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Developing the Iraqi Army: The Long Fight in the Long War


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
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Executive Summary

Title: Developing the Iraqi Army: The Long Fight in the Long War

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Thesis: The surge of American troops, coupled with local and militia uprisings (i.e., the Al Anbar Awakening), was the catalyst for the Iraqi Army's progress in critical areas, such as logistics, personnel recruitment and retention, and pay administration, which contributed to building the confidence and performance of the Iraqi Army in 2007.

Discussion: Strategic decisions regarding the Iraqi Army have been a central point of debate within the U.S. military since 2003. After the fall of the Iraqi regime, American forces were not prepared nor had they planned for post-combat operations. The turning point of the Iraqi conflict came in mid-2003, when the American forces transitioned from conventional operations to a counterinsurgency. The former Iraqi Army was disbanded and Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 2, August 23, 2003, dictated a new army was to be formed.

Since 2004, the newly formed Iraqi Army's logistics, personnel recruitment and retention, and administrative support were major concerns for Coalition forces. Furthermore, progress toward independence was impeded at top levels within the Government of Iraq and the Minister of Defense because of poor security conditions and continuous corruption within the ministry. Because the strategy was failing, a surge of U.S. forces totaling over 30,000 additional troops deployed to Iraq to provide security and stability in late 2006.

This paper uses an explanatory case study approach to investigate the 2nd Brigade, 7th IA Division's level of progress made in logistics, personnel recruitment, and pay administration over the span of two calendar years, 2006 (CY06) and 2007 (CY07). The case study approach determines the relationship among the various factors (i.e. the surge and the citizen uprisings) that influence the current behavior of the 2nd Brigade, 7th Iraqi Army Division (2/7 BDE).

In order to determine the relationship among the Brigade's various factors, several sources were used for data. For the experiential knowledge, the researcher interviewed a former advisor of 2/7 BDE, located in Al Asad, Iraq. He was the researcher's successor upon turnover of the researcher's duties in December 2006. The researcher's personal experience in 2006 will be compared to the successor's assessment of the BDE's performance in 2007. The researcher's personal notes and successor interview are the primary sources. Similarly, U.S. advisor after action reports regarding other Iraqi units were reviewed.

Conclusion: The lessons learned from advising Iraqi Army has set the tone for a new paradigm shift for the U.S. military. As the U.S. military becomes involved with global conflicts, a key mission set will be advising disorganized militaries strife with corruption. This tall task and new paradigm shift will impact the U.S. military to restructure its forces to conduct the full gamut of nation building. Therefore, building the Iraqi Army is a lesson learned how the United States develops future militaries.

DISCLAIMER

THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE THOSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL STUDENT AUTHOR AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF EITHER THE MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY. REFERENCES TO THIS STUDY SHOULD INCLUDE THE FOREGOING STATEMENT.

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INTRODUCTION

The strategic decisions leading up to the Iraq War will be controversially discussed and debated for many years. In particular, the strategic decisions regarding the disbandment of the Iraqi Army have been a central point of debate within the U.S. military since 2003. After the fall of the Iraqi regime, American forces were not prepared nor had they planned for post-combat operations. At no fault to the operational commanders, failure of strategic design and the lack of understanding of the Middle-Eastern culture cost not only American lives, but also left Iraq lawlessness and in chaos. The turning point of the Iraqi conflict came in mid-2003, when the American forces transitioned from conventional operations to a counterinsurgency. The Iraqi Army was disbanded and Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) Order Number 2, August 23, 2003¹, dictated a new army was to be formed. In addition, the U.S. Military was forced to play a larger role in nation building—in particular, building a new Iraqi Army.

Since 2004, inadequate logistics, personnel recruitment and retention, and pay administration within the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) were major concerns for Coalition forces. Furthermore, progress toward independence was impeded at top levels within the Government of Iraq (GOI) and the Minister of Defense (MOD) because of poor security conditions and continuous corruption within the ministry. However, this paper argues that the surge of American troops, coupled with local and militia uprisings (i.e., the Al Anbar Awakening), was the catalyst for the Iraqi Army's (IA) progress in critical areas, such as logistics, personnel recruitment and retention, and pay administration, which contributed to building the confidence and performance of the IA in 2007. This paper will discuss the Iraqi Army, its development, and its ability to sustain itself in combat service support functions. In addition, this paper will illustrate that

progress at the tactical level has outpaced progress within the GOI's ministries at the strategic level.

The paper begins with the project methodology and how data was obtained and analyzed. Then, the researcher discusses background information describing how the situation in Iraq dictated the roles and responsibilities of the advisors in developing the IA and how the increased troop levels provided the breathing room for political and military development. In addition, the paper analyzes the impact of the improved security and how it effected the evaluation criteria (logistics, personnel, and pay administration) for the IA. After detailed discussion in three functional areas within an Iraqi Brigade (BDE), discussion of findings and recommendations for the Marine Corps and the U.S. military are addressed and a conclusion is stated.

METHODOLOGY

This paper uses an explanatory case study approach to investigate the 2nd Brigade, 7th IA Division's (2/7 BDE) level of progress made in logistics, personnel recruitment, and pay administration over the span of two calendar years, 2006 (CY06) and 2007 (CY07). The case study approach "involves extensive observation of a single individual, several individuals, or a single group of individuals as a unit"² in order to determine the relationship among the various factors that influence the current behavior of the 2/7 BDE. An explanatory case study concentrates on "experiential knowledge of the individuals or unit and close attention to the influence of their/its social, political, and other contexts."³

In order to determine the relationship among the Brigade's various factors, several sources were used for data. For the experiential knowledge, the researcher interviewed a former advisor of 2/7 BDE, located in Al Asad, Iraq. He was the researcher's successor upon turnover of the researcher's duties in December 2006. The researcher's personal experience in 2006 will be

compared to the successor's assessment of the BDE's performance in 2007 in the Al Anbar region. The researcher's personal notes and successor interview are the primary sources. Similarly, U.S. advisor after action reports (AAR) regarding other Iraqi units were reviewed. Additionally, the researcher wanted to gain perspective from outside of Al Anbar through a personal interview of a former U.S. Army advisor, who deployed with the Iraqi Army's 2nd Division in Mosul. In addition to other advisors' reports, the researcher evaluated Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports, *The Report of the Independent Commission on the Security of Iraq*, *Report to Congress on the Situation in Iraq*, and other newsprint articles (e.g., newspaper, *Marine Corps Gazette*) in order to look at factors that affected the Brigade, to include Iraqi units outside of Al Anbar, and analyze how those factors were influenced by the Brigade's social, political, and geographic contexts.

By using a wide variety of resources (i.e., government documents, first-person experiences/observations, personal interviews with subject matter experts), the researcher was able to triangulate the data which highlighted common supporting themes from several sources. An Excel spreadsheet was used to categorize large amounts of data into its respective categories and to capture specific information for each area. An example of how the researcher reduced the data for one category (i.e., Logistics and Pay) and its supporting evidence can be found in Appendix A. The following section introduces the surge and the civilian uprising's impact improved the performance of the Iraqi BDE.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

"A second tenet of counterinsurgency is that foreign forces, however adept, are no substitute for capable indigenous ones. Lest we forget, huge foreign military intervention did not produce victory for the French in Indochina or Algeria, for the Soviets in Afghanistan, or for the Americans in Vietnam. An indigenous army can claim a measure of legitimacy that an occupying army—especially a Western one amid Muslim cooperation---cannot."⁴

In 2003, after the invasion of Iraq, Coalition forces misjudged the character and nature of the conflict and failed to plan for post-conflict and reconstruction operations. That is, Coalition forces transitioned from liberators to occupiers. In addition, the decision to disband the Iraqi Army in May 2003 was also a strategic flaw. The outcome of this decision resonates as one of the most failed decisions during this war and illustrates that the U.S.'s inability to predict how disbanding the Iraqi Army only exacerbated the security situation.⁵ In an article from the *Iraqi Security Forces: A Strategy for Success*, James J. Wirtz wrote *The Exquisite Problem of Victory: Measuring Success in Unconventional Operations*. Wirtz states:

“Greatly worsening the situation was the U.S. decision to disestablish the Iraqi Army, a decision that promptly left over 400,000 officers and soldiers unemployed. This military talent served as a ready recruitment pool for ethnic militias, criminal organizations, and terrorist groups who benefited from the chaotic conditions that quickly spread across several urban centers in Iraq.....on stability operations, the Coalition’s efforts in Iraq were more than unsuccessful. They actually were counterproductive because they had the net effect of reducing the security enjoyed by the Iraqi people.”⁶

By July and August 2003, the first efforts were taken to form and create the new Iraqi Army. It was led by the Coalition Military Assistance Training Team (CMATT). CMATT planned to establish three light motorized brigades, called the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC). However, structural and organizational problems within CMATT and the CPA hindered the effort to operationalize these brigades.⁷ As a result of the failure to accurately plan and resource the Iraqi military, training and operations were further delayed. It was not until the spring of 2004 that Coalition forces achieved a sense of urgency and realized that Iraqi security forces were vital to Iraq’s future.⁸

Between 2004 and 2005, the Iraqi Army continued to struggle. Operational capability was limited and personnel attrition remained extremely high. As Coalition forces continued to form, train, man, and equip a new Iraqi Army, security in Iraq continued to deteriorate which put a

continuous strain on Coalition forces. Furthermore, many Iraqi units performed abysmally. Iraqi units were poorly led, refused to fight, and deserted from the army.⁹ According to Cordesman, "Corruption, nepotism, political favoritism, false manpower reports, and false activity reports continued to be serious problems—something that was inevitable in trying to develop security and police forces in a foreign culture and in a country that was governed in a corrupt manner for decades."¹⁰ To stanch this poor performance, the U.S. placed advisors with Iraqi Army units. The following section will describe how transition teams were formed to advise the new Iraqi Army in order to help it bring security and order to the country.

