Army Transformation to Expeditionary Formations
Abstract
This thesis explores the path of transformation in the U.S. Army from its inception in the late 1990s by then Chief of Staff GEN Eric Shinseki to the Interim Brigade Combat Team and through Operations Enduring and Iraqi Freedom. The thesis also will discuss the future of the Army's current transformation roadmap. After 215 years of ever-changing doctrine, tactics, formations, and mostly huge successes, the U.S. Army found itself sitting in the desert of Southwest Asia poised to invade another enemy that threatened the United States' national security. Saddam Hussein had recently invaded Kuwait, and the United States responded with an armed force to intercept his army and push it back into Iraq. The first units to deploy were the 101st Airborne and 82nd Airborne Divisions. It is now known that if Saddam had chosen to, his Republican Guard (heavily fortified with T series Soviet tanks and mechanized units) could have easily engaged these two historic units and caused numerous American casualties as well as a public relations disaster back home. This did not happen because the Army took the time necessary to deploy an overwhelming force that ultimately could not be reckoned with. But what happens if the time to develop appropriate forces for a situation is not available? This is the "bridging the gap" problem that General Shinseki talked about but would not be addressed for another decade. The author proposes changes in formations, education, and equipment and the development of an "expeditionary mindset" on the part of the U.S. Army.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 01, 2008
- Accession Number
- ADA490849
Entities
People
- Jeff Bryson
Organizations
- Marine Corps University