Auctions in Defense Acquisition: Theory and Experimental Evidence

Abstract

When the Federal Acquisition Rules were rewritten in 1997, the Office of Management and Budget eliminated the prohibition on auctions. The enhanced technology currently available makes online auctions more appealing than ever, and the General Services Administration (GSA) has encouraged their use. Now that auctions are possible, even encouraged, for DoD acquisition, the question arises as to how these auctions should be conducted. The purpose of this article is to discuss the different types of auctions DoD may employ and describe the characteristics and qualities associated with each. When buying a single item (or lot of items), like a certain quantity of computers, what are the properties of a sealed-offer auction relative to a reverse auction conducted online? After discussing the theoretical properties of these auctions, the authors will review some of the pertinent experimental literature that may have something to say about each type of auction. Finally, they will conclude with a summary of the significance of these results for DoD auctions.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Jan 01, 2002
Accession Number
ADA487523

Entities

People

  • Bruce G. Linster
  • David R. Mullin

Organizations

  • Defense Acquisition University

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Air Platforms
  • Materials and Manufacturing Processes
  • Weapons Technologies

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Acquisition
  • Air Force
  • Department Of Defense
  • Economics
  • Electronic Commerce
  • Electronic Mail
  • Game Theory
  • Governments
  • Information Operations
  • Literature
  • Military Acquisition
  • Probability
  • Uncertainty
  • United States
  • United States Air Force Academy
  • Universities

Readers

  • Government Contracting/Procurement.
  • Library and Information Science
  • Theoretical Analysis.