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MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

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
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## Preface

Many Americans believe that the efforts of the United States Government are carefully choreographed to achieve clearly defined national goals. The majority of Americans are unfamiliar with the inner working of their government and assume that this grand organization, which consumes a substantial percentage of the United States' Gross Domestic Product to operate, is fully integrated and capable of efficiently attaining results.

This paper examines whether the U.S. government is properly organized and able to achieve the goals of the President's National Security Strategy at the executive level. A case study method is used to examine whether assigning the lead responsibility of stabilization and the reconstruction in Iraq and Afghanistan to the U.S. military is sensible, efficient, and necessary for achieving the goals of a National Security Presidential Directive. The current U.S. Administration has assigned the responsibility of reconstruction in Iraq and Afghanistan to the Department of State. This paper presents an explanatory case study on how the President of the United States uses his National Security Council to achieve the goals outlined in his National Security Strategy. The sources used to write this paper included a literature review to define the problem and develop recommendations for improvement, personal interviews of military personnel who have served with or are currently assigned to the Staff of the National Security Council and personal observations.

Daily guidance on this paper was provided by my civilian faculty advisor, Dr. Christopher Jaspardo of the U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College, as well as Dr. Patrice Scanlon and Ms. Andrea Hamlen of the Gray Research Center.

## Abbreviations

|       |                                                          |
|-------|----------------------------------------------------------|
| APNSA | Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs |
| ARC   | Active Response Corps                                    |
| CPA   | Coalition Provisional Authority                          |
| DC    | Deputies Committee                                       |
| DOS   | Department of State                                      |
| DOD   | Department of Defense                                    |
| FSN   | Foreign Service Nationals                                |
| <hr/> |                                                          |
| IWiGS | Interagency Working Groups                               |
| ISAF  | International Security Assistance Force                  |
| NID   | National Intelligence Directorate                        |
| NMPC  | National Monitoring and Planning Center                  |
| NSA   | National Security Advisor                                |
| NSC   | National Security Council                                |
| NSPD  | National Security Presidential Directive                 |
| NSS   | National Security Strategy                               |
| ORHA  | Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance     |
| PC    | Principals Committee                                     |
| PCC   | Policy Coordination Committee                            |
| PDD   | Presidential Decision Directive                          |
| POTUS | President of the United States                           |
| PRT   | Provincial Reconstruction Teams                          |
| RSO   | Regional Security Officer                                |

## Introduction

The purpose of this research paper is two-fold: 1) to examine whether the U.S. government is properly organized and equipped at the Executive level, to achieve the goals of the President's National Security Strategy and 2) I will consider whether assigning the lead responsibility of stabilization and the reconstruction of the governments in Iraq and Afghanistan to the U.S. military is sensible, efficient, and necessary to achieve the goals of a National Security Presidential Directive. This paper will briefly describe the elements of national power (i.e. diplomacy, information management, military, and economics) available to attain security strategy objectives. Then it will assess whether the responsibility to manage these elements should rest with a single department of the government or be a shared accountability in which a lead-agency is assigned with other departments providing support as required.

## Methodology

This paper offers an explanatory case study on how the President of the United States uses his National Security Council to achieve the goals outlined in his National Security Strategy. Additionally, it explores whether assigning the lead responsibility of stabilization and reconstruction of the Iraqi and Afghanistan governments to the U.S. military is sensible, efficient, and necessary to achieve success as defined in National Security Presidential Directives. The sources used to write this paper included a literature review to define the problem and develop recommendations for improvement, personal interviews of military personnel who have served with or are currently assigned to the Staff of the National Security Council and personal observations.

## Current Challenges



With the growth of destabilized regions in the aftermath of the Cold War, the United States has found itself in a position where it needs to positively influence world leaders, foster economic growth, and contribute to global security. The *9/11 Commission Report* concluded that the United States is currently engaged in global efforts that extend beyond the war on terror, stating, “long-term success demands for the use of all elements of national power: diplomacy, intelligence, covert action, law enforcement, economic policy, foreign aid, public diplomacy, and homeland defense.”<sup>1</sup> While stating that the U.S. Government must engage all instruments of national power to defend our sovereignty seems obvious, the assignment of these responsibilities must be carefully selected. Specifically, agencies and departments that are adequately staffed, trained, equipped, and funded should be designated as the “lead” agency and supported by other governmental organizations who will contribute to task accomplishment. When the Federal Government fails to designate a “lead” organization capable of performing the tasks essential to achieving national goals, the government’s half-hearted effort will diminish the credibility of the United States as a nation of action, possessing leadership, direction, and vision. Instead, the United States will be viewed as a weak, self-serving, unreliable nation incapable of delivering what we advertise.

#### The National Security Apparatus

The National Security Act of 1947 requires the President to promulgate instructions to his National Security Council within 150 days of entering office. Additionally, as directed by the Goldwater Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986, the president must publish a National Security Strategy, specific to his administration, within two years of assuming office. The President articulates his priorities, goals, philosophies, and vision for the nation in his National Security Strategy. In his first National Security Strategy, dated September 2002, President Bush

assigned the responsibility of diplomatic interaction with other nations to the U.S. Department of State. The Department of Defense was assigned to defend America's interest at home and around the world. However, before this paper can address the president's NSS, it will describe the structure and personnel that help the president develop this important document which defines the framework of his security strategy.

