E-2PC Hawkeye 2000 Airborne Early Warning Suite for P-3s	\$855 Million
Total \$ 8.721 Billion	

* Denotes dual purpose type weapons systems that can be utilized for both fighting terrorism and conventional forces

⁹ Defense Security Cooperation Agency News Releases [database on-line]; available from http://www.dsca.osd.mil/PressReleases/36-b/36b_index.htm; Internet; accessed 4 Nov 2007

The U.S. Foreign Military Sales system is a peace time system and is not responsive for operational needs. Pakistan has taken possession of only a few of the items mentioned. The system was designed with significant oversight between the State Department and Congress to prevent a shift in the balance of power of a particular region. Therefore, the process of providing equipment to foreign allies gets bogged down in the bureaucracy, sometimes taking years to get a decision to sell a particular system. In addition, many of the weapons systems today are complex and may take years to build.

One weapons system that can have a direct impact on terrorism, not listed above because it falls below the \$50 Million threshold for notifying congress, has been plagued with a series of problems. Cobra Helicopters are an important weapon in the fight in the War on Terror because they are able to quickly respond to areas where the terrorist accumulate for training. Forty Cobra Helicopters were made available to Pakistan as Excess Defense Articles whereby twenty are parts aircraft and twenty refurbished for operation. The program that began in 2003 still has not been fully completed, three years behind schedule. The Cobra's were in worse shape than initially expected, particularly the weapons systems. In addition, the contractor refurbishing the helicopters did not fully understand Pakistan's contractual requirements causing a substantial delay. However, Pakistan did receive twelve of the twenty helicopters that are being refurbished, eight in February 2007 and four more in October 2007.

The Cobra's primarily weapons systems (20 MM machine gun and TOW Missiles) were designed to be used against armored vehicles. However, Pakistan has been requesting Bunker Buster type TOW Missiles that are much more effective against

terrorist held up in the mud type houses. Cobras armed with the Bunker Buster type TOW Missiles still have not been provided to Pakistan. Most of the weapons systems requested by Pakistan are not conducive for the fighting terrorism and are primarily focused to defend against an external conventional threat. However Cobra helicopters, a system that can be used against terrorism has been caught up in the bureaucratic friction of war.

Pakistan has not helped themselves with their limited understanding of US policies with regard to military assistance. Very few Pakistani officers have been trained in how the Foreign Military Sales process operates. The carpet buyer verses the carpet seller culture within Pakistan has a tendency to bleed over into this realm. The carpet seller, not understanding what the buyer is willing to pay, will begin bargaining prices much higher than what is realistically expected. The carpet buyer will at the same time showing little interest will begin at a rate much lower than one might expect to pay and the negotiation begins from there. Pakistan does not seem to understand that Governments usually are not in the business of negotiating assistance and extreme expectations may not even prompt a reaction.

On the other hand the U.S. does not help matters when Washington establishes policy that deters from Pakistan's mission of securing their border with Afghanistan. The U.S. has provided several hundred Night Vision Goggles to Pakistan but because of the sensitive technology of these devices, End Use Monitoring is required to ensure their proper use. The frequency of conducting inventories once a quarter is disruptive to on going operations. Much of the border where the devices are used is inaccessible and requires mules to carry supplies to and from the locations. In addition, the Pakistan

military does not control all of the roads within the FATA because Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) are regularly emplaced. Therefore, Pakistan limits their military movement into and out of the FATA by road to only two or three days per week. In order to conduct a full inventory, the devices are removed from operation on the border areas for approximately three weeks in order to bring them to a central location. Conducting annual inventories and bringing them in line with other sensitive inventories such as stinger missiles would provide the necessary oversight while having a minimal impact on operations.

Convincing Pakistan to shift their priority from the purchase of traditional weapons systems to weapons systems primarily focused on defeating terrorism is not likely until the traditional threat is normalized. Weapons systems that support surgical strikes against terrorist are usually much cheaper in comparison and can have a much greater impact. Similarly many U.S. Governors like having military systems in their National Guard units that also are able to support potential state missions. Engineering equipment to support response to natural disasters, Infantry systems to squelch mass disturbances, helicopters to quickly respond to specific areas for both disasters and mass disturbances. Shifting Pakistan's focus to more modest dual purpose type systems are more in line with providing for internal stability.

