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The Indirect Approach to Counterterrorism

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Executive Summary

Title: The Indirect Approach to Counterterrorism

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Thesis: Globalization mandates that the United States assume a leading role in nullifying the persistent threat of terrorism and the indirect approach provides an effective strategy.

Discussion: The world is increasingly plagued by terrorism and continues to become even more susceptible to it through the process of international integration. Evaluating terrorism as a disease provides numerous insights. Terrorism is an adaptive disease that can mutate and form new strains quickly. The key to successful treatment is catching the disease early and properly identifying the particular strain. Simply quarantining the disease or treating the symptoms has proven futile and often exacerbates the issue. Similarly, large conventional forces are not a panacea for the multitude of security threats throughout the world. Terrorism flourishes in an environment of social injustice, weak or corrupt governance, and economic deprivation. A lack of security will allow terrorists to establish a foothold and expand an organization. Improving security and eliminating the underlying causes that facilitate the growth of terrorism is essential for success. The indirect approach to counterterrorism focuses on building host nation defense capacity, improving economic and social conditions, and legitimizing the host nation government. Military operations compliment the broader strategy which emphasizes political cooperation and economic development. Employing the indirect direct approach to counterterrorism at the early stages of political, social, and economic degradation constitute a viable terrorism prevention strategy. This paper utilizes the disease analogy to better understand the incubation and transmission of terrorism, as well as the effectiveness of the indirect approach in correcting the environment that supports the growth of terrorism.

Conclusion: Terrorist activity in any part of the integrated world has the potential to profoundly impact the entire system. A combined military and interagency engagement strategy must be established to address the global threat of terrorism in its infancy and eliminate the causes that create a hospitable environment for its development.

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INTRODUCTION

The world is increasingly plagued by terrorism and continues to become even more susceptible to it through the process of international integration. While globalization increases economic growth and strengthens international relations, it also increases interdependency. Terrorist activity in any part of the integrated world has the potential to profoundly impact the entire system. Targeting individual terrorists or specific groups is often costly and ineffective. Terrorist organizations often thrive in regions experiencing severe social, economic, and political problems. For example, the number of terrorist attacks against civilians in eastern and sub-Saharan Africa rose 64 percent during 2006.¹ Attacking the environments that support the incubation and proliferation of terrorist groups would be a more prudent approach. Identifying and eliminating the causes of social, economic, political, and security problems produces an environment inhospitable to terrorist activity.

The US military performs a vital supporting role in establishing environments conducive to undermining terrorism. Programs designed to address social, economic, and political issues require a minimum level of security for effective implementation. The ultimate goal is to create environments that are self sustaining. Therefore, host nation forces must be trained and equipped to maintain security after the US forces are gone. Special Operations Forces (SOF) are uniquely trained and equipped to accomplish this mission. Properly employed, SOF can assist a host nation in creating a secure environment where the underlying causes of instability can be eliminated. Correcting the environment at the earliest signs of degeneration requires limited expenditure of resources and minimizes the impact on the international community. Globalization

mandates that the United States fulfill its role as a leading nation and implement an effective strategy to nullify the persistent threat of terrorism.

EVALUATING THE TREAT

Terrorism is a Disease

The term "terrorism" is defined as "the calculated use of violence or threat of violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological."² Terrorism is a tactic used by groups seeking certain concessions and by insurgents seeking to overthrow a constituted government. In rare cases, governments may fund or provided safe haven for terrorists however; experts agree that state sponsorship is not a root cause of terrorism.³ Terrorism stems from actual or perceived social, economic, and political injustices. Terrorist organizations can develop rapidly and insurgents can graduate to more conventional operations in environments where security forces are inadequate.

Evaluating terrorism as a disease provides numerous insights. According to open-source information, approximately 14,000 terrorist attacks occurred in various countries during 2006, resulting in the injury or death of nearly 58,000 individuals worldwide.⁴ Like many diseases, terrorism presents identifiable symptoms, is transmitted in predictable patterns, and flourishes in certain environments. Terrorism is an adaptive disease that can mutate and form new strains quickly. The key to successful treatment is catching the disease early and properly identifying the particular strain.

