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Agenda

- **Recent organization history of Army Headquarters**
- **Current view of “Full Spectrum Operations”**
 - **Combat (Offense, Defense) and Stability**
 - **Joint Operational Concepts -- USG policies**
 - **Secretary of the Army Functions**
- **Organizing for Operations and Functions**
 - **Echelons -- Authorities**
 - **Force Tailoring -- Packaging**
 - **Stability Operations -- capabilities**
- **Training / Education strategies**
 - **Management -- Tailoring**
 - **Other DoD and Other Government Agencies**
 - **Training for METT T and Training for Functions**

Army Headquarters Over Time

| | Division Strength | CBT/CS/CSS | CONUS Support | Total Strength | Concept for organization | |
|---------------------|---|----------------------------|------------------------------------|---------------------------|--|---|
| WW II | 1.1 M | 3.2 M | 1.61 M | 5.8 M (less Air Force) | ~110 divs.; Service Troops; 3 Army Grps; 9 Field Armies (allies and USMC. 7 French armies, 2 corps, 8 Divs. 15 th Army Gp in Pacific for 15 divisions (7 US) | <u>ETO</u> 44K/Div- <u>8th Army</u> 40K/Div |
| 1948 - 1950 | ~ 180K | 231K total overseas | 360K - CONUS | 590K | 9 -10 Divs. Each RCT reduced to 2 Bns from 3. | |
| Korea | 7 Army Divisions | | 10 Regular Army Training Divisions | | 20 Combat Divisions activated or mobilized. Ind. Rotations (1951) | |
| Vietnam | Peak Strength: 362K (US Army only) Plus USMC. Other nations | | | | MACV- ("5 star") USARV (4 Star) 24 th Corps, I FF, II FF (3 star) 7 x Divisions/4 Sep Bdes (1 star) | 52K/Div |
| 1989 | 4 corps 10 Divs 780K AC(1973-89)4 corps | | | | 10 AC divs/ 4 AC/RC corps Field armies eliminated (1976). Corps as basic formations of operational maneuver and joint/combined integration. Corps -largest units with doctrine | |
| Desert Storm | ARCENT ~340K | 21st SUPCOM ARSOF - ~3K | ~300K | | 7 x Divs 2 x ACR's | 43K/Div |
| | | | | | | |

Doctrinal Estimates of Required Forces for OIF (Immediately before OIF)

Divisions x 5 ~75K
 •1AD...15K
 •1 ID...15K
 •101....17K
 •3rd15K
 •10 ...10K
 •2 LCR..3K

Corps Base (5 Divs)~61K
 •Artillery
 •Aviation
 •ADA
 •Chemical
 •Engineer
 •MI

ASCC (5 Divs)~50K
 •EPW/IR •BCD
 •ENCOM •SOF
 •MEDCOM •AAMDC
 •SIGNAL •MP
 •MI •TSC

5 Divisions ~186K total

Divisions x 2 ~32K
 •1AD...15K
 •1 ID...15K
 •3 (-)/2LCR..2K

Corps Base (2 +Divs) ~30K
 •Artillery
 •Aviation
 •ADA
 •Chemical
 •Engineer
 •MI

ASCC Base (2 +Divs) ~35K
 •EPW/IR •BCD
 •ENCOM •SOF
 •MEDCOM •AAMDC
 •SIGNAL •MP
 •MI •TSC

2 Divisions ~97K total

Proportionally reduced capabilities in EPW/IR, ENCOM, MEDCOM, Signal, MP, TSC

Divisions x 1~18K
 •1 ID...15K
 •SBCT/ACR..3.6K

Corps Base (2 Divs) ~25.5K


ASCC Base (1+Div)~35K

1 Division ~79K total

“Troop Lists”
 Corps Troops ---61,000
 5 Divisions -- ~72,000
 ASCC Troops -- ~50,000
 -SOF - 2,000
 -TSC - ~20,000
 -AAMDC - ~ 2,000
 -Signal Command - ~5,000
 -513th MI Bde - ~3,000
 -Engineer Command - ~ 10,000
 -Chem Bde - ~ 2,000


Additional Requirements ?
 Internment and Resettlement: ES Brigades?
 RSOI troops – ASCC
 Pre and Post Hostilities Requirements – ARNG
 Exploitation – AC and ARNG formations

Reductions of Army Echelons since WW II




Since World War II, the Army has reduced its larger echelons of command from five above brigade to only two. While the size of Army forces have also gone down, the complexity and strategic significance of Army operations have increased. Army Modular Doctrine and Army FM 3.0 Operations....now....