While Coalition forces were providing security throughout Iraq, advisor teams were created to help develop the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). Specifically for the IA, the Military Transition Teams (MiTTs) were embedded with Iraqi units for training, mentoring, and advising. Advisor teams were task-organized to ensure team composition facilitated the Iraqi Army in the functional areas of operations, intelligence, logistics, communications, and leadership. However, in 2006, many advisors were redirected to help build the Iraqi Army's life support infrastructure, instead of training them to fight a counterinsurgency. The 2/7BDE's operational status during the time that the researcher was assigned to was no different. His team was not only tasked with building the BDE's fighting capability, but was also part of the effort to build the BDE's life support infrastructure.

The researcher is an intelligence officer by training, and his expectation for his tour of duty in Iraq in 2006 was to train and mentor an Iraqi BDE Intelligence Section. Instead, his mission was redirected toward building the foundation for the Iraqi BDE. Able to conduct limited combat operations, the BDE was incapable of sustaining any level of progress because the basic life support requirements of logistics, personnel, and a pay system was broken. This research paper

is grounded in the researcher's day-to-day experiences and interactions with members of the BDE and MOD.

The security situation during 2006 was poor and hindered the researcher and his team's effort to establish the BDE's operational capability; this problem was also pandemic across all Iraqi units. As a result, General David H. Petraeus recommended that 30,000 additional troops deploy to Iraq in December 2006. The researcher was interested to find out how the BDE functioned as a result of the improved security, and this paper's findings show that the improved security had a positive impact on the BDE's progress. In order to make this statement, the next section provides an explanation of where and how data was obtained, as well as how it was analyzed.

THE SURGE – "OPERATION FARDH-AL QANOON" AND THE AWAKENING

By December 2006, Coalition forces were failing to meet their objectives in Iraq. The peak of the sectarian violence so far was the bombing of the Golden Dome Mosque in Samarra in February 2006, which escalated the level of violence throughout the country.¹¹ There were not enough U.S./Coalition troops to secure the country, and the level of violence hindered the progress of the GOI and the Iraqi Army.¹² The IA was totally dependent upon Coalition forces for survival. Iraqi units were only capable of conducting combined operations with Coalition forces. All combat service and support was provided by Coalition forces. Morale was low within the Iraqi Army and soldiers were quitting in droves.¹³ By mid-June 2007, 30,000 new U.S. troops were deployed throughout the country. In Al Anbar, a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) and one infantry battalion deployed to conduct surge operations, which totaled nearly 5,000 additional Marines and Sailors. General David H. Petraeus, Commander of Coalition forces in Iraq, focused the surge on the following areas:

- Offensive and clearing operations in several key cities.

- Engage in dialogue with insurgent groups and tribes to oppose Al Qaeda (AQI) and other extremists.
- Emphasize the development of the Iraqi Security Forces.
- Employ non-kinetic operations with added reconstruction teams.¹⁴

Once offensive operations commenced, Al Qaida in Iraq's (AQI) influence and ethno-sectarian violence was reduced.¹⁵ Appendix B shows a portion of the effects of the surge. In addition, an uprising of anti-Al Qaeda groups formed under the leadership of various Sheiks in Al Anbar. A plethora of sources confirm that the violence and uprisings were beginning to decline. According to an article written in the *Weekly Standard* in March 2007, the "awakening" was a key to reducing the level of violence.¹⁶ On December 28, 2007, *Time* magazine reported that "militias that once fought against Coalition forces have turned against Al Qaeda."¹⁷ In addition, on December 21, 2007, *The Washington Post* reported, "the number of attacks fell in Al Anbar from 1,350 in October 2006 to fewer than 100 per month. Last week, there were just 12 attacks in Anbar."¹⁸

Furthermore, the Concerned Local Citizens (CLC) program was instituted and provided local security in Baghdad. Recruited citizens were paid \$300 to join in neighborhood watch groups. As of December 2007, there were 69,000 citizens serving in this program.¹⁹ Finally, on December 30, 2007, *The Washington Post* reported:

"The downturn in violence is generally attributed to three factors that emerged over the year: the arrival of 30,000 additional troops, the emergence of tens of thousands of Sunni fighters who aligned with American troops against al-Qaida in Iraq, and the decision by Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr to call for a six-month cease-fire by his militia."²⁰

For the IA, the surge improved the security and stability for cities and road networks to support logistical and personnel movement. In addition, the Al Anbar Awakening and the CLC provided Coalition forces useful tactical intelligence to target insurgent activities and AQI.

Therefore, these initiatives extended the space and time available for Coalition forces to operationally develop the IA and sustain themselves independently. Because of these events, the IA has made considerable progress. David Gompert, an analyst from the Rand Corporation, noted:

“The army is emerging as one of Iraq’s few effective national institutions: an integrated force with units and commanders drawn from every province, people, and sect. Generally speaking, they are well-led, disciplined, adequately funded, politically trustworthy, and respected by the people. The most important indicator of their progress is that U.S. commanders are starting to decide that Iraqi Brigades can replace U.S. brigades one by one, a process that will gain speed in the coming year.”²¹

The evidence presented above indicates how the surge of personnel provided Coalition forces, specifically the MiTTs, the space and time to continue the development of the IA. Furthermore, it is important to mention that the surge ends in the summer of 2008, and the Iraqi Army will need to stand on their own to operate and sustain themselves independently without Coalition forces assistance. Advisors will still embed with the IA, but operations, intelligence, logistics, and personnel/pay administration will be led by the Iraqi Army.

In 2007, 2/7 BDE made significant improvements in their operational development, in spite of MOD’s slow progress to develop and implement its policies to support the IA; and, in fact, Major Steve Sims, 2/7 BDE MiTT in 2007 (and the researcher’s successor), stated that the BDE was operating independently and had tactical control of assigned battlespace. During the interview, Sims noted that 2/7 BDE was currently rated as (Operational Readiness Assessment (ORA) Level 2 and had reached that level within six to eight months after ending the year 2006.²² (See Appendix C for a description of the ORA) The BDE had tactical control over its battalions and the 7th Division had tactical control over its Brigades. In addition, Iraqi Ground Forces Command (IGFC) had tactical control over the two Divisions in Al Anbar. In essence,

2/7 BDE was operating in battlespace adjacent to Regimental Combat Team-2 (RCT-2) and all tactical direction and taskings were now directed from the Iraqi Division. Sims stated that the BDE was “performing well in tactical and convoy operations.” Sims continued:

The BDE’s Operations Shop grew by two field grade officers. A civil affairs and training section was added to the BDE staff. Planning continued to remain centralized and the BDE Commander still made all the decisions. Even though the staff was taught numerous classes on Military Decision Making (MDMP), the BDE staff always reverted back to the BDE commander to make all the decisions. Nevertheless, the BDE executed well. The soldiers performed well in tactical operations. They [Iraqi soldiers] still lacked discipline for not wearing their PPE [Personal Protective Equipment], but they still got the job done.²³

Thus far, this paper has provided an overview of the advisors’ role and the current effects of the surge and Iraqi civilian uprising. As discussed, the BDE’s overall operational capability improved over the course of the year, but the following discussion will detail how the surge, coupled with the rising of the Iraqi people, impacted the critical areas of logistics, personnel, and pay, based on the researcher’s and his successor’s personal experiences.

HOW THE SURGE IS AFFECTING LOGISTICS, PERSONNEL, AND PAY

Logistics

In war, a military unit’s capability is degraded if the unit has poor logistics planning and execution.²⁴ During the researcher’s tour of duty, he, along with his team members, determined that IA logistics was the bottleneck to effectively enhance the BDE’s sustainment capability. The following section will focus on the concept of IA logistics, followed by the BDE’s performance between 2006 and 2007.