Globalization is effectively making the world smaller and disease is highly transmittable in densely populated and interconnected areas. Thus, increased interaction and dependency make terrorism in distant regions a local threat. Several common

approaches to counterterrorism have proven ineffective. For example, interdicting the transmission pattern is prudent but left untreated, terrorism will adapt and continue to spread. Treating terrorism's symptoms and ignoring its underlying causes provides only temporary relief. Similarly, stopping treatment once the symptoms have subsided may cause terrorism to become dormant, but its adaptive nature will prevail. However, by correcting the environment that supports the growth of terrorism, the disease will be eliminated and its reoccurrence prevented.

Quarantine

The easiest method to contain the spread of terrorism would be to simply quarantine the disease until it succumbs to a lack of resources. This appears to be a viable option given Libya's recent agreement to discontinue support for international terrorism and dismantle weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in response to more than two decades of international sanctions.⁵ The US and United Nations (UN) have normalized economic and political relations and reintegrated a cured Libya into the world community. However, state sponsorship is not the cause of terrorism and the terrorists simply find a new host. Furthermore, the possibility of cross pollination when terrorism and WDM proliferation exist in the same environment creates the opportunity for the disease to mutate into a more deadly form if left untreated for decades.

In spite of strict international sanctions from 1981 until 2004, Libya continued to provide funds, weapons, and material to terrorists.⁶ The country became a safe haven where terrorist organizations operating in Asia, Africa, Europe, and the Middle East could plan and conduct operations.⁷ Libya concurrently pursued a wide range of WMD programs that exceeded most intelligence estimates. Discovery of nuclear technology

from Pakistan and ballistic missile technology from North Korea indicate Libya's active participation in the proliferation of WMD. There is also evidence of a robust chemical weapons program.⁸ A nation isolated from the international community for sponsoring terrorism may not have to be concerned with the potential political or economic repercussions for engaging in other nefarious activities for quite some time. The potential global repercussions of the combination of state sponsorship of terrorism and WMD proliferation for more than two decades make the practice of quarantine an ineffective approach to counterterrorism.

Treating the Symptoms

A common medical mistake is to treat disease symptoms or to stop the treatment once the symptoms have subsided. The initial diagnosis may look promising but the disease invariably resurfaces, often in a more drug resistant form. Terrorist organizations similarly often curtail operations and seek refuge when faced with an overwhelming force. If the force remains in theater and fails to address the underlying causes, the terrorists will adapt their operations to exploit the enemy's vulnerabilities. If the force departs once the symptoms have subsided, the terrorists will resume operations with a better understanding of the changed operational environment.

Operation Restore Hope in Somalia illustrates the disastrous result of only treating the symptoms. The US responded to public pressure to relieve the suffering of millions of famine stricken civilians being terrorized by warlords by providing transportation of relief supplies into Somalia. The suffering continued as warlords blocked UN efforts to distribute the supplies and in December, 1992, the US committed ground forces to secure the distribution of supplies. The US presence grew to 24,500

personnel and by May, 1993, hostilities had ended and the starvation crisis subsided. The US returned control of the operation to the UN and began to drawdown its force to about 4,650 personnel.⁹

The warlords responded to the withdrawal of US forces almost immediately, killing twenty-four Pakistani troops in a carefully planned ambush on 5 June. Hostilities continued to escalate until 3 October, when a US force targeting a Somali warlord met stiff resistance. Using women and children as human shields, erecting hasty roadblocks, and attacking helicopters with rocket-propelled grenades, the Somali militia killed eighteen US troops and wounded another eighty-four. The US reacted by withdrawing its support for the UN mission and by March, 1994, the last of the ground forces had been withdrawn, leaving an ineffective UN force to observe the rapid deterioration.¹⁰

Treating the symptoms and ignoring the causes of terrorism resulted in long term instability. The Failed States Index 2007, which measures political, economic, military, and social indicators of instability, ranked Somalia the third most vulnerable state to violent internal conflict and societal deterioration.¹¹ Today, Somalia continues to degenerate into a breeding ground and safe haven for terrorist organizations while local warlords remain a destabilizing force in the region. The warlords emerged from Operation Restore Hope more resilient and presently pose a greater threat to the international community than ever before.

