

AIR WAR COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

WHY JIHADS END: LESSONS FOR TODAY

By

Shane R. Smith, Col, USAF

A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty

In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements

15 February 2008

Report Documentation Page

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.

1. REPORT DATE 15 FEB 2008		2. REPORT TYPE		3. DATES COVERED 00-00-2008 to 00-00-2008	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Why JIHADS End: Lessons for Today				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S)				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Air War College,325 Chennault Circle,Maxwell AFB,AL,36112				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT unclassified	b. ABSTRACT unclassified	c. THIS PAGE unclassified			

DISCLAIMER

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the US government or the Department of Defense. In accordance with Air Force Instruction 51-303, it is not copyrighted, but is the property of the United States government.

Contents

Disclaimer.....	1
Contents.....	2
Biography.....	3
Introduction.....	4
What are Jihads.....	4
Jihads from 632 to 1683 AD.....	9
Jihads from 1683 AD to the present.....	17
Lessons Learned.....	26
Recommendations.....	30
Conclusion.....	33
Bibliography.....	34

Biography

Colonel Shane Smith is a career intelligence officer in the U. S. Air Force. He entered the active duty in 1977, was trained to be an Imagery Interpreter. Selected for Officer Training School he was commissioned in 1986 and completed the Air Intelligence officer course that year. He has served in a wide variety of intelligence duties with United States Air Force in Europe, Air Force Space Command, United States Strategic Command, and Air Education and Training Command.

Introduction

Past Jihads may hold clues for successfully countering Jihadist movements of today. This paper proposes to take a broad look at how Islamic Jihads of the past have ended to determine if there are lessons that may be used to help bring current Jihads to an end. To do this the paper will look at the definitions and characteristics of Jihad and why Jihads are of concern today. The paper starts by looking at Jihads covering the period from the beginning of Islam until the defeat of the Ottomans at Vienna in 1683 when Islam was primarily in an offensive mode, spreading the message of Islam. It then looks at Jihads that have occurred during the period since 1683 when Islam has been in a mainly “defensive mode,” losing control of lands they previously held and experiencing colonialism. It covers the reasons that past Jihads have been successful and also the issues, efforts, and movements that sapped the strength of past Jihads. The paper finishes by determining if the reasons for the success or failure of the past Jihads have implications for successfully dealing with the ongoing Jihads of today.

What are Jihads

What is Jihad? Jihad is a word that has come to have different meanings to different people. To many people in the West it automatically is assumed to mean an Islamic holy war to defeat the Jews and Christians and force conversion to Islam. There is a wealth of information about Jihad available and it quickly becomes apparent that there is disagreement not only in the West about the meaning of Jihad but also within the Muslim community. Literally it means to strive or struggle, to exert oneself. In religious terms this may mean striving to improve your self and resisting evil temptations. Or it could

mean one Muslim or all Muslims, exerting themselves for the greater good of Islam.¹ You can have an internal (personal) Jihad or an Islamic community could have a Jihad against poverty. This is referred to as “the greater Jihad.”² “In the books on Islamic law, the word means armed struggle against the unbelievers, which is also a common meaning in the Koran.”³ This is often referred to as “the lesser Jihad.”⁴ It is similar to the word “crusade” that also has multiple meanings. Jihad also carries the same baggage as the word “crusade.” Some modern writers on the subject of Jihad proclaim that the holy war definition is not accurate and does not reflect modern Islamic beliefs. However, in Islamic law, doctrine, and history it does carry that meaning and more importantly, Islamic extremist groups use the term in its “lesser” meaning. It is a concept that has meaning in today’s world.

As a concept Jihad goes back to the time of Mohammad. Jihad originates with the Koran in which fighting is mentioned frequently. The point of disagreement on whether Jihad is peaceful or warlike goes back to the “sword verses” of the Koran and whether they take precedence or abrogate the verses that stress peace with one’s neighbors. There are verses in the Koran that not only discuss when to fight but also covers topic such as rewards for those killed in fighting, punishments for those who do not fight, prisoners of war, truces and much more.⁵ According to Rudolph Peters, the doctrine of Jihad can be found in documents on Islamic law. The doctrine was based upon what is written in the Koran, the actions of Muhammad and the first caliphs as written in the *Hadith*,

¹ Peters, Rudolph. *Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam*, Princeton, NJ, Markus Wiener Publishers, 2005, 1.

² Haq, S. Nomanul, “Violence is Not Inherent in Islam.” In *Religions and Religious Movements: Islam*, edited by Mitchell Young, Farmington Hills, MI, Greenhaven Press, 2006, 193.

³ Peters, Rudolph. *Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam*, 1.

⁴ Haq, S. Nomanul, “Violence is Not Inherent in Islam”, 193

⁵ Ali, A Yusuf. *An English Interpretation of The Holy Koran*, Sh. Muhammad Ashraf Publishers, Booksellers, Lahore, Pakistan, S. 22: 39-40, S. 3:157-158, S. 9:81-85, S. 47:4, S. 8:61.

Muhammad's sayings. It is based on a single Islamic state ruling the entire universe of Islamic peoples or *ummah*, led by the caliph. The *ummah* is charged with expanding the Islamic state, in terms of both territory and peoples, until the world is ruled by Islam and unbelief has ended. Jihad is a collective duty both for expanding the Islamic state and for defending regions of Islam if attacked.⁶ Islam is an expansive, evangelical religion that has the goal of bringing the entire world under Islam. Per the Koran, "Fight them until there is no persecution and the religion is God's entirely."⁷ The compulsory nature of Jihad is based upon the Koran, 2:216, "Prescribed for you is fighting, though it be hateful to you." While a collective duty, it is not always a personal obligation; not all Muslims need to fight. This is based on further Koranic verses and the actions of Muhammad.⁸ The Koran allows Muslims to fight to defend their lands and faith. It is the interpretation of "defend" that adds difficulty to understanding when Jihad is allowed or not.

There are certain principles associated with Jihad that define when it is permissible to have a Jihad. As mentioned previously, Muslims are allowed to fight to defend their homelands and faith. Jihad is allowable to strengthen Islam and to protect the freedom of Muslims to practice their faith.⁹ Protecting Muslims against oppression justifies a military Jihad. Finally, punishing an enemy who broke an oath and righting a wrong are also valid reasons for Jihad.¹⁰

A Jihad is not about forcing non-Muslims to convert.¹¹ A classic principle of Jihad is that the peoples who are the object of the Jihad must first be offered an opportunity to

⁶ Peters, Rudolph. *Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam*, 3-4.

⁷ Ali, A Yusuf. *An English Interpretation of The Holy Koran*, S. 2:193, 8:39.

⁸ Peters, Rudolph. *Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam*, 29.

⁹ Ali, A Yusuf. *An English Interpretation of The Holy Koran*, S. 2:193, S. 4:75.

¹⁰ Peters, Rudolph. *Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam*, 120-121 and Ali, A Yusuf. *An English Interpretation of The Holy Koran*, S. 22:39.