Today's Doctrine: Full Spectrum Operations



Joint Concepts - Army Capabilities



Secretary of the Army Functions
USC Title 10, Sec 3013b

- (1) Recruiting**
- (2) Organizing**
- (3) Supplying**
- (4) Equipping (including research and development)**
- (5) Training**
- (6) Servicing**
- (7) Mobilizing**
- (8) Demobilizing**
- (9) Administering (including the morale and welfare of personnel)**
- (10) Maintaining**
- (11) Construction, outfitting, and repair of military equipment**
- (12) Construction, maintenance, and repair of buildings, structures, and utilities and the acquisition of real property and interests in real property necessary to carry out the responsibilities specified in this section**

*Organizing and Training
for
Operations and Functions*

Headquarters Definitions

Army Command (AC):

An Army force, designated by the Secretary of the Army, performing multiple Army Service Title 10 functions (3013b) across multiple disciplines. Command responsibilities are those established by the Secretary and normally associated with administrative control (ADCON).

Army Service Component Command (ASCC) / JFLCC / JTF:

An Army force, designated by the Secretary of the Army, primarily of operational organizations and serving as an Army component, or Joint Forces Land Component Command, or Joint Task Force for a unified, combatant command or a functional component command. Command responsibilities are those established by the Secretary and normally associated with operational control (OPCON) and ADCON.

Direct Reporting Unit (DRU):

An Army organization comprised of one or more units with institutional or operational functions, designated by the Secretary of the Army, providing broad general support to the Army in a normally single, unique discipline not otherwise available elsewhere in the Army. Direct Reporting Units report directly to a Headquarters, Department of the Army principal and / or Army Command and operate under authorities established by the Secretary of the Army.

Field Operating Agency (FOA): No Change

Staff Supporting Agency (SSA): No Change

Army Headquarters

3 Army Commands

*US Army Forces
Command
(FORSCOM)*

*US Army Training and
Doctrine Command
(TRADOC)*

*Army Material
Command (AMC)*

Functional

9 Army Service Component

Commands (ASCC)

- *Army Europe*
- *Army Central*
- *Army North*
- *Army South*
- *Army Pacific*
- *US Army Special Operations
Command*
- *SDDC*
- *Space Missile Defense
Command (SMDC) / Army
Strategic Cmd (ARSTRAT)*
- *Eighth US Army (EUSA) ***

Functional and Operational

11 Direct Reporting Units

- *Network Cmd (NETCOM)*
- *Medical Command
(MEDCOM)*
- *Intelligence Cmd (INSCOM)*
- *Criminal Invest Cmd (CIDC)*
- *US Army Corps of Engineers*
- *Military District of
Washington*
- *Army Test - Eval Cmd (ATEC)*
- *USMA*
- *US Army Res Cmd (USARC)*
- *Acquisition Support Center*
- *Installation Mgmt Command
(IMCOM)*

Primarily Functional

***Army Service Component Command to USFK until conditions in Korea no longer require
an Army level HQ*

Echelons and Roles

Combatant Commanders

- Fight and win wars.*
- Conduct Civil-Military Operations (CMO)*
- “Integrate” capabilities*

• Army Service Component –typical duties

As “Combined/Joint Forces Land Component” (CFLCC)

- Assess the Threat & Theater Conditions
- Set the Theater (Ex: Log, C4ISR, Protection, Enablers...)
- Build/Prepare The Ground Campaign Plan
- Receive and Prepare Forces (CJRSOI)
- Fight the Ground Forces
- Transition to Post-Major Combat Operations


As Service Component (ASCC/ARFOR)

- Theater Security Cooperation
- Joint/Coalition Training & Exercises
- Deliberate Contingency Planning
- Advise RCC on any Army/Land issues
- Nominate Army Force Capabilities
- Program & Budget Requests/Execution Tracking

Army Support to Other Services (ASOS)*


- | | |
|-------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| • Theater Signal Architecture | • Theater Sustainment to Land Forces |
| • Common User Logistics | • Surface Distribution |
| • Vet Support | • Conv Ammo Mgt |
| • Mortuary Affairs | • Food Safety Service |
| • Troop Construction | • Medical Logistics Mgt/ |
| • EPW/Detainee Ops | • Blood Pgm |
| • Ocean Terminal Ops | • Overland Petroleum Mgt |
| • Intermodal Container Mgt | • Water |
| • Postal Services | • Joint Communications |
| • DOD Customs Insp | |

9 Army Service Component Commands




3 major roles for the ASCC

Administrative Control AR 10-87



“...in some cases, ADCON is shared by more than one Army organization to more efficiently and effectively support Army forces globally using the ACOMs and DRUs...”

