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MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

THE IMPORTANCE OF ENDURING PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN THE US AND PAKISTAN IN
COMBATING TERRORISM

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Executive Summary

Title: The importance of enduring partnership between the US and Pakistan in combating terrorism

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Thesis: An enduring partnership between US and Pakistan is needed to fight terrorism since if Pakistan loses war against terrorism; there are minimal chances for the world to win this war.

Discussion: As the Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) progressed in Afghanistan, the insurgents fled to Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA), where they found refuge due to peculiar nature of the governance, culture and terrain. Pakistan initially gained appreciable success in GWOT, however soon became victim to the terrorism itself. Despite consistent international resolve the terrorism is on rise in Pakistan. Coupled with its inherent political, security and social problems, the war against terrorism in Pakistan has become a complex phenomenon. Pakistan's contiguity to Afghanistan mandated its participation in Global War Against Terrorism (GWOT). However, it is now Pakistan's twofold significance in this war, attributive and contributive, that requires a consistent engagement with the country. It will be an irreversible calamity to leave Pakistan alone in the midst of GWOT.

Conclusion: Pakistan today confronts an array of challenges that help flourishing of terrorism. The strategy to root out terrorism was so far biased towards military means and lacked popular support. It seems to be ineffective. A comprehensive strategy, focused on the people of Pakistan is required to be employed that may bring out solutions to the political, security and social problems of Pakistan. It will also be effective in uprooting terrorism with the help of public support.

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PREFACE

The urge to write on this topic is derived from my personal agenda of keeping the perspective correct. I have heard and learned of many people discussing Pakistan with reference to its role in the GWOT. Most of them however often fail to recognize the fact that Pakistan despite its inherent intricacies has contributed a lot in this war. It is Pakistan's problems and contributions that combine shape its significance in the GWOT. This paper is an attempt to highlight this fact. In carrying out this study I have made use of my education earned during discussions with the worthy speakers, elite faculty members and my able peers at USMC Command and Staff College. But more importantly, it is primarily based on experience as a Pakistani.

As mentioned earlier, I feel indebted to many people in undertaking this modest effort. I would however like to pay my gratitude to LCOL B J Payne USMC for having gone through my draft and advising me on much needed corrections. I also owe thanks to Dr Eric Schibuya for having provided me his candid opinion on Pakistan's geo-political situation from time to time. I am extremely grateful to Dr Douglas E Streusand who was not only my Mentor for this paper but also supervised one of my electives. I have no hesitation in accepting the fact that I learned a lot about Pakistan from him. Specially, this paper would not have been possible without his able guidance and wholehearted support.

INTRODUCTION

Soon after 9/11, Pakistan joined international coalition in Global War Against Terrorism (GWOT). It broke relations with Afghanistan's Taliban government, arrested more than 700 Taliban and Al Qaeda leaders including the most significant cathes such as Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and has deployed 70,000 troops in Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA), to track Al Qaeda fugitives.¹ Pakistan is also the only regional country to participate in Coalition Maritime Interdiction Operations, the maritime component of Operation Enduring Freedom.² Pakistan has provided more support, captured more terrorists, and comitted more troops than any other nation in the Global Counter Terror Force (GCTF).³ In return for its alliance, Pakistan has received a substantial financial and political support from United States. Pakistan today stands as the Major Non NATO Ally (MNNA) of the US. It is interesting to note however, that despite concerted efforts by both the countries to root out terrorism, it is on rise in Pakistan.⁴ Internal security in Pakistan is fragile and it is today one of the most affected countries by the terrorism.

There is a need to undertstand the factors perpetuating terrorism in Pakistan despite international resolve to curb it. It is important to note that if Pakistan loses war against terrorism, there is minimal chance for the world to win this war.

This paper is therefore aimed at analyzing Pakistan's significance in war against terrorism, its limitations to fulfill international community's demands and its needs for continued support by the US.

¹Khurshid M Kasuri in an address to The Brookings Institute, June 9, 2008.

² United States Institute of Peace, Special Report, August 2005.

³ C Christine Fair, *The Counter Terror Coalitions, Cooperation with Pakistan and India* (Santa Monica: RAND Corp, 2004), p27.

⁴ According to a report by the Pak Institute for Peace Studies, Pakistan has seen a sharp acceleration in suicide attacks over the past year. For details see PIPS Security Report 2007: "1442 Attacks/Clashes took 3448 Lives," January 7, 2008.

Chapter 1

PAKISTAN AND TERRORISM

Background

The Pakistani society is divided into ethnic and religious complexions. The ethnic division is mainly based on provincial/linguistic differences. The religious division is however much more stark and dangerous which has been the real cause for the current disrupted internal security situation. The first religious divide is between Shi'ites (20% of the population) and Sunnis. There is however further division among Sunnis broadly comprising of the Deobandis who focus strongly on the Prophet Muhammad, Peace Be Upon Him (PBUH), Barelvis who are in majority, venerate saints and the Prophet Muhammad PBUH. The Ahl-i-Hadith are another group who distinguish themselves from Deobandis by refusing theological and philosophical thinking which has accrued in the course of Muslim history.⁵ The fourth group is of Wahabis, following Saudi model of the religion.

The religious movements in Pakistan have undergone 2 different forms of radicalization: Islamist and neo-fundamentalist.⁶ Islamists are the people who despite having ideological radicalism adopt political route, such as Jamat-i-Islami Pakistan. Deobandis and Ahl-I-Hadith are the neo-fundamentalists, who follow Shari'a strictly and profess its implementation even through violent means. Barelvis on the other hand are moderates, having no participation in violence. The transition of Deobandis and Ahl-i-Hadith into politics dates back to 1980, when it was feared that Iran's Islamic Revolution would utilize Shi'ites living in Pakistan.⁷ It was also the time when manpower was needed to fight against Soviets in Afghanistan. Both Islamists and neo-fundamentalists, encouraged by the government of Late Gen Zia-ul-Haq, worked for the "Afghan Jihad." They recruited youths

⁵ Mariam Abou Zahab, Olivier Roy, *Islamist Networks* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004) p20.