A logistics concept was developed by MOD in 2005, as a multilayered system that synchronized the logistics and maintenance at all levels (i.e., strategic, operational, tactical), within the Iraqi Army.²⁵ As a result, various garrison support units and maintenance contracts

were established in key locations around Iraq. Strategically, MOD developed a support command that was responsible for plans, policies, acquisition, and budgeting. Formal schools were also established to train logistic specialists supported by MOD and Coalition forces. The schools, located in Taji, provided a formal curriculum that enabled officers and enlisted personnel to acquire the capability and skill level to support the logistical infrastructure within the army.²⁶

Logistics: 2006

Unfortunately, MOD was unable to fully execute and implement this logistics plan. Security conditions and MOD's inefficiency and inexperience slowly hampered the logistics development in 2005 and 2006, although some progress was made in 2007.²⁷ In addition, in September 2007, The Independent Commission reported, "The lack of logistics experience and expertise within the Iraqi armed forces is substantial and hampers their readiness and capability. Renewed emphasis on Coalition mentoring and technical support will be required to remedy this condition."²⁸ For 2/7 BDE, the Team Chief stated in June 2006, "Sometimes they don't eat for days.....logistics has been the Iraqi army's primary problem here."²⁹ Considered the Achilles heel of developing the IA, logistics has had uneven progress in 2007, as noted in a recent Department of Defense Report, *Measuring and Stability in Iraq*:

The MoD, and to a lesser extent, the MoI, have shown some improvement in logistics capabilities. The notable exception is an inability to adequately forecast life-support requirements and to promptly take action when contracts are expiring. The Minister of Defense had set an ambitious goal of December 1, 2007, for attempting again to assume life support self-reliance. Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) advisors had recommended that implementation be phased in over time. So far, the implementation has been mixed. The construction of national-level maintenance and warehousing facilities at the Taji National Maintenance and Supply Depots should be completed by 2009.³⁰

Furthermore, Coalition forces instituted a type of "tough love" policy toward the Iraqi Army by mid-2006. Because Coalition forces had a time-driven plan for IA logistics independence, this policy halted all Coalition forces logistic support, to include fuel replenishment, to the IA in order to "kick-start" the MOD and the IA to begin to demonstrate initiative in order to gain operational independence. This policy failed because the IA/MOD infrastructure was still not established and the security conditions were still not favorable for independent Iraqi convoys for logistical movement. Coalition forces then resumed combat support to the IA and realized that the IA's logistics transition was going to be an event-driven process instead of enforced timelines.³¹

Logistics: 2007

The year of 2007 was considered the "Year of Leaders and Logistics"³² as stated by MNSTC-I's campaign plan. The plan directed that the Iraqi Joint Headquarters was to assume total responsibility for logistics by November 2007. This benchmark was not totally achieved; however, considerable progress was made at the BDE.

In January 2007, MOD awarded the Sandi Group (Iraqi food service contractors with U.S. oversight) the contract to oversee the food and life support for the IA, and significant progress was made in BDE's quality of life.³³ Food distribution improved because the surge increased the road networks' security. In addition, the Sandi Group was also able to support fuel transportation across Al Anbar, and by mid 2007, the entire BDE's fuel requirements became independent from the Coalition forces. Furthermore, the road networks improved to the point that Iraqi commanders did not want American convoys and checkpoints on the main roads because it caused traffic delays for Iraqi logistical resupplies.³⁴

Personnel

Manpower retention and recruitment were also major obstacles for MiTTs and the 2/7 BDE to overcome. These personnel shortfalls also inhibited the IA's operational capability. Because Iraq was still unsecure as of 2003, recruitment and sustainment of young Iraqi males was difficult to achieve. The following sections will describe the personnel situation between 2006 and 2007.

Personnel: 2006

In June 2006, the *Stars and Stripes* reported, "In Hadithah, the Iraqi Army Brigade has been losing about 100 soldiers a month, dropping from more than 2,000 at the beginning of the year to fewer than 1,600 in May."³⁵ The personnel decline was also noted in the same *Stars and Stripes* article by the researcher's MiTT Chief. "We won't make any real progress until we stop hemorrhaging the personnel," stated Lieutenant Colonel Jeff Kenney.³⁶ 2/7 Brigade was not the only unit experiencing high levels of attrition. In an article referring to Iraqi units across Al Anbar, Dr. Carter Malkasian, from the Center of Naval Analysis, wrote:

Between 20 and 33 percent of the 750 men in a battalion are on leave at any time, while desertions and combat losses—because of poor living conditions, irregular pay, distance from home, and constant exposure to combat—reduced on-hand strength to between 150 and 600 men per battalion. In the worst cases, personnel attrition has forced certain Iraqi units to drastically cut back on operations.³⁷

Recruiting drives proved unsuccessful in 2006 due to several factors. The BDE commander had a positive influence with the local Sheiks, but was unable to fully persuade sufficient number of Sunni males to join the predominantly Shia Army. The Sheiks affirmed that no males were going to join the army because of their fear of becoming targets of the insurgents. The BDE and Coalition forces were unable to win the support of the local Sunni community because of the

strong influence AQI had on the local population. It was clear that local support for police, army, and the government was not going to happen until the insurgency was quelled.

Personnel: 2007

Fortunately, there was a turning point in 2007. As the surge began to eliminate AQI's influence, especially in Al Anbar, the local Sheiks also began to sway toward local and regional reconciliation. The Al Anbar Awakening was the "call to all of Iraq to stand up with people from all tribes, and all religions to stop insurgents from causing fear throughout their land."³⁸ In addition, Major General Walter E. Gaskins, Commanding General, Multi-National Force West, stated, "Here around us is the evidence of the peace and stability that are the rewards of the Iraqi people standing together, standing to eliminate the terrorism and lawlessness."³⁹

In addition to the BDE Commander's growing influence, Sheik persuasion, pay incentives, and quality of life were attractions that led Sunni males to join the army. During 2007, the BDE held six recruiting drives from Rawah, Hadithah, Baghdadi, and Hit and was able to recruit over 6,300 Sunni males into the IA. This integration of Sunni and Shia soldiers into the army also had an impact on the leave process. Appendices D and E depicts the growth in personnel in 2/7 BDE between 2006 and 2007.

The Shia soldiers continued to travel by bus from Al Asad to Baghdad for their monthly leave period.⁴⁰ Because security improved over the course of the year, bus transportation traveled more freely between Baghdad and Al Asad than in 2006. In addition, the BDE was providing the security for the passenger buses—a task that Coalition forces performed during 2006.⁴¹ The Sunnis, however, no longer required bus transportation and were able to freely depart Al Asad Base on leave and travel to their homes within the local area.⁴²

Personnel strength also grew across the entire Division throughout Al Anbar. By late 2007, the BDE was able to reach its personnel manpower goals according to the Modified Tables of Organization and Equipment (MTOE), which is the IA's task organization.⁴³ Also, the researcher reviewed classified Operational Readiness Assessments (ORA) reports from two Iraqi Brigades located in Ramadi and Habbiniyah. The percentage of On-Hand personnel to the MTOE was 110% and 118%, respectively.⁴⁴ Furthermore, it is important to mention that the entire IA grew in personnel strength over the course of the two years of the data presented for this research study. In January 2006, the army had 106,900 personnel. By December 2007, the army had 194,233 personnel on the rolls.⁴⁵ (See Appendix F, Iraqi Army Personnel Growth) Along with personnel growth, the IA's pay administration improved over the two-year period as well. Improvements to the pay process will be discussed in detail in the following section.

Pay Administration

Pay: 2006

Pay is a motivator for the Iraqi soldier.⁴⁶ Young Iraqi males join the IA so they can earn money to support their families. In 2006, Iraqi soldiers earned approximately 477,000 dinar (approximately \$320 USD) per month.⁴⁷ The money was brought home every month and given to their families. The soldiers were authorized ten days of leave each month in order for them to take the money home to provide consistent financial support for their families. The pay, however, was inadequate to support the families.⁴⁸ Poor security conditions and the dire quality of life caused soldiers to begin to complain about the low pay. Evidence of this observation was found in a June 11, 2006 article in the *Stars and Stripes*, which stated, "Iraqis complained more about pay and food than they did about combat casualties."⁴⁹ In addition, the researcher spent approximately 70% of his tour of duty addressing BDE pay issues. The researcher also spent

25% of his time in Baghdad (MOD), fixing pay problems within the BDE.⁵⁰ Something or someone was needed to implement a better pay administration process.

The researcher and other advisors took ownership of the pay process and, similar to Marine Corps leadership, MiTTs persevered to ensure every soldier in the Brigade was paid. The first task the advisors accomplished was to review the Brigade's payroll roster. In January 2006, the advisors found there were over 400 "ghost soldiers" that needed to be taken off the payrolls because the extra money was an avenue for skimming off the top among senior officers (Ghost soldiers are soldiers officially listed in the IA pay system, but who are unaccounted for because of being absent without leave). In addition, the advisors determined there were over 150 soldiers who were not getting paid, and some who had not been paid in over six months. This problem along with the complete pay cycle needed attention at all levels of the process, particularly within the Minister of Defense (MOD).⁵¹

Pay: 2007

The complete pay cycle was complex and arduous (See Appendix G for a description of a complete pay cycle). Between May and July 2006, however, the BDE began utilizing a local bank in Al Anbar to cash the BDE's payroll check. Utilizing the local bank in Hadithah allowed the BDE to take a more active role in its own payroll process with minimal support from Coalition forces. Unfortunately, security within Baghdad worsened during the summer of 2006, and the Minister of Finance declined to move large amounts of cash across the country. Therefore, the BDE took a step backward having to again use a bank in Baghdad.

