Planning in a Counterinsurgency: How We Use the Process
Abstract
The United States is immersed in a counterinsurgency struggle in Iraq that has challenged its military in a realm of warfare it has not fought on such a large scale since the war in Viet Nam. This type of warfare is not new to our country or it's military but there have been many lessons re-learned and, as a result, our counterinsurgency doctrine was in dire need of being re-written to meet the current setting. Characteristic of this operating environment is our ability to conduct planning in a dynamic atmosphere against a highly adaptive enemy. The purpose of this paper is to examine these counterinsurgency characteristics and the way in which we utilize the current planning process at the operational-level of war to develop lines of operation. The thesis of this research is that the planning process, in its current construct, needs to adapt in order to allow planners to develop lines of operation in a COIN environment that are alternatives to our traditional kinetic approach to warfare and enable us to gain greater efficiencies in our operational objectives. This paper will analyze the planning cycle, not from a scientific point of view, but rather under the lens of the "art of war" and how we need to expand our thinking to adapt a planning process to fight a long or protracted counterinsurgency war.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Apr 03, 2008
- Accession Number
- ADA487163
Entities
People
- Michael H. Brown
Organizations
- National Defense University