⁶ Ibid p19.

⁷ Ibid p23.

from Pakistan and other Muslim countries, which then received training in special camps with the help of Central Investigation Agency (CIA). The religious groups were thus used as intermediaries between Afghan Mujahideen and the Pakistani government. It was also at this time that a strong relationship between Pakistani religious groups and Muslim radicals around the world was nurtured. When the Afghan war was over, this trained, armed, motivated but unemployed and socially abhorred manpower⁸ compelled by religious beliefs, found its employment in various militant outfits for the Kashmiri struggle, Taliban and Al-Qaeda.

Taliban & Al Qaeda

Pakistan's contiguity to Afghanistan mandated its participation in Afghan Jihad against 1979 Soviet invasion. The Soviet action had great implications for the security of Pakistan, Iran and the Persian Gulf region.⁹ Consequently, Pakistan assumed the role of the frontline state against the Soviets and helped recruitment of militias, their training and the distribution of arms with the help of United States and other Muslim countries. The Afghan resistance was projected as part of global jihad against communism. Pakistan took a leading role in organizing Muslim countries and other members of the Non Aligned Movement (NAM).¹⁰ Throughout this Jihad, Pakistan stood firmly by the international community despite paying a heavy price due to the spillover effects such as proliferation of illegal weapons, drug trafficking and hosting almost four million Afghan refugees out of which 2 million still remain in Pakistan today. More importantly, Pakistan today confronts worst internal security situation which has its roots buried in Afghan Jihad. After the Soviet withdrawal, the international community abandoned Afghanistan paying no attention to the

⁸ Stephen Philip Cohen, *The Idea of Pakistan*, (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2005) p 182.

⁹ A Z Hilali, *US-Pakistan relationship, Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan* (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2005) p51.

¹⁰ Dennis Kux, *The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000, The Disenchanted Allies*, (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2001) p248.

reconstruction of this war-ravaged country. This resulted in internal instability, civil war and the subsequent rise of Taliban in Afghanistan with the help of Pakistan, whose support to Taliban was only India centric. Islamabad's wish for friendly regime in Afghanistan is rooted in part in the hope of gaining "strategic depth" against India.¹¹ Taliban were predominantly Pushtuns, recruited mainly among the students of a network of rural and Pushtun religious schools situated between the towns of Ghazni and Kandahar in Afghanistan, linked with a parent network based in Pakistan.¹² Taliban followed Deobandi School of Religious thought, which was minority in Pakistan. Taliban's movement was of a fundamentalist and rigorous in nature, but with no political project beyond the Shari'a. Taliban's Islam in this sense displayed a Saudi character.¹³ During Taliban regime the international community refused to engage constructively in Afghanistan and isolation of the Taliban regime allowed Al-Qaeda to strengthen its stronghold in the country. Meanwhile in Pakistan, the radicalism grew, which is characterized by the formation of armed splinter groups often organized within a clandestine framework.¹⁴ The fusion of this radicalization on both sides of Pak-Afghan border has been a very dangerous phenomenon strengthened by religious and ethnic commonalities. The nexus between Pakistani and other Islamic radicals developed during and after Afghan war is a major factor in Pakistan's current internal security situation. These radicals found sanctuary in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) contiguous to Afghanistan. It is therefore important to understand the unique layout and social structure of this area.

¹¹ Dennis Kux, p xviii.

¹² Mariam Abou Zahab, Olivier Roy, p13.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid p21.

Geography and Demography of FATA

Pakistan shares a 2,500 km long border with Afghanistan through FATA, which lies to the northwest of North West Frontier Province NWFP. It is a narrow tract of land with rugged mountainous terrain where people living along both sides of the border have same ethnicity, deep-rooted historical ties and a common religion. Administratively, FATA is divided into seven political agencies: Khyber, Bajaur, Mohmand, Orakzai, Kurram, North and South Waziristan, and six Frontier Regions: Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, Lakki Marwat, D I Khan and Tank (For details see Annex A). The latest census estimates the population at 3.176 million¹⁵ while unofficial sources claim it to be around five million. Various Pashtun tribes inhabit FATA who follow the ancient code of *Pukhtunwali* in day-to-day affairs (for details see Annex B). The tribal psyche hinges on sensitivities based on tribal traditions or *Riwaj* and religious sentiments, which are often intermingled in a complex manner. Similarly, *Melmastia* (unconditional hospitality) (see annex B) is an important custom strictly observed by the people of FATA, which may be extended to both coreligionists, whether Pashtuns or non-Pashtuns, and even members of other religious communities.¹⁶

Constitutional Status of FATA

Under the constitution of Pakistan, the FATA is separate from the NWFP, within which they lie and are governed by a distinct and different set of laws. The administrative and judicial systems in tribal areas intermingle and hinge on the troika of *Jirga* System (see annex B), the Political Agent and the Frontier Constabulary Regulations of 1901. The Jirga is an assembly of tribal elders where disputes are taken for amicable settlement, and decisions are given on the basis of 'Riwaj'.¹⁷ The Pakistan's Ministry of State and Frontier Regions (SAFRON), in

¹⁵ "1998 Census Report of FATA," (Population Census Organisation, Statistics Division, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad, 2001), pp 11-14.

¹⁶ C Christine Fair and Peter Chalk, *Fortifying Pakistan, The Role of US Internal Security Assistance* (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2006) p12.