The National Security Council (NSC) was established in 1947 by the National Security Act, which states "The function of the Council shall be to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security."<sup>2</sup> The statutory members of the NSC include the President, Vice President, Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense (see Figure 1). Regular attendees of NSC meetings include the Secretary of the Treasury and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (APNSA), also known as the National Security Advisor.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the statutory military advisor to the Council. The Director of National Intelligence is the intelligence advisor. The Chief of Staff to the President, Counsel to the President, and the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy are also invited to attend any NSC meeting. The Attorney General and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget are invited to attend meetings pertaining to their responsibilities. The heads of other executive departments and agencies, as well as other senior officials, may attend meetings of the NSC when appropriate.<sup>3</sup> Amendments to the structure of the NSC occurred in 1949 under the Eisenhower Administration and, most recently, in 1986 under the Reagan Administration.

The National Security Advisor (NSA) is appointed by the President and does not require congressional confirmation. The NSA performs the duty of chairperson of the committee and provides assistance and advice to the President and the NSC on matters pertaining to national security. Since the NSA has no legal authority, his or her involvement with the NSC largely depends on the President he or she serves. While most NSAs have been the cornerstone of a President's National Security Strategy, some have provided little more than detailed research for NSC consideration.




Figure 1

In accordance with the National Security Act of 1947, each President is required to provide Congress with a National Security Strategy report within 150 days of inauguration. In addition to this initial obligation, the President must present a National Security Strategy Report to the Congress annually with each budget. In the early years of the National Security Council, Presidents typically revised their National Security Strategy annually. In more recent

administrations, Presidents have transmitted their National Security Strategy Reports annually and published new National Security Strategies once during each term in office, as President Bush did in 2002 and 2006. Table 2 provides a comparison of the NSS published in 2002 and 2006.

While all Presidents use their NSC to achieve their security strategy, the level of formal involvement changes with the personality of each President. For instance, President Eisenhower considered the NSC as the most important organization of the Executive Branch and relied on its members to provide thoroughly researched recommendations and options similar to what his general officer staff provided him when he was the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe during World War II.<sup>4</sup> President Kennedy, on the other hand, relied on advice from his NSC, but frequently sought counsel from advisors not typically associated with the NSC.

Each president promulgates a series of presidential directives to outline a vision for the NSC in his administration, and to convey national security initiatives for review and decision. The naming conventions for these presidential directives have changed in every administration since President Carter (see Table 1). The current Bush Administration propagates National Security Presidential Directives (NSPD) for the purpose of assigning national security responsibilities, outlining policy, and directing interagency cooperation to achieve specific goals.

#### The Elements of National Power

The instruments of national power include the use of diplomacy, information, the military, and economy. These are leveraged to help represent the interests of the United States and allow it to maintain its ability to influence global politics, commerce, and regional security.

The Department of State's mission is to "Create a more secure, democratic, and prosperous world for the benefit of the American people and the international community."<sup>5</sup> The

Secretary of State is responsible for developing a strategic plan, which provides the framework to accomplish this mission. This plan requires more than 6,500 foreign service officers and support staff to be assigned at 267 U.S. embassies, consulates, and missions throughout the world.<sup>6</sup> This daunting task is accomplished on a limited budget with remarkably positive results.

Information is the least managed instrument of power because there is no department or agency assigned the lead on this responsibility. With the incorporation of the United States Information Agency into the Department of State in 1999, DOS has been actively engaged in managing a focused public information effort. Unfortunately, results are Department of State centric and do not always coincide with the images or messages other government departments desire to project.

On the other hand, several departments are charged with managing economic activities. The Office of Management and Budget determines government spending and taxation while the Federal Reserve Board establishes interest rates. The Departments of Commerce and Department of State play roles in international trade and economic treaty activities.

The Department of Defense has the lead responsibility in the management of all military matters within the government. Its responsibilities and capabilities are enormous as is evidenced by the 1.3 million men and women in uniform and a budget totaling more than 481.8 billion dollars.<sup>7, 8</sup>

### The Evolution of National Security Strategy

Shortly after entering office in January 2001, President Bush published National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 1 which delineated his vision for the NSC. Since then, more than 50 NSPDs have been issued that cover a wide spectrum of topics from terrorism to human trafficking and the U.S. strategy in sub-Saharan Africa. While NSPDs provided essential

direction to the members of the National Security Council, the publishing of a National Security Strategy that offered broad strategic guidance was a primary goal of the Commander in Chief for communicating his priorities.

The staff of the NSC was dutifully finishing President Bush's initial NSS in the late summer of 2001, when the terrorist attacks of September 11<sup>th</sup> occurred. As a result, the NSS was re-written to address the imminent threat to U.S. security, and was published in September of 2002. This NSS departed from strategies published during former administrations and represented the plan of a nation at war that faced enormous challenges and required the focused efforts of all governmental resources.<sup>9</sup> President George W. Bush published the second NSS of his administration in March of 2006. This revised NSS reviewed the goals of the 2002 strategy and provided additional direction for achieving these objectives during the remainder of the current Bush administration (see Figure 2 for NSS influences and Table 2 for a comparison of the 2002/2006 NSS).




Figure 2

The mechanism which translates ideas and concepts into direction and decision within the NSC is its staff, which maintains several committees responsible for conducting research, developing options, and ensuring unity of effort among participating agencies. The Principals Committee (PC) is the senior interagency body. The PC is traditionally chaired by the National Security Advisor and exists to deliberate policy issues that affect national security.

The Deputies Committee (DC) is the senior sub-cabinet and interagency body, frequently responsible for crisis management and response. The DC deliberates policy issues that affect national security. The Policy Coordination Committee (PCC) is responsible to the President for the management, development, and implementation of national security policies by multiple agencies of the United States Government. Arguably, the yeoman's work of the NSC takes place within Interagency Working Groups (IWiGs). The purpose of these working groups is to provide options to national security issues, recommend policy implementation or change, educate NSC members or offer an update on an ongoing concern to national security. IWiGs can be formed along functional lines or geographic areas of interests.<sup>10</sup>

Although there is substantial effort by the NSC and its staff to provide the President with the best possible information, errors are made and agencies can be assigned lead responsibilities that they are incapable of achieving. An example of an inappropriate tasking is NSPD-44 which was promulgated on December 7, 2005 assigning the Department of State (DOS) with the lead responsibility to "promote the security of the United States through improved coordination, planning, and implementation for reconstruction and stabilization assistance for foreign states and regions at risk of, in, or in transition from conflict or civil strife."<sup>11</sup> NSPD-44 outlines a dozen specific tasks that include strategy development, course of action refinement, interagency

coordination, international cooperation, development of partnership capacity, and program execution.