¹¹ Ali, A Yusuf, *An English Interpretation of The Holy Koran*, S. 2:256

join Islam. If they choose to embrace Islam they become part of the *ummah* and have the same responsibilities and privileges as any other member. They can choose not to embrace Islam, but also not to fight. In this case they are free to continue practicing their religion but they must pay the *jizya*, a poll tax that the *ummah* does not pay. However, they become a protected community under the Islamic ruler. Finally, if they refuse to accept Islam and the taxes, then they must fight.¹²

Because people emphasize different verses or interpretations of verses from the Koran or Hadith differently, there is confusion on when fighting is allowed. The Koran says you can only fight to defend against an aggressor; you cannot be the aggressor. Another verse allows the fighting at any time or place but there must be a valid reason such as being attacked, oppressed or threatened.¹³ There is a Hadith which says Muhammad stated, after the battle of Tabuk, “we have returned from the lesser Jihad to the greater Jihad.” This would imply that the armed struggle against non-believers was either over or of lesser importance. However, many disagree with this and cast doubt on the authenticity of that Hadith.¹⁴ However, classic Jihad doctrine held that under Shari’ a, the Islamic code of law, any war against non-believers was legal. In fact, the legalists require the caliph to launch raids or attacks on non-Muslim lands at least once a year. The purpose is to keep the idea of Jihad alive in the minds of Muslims.¹⁵

Based on verses from the Koran there are rules that must be adhered to for a Jihad to be legitimate. Jihads are called for via a fatwa and “a fatwa can only be given by a scholar

¹² Haq, S. Nomanul, *Violence is Not Inherent in Islam*, 194.

¹³ Ali, A Yusuf. *An English Interpretation of The Holy Koran*, S. 2:190, S. 2:217.

¹⁴ Bonney, Richard. *Jihad From Qur’an to bin Laden*, Hampshire, UK, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004, 40.

¹⁵ Peters, Rudolph. *Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam*, 112.

with wide enough knowledge of the Shari'a to be considered a Mufti.”¹⁶ The *ummah* must not be the aggressor, the opponent must have started the battle.¹⁷ The Jihad should not be solely to gain territory. The Jihad needs to be approved by a religious leader and it must be fought to bring about good. Innocent people, including women, children and old folks, should not be killed unless they are fighting, but it is understood that unintended deaths will occur. Enemies should be treated fairly and justly; wounded enemies should be treated as one's own would be treated. Property was not to be damaged.¹⁸

The Jihad remains a concern for today due to its interpretation by radical, militant, Islamic extremists as a justification and calling for violence against peoples and governments in order to achieve the stated goals of those groups. These groups advocate the overthrow of existing governments in Islamic countries if they are not (in their view) sufficiently Islamic, or do not base their legal system totally upon the Shari'a. To them these governments are apostate and may legally be attacked.¹⁹ Democracies, or any other form of secular government, are opposed by Jihadi groups.²⁰ They advocate Jihad against countries they view as oppressing Muslims or living on what was once Muslim territory. They further exhort Muslims to attack Western countries that support Islamic countries they disagree with. Although not mentioned in the writings on Jihad, today's extremist groups extend the call for Jihad to include attacking Israel. These groups argue

¹⁶ Bar, Schmucl, *Jihad Ideology in Light of Contemporary Fatwas*, Hudson Institute, Center on Islam, Democracy, and the Future of the Muslim World, Aug 2006, 2. Osama Bin Laden has issued *fatwas* on his own however even Mullah Omar of the Taliban has stated these are not legitimate. See Richard Bonney's *Jihad from Qur'an to Bin Laden*, Hampshire, UK, Palgrave MacMillan, 2004, pp. 358. Bin Laden appears to be relying on his being the head of Al Qaeda and standing as a Jihadist to issue the *fatwas*.

¹⁷ Ali, A Yusuf. *An English Interpretation of The Holy Koran*, S. 2:190.

¹⁸ Peters, Rudolph. *Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam*, 13-14.

¹⁹ Roberts, Hugh. *The Battlefield Algeria 1988-2002, Studies in a Broken Polity*, London, UK, Verso, 2003, 5-6.

²⁰ Zabel, Sarah, *The Military Strategy of Global Jihad*, Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle, PA, U. S. Army War College, Oct 2007, 3.

that Jihad is a personal obligation of all Muslims. They are willing to kill fellow Muslims who they believe support the West, the apostate government, or do not practice Islam as they do.²¹ The goal is to unite the *ummah* and re-establish the caliphate, the single leader of all Muslims. It appears to be a war where you are either with them or against them.

Jihads from 632 to 1683 AD

Jihads have been around since the time of Muhammad. For the purposes of this paper the history of Jihads is broken into two timeframes. The first is the period of offensive or expansionist Jihads, from roughly 632 to 1683 AD, when Islam was mostly expanding through conquests. This covers the period from the uniting of the Arabs on the Saudi peninsula to the defeat of the Ottoman Turks at the gates of Vienna, the highpoint of Islamic territorial expansion. The second period covers the timeframe when Islam was primarily in retreat and was in a defensive mode as Western forces invaded and colonized Muslim lands. The two periods are not only different due to the offensive or defensive nature of the Jihad but also in the nature of the fighting. When Islam was expanding the fighting was done mainly by armies of Islamic soldiers, first Arabs and then others. The nature of the war was conquering territory by defeating the enemies' armies and sieges of castles and cities, all very typical of warfare at that time. When Jihad became defensive the nature of the war gradually changed to an insurgent type of warfare with the aim of removing whatever forces or rulers were judged illegitimate. Each conquest or rebellion, whether victorious or not, possessed factors that helped determine its outcome.

²¹ Peters, Rudolph. *Jihad in Classical and Modern Times*, 105-106.

After the death of the prophet, Islam spread rapidly and by 1683 Muslim lands covered not only the Middle East but also Northern Africa, Southeastern Europe, and from Iran to India and Indonesia. How did Islam spread so far so swiftly? With a few exceptions for traders and missionaries (e.g. Indonesia, Malaya), Islam was spread by force.²² Essentially the struggle to spread Islam from Mecca and Medina to the whole of the Arabian Peninsula and beyond was a combination of Jihad and outright imperialism.

From the time Mohammad started receiving revelations and started preaching his message (around 613 AD) until his death in 632, he spent most of his time overcoming opposition and building his following. In 622 he and his followers emigrated to Medina where he consolidated his power over the different groups in town. After battling with his fellow clansmen from Mecca for the next several years, they eventually submitted to Mohammad and he gained control of Mecca in 630. He then led a victorious military campaign against Taif and several nomadic tribes. By the time of his death in 632 western Arabia was under his control; he was the political, military and religious leader.²³

Following his death the first successor (caliph) was his father-in-law, Abu Bakr. He acted quickly to keep in line tribes that tried to sever their ties when Mohammad died. These were the Apostasy Wars and Abu Bakr's forces went out to the various tribes and ensured they kept their support. He also picked up new believers and allies. Eventually, through force of arms, the entire Arabian Peninsula came under their power by 634. There now existed in Arabia a state where none had existed before and with it a standing army that was at the edges of the Byzantine and Sasanian empires. Abu Bakr died in 634 and the 2nd caliph, Umar ibn al-Khattab (died 644), began the first round of conquests

²² Crone, Patricia. *Jihad: Idea and History*, 30 Apr 2007, http://www.opendemocracy.net/faith-europe_islam/Jihad/, accessed 28 Oct 2007

²³ Esposito, John L., ed. *The Oxford History of Islam*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1999, 7-10.