¹⁷ Rahimullah Yusufzai, "Circled in Controversy," News Line, August 2002.

Islamabad looks after the administrative affairs and development activities in the area. The Governor NWFP acts as agent of the President of Pakistan and administers the Tribal Areas through FATA Secretariat.

Social Structure of FATA

The region has a literacy rate of 17.4%, which is significantly lower than the national average of 45%.¹⁸ The meager number of schools, health care facilities, communication infrastructure and allied services cannot support any major economic venture. Water for sustenance and irrigation is a major need. A mere 44% of the population has access to clean drinking water.¹⁹ Trade has been major source of economic activity in the area. However, due to smuggling and other illegal practices, the trade opportunities have dwindled over the years. Most of the tribesmen consider smuggling as a legitimate business activity and call it '*Tijarat*'. A brief overview of socio-economic conditions in FATA is attached as Annexes C, D, E and F.

¹⁸ Pakistan Development Forum Islamabad Report on NWFP, May 2003.

¹⁹ Ibid.

Chapter 2

SIGNIFICANCE OF PAKISTAN IN GWOT

Pakistan's significance in fighting terrorism is twofold, attributive and contributive. Pakistan's certain attributes such as security concerns, disintegrated political environment as well as unique and deprived social structure distinguish it to deserve special attention. The contributive significance entails mutual cooperation between Pakistan and US in degrading terrorists' capabilities as well as financial and political intercourse, which has taken place between the two countries since 9/11. A brief description of both types of significance is appended below:

Attributive Significance

Security Concerns Pakistan's security concerns are multidimensional and genuine in nature. It is most tragic that Pakistan has been locked ever since independence in disputes with its neighbors India and Afghanistan over boundary delimitation and demarcation.²⁰ Throughout its history the main aim of Pakistan has been to shield itself against attacks from these two neighbors.

Threat from India Pakistan has a long traditional security risk from India because of contentious Kashmir issue. The confrontation on Kashmir has caused both the neighbors to fight at least two wars and a number of skirmishes. India and Pakistan came to the brink of third war in 2002 after *nuclearization* of both the countries, when India amassed its forces on the border after an attack on its parliament on 13 December 2001, which it claimed the Kashmiri outfits *Lashkar-e- Taiba* and *Jaish-e- Muhammed*²¹ had

²⁰ A Z Hilali, p31.

²¹ www.CNN.com/world, "Indian Parliament Attack Bungled," December 17, 2001.

carried out. Pakistan attaches great significance to Kashmir for following reasons:

- a. The issue is principally in line with the sub continent's partition criteria and explicitly justifies Pakistan's founding "Two Nation" theory.
- b. Pakistan's major rivers, Indus, Chenab and Jehlum flow out of Kashmir and Pakistan's survival depends upon this water.
- c. It affords historical strategic path between Central Asia and China.
- d. Pakistan's promises to Kashmiris for their freedom entail its credibility.
- e. Kashmir has been much publicized, politicized and exploited by the successive governments in Pakistan to an extent that public pressure will be detrimental in taking a u-turn.
- f. The armed groups who have been fighting for Kashmir's freedom have a capacity to lash back, in case Pakistan quits its stance on Kashmir.
- g. A plebiscite in Kashmir still has probability of Kashmiris opting for Pakistan.
- h. Kashmir offers immense economic benefits such as tourism, fresh and dry fruits, vegetables etc.
- j. Foregoing Kashmir completely would mean succumbing to Indian hegemonic designs in the region.

Threat from Afghanistan At the time of its independence, Afghanistan was seldom friendly but problems between the two countries were considered

more irritants than threat.²² The border between Pakistan and Afghanistan called "Durand Line" is poorly marked. The problem is exacerbated by close relations between the fiercely independent Pashtun people who live on both sides of the border. Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the Pakistani Government played a vital role in supporting the Afghan resistance movement and assisting Afghan refugees. After the Soviet withdrawal in February 1989, Pakistan continued to provide extensive support for displaced Afghans. The overthrow of the Taliban Regime in November 2001 has seen somewhat strained relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The present administration in Kabul, has also voiced its support for the reunification of Pushtun tribes living on both sides of the border,²³ which poses a threat to Pakistan's sovereignty. It further feels that the remnants of former Taliban government are being supported by certain factions within Pakistan. Another discomforting factor for Pakistan is the growing Indian influence in Afghansiatn. Pakistani authorities have voiced their concern over this development and feel that Pakistan is being encircled by India. Pakistan has expressed concern regarding the opening of four Indian consulates, besides the embassy, in Afghanistan, particularly in Kandahar and Jalalabad, along Pakistan's border with Afghanistan. Pakistan suspects that, through these consulates, India is involved in clandestine activities aimed at destabilizing

²² A Z Hilali, p32.

²³ In his condolence on the death of Khan Abdul Wali Khan, the Afghan President Hamid Karzai said he does not accept Durand Line as it has raised a wall between the two brothers, www.Afghannews.net, February 19, 2006. Also, Gen (R) Jehangir Karamat, Ex-Pakistani Ambassador to the US, while speaking at Brookings Institute on February 6, 2008 mentioned that, "Afghans have also resisted any attempt to harden the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and there are several reasons for that."

Pakistan.²⁴ This means losing “Strategic Depth” that Pakistan has been vying for years.