The Panacea

Any treatment that could eradicate of a wide range of diseases with a single dose would be extraordinarily expensive. The exorbitant cost of such a panacea would inherently evoke extremely high expectations while administering the treatment. Use of

conventional military forces is frequently viewed as such a panacea in the face of a security threat like terrorism. However, terrorism is an adaptive disease that rarely succumbs to a single exposure of military force. Frustrated by a lack of results and having a significant vested financial and political interest, increasing the dose appears to be a reasonable solution. Yet over medicating can further weaken the patient and create a better environment for the disease to flourish.

The US experience fighting the terror campaign of the Viet Cong illustrates the limitations of conventional forces and tactics as a cure-all. Initial advisory efforts in Vietnam emphasized conventional warfare and attempted to train, equip, and organize indigenous forces for a Korea-type war. The lack of progress in reducing terrorist activity in turn, stimulated direct military intervention which included the deployment of 550,000 troops at peak, thousands of aircraft, and eventually cost more than \$150 billion.¹² Capabilities naturally shape strategy and tactics, and the ensuing quasi-conventional conflict produced millions of civilian casualties.¹³ Meanwhile, the US effort largely ignored the ailing Vietnamese government and contributed to the disenchantment of the indigenous population. The social, economic, and political injustices that gave rise to the initial terror campaign were left largely unchecked until the disease was so deeply rooted that the cure was out of reach.

The massive costs and high expectations associated with employing a sizeable conventional force demand measurable results. Operations against elusive terrorist organizations rarely provide the quantifiable results associated with conventional warfare. Activity itself then becomes the measure of effectiveness, such as numbers of sorties flown or raids conducted. This, in turn, leads to operations that have little impact on the

enemy. Conventional operations tend to alienate indigenous populations, delegitimize the host nation governments, and encourage external support for the terrorists. Like inoculating an infected population and ignoring the vectors that transmit the disease, conventional operations produce drug resistant strands of the disease that reemerge with deadly consequences.

A Proven Cure

Common major contributors to a terrorism-fertile environment include social injustice, weak or corrupt governance, and economic deprivation. A lack of security will allow terrorists to establish a foothold and expand an organization. While conventional militaries are well trained and equipped to address security issues, the major contributing factors require political solutions. Social reform and economic development are normally the responsibility of established and stable governments. Stabilizing a foreign government and influencing it to improve a country's social and economic environment can be a long and arduous but worthwhile task.

The Malayan Emergency from 1948 to 1960 demonstrates the effectiveness of implementing a political solution with military support. The Government of Malaya (GOM), hampered by years of colonial rule and recent Japanese occupation, looked to the United Kingdom (UK) for assistance in defeating the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) that was terrorizing the nation. The military initially focused on providing security for the population while the previously neglected police force was invigorated. The UK worked through the GOM to enact land reforms and grant citizenship to immigrants which alleviated much of the social tension. Infrastructure improvement programs were implemented to stimulate the economy by providing jobs and expanding commerce.

Within five years, the GOM enjoyed the legitimacy associated with having a police force that was providing a secure environment for social reforms embracing a previously dissident population. The military gradually transitioned security duties to police forces and commenced operations to eliminate the terrorist organization that was increasing isolated from the support of the population.

The MCP pursued a terror campaign designed to demoralize the government and make the population susceptible to insurgency. The UK however, designed a politically focused response and as a result, the GOM gained legitimacy through prudent execution. The governments' efforts changed the environment that had fostered the MCP and despite repeated attempts to regain momentum, the MCP was unable to sustain itself in Malaya. The campaign cost the UK an estimated \$235 million and they sustained fewer than 1,500 casualties over the twelve year period.¹⁴

Prevention

The basic tenets of the Malayan campaign have been touted for their remarkable effectiveness, relatively low casualty figures, and reasonable monetary investment. However, the fact that the campaign lasted twelve years is often overlooked. Maintaining political resolve and public support for a military operation over a twelve year span can prove problematic. The prohibitive time required to rejuvenate an environment that has degenerated to a level conducive to supporting terrorism makes prevention critical. The key to prevention is identifying the areas of the world that present a terrorism permissive environment and taking proactive steps to induce positive change.