In 2007, improved security in Baghdad allowed ministry officials the time and effort to focus on payroll administration, which resulted in significant improvements, and employees were able

to go to work unafraid.⁵² One example of improvement was that 98.5% of the soldiers were paid and the “ghost soldier” count remained at a mere 40 per month by the end of November 2007.⁵³

Since security improved throughout the country, the Iraqi Government’s confidence grew to allow monetary funds to travel safely throughout the country. Therefore, MOD reevaluated the possibility of using local banks in Fallujah, Ramadi, and Hit to support the IA. In addition, MOD employees were allowed to use direct deposit as an experiment to validate its necessity; and because of direct deposits success, MOD planned to expand direct deposit to Iraqi Army personnel. Therefore, an Iraqi soldier could withdraw his money from his local community bank instead of relying on an antiquated pay system with multiple layers of procedures.⁵⁴

Furthermore, The Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq reported:

The MOD also continues to develop a new banking facility that is already providing roughly 2,800 employees with direct deposit services. The MOD is working to add another 1,500 personnel to the bank’s rolls. The new MOD bank will facilitate payment while also reducing the risks of corruption in the payroll system. Although at present only a fraction of MOD personnel are part of the new direct deposit system, it is an important step in the right direction.⁵⁵

IRAQI BRIGADE (1ST BDE, 2ND DIV) PROGRESS IN MOSUL, IRAQ

In addition, the researcher was able to corroborate further evidence and gained additional information from an interview with a U.S. Army officer, Captain George T. Jones, who served on a MiTT, had recently returned from Iraq. Captain Jones served as a Maneuver Trainer for 1st Brigade, 2nd Iraqi Army Division, located in Mosul, from February 2007 until January 2008. During the interview, which was held on January 13, 2008, the researcher was able to establish a pattern consistent that corroborated evidence the researcher previously collected.⁵⁶

With regard to the three main areas discussed in this paper (i.e., logistics, personnel, pay), Jones stated that the surge had provided the space and time for the IA to operationally develop by “getting into the fight.”⁵⁷ He stated that the IA participated in the surge along side Coalition

forces and determined that the IA was able to improve its performance because the soldiers were constantly challenged tactically and operationally by Coalition forces.⁵⁸ With regard to logistics, Captain Jones stated the BDE's life support was contracted by a local supplier outside of Mosul. Jones said that the BDE was being fed daily and that food supplies never fell short; however, Jones also stated that supply, maintenance, and medical requisitions remained a challenge because MOD's systemic problems of the inability to support its Army. Therefore, Coalition forces still provided supply, maintenance and medical support to the BDE.⁵⁹ This is consistent with the researcher's and Major Sims' reports.

On the other hand, the BDE's personnel strength remained steady during Jones' tenure. Recruitment of Iraqi males was successful, but MOD remained slow including/entering the new soldiers into the payroll system. According to Jones, "ghost soldiers" were still a problem during the course of the year, but his team was confident that the new Iraqi data base, Human Resource Information Management System (HRIMS)⁶⁰ was going to solve a majority of those issues. Jones also stated that the HRIMS would put a check and balance into the payroll system and identify whether the system was circumvented. In addition, Jones and his team dealt with corruption within the senior ranks of the BDE during the course of the year. However, his team was confident that the BDE could independently operate and sustain itself the following year, regardless of the Iraqi culture and mindset.⁶¹

DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

This data reflects and supports the argument that the surge and the uprising of Iraqi citizens (Al Anbar Awakening and the Concerned Local Citizens) allowed the space and time for MOD to develop its programs and policies to build, operate, and sustain the IA. The surge and the uprising of Iraqi citizens also gave Coalition forces the additional breathing room needed to

enhance the IA's capability to independently sustain itself. Evidence collected from four different sources showed a pattern of consistency of how the IA improved in the areas of logistics, personnel, and pay administration over the course of 2007. Although the speed of improvement wasn't a factor the researcher intended to study, it is important to mention that the data indicated progress continued faster at tactical level units than it did at the strategic or national level. The measure used to determine progress made at the tactical level will be discussed in the next section.

Operational Readiness Assessment (ORA) reports from four BDE's were reviewed in December 2007 in the areas of logistics, personnel, and pay. Each MiTT Chief rated the Iraqi unit with high ratings in the areas of logistics, personnel, and pay.⁶² All subjective comments regarding the three areas had a consistent message that MOD needed to accelerate its programs to support the IA, especially in administration and logistics.⁶³ The ratings from the four ORA for the four different BDE's indicated a consistent pattern that progress had been made at the tactical level and that MOD lagged at the strategic level. At the current pace, the lack of programs initiated and implemented by MOD will only stall Iraqi units from achieving ORA Level I,⁶⁴ (i.e., the ability for an Iraqi unit to plan, execute, and sustain a counterinsurgency). Furthermore, Sims indicated that MOD remained inefficient and continued its social bureaucracy and failure to plan."⁶⁵ The next section will provide specific information on MOD's critical shortfalls that have resulted in the IA's lack of strategic development and that have prevented the IA from fully operating independent of coalition support.

Air Capability

The IA's air lift capability is still limited. In 2005, Coalition forces completely eradicated the Iraqi Air Force and there was no flyable aircraft within the Iraqi Army's inventory. Coalition

forces had to start from scratch to build a new Iraqi Air Force. U.S. Air Force Brigadier General Robert R. Allardice, in a report to the Foreign Relations Council, projected that the Iraqi Air Force will be fully mission-capable by the year 2012.⁶⁶ This projection has a direct impact on the overall movement and logistical capability the IA needs to operate independently.⁶⁷

Leadership Development

The IA's officer and enlisted leadership development continues to progress, albeit slowly, but it should not be construed negatively because developing junior officers and enlisted non-commissioned officers (NCO) takes time. When Coalition forces disbanded Sadaam Hussein's military, the foundational leadership within the former regime was also disbanded. Coalition forces then had to start from the bottom up to build a new officer and enlisted corps. It was not until late 2006 that Coalition forces allowed former officers and enlisted back into the IA. The resident knowledge of the former officers will continue to serve purposefully in developing the IA, but a new leadership culture will take many years to fully mature. Solid Iraqi leadership at senior ranks, elimination of government and ministry corruption, coupled with professional military education will be the cornerstone for successful IA development.⁶⁸

RECOMMENDATIONS

Given the evidence presented and the discussion provided, the following are the researcher's recommendations on what Coalition forces and the Iraqi Government must focus on and accomplish in 2008, in order for Iraq to become a legitimate and independent nation state. These recommendations are not limited to U.S. military efforts, but include necessary actions and coordination with U.S. Inter-Agency organizations. The first three sections will address recommendations for logistics, personnel, and pay. Then, the following sections will suggest five additional areas where the US Government and Inter-Agencies should focus their efforts.

Logistics

Logistics development will continue to be the Achilles heel for the IA, especially at the strategic level. However, logistics improvement contributed to the Iraqi Army's ability to receive an ORA Level 2 performance rating by Coalition forces in 2007, even though the IA had received poor performance ratings the previous year. Coalition forces and MOD remain confident that if the strategic level of logistics progresses, the entire logistics system will become integrated and supportable to the Iraqi Army's operational and tactical units. In addition, the medical capability, which is the largest constraint for the Iraqi Army, continues to remain a long challenge for coalition forces. Therefore, Coalition advisors must continue to mentor and train senior MOD and Iraqi Army officers in strategic logistics in order to support the operational units, and have a synchronized logistical program that sustains the Iraqi Army's operational capability.

Personnel

MOD is meeting its desired manpower levels. It is unreasonable, however, to predict that MOD should curb its policy regarding the IA's leave process. Even though the U.S. feels that the leave policy is excessive (i.e., 10 days off for every 20 days of duty), one of the key areas the IA's morale is based upon is the vacation time the soldiers receive by serving in their army. Implementing a western culture's style of leave system whereby one earns leave for time served would be detrimental to the Iraqi Army at this time. In addition, MOD must continue to build its legitimacy in order for personnel strength to continue to grow. Soldiers and Iraqi citizens must have confidence in their government and U.S. Inter-Agency personnel and advisors must ensure that MOD establishes legitimacy to build that confidence.

Pay

To date, the data shows that there are high expectations that the new HRIMS will significantly benefit the IA. MOD should continue to use of local banks and a direct deposit program for the army. This process eliminates the burden of Coalition forces having oversight of the payroll process and puts the burden of control directly into the hands of MOD and the IA. If the IA is independent of Coalition forces' administering payroll, it will allow the advisors to focus on other critical areas of the IA, such as expanding their counterinsurgency abilities.

In order to effectively defeat the counterinsurgency and continue the positive progress the Iraqi Government has made, DoD and the U.S. Inter-Agencies need to focus on the following five areas in 2008: 1) the continuous combat operations to support the surge and the awakening, 2) MOD's legitimacy, 3) operationalize the IA, 4) Iraqi Police legitimacy, and 5) increase the size of advisory teams and the quality of advisors.