Political Environment

Pakistan has had a checkered political history due to tug of war between civilian and military leadership for controlling locus of power. Pakistan has been governed by the military, for more than half of its 60 years history, which often justified its intervention in politics on the grounds that civilian rule undermines the viability of Pakistan by not appreciating the security situation.²⁵ Pakistani military is the most well organized, trained, equipped, financed and supported organization in the country, which has a temptation to seize power when it finds that politicians are not playing justifiable role. As a professional and disciplined institution, the Pakistani military cannot remain oblivious to realities on ground.²⁶ Today, Pakistan’s politicians have a serious concern about how to come to the power and hold on to it given the military’s traditional role as ruler or power broker. This seesaw between civilian and military rule has cast following effects on the country’s political fabric:

- a. An uncertain political environment exists, wherein military is feared of taking over power anytime it considers necessary.
- b. Immature political institutions, frequently abandoned even by the politicians, have given rise to personality-oriented governance and strengthened feudal political culture.

²⁴ Fahmida Ashraf, “India-Afghanistan Relations-Post 9/11,” Islamabad Institute of Strategic Studies, Strategic Studies, XXVII Summer Number 2.

²⁵ Gen Pervez Musharraf, *In the Line of Fire: A Memoir* (London: Simon & Schuster, 2006).

²⁶ Hasan Askari Rizvi, “Pakistan’s Strategic Culture,” South Asia in 2020: Future Strategic Balances and Alliances, Michael R Chambers, ed (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, November 2002) p325.

c. Distrust among different political parties prevails because of siding with the army.

d. Critical issues linger on such as slow economic growth, poor social security system, dissidence among provinces and sub-national groups, the question to define Pakistan's identity and its profile as an Islamic state or a modern state.

e. Common Pakistanis do not participate in the political system.

Pakistani politics is mostly issue-free: it is about patronage and money.²⁷

Social Structure Pakistan's ethnic and religious diversity, unique social structures such as one prevalent in FATA, socio-economic deprivation and tribal affiliation across the borders especially in Afghanistan help institutionalize terrorism.²⁸ These factors have already been discussed in the previous chapter.

Contributive Significance

Pakistan's Contribution Pakistan today is one of the most important coalition partners in the GWOT. It is playing a critical role in degrading operational capabilities of Al Qaeda and Taliban elements. Pakistan has rendered more suspected Al Qaeda operatives to the US, including several high profile commanders such as Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, Abu Faraj al Libbi and Ahmed Ghailani than any other coalition partner.²⁹

Following Pakistan's decision to ally with the US in GWOT and crack down on terrorist groups inside Pakistan, these groups started terrorist activities inside the

²⁷ American Policy and Pakistan: Testimony of Dr. Stephen P. Cohen before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, July 25, 2007.

²⁸ For instance, Maryam Abou Zahab and Olivier Roy in their book *Islamist Networks* mention, "The radicalization of Deobandi movements can be traced back to the policy of conservative re-Islamization instituted by Gen Zia ul Haq after his seizure of power in Pakistan in 1977," p22.

²⁹ Cohen & Chollet, "When \$10 Billion Is Not Enough: Rethinking U.S. Strategy toward Pakistan" (The Washington Quarterly Spring 2007) p1.

country targeting high level personalities including President Pervez Musharraf, members of security services and armed forces, intelligence agencies and foreign nationals residing in Pakistan. Hundreds of Pakistanis including armed forces members have so far been killed in these terrorist attacks. The most high profile personality that has so far been killed in such attacks was Mrs Benazir Bhutto, Pakistan's ex Prime Minister.

Pakistan has so far provided following assistance to the US:

- a. Allowed the United States to fly sorties from the south over Pakistani airspace.
- b. Granted U.S. troops access to a select number of its military bases, although it insisted that the bases should not be utilized for offensive operations.
- c. Tens of thousands of Pakistani troops provided force protection for these bases and U.S. ships in the Indian Ocean.
- d. Rendered logistical support to the U.S. war effort, including vast amounts of fuel for coalition aircraft and port access for the delivery of vital supplies.
- e. Deployed Pakistan military to its western border to cut off retreat to Al Qaeda and Taliban members fleeing Afghanistan.
- f. Provided Washington with access to Pakistani intelligence assets in Afghanistan and Pakistan.³⁰

Consequently, 50 percent to 75 percent of U.S. supplies for Afghanistan fly over, or go through, Pakistan.³¹ In addition, Pakistan has deployed some 70,000

³⁰ Cohen And Chollet, p10.

³¹ Peter Brookes, "The Pakistan Problem," The Heritage Foundation, January 9, 2008.

troops in FATA area to crack down foreign militants who fled from Afghanistan after coalition operations there, and handed over around 500 Al Qaeda operatives to the US and has suffered numerous civilian and armed forces casualties.

US Assistance

The United States has provided Pakistan with more than \$10 billion in military, economic, and development assistance over the past six-plus years.³² The centerpiece of this support includes a five-year \$3 billion assistance package, which requires congressional approval in each of the five years and amounts to \$ 600 million annually, evenly split between Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and Economic Support Funds (ESF). The main purpose of this is to lay groundwork for a long-term mutually beneficial relationship that fosters and consolidates an internal environment in Pakistan hostile to terrorism and extremism.³³ Additionally, the US has devoted funds approximately \$ 100 million per year to help Pakistan in counter terrorism, law enforcement, and governance initiatives. A macro breakdown reveals that, 57 percent of the \$10 billion has gone towards Coalition Support Funds; money intended to reimburse U.S. partners for their assistance in the war on terrorism. Roughly 18 percent, or \$1.8 billion, has gone toward security assistance. Another 16 percent has gone toward budget support as direct cash transfers to the government of Pakistan. This leaves less than 10 percent for development and humanitarian assistance, including the U.S. response to the October 2005 earthquake. Education in Pakistan has received \$64 million per year for more than 55 million school-aged children, or \$1.16 per child per year.³⁴ A number of US agencies are working closely with Pakistani agencies and departments.

³² Cohen and Chollet, p11.

³³ C Christine Fair and Peter Chalk p45.