Training Strategies



Research Functions and Agreements

DoD, IA, IMS, Service Functions

Management of Terms of Reference and IA Agreements

Apply Interagency Management Systems – “Whole of Govt” staffing

Campaign Plan

DOD and OGA

elements of stability operations and Civil Military Operations

METT-TC “Capabilities and Task Based Analysis

-UJTL Theater-Strategic Tasks

-Coordinate - gaining ARFOR; on task basis

tasks, allocate, through task analysis, to ARFOR or to functional commands

“BCTP-like” major management functions such as installation plans, mobilization plans, training timelines, personnel management methods

Packaging of capabilities

- Staff and issue operational guidance, to include “implementation orders” to elements of units in packages. Include practice of collective staff skills – as requested by ARFOR

-Program funds / time. Measure against the annual approved training plans

Force Management and Training Strategies to Tailored Capabilities

Army Organization and Process

- *DA and ASCC tailor packages*
- *DA, ACOM, ASCC, and DRU develop training strategies to organize packages of capabilities.*
- *Few fixed formations forward ...*
- *Force Generation -- force provision*

Capability Based Planning

Capability 1

Expeditionary Force Capabilities
Rotational force factors built into the program. Capability likely stationed in CONUS


Regional Focused Capabilities
No rotational factors. Capability might be stationed in theater or in CONUS.

Capabilities 2 through ...

Expeditionary Force Capabilities

Regional Focused Capabilities

Each capability must be prepared and trained, as well as programmed for either theater focus or




Tailor "Deployment Expeditionary Force" capabilities

“Packaging” Capabilities

| | |
|--|-------------------|
| | PACOM / USARPAC |
| | CENTCOM / ARCENT |
| | SOUTHCOM / USARSO |
| | EUROM / UASAREUR |
| | AFRICOM |

“Some assembly required....”

Offense / Defense / Stability




Two Illustrations:

Other Government Agency coordination – DOD to USAID

Army Reserve Functional and Operational Commands

Interagency Management System for R&S



Source; Brief by Mr. Ladiner, US AID



For Training Purposes Only


CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION GOAL:
Sudan is at peace, with a government representative of the Sudanese people that makes unity attractive in a referendum.

SUB-GOALS:
1 – A peaceful resolution to the conflict in Darfur within the framework of the CPA.
2 – Broad and sustained international engagement, support, and funding.
3 – Immediate humanitarian needs met, with eventual voluntary reintegration of IDPs, refugees, and ex-combatants into functioning local communities.
4 – More participatory, inclusive, and responsive governance, empowerment of women, and enhanced economic opportunity.
5 – Public order and stability and accountable civilian-controlled security forces.
6 – Continued effective counterterrorism cooperation.