The Surge and the Awakening

Coalition forces must continue to pressure the insurgency and Al Qaida until the enemy's ability to fight becomes untenable. Although the overall violence decreased in Iraq in 2007,⁶⁹ Coalition forces must be cautious of a re-emergence of violence from either sectarian feuds or AQI in 2008. Coalition forces must continue its operations against the insurgency, and maintain its strategy of clear, hold, and build. The situation and the level of violence will dictate a decision to withdraw troops and it should not be based on U.S. political pressure of specific time lines. Currently, Coalition forces have the operational momentum, but as General Petraeus states, "while progress in many areas remains fragile, security has improved."⁷⁰

MOD Legitimacy

MOD is a critical element to developing the IA. *The Washington Post* reported that even though the surge has provided the time and space for the ministry and political improvement, the Iraqi Government has not taken full advantage of this opportunity.⁷¹ Critics argue there remains political sectarianism and corruption within the ministries. However, the researcher argues that pundits have discounted the level of progress the IA has made in the last year. In its December 2007 report to Congress, *Measuring the Stability and Security in Iraq*, DoD noted:

The MoD has made solid gains in institutional capacity and force generation during this reporting period but is still developing capacity in other areas. A significant restructuring of the Joint Headquarters' (JHQ) command and control arrangements has also been undertaken. **Coalition assistance provides fielded forces with some logistical support, but the MoD has begun a renewed effort to attain self-sufficiency in life support, maintenance and logistics in the coming quarters.** The MoD is showing slow but real progress in the acquisitions process and is demonstrating an approach to the planning and management of all ministry requirements that are joint and reflective of civil-military coordination.⁷²

If the previous report is correct, U.S. and Coalition forces can expect major gains at the strategic level. Regardless, Coalition forces and the U.S. Inter-Agencies must continue to further validate and solidify the Government of Iraq and its ministries. This researcher suggests that strategic level advisors, to include U.S. Inter-Agencies, must continue to mentor and interact with senior MOD officials on a daily basis, instill a sense of ethics and discipline to reduce or eliminate corruption, and to hold officials accountable for new Iraqi Government programs and policy implementation.

Operationalize the IA

Iraqi units in Al Anbar are currently assessed at ORA 2. At that level, it is important the MiTTs begin advising Iraqi units to focus more on the counterinsurgency fight. For 2008, the strategy for the MiTTs should be the integration of the IA into fighting a counterinsurgency and

to achieve operational independence while obtaining battlespace. According to an AAR by 3-1

BDE Team Chief,

“MiTTs must leverage the Iraqis across three levels of Logical Lines of Operations (LLOs): security, governance, and reconstruction. IA (Iraqi Army) officers are good at communicating with local nationals to find out real needs of the area. Get them involved. Too many IA units are simply relegated to patrolling in zone and following behind CF (Coalition Force) formations.”⁷³

Operational plans for the IA in 2008 should focus in the areas of tactical and operational intelligence, fires/effects and information operations, humanitarian assistance, civil-military operations, and close air and artillery support.

Along with operationalizing the IA, it is important that the Iraqi Army and its officers begin solving their own problems. Sims stated that the Iraqis should not be “baby sat.”⁷⁴ Furthermore, it is a mistake to perceive that advisors need to model the IA to western military standards. This misperception of approaching the Iraqis with a western mind-set has caused frustration among advisors in the last two years.⁷⁵ Brigadier General Reist is quoted in an article in the Marine Corps Gazette that “The tribal culture is the most complex issue in Al Anbar. The complexity of this issue stems from the simple fact that the Western mind does not (and may never) understand it. We do not have to understand though; simply accept it for what it is.”⁷⁶ It is logical to conclude that the IA has a distinct cultural advantage when it relates to tribal engagements.

What is the bottom line? Now that security conditions have improved, start putting the Iraqis in front and let them figure out the problems themselves. On January 10, 2008, the *Washington Post* reported, “After countless unsuccessful efforts to push Iraqis toward various political, economic and security goals, they [U.S. military and diplomatic officials] have decided to let the Iraqis figure things out themselves.”⁷⁷

Iraqi Police

While initial assumptions were flawed regarding the decision to disband the Iraqi Army, the decision to disband the Iraqi Police also had a wide impact to the overall security within Iraq.⁷⁸ As Coalition forces transitioned to a counterinsurgency, there were no local constables to provide security, civil control, or law and order and the country resulted in chaos when the regime had fallen. Although the Iraqi Police was not considered a variable at the beginning of this study, it is important to mention that the police development has lagged behind the IA in their life support and pay administration. Like the IA, the quality of life of the Iraqi Police is also very important. Poor pay and life support leveraged the insurgency to influence young males. Therefore, Coalition forces and the Inter-Agencies must ensure that police remains a high priority and that their life support programs and training requirements are met.⁷⁹

Quality Advisors

Recently, U.S. Army General Barry R. McCaffrey (Ret) conducted an assessment on the situation in Iraq for the United States Military Academy. In his report, General McCaffrey was optimistic about the outcome of the status of the Iraqi Security Forces. He stated, "The embedded US training teams have simply incredible levels of trust and mutual cooperation with their Iraqi counterparts. ... This is the center-of-gravity of the war."⁸⁰ The researcher supports General McCaffrey's argument, never the less, home-base units must select only the best qualified leaders for advisor billets. If the advisors are the center-of-gravity for winning this war, then units must not fall short in their personnel selection.

Another important factor is the size of the advisor teams. Coalition forces realized that the size of the teams had to increase in order to be effective for the IA. For example, "In Al Anbar alone, there were 1,700 advisors committed to the Iraqi Army, police, and border forces. This

represented a 40% increase in advisor support.”⁸¹ Also, home station units must ensure that advisors continue with quality pre-deployment training and cultural development. Team Chiefs must hold strong leadership skills and must be able to develop the relationships not only between the IA, but also among partnered coalition units. Therefore, it is vitally important that the selection criteria be set at a high standard when selecting team members.

CONCLUSION

If the U.S. employed the same surge strategy in 2003 that was employed in 2007, conditions in Iraq may have been different. Specifically, the country may have seen a more stable government, the IA and security forces may have been more operationally capable, Coalition forces and the IA may have sustained fewer casualties, and the U.S. troop strength may have reduced over time, thus allowing for shorter deployments. However, after four years of occupation, it was not until late December 2006 that the United States realized that more forces were needed to meet the clear, hold, and build strategy.

The 2007 surge has not only decreased the level of violence, but was the catalyst for the Iraqi Army to improve in the areas of logistics, personnel, and pay administration. As this paper has clearly presented, the Iraqi Army has made progress in these critical areas, which contributed to building the confidence and performance of the Iraqi Army in 2007. As the difficult work for advisors continue, major areas within the Iraqi Army still need developed, such as, intelligence, air support, and medical capability.

Successful development of the Iraqi Army in 2007 is the starting point for the advisors’ tall order in 2008. Troop levels may reduce, but the advisors’ mission remains critically important. Furthermore, if violence spikes in 2008, the researcher believes that the Iraqi Army will be able to stand on their own, but the U.S. must maintain close over watch of the Iraqi Army’s

performance. The IA and the security forces may experience some operational setbacks, but overall, they will prevail over the insurgency because the IA is better trained, and the infrastructure has improved over the last two years. Also, with lower U.S./Coalition troop levels in 2008, the Iraqi Army must obtain the freedom to operate and sustain operations, not necessarily by western standards, but through the Iraqi way, regardless if it's right or wrong. The U.S. presence in Iraq will only reduce faster if Coalition forces put the Iraqis in front of the fight. The Iraqi Army may not meet the criteria of ORA 1 in western standards, but at least the Iraqis are taking the lead.

Finally, the lessons learned from advising foreign militaries sets the tone for a new paradigm shift for the U.S. military. As the U.S. military becomes involved with global conflicts, a key mission will be advising disorganized militaries most likely strife with corruption. This tall task and new paradigm shift will impact the U.S. military's ability to restructure its forces to conduct the full gamut of nation building. Therefore, building the Iraqi Army is a lesson learned how the United States develops future militaries.

Logistics	2nd BDE, 7th Iraqi Division BDE MiTT Personal Notes-2006*	2nd BDE, 7th Iraqi Division BDE MiTT Interview-2007*	1st Iraqi Army Division, BDE MiTT MiTT AAR 2006*	1st Iraqi Army Division, BDE MiTT AAR 2007*	News Article June 2006*	News Article July 2007*
Quality of Life	Poor living conditions aboard the BDE and BN camps. Food contractor performed miserably. Soldiers would eat meat/produce only twice per week. No camp support, to include water removal. Total support required from the Regiment.	New Contractor, Sandi Group, provided life support for the BDE. Contract had American oversight but the quality of life improved for the soldiers. Fresh produce and meats began to arrive regularly. Road networks improved in Al Anbar because security was better. Numerous times, produce and meats was purchased in the local markets. MOD began allocating money to the BDE for local food purchases, which also showed signs of economy improvement.	The performance at Habbiniyah has been extremely poor since MOD took over control of awarding and paying for the contractor. Not enough supplies to support the BDE. The Army had to purchase food items in the open market with "out of pocket" money.	The contracting company, the Sandi Group, improved its performance. In January 2007, the contractor was providing 60% of the IA food and water. Spoilage, at times, was a problem, and they were not prepared for the "surge" of increased number of troops.	Lousy living conditions, bad food and failure to receive regular pay are the main reasons behind the exodus, which is running at least several hundred soldiers a month, the officials said.....Sometimes, they don't eat for two or three days at a time. Logistics has been the Iraqi army's primary problem here. The Iraqis complain most about the persistent problems with food and pay rather than bouts with combat and casualties.	The Iraqi military logistics system also is improving, Pine said, although he acknowledged it does experience occasional hiccups. "Logistics is probably the most complex thing any military force does, and so we're trying to really help them focus on the ability to do logistics," Pine said. Now paper-based, the Iraqi logistics system is being retooled to eventually incorporate a computer-run supply database patterned after one used by the U.S. Air Force, he said. he Iraqi army's logistics capabilities "have improved across the board," Pine said, noting efforts have been made to cut down on the amount of time it takes to approve supply requisitions from field units. In addition, the number of Iraqi army fuel requisitions that were filled by coalition sources dropped dramatically over the past few months, he said. Pine said, because the Iraqis' supply processes are improving.