### Reconstruction and Stabilization in Iraq and Afghanistan

After the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States, the U.S. was instrumental in ousting Al-Qaeda and the Taliban and ending the brutal control they exercised over Afghanistan for more than a decade. In 2004, President Hamid Karzai became Afghanistan's first democratically elected head of state. Since then he has achieved enormous success towards establishing a government, providing a secure environment, and representing his nation as a peaceful participant on the world stage.

In 2006, the military efforts in Afghanistan transitioned from a U.S. led coalition to a United Nations directed International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) consisting of a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) multi-nation coalition which includes 26,000<sup>12</sup> U.S. service members. These forces are dedicated to improve the security of towns, villages and cities. Concurrently, an interagency effort is focusing on governance, establishment of municipal services, and preserving the rule of law. Some of the interagency participants include the U.S. Departments of State, Justice, Commerce, and Agriculture. Additionally, more than 1,600 non-governmental organizations (NGO's) are registered with the government of Afghanistan in order to provide humanitarian assistance and technical information to make Afghanistan a more functional society.<sup>13</sup> While substantial progress has occurred, a greater unity of effort may be possible if an organization such as the Department of Defense assumes the lead role with directed cooperation from inter-agency participants.



In March of 2003, a U.S. led multinational coalition invaded Iraq for the purpose of preventing the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and facilitating a regime change that would end Saddam Hussein's 24 years of unethical, inhumane, and oppressive rule. Originally the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), led by retired U.S. Army Lieutenant General Jay Garner, was responsible for the post-war planning and reconstruction in Iraq. Unfortunately, the establishment and operational planning for this organization did not commence until three months prior to the invasion. The initial chaos the U.S. encountered in Iraq, a lack of experienced diplomats, and the marginal support for the mission of ORHA caused it to be disestablished after just five weeks.

In May of 2003, L. Paul Bremer III, a retired career foreign service officer and former U.S. Ambassador, was appointed as the administrator for the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). Ambassador Bremer managed the reconstruction effort and transition to an Iraqi-led government until the official change of power was conducted on June 28, 2004.<sup>14</sup> Currently, the U.S. remains heavily engaged in Iraq with the largest overseas contingency of DOS personnel located in the semi-protected Green-Zone of Baghdad. Additionally, more than 158,000<sup>15</sup> U.S. service members are also serving in a multitude of functions ranging from security operations to training the Iraqi armed forces and providing utilities for small communities.

#### The Department of State in Iraq and Afghanistan

Currently, the responsibility of assisting in the establishment and operation of the governments of Afghanistan and Iraq rests with DOS. While DOS has and can make a difference developing partnerships and contributing to regional stability through a variety of programs, they are constrained by the local security environments and their limited overall capability.

DOS's organizational charter never included meeting the security requirements for facilitating stability and security operations in dangerously uncertain environments such as Afghanistan and Iraq. Consequently, the presence of DOS personnel in the small towns and villages of Afghanistan and Iraq is only possible because of the overall security provided by the United States military. Close-in personal security is supplied by diplomatic security officers or contracted personnel but, overall security comes from U.S. military presence in the town or villages where DOS personnel are operating. DOS simply does not have the trained security personnel, resources, and infrastructure to manage a successful overarching security effort over extended distances in an austere, hostile and frequently violent setting. For example, according to Mr. Paul Folmsbee, the senior foreign service officer responsible for supervising PRTs in Iraq,

We couldn't function without the U.S. military right now, whether we're embedded or not... And we have one mission. We're looking to reach out to the community, work in security, work in governance. And so wherever we can apply jointly resources, we do that and that's the great advantage of an embedded team.<sup>16</sup>

Approximately 497 Diplomatic Security Special Agents serve at more than 260 overseas missions world-wide. By mid-2007 the Regional Security Office (RSO) of the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad controlled more than 1,600 security personnel. The RSO provides security for the embassy and designated buildings within the "Green Zone" a four square mile controlled access area for the Iraqi seat of government and foreign diplomatic missions. Of the 1,600 security personnel, 1,395 are contracted employees, which include 945 Americans, 29 Iraqis and 421 third country nationals. Less than ten percent of the RSO team is comprised of Diplomatic Security Special Agents.<sup>17</sup> These numbers illustrate DOS's inability to achieve mission success without contractor assistance. Although contracted security assistance is essential, it is not

always welcome by the host nation. Perceived misconduct or unprofessional interaction by contracted security personnel has complicated DOS's ability to diplomatically engage with the Iraqi government.

Shortages of trained personnel within the Department of State are not limited to those who provide security. DOS relies heavily on 8,300 civil service employees to staff its headquarters and domestic operations. Another 4,900 professionals with expertise in office administration, information management, and medicine, work both domestically and overseas. The largest portion of DOS's support staff is provided by Foreign Service Nationals (FSNs) who perform duties ranging from administration to maintenance and security at U.S. missions world wide.<sup>18</sup> The U.S. Embassy in Iraq has been described by the DOS as their largest overseas mission with more than 3,500 personnel. Although a large percentage of the Mission will be contractors or members of the interagency, nearly a third of these individuals will be DOS foreign service officers and support personnel. If DOS resources were focused exclusively on the events in Iraq and Afghanistan, their opportunity for success would be greater. However, DOS responsibilities are global and the numerous instable countries around the world require resources to promote security and provide stabilization assistance before states fail and regional conflict or civil strife becomes a reality.