beyond Arabia. These continued under the 3rd caliph, Uthman ibn Affan (died 656) and the 4th caliph Ali ibn Abi Talib (died 661). These four caliphs, not blood relatives of Mohammad, are considered the “rightly guided” caliphs and ruled when there was a united *ummah*.²⁴ This period is important to Muslims today who follow salafism, a conservative Islamic movement that advocates a return to the fundamental principles of Islamic practices followed by Mohammad and the “rightly guided” caliphs.²⁵

The early conquests were a religious and political movement. “They saw their mission as Jihad, a militant effort to combat evil and to spread Muhammad’s message of monotheism and righteousness far and wide.”²⁶ The caliph, that important symbol of Muslim unity, was the leader of the expansion effort. He planned and authorized raids and conquests and called for Jihad. The drive to conquer was fueled not only by religious beliefs but also by a desire to obtain wealth. Each successful conquest not only gained territory but also booty as conquered land was plundered.²⁷ Unlike Christian forces the Koran specified that both leaders and individual soldiers were to be allotted a specific share of the captured wealth and people taken as slaves.²⁸ Captured booty was distributed among the caliph, the warriors and others. Captured people were often enslaved and either kept for their use or sold. Finally, the Jihads were seen to increase the legitimacy of the caliph currently in power.²⁹ While the Jihads expanded Islamic territory they did not dramatically increase the number of Muslims. This was because

²⁴ Esposito, John L., ed. *The Oxford History of Islam*. 17.

²⁵ Willis, Michael, *The Islamist Challenge in Algeria, A Political History*. New York, NY, New York University Press, 1996, 8-9 and Stanley, Trevor, “Understanding the Origins of Wahhabism and Salafism,” *Global Terrorism Analysis, Terrorism Monitor*, Vol. 3, Issue 14, Jul 15, 2005, <http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/>, (accessed 9 Jan 2008).

²⁶ Esposito, John L., ed. *The Oxford History of Islam*, 13.

²⁷ *Ibid*, 12-13.

²⁸ Ali, A Yusuf. *An English Interpretation of The Holy Koran*, S. 8:41.

²⁹ Peters, Rudolph. *Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam*, 5.

unless you were a pagan, the conquered people were not required to change their religion. They were required to pay the *jizya*. By limiting conversions to Islam the Muslims collected more revenue from taxes and did not have to share power with other people. After being conquered, new ruling and economic structures were put in place, run by Arabs. A lack of new wealth and perceived unfair sharing of captured gains were reasons that led to a rebellion against Uthman and his eventual death.³⁰

The initial expansions set the pattern for future conquests. When the Muslims first started expanding, the main two powers in the region were the Byzantine and Sasinid empires. They had been fighting each other for 26 years prior to the outset of the Islamic expansion. The Byzantine Empire had just defeated the Sasinids in 628. Both empires were worn down from all the fighting. The Byzantines were having problems paying their army and they had lost authority and control in some regions. The peoples of Syria and Palestine did not identify with the Byzantines nor were there Syrians or Palestinians in the Byzantine army. To them there was no difference between the Arabs and the Byzantines. The religious leaders were intolerant and there was little comfort from, or zeal to spread, their religion.³¹ On the other hand the Arab warriors were filled with a religious zeal to spread the word of Allah. They also knew that if they died fighting for Allah they would be martyrs and would ascend immediately to heaven. Finally, they knew that if they were victorious they would be rewarded with a share of the booty won in battle. In 633-634 the armies of Islam invaded Syria and Palestine. By 635 they had defeated a Byzantine army and captured Damascus. In 636 a second Byzantine army had

³⁰ Esposito, John L., ed., *The Oxford History of Islam*, 15.

³¹ Nafziger, George F. and Walton, Mark W., "Islam's Warriors defeat a Powerful Empire," In *Religions and Religious Movements: Islam*, edited by Mitchell Young, Farmington Hills, MI, Greenhaven Press, 2006, 51-52.

arrived to take on the Muslim forces. However, they were defeated at the battle of Yarmouk.³² This defeat allowed the Arab forces to take all of Syria and Palestine. From there the Muslims expanded into Egypt, Mesopotamia, Armenia and southern Anatolia by 642. The Sasanians also mobilized to defend against the Muslim forces but they were defeated at al-Qadisiyah, opening up the lands of Iraq to the Muslims. From there they launched campaigns against Khuzestan and Azerbaijan and into present day Iran. The Believers were soon launching further raids into Libya, North Africa, Sudan, the Caucasus region, eastern Iran, Afghanistan and Central Asia.³³ Expansion slowed dramatically from 656 to 692 as civil war erupted over how the leadership of the *ummah* was to be selected. The Shia believed the leader must be a blood descendant of Mohammad, versus Sunnis who believed only piety and righteous behavior were required. This led to the Sunni-Shia split; after the civil wars the caliphate was ready to continue expanding the Islamic empire.³⁴

The difficulties and fighting over who would be the next caliph led to civil wars between different groups over who was the legitimate leader of the believers. The basic argument was between genealogical (Shia belief – must be a member of Mohammad’s family or clan) versus the consensus of the community (Sunnis belief). This led to battles between believers and the creation of the Sunnis, Shias, and Kharijites. Kharijites believed that true piety and righteous behavior were the only true qualities required. These became subdivisions of Islam with the Sunnis the majority. These civil wars lasted from 656 to 692 and resulted in the Umayyad caliphate. “A politically unified

³² Nafziger, George F. and Walton, Mark W., “Islam’s Warriors defeat a Powerful Empire,” In *Religions and Religious Movements: Islam*, 56-59.

³³ Esposito, John L., ed., *The Oxford History of Islam*, 12.

³⁴ *Ibid*, 14-22.

community of believers (ummah) headed by a caliph eventually became unrealizable in practice” as the empire expanded and grew in size and number of people.³⁵

After 700 AD new campaigns were launched to expand the Islamic empire. Islamic forces spread west across North Africa to the Atlantic coast of Morocco. In 711 they crossed the straits of Gibraltar and invaded Spain. Within a few years they had defeated the Visigoths, controlled most of the Iberian Peninsula and crossed the Pyrenees into France. They made it to the Loire valley before being turned back by King Charles Martel in 732. By the end of the 8th century they were forced back south of the Pyrenees. The Muslims continued ventures into Europe raiding Sicily, southern Italy, and the French and Italian Rivas. Their expansion was aided by alliances with kingdoms more interested in protecting their own interests than they were with stopping Islamic expansion. To the East they expanded across Iran, then on to present day Uzbekistan and into the Indus river valley. Over the next two centuries they conquered what are today Afghanistan, Pakistan.³⁶

Although the Muslim world was expanding there were problems. Struggles over succession and power prevented unity and led to some regions becoming autonomous. In Spain the Caliphate was in dispute and was then abolished. The Muslims in Spain became divided into city-states. This set the stage for the start of the reconquista, as Christian kingdoms began expanding in 1085. The arrival of Islamic forces from Morocco delayed Christian progress for over 100 years. But by 1212 Christian forces had begun winning victories over the Muslims, reducing their holdings until only one

³⁵ Esposito, John L., ed., *The Oxford History of Islam*, 18.