Appendix A. Triangulated Data (Logistics) collected from various sources.

Logistics	2nd BDE, 7th Iraqi Division BDE MiTT Personal Notes-2006*	2nd BDE, 7th Iraqi Division BDE MiTT Interview-2007*	1st Iraqi Army Division, BDE MiTT MiTT AAR 2006*	1st Iraqi Army Division, BDE MiTT AAR 2007*	News Article June 2006*	News Article July 2007*
Fuel	All POL's (MOGAS, diesel) was provided by Coalition Forces aboard Camp Alasad. During 2006, there was no capability for fuel replenishment. Road networks and fuel tanker transportation was too dangerous to travel.	MOD began supplying fuel to the BDE and the BN's. The entire BDE was self sustained and required minimal assistance from Coalition Forces. Increase security allowed fuel trucks to travel freely throughout Al Anbar.	Supplemental fuel provided by Coalition Forces.	Within two months of January 2007, the BDE became totally independent because of the improved life support contract provided by the Sandi Group.		
Supply	Iraqi Soldiers had only one set of uniforms and one pair of boots. There was no supply system established during 2006. All supplies were supported by Coalition Forces.	The BDE's supply requisition improved. Able to conduct convoys to Div HQ (Ramadi) for supply replenishment and equipment. HUMVEE allocation increased through the Enhance Supplemental Utilization Program (ESUP) - temploan program of vehicles to the Army.	Army supply support was abysmal. No issue facility established for the BDE. Reports made to higher HQ but received no response. Morale greatly suffers. Cold weather gear not issued in 2005 and only 1/3 of equipment has arrived in 2006.	Logistical readiness improved to 98%. The BDE Commander and his staff had strong influence to supply and logistic readiness.		

Logistics	2nd BDE, 7th Iraqi Division BDE MiTT Personal Notes-2006*	2nd BDE, 7th Iraq Division BDE MiTT Interview-2007*	1st Iraqi Army Division, BDE MiTT MiTT AAR 2006*	1st Iraqi Army Division, BDE MiTT AAR 2007*	News Article June 2006*	News Article July 2007*
Maintenance	National Maintenance Contract was established mid-2006. All preventative maintenance for Iraqi vehicles was done by the NMC, located adjacent to the BDE camp. The Iraqi BDE did no PM's on their vehicles, even though the MiTTs constantly pushed the Iraqis to do PM's.	Iraqis still do not do PM's. The NMC performed superbly during the year. However, the NMC does not have the spare parts block to repair the BDE's entire asset allocation. For example, Ford and Chevy pickup trucks have remained on a lot at the BDE HQ's for over one year.	Maintenance is non existent. Turn around is slow and usually takes months.	The Iraqi Army Maintenance Program (IAMP) improved the BDE's maintenance capability. The BDE has had success in sending vehicles to Habbiniyah for repair and maintenance.		

Logistics	2nd BDE, 7th Iraqi Division BDE MiTT Personal Notes-2006*	2nd BDE, 7th Iraq Division BDE MiTT Interview-2007*	1st Iraqi Army Division, BDE MiTT MiTT AAR 2006*	1st Iraqi Army Division, BDE MiTT AAR 2007*	News Article June 2006*	News Article July 2007*
Medical	Limited medical capability. Trained Combat Life Savers but the Army had no capability for any surgical care. All surgical care required Coalition Support in Al Asad. The BDE had a Microbiologist as their Medical Officer. He was totally not qualified.	Medical capability improved slightly. All combat related injuries still required Coalition Force support. However, the BDE signed a MOU to the local hospital in Hit that all non-combat related injuries would be treated by the hospital.	No medical records exist for soldiers in the BDE. Preventative medicine practices do not exist. Medical readiness is not tracked.			
Camp Infra-structure	BDE was living in temporary quarters. Buildings were built by Combat Logistics Group. The buildings were wooden framed. They were heated/AC but was not built for permanent use.	The new camp was within three months of completion. The camp was nicely constructed for permanent infrastructure.				

Appendix A. Triangulated Data (Logistics) collected from various sources.

Pay	2nd BDE, 7th Iraqi Division BDE MiTT Personal Notes-2006*	2nd BDE, 7th Iraq Division BDE MiTT Interview- 2007*	1st Iraqi Army Division, BDE MiTT MiTT AAR 2006*	1st Iraqi Army Division, BDE MiTT AAR 2007*	Battalion MiTT AAR comments December 2006
Metrics	Over 400 "ghost soldiers" on roles. 100% MiTT involvement to ensure rosters are clean. Required a lot of MiTT presence at MOD to reconcile rosters. Average 97% of BDE was paid monthly.	Process improved dramatically in 2007. 98.5% of BDE paid monthly. Ghost soldiers was at 40 during in December 2007	25-30 Soldiers were never paid on time. 80% of BDE paid.	Early 2007, 700 ghost soldiers were on the rolls. By end of 2007, it reduced to 17. No pay dues reduced during 2007.	Four reasons Iraqis join the military: pay, vacation, quality of life. Pay was greatest motivator for individuals to remain on active duty.
Process	Complex process of getting check signed monthly. The check process required numerous stamps and signatures. Not efficient process. Always wondered of the significance of the MOD workers—it's their culture.	Cashing check improved to central location in Green Zone (Bank within MOD). Eliminated convoy support to local bank and was more secure. Still required many stamps and signatures.	New joined the BDE, it was impossible to for the Battalions/Brigade/Division to accurately and quickly process these soldiers into the MOD system.	Required MiTT involvement to address issues at MOD level. MiTTs would have "ticket in" to MOD to address issues face to face with MOD personnel.	

Pay	2nd BDE, 7th Iraqi Division BDE MiTT Personal Notes-2006*	2nd BDE, 7th Iraq Division BDE MiTT Interview- 2007*	1st Iraqi Army Division, BDE MiTT MiTT AAR 2006*	1st Iraqi Army Division, BDE MiTT AAR 2007*	Battalion MiTT AAR comments December 2006
Process cont'd	Pay process was complex and was often delayed. Required helo lift to Baghdad, meetings with MOD to sign for check, coordinate convoy to local bank to cash check, drive back to Green Zone, fly back to Al Asad, convoy to Bns to pay soldiers.	Payment to soldiers remained consistent at around the 5th of each month. Reconciliation became easier by eliminating trip to Division HQ.	Delay in paying soldiers resulted in soldiers quitting, which had a significant impact on operational readiness.	MiTTs and G-1's would send Arabic/English report to MOD for corrective action.	
	Security situation in Baghdad delayed cashing of check on three occasions, further complicating logistic movement and coordination.	Data base being established in Al Anbar--(HRIMS) Human Resource Information Management System. Similar to Marine Corps 3270. Expected to eliminate corruption and improve reconciliation process.		Recommend a "diary" system to effect corrective actions.	

Pay	2nd BDE, 7th Iraqi Division BDE MiTT Personal Notes-2006*	2nd BDE, 7th Iraq Division BDE MiTT Interview- 2007*	1st Iraqi Army Division, BDE MiTT MiTT AAR 2006*	1st Iraqi Army Division, BDE MiTT AAR 2007*	Battalion MiTT AAR comments December 2006
Process cont'd	MiTTs closely watched pay officers pay the soldiers. Properly identifying soldiers was difficult for the MiTTs to determine if he was the actual person on the pay roster.	Pay officers were replaced and new Iraqi BDE commander instilled discipline into the BDE. MiTTs gained trust in the pay officers. In addition, all soldiers are BAT'd and have official MOD Iraqi Army ID cards. Soldiers must present their ID cards upon receiving their payment.			

Pay	2nd BDE, 7th Iraqi Division BDE MiTT Personal Notes-2006*	2nd BDE, 7th Iraq Division BDE MiTT Interview- 2007*	1st Iraqi Army Division, BDE MiTT MiTT AAR 2006*	1st Iraqi Army Division, BDE MiTT AAR 2007*	Battalion MiTT AAR comments December 2006
Process cont'd	Same nut roll to reconcile pay rosters and return cash back to Baghdad. Flight coordination and getting MOD to respond to fixing the pay rosters was challenging.	Money is returned directly to MOD within Green zone. No convoy support required.			
	Only one central bank system. Had opportunity between May thru July to use local bank in Hadithah, but poor security halted process. The bank manager feared for his life.	MOD now exploring local branch banks in Fallujah, Ramadi, and Hit to support Army payroll.			