STRATEGIC WAY AHEAD

Strategy – The art and science of developing and using the diplomatic, economic, and informational powers of a nation, together with its armed forces, during peace and war to secure national objectives.

JP 1-02, 12 April 2001

The nature of the strategic environment is encapsulated in the acronym VUCA which refers to Volatility, Uncertainty, Complexity, and Ambiguity. The strategic environment has external, international and internal, domestic components. Rational and irrational choice, chance, and probability, competitors, allies and other actors all add to the complexity of the strategic paradigm.¹ This paper provides one possible optimistic strategic concept that must consider both the War on Terror and the Cold War with India within a holistic approach that could ultimately lead to a more secure and stable Pakistan. Strategy is a method of creating strategic effects that are favorable to the nation by applying end, ways, and means while considering the risks.

The “ends” or U.S. objective in Pakistan is a democratic, stable and prosperous Pakistan that is a full and reliable partner in the struggle against the Taliban, Al Qaida, and other terrorist groups, and is a responsible steward of its nuclear weapons and technology”.² The “way” or strategic concept recommended is a mutual shift in strategic priorities on the part of Pakistan and the U.S. Shifting the strategic priorities of the U.S. will require focusing elements of national power toward providing a means of external security for Pakistan first. The “means” or resources to accomplish it are the

¹ Yarger and Army War College . Strategic Studies Institute, *Strategic Theory for the 21st Century : The Little Book on Big Strategy*, 65.

² Library of Congress, *House Resolution 1 Section 2042 Pakistan*

employment of all national elements of power, Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic.




Figure 5. World Perception of U.S. Employment of DIME

The above diagram (Fig 5) depicts the weighting of national elements of power (DIME) which can be applied to combating Irregular, Disruptive, and Catastrophic. The two large ovals depict the areas in which governments operate that represent the world perception of an area to exploit the success of positive actions and the area of vulnerability for negative actions. The dotted arrow represents the positive (up) and negative (down) messages espoused by particular type actions of national power. Nation building is normally viewed as a positive action while kinetic or military conflict is viewed as negative action. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report shows the Department of Defense is shifting its portfolio of capabilities to address irregular, catastrophic and

disruptive challenges while sustaining capabilities to address traditional challenges.³

This is shown by the lower box while the upper box identifies the weighting of the national elements of power, D = Diplomatic, I = Informational, M = Military, E = Economic, as a counter to the disruptive challenges. The diplomatic and military efforts of control oppose each other in that the diplomatic effort pushes governments toward the democratic freedoms while military efforts focus on maintaining security and control. This is represented by both: the solid line showing control and freedom, as well as the Military and Diplomatic arrows. The boxes along the right side denote positive (lighter) and negative (darker) strategic communication themes to communication messages as well as the intent of actions.

The world perception is that nation building and providing humanitarian assistance to nations in need is a positive influence for championing human dignity. The world view of employing military force is a negative influence because it is primarily viewed as a mechanism of kinetic destruction. The traditional role of the military is focused on maintaining control in order to limit the risk to national interests. The Diplomatic element has been traditionally focused on exporting freedoms, supporting the establishment of democracy, and championing human dignity. The impoverished areas become a breeding ground for radical extremism and Irregular type warfare to take root; therefore requiring a weighting of an Economic element of power to counter the forces of poverty.

A strategic communications plan is necessary to communicate truthful Information focused at the terrorist center of gravity. The plan should incorporate means

³ U.S. Secretary of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* See Fig. 1 on pg 1

for disseminating the positive messages of success in building hope for a better future while countering the perceived negative message, the necessity of having to establish security and control in order to provide a stable foundation from which to build.

Although the weighting of the particular efforts toward the mentioned area is necessary all the elements must maintain a realistic balance in order to achieve sufficient effectiveness. It appears weighting the use of traditional military for fighting terrorism in Pakistan has been the primarily focus and more effort needs to be placed on employment of the other elements of power.

