

*United States Marine Corps
Command and Staff College
Marine Corps University
2076 South Street
Marine Corps Combat Development Command
Quantico, Virginia 22134-5068*

MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

TITLE:

Applying the Powell Doctrine:

A Comparison and Analysis of


Operation DESERT STORM and IRAQI FREEDOM

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

AUTHOR


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AY 07-08

Mentor and Oral Defense Committee Member: 

Approved: 

Date: 25 March 2008

Oral Defense Committee Member: 

Approved: 

Date: 25 March 2008

Report Documentation Page				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.					
1. REPORT DATE 2008		2. REPORT TYPE		3. DATES COVERED 00-00-2008 to 00-00-2008	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Applying the Powell Doctrine: A Comparison and Analysis of Operation DESERT STORM and IRAQI FREEDOM				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S)				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) United States Marine Corps, Command and-Staff College, Marine Corps University, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 2076 South Street, Quantico, VA, 22134-5068				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT Same as Report (SAR)	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 34	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT unclassified	b. ABSTRACT unclassified	c. THIS PAGE unclassified			

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Executive Summary

Title: Applying the Powell Doctrine: A Comparison and Analysis of Operation DESERT STORM and IRAQI FREEDOM

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Thesis: The Powell Doctrine should be applied before planning to commit military forces in order to ensure the commitment is successful.

Discussion: The Powell Doctrine is a neologism attributed to its proponent, General Colin S. Powell. The doctrine articulates circumstances which should be evaluated before committing armed forces. These circumstances include: 1) Is the political objective important? 2) Is the objective clearly defined and easily understood? 3) Have all other non-violent policy means failed? 4) Will military force achieve the objective? 5) Have the risks and costs been fully and frankly analyzed? 6) How might the situation, once it is altered by force, develop further and what might be the consequences? 7) Is there public and international support in order to gain legitimacy for committing armed forces? The Powell Doctrine was an outgrowth of lessons from Korea, Vietnam, and Lebanon-campaigns which failed to address many of these circumstances before committing military forces.

The successes of Operation DESERT STORM can be attributed to the George H.W. Bush Administration's application of the Powell Doctrine. The administration was composed of veterans who had learned the lessons of Korea, Vietnam, and Lebanon. Additionally, his administration had a functional civil-military relationship, realized technology can't always substitute for mass, and understood the consequences of occupying another country.

In contrast, the failures of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM can be attributed to the George W. Bush Administration's failure to apply the Powell Doctrine. The doctrine contradicted the administration's policy of pre-emption and transformation. Additionally, the administration was composed of individuals with little to no combat experience, who lacked trust in their senior military leadership, relied on technology over personnel, and discarded lessons in nation building.

Both Operation DESERT STORM and IRAQI FREEDOM demonstrate the value of applying the Powell Doctrine. The doctrine is applicable towards the use of force in our future conflicts. However, it is not a checklist with set rules or principles that can guarantee success in the next war. Rather, it serves as a critical analysis of the circumstances involved with applying military force in a conflict.

Conclusion: The successes of Operation DESERT STORM and failures of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM can be attributed to how those operations applied the Powell Doctrine. The Powell Doctrine is not a recipe for success, but a critical analysis of circumstances which should be evaluated before committing military forces in the next conflict.

DISCLAIMER

THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE THOSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL STUDENT-AUTHOR AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF EITHER THE MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY. REFERENCES TO THIS STUDY SHOULD INCLUDE THE FORGOING STATEMENT.

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Preface

This research paper addressed the application of the Powell Doctrine in Operation's DESERT STORM and IRAQI FREEDOM. The doctrine articulates circumstances which should be evaluated before committing armed forces. Each operation was compared and analyzed according to its application of the Powell Doctrine. The successes of Operation DESERT STORM can be attributed to the George H.W. Bush Administration's application of the Powell Doctrine. In contrast, the failures of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM can be attributed to the George W. Bush Administration's failure to apply the Powell Doctrine. The reason for choosing to research this topic was to determine whether the Powell Doctrine should be applied before planning to commit military forces. Using DESERT STORM and IRAQI FREEDOM as a framework for analysis, my research was able to demonstrate the value for applying the Powell Doctrine in planning future operations.