Pay	2nd BDE, 7th Iraqi Division BDE MiTT Personal Notes-2006*	2nd BDE, 7th Iraq Division BDE MiTT Interview- 2007*	1st Iraqi Army Division, BDE MiTT MiTT AAR 2006*	1st Iraqi Army Division, BDE MiTT AAR 2007*	Battalion MiTT AAR comments December 2006
Process cont'd	Slow responsiveness of MOD to not fix rosters led to soldiers quitting the Army.	New HRIMS will eliminate paper trail. Pay rosters will be updated automatically.			
Soldier's pay levels	Soldiers complained that they did not make enough money. Always complained about not receiving hazard pay. Soldiers received 477,000 dinar per month/ \$320.00 per month	Soldiers received \$160,000 increase in pay or \$450 per month.			

Pay	2nd BDE, 7th Iraqi Division BDE MiTT Personal Notes-2006*	2nd BDE, 7th Iraq Division BDE MiTT Interview- 2007*	1st Iraqi Army Division, BDE MiTT MiTT AAR 2006*	1st Iraqi Army Division, BDE MiTT AAR 2007*	Battalion MiTT AAR comments December 2006
Soldier's pay levels cont'd	Soldiers received cash payment. Money was brought back to their home to pay their families.	MOD is exploring a direct deposit system for Army soldiers. Direct deposit is new to the Iraqi people but is utilized with MOD employees at this time.			
		Increased pay helped recruiting effort in Al Anbar in 2007. Increase pay also improved soldier's quality of life.			

Appendix B Effects of Operation Fardh Al-Qanoon on Iraqi Provinces

EFFECTS OF OPERATION FARDH AL-QANOON ON IRAQI PROVINCES²⁰

PROVINCE	DEVELOPMENT
Anbar	*Violent attacks in the Ramadi region have dropped from 25 per day in 2006 to 4 per day since the Surge (April 29, 2007) *In May 2006, there were 811 attacks throughout the province. In May 2007, that figure was just over 400 (May 31, 2007) → In the city of Ramadi, there were 234 attacks in May 2006 compared to 30 in May 2007 *Since the beginning of 2007, 12,000 Iraqis have volunteered for the security forces. In all of 2006, 1,000 volunteered (May 31, 2007)
Diyala	*There has been roughly a 30% increase in offensive actions and attacks in Diyala province (March 9, 2007) *In 2006, Diyala province was the eighth-deadliest province (of Iraq's 18) for U.S. troops (April 22, 2007) → Thus far in 2007, it ranks as the third-deadliest province behind Baghdad and Anbar * Over the past five months, attacks on U.S. and Iraqi troops have increased 70% (April 16, 2007) → It was reported on April 15, 2007, that almost a full brigade of between 2,000 and 3,000 soldiers is being sent to reinforce the territory between Baghdad and Baqubah, the provincial capital
Baghdad	*In all of 2006, 266 weapons caches were found within all security districts. Thus far in 2007, 441 have been found (May 31, 2007)

Source: Iraq Index, Tracking Variables of Reconstruction and Security in Post Saddam Iraq, The Brookings Institution, December 21, 2007. Pg. 15

Appendix C. Iraqi Army Operational Readiness Assessment (ORA) Level Definitions.

Green 	A Level 1 unit is capable of planning, executing, and sustaining counterinsurgency operations.
Yellow 	A Level 2 unit is capable of planning, executing, and sustaining counterinsurgency operations with ISF or coalition support.
Orange 	A Level 3 unit is partially capable of conducting counterinsurgency operations in conjunction with coalition units.
Red 	A Level 4 unit is forming and/or incapable of conducting counterinsurgency operations.

Each month, advisors rate objective criteria and subjective assessments. The measurement criteria are based on “planning, executing, and sustaining counterinsurgency operations.” Additionally, within the classified report, the IA is evaluated in the sub-categories of Operations, Intelligence, Administration (Personnel/Pay), Logistics, Communications, and Leadership.⁸² The following is criteria used within the three areas that the MiTTs used to evaluate the IA. Specific metrics are not listed because the data is classified secret.

Logistics Criteria

- Ability to conduct and sustain logistical planning for combat and garrison operations.
- Maintain accurate records of weapons, supplies, gear, and equipment.
- Maintain adequate days of supply on critical end items and conduct requisition procedures for supply replenishment.
- Maintain combat readiness for all weapons, gear, and equipment in accordance with Iraqi Ground Forces Command standards.

Personnel/Manpower

- Maintain staffing requirements in accordance with Iraqi Ground Forces Command standards.
- Ability to conduct basic administrative duties and maintain personnel accountability.

Pay Administration

- Maintain adequate percentage of personnel receiving monthly pay.
- Ability to conduct payroll reconciliation with higher headquarters to resolve pay discrepancies.
- Maintain accurate accountability of payroll rosters.

Source: The Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, September 6, 2007. Pg 59

Appendix D. Personnel Strength for 2nd Brigade, 7th Iraqi Division (2006 - 2007)

	On- Hand	Present for Duty	Fired per Month	Wounded in Action	Killed in Action
2006	850	600	100	170	35
2007	2,800	1,600	40	50	15

On Hand = Personnel listed on official rosters. Included soldiers that were on leave, AWOL, and Present for Duty

Present for Duty = Personnel located at unit. It does not include personnel on leave, medical, or AWOL.

Fired per Month = Average number of soldiers who were terminated per month, primarily for AWOL.

Source: Compilation of numbers from Bilas' Personal Journal 2006 and from Sims' personal interview on December 11, 2007.

Appendix E Personnel Strength In Comparison To MTOE* (2006 – 2007)

	% of Assigned/ MTOE	% of Present for Duty/MTOE	% of Fired per month/ MTOE
2006	65%	24%	4%
2007	114%	65%	2%

Modified Table of Equipment (MTOE) = The Iraqi Army's manning and equipment organization. The MTOE was developed in 2005 based on Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) Order Number 2, which disbanded the old IA and created a new structure based on coalition input.

Source: Compilation of numbers from Bilas' Personal Journal 2006 and from Sims' personal interview on December 11, 2007.

Appendix F. Growth of the Iraqi Army. (Source: Iraq Index, Tracking Variables of Reconstruction and Security in Post Saddam Iraq, The Brookings Institution, December 21, 2007. Pg. 15)

Month	General Police Capabilities	National Guard	Iraqi Armed Forces	Border Patrol	Total Iraqi Security Forces
May 2003	7,000 - 9,000	N/A	0	N/A	7,000 - 9,000
June	N/A	N/A	0	N/A	N/A
July	30,000	N/A	0	N/A	30,000
August	34,000	670	0	2,500	37,170
September	37,000	2,500	0	4,700	44,200
October	55,000	4,700	700	6,400	66,800
November	68,800	12,700	900	12,400	94,800
December	71,600	15,200	400	12,900	99,600
January 2004	66,900	19,800	1,100	21,000	108,800
February	77,100	27,900	2,000	18,000	125,000
March	75,000	33,560	3,005	23,426	134,991
April	80,016	23,123	2,367	18,747	124,253
May	90,803	24,873	3,939	16,097	135,712
June	83,789	36,229	7,116	18,183	145,317
July	31,300	36,229	7,700	19,859	95,088
August	32,942	37,925	6,288	14,313	91,468
September	40,152	36,496	7,747	14,313	98,708
October	44,728	41,261	6,861	18,148	110,998
November	49,455	43,445	6,013	14,593	113,506
December	53,571	40,115	14,500	14,267	118,009
January 2005	58,964	36,827	14,796	14,786	125,373
February	82,072 "trained and equipped"	"operational"	59,689	N/A	141,761 Trained and Effective: General Myers: 40,000 Senator Biden: 4,000 - 18,000
March	84,327		67,584	N/A	151,618 Trained and Effective: Lt. Gen Petraeus: 50,000 "off-the-cuff"
April	86,982		72,511	N/A	159,493
May	91,256		76,971	N/A	168,227
June	92,883		75,791	N/A	168,674
July	94,800		79,100	N/A	173,900
August	101,000		81,900	N/A	26,000 in Army in level I and II 182,900
September	104,300		87,800	N/A	192,100 - 30,000 in Army in level I and II 56
October ⁵⁷	111,000		100,000	N/A	211,000 - 32,000 in level I and II 58
November	112,000		102,000	N/A	214,000
December	118,000		105,700	N/A	223,700
January 2006	120,400		106,900	N/A	227,300
February	123,600		108,500	N/A	232,100 - 46,000 MOD forces and 8,000 MOI forces in Level I and II 59
March	134,800		115,700	N/A	250,500
April	138,700		115,000	N/A	253,700
May	145,500		117,900	N/A	263,400
June	148,500		116,100	N/A	264,600
July	154,500		115,100	N/A	269,600
August	167,900		130,100	N/A	298,000
September	176,200		131,600	N/A	307,800
October	180,800		131,600	N/A	312,400
November	188,300		134,700	N/A	323,000
December	188,300		134,700	N/A	323,000
January 2007	188,300		134,700	N/A	323,000
February	188,260		134,920	N/A	323,180
March	193,300		136,500	N/A	329,800
April	193,300		139,800	N/A	333,100
May	194,200		154,500	N/A	348,700
June	194,200		158,900	N/A	353,100
July	194,200		158,900	N/A	353,100
August	194,200		165,500	N/A	359,700
September	194,200		165,500	N/A	359,700
October	194,200		165,500	N/A	359,700
November	238,089		191,541	N/A	429,630
December	210,529		194,233	31,431	439,678

