Project CHECO Southeast Asia Report. The Air War in Vietnam, 1968 - 1969
Abstract
The character of the U.S. military effort in Vietnam and the role of airpower in support of that effort changed markedly between January 1968--when the enemy launched his greatest offensive of the war--and December 1969, when the pace of the war had slowed appreciably. The enemy had suffered a major defeat in his early 1968 offensive; U.S. bombing of North Vietnam had been halted; and peace negotiations were begun in Paris. The out-country air effort shifted to strike against enemy infiltration routes in Southern Laos and support of Royal Lao Forces in Northern Laos. The U.S. and Allied ground forces in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) operated under a strategy emphasizing reconnaissance and undercutting the enemy infrastructure. The combination of air interdiction in Laos and ground and air attrition of the enemy logistics base and infrastructure in RVN gradually eroded the enemy's capabilities, allowing the RVN political and military establishments to expand control of the countryside and take a greater role in combat. This CHECO Report documents the role of airpower in this critical period of the war. It describes the various elements of the USAF air capability and how they were employed in support of United States strategy in Vietnam.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Apr 01, 1970
- Accession Number
- ADA487283
Entities
People
- J. Schlight
- K. Sams
- M. J. Mendelsohn
- P. D. Caine
- R. F. Kott
Organizations
- Pacific Air Forces