Diplomatic

Pakistan is not only fighting an Irregular war against terrorism they also continue to fight a traditional fault line war with India. There is not a single diplomatic effort that can include both wars. With regards to Pakistan's Cold War, the weighting of a diplomatic effort toward international support for a military peacekeeping role may be in order. However, the U.S. must utilize a more indirect diplomatic effort when dealing with the War on Terror in Pakistan.

War on Terror

The U.S. does not negotiate with terrorists. Diplomatic efforts are usually conducted between nation states.⁴ Although the FATA resides within the borders of Pakistan, historically the tribal leaders have been provided autonomy by the Government of Pakistan. In 2006 President Musharraf attempted to negotiate with the tribal leaders by allowing them the opportunity to control their own tribes and holding them

⁴ "Press Briefing by Scott McClellan," 19 Jan 2006 Available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/01/20060119-6.html>.

responsible. However these efforts have not been successful as there have been a steady increase in cross border incursions.⁵

However it is vital to maintain continuity of established positive relationships between individuals within the Governments of Pakistan and U.S. as well as at the tactical level in order to shape the environment as personalities do matter. Even in the worst of times, for example in the mid-1990s when formal military-to-military relations were all but severed, the two militaries continued to cooperate in UN peacekeeping missions, exchanged small numbers of students in military schools, and received each others' senior defense officials warmly.⁶ The U.S. military has very few officers in Pakistan working in the Office of the Defense Representative Pakistan (ODRP) which virtually did not exist prior to 9/11 due to sanctions. Initially many officer assignments were short in duration that did not provide time to develop relationships but since 2005 many officers have extended providing for better military-to-military relationships. An expansion of exchange officers to collaborate on Pakistan's long-term strategic vision building on the successful military-to-military relationships could provide for an increased merging of the diplomatic and military cooperative efforts.

Cold War with India

Although diplomatic efforts have been ongoing to resolve the Kashmir dispute the current positive environment established by the composite dialogues supports a sense of urgency for the international community to seize the opportunity to bring it to final

⁵ David Gollust, "US Links Pakistan Agreement with Tribal Leaders to Upsurge in Afghan Attacks," *GlobalSecurity.Org* (2007), [journal on-line]; available from <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2007/03/mil-070301-voa04.htm>

⁶ Smith, *Facing Up to the Trust Deficit*, 1.

resolution. President Musharraf has been considering some out-of-the-box thinking that may be roughly in line with India's position on the issue. It involves a four point proposal leading to "self-governance," defined as "falling between autonomy and independence."⁷ The Kashmiri leaders currently reject the idea but added international incentives might provide the leverage for breaking the stalemate as was done with the Water Basin Treaty of 1960.

As the stronger nation, India insists that the dispute not be "internationalized" through third-party mediators.⁸ The current U.S. position is that the issue must be resolved through negotiations between India and Pakistan while taking into account the wishes of the Kashmiri people.⁹ However, by not internationalizing the effort the U.S. by default supports India's position. The U.S. is in a position with India to expend some short term diplomatic capital with India for potential long term benefits with both Pakistan and India. A shift from the status quo to leading an international effort is needed by the U.S. to provide for the wishes of the Kashmiri people and bring an end to the conventional type threat which it is believed that Pakistan would support.

Information – Center of Gravity

The center of gravity for the war on terror resides within the Muslim faith. The *dar al-harb*, those outside the non-Muslim world, can only serve to inflame the Muslim faith if an attempt is made to persuade or influence those within the faith. Therefore, the best the dar al-harb can do is serves as a *defense* to preventing radical extremism from

⁷ Kronstadt, *CRS Report to Congress India-U.S. Relations*

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid.

getting out of control by understanding religious sensitivities and not provoking a religious fervor, such as was done in 2005 with the Danish cartoon of the Prophet Mohammad.

It is the *dar al-Islam*, those within the Muslim world, that are able to influence the radical extremist. Therefore they are ultimately the *offense* that must be encouraged to engage in the War on Terror. The terrorist enemy attempts to validate its actions by aligning with the faith of Islam in declaring Jihad. Jihad means striving in the way of God and the most excellent jihad is that for the conquest of oneself.¹⁰ It is a war that has emerged from within the heart of Islam in attempting to define itself. It struggles to define what it will accept as good versus evil.