| Major Mission Element #1: Immediate humanitarian needs addressed | Major Mission Element #2: Peace and stability in Darfur | Major Mission Element #3: Military transformed and demobilization, disarmament and reintegration initiated, bolstering confidence of the Sudanese | Major Mission Element #4: A functioning GNU per the CPA that is implementing wealth and power sharing provisions | Major Mission Element #5: Econ/social infrastructure and services strengthened in targeted communities in southern Sudan, including those receiving returnees | Major Mission Element #6: More responsive and participatory governance in Southern Sudan in accordance with the CPA | Major Mission Element #7: Individual and community security is improved |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Darfur/Chad Humanitarian assistance (including food) and protection provided to IDPs and vulnerable communities in Darfur Humanitarian assistance (including food) and protection provided to refugees and affected communities in Chad Voluntary repatriation and return of refugees and IDPs supported, as appropriate Violence against women in Darfur mitigated and victims assisted | Peace Peace agreement achieved Expanded and sustained peacekeeping mission in Sudan Coordinated international community promoting peace/ending violence Peace agreement accepted by Darfurians | GOS and SPLA troops downsized and units re-positioned as agreed to by the parties Joint Defense Board functions and Joint Integrated Units deployed and operational The SPLM transformed into a standing conventional force, incorporating other Southern militia forces and under the control of a representational civilian authority | Ministries transformed per the CPA Functioning government in South Kordofan, Abyei, and Blue Nile Human rights and religious freedoms protected Census designed and infrastructure established Transparent and accountable mgmt of state and national budgets (including oil) | Essential social services received by targeted populations -Basic health services received by targeted communities and foundation for health infrastructure established -Primary and other education received by targeted populations and foundation for education system established -Water and sanitation infrastructure rehabilitated and expanded -Other community services received by targeted populations Key transport links rehabilitated and expanded Foundation for economic recovery, including food security, strengthened | Institutional/ legal structures for a transparent and accountable GOSS developed -Cabinet/ presidency -Ministry of Finance -Ministry of Public Service -Legal Frameworks for GOSS (Min of Justice - Attorney General) Foundation for participatory and inclusive political processes developed -Development of civilian democratic political parties -Parliament established | Conflict mitigated -Support people-to-people processes -Support South-South dialogue including OAGs -Northern conflict mitigated -Property claims issues addressed More effective justice system More effective correctional system More effective police and border control Transitional contingencies addressed |
| Rest of Sudan Humanitarian assistance, including food, and protection provided to IDPs, non-Sudanese refugees, Sudanese refugees outside Sudan, and vulnerable communities in the rest of Sudan, along with support for voluntary repatriation and return of refugees and IDPs | Stability Recovery and reconstruction initiated in Darfur Local communities resolve issues that caused conflict War crimes accountability | Effective demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR) | Access to independent media Oversight of CPA established Ceasefire monitored by UNMIS | Decentralized local gov't structures strengthened Institutional capacity of a vibrant inclusive civil society increased emphasis on women and marginalized groups Availability of and access to independent media and public information increased | | |
| <p>Overall Methodology: Tap Diaspora Build Indigenous Capacity Gain Donor Support Fight Corruption Community Development Gender Sensitive Programming</p> | | | | | | |
| <p>Illustrative Example – US AID task list, organized to coordinate iaw IMS to link to military JTF capabilities Source: Briefing by US AID; “The Interagency Management System” (NDU short course on stability operations, Mr. Ladiner, US AID)</p> | | | | | | |

*The Conflict Transformation Goal and its Sub-Goals are linked to achievement of the CPA, which has a six-year timeframe. The MMEs and Essential Tasks constitute a 2-3 year USG strategy encompassing both programmatic and diplomatic efforts to reach the Conflict Transformation Goal. This planning template is intended as a complement to interagency planning materials and as a graphic representation of processes articulated therein.

Example: Army Reserve Transformed



Mark Gerner


US Army Reserve

- Army Force Generation (Army Reserve Expeditionary Force Concept and Plans) Modeling and Simulation (Substitution rules, packaging rules, etc -- since 2004)
- USARC - CAPOC Plans / packages
- DA Army Campaign Plan
- Building Operational Depth
- Mobilization timelines
- Training Strategies based on capabilities and modules
- Time, money, concepts

Today's Doctrine: Joint, Interagency, Multinational (JIM) Cyclic and Rotational

A Transformed Climate in ...

Requires Training Strategies for ...



Backup

What and Where Are the “Tasks?”

National Security Presidential Directive 44: Management of Interagency Efforts in Support of Reconstruction and Stabilization (~2006).
Unified Joint Task List (UJTL)
Army Unified Joint Task List (AUTL)
DOD Directive 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations (28 Nov. 2005)
Department of the Army White Paper: “Army Stability Operations in an Era of Persistent Conflict” DA G-3/5 (Stability Operations) (May 2008)
DOD and JCS Instructions – (several hundred under JDEIS)
Joint Publication 3.0; Operations (Feb 2008)
Joint Publication 4-05.1; Manpower Mobilization and Demobilization Operations – Reserve Components Call up (6 April 2006)
Theater-Strategic level plans (RCC’s – Service Plans (ASCC)
Interagency Management System
Army Field Manual 3.0, Operations
Army Field Manual 1-01, The Generating Force for the Army in Joint Operations (Feb 2006)
Army Field Manual 3-24; Counterinsurgency Operations (Dec 2006)
(The Army Magazine “Hooah Guide to Counterinsurgency Operations”
Army Stability Operations (Draft)
Army Campaign Plan (Force Generation annex)
Army Regulation 10-87, Army Commands, Army Service Component Commands, and Direct Reporting Units (Sept 2007)
Army Force Management School
Joint Defense Education and Information System
Joint Special Operations University
Special Warfare Center and School
US Army War College – Army Employment Data (Dr. Bonin, Dec 2007)
National Defense University – Courses in Stability Operations: courses and agenda items
DOD Policy and Plans (Partnership) agreements and skills
Interagency Agreements (DOD – DOS – US AID)
US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute Record of methods