Appendix G Detailed Description of Monthly Pay Cycle for 2/7 BDE

The pay representatives met with MOD personnel who signed the pay rosters and the pay-check. Because the process to receive the check required many levels of approvals with signatures and rubber stamps, it required the researcher to hand-walk the rosters and paycheck to various offices within MOD to meet the approval process. To expedite the pay process, the researcher normally had the "ticket-in" within the MOD building and was able to bypass Iraqi security checkpoints within the MOD hallways and offices. These checkpoints were normally manned by MOD employees and they only allowed MOD civilian workers, senior Iraqi Army officers, and all U.S. military personnel to bypass through all office and hallway checkpoints. However, the guards did not allow the Iraqi pay representatives through the checkpoints because the pay representatives were never considered essential personnel. This became confrontation between the pay representatives and the guards. The reason the Iraqis became confrontational is because the pay representatives were always on a short time frame to complete the pay process, and the researcher emphasized to the pay representatives of these strict timelines because of limited air support to transport money from Baghdad to Al Asad. The guards, however, were never concerned about the pay representatives' short time frame which is why the situation always became confrontational. Once the researcher defused the situation, the pay representatives were able to bypass the checkpoints to complete the check approval process.

The final step in this part of the pay process was to obtain the Minister's signature. The researcher and the pay representatives hoped the Minister was in the office that day to sign the check. On one occasion, the researcher was standing outside the Defense Minister's office with the check so the minister could sign it. (The irony of this situation caused the researcher to make

the analogy of a field grade officer standing outside then-Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld's office, hoping he would come out to sign a Marine Regiment's payroll roster.)

Once the check was signed, the next task was to coordinate a coalition convoy to the bank to cash the check.⁸³ The researcher would have to coordinate a convoy supported from Joint Headquarters, MNSTC-I. Convoys to support bank runs was not a capability offered by MNSTC-I, so maintaining contacts and close personal relations (affectionately called "hook-ups" by military personnel) with MNSTC-I personnel was essential. Therefore, the researcher was able to acquire convoy support. In addition, the researcher drove an up-armored SUV to transport the cash and a coalition convoy supported the movement. Upon arrival to the bank, the convoy personnel, normally U.S. Army, provided security around the bank perimeter while the researcher and the Iraqi pay representatives conducted business in the bank. On two occasions, the bank did not have money in the vault. The security situation was so poor during this period that no money was transported from the Central Bank of Baghdad to the local bank. Therefore, the convoy returned back to the International Zone (IZ), and the operation would fall to the next day.⁸⁴

When the check was finally cashed, six to eight potato sacks full of cash was loaded into the researcher's SUV, and the convoy would travel back to the IZ under heavy security. From there, the researcher and Iraqi pay representatives flew from Baghdad to Al Asad. On the following day, the MiTTs then convoyed the money to each battalion and the battalions had approximately seven days to fully pay the soldiers. After seven days, the pay representatives would then return the money and rosters to the BDE Headquarters where reconciliation of the books took place. Next, the researcher oversaw which soldiers did not get paid, soldiers who needed to be removed from the pay roster, and soldiers who were not getting paid according to rank. A complete roster

and report (in both Arabic and English) were sent directly to MOD for updating, which needed to be completed by the 20th of each month. MOD was required to update the data base, and the changes were supposed to be reflected on the following month's pay roster. However, there were many months that the MOD never updated the pay rosters, and soldiers continued to serve without getting paid.



Note: Iraqi Officers conducting a monthly bank transaction. On average, the total amount of money cashed was nearly one million dollars per month.

Source: Bilas Personal Journal, 2006

Appendix H Iraqi Army Pay Scale (Source: MNSCT-I SIPR website, unclassified)

IRAQI GROUND FORCE COMMAND

JHQ & MOD FINANCE AND PERSONNEL

SOLDIER PAY PROCEDURE INFORMATION

Salary Details Each soldier will be paid a net salary based on his rank, allowances and deductions.

Military Pay Scale									
Rank	Grade	Step	Base Salary	Hazard	Retirement	Deduction	Taxes	MWR	Publication
			(000)	(000)		(000)	(000)	(000)	(000)
1LG	A	9	2,817	620	10%	281.7	282.85	1,500	100
LG	B	7	1,999	620	10%	199.9	209.35	1,500	100
MG	1	5	820	605	7%	57.4	105.85	1,500	100
BG	2	7	667	590	7%	46.69	102.85	1,500	100
COL	3	7	516	575	4%	20.64	99.35	1,500	100
LTC	4	9	416	560	4%	16.64	87.35	1,500	100
MAJ	5	10	328	545	4%	13.12	75.35	1,500	100
CPT	5	6	299	530	4%	11.96	70.85	1,500	100
1LT	5	2	271	515	4%	10.84	66.35	1,500	100
2LT	6	10	253	500	4%	10.12	61.85	1,500	100
OFC	7	7	183	320	1%	1.83	28.85	500	100
CWO	5	5	292	485	4%	11.68	63.35	500	100
WO	5	3	278	470	4%	11.12	60.35	500	100
SGM	5	1	264	455	4%	10.56	55.85	500	100
MSG	6	10	253	440	4%	10.12	52.85	500	100
SFC	6	8	242	425	4%	9.68	49.85	500	100
SGT	6	6	231	410	4%	9.24	46.85	500	100
CPL	6	1	204	395	4%	8.16	40.85	500	100
PFC	7	6	179	380	1%	1.79	37.85	500	100
PVT	7	2	162	350	1%	1.62	31.85	500	100

Monthly Pay Roster Details The details of the table above will be reflected in the monthly pay roster produced by MoD Payroll which will be presented in the following format:

Net Salary	Bonus	Hazard Pay	Food	Social Salary	Base Salary	Name	ID Number	Employee 1
Direct Correction	Lodging Stipend	Correction	Retirement	Taxes	MWR	Public Deduction	Marriage Status	
					Punish Taxes	Government Tax	Number of Children	

Net Salary	Bonus	Hazard Pay	Food	Social Salary	Base Salary	Name	ID Number	Employee 2
Direct Correction	Lodging Stipend	Correction	Retirement	Taxes	MWR	Public Deduction	Marriage Status	
					Punish Taxes	Government Tax	Number of Children	

Net Salary	Bonus	Hazard Pay	Food	Social Salary	Base Salary	Name	ID Number	Employee 3
Direct Correction	Lodging Stipend	Correction	Retirement	Taxes	MWR	Public Deduction	Marriage Status	
					Punish Taxes	Government Tax	Number of Children	

The soldier will sign the roster after receiving his net salary, rendering the roster a receipt for the salary paid to the soldier. The signed roster will return to the MoD to be filed as a permanent record of received salary payments.

IMPORTANT DATES

Activity	Deadline
Unit Roster Submittal	6th
Changes to Roster	15th
Payment	27th-30th



Medical Allowances soldiers are entitled to medical treatment and allowances based on the level of injury experienced. Injuries are categorized as light if recuperation is less than 30 days and medium and heavy if the soldier requires recuperation for more than 30 days. Medium and heavy injuries would result in the soldier being transferred to a medical facility close to home. The allowances paid by the MoD for injuries are as follows:

Injury Level	Frequency	Bonus Amount
Light	Once	150,000 ID
Medium	Once	300,000 ID
High	Once	500,000 ID

Martyr Allowances The MoD has a specific course of action for soldiers missing or killed in action. The process is comprised of an investigation that involves various parties including the Police, a doctor, the Unit Commander and representatives, and eventually the Division Legal Advisor. Once a soldier is confirmed to be a martyr, the MoD will provide allowances to his family.

Martyr bonus paid to the family will equal the soldier's one year salary plus 3,750,000 ID.

Pay Process

The pay process begins once a recruit enters the military.

1. The recruitment centers will obtain your personal information in order to send it to the M1 Section of the JHQ with the Assignment Order for the MoD Personnel to conduct a background check. It is therefore very important that you provide accurate and complete information.

2. Once approved, you will be given a new employee 8 digit number which you will need for all of your personnel matters.

3. Once you arrive to your assigned Unit, a Commencement Order will be sent to M8 to send to the MoD Payroll Section.

4. Once Payroll validates the accuracy of the information, the soldiers are then added to the system for their pay distribution.

5. Payroll Department will then create a roster by unit at the end of the month.

6. Units will then send their assigned Pay Committees to M8 to collect the Unit's salaries along with the original payroll roster.

7. The Pay committees will then return to the Units and assign officers to be in charge of pay distribution.

8. The Unit pay distribution officers will then call you to receive your pay and sign the original roster as receipt.

PLEASE NOTE: Without the information below, you will NOT be paid:

1. Full four names
2. Date of Birth
3. Place of Birth
4. Address

Once assigned to your Unit, make sure to obtain your new 8 digit employee number which is included in the list accompanying the Commencement order.

If the above information has been provided accurately, but you still have not been paid, check with your Unit to see if they have submitted the following:

1. Assignment Order
2. Commencement Order
3. Transfer Order
4. Any other relevant order

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