Sufism is a mystic tradition within Islam that encompasses a diverse range of beliefs and practices dedicated to divine love and the cultivation of the elements of the divine within the individual human being.¹¹ Sunni Muslims acknowledge that there are five areas of Jihad; the struggle within one's own self to achieve spiritual perfection, the struggle to control one's tongue, the struggle to control one's actions, the struggle for logical reasoning, and the Jihad of the sword.¹² It is the separation of the Greater Jihad (spiritual) from the Lesser Jihad (the use of the sword) that has become the center of gravity. It is not only the center of gravity for the war on terror but also for Islam itself.

¹⁰ "The True Call - ISLAM - did You Know Jihad does NOT Mean 'Holy War'?" [cited 2008]. Available from <http://islam.thetruecall.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=44>.

¹¹ "The Mystics of Islam," in Routledge, Kegan Paul, London [database online]. [cited 2008]. Available from <http://www.sacred-texts.com/isl/moi/moi.htm#1>. In R. A. Nicholson introduction to Sufism, *The Mystics of Islam* he remarks: "Sufism, the religious philosophy of Islam, is described in the oldest extant definition as 'the apprehension of divine realities.'" Although referring to it as "Islamic mysticism," he still maintains the idea that Sufism was largely the product of diverse philosophical and spiritual influences, including Christian, Neoplatonic, and others. He further states that it is "a subject so vast and many-sided that several large volumes would be required to do it anything like justice".

¹² Ibid.

It is the Sufi view of the Greater Jihad as the primary means of achieving enlightenment which Muhammad emphasized that must be embraced by the *dal al-harb*. Providing the support for this Sufi view within the *dal al-Islam* will ultimately lead to victory in the War on Terror and the enlightenment of the Muslim faith.

Many are looking to the “moderate Muslim” to become the catalyst for overcoming the radical extremist within Islam.¹³ In comparison, this would be like empowering “lukewarm Christians” to convince those with a steadfast faith that they are more enlightened. According to the Bible, lukewarm Christians are an abomination. Revelations 3:16 states “So then because thou art lukewarm, and neither cold nor hot, I will spue thee out of my mouth.”¹⁴ The tactic of empowering moderate Muslims is likely to lead to fueling additional extremism.

A great awakening of spiritual enlightenment is needed. This will require spiritually zealous and dynamic leaders that are not moderate but are quite extreme that wish to save Islam from spiritual destruction. The declaration and acceptance of Jihad within a spiritual context of rational debate should not be something which is feared but rather embraced by the non-Muslim.

This is not to advocate that one religion can impose its views onto another religion. Non-Muslims cannot and must not attempt to explain or question Islam to a Muslim. However, a Non-Muslim can proclaim truths that are self-evident such as recognition of the inherent dignity and inalienable rights of all members of the human

¹³ "RAND | News Release | RAND Report Says Cold War Offers Lessons on Engaging with the Muslim World," in RAND Corporation [database online]. 26 Mar 2007 [cited 2007]. Available from <http://www.rand.org/news/press/2007/03/26/index.html>. stated “We cannot come in as outsiders, as a non-Muslim country, and discredit the radicals’ ideology. Muslims have to do that themselves. What we can do is level the playing field by empowering the moderates.”

¹⁴ Barry Moser, *The Holy Bible : Containing all the Books of the Old and New Testaments : King James Version* (New York: Viking Studio, 1999), 994.

family as the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.¹⁵ Muslim nations that are also United Nation members pledge “themselves to achieve, in co-operation with the United Nations, the promotion of universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms.”¹⁶ It is these self-evident truths which can also serve as a foundation for the Nation of Islam in its search for enlightenment. The merging of the self-evident truths from the foundations of sacred books such as the Koran, the Pentateuch, the Vedas, and the Bible will also serve as a foundation, but one must be careful not to impose a particular interpretation. A foundation of good and evil must be commonly accepted and cannot be forced, just as democracy cannot be force upon an unwilling nation, it must come from within.

