The Cambodian Incursion: Tactical and Operational Success and Its Effects on Vietnamization

Abstract

The United States incursion into Cambodia in 1970 was a tactical and operational success, but these successes led MACV and Nixon administration officials to draw false conclusions in regards to the performance and capabilities of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN). United States (US) and South Vietnamese Forces achieved tactical success during cross border missions. The incursion set the North Vietnamese forces back at least a year by denying them much needed war materiel. MACV and Nixon administration officials equated this success to a competent and capable ARVN, which in the summer of 1970 was not the case. These false conclusions led to the failure of Vietnamization.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Jan 01, 2008
Accession Number
ADA491124

Entities

People

  • Jeff Hackett

Organizations

  • Marine Corps University

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Air Platforms
  • C4I
  • Human Systems
  • Materials and Manufacturing Processes
  • Weapons Technologies

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Air Force
  • Combat Operations
  • Command And Control
  • Contingency Operations (Military)
  • Department Of State
  • Governments
  • Military History
  • Military Operations
  • Military Organizations
  • National Security
  • New York
  • North Vietnam
  • Reconnaissance
  • South Vietnam
  • Students
  • United States
  • Warfare

Readers

  • Military History of the United States in the 20th Century.
  • Military Science
  • Military and Counterinsurgency Studies.