³⁶ *Ibid*, 21.

emirate, in Granada, remained in Spain. That was defeated in 1492 and the last remains of Islamic control were removed from Spain.³⁷

The crusades started in 1096. Except for some rebellions against Muslims in Spain, this was the first offensive action against the invaders by Christians. Called for by Pope Urban II, it was supported by the Church, royalty and the common folk. In 1099 they captured Jerusalem. When captured, it was sacked and many Muslims were slaughtered. This is seen by many as the start of true hostility between Christians and Muslims. The Muslim world at that time was lacking in unity and it was almost 50 years before they fought back in a Jihad against the Christians. Still, it took Christian disunity and the Kurdish general Saladin until 1187 to decisively defeat the Christians at Hattin and regain control of Jerusalem. Six crusades in total over two centuries ended when Mamluk forces out of Egypt drove all the remaining crusaders from Palestine.³⁸ After the crusades the Turkish Muslims continued their efforts against the Christian Byzantine Empire, conquering the Balkans and culminating in the successful siege of Constantinople in 1453. From there Islamic forces, more specifically the Ottoman Turks, expanded further West and North.³⁹ By 1566 they controlled an area that stretched North through Hungary and east through Moldova, Bessarabia, and the Crimean area. To further spread the Islamic empire the Ottomans made another attempt to capture Vienna in 1683 but were defeated.⁴⁰ From that point on the Ottomans and Islam in general were on the defensive.

³⁷ Esposito, John L., ed., *The Oxford History of Islam*, 34-35, 51.

³⁸ Ibid, 337-340.

³⁹ Ibid, 342.

⁴⁰ Esposito, John L., ed., *The Oxford History of Islam*, 374.

During this period the non-Muslim armies were defeated for a number of reasons. In many cases the Muslim forces were numerically superior and better led. They were united in mission and often filled with a strong zeal to spread the word of Islam. This is compared to the non-Muslim forces which often lacked unity of effort between kingdoms and allies. In the case of Christian forces there were religious differences that kept them from aiding each other. Beyond religion, different languages and cultures made fighting the invaders more difficult. The Muslim forces were able to take advantage of different kingdoms trying to retain their power by playing off one against the other. Another factor was that the existing rulers were often considered oppressive; the Muslim invaders were often seen as being liberators. Captives and other booty were taken after cities fell but after that the Muslims were usually lenient, at least initially. There were no forced conversions for Jews and Christians; only pagans were usually forced to convert. It seemed there were no limits to how far Islam would spread.⁴¹

Islam had internal issues that contributed to slow down the spread of Islam. One of the main reasons was the ongoing internal struggles for power between rivals for political power and the caliphate. The internal religious divisions leading to the Sunni vs. Shia civil wars (656 – 700 AD) seriously slowed the initial expansion. After the civil wars there were many, later struggles between groups vying for power in different parts of the new empire.⁴² As the empire became more widespread it was no longer really controlled by one ruler; there were effectively many autonomous zones that were not mutually

⁴¹ Fregosi, Paul, *Jihad in the West*, Amherst NY, Prometheus Books, 1998 and Nafziger, George F. and Walton, Mark W., *Islam's Warriors defeat a Powerful Empire*, 50-59.

⁴² Manheimer, Eric L., *Islam, Evolution and Development*, Kendall/Hunt Publishing Co., Dubuque, IA, 1994, 113-122.

supportive.⁴³ This led to a lack of unity in new offensives and later in defense when the people of conquered territories began rebelling and trying to reclaim their lands.

Jihads from 1683 AD to the Present

After the defeat of the Ottoman Turks at Vienna, Islam went on the defensive mode as there began a slow retreat from the European lands they had conquered. This did not end the Jihads but the nature of the Jihads began to change. Over the next two hundred years there were numerous Jihads to create independent theocratic states for Muslims living in areas that were either not Muslim or only partly Muslim. Many of these Jihads were of a reformist nature, striving to return to a pure form of Islam.

From the late 1700s to the mid-1800s several Jihads were declared by existing Muslim communities in sub-Saharan Africa. There the local Imams felt the people had not truly accepted Islam. The local peoples were a mix of pagans and Muslims that were performing acts that had for centuries been accepted as legitimate accommodation of Islam to traditional religions. The old ways of the tribes were still being followed and the Imams felt the village leaders were too accommodating to the old ways. Their Jihads were successful against the local tribes and led to several small independent, military and theocratic states such as Futa Jallon, Sokoto, Massina and Kaarta that endured until European colonization.⁴⁴ These states were a further sign of fracturing of the *ummah*.

During this same time period Jihads were declared in the Caucasus region against the rule of the Russians. The first Jihad there was from 1785-1791, led by Imam Monsur, and was successful until support from the Ottomans ended. At that time the Ottomans lost the Crimea and Georgia to the Russians. This allowed Russia to use those freed up

⁴³ Robinson, Francis, *Atlas of the Islamic World since 1500*, New York, NY, Facts on file Inc, 25.

⁴⁴ *Ibid*, 128-129.

forces to put down the rebellion. The capture of Imam Monsur ended the Jihad.

However, the Jihad returned in 1834 and lasted until 1859 under Imam Shamil. The Jihad here was in the Chechnya and Dagestan regions. Successful for a short period, a theocratic state was created. The Jihad ended when Russian forces combined clearing forests to remove their ability to hide, with razing villages, killing many and deporting many more to Siberia.⁴⁵

Similar efforts occurred in east Turkestan and Yunan, China. Independent theocratic states for Muslims were created, through force, to ensure Muslims could worship freely and not be oppressed. The Jihads were successful in creating the state because the existing power was unprepared for the fight. Both ultimately fell to a combination of internal dissension, stronger opposing military forces and a lack of outside support, a pattern that would be found in the demise of other Islamic movements.⁴⁶

At the start of the 19th century a new force came to the Islamic world. This was colonialism. Starting with Napoleon's invasion of Egypt, European forces were in control or strongly influencing most of the Islamic world. "Initially only a minority of Muslim leaders resisted colonialism or tried to avoid conquest by making the Hijra (migration). The majority, however, chose accommodation and collaboration."⁴⁷ By the 1920s only the Muslims in Afghanistan, Yemen, and Arabia were not under European influence.⁴⁸ Not that everything was tranquil. Jihads that were uprisings against colonial

⁴⁵ Robinson, Francis, *Atlas of the Islamic World since 1500*, 124.

⁴⁶ Ibid, 124-125.

⁴⁷ Levtzion, Nehemia and Pouwels, Randall L. eds., *The History of Islam in Africa*, Athens, OH, Ohio University Press, 2000, 13.

⁴⁸ Robinson, Francis, *Atlas of the Islamic World since 1500*, 132.

rule occurred in several countries. In Asia, there were uprisings in Indonesia and India, while in Africa there were rebellions in Algeria, Libya, Somalia and Sudan.⁴⁹

The Asian uprisings started in Indonesia. The first, the Java War (1825-1830) was led by Panferan Diponegoro. It was a bitter guerrilla war with lots of popular appeal based on Islam and a desire to have a Java free of the Dutch. It ended after the Dutch set up a system of posting mobile troops in fortresses around the country. Over 200,000 Javanese died and Diponegoro was captured and exiled in 1830, ending the uprising. The Aceh War (1873-1903) was one of the longest and bloodiest in Dutch-Indonesian history. It was a guerrilla war that officially ended with the death of the Sultan although guerrilla activity against the Dutch continued until the Indonesians gained independence.⁵⁰

Further west in India, the British had established colonies and expanded. Sayyid Ahmad Berelwi believed that any land under the control of a non-Muslim could not be the land of Islam. With this logical underpinning he decided to lead a Jihad to create an Islamic state in northwest India, in what is now Pakistan. Not part of the Mughal Empire, he meant for his state to be an alternative for Muslims in India. However, he had conflicts with his neighbors and he was killed in battle by a Sikh army. With his death his state and movement collapsed.⁵¹ In 1857 the Great Indian Mutiny began. Muslims saw the growing economic, social and educational changes occurring in India, brought on by the British. Muslim influence was losing out to the Hindus and Western ways. The mutiny was brought on by two specific events. The first was the annexation of the state of Oudh, a wealthy state in the Mughal Empire. The second was the use of cartridges for

⁴⁹ Esposito, John L., ed., *The Oxford History of Islam*, 550.