The aspect of enlightenment is difficult to measure; however, there are some indicators that can be observed. Although the Government of Pakistan advocates equal rights for women it is not universally practiced. The acceptance of equal rights for women is one milestone that can be used for determining progress in achieving enlightenment of human dignity.

Military

The building of Kashmir cannot be accomplished while cross border fighting continues even though limited. The United Nations played an important role in reestablishing peace after the 1949 and 1965 wars with India, but final resolution of the Kashmir dispute has never been achieved. Now the opportunity exists to make success more permanent with a U.N. force serving in a Peacekeeping role while building up the

¹⁵ United Nations General Assembly Resolution 217 A (III), *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* 1948), [database on-line]; available from <http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html>,

¹⁶ Ibid

infrastructure within Kashmir. The U.N. can serve as the authority necessary to separate the two brother nations allowing time for their wounds to heal.

A Peacekeeping force would allow both Pakistan and India to further reduce their military forces in the Kashmir region. This would provide an opportunity for Pakistan to employ the forces elsewhere or to build law enforcement capability to maintain internal control while lessening the opportunity for a traditional conflict. Recent indications are that instead of the Indian threat subsiding, the terrorist threat is increasing.

Pakistan utilizes their military primarily as a reactionary force when a situation gets beyond the capability of the local police. However, many Pakistani's have little respect for the police as they see them as corrupt and lacking in capability. In some cases the police become apprehensive before engaging a crowd as they have become conditioned to rely upon the military too much. Relaxing the tension level of the Indian threat to a lesser degree can provide for a natural shifting of priorities to the next higher threat of internal instability. Pakistan's Frontier Corp is the policing type force used in the FATA but they have been severely lacking in capability. Reducing the external threat can allow for the shift of infantry resources or the building of additional law and order capacity, specifically for the Frontier Corp to provide for the long-term stability that is needed.

The military element of power can also serve as a means to build by taking on a humanitarian assistance role such as was done during the 2005 Earthquake relief. As previously mentioned, military systems can serve a dual purpose, building infrastructure as well as a traditional military role is essential for long term stability.

The development of a strategic communications plan that espouses truthful

information even when it may not initially be positive is required in order to ultimately focus on defeating the terrorist center of gravity. However winning the hearts and minds is more complex issue than a traditional military battle. There are limitation to the military elements of power and the role they can play.

Economic

Pakistan has been receiving substantial monetary support, more than \$1 Billion a year for their part in the war on terror through U.S. assistance. However, there does not seem to have been much progress in controlling terrorism within the borders of Pakistan over the past six years. Maybe it is time to shift how the funding is being applied. A majority of the costs is to help Pakistan with the cost of having soldiers stationed along the western border. Pakistan would argue the U.S. is getting a bargain by only charging approximately \$700 per Pakistani soldier per month when the average cost of maintaining a soldier under the UN is approximately \$1,400 per month. This aspect conveys that Pakistan is acting as a “hired gun” and only in it for economic reasons. The security assistance and coalition support funds amount to more than \$1 Billion a year. This funding is not something that can continue indefinitely and if the funding was reduced does this mean Pakistan would reduce their forces in the FATA? Probably not but this is not the message they are sending to the American public. American wants to help Pakistan to become more self-reliant and reduce their dependency on foreign assistance.

Using the \$1 Billion a year as the current benchmark it is recommended that a graduated incentive plan be implemented that is focused on building infrastructure rather than paying for military operations. A starting point could be to provide a 25% to 75% division of funds over X years based on how much Pakistan puts toward the improvement

of the infrastructure. For example, Pakistan contributes \$250 Million toward the infrastructure the international community then puts \$750 Million toward the effort over an agreed number of years. Then the ration changes to a 50:50 then 75:25 and finally a continued base amount. This allows Pakistan to gradually grow out of dependency while having some sense of reasonable assurance that the U.S. will simply not abandon them. In addition this would provide for the development of a specific end state, built upon tangible milestones of progress, allowing the gradual reduction of the recommended UN forces.