Despite these limitations, in response to the requirements of National Security Presidential Directive-44, the Department of State has recognized that it needs to transform itself into a more capable and responsive agency. Perhaps the best example of this has been the establishment by DOS of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) at the district-level in Iraq and Afghanistan. These PRTs are comprised of DOS subject-matter experts who provide assistance and advice to local leaders who are governing their communities. While the level of experience

varies, the DOS goal is to staff PRTs with personnel well-versed in the requirements of effectively administering government in the village, city, or region assigned. Since its beginning in 2003, PRTs have realized progress in developing political, social, and economic stability. These teams have grown in number from an initial 10 in a few provinces to 25 in all the provinces of Iraq. Several PRTs are also being led by British, Italian, and Korean coalition partners. Additionally, the composition of PRTs is becoming increasingly diverse with greater participation by various interagency core members such as USAID, the Department of Justice, and the Department of Agriculture.<sup>19</sup>

The establishment of an Active Response Corps (ARC) in 2006 was another DOS transformation initiative designed to meet the requirements of reconstruction and stabilization assistance around the globe. The purpose of the ARC is to field first-responders who can, engage with a host country government, coordinate with international partners, and conduct assessments. ARC members are State Department officials serving one year tours. Ten (members) are now on-board, trained, equipped and being deployed. By the end of 2007, the team is expected to expand to 30.<sup>20</sup>

Members of the ARC have already been deployed to assist in Sudan and Lebanon and can provide an initial critical capability for responding to situations in failed, failing, and troubled nations. Members of the ARC and PRTs receive general and skill specific training focused on the cultural, governmental, political environmental and personal security factors required to ensure their safety and success.

Nonetheless, despite the formation of PRTs and the ARC, the DOS will remain severely limited in its ability to achieve or contribute to mission success unless it receives proper fiscal support. In fiscal year 2007, the Department of State was authorized 30.2 billion dollars, or one

percent of the total federal budget. In its 2008 federal budget summary, DOS allocated \$449 million for increasing the number of PRTs in Iraq from 10 to 25. However, there was no direct mention regarding the funding of PRTs in Afghanistan, or the overall cost of ARCs within DOS.<sup>21</sup> Given its limited ability to staff, train, equip, and finance for the requirements of NSPD-44, the DOS will find itself in the supported role attempting to solicit cooperation in order to coordinate, plan, and implement reconstruction and stabilization efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq.

#### The Department of Defense in Iraq and Afghanistan

The reality in Afghanistan and Iraq is that most of the stability and reconstruction happening on the ground in hundreds of small towns and remote communities is a direct result of the U.S. military presence. With more than 158,000 soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen engaged in security and stability operations in Iraq and 26,000 in Afghanistan, the Department of Defense is clearly shouldering the preponderance of the burden assigned to DOS in PNSD-44.<sup>22</sup>

The United States military has been assigned the responsibility of governing towns, communities, territories, states, and countries following conflict since the end of the Mexican – American war in 1847.<sup>23</sup> Although this task is not always embraced, it was covered in the curriculum of the U.S. Army War College and first codified in doctrine by Field Manual 27-5, *Military Government*, published in 1940. After World War II, the responsibility of interacting with local populations fell to the civil affairs division of the U.S. Army. In November of 1942, while the U.S. Army was busy conducting Operation Torch in French North Africa, members of the cabinet and White House were considering assigning the Department of State the responsibility of governing territories overseas once hostilities ceased. However, the uncertain post-conflict environment and limited capabilities of DOS resulted in the assignment of this duty to the U.S. military, with technical assistance available from DOS as necessary.

Since the U.S. military's World War Two post conflict experiences with the occupation of Japan and Germany, the Department of Defense has refined the responsibilities and duties of an occupying military through the 1956 publication of FM 27-10, *The Law of Land Warfare*.<sup>24</sup> This manual clearly defines the responsibilities of the military when occupying a foreign nation.

Although DoD has experience with post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization, and possesses greater resources than DOS, it still requires direction and training to meet unique mission requirements and successfully achieve the goals of the NSS.

#### Efficiently Achieving National Security Strategy

If the United States government desires to achieve global success by using all elements of national power, substantial effort must be focused on employing the NSC, its sub-committees, and staff efficiently. Currently, there is little that unifies the labors of the executive departments of the government. The President must coordinate the work of fifteen executive departments through the assigned secretaries. As previously stated, President Bush attempts to achieve unity of effort through NSPDs and defined the goal of his administration's National Security Counsel early in his tenure to achieve positive results.

Unfortunately, attaining unity of effort continues to present a substantial challenge throughout government. In the mid 1980s, a dangerous lack of unified effort among the different branches of the military resulted in wasted resources, inefficient outcomes, and on occasion, the loss of service members. The failed attempt to rescue U.S. hostages held in Iran in 1980, was an embarrassment for the U.S. military and ended in the death of several service members and an aborted rescue effort. This failure was a result of the military's inability to plan and conduct a complex clandestine special operation that required the participation of all services and several government agencies. Frustrated with these inefficiencies, a review of how the military

conducted operations was sponsored by Senator Barry Goldwater and Representative Bill Nichols in 1986. Known as the Goldwater Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, this act modernized the U.S. military by requiring joint cooperation at every level, to include, individual service member's education, personnel assignments, operational planning, and service funding.<sup>25</sup>

The challenges of achieving unity of effort are not limited to the military or unique to the Bush Administration. By May of 1997, the Clinton Administration realized the departments and agencies of the federal government were not capable of supporting the planning and execution required when managing complex contingency operations. As a result, President Clinton promulgated Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 56, instructing all government agencies to institute change necessary to achieve unity of effort among other U.S. Government agencies and international organizations when engaged in complex contingency operations. This PDD spells out the requirements necessary to plan and participate in complex operations.<sup>26</sup> In addition to assigning the responsibility of promoting security through improved coordination, planning, and implementation to DOS, NSPD-44 also superseded PDD-56.