⁵⁰ Metz, Helen Chapin, ed. *Indonesia, A Country Study*, 5th ed., Washington, DC, Library of Congress, 1993, 22.

⁵¹ Esposito, John L., ed., *The Oxford History of Islam*, 528.

the Lee-Enfield rifle that allegedly were greased with animal fats; handling cartridges greased with pork or beef fat would be an affront to either Muslims or Hindus. The mutiny began in Meerut, and spread further when those forces offered their services to the Mughal emperor. Holy war was proclaimed against the British. Eventually northern and central India were part of the rebellion. This mutiny was unique in that both Muslim and Hindu forces fought together against the British. However it was never a unified Jihad and the British were able to violently suppress the mutiny. The last battle was in 1859 and the last rebels moved to Nepal. When it was over, the British abolished the Mughal Sultanate.⁵²

There were also Jihads in Africa against colonial rule. France invaded Algeria in 1830. In 1832 a Jihad, led by Abd al Qadir, was launched against the French. Cunning and resourceful he gained his strength and support from the communities of the interior, the tribes and religious brotherhoods. Seven years later he controlled two thirds of the country with an effective government. A peace treaty with the French was negotiated in 1837 that recognized his territory. The French broke it in 1839 prompting Qadir to continue the Jihad. His style was classic guerrilla, attacking when the French were weak, retreating when they were strong. His government moved with him. Eventually superior French military power and resources, along with the defection of some tribal chiefs, began to wear him down. The French strategy was to destroy his bases and the means of the people to subsist. By 1843 his strongholds and his best commanders were gone; his

⁵² Metz, Helen Chapin, ed. *India, A Country Study*, 5th Ed., Washington, DC, Library of Congress, 1996, 35-36 and Esposito, John L., ed., *The Oxford History of Islam*, 539.

state collapsed. He fled to Morocco and continued to raid the French but he ultimately surrendered in 1847, ending the Jihad in Algeria.⁵³

In the Sudan, Muhammad Ahmad led a Jihad against the rule of the Egyptians. The people resented the ruling ulama from Egypt and the imposition of Western changes on them, primarily the abolition of the slave trade. Muhammad Ahmad proclaimed himself the “Mahdi” in 1881 and built the Mahdist army. In 1882 they began attacking and defeating Egyptian and British forces. By 1885 they had captured Khartoum and secured control of most of present day Sudan. He then established the Mahdi state, an Islamic theocratic state. The Mahdi died six months later but his successor, the khalifah Abadlahi continued to lead the state. He continued the Jihad and had success against Ethiopia but other efforts were stopped by the colonial powers that surrounded Sudan. The British, fearing the other European powers would take action that would harm their hold on Egypt sent a joint British and Egyptian expedition into Sudan and defeated the Sudanese forces in 1898. The Khalifa escaped but died in battle a year later; organized resistance then ended. The population welcomed the end of the reign due to the destruction of the economy, huge population loss (war, famine, disease, persecution), and the impact of the Mahdi on the tribes and religious leaders.⁵⁴

Influenced by the Mahdi uprising in Sudan, Mohammad Abdullah Hasan organized and led a Jihad against the colonial powers in Somalia. His effort was a reformist movement with a strict interpretation of Islam and the belief that Jihad was a perpetual obligation. His warriors were the Somali dervishes. Initially dismissed as “the Mad

⁵³ Metz, Helen Chapin, ed. *Algeria, A Country Study*, 5th ed., Washington, DC, Library of Congress, 1994, 25-26.

⁵⁴ Metz, Helen Chapin, ed. *Sudan, A Country Study*, 4th ed., Washington, DC Library of Congress, , 1991, 18-23.

Mullah” he had staying power and fought from 1899 to 1920. Although it destroyed the economy and ended up killing a third of the population in northern Somalia, Hasan became a hero of Somali nationalism. He died in 1920; that, along with an RAF aerial bombardment on the Dervish capital of Taleex, ended the rebellion.⁵⁵

In modern, post-World War II times, Jihad has again become a well known phenomenon. Calls for Jihad have come out in times of conflicts or as a means of calling for support to groups that wish to overthrow an occupier, opposing force, or an existing government. Many of these extremist groups have a salafist outlook; they wish to create a pure Islamic State, one governed as it was under the “rightly guided” caliphs.⁵⁶ Non-Muslim people or forces in Muslim or formerly Muslim lands are viewed as occupiers and therefore legitimate targets. But, in addition, Muslim countries that have secular governments or that are seen as working with the West are also viewed as illegitimate, impious, or apostate. In some places, Muslims who disagree with the views of the extremist groups are viewed as the enemy.⁵⁷ Not all Jihad movements succeed but neither do they all fail. Modern Jihads go through phases, progress or regress, change tactics and sometimes identities, ebb and flow as they succeed or fail against the forces of their enemies. Although suffering defeats and setbacks, most of these modern Jihads continue to struggle for their goals.

The one clearly successful Jihad was the one to remove the Soviet forces from Afghanistan. The USSR invaded Afghanistan in Dec 1979 and remained until Feb 1989 when their last forces withdrew. A long campaign that took thousands of lives on both

⁵⁵ Metz, Helen Chapin, ed. *Somalia, A Country Study*, 4th ed., Washington, DC, Library of Congress, 1993, 13.

⁵⁶ Willis, Michael, *The Islamist Challenge in Algeria, A Political History*, New York, NY, New York University Press, 1996, 8-9.

⁵⁷ Roberts, Hugh, *The Battlefield Algeria, 1988-2002*, 206-213.

sides, it was a war that the Mujahadeen could have lost as late as 1986. But increased supply and advanced weapons like the Stinger missile gave the Mujahadeen an improved ability to operate against the Soviets. After these developments Soviet President Gorbachov decided the costs were too great and they needed to pull out.⁵⁸ The Jihad was successful due to the Mujahadeen's ability to maintain a supply source from outside, a greater will than that of the Soviets, and the mounting costs to the Soviets in terms of lost personnel and manpower.

There are other Jihads that have had at least limited success. Hezbollah is fighting a successful Jihad to remove foreigners from Lebanon. Through the use of terrorist acts, suicide bombings and strong will it has had success with the departure of France, the US, and most Israeli forces from Lebanon.⁵⁹ In 2006 they successfully fought the Israelis in southern Lebanon, gaining stature in the eyes of Muslims worldwide. Internal to Lebanon it appears to be pursuing its goal of an Islamic state through political rather than military means and claims 14 of 128 seats in the Lebanese national Assembly.⁶⁰

In the West Bank and Gaza Strip Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and other Islamic extremist groups have been waging Jihad against the Israelis, with the stated goal of eliminating the Israeli state and removing the occupiers from the Muslim Holy lands. This Jihad has been going on since at least the first Intifada with no signs of let up.⁶¹ Tactics change and the ops tempo may change with political activities but the Jihad goes on. Like Hezbollah,

⁵⁸ O'Balance, Edgar, *Afghan Wars, Battles in a Hostile Land*, London, UK, Brassey's, 2002, 89-196.