³⁴ Cohen & Chollet, p12 .

PAKISTANI GOVERNMENT'S LIMITATIONS

Despite its resolve, the efforts by the Pakistani government to fight terrorism seem to be ineffective. Following factors limit the effectiveness of Pakistani government's counter-terrorism measures:

Security Concerns It is important to note that following Indian trail, Pakistan developed nuclear weapons despite its turbulent economic voyage. This clearly highlights its security consciousness and the value it attaches to its survival. Similarly, the security issues with its neighbors have consumed much of Pakistan's resources throughout its history. Unless these issues are resolved, it is difficult for Pakistan to divert its resources and attention to focus on any other problem. For Pakistani authorities, "Pakistan is First," a term used by President Musharraf a number of times. It was demonstrated during military standoff with India in 2002, when in response to Indian deployment, Pakistan moved large numbers of its troops from western border to the border with India.

Political Atmosphere The political uncertainty in the country is one of the major hurdles in the functioning of the government. As soon as the government is formed, it feels threatened of getting overthrown by the military either directly or indirectly. Consequently, every Pakistani government devotes most of its time and resources to consolidate its power, while those in opposition, struggle to destabilise the government in a hope to clinch reigns of the country. Even the government with 2/3rd seats in the parliament, as in the case of Nawaz Sharif's government from 1996 to

1999,³⁵ has minimal chances to complete its term without continued approval of the military. The last government was the first ever political government in Pakistan that completed a five year term, for the mere fact that it supported President Musharraf's policies, who was also Chief of the Army Staff during this period. The Army's patronage to political players gives rise to polarization of the society into feudals and the populace, discouraging the latter to participate in the political process. The 40% turnout of voters in the recent elections is an evidence to this fact. Therefore the government usually does not have popular support for its policy decisions such as military operation in FATA, and faces difficulties on domestic front.

Social Structure

Cultural Impediments Although, the presence of militants and extremists in Pakistan's FATA dates back to Russian invasion of Afghanistan but during civil war in Afghanistan, Taliban and Al Qaeda established their roots in the area by appealing to the religious zeal and cultural sensitivities of the area in a significant portion of tribal people. After the fall of Taliban in 2001, the Taliban and Al Qaeda elements fled Afghanistan and took refuge in FATA. Pakistan Army conducted operation in South Waziristan in 2004, during which 302 militants were killed while 656 were detained. Some 80% of these militants were foreign, mostly comprised of Afghan Arabs, Uzbeks, Chechens and a small number of Uighurs from China.³⁶ They established their bases and tried to intermingle with the locals. The main interest of these groups rested in the use of these remote and virtually lawless areas as hideouts to perpetuate their extremist movement. These groups have created internal security

³⁵ www.nni-news.com.pk, "Pakistani Elections," February 3, 1997, reports "According to unofficial results, Nawaz Sharif's Pakistan Muslim League has swept the polls on Monday and has got more than the 2/3rd majority required to amend the constitution as well in the National Assembly."

³⁶ C Christine Fair and Peter Chalk, p13.

problems for Pakistan while making the local population as their virtual hostages by resisting government's ingress.

Socio Economics The social security system in Pakistan is incapacitated to render essential support to the people. The employment situation in Pakistan has become worse since the 90s as the unemployment rate surged to almost 9 percent.³⁷ This poor socio-economic condition has widespread effects on the society. For instance, in addition to the exploitation of religious beliefs, some Waziris in FATA continue to give succor to Al Qaeda affiliates also because of lucrative monetary incentives.³⁸ There is also a need to understand the family structure in Pakistani society, which is largely patriarchial in nature. Unlike in the West, a family in Pakistan has usually one earning hand mostly the male, who also heads the family. The family head feeds his dependents until daughters are married after completing their education and sons become capable of earning themselves. One of the greatest disadvantages of this system lies in the fact that a family collapses when in an early age, the family Head suddenly dies or is unable to earn money. Given the inapt social security system in the country, in some cases specially, at lower levels of the society, this virtually brings a family on the road. In their struggle to earn livelihood, the family sometimes becomes vulnerable to terrorists who offer to feed the family simply against the recruitment of male members for a "Divine Jihad." An easy flow of money is thus promised that makes up for the family's inability to earn decent livelihood.

³⁷ Naushin Mahmood and Zafar Mueen Nasir, "Pension and social security schemes in Pakistan: Some Policy options," Islamabad: Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, 2008:42, p 7.

³⁸ Ibid, p14.

Lack of Education Opportunities Due to the government's failure in providing adequate schools to its citizens, the Madressahs (religious schools/seminaries) fill in the gap. Not only education, but these institutions also offer boarding and lodging facilities with a small amount as monthly stipend, which is a significant incentive for the poor families who cannot even send their children to the government owned schools, let alone private school system. Consequently, a great strength of Pakistani human resource resides in these Madressahs. Although all Madressahs are not infested with the "Divine Jihad" ideology, still the number of Madressahs preaching it is in thousands.

The Islamic Identity of Pakistan

The government's failure in defining Pakistan's Islamic identity, has divided the society in a disarrayed fashion. By one estimate, some 15% of Pakistan's Sunni Muslims would consider themselves Deobandi, and some 60%, are in the Barelvi tradition based mostly in the province of Punjab. But 64% of the total seminaries are run by Deobandis and 25% by the Barelvis.³⁹ The terrorists have therefore been able to recruit manpower consistently.

³⁹ www.globalsecurity.org, "Barelvi Islam."

Chapter 4

THE REQUIRED US SUPPORT

“Pakistan’s future is too vital to our interests and our national security to ignore or to downgrade.”