In 2004 the Center for Strategic and International Studies released the findings of a two year study, *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era: Phase 1 Report*. This study critically examined how the U.S. military currently operated and set out to recommend changes only if their decision and implementation process was considered detrimental to mission accomplishment and not simply because it was inefficient. Although the *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols* study originally focused on defense improvements, it soon determined that interagency cooperation required the examination of non-DOD government departments. Given the level of involvement of the entire U.S. Government in achieving

National Security Strategy, examining the relationships and efficiencies of both military and civilian government agencies was essential. According to the study, "Defense reform must look beyond purely defense issues because, in many instances, ultimate success hinges on how well DOD integrates with other government agencies and coalition partners."<sup>27</sup> Among the recommendations of this study, include an increased involvement of the National Security Council and improved interagency cooperation to maximize unity of effort for the purpose of achieving a balanced use of all instruments of national power in pursuit of NSC objectives. Additionally, this study recommends that all agencies who are involved with planning and participating in operations abroad establish offices to lead in the development and execution of these missions. Currently these capabilities exist with only a limited ability to plan, coordinate, and execute a medium to large scale mission.

According to Mr. Anton K. Smith, a career foreign service officer and former Deputy Chief of Mission, the strength of DOS is its ability to operate with minimal guidance.<sup>28</sup> The DOS's five-year strategic plan may offer the minimal guidance Mr. Smith suggests. This five-year plan, which is provided by the Secretary of State, outlines the departments overall strategy, which gives the latitude required to achieve its mission goals. Mr. Smith also recognizes that, "Most State officials... have little exposure to the military planning process and may have difficulty understanding DoD's more robust but relatively inflexible, top-down, step-by-step approach."<sup>29</sup> The inability of the Department of State to manage large scale crises, especially in an uncertain security environment, is widely recognized within the department and efforts such as the Active Response Corps and Provisional Reconstruction Teams are designed to enhance their ability to respond. Nevertheless, Mr. Smith states in his research paper, *Turning on the*



*DIME: Diplomacy's Role in National Security*, "In view of its resource limitations, the present most valuable DOS role may be in helping ward off military conflicts." <sup>30</sup>

To achieve positive results in any undertaking, the assigned task must have the necessary dedicated financial resources. The fiscal year 2008 discretionary funding request for the Department of Defense is 481.8 billion dollars while the Department of State will receive only 35 billion.<sup>31</sup> Given the global responsibilities of DOS, it seems ludicrous to believe diplomatic efforts can achieve a reasonable degree of success when DOS receives only a fraction of the total federal budget. The military by comparison receives more than 10 times the amount allocated to DOS.<sup>32</sup> Additionally, fiscal year 2007 military strength estimates were 1.3 million officer and enlisted personnel for service around the globe.<sup>33</sup> This number, compared with the small population of DOS foreign service officers requires serious contemplation as to whether any organization other than the U.S. military could be successful in the uncertain, austere, and dangerous environments of Iraq and Afghanistan. Retired U.S. Marine General Anthony Zinni agrees that DOS is unable to attain success given their size. In *The Battle for Peace*, General Zinni writes, "The State Department may have ideas about prevention and reconstruction, but these have no relation to the military's plans, nor can State provide much in the way of people on the ground to implement their plan."<sup>34</sup>

### Conclusion

General Zinni recommends a new organization at the national level of government called the National Monitoring and Planning Center (NMPC). This organization would monitor worldwide security situations and would integrate the efforts of all agencies required to appropriately respond to emerging or persistent areas of interest. General Zinni also believes that the success of the NMPC would be contingent on the government's ability to reorganize the current system

of agencies and departments along functional areas such as justice, intelligence, and diplomacy, to an integrated organization that efficiently utilizes all available resources for mission accomplishment vice focusing on the narrow requirements of their particular department.<sup>35</sup>

While I agree with General Zinni's assessment that government needs to be reviewed for efficiency, I believe the existing structure of the National Security Council and its staff could serve this purpose if properly staffed and clearly directed.

In a July 2006 article in the *Strategic Insights Journal*, Mr. John R. Mills, a strategic planner and senior program analyst for the Assistant Secretary of Defense, critically examined the elements of national power and how the President of the United States (POTUS) allocates resources to accomplish National Security Strategy. Mr. Mills also considers a reorganization of the current structure of government as necessary. He asserts that only the military is properly resourced to achieve its intended goals. Additionally, Mr. Mills considers the current structure of government unmanageable since a typical supervisor is required to monitor the daily progress of more people and departments than is reasonable. He suggests this fact is easily verified by examining the record of success government departments and agencies produce. Mr. Mills proposes structuring the National Security Council and an associated interagency staff in a fashion similar to the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Specifically, all agencies of the government would be required to maintain positions on the NSC and its staff. Primary staff positions would rotate from department to department so one agency or department would not become the historical chair-holder of a specific posting. Once reorganized the charter of the NSC would require redefining to delineate authority and ensure the roles and responsibilities of the NSC are carried out.<sup>36</sup>