Doctor Bruce E. Bechtol, Jr. (Associate Professor of International Relations, Marine Corps Command and Staff College) served as my research advisor and provided me guidance and reference materials for this project. Additionally, Doctor Patrice M. Scanlon and Andrea Hamblin from the Leadership Communication Skills Center (Marine Corps University) provided me grammatical, spelling, and format assistance for this research paper. The preponderance of my research was derived from books, journals, articles, and online sources available at the Gray Research Center.

The United States has been engaged in major combat operations against Iraq twice-first under George H.W. Bush then again twelve years later under George W. Bush. The United States was successful in meeting its objectives for the first operation, DESERT STORM, achieving public and international support, and avoiding a protracted conflict. However, the United States was unable to meet its objectives for the second operation, IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), lost public and international support, and turned into a protracted occupation of Iraq. The success of DESERT STORM and failure of IRAQI FREEDOM can be attributed to each operation's application or failure to apply the Powell Doctrine.

A neologism attributed to General Colin Powell, the doctrine articulates circumstances which should be evaluated before committing armed forces. These circumstances included: 1) Is the political objective important (i.e. vital national interest)? 2) Is the objective clearly defined and easily understood? 3) Have all other non-violent policy means failed (i.e. last resort)? 4) Will military force achieve the objective (i.e. will force applied be overwhelming and decisive)? 5) Have the risks and costs been fully and frankly analyzed (i.e. casualties)? 6) How might the situation, once it is altered by force, develop further and what might be the consequences (i.e. is there an exit strategy to avoid a protracted conflict)? 7) Is there public and international support in order to gain legitimacy for committing armed forces?¹ The Powell Doctrine was an outgrowth of lessons from Korea, Vietnam, and Lebanon- campaigns that failed to address many of these circumstances before committing military forces.²

The first Bush administration applied the Powell Doctrine because much of his administration had combat experience and understood the lessons of Korea, Vietnam, and Lebanon. Additionally, Bush had a functional civil-military relationship, realization that technology can't always substitute for mass, and an understanding of the implications of

occupying another country. The second Bush administration discarded the Powell Doctrine in the planning for OIF because it contradicted the administration's strategy of pre-emption and military transformation. The second administration stood in stark contrast to his father's administration, consisting pre-dominantly of individuals with little to no combat experience, who lacked trust in their senior military leadership, relied on technology over personnel, and discarded lessons learned in nation building. Several of these individuals viewed the Powell Doctrine as a rigid, inflexible checklist that has very limited application in limited warfare (as opposed to linear warfare). However, the Powell Doctrine was not intended to be used as a checklist with set rules for the application of force. Further, Powell recognized that almost all wars short of all-out nuclear war are limited. The Powell Doctrine is applicable to limited wars and should be used prior to any commitment of military force.

The Powell Doctrine should be applied before planning to commit military force in order to ensure the commitment is successful. Operation's DESERT STORM and IRAQI FREEDOM will be used to support this thesis, using the Powell Doctrine as a framework of analysis (see Appendix A). It will provide a brief background on each operation then argue why each administration did or did not apply the Powell Doctrine. Finally, this paper will argue why the doctrine should be applied in planning for future wars.

Operation DESERT STORM

Background

US efforts to transform Saddam into a pro-western ally prior to Operation DESERT STORM proved largely unsuccessful. Throughout the 1980s, the Reagan Administration attempted to use diplomatic incentives with Iraq, including removing them from a list as a state sponsor of terror. Additionally, the US attempted limited military support in the form of