⁵⁹ Pape, Robert A. "The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 97, No. 3, August 2003.

⁶⁰ Office of the Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism, *Country Reports on Terrorism – 2006*, Washington, DC, Dept of State, 21 Mar 2006, 135.

⁶¹ Milton-Edwards, Beverly, "The Concept of Jihad and the Palestinian Islamic Movement: A Comparison of Ideas and Techniques," *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 19, No. 1, 1992, 48-53.

Hamas has a political wing and won the 2006 Palestinian Authority elections. However, Hamas has not changed its goal of elimination of the state of Israel.⁶²

Not all modern Jihadi movements have been successful. Many have suffered setbacks. Mujahadeen went to Bosnia and Kosovo when conflicts started there. But when the conflicts ended (with the Dayton Peace accords and Rambouillet agreement respectively) the need and desire for the Mujahadeen to stay was not there. The impact of the Mujahadeen was limited but more importantly the people of those nations were not interested in the vision of radical Islam. The people preferred secular government. The Jihad may have ended here, however some Mujahadeen remain in those countries and represent a latent threat.⁶³

A common movement in modern times is Jihad to remove the existing national government. Again, Algeria is a good example. A civil war started there in 1992 when the election results, in which the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) would have won a majority, were negated. The war dragged on through the '90s as forces from several Islamic extremist groups fought with Algerian military and security forces; tens of thousands died. The worst militant group was the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), which declared Jihad on the government and sought to replace it with a pure Islamic state. GIA believed that if you did not agree with their views you were a legitimate target. The Algerian government actively repressed the GIA. They killed many militants including leaders, infiltrated the groups, and violated the civil rights of many in putting down these groups. Additionally, they eventually held elections and pardoned many extremists who had not been convicted of violent crimes. These actions, along with growing non-support

⁶² Office of the Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism, *Country Reports on Terrorism – 2006*, 134.

⁶³ Takeyh, Ray and Gvosdev, Nikolas, *The Receding Shadow of the Prophet*, Westport, CT, Praeger Publishers, 2004, 88-93, 94-96.

from the local population, severely reduced the effectiveness and operating areas of the extremists.⁶⁴ The militant arm of the FIS disbanded and its forces helped the government locate and target the GIA. Although weakened, the GIA was not eliminated. A part of the group that disagreed with GIA's leadership and tactics broke off and formed the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat. In September 2006 this group merged with Al Qaeda to form Al Qaeda in the Islamic Mahgreb (AQIM), or Al Qaeda of North Africa. Although operations by GIA and AQIM have occurred outside Algeria, the focus remains on replacing the Algerian government with an Islamic government.⁶⁵ The Algerian government has weakened the Islamic extremist threat but not eliminated it.

This type of result can be seen with Islamic extremist groups operating in other countries. The circumstances are always different but the current situation is often similar. In Egypt the government acted to suppress the Jihadi movements after numerous attacks on Egyptian officials and tourist sites. The extremists lost the support of the people by the type of attacks, the violence against fellow Muslims, and the economic impact of loss of tourism.⁶⁶ In Uzbekistan, the government has been working to suppress the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and Islamic liberation party (Hizb ut-Tahrir) since the late '90s. The government of Uzbekistan was a recipient of US aid after 9/11. Additionally, the IMU, which had close associations with the Taliban and Al Qaeda, was hurt by the war in Afghanistan. Their leader was killed and many of their members were killed or captured during Operation Enduring Freedom. Although the government has

⁶⁴ *The Middle East and North Africa 2005*, 51st edition, London, UK, Europa Publications, 2005, 169-192.

⁶⁵ McGregor, Andrew, "Leadership Disputes Plague Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb," *Global Terrorism Analysis, Terrorism Focus*, Vol. 4, Issue 30, Sep 25, 2007, <http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news>, accessed 2 Dec 2007.

⁶⁶ Takeyh, Ray and Gvosdev, Nikolas, *The Receding Shadow of the Prophet*, 88-93, 61-68.

made strides against the extremists they have not been defeated.⁶⁷ In the Philippines, their military forces, with US military training and assistance, hunted down and killed the leader and spokesman for the Islamic extremist group Abu Sayyaf Group.⁶⁸ Although that was a severe setback the threat still exists.

In Chechnya conflict with Russia had initial success defeating the Russians in 1997 it declared itself an Islamic Republic. Continued illegal activities and Jihadist activity in the North Caucasus led to the Russians re-engaging in 1999. Chechnya ended up with autonomy within Russia rather than independence. Today Russia is spending to boost the local economy and undercut popular support for the Mujahadeen. However, there is still a distinct Jihadi threat in Chechnya.⁶⁹

Possibly the best known extremist group is Al Qaeda which declared Jihad against all Americans in 1998. It has a global focus and operating area. Although hurt by Operation Enduring Freedom they have adapted and become a more de-centralized, networked organization. They have linked with other extremist groups throughout the Muslim world that think like they do, supporting their efforts to reach their regional goals as steps to the larger goals.⁷⁰ Their Jihad is far from over.

Lessons Learned

In modern times Jihads are insurgencies with a religious basis. Like insurgencies they do not end until there is little or no support for the movement from society. Jihads against what are seen as occupiers have more support and success than those aimed at

⁶⁷ Fredholm, Michael, *Uzbekistan & The Threat From Islamic Extremism*, Conflict Studies Research Centre, UK Ministry of Defence, March 2003, 5-15.

⁶⁸ Office of the Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism, *Country Reports on Terrorism – 2006*, 25

⁶⁹ Takeyh, Ray and Gvosdev, Nikolas, *The Receding Shadow of the Prophet*, 131-135.

⁷⁰ Office of the Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism, *Country Reports on Terrorism – 2006*, 144-145. In addition to sharing ideology they also share tactics including use of improvised explosive devices, suicide bombers, and an increasing use of females.

overthrowing existing governments. With the exception of Al Qaeda their operations are regionally focused; a contradiction with Salafi belief that recognizes only a single united Islamic state.

So what lessons can be learned from the past? What issues, efforts, or movements sapped the strength of past Jihads? First and foremost, a lack of unity among the people and groups involved in the Jihad will reduce the strength of the movement. Internal dissension and struggles for power and leadership have reduced the strength of Jihadi efforts since the beginning of the Islamic expansion. From a worldwide perspective, there has not been a truly united *ummah* since the Sunni-Shia split and there has never been a united Muslim response to a non-Muslim threat. From a regional perspective a lack of unity has caused failure to hold land or gain objectives. For example, the reconquista of Spain was possible due to the end of the caliphate there and competition for power among the many chieftains. Part of the reason Israel has had success against its Arab neighbors, and the groups who want to destroy it, is because they have never been able to unite and cooperate. Even in the successful Jihad to remove the Soviets from Afghanistan there was little unity and coordination among the many groups fighting. Lack of unity may be the single biggest weakness of Jihads.