The Secretary of State provides Congress an annual report identifying countries in which acts of terrorism occurred, countries that are state sponsors of terrorism, and

countries determined by the Secretary to be of particular interest in the global war on terror.¹⁵ The vast majority of the countries reported also appear high on the Failed States Index produced by The Fund For Peace.¹⁶ The Failed States Index ranks countries based on twelve social, economic, and political factors. Sudan is ranked as the number one failed state and is identified in the Secretary's report as a state sponsor of terrorism. In the top twenty failed states, two are reported as state sponsors of terrorism, six are reported as terrorist safe havens, and seven are reported as experiencing significant levels of terrorist activity.¹⁷ The direct correlation between terrorist activity within a state and the presence of social, economic, and political instability makes the Failed State Index an exceptional tool for identifying present and future threats.

Zimbabwe ranks fourth on the Failed States Index with significant political, economic, military, and social instability.¹⁸ The former tourist destination and regional trade center is now renowned for human rights violations, money laundering, human trafficking, and drug smuggling. The population of Zimbabwe is currently experiencing an unemployment rate over 80% and private sector experts put inflation at over 60,000%.¹⁹ The situation is forcing many citizens to choose between emigration and illicit activities as a means of survival. Emigration is most often through illegal networks making Zimbabwe a source country for human trafficking. The combination of strategic location, failing economy, corrupt government, and no rule of law make Zimbabwe an ideal safe haven for transnational terrorist.

The illegal networks supporting human trafficking and the massive emigration are also contributing to increased drug smuggling. Border controls are unable to contain the flood of people and Zimbabwe has become a transit point for cannabis, heroin, and

methamphetamines destined for South Africa.²⁰ Additionally, the expansion of illicit activities has produced a complex system to launder the profits. Weak government regulatory and enforcement framework contribute to Zimbabwe's potential as a money laundering destination.²¹ Terrorists use the same networks as smugglers and traffickers to move operatives and the profits from illicit activities can be used to fund terrorism.²² The situation in Zimbabwe creates an environment where terrorists can exploit the social and economic tribulation of the population to safely conceal their operations.

South Africa's President Thabo Mbeki has argued that Zimbabweans must solve their own problems.²³ This argument does not take into account the fact that the ZANU-PF party has consistently resorted to violence and election fraud to ensure they remain in power. The people of Zimbabwe are left with no recourse to affect change other than violence. The violent overthrow of the government could hardly be expected to remain contained within the nation's boundaries. The spillover effect of violence and refugees into neighboring countries could destabilize the region for an extended period of time. Zimbabwe presented an ideal opportunity for international prevention but the US has responded by terminating military cooperation since 2001 and US Agency for International Development (USAID) provides limited humanitarian assistance, primarily in the form of food aid.²⁴ The current US engagement strategy is unlikely to stimulate positive change in an environment that exhibits the characteristics of a future safe haven for terrorism.

DEFEATING THE THREAT

The Indirect Approach

The indirect approach to counterterrorism focuses on building host nation defense capacity, improving economic and social conditions, and legitimizing the host nation government. The basic elements of the indirect approach have proven fundamentally sound in defeating terrorist activity in the past. It provides a broad strategy for improving the operational environment but with the understanding that every situation will be unique. Thorough analysis is required to determine the underlying causes that are destabilizing a particular environment and the counterterrorism effort must be tailored to address these causes. Because terrorist organizations are dynamic and constantly evolving, continued analysis is needed to adapt to changes in the underlying environment.

Indirect approaches can be a slow and their results are often difficult to quantify. Positive environmental changes provide more pertinent metrics for assessing indirect approaches than measuring the amount of effort expended. For example, a large amount of effort may initially produce minor changes while later, as a situation develops, minimal efforts may have profound effects. The military's primary role is to train, organize, and assist local security forces and establish an environment that is receptive to change. Local humanitarian aid and civic assistance are helpful in building rapport with the population while an active information operations campaign can promote favorable impressions beyond the immediate area. Working through, by, and with the indigenous forces creates a system that can eventually sustain itself and brings legitimacy to the host nation government.

The military role in the indirect approach is a small fraction of the overall effort. Political officials must first garner host nation support for international involvement. Additionally, eliciting partner nations to contribute special capabilities and assistance improves the effectiveness of the operation and demonstrates international resolve. Interagency also plays a significant role in the indirect approach by training, advising, and assisting host nation officials at various levels and providing capabilities outside the scope of military operations. Finally, programs supported by USAID and other organizations can result in long-term economic growth in the region.