intelligence sharing and arms trade, and economic incentives—which included purchasing large quantities of oil from Iraq. However, Saddam Hussein remained a source of instability in the Middle East by continuing to support terrorist organizations, denouncing the state of Israel, and using chemical weapons against the Iranians and Kurds.³ The United Nations Security Council passed multiple resolutions condemning Iraq's use of chemical weapons (see Appendix B). Despite US economic incentives, Iraq's war with Iran left Iraq in economic ruin. In an attempt to shift blame for his failing economy, Saddam accused Kuwait of slant drilling into the jointly owned Rumaila oil fields. Additionally, he asserted that Kuwait was really the 19th province of Iraq and was created by the British to constrict Iraqi's access to the Persian Gulf. Kuwait did not respond to Saddam's grievances; in response he conducted a massive buildup of forces along the Kuwaiti border.⁴ The US responded to this buildup by pandering to Saddam's acts of aggression. The US response included multiple diplomatic engagements by individuals such as US Ambassador April Glaspie, assuring Saddam that the US would not get involved in this 'Arab dispute'.⁵ The United States' soft approach towards Iraq left Saddam Hussein confident that the U.S. would not use force to evict him from Kuwait by force. Despite attempts at diplomacy (including attempts from other Arab nations), Saddam invaded Kuwait on August 02, 1990.⁶

US Response to the Invasion of Kuwait

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) immediately passed UN Resolution 660 demanding Iraq's unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait (see Appendix B). Four days later, the UNSC passed Resolution 661, implementing economic sanctions on Iraq. The United States' mobilization and deployment of forces to Saudi Arabia was intended initially to deter an Iraqi invasion of Saudi Arabia (Operation Desert Shield). However, as it became apparent that force would be required to enforce Resolution 660, the UNSC passed Resolution 678 on November 29,

1990. This resolution authorized all means necessary to implement Resolution 660 if Iraq did not comply by January 15, 1991. After all diplomatic actions failed, the US Congress and Senate authorized the use of force to drive Iraq out of Kuwait on January 12, 1990. After a six month buildup, a coalition of over 737,000 troops (500,000 were US) and comprising over 38 nations were in the Persian Gulf region ready to use force to liberate Kuwait.⁷

Operation Desert Storm

Operation DESERT STORM began with a massive air campaign on January 17, 1991. The ground campaign, launched on February 24, consisted of a five corps assault into Kuwait and Iraq. Kuwait was liberated and the assault ended after just 100 hours of offensive operations.⁸ UN Resolution 660 had been met, Iraqi Republican Guard (RGFC) forces had been reduced by 50%, and only five of Iraq's 43 combat divisions remained combat effective.⁹ President Bush, concerned about public opinion as Allied air and ground forces decimated fleeing Iraqi forces, consulted with Generals Powell and Schwarzkopf, then ordered a cease fire.¹⁰

The Powell Doctrine Examined in Operation Desert Storm

Bush's adherence to the Powell Doctrine (see Appendix A) was largely responsible for the success of Operation DESERT STORM. Although his post-DESERT STORM containment plan proved to be ineffective in removing Saddam's regime, the administration's use of the Powell Doctrine prevented many of the problems the US faces today as an occupation force in Iraq (i.e. an unclear exit strategy, etc).

Political Objective Important?

The U.S.' dependence on Persian Gulf oil and concern over an Iraqi regional hegemony were considered vital national interests. Saddam's control of Kuwait meant he controlled 10% of

the world's oil.¹¹ Additionally, Iraq's potential invasion into Saudi Arabia threatened control of almost 40% of the world's oil reserves, significantly off-setting the economic balance in the world.¹² By controlling such a vast amount of oil in the Middle East, Saddam could have significantly disrupted regional stability with his oil producing neighbors.

Clearly Defined and Attainable Objective?

The objectives in Operation DESERT STORM were clear and attainable. As an international objective, UN Resolution 660 demanded Iraq's unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait. US national policy objectives for Operation Desert Storm were "The immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait; Restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government; Security and stability of Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf; (and,) Safety and protection of the lives of American citizens abroad."¹³ All of these objectives were met on February 28, 1991 when Iraq was evicted from Kuwait.

All Non-Violent Policy Means Failed?