During a January 14, 2008 interview, Colonel Thomas C. Greenwood related his experiences while serving on the Staff of the NSC as the Senior Director for Defense Policy and Arms Control, during the end of the Clinton Administration and the first few years of President George W. Bush's first term in office. Colonel Greenwood believed the process he experienced was unnecessarily constrained because of a tendency to be overly protective of information. This lack of enthusiasm for broadening the circle of those permitted access to relevant information ultimately added to inefficiencies and further slowed down progress. Additionally, Colonel Greenwood suggested that when a member of the council believes they wield more authority than other members, this can result in unnecessary friction which in the end impedes progress. Finally, Colonel Greenwood proposed that the success of the NSC ultimately comes down to leadership by all participants at every level of the interagency process and their ability to put aside personal agendas or perceived animosity to achieve the nation's security objectives as defined by the President.<sup>37</sup>

A senior military member, currently serving on the National Security Council, related that the NSC achieves their mission by attaining consensus. While the interagency process is both challenging and painfully slow, it allows all participants to have their say. He concurs that the system breaks down when participants do not use the proper forum to air their disagreements or when they decide to circumvent the process by having their secretary engage directly with the President rather than allowing the process to work as designed. According to this senior NSC staffer, the ultimate success or failure of the NSC rests with leadership at all levels. Those who have the discipline to adhere to and manage the process are well respected team players with a common goal and those who circumvent the process create friction and contribute to unnecessary delays. Finally, he believed the current composition of the staff and the roles and responsibilities

of committees were adequate for the enormous responsibilities assigned to the NSC. As members embrace the requirements of their job and take all necessary steps to research, plan, and draft sound recommendations, their accomplishments will be noteworthy. However, given the level of complexity, achieving perfection is an unrealistic goal.<sup>38</sup>

The observations of both interviews confirm what twenty-five years of military service has taught me. Every organization, no matter how carefully designed, relies on leadership at every level to achieve efficient results. Even at the highest levels of government, a periodic review must be conducted to ensure an efficiently organized, capably prepared federal government is able to administer its responsibilities with greater accuracy. A more competently operating administration is the responsibility of the government itself and requires leaders to inspect its internal processes and make changes as necessary to respond to evolving threats and prepare the United States for continued future success.

Assumptions that the efforts of the U.S. government are carefully choreographed and clearly defined and that the U.S. government is properly structured, adequately financed, and well versed in individual agency responsibilities are unfounded. Simply stating that we must engage all instruments of national power to defend our sovereignty is of little help. More importantly, the assignment of these responsibilities must be specific and to organizations that are adequately staffed, trained, equipped, and funded to produce results and achieve success. Failure to designate a lead organization to perform tasks essential to achieving national goals sends the message that we are not seriously pursuing solutions to problems but complicit in the inefficiencies of a poorly organized government.

In order to achieve the goals of National Security Strategy, a review of the National Security Council and its supporting staff should be undertaken. The goal of this review should

be to re-define the statutory responsibilities of the NSC and to assign a specific mission with measurable goals. This review would also institute an interagency staff, requiring personnel who desire promotion to the senior levels of government to serve successfully in an interagency assignment. The NSC should continue to assign and supervise a lead agency with the responsibility of U.S. policy implementation and engagement as it relates to diplomacy, the economy, information, and the military. Agencies assigned to support the lead organization must be fully committed to this effort and held accountable for adequately contributing to this endeavor. Additionally, departments and agencies assigned a role in achieving the National Security Strategy must be properly supervised and resourced, and would report their success or failure annually to the NSC.

The NCS is comprised of several different cultures, including membership by the military, career federal employees, third party contractors, and political appointees. All of whom have their own ideas on task accomplishment, job loyalties, and the rate of success. A review may add efficiencies to the process of defining and achieving the National Security Strategy, but ultimately it will be the positive leadership and professional actions of every participant that will produce superior results.

Finally, the multitude of the tasks associated with establishing local government, promoting an economy, and building a trustworthy justice system necessary to stabilize Iraq and Afghanistan for self-rule and peaceful coexistence can only be realized with the U.S. military in the lead role. Defining this requirement in a National Security Presidential Directive should be the first step in the NSC review process, demonstrating a clearly defined, properly resourced, and fully supported effort is the United State's primary goal.

## Glossary of Terms

Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (APNSA) - Also known as the National Security Advisor (NSA), advisor to the President for National Security Affairs, responsible for the functioning of the National Security Council (NSC), and the NSC staff.

Active Response Corps (ARC) - Members of the Department of State first-responder team who are prepared to deploy on short notice to a designated country to provide the local government assistance in governance, civil affairs, international partnerships, and to conduct assessments for the Secretary of State.

Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) - The provisional government established by the United States in Iraq in 2003 to manage the reconstruction effort and changeover to an Iraqi led government in mid-2004.

Deputies Committee (DC) - The senior sub-cabinet and interagency body, frequently responsible for crisis management and response, that deliberates policy issues which affect national security.

Foreign Service Nationals (FSNs) - An individually locally hired by the Department of State to work at overseas missions in a variety of positions that include maintenance, administration, security and contracting.

International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) - United Nations directed multinational security force dedicated to improve the security of towns, villages and cities in Afghanistan.

Interagency Working Groups (IWiGs) - Membership by NSC staff for the purpose of providing options to national security issues, educating NSC members by providing an update regarding ongoing national security concerns. IWiGs can be formed along functional lines or geographic areas of interests.

Instruments on National Power - For the purpose of this paper, the Instruments of National power is the use of diplomacy, information, military or the economy to accomplish stated goals.

National Monitoring and Planning Center (NMPC) - A proposed governmental organization that would monitor world-wide security situations and integrate the efforts of all required agencies to appropriately respond to emerging or persistent areas of interest.

National Security Council (NSC) - Advises the President on domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security.

National Security Presidential Directives (NSPD) - Provided to the NSC by President G.W. Bush to assign responsibilities, outline policy, and direct cooperation to achieve specific goals.