The possibility of the international community reestablishing humanitarian support to assist Pakistan in the Kashmir Valley to improve much needed infrastructure could provide some added incentive for Pakistan and the Kashmiri people to be able to claim success. Continued humanitarian assistance particularly in light of the devastating 7.6 magnitude earthquake of Oct 2005 in the Kashmir region could be viewed as a win – win situation for all sides. The infrastructure of roads and communication in the region barely existed before the earthquake and ongoing efforts to reestablish the area continue.¹⁷ The positive impact of the humanitarian assistance provided immediately after the earthquake was significant in the war of winning the hearts and minds of Pakistanis.

Resolving the Kashmir dispute will require this financial commitment to continue but will need to be applied differently. Any financial commitment must be controlled and specifically directed toward building the infrastructure and not on traditional offensive weapons aimed at India. Discretion is required to keep Pakistan from

¹⁷ "USAID-Supported Makri Park Built on Earthquake Rubble Inaugurated," *U.S. Embassy Press Release* (2007), [journal on-line]; available from <http://pakistan.usembassy.gov/pakistan/h07112801.html>; nternet; accessed 12 Dec 2007.

developing unrealistic expectations. At the same time, the seeds of rugged individualism and investment opportunities need to be planted in order that Pakistan can become self sufficient. Incorporating the use of international contractors to initially stimulate target projects such as building roads, developing potable water resources, improving communication systems, and schools can provide for employment of local labor while acquiring the marketable skills to continue the projects after the contractors and UN forces depart. This will provide the foundation for locals to increase business opportunities while establishing a potential supply chain with the international community.

While the international community focuses on building the infrastructure with in the Kashmir region, Pakistan can increase their efforts toward their western border area in the FATA. The building up of the infrastructure and the establishment of the economic blood flow into both Kashmir and Afghanistan can set an example for the tribal areas on both sides as well as increasing the mechanism for containing terrorism within Pakistan. It is by setting the example on both sides of the FATA and not by imposing or fueling the perception of imposing an alternate way of life upon the tribal area that can eventually soften the hearts of the potential terrorist of the future. The establishment of schools and links to information can provide the mechanism to overcome the passions of extremism with a fundamental base of knowledge and logic. Building up the areas immediately surrounding those areas where the prominent terrorist threat resides, will ultimately provide the capability to sustain the long-term war.

CONCLUSION

The neglected border area in the FATA of Pakistan gave rise to Al-Qaida and the Taliban for terrorism to declare war on the West. However, Pakistan has been at war with India since its independence from British controlled India, and now has been caught up in two wars simultaneously. Pakistan continues to focus primarily on the war with India while the U.S. focuses on the internal terrorism that was exported to the U.S. on 9/11. A mutual shifting of strategic priorities on the part of Pakistan and the U.S. is required to bring long term stability to Pakistan. The U.S. and the international community need to shift its focus to resolving the Kashmir dispute, the center of gravity in the Cold War between Pakistan and India. This will ultimately increase Pakistan's ability and willingness to "do more" in winning its internal War on Terror.

US policy seems to be headed down a path similar to the one of the Cold War. Washington forced the Government of Pakistan to choose if they were with or against the U.S. at the beginning of the War on Terror. Although Pakistan and the U.S. share common goals they are not the top tier efforts thus neither may achieve its desired objectives. On several occasions Pakistan has not realized the strategic impact of their tactical decisions. Pakistan continues to look for international support for their regional security but their remains a trust deficit because of a perceived historical lack of commitment from the U.S.

A different strategy from the current status quo needs to be considered that employs and synchronizes all elements of national power. A weighted effort from kinetic military operations needs to shift to championing human dignity. Non-kinetic elements of national power such as Diplomatic, Informational, and Economical need to dominate

in order to ultimately provide for long term stability. The U.S. is in a position to lead a diplomatic effort to put a pressure bandage on the Kashmir wound that has never healed. A UN peacekeeping force may cost some short term diplomatic capitol with India but would ultimately prove to be best in the long term for both regional stability and the War on Terror.