The US Special Operations Command, Pacific (SOCPAC) has been improving the environment in the southern Philippines for the last five years. SOCPAC sent 1,200 troops to Basilan Island in January, 2002. Their mission was to advise and assist the Armed Forces of the Philippine (AFP), who would then conduct operations against the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG).²⁵ The ASG is a terrorist organization formed in 1991 with the intent to establish an independent Islamic republic in the southern Philippines. It has engaged in kidnappings to extort ransom as a means of funding their operations and conducted bombings in an attempt to gain media attention and pressure the government into meeting their demands. The ASG was estimated to have had 460 members on Basilan at the time US forces began assisting the AFP.²⁶

The US personnel began the operation by assessing the readiness of the AFP and surveying the local population to gain a comprehensive understanding of their operational environment. Training programs were established to improve AFP and local security forces' capabilities, while US personnel provided technical expertise to expand their operational capacity. Military operations balanced the requirement to protect the

population with the need to eliminate the terrorists. The military also worked with the Filipinos to repair critical infrastructure and restore basic social services. This collaboration strengthened civilian confidence in the military, provided needed employment, and gave the Filipinos a vested interest in eliminating the destructive terrorists. Having indigenous military and security forces leading the effort enhanced the legitimacy of the host nation government and diluted terrorist propaganda.

Military operations compliment the broader strategy which emphasizes political cooperation and economic development. US government officials work closely with President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo and her administration to ensure the engagement strategy is beneficial to both countries. The US Ambassador to the Philippines Kristie Kenney recently displayed her commitment to success by making her fifth visit to Basilan in the last two years. She visited the site of a newly completed road project funded by USAID. USAID has funded the construction of 40 regional infrastructure projects and 830 smaller village improvement projects in the region.²⁷ The infrastructure improvement has had immediate impact by providing much needed employment and supporting sustainable economic growth and investment.

The operation's success can be measured by the fact that there is estimated to be fewer than twenty ASG fighters remaining on Basilan and that the AFP has been able to reduce its presence from fifteen infantry battalions to two.²⁸ An even better measurement of success is the fact the population's security is no longer threatened. Legitimate business has returned to the region, political ties between the US and Philippines have improved, and other Islamic terrorist groups in the region are engaging in peace talks with the Manila government. "The Americans did not take the shortcut in Basilan,"

Rohan Gunaratna, head of terrorism research at the Singapore-based Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, observes. "They took the long road that's working with the civilians. Their priority was to build bridges with the Muslim public rather than hunt the terrorists."²⁹

Special Operations Forces

The indirect approach places the burden of creating and maintaining a secure environment on indigenous security forces. The US forces focus on building capabilities and providing technical expertise. Within the SOF community, the Army Special Forces (SF) dedicates the most time to training for this type of mission. Their recruitment and initial training are predicated on the expectation that they will be called on to work with indigenous forces. They further refine their skills by repeatedly training with foreign forces during peacetime exercises conducted overseas. The skills and experience developed through a comprehensive training and employment strategy make SF the premier choice for executing the indirect approach to counterterrorism.

The average soldier entering SF has approximately six years of military experience and undergoes an additional 18 to 24 months of selection and training. The training develops the soldiers' individual and collective military skills and incorporates the language and cross-cultural training necessary to teach those skills to foreign forces. Upon completion of training, the soldier is assigned to an SF unit that maintains a regional orientation which will capitalize on his language training. The SF soldier can expect to participate in numerous deployments within the region to enhance his cultural understanding and improve his ability to work with foreign forces. The deployments also

build enduring relationships with host nation personnel that reduce the time needed to build rapport during subsequent engagements.

Special Forces units are organized and equipped to operate independently, allowing a commander to deploy the smallest number of personnel required while maintaining unit integrity. This is a big advantage over their conventional counterparts, who must deploy a larger force or establish an ad hoc organization. Special Forces also have the advantage of maturity. The average age of a twelve man SF team, the basic building block of an SF unit, is thirty-two.³⁰ The average age of the U.S. Marine Corps is nineteen. Deploying a smaller mature force minimizes the perception of U.S. dominance and reduces the likelihood of having an incident that could fracture relations with the host nation population.