Mr Negroponte US Deputy Secretary of State
November 2007

Given the economic and political support it has rendered so far, the US can leverage Pakistan,⁴⁰ and help the country to stay on the right course. It will be too dangerous to leave Pakistan in the midst of GWOT, which is expected to bring adverse consequences not only for Pakistan but also for the entire world. Leaving Pakistan alone will let terrorism flourish, threatening US at its doorstep. The US support should be focussed chiefly on the people of Pakistan with following two prongs:

Resolution of Security Issues

Pakistan has serious security concerns on its eastern and western borders. Kashmir is the touchstone of Pakistan’s security parameters. Similarly, any attempt to delegitimise Durand Line will pose a direct threat to the integrity of Pakistan. US must play an active role in resolving these issues which will:

- a. Help diminishing Pakistani military’s role in country’s politics, allowing democracy to prevail.
- b. Allow government to sanction resources for social upheaval of the masses thus empowering them against the traditional politics of feudalism
- c. Afford government to dedicate more resources and attention for the GWOT.
- d. Curb the number of Jihadi groups inside Pakistan, as there remains hardly any justification for them to exist.

⁴⁰ “Negroponte and Boucher have been assigned to review Pakistan's performance in this theater on a quarterly basis and report back to Washington on whether or not aid should be released. In this situation, Pakistan has little option but to follow US demands.” Cohen and Chollet.

- e. Help controlling corruption, improving judicial process, implementing law and order and achieving sustainable economic growth.

Resolution of Social Issues

To win this war, popular support of Pakistanis is mandatory. People of Pakistan however find themselves out of context in GWOT, because:

- a. Often leaders around the world, especially US, only address President Pervez Musharraf as an ally in GWOT.
- b. Only about one-tenth of more than \$10 billion provided to Pakistan since 2001 (including coalition support) has been specifically devoted to development and humanitarian programs.⁴¹
- c. Education in Pakistan has received \$64 million per year for more than 55 million school-aged children, or \$1.16 per child per year.⁴²
- d. Democracy in Pakistan has not received due attention.⁴³

In the short run, the US should keep encouraging Pakistan to fight the militants within its borders and provide it with the support to do so. In the longer run, however, helping the country overcome its vast domestic challenges and giving its people a more hopeful future would do more for the war on terror than any attempt to defeat extremism with military force alone.⁴⁴

⁴¹ Pakistan's Political Crises, CRS Report for Congress, January 3, 2008.

⁴² Cohen and Chollet, p 12.

⁴³ "The money devoted to democracy programs in the 165 million-person country was almost doubled in the fiscal 2008 budget, to \$41 million, but that is still less than the \$43 million set aside for such efforts in Kosovo, the former Albanian enclave of Serbia with a population of 2 million. In the region, U.S. democracy programs aimed at Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran and Egypt are all larger than the effort in Pakistan." Glenn Kessler, "Democracy gets small portion of USAID," www.washingtonpost.com, January 6, 2008.

⁴⁴ Philip H Gordon, "If Pakistan prospers, Al Qaeda will not," Brookings Institute, July 25, 2007.


CONCLUSION

Pakistan took an impressive start in GWOT and achieved appreciable successes. It however soon became a victim of terrorism and engrossed in defending its citizens. The government's difficult decisions in curbing this menace were however, not approved by the people of Pakistan who feel they have received nothing out of this war.

Pakistan today confronts a mosaic of threats to its internal stability, which is linked to the regional and international stability. The array of challenges confronting Pakistan includes sectarian, extremism, drug trafficking, smuggling, endemic corruption and systemic problems with the justice and law enforcement. These problems complement and enable the flourishing of terrorism in the country.

The strategy that was employed in fighting terrorism was in fact biased towards military means. Given the Pakistan's social, security and political problems a holistic strategy is actually needed that focuses on the people of Pakistan, since it is of paramount importance that people of Pakistan are onboard in GWOT. It is also important that Pakistan should be supported in this difficult time of its history. The US has made considerable political and financial investment in Pakistan and must leverage Pakistan to let the country find the correct course. If Pakistan loses its war against terrorism, it will be extremely difficult for rest of the world to recover.

MAP OF FEDERALLY ADMINISTERED TRIBAL AREAS



Annex B

THE TRIBAL HONOUR CODE - PUKHTUNWALI

To my mind death is better than life when life can no longer be held with honor:

(Khushal Khan Khattak)

1. The people of Tribal Area, essentially Pathans, are grouped into tight tribal communities, the chief being Bajauris, Mohmands, Afridis, Turis, Wazirs, Mahsuds, Sherains each with its own distinct individuality marked off from the other by slight differences ranging from social customs to pronunciation, but all knit together by a common language, culture and religion.
2. A unique feature of tribal life is the Jirga, "moot" or a council of tribal elders which settles all inter-tribal disputes and acts as the spokesman of the whole tribe where relations with the Government are concerned. In many respects the tribal system of administration is reminiscent of the primary democracy of the city-states of ancient Greece, for it ensures for every male adult an effective participation. Although, the women have direct participation denied to them, but in actual fact they exercise a very real influence over their men folk.
3. Brave to the point recklessness, impulsive, warm hearted, they are ruthless enemies should one violate their code of honor. It is code of honor whose sanctity and inviolability the tribesmen cherish above all things. The tribesmen can be bitterest foes; they can also be the staunchest of friends. They are the soul of loyalty. Honor and chivalry and no crime appears more heinous to them than letting down one's friend.
4. The Pathan outlook of life and on life has undergone a complete change during the last half century. The Pathans are now awake. They have genuine desire to change their socio-economic conditions, without of course disturbing the basic character of tribal society and violating the '**Pakhtunwali**' or Pathan's code of honor. They want to make material progress through development of barren and bleak chunks of land by bringing them under the plough, using modern and mechanized means of farming; by setting up new industries; and above all by fully participating in national and international affairs.
5. Tribal customs and traditions form an inseparable part of Pakhtoon society. These are closet to the heart of every Pathan and are followed religiously in tribal polity in spite of the noticeable social change. Despite these changes their centuries old traditions, social

usage and customs have not least changed, rather they have added luster to their way of life. These important traditions, writes James W Spain, guide community life and in many cases influence and even determine the actions of individuals.