Another factor that weakens the Jihads is a lack of outside support. Jihads are able to continue only because they can get financial, material, and often, personnel support from outside the area of fighting. This support usually comes from other Muslim nations but, as in the case of Afghanistan, it may come from Western countries as well. In Jihads of the colonial era part of the reason for their defeat was due to the ability of the regional powers to cut off outside support to the Jihadist forces. The Jihad in Afghanistan was

only able to defeat the Soviets because of the financial and material support of the Saudis and the West along with the delivery help of the Pakistanis.⁷¹ Military force may not be able to defeat an idea but it takes money, materials and excellent leadership skills to spread it by Jihad.

Leadership is a key element in the success or failure of Jihads. Good leaders were vital to spreading Islam in the early expansive phase of Islam's history and for those Jihads that succeeded, even for a short while, since then. It was superior leadership on the part of the Muslims that first conquered Spain and later slowed the success of the Spanish reconquista. Lack of good leadership led to defeat of Islamic forces at Vienna and later battles. The death or capture of key leaders sounded the death knell for past Jihads in Africa and Chechnya and has greatly weakened recent Jihads. History indicates that removing key leaders will seriously harm modern Jihads.

Another factor is the amount of popular support for the Jihad and its goals. Not all Muslims are the same. The history, geography, customs and beliefs of Muslims in various regions are different. Some groups, like the Albanians and Kosovars, are highly nationalistic, others, like the Afghans, have a history of putting aside tribal differences to fight invaders. The native people of regions like Chechnya or the Palestinians may be more interested in nationalistic goals such as an independent state than they are whether it is an Islamic state ruled by the Shari'a or whether they are part of a single worldwide Islamic state. In the case of the Bosnian Muslims, they see their future more tied to Europe than the Middle East. It is interesting to note that although most Muslims do not live in Arab cultures, most fatwas for Jihad come from Arab countries; the few that come from Muslims living on the edges of the Muslim world usually come from clerics who

⁷¹ O'Balance, Edgar, *Afghan Wars, Battles in a Hostile Land*, 119.

were trained in Arab schools.⁷² The bottom line is that the native folks, even though they are Muslim, are not necessarily supportive of Jihadis coming in from other countries to participate in their struggle. The newcomers pose a threat to their existing institutions and way of life.

The actions the Jihadist movement takes can cause it to lose strength and support. In Algeria, the leadership of GIA's decision to declare anyone who disagrees with them an apostate and a legitimate target, and then killing thousands of men, women, children led to the loss of support from the people. Their actions were seen as un-Islamic and outside the rules of Jihad. Without that popular support the government forces were able to locate and suppress their movement. In Egypt, the actions of the Islamic Jihad were also seen in a negative light. The people were concerned that if this was how they acted getting to power, killing non-combatants and other Muslims, what would they be like once they were in office? Additionally, leaders of the Jihadists decided to attack targets in the tourist industry, the economic lifeblood of many Egyptians.⁷³ In Iraq, the beheadings of civilians and other acts of brutality have eroded the support of fellow Muslims. The actions of Jihadi groups need to be seen to advance their goals without causing the loss of popular support.

Another result of specific Jihadi actions relates to the response of their enemies. Some actions will cause only low level responses while others will cause massive reactions or stiffening of will. For instance, the attacks of 9/11 resulted in the removal of the Taliban from power in Afghanistan, and losses to Al Qaeda and other Jihadi groups training or

⁷² Bar, Schmucl, *Jihad Ideology in Light of Contemporary Fatwas*, 3.

⁷³ Takeyh, Ray and Gvosdev, Nikolas, *The Receding Shadow of the Prophet*, 88-93, 61-68. Killing of non-combatants, especially fellow Muslims, to achieve their goal is a relatively new phenomenon. A question for further research is whether modern Jihads can succeed without resorting to this tactic.

operating out of Afghanistan at the time. Suicide bombings against civilians in Israel caused a hardening of Israeli attitudes toward the Palestinians and eroded support for “land for peace” efforts.⁷⁴ The actions of the Jihadis are truly a case where tactical actions had a strategic effect and sapped their strength.

The final item that eroded the strength of the Jihadist movements was the strength of the government they were fighting. Whether fighting against military forces or government security forces strength is often not on their side. In the colonial era, the Algerians, Chechnyans, Indonesians, Indians, Somalis, and eventually the Mahdi army of Sudan were beaten by superior military forces. The Jihadist threats were unable to overcome government security forces in Algeria, Egypt, Israel, and Chechnya. Where there has been success, as in Afghanistan and Lebanon, a vital national interest was not at stake. Afghanistan was not a vital interest for the Soviets; nor was Lebanon to the US or France. Where vital interests are involved governments will act and fight to eliminate the threat. Many Islamic governments, not to mention Israel, view the Islamic extremist groups as a threat to their vital interests. While governments can fall, as happened in Iran, the existing government has options and powers to defeat extremist groups.

Recommendations

What do the lessons of past Jihads have for countering today’s Jihads? Jihads prior to the 1700s have little resemblance to Jihads of today. Jihads before that time were mainly force on force, whereas Jihads since then have slowly transitioned to insurgencies. But they do have characteristics in common. Both need the support of people, good leadership, material and financial support, and an effective strategy with good tactics to

⁷⁴ Hammes, Thomas, *The Sling and the Stone*, St. Paul, MN, Zenith Press, 2004, 111-129.

succeed. The fortunes of the *ummah* and the Jihadists' methods may have changed, but the basic requirements for conducting a Jihad have not.

Jihads of today are essentially the same as any other insurgency except the goal is an Islamic state and the fighters believe they are martyrs who will enter heaven if they die for the Jihad. Strategies for defeating Jihads of today should be similar to those needed to fight other insurgencies. These broad-based strategies include 1) coordinated, united and consistent government actions to defeat the insurgency through political, economic, military and informational means; 2) a coordinated effort among governments to identify and stop the movement of terrorists, money and armaments between countries and 3) highlighting the non-Islamic character of their actions, and promoting dissension between different groups through information operations.

The existing government is in the most powerful position to defeat the Jihad. Losing may mean either being put out of power, a totally new form of government, or even death. To most governments, even Islamic ones, a Jihadist movement is considered a threat to vital national interests. However, most of these movements have a small number of active members and limited numbers of supporters. They take their actions to create chaos and anarchy. Their goal is to show that the government cannot protect the people, or provide for them. They believe that when there has been enough violence and anarchy at some point the people will turn to them and their ideal of an Islamic world.⁷⁵ The government needs a coordinated campaign involving the different instruments of national power. Security and military forces can seek, capture, arrest, or kill any Jihadi members they can find. Capturing or killing key leaders does affect Jihadi movements. In Algeria and Egypt the governments hunted down the members of the groups. The

⁷⁵ Zabel, Sarah, *The Military Strategy of Global Jihad*, 5.

efforts were repressive, civil rights were abused, but the threat was reduced. Political efforts that bring legitimacy to the government also reduce the popular support for the extremists. In Algeria elections were held and the winners came to office, effectively removing the initial reason for the civil war. In Egypt members of the Muslim Brotherhood are allowed to be part of the government. Money spent to improve the economy and infrastructure help get people jobs and shows the government is working to better their lives. Work to remove the reasons for popular disaffection with the government. On the information front every action the Jihadis take that is out of line with Muslim character or what is normal for Jihad needs to be highlighted. Killings of innocents, the old, women and children, killings of other Muslims, and actions that make people lose their jobs or ability to support their families, are actions that need to be highlighted in every forum to the people.