AR 10-87: Army Commands, Army Service Component Commands, and Direct Reporting Units (4 Sep 07)

o Shifts focus : from Army commands in CONUS towards all primary Army organizations

o Removes the term major Army command and the acronym MACOM - designates Army Commands, Army Service Component Commands of combatant commands / sub unified commands, or Direct Reporting Units.

o Reorganizes HQ DA – to support leaner, more agile, modular force

o Sets conditions to implement business transformation processes to manage Army resources -- establishes functional organizations

o HQ DA recognizes distinctions of the three commands – defines aligns responsibilities of each organization for executing policy and operations

o Theater Army as an Army Service Component Command, reporting directly to Department of the Army, and serving as the Army's single point of contact for combatant commands (para 1-1d(3) and chap 5 through chap 13).

o Direct Reporting Units - provide broad general support to the Army in a single, unique discipline and exercise authorities as specified in regulation, policy, delegation, or other issuance...

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Command Authorities

(COCOM)

(DOD) Nontransferable command authority established by title 10 (“Armed Forces”), United States Code, section 164,
--exercised only by commanders of unified or specified combatant commands unless otherwise directed by the President or the SECDEF.
--cannot be delegated / the authority to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designing objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command.
--Normally exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Combatant command (command authority) provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces, as the combatant commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). (JP 1-02)

Operational control (OPCON)

(DOD) Transferable command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command.
--inherent in combatant command--may be delegated and is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designing objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command.
--Normally this authority exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions.
--Does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. (JP 1-02)

Authorities

Functional Coordination: The coordination, usually technical in nature, that occurs between a functional headquarters and its supported units. This coordination provides specialized or professional guidance for the implementation or execution of policies and procedures. Functional coordination is not command authority.

Technical Control (TECHCON): The authority to provide specialized or professional service, or the exercise of professional guidance or direction through the establishment of policies and procedures. Technical control is legal, doctrinal, or policy authority, less than command, over clearly delineated functions.

Administrative Control (ADCON). (DOD) Direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in respect to administration and support, including organization of Service forces, control of resources and equipment, personnel management, unit logistics, individual and unit training, readiness, mobilization, demobilization, discipline, and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations. (JP 1-02)


Assign. (DOD, NATO) To place units or personnel in an organization where such placement is relatively permanent, and/or where such organization controls and administers the units or personnel for the primary function, or greater portion of the functions, of the unit or personnel. (JP 1-02)

The Way It Was: Corps and Theaters

- **Corps:**
 - A tactical organization performing missions within a designated Area of Operation - Designed against requirement ~350 personnel
- **ASCC:**
 - *Required component headquarters for Army and land operations planning and maintains linkages to joint, multinational, interagency, non-government organizations, and international organizations in support of the combatant commander.*
 - *Supports the complete AOR of the combatant commander.*
 - *Has forces and roles not to be subordinated to corps. Manages international efforts as determined by commander- other services and allies*
 - *Provides Administrative control (ADCON) and logistical support to all Army forces (ARFOR) provided under the operational control (OPCON) of other joint or multinational headquarters. Also provides user common user logistical support (CUL) to other services, NGO's, multinational partners, or non military governments.*
 - *Conducts major land operations as an ARFOR or functional joint land force component commander (JFLCC) to support theater campaign plan...*


•The complexity of the operation, not the number of troops, drives the C2

Army Echelons in World War II




For World War II, the Army established five echelons of command above regiment/brigade-level as depicted. The doctrinal basis for these were Field Service Regulation-Larger Units, 1930, and subsequently FM 100-15, Larger Units, 1942. Field armies and corps had normative “type troops” per doctrine.

U.S. Army in World War II





Army Echelons post-World War II



After World War II, the Army reduced its larger echelons of command from five above regiment/brigade to four. The Army Group HQs became an Allied HQs only as in NATO (NORTHAG, CENTAG). Field armies were retained in doctrine in FM 100-15, Larger Units, 1950. 8th Army functioned as the highest US Army operational command in the Korean War. For Vietnam, USARV served as both the Service component and operational HQ, while Field Forces were used in place of corps. The doctrine in FM 100-15, Larger Units, 1963, 1968, 1973 was not completely followed during Vietnam.

