Interdicting a Nuclear-Weapons Project
Abstract
A "proliferator" seeks to complete a first small batch of fission weapons as quickly as possible, while an "interdictor" wishes to delay that completion for as long as possible. We develop and solve a max-min model that identifies resource-limited interdiction actions that maximally delay completion time of the proliferator's weapons project, given that the proliferator will observe any such actions and adjust his plans to minimize that time. The model incorporates a detailed project-management (CPM) submodel, and standard optimization software solves the model in a few minutes on a personal computer. We exploit off-the-shelf project-management software to manage a database, control the optimization, and display results. Using a range of levels for interdiction effort, we analyze a published case study that models three, alternate, uranium-enrichment technologies. The task of "cascade loading" appears in all technologies and turns out to be an inherent fragility for the proliferator at all levels of interdiction effort. Such insights enable policymakers to quantify the effects of interdiction options at their disposal, be they diplomatic, economic, or military.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Dec 04, 2007
- Accession Number
- ADA487231
Entities
People
- Eric Skroch
- Gerald G. Brown
- Matthew Carlyle
- R. Kevin Wood
- Robert Harney
Organizations
- Naval Postgraduate School