6. Certain of them are almost universal and their knowledge is essential to understanding, what the Pathan is and how he got that way. The Pukhtoon social behavior revolves around 'Pukhtunwali'. Sometimes called 'Nang-i-Pukhtun' or 'The Pukhtun code' or 'The Way of the Pathan'. Every Pathan is aware of the main elements of Pukhtunwali. This code has numerous laws, which in one way or the other are interrelated. Important ones are:-

- a. **Nang (Honor)**. Under this code a tribesman is obliged to employ every mean available, in order to shield and protect himself, his honor and the honor of his family
- b. **Melmastia (Hospitality)**. This means the showing of hospitality to all visitors without hope of remuneration or favour. It is the hallmark of tribal social customs and traditions. 'Melmastia' enjoins the obligation of protection. Anyone who can gain access to the house of a Pathan, can claim asylum from the house, regardless of the previous relationship between them. Incidents have occurred where innocent men have died defending strangers or even their own personal enemies who demanded refuge while being pursued by hostile forces. Tribal society's obligations of **Melmastia** frequently led to difficulties under the British rule. A classic case in point is **Melmastia** for Osama Bin Laden (or for that matter proclaimed offenders from Pakistan) by the Taliban.
- c. **Badal (Revenge)**. Badal permits no limits, no limitation in time or space and regardless of cost or consequences. Blood feuds and enmities at times extend over generations. On the positive side, it is only because of these unremitting principles of revenge that crimes in the tribal Areas are limited in number and extent.
- d. **Nanawatay (To seek Forgiveness)**. It means to go in and seek forgiveness from the victim to whom a wrong has been done. It is used when the vanquished party is prepared to go into the house or *Hujra* of his enemy to beg forgiveness and make peace with him, usually with the Holy Quran in hand.

There is no Nanawatay when the dispute involves **Tor** (black) i.e concerned with the dishonour of a woman. Tor can only be converted to **Speen** (white) by the victims on agreed conditions

- e. **Tor (Black)**. It is a state of open guilt or infamy. It refers to those cases, which are concerned with the honor of a woman. Tor can only be converted to Speen (white) by death. Because of the serious consequences involved, cases of adulterous or illicit relations between sexes are extremely rare. It is important to underline that the only killing in tribal society that does not involve the law of revenge, is, when a man and a woman having illicit relations are killed.
- f. **Tarboor (Cousin)**. This term is used for paternal cousin and has a connotation of cousin rivalry in Pukhtun customs and traditions. The Tarboor may grow up as a childhood friend, in time, the chief rival for status and political leadership within the lineage. It is in this competition that Tarboorwali (cousin rivalry) exists and manifests itself in many a conflicts in the tribal area.
- g. **Jirga (Tribal Council)**. It is an assembly of tribal elders who are called to decide specific issues and whose decision is binding on all parties in conflicts. As an institution, the Jirga may pronounce penalties against persons or groups who do not submit to its decision. The Jirga may also call for a Lashkar (tribal army) to implement its decision through force. The relations with the outside world are also conducted through the Jirga.
- h. **Lashkar/Lakhar (Tribal Army)**. A body of tribesmen raised for an offensive purpose or to deal with particular incident. The strength of tribalism is manifested in the institutions of the Lashkar, which is primarily raised to enforce the decisions of the Jirga. It may be raised against individuals, a group, or against the outside powers.
- j. **Teega or Kanrai**. Means a fixed date until which all hostilities between warring factions will be suspended. The Jirga then ensures the implementation of cease-fire. Any violation of the terms of truce, by any party, makes it liable to joint action by Jirga.

- k. **Badragga (Tribal escort)**. A tribal escort usually composed of members of that tribe through which the travelers are passing. If a Badragga is violated a tribal feud will follow
- l. **Hamsays**. Is a word used for client or dependent groups, who attach themselves to larger or stronger Maliks. An attack against Hamsays is considered as an attack on the protector.
- m. **Muajib**. It means the yearly (or half-yearly) fixed allowances paid by the political authorities to the tribe and its various sections.
- n. **Lungi**. Means the allowances given by the political authorities to individual Maliks
- o. **Nagha**. Is a tribal fine decided by the council of elders and imposed upon the wrongdoer. It is extracted, if necessary by force
- p. **Hujra**. Is a common sitting (or sleeping) place for males in the village. Visitors and unmarried young men sleep in the Hujra. Expenses are usually shared by the village. Almost every Hujra has mosque attached to it. It is in the Hujra that hospitality of the Pathan is portrayed
- q. **Rawaj**. The Pathan's way of life is also governed by the Rawaj, or Rawaj-i-am, customary law, and by Sharia, the Muslim Law. Rawaj is more in use than the Sharia and is generally preferred

Malik. Certain men are accepted as leaders and a spokesman for the group, on the basis of ability and experience, within a group are called Maliks. A Malik among the Pathans, is at best "first among equals". In the present times, with such vast development schemes afoot, the Malik may well ignore tribal benefits to better his bargaining position vis-à-vis the political authorities. He may actually oppose two reasons for doing so. The first and obvious one is the expectation of monetary or other rewards. The second is more subtle. He feels that with any change in status quo of the village, whether in the educational or economic spheres, there comes a corresponding change in his social position and political hegemony.