Third Army/ARCENT February 1991


VII Corps 146,321 (123, 321 USA)
 XVIII Corps-117,160 (106,040 USA)
 22 SUPCOM-38,825
 Army Troops-33,454
 ARSOF-2,585
TOTAL- 338,345 (304,215 USA)




AS OF FEB 91

43,000 per US Army Division

U.S. Army in Vietnam 1968-69




Army Echelons in 1989




By 1989, the Army reduced its larger echelons of command again from four above regiment/brigade to three. Field armies were officially eliminated as separate HQs in 1976 and their designations merged with that of theater armies. Corps replaced field armies as the basic formations of operational maneuver and joint/combined integration. Corps were the largest units of the US Army with doctrine (FM 100-15, Corps). But, unilateral US multi-corps operations, especially in non-NATO or ROK contingencies required a HQs larger than a corps.

Army Echelons in 2003



Ma After DESERT STORM, the Army officially replaced the theater army with the ASCC and added operational functions to its doctrinal role (FM 100-7, Decisive Force: The Army in Theater Operations, 1995). ARCENT and EUSA HQs had converted to a base TOE design, but were not at full strength. ASCCs now responsible for joint integration when designated by a JFC a JFLCC.

Reductions of Army Echelons due to Modularity




Under Modularity, the Army reduced its larger echelons of command from three above regiment/brigade to only two. While communications has improved, the complexity and strategic significance of Army operations have increased.

The Army Reserve

The Purpose of the Army Reserve, IAW Title 10, United States Code (U.S.C), section 10102, is to provide trained and ready units and qualified Soldiers to support the armed services during time of war or national emergency, and at such other times as the national security may require to fill the needs of the armed forces whenever more units and Soldiers are needed than are in the regular components.

The Chief, Army Reserve (CAR), IAW Title 10, U.S.C, sections 3038 and 10172, performs two roles as the Chief, Army Reserve and the Commander of the United States Army Reserve Command (USARC). The USARC is a Direct Reporting Unit (DRU) reporting to the Chief of Staff, Army. The Commander, USARC, commands Army Reserve forces in the continental United States other than forces assigned to the unified combatant command for special operations forces in Title 10, U.S.C., section 167

Reductions of Army Echelons due to Modularity







Under Modularity, the Army reduced its larger echelons of command from three above regiment/brigade to only two. While communications has improved, the complexity and strategic significance of Army operations have increased.

V ARMY CORPS

| | |
|--------------------------|---------------------------|
| Maneuver - 5 divs ~75K | Corps Base, 5 divs ~41K |
| Maneuver - 2 + divs ~32K | Corps Base, 2 + divs ~30K |
| Maneuver -1 div + ~18K | Corps Base, 1 + divs ~25K |


 ~ 42,000 in Europe
 ~ 116,400 Req - 5 Divs (75K + 41,378)
 ~ 62,000 Req - 2 Divs (32K + 30,118)

Active 
 USAR 
 ARNG 



Numbers represent then doctrinal requirements for 1, 2, or 5 divisions that a corps could expect to command in war. Shows how "sensitive" each function was to a changed number of divisions. In some functions, the investment was simply required of the Army corps, no matter the corps size. For example, the then 69th Corps Air Defense Brigade (PATRIOT) required about 2,500 troops for 3 ADA Bns and its links to the theater Army Air and Missile Defense (AAMDC)

| | | |
|-------|--------|-------|
| EUROP | 0 | ~ 900 |
| RQD-5 | 000 | ~1800 |
| RQD-2 | 28 | ~900 |
| RQD-1 | ~1,420 | ~900 |



| | | | | | | | | |
|--------|---------|---------|----------|----------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| EUROPE | ~1,300 | ~ 1,940 | ~ 1, 800 | ~ 3,830 | ~ 500 | ~ 200 | CONUS | ~ 100 |
| RQD-5 | ~3500 | ~ 4000 | ~ 8,300 | ~ 18,000 | | | | |
| RQD-2 | ~ 1,700 | ~ 1,900 | ~ 5,133 | ~ 7,500 | | | | |
| RQD-1 | ~ 1,500 | ~ 1,460 | ~ 5,133 | ~ 5,000 | | | | |