Eradication

The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report from the U.S. Department of Defense embraces the determination required to win the war on terrorism and describes a global strategy for attacking terrorist networks and denying them sanctuary.³¹ Given the catastrophic nature of the 9/11 terrorist attack, it is reasonable to assume that war on terrorism will maintain popular support until the threat of future attacks is believed to have been eradicated. It is at this time that the nation will be most vulnerable to the every evolving disease of terrorism. As the population feels less threaten, they will resist the restrictive control measures enacted since 9/11, effectively weakening their immune system. Complacency within the political and military arenas will present opportunities for terrorism evolve and propagate in undetectable ways. The potential for this is illustrated by the fact that mortality due to infectious disease decreased over the first eight

decades of the twentieth century and then increased between 1981 and 1995.³² The sudden increase is largely attributed to globalization and complacency. Thus continued surveillance and research are critical to controlling any disease, whether biological or terroristic.

Special Forces utilizing the indirect approach to counterinsurgency would provide much of the surveillance and research needed to control terrorism. There are currently a number of programs that allow the US military to train with the militaries of partner nations however, only a few of these programs allow the US military to train with foreign security and police forces. Expanding these programs with more focus on the non-military security forces of partner nations and including an interagency component would yield multiple benefits. Foreign nations are often hesitant to employ military forces in support of domestic issues until they become a national threat. The local security forces and police are the leading agencies in domestic affairs and improving the capacities of these forces would have the greatest impact on the local security environment. Including interagency participation would extend the breadth of the programs to better understand the political and economic issues that are contributing to instability and facilitate the development of customized programs to maximize the use of resources.

These expanded programs would constitute a surveillance program that could help severely limit the ability of terrorist organizations to develop undetected. Working directly with local security forces and gaining the confidence of the local population would provide detailed intelligence assessment of the operational environment. Leveraging military and interagency cooperation would incorporate security, social, economic, and political aspects of the environment in the analysis. Identification of

emerging threats would be the catalyst for further research. Understanding the tactics, techniques, and technological capabilities of emerging threats is vital to developing effective countermeasures. The thorough assessments from multiple deployments would provide data for trend analysis and assist in allocating limited resources to areas where they will have the greatest impact.

The programs must focus on the regions exhibiting instability to prevent terrorism from establishing a foothold. Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act supports the building of host nation military capacity to conduct counterterrorism in “partner nations that uphold the cornerstones of democracy, human rights, attendant fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law.”³³ The nations of the world that do not qualify for assistance under Section 1206 rank high on the Failed States Index and should be the principle areas of focus in preventing future terrorism threats. The U.S. may have to promote democracy, human rights, freedom, and the rule of law if it wishes to eliminate terror networks in their infant stages. A strong political effort is required to gain access to many of these nations and the benefits that interagency organizations offer can be the incentive needed for a host nation to support U.S. military presence in their country.

CONCLUSION

The 9/11 terrorist attack galvanized the United States’ will to defeat transnational terrorism. Like the Cold War, the Global War on Terrorism will end and complacency will consume the United States as it basks in the feeling of security that accompanies victory. Gaining financial and political support to maintain military forces and fund deployments directed at eliminating an elusive enemy that presents no immediate threat

will be difficult. The long war on terror is similar to the eradication of smallpox. The first attempts to eradicate smallpox started in 1801. It was not until the early 1900s that smallpox was nearly eliminated in industrialized nations, and even then it persisted in developing countries where poor infrastructure, internal strife, famine, and refugees made the task more difficult. Increased accessibility to rapid transportation that allowed infected people to transit vast distances before displaying signs of infection evoked an international commitment to eradicate the disease. Smallpox was certified eradicated in 1979, almost two hundred years after the process began.³⁴

Globalization has increased the connectivity and interdependency of nation states. The United States has assumed the leading role in defeating terrorism. It will not be sufficient to simply reduce the threat of transnational terrorism to a level that no longer endangers American interests. Unattended, terrorism will seek out the unstable spaces in the world and evolve into a threat that can have a disastrous impact on the international community. A combined military and interagency engagement strategy must be established to provide stability in the vulnerable regions of the world. An enduring global counterterrorism campaign will compete with a multitude of foreign and domestic programs for limited resources. Failure to address the global threat of terrorism in its infancy and eliminate the causes that create a hospitable environment for its development will have catastrophic consequences.

Notes

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