Annex C

SUMMARY OF SOCIO – ECONOMIC INDICATORS

<u>Ser</u>	<u>Item</u>	<u>Pakistan</u>	<u>NWFP</u>	<u>FATA</u>	<u>%age of Pakistan</u>
1.	Cultivated Area (Million Hec)	21.9	17	0.2	0.8
2.	Population per cultivated Hectare (#)	6.0	10.0	17.0	283.3
3.	Irrigated Area (Million Hec)	18.2	0.9	0.1	0.6
4.	Population per irrigated Hectare (#)	7.0	21.0	32.0	457.1
5.	Forested Area (Million Hec)	3.6	1.3	0.0	0.9
6.	Literacy rate (%)	45.0	37.3	17.4	
7.	Male	56.5	52.8	29.5	
8.	Female	32.6	21.1	3.0	
9.	Participation rate (Primary)	77.0	64.5	NA	
10	Pop: per Hospital Bed (#)	1450.0	1869.0	2327.0	160.5

Source:

1. Bureau of Statistics, Planning and Development Department, Government of NWFP.

Annex D**COMMUNICATION INFRASTRUCTURE OF FATA**

Item	Year	Unit	Pakistan	NWFP	FATA	FATA as % Share of Pakistan
COMMUNICATION						
Post Offices	1999-2000	Number	12854	1990	195	1.5
Telegraph Offices	1999-2000	-do-	384	44	4	1.04
Telephone	-do-	-do-	3124000	316820	24283	0.8
TV Sets	1998	-do-	273620	60665	76	0.03
Population Per Telephone	-do-	000 Persons	44	59	136	-
Population Per Post Office	-do-	-do-	10	9	17	-
ROADS						
Total	1999-2000	Km.	248340	10134	4417	1.8
High Type	-do-	-do-	138200	7431	2592	1.9
Low Type	-do-	-do-	110140	2703	1825	1.7
Road per Sq: Km of Area	-do-	-do-	0.31	0.13	0.16	-

Notes:

1. Road Kilometer data of NWFP for the year 1998-99.
2. The Pakistan road Km figures are Provisional.

Sources:

3. General Manager Northern Tele communication Region, Peshawar & D.I.Khan.
4. Post Master General, North Western Circle, Peshawar.
5. Pakistan Television Corporation, Islamabad.
6. Chief Engineer, C.D.O. Office C&W Department, Govt: of NWFP.
7. Pakistan Economic Survey, 2000-2001.
8. Bureau of Statistics, Planning and Development Department, Government of NWFP.

Annex E**DETAILS OF LITERACY AND EDUCATION FACILITIES IN FATA**

Item	Pakistan (P)	FATA	FATA as %age share of Pakistan
<u>A) Educational Institutions (Nos)</u>			
<u>Primary Schools Total</u>	<u>162500</u>	<u>3276</u>	<u>2.02</u>
Male	104900	2120	2.02
Female	57600	1156	2.01
<u>Middle Schools Total</u>	<u>18400</u>	<u>347</u>	<u>1.88</u>
Male	10300	259	2.51
Female	8100	88	1.08
<u>High Schools Total</u>	<u>12600</u>	<u>201</u>	<u>1.60</u>
Male	8000	183	2.28
Female	4600	18	0.39
<u>Inter & Degree Colleges Total</u>	<u>853</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>1.06</u>
Male	509	9	1.76
Female	344	-	-
<u>B) Enrolment (By level)(Nos)</u>			
<u>Primary Schools Total</u>	<u>20399000</u>	<u>266713</u>	<u>1.30</u>
Male	11720000	205749	1.76
Female	8679000	60964	0.70
<u>Middle Schools Total</u>	<u>4338000</u>	<u>40949</u>	<u>0.94</u>
Male	2631000	37158	1.41
Female	1707000	3791	0.22
<u>High Schools Total</u>	<u>1795000</u>	<u>15166</u>	<u>0.84</u>
Male	1105000	13985	1.26
Female	690000	1181	0.17

<u>Inter & Degree Colleges Total</u>	<u>791000</u>	<u>3007</u>	<u>0.38</u>
Male	435000	3007	0.69
Female	356000	-	-
C) <u>Teaching Staff (Nos)</u>			
<u>Primary Schools Total</u>	<u>373900</u>	<u>8988</u>	<u>2.40</u>
Male	236000	5982	2.53
Female	137900	3006	2.18
<u>Middle Schools Total</u>	<u>92300</u>	<u>3588</u>	<u>3.88</u>
Male	45800	2777	6.06
Female	46500	811	1.74
<u>High Schools Total</u>	<u>202900</u>	<u>3711</u>	<u>1.82</u>
Male	131600	3401	2.58
Female	71300	310	0.43
<u>Inter & Degree Colleges Total</u>	<u>26942</u>	<u>233</u>	<u>0.86</u>
Male	16599	233	1.40
Female	10343	-	-
<u>D) Literacy Ratio (%)</u> <u>(1998 Census)</u>	PAKISTAN	N.W.F.P.	F.A.T.A.
<u>Both Sexes</u>	<u>45.00</u>	<u>37.3</u>	<u>17.42</u>
Male	56.50	52.8	29.51
Female	32.60	21.1	3.00

Notes:


1. Madressahs are included in Primary Schools.
2. Data was obtained in 1999-2000.

Sources:


1. Directorate of Education (FATA) Government of NWFP.
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3. Provisional Census Reports of Pakistan & FATA
4. Census Report of FATA, 1998.
5. Bureau of Statistics, Planning and Development Department, Government of NWFP.

Appendix 1 to
Annex E

COMPARISON OF LITERACY RATES



COMPARISON OF HEALTH FACILITIES IN PAKISTAN AND FATA



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