The center of gravity for the war on terror as well as the potential spiritual destruction of Islam resides within the battle between the Greater Jihad and the Lesser Jihad. Non-Muslims are limited in their ability to directly influence. The non-Muslim at best can only defend against the expansion of radical Islam and assist in providing the fertile ground of self-evident truths. In addition Moderate Muslims are also limited in their ability to influence extremist as many hope. But hope resides within the spiritual enlightenment of the Sufi sect to influence in the ways of non-violence. The championing of human dignity in both word and actions needs to be focused toward the next generation to prevent the continuation of the War on Terror.

One of the critical means to defeating terrorism in Pakistan remains with the Pakistan military as the backbone that holds the country together. While the Pakistan military can act as a reactionary defense force against terrorism getting out of control, the offense is the softening of hearts and minds with the hope of a better life. Additional efforts require providing for proactive law enforcement capabilities particularly in the FATA, and the Frontier Corp is the place to begin this effort.

It appears that Pakistan has made little progress in winning the War on Terror even with significant financial assistance. Pakistan spends the bulk of their military assistance funds acquiring conventional weapons systems focused toward their eastern

border with India. Shifting the way of employing financial assistance from primarily military efforts directed toward India to building internal infrastructure is also necessary.

It is going to take patience and strong commitment to defeat Al-Qaida.

Americans have a tendency to seek instant gratification but this war is not one that will be over quickly and may be measured in generations. The long term commitment to Pakistan is not only necessary for defeating terrorism but also for providing stability in Southwest Asia.

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About The Author

Colonel Donald Rutherford is a traditional Army Reservist who lives in Huntington, WV with his wife Peggy and three daughters Savannah, Rebecca, and Dorothy. His military career began at the age of 17 in 1976 when he enlisted on active duty. He was commissioned in 1982 and has commanded, C Company 216th Engineer Battalion and 316th Ordnance Company, as well as the 332nd Ordnance Battalion. He has served on staffs at every level from battalion to the Joint Staff. He is qualified in four branches; Aviation, Engineer, Chemical, and Ordnance (Ammo) with a functional focus on disaster relief operations and planning. The foundation for his disaster experience comes from serving as a National Guard officer in several disasters in multiple states (WV, KY, and OH).

Previously in his civilian capacity he was Vice President of NAMACO Industries, a bedding manufacturer in Huntington, WV. He was attending Southern Baptist Theological Seminary in 1998 as a full-time student when recommended by National Guard Bureau and requested by from Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) to plan and execute a U.S./ Icelandic bilateral exercise requiring approximately one year of deployed service. He gained the recognition of JFCOM and Joint Chiefs of Staff as a focal point in initiating, developing, and implementing the first overseas Joint Reserve Unit as well as planning and executing Northern Viking 99. He was immediately requested again by JFCOM to help create a consequence management headquarters, Joint Task Force-Civil Support, to manage military forces in the event of an attack on the U. S. and take a lead in developing response plans as the NBCR Operations Officer for another year.

After 11 September 2001 attack on the Pentagon he was mobilized to help reestablish and manage the Army's Strategic Planning, Concepts, and Doctrine Division as its Executive Officer. He then was requested to serve as the Army Liaison Officer for the Joint Staff Crisis Action Team during the initial combat operations for OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM in the National Military Command Center.

Recently he served as Chief, Army Security Assistance Officer for the Officer of the Defense Representative – Pakistan from Jun 2005 to March 2007. During his tenure he was invited to join the Pakistan Army Staff, the only American with such privilege, to help coordinate the helicopter response to the Oct 2005 earthquake in Pakistan. As an advocate for Pakistan, he was instrumental in ensuring the accomplishment of high priority program that was in jeopardy. The delivery of cobra helicopters from Puerto Rico to Pakistan in early 2007. He was singled out and specifically requested by the Government of Pakistan to attend the Pakistan National Defense University but due to last minute administrative issues was provided the opportunity to attend the Joint Advanced Warfighting School as its first Army Reservist. After graduation COL Rutherford will return to his assignment as Chief of Operations for Standing Joint Force Headquarters in Norfolk, VA. His passion remains toward Pakistan for possible additional military deployment.