The government needs to work with its neighbors, friends, allies and the international community to identify and stop the movement of terrorists, the money and goods that support them, and the sale and transfer of armaments. Jihads cannot succeed without outside support to provide goods and arms as well as pay the Jihadis or at least provide money to their families if they die. Again, starving the Jihad may keep it controlled if not eliminated.

Promote dissension and conflict among the Jihadi groups. Lack of unity keeps the individual groups weak and less capable. Emphasize differences between groups and the government and what it means to the people. Most groups involved in Jihads have varying goals; there is little common vision or agreement on goals. The aftermath of the Soviet departure from Afghanistan was partly due to each group having different visions

of the future for the country. Play up the differences between foreign fighters who may show up and the locals. Their tactics, strategies, and goals may not be in concert with the local customs, history and belief; stress how they are using the people for their own goals versus what the locals favor. Also, stress the negative impact their actions may have on the local, native population.

Conclusion

Past Jihads are very different in form from those of today but the key reasons that some of those Jihads succeeded or failed are still relevant today. Those reasons include a unity of effort, superb leadership, outside support, popular support, the strength of opposing forces, and the actions of groups themselves. Actions taken to affect the viability and effectiveness of each of these factors will impact the Jihad and contribute to its defeat.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Ahrari, M. Ehsan, *Jihadi Groups, Nuclear Pakistan, and the Great Game*. Carlisle Barracks, PA, Strategic Studies Institute, 2001.
- Ali, A Yusuf. *An English Interpretation of The Holy Koran*, Lahore, Pakistan, Sh. Muhammad Ashraf Publishers, Booksellers, 1995.
- Bar, Schmucl, *Jihad Ideology in Light of Contemporary Fatwas*, Hudson Institute, Center on Islam, Democracy, and the Future of the Muslim World, Washington, DC, August 2006.
- Bonney, Richard, *Jihad, From the Quran to Bin Laden*. Hampshire, UK, Palgrave MacMillan, 2004.
- Capan, Ergun, ed. *An Islamic Perspective, Terror and Suicide Attacks*. Somerset, NJ, The Light, Inc., 2004.
- Cook, David, *Understanding Jihad*. Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 2005.
- Crone, Patricia, *Jihad: idea and history*, www.opendemocracy.net, 30 April 2007, (accessed 28 Oct 2007).
- Desai, Meghned, *Rethinking Islamism – The Ideology of the New Terror*. New York, NY, I.B. Tauris and Co., Ltd., 2007.
- Esposito, John L., ed., *The Oxford History of Islam*. Oxford, UK, Oxford University Press, 1999.
- Firestone, Reuven, *Jihad, The Origin of Holy War in Islam*. Oxford, UK, Oxford University Press, 1999.
- Fredholm, Michael, *Uzbekistan & The Threat From Islamic Extremism*. Sandhurst, UK, Conflict Studies Research Centre, Royal Military Academy, March 2003.
- Fregosi, Paul, *Jihad in the West*. Amherst, NY, Prometheus Books, 1998.
- Habeck, Mary, *Knowing the Enemy – Jihadist Ideology and the War on Terror*. New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 2006.
- Hammes, Thomas, *The Sling and the Stone*. St. Paul, MN, Zenith Press, 2004.
- Haq, S. Nomanul, “Violence is Not Inherent in Islam.” In *Religions and Religious Movements: Islam*, edited by Mitchell Young, Farmington Hills, MI, Greenhaven Press, 2006, pp. 190-196.

Levtzion, Nehemia and Pouwels, Randall L., eds. *The History of Islam in Africa*. Athens, OH, Ohio University Press, 2000.

Manheimer, Eric L., *Islam, Evolution and Development*. Dubuque, IA, Kendall/Hunt Publishing Co., 1994.

McGregor, Andrew, "Leadership Disputes Plague Al Qaeda and the Islamic Maghreb," *Global Terrorism Analysis, Terrorism Focus*, Vol. 4, Issue 30, Sep 25, 2007, <http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news>, (accessed 2 Dec 2007).

Metz, Helen Chapin, ed. *Algeria, A Country Study, 5th Ed.* Washington, DC, Library of Congress, 1994.

Metz, Helen Chapin, ed. *India, A Country Study, 5th Ed.* Washington, DC, Library of Congress, 1996.

Metz, Helen Chapin, ed. *Indonesia, A Country Study, 5th Ed.* Washington, DC, Library of Congress, 1993.

Metz, Helen Chapin, ed. *Somalia, A Country Study, 4th Ed.* Washington, DC Library of Congress, 1993.

Metz, Helen Chapin, ed. *Sudan, A Country Study, 4th Ed.* Washington, DC, Library of Congress, 1992.

Milton-Edwards, Beverly, *Islam and Violence in the Modern Era*. Hampshire, UK, Palgrave McMillan, 2006.

Milton-Edwards, Beverly, "The Concept of Jihad and the Palestinian Islamic Movement: A Comparison of Ideas and Techniques," *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 19, No. 1, 1992, pp. 48-53.

Nafziger, George F. and Walton, Mark W. "Islam's Warriors defeat a Powerful Empire." In *Religions and Religious Movements: Islam*, edited by Mitchell Young, Farmington Hills, MI, Greenhaven Press, 2006

O'Balance, Edgar, *Afghan Wars, Battles in a Hostile Land*, London, UK, Brassey's, 2002.

Office of the Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism, *Country Reports on Terrorism – 2006*, Washington, DC, Dept of State, 21 Mar 2006.

Pape, Robert A., "The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 97, No. 3, August 2003, pp. 343-361.

- Peters, Rudolph, *Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam*. 5th ed., Princeton, NJ, Markus Wiener Publishers, 2005.
- Roberts, Hugh, *The Battlefield Algeria 1988-2002, Studies in a Broken Polity*. London, UK, Verso, 2003.
- Robinson, Francis, *Atlas of the Islamic World since 1500*. New York, NY, Facts On File, Inc, 1982.
- Spencer, Robert, *Onward Muslim Soldiers – How Jihad Still Threatens the America and the West*. Washington, DC, Regnery Publishing, Inc., 2003.
- Stanley, Trevor, “Understanding the Origins of Wahhabism and Salafism,” *Global Terrorism Analysis, Terrorism Monitor*, Vol. 3, Issue 14, Jul 15, 2005, <http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/>, (accessed 9 Jan 2008).
- Streusand, Douglas, “What does Jihad mean?” *Middle East Quarterly*, Sep 1997, Volume IV: Number 3, www.meforum.org, (accessed 28 Oct 2007).
- Takeyh, Ray and Gvosdev, Nikolas, *The Receding Shadow of the Prophet*, Westport, CT, Praeger Publishers, 2004.
- The Middle East and North Africa 2005*, 51st ed., London, UK, Europa Publications, 2005.
- Willis, Michael, *The Islamist Challenge in Algeria, A Political History*. Washington Square, NY, New York University Press, 1996.
- Zabel, Sarah, *The Military Strategy of Global Jihad*, Carlisle, PA, Strategic Studies Institute, U. S. Army War College, Oct 2007.