National Security Strategy (NSS) - The President of the United States articulates his priorities, goals, philosophies, and vision for the nation by promulgating a National Security Strategy.

## Glossary of Terms

Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) – Originally the office responsible for the reconstruction and humanitarian assistance provided to Iraq in 2003. This office was dissolved when the Coalition Provisional Authority was established in May 2003.

Policy Coordination Committees (PCCs) – Responsible to the President for the management, development, and implementation of national security policies by multiple agencies of the United States Government.

Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) - Provided to the NSC by President W.J. Clinton to assign responsibilities, outline policy, and direct cooperation to achieve specific goals.

Principals Committee (PC) – The senior interagency body, traditionally chaired by the National Security Advisor, for the purpose of deliberating policy issues that affect national security.

Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) – Department of State subject-matter experts who provide assistance and advice to local leaders who are governing their communities, currently working in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Rule of Law - The principle that all members of society adhere to set of plainly defined and commonly accepted laws.

## Presidential Directives Naming Convention

Table 1

| President  | Review Directive                                |     | Decision Directive                              |     |
|------------|-------------------------------------------------|-----|-------------------------------------------------|-----|
| Truman     |                                                 |     | National Security Council (NSC)                 | 3   |
| Eisenhower |                                                 |     | National Security Council (NSC)                 | 87  |
| Kennedy    |                                                 |     | National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM)      | 272 |
| Johnson    |                                                 |     | National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM)      | 100 |
| Nixon      | National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM)       | 206 | National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM)    | 264 |
| Ford       | National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM)       | 41  | National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM)    | 83  |
| Carter     | Presidential Review Memorandum (PRM)            | 47  | Presidential Directive (PD)                     | 63  |
| Regan      | National Security Study Directive (NSSD)        | 53  | National Security Decision Directive (NSDD)     | 325 |
| Bush       | National Security Review (NSR)                  | 30  | National Security Directive (NSD)               | 79  |
| Clinton    | Presidential Review Directive (PRD)             | 66  | Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)           | 75  |
| GW Bush    | National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) | 51  | National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) | 51  |

Table derived from <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/direct.htm>



National Security Strategy Comparison  
Table 2

|                                                                                                                   | 2002 Summary                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     | 2006 Future Direction                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>I. Overview of America's International Strategy</b>                                                            | The goal of the 2002 NSS was to assist in creating a world of democratic, well-governed states that could meet the needs of their citizens and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       | This is best achieved by remaining focused on the course started by the 2002 NSS and is the best way to provide enduring security for the American people.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                |
| <b>II. Champion Aspirations for Human Dignity</b>                                                                 | The US will defend principles of liberty and justice. These rights are essential to human dignity and necessary for secure democracy. We will advance this effort by speaking out and taking appropriate action, upholding human rights and allocating necessary resources to attain these goals.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                | The US will continue to achieve this goal by leading an international effort against tyrannical rule and promote effective democracy by being vocal in our support and disagreement. Additionally, we will promote effective democracy and encourage others to do the same. We will clearly state our disapproval for tyranny by our words and actions.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |
| <b>III. Strengthen Alliances to Defeat Global Terrorism and Work to Prevent Attacks Against us and Our Friend</b> | This goal requires a long-term strategy and a break from traditional solutions. The enemy possesses a global reach and the US can no longer simply rely on deterrence to keep the terrorists at bay or defensive measures to thwart them at the last moment. We must take the fight to the enemy and keep them off balance. To achieve this goal we need to attain the support of our friends and allies. We must maintain contact with others to ensure those who intend to do us harm do not have sanctuary to commit their acts of terror.                                                                                    | We have achieved enormous progress in this area and clearly made the world a more dangerous place for terrorist and non-state actors to operate unmolested. We must continue to forge these relationships through political, security, economic and educational means at all levels of engagement. This interaction is not only limited to Iraq and Afghanistan but extends globally and includes stable, failed and failing states. Through world-wide engagement our message will be consistent and results will continue to be positive.                                                                                                               |
| <b>IV. Work with others to Defuse Regional Conflicts</b>                                                          | Regional conflicts are continuous and even though they may not occur in our area of the world, history reminds us they will eventually impact outside parties. Organizations that desire to impose their will can use these instable environments and exploit them for their own evil cause. It is imperative to engage in these areas in an attempt to resolve conflict and provide a stable security environment. Although we may not play a direct role in conflict resolution we can assist to set the conditions for regional parties to achieve an effective resolution.                                                   | The US has realized continued success in this area by remaining engaged in global politics and offering assistance where possible. Additionally, by supporting efforts of NATO, the UN and other conflict intervention and resolution organizations we are able to provide appropriate support to minimize conflict and achieve a stable and secure environment as expeditiously as possible. Other areas such as genocide prevention and post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction is essential to ensure actions continue for society to progress and not return to an era of conflict.                                                            |
| <b>V. Prevent Our Enemies from Threatening Us, Our Allies, and Our Friends with Weapons of Mass Destruction</b>   | The security environment of 2002 was considerably different from that which the US faced pre-9/11. The primary responsibility of the US government is to protect the American people and interests. This requires anticipating threats, and defending ourselves, even if anticipatory action is necessary. There are few greater threats than WMDs and we must institute a comprehensive strategy to reinforce our non-proliferation efforts to deny weapons to terrorist and nation states who pose a threat to our national security. This includes a strategy for discouraging nations to engage in the proliferation of WMD. | Our success has been clear through the voluntary WMD disarmament programs in Libya but the challenges remain constant with the actions of the DPRK and their willingness to provide assistance to other nations intent on acquiring nuclear technology. Our continued work through the IAEA to detect and deter this behavior, coupled with the cooperation of the UN will continue to achieve positive results in a highly dangerous and unpredictable activity. These efforts must include discouraging the development of chemical and biological weapons as the fall out from utilizing these weapons will exact a tremendous burden on all involved. |
|                                                                                                                   | 2002 Summary                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     | 2006 Future Direction                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |

Table derived from the 2002 and 2006 National Security Strategy

## National Security Strategy Comparison

Table 2

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|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>VI. Ignite a New Era of Global Economic Growth through Free Markets and Free Trade</b>                      | Promoting free and fair trade will lead to economic freedom and ultimately political liberty. Greater economic freedom also leads to greater economic opportunity and prosperity for everyone. In the past a market economy has proven the single most effective economic system and the greatest cure for poverty. To expand economic liberty and prosperity, the US promotes free and fair trade, open markets, a stable financial system, the integration of the global economy, and secure, clean energy development.                                                                                                                                    | The US has opened markets and integrated the global economy through launching the Doha Development Agenda negotiations of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The US proposed to reform global agricultural trade, eliminate farm export subsidies and reduce trade-distorting support programs, to eliminate all tariffs on consumer and industrial goods, and to open global services markets. In 2003, the US took the initiative to put Doha back on track, culminating in a successful framework agreement reached in Geneva in 2004. The US continues to lead the world in advancing bold proposals for economic freedom through open markets and helping the accessions of new WTO members such as Armenia, Cambodia, Macedonia, and Saudi Arabia.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                |
| <b>VII. Expand the Circle of Development by Opening Societies and Building the Infrastructure of Democracy</b> | Helping the world's poor is a strategic priority and a moral imperative. Economic development, responsible governance, and individual liberty are intimately connected. The US must promote development programs that achieve measurable results – rewarding reforms, encouraging transparency, and improving people's lives.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                | Our initiatives include, advancing development and reinforcing reform, turning the tide against AIDS and other infectious diseases, promoting debt stability, and instituting transformational diplomacy. Transformational diplomacy means working with our many international partners to build and sustain democratic, well-governed states that will respond to the needs of their citizens and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system. The Administration has created the new position of Director of Foreign Assistance (DFA) in the State Department. It will focus our foreign assistance on promoting greater ownership and responsibility on the part of host nations and their citizens.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |
| <b>VIII. Develop Agendas for Cooperative Action with the Other Main Centers of Global Power</b>                | Relations with the most powerful countries in the world are central to our national security strategy. We must pursue American interests with cooperative relationships, particularly with our oldest and closest friends and allies, as well as seizing the opportunity relative cooperation between the great powers. Another priority is preventing the reemergence of the great power rivalries that divided the world in previous eras. New times demand new approaches, flexible enough to permit effective action even when there are reasonable differences of opinions among friends, yet strong enough to confront the challenges the world faces. | Five principles outline the strategy for relations with the main centers of global power. First, these relations must be set in their proper context. Bilateral policies that ignore regional and global realities are unlikely to succeed. Second, these relations must be supported by appropriate institutions, regional and global, to make cooperation more permanent, effective, and wide-reaching. Third, we will encourage all our partners to expand liberty, and to respect the rule of law and the dignity of the individual, as the surest way to advance the welfare of their people and to cement close relations with the United States. Fourth, while we do not seek to dictate to other states the choices they make, we do seek to influence the calculations on which these choices are based. We also must hedge appropriately in case states choose unwisely. Fifth, we must be prepared to act alone if necessary, while recognizing that there is little of lasting consequence that we can accomplish in the world without the sustained cooperation of our allies and partners. |
|                                                                                                                | <b>2002 Summary</b>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          | <b>2006 Future Direction</b>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |

Table derived from the 2002 and 2006 National Security Strategy

## National Security Strategy Comparison

Table 2

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|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>IX. Transform America's National Security Institutions to Meet the Challenges and Opportunities of the Twenty-First Century</b> | <p>The major institutions of American national security were designed in a different era to meet different challenges. They must be transformed.</p> | <p>The establishment of the Department of Homeland Security brought under one authority 22 federal entities with vital roles to play in protecting our Nation and preventing terrorist attacks within the United States. In 2004, the Intelligence Community launched its most significant reorganization since the 1947 National Security Act. The centerpiece is a new position, the Director of National Intelligence, endowed with expanded budgetary, acquisition, tasking, and personnel authorities to integrate more effectively the efforts of the Community into a more unified, coordinated, and effective whole. The transformation also includes a new National Counterterrorism Center and a new National Counterproliferation Center to manage and coordinate planning and activities in those critical areas. The transformation extends to the FBI, which has augmented its intelligence capabilities and is now more fully and effectively integrated with the Intelligence Community. The Department of Defense has completed the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, which details how the Department will continue to adapt and build to meet new challenges. Continuing to reorient the Department of State towards transformational diplomacy. Improving the capacity of agencies to plan, prepare, coordinate, integrate, and execute responses covering the full range of crisis contingencies and long-term challenges. Promoting meaningful reform of the U.N.</p> |
| <b>X. Engage the Opportunities and Confront the Challenges of Globalization</b>                                                    | <p>Not mentioned in the 2002 National Security Strategy.</p>                                                                                         | <p>The new flows of trade, investment, information, and technology are transforming national security. Globalization has exposed us to new challenges and changed the way old challenges touch our interests and values, while also greatly enhancing our capacity to respond. These challenges include: Public health challenges like pandemics that recognize no borders; Illicit trade, whether in drugs, human beings, or sex, that exploits the modern era's greater ease of transport and exchange; Environmental destruction, whether caused by human behavior or cataclysmic mega-disasters such as floods, hurricanes, earthquakes, or tsunamis. The United States must lead the effort to reform existing institutions and create new ones – including forging new partnerships between governmental and nongovernmental actors, and with transnational and international organizations.</p>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |

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