The United States and other countries attempted to evict Iraq from Kuwait by using diplomatic negotiations and economic sanctions, employing military force as a last resort. Economic sanctions were applied and enforced through a maritime embargo.¹⁴ Diplomatic negotiations were also unsuccessfully attempted by Secretary of State James Baker and nations such as the Soviet Union.¹⁵ Although several US House of Representatives members wanted more time for sanctions, President Bush was concerned that any further delay of offensive operations would fracture the fragile Coalition and lead them to concede Kuwait to Saddam.¹⁶

Military Force Achieve the Objective?

General Powell was instrumental in pressing for a massive military buildup of over 500,000 U.S. troops in the region. Although Desert Storm was initially planned as a single corps

attack straight into the Iraqi defenses that relied on air power (technology) to provide the decisive advantage, Powell realized the dangers of this approach with regard to U.S. casualties. Powell pressed for a two corps assault, building up forces for a massive, decisive victory rather than risking a hastily executed attack.¹⁷

Risks and Costs Fully and Frankly Analyzed?

Bush and Powell understood the potential cost in terms of casualties that their forces could face in evicting Iraq from Kuwait. US casualty estimates during planning for the war were 12-16 thousand in the liberation of Kuwait.¹⁸ However, the ground war ended in less than 100-hours with only 146 U.S. killed in action.¹⁹

Consequences Considered?

A CIA estimate concluded that 1-2 more days of combat would have destroyed the RGFC capability.²⁰ However, George Bush and his National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft both recognized the dangers of exceeding the UN mandate or invading Baghdad. Bush and Scowcroft recounted seven years after DESERT STORM that they didn't want to engage in mission creep by changing their mission mid-stream. Additionally, Bush and Scowcroft didn't want Iraq's breakup to create an imbalance of power. Sunni nations such as Saudi Arabia were also concerned by the possibility of an Iranian Hegemony. Turkey was equally concerned with an unstable Kurdish region along its southern border. Lastly, the U.S. believed that by occupying Iraq, it would merely validate Arab concerns of Western imperialism, which could result in a collapse of the coalition.

Public and International Support?

Gaining international and public support was vital to the administration's goal of demonstrating US credibility and preserving international order. As a veteran of World War II,

Bush remembered the lessons of the 1930s, in which allied nations watched complacently as the Axis powers aggressively invaded one country after another. Bush believed that the world needed to demonstrate its intolerance for aggression and would use force if necessary to evict Iraq from Kuwait.²¹ Public support for the war in Desert Storm was 79% in January, 1991.²² Obtaining legitimacy from the House through the War Powers Resolution proved challenging but successful. House authorization for the use of force was the closest in US history (58% House, 52% Senate).²³ However, Bush was noted as saying he would have used force regardless of House approval.²⁴ International support was so critical to Bush's strategy that he had Baker personally meet with the heads of state (vice a representative) in order to win their support for the use of force against Iraq.²⁵ UN Resolution 660 legitimized international support for the war. The 38 member coalition that actively participated in forcing Iraq from Kuwait gave the war further legitimacy.

Conclusion

As combat veterans, Bush and Powell understood the reality of combat from a front-line perspective. They wanted the operation to remain multi-lateral and under the UN mandate, recognizing that unresolved and new problems would arise by allowing Saddam to stay in power. However, they were also aware that the outcome of their decisions was uncertain due to the fog of war.²⁶ Powell echoed Bush and Scowcroft's comments in subsequent years after DESERT STORM.²⁷ Dick Cheney similarly justified the decision not to invade Iraq in 1994.²⁸ The Bush Administration believed containment was the best strategy to squeeze Saddam into compliance. They also believed internal coup was the best means for changing Saddam's regime and avoiding a breakup of Iraq.²⁹

Operation IRAQI FREEDOM

Background

A major goal of the first Bush administration's containment strategy for Iraq was the elimination of Iraq's WMD capability. UN Resolution 687 was passed on April 3, 1991 requiring Iraq to destroy its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missile capability (see Appendix B).³⁰ Between 1991 and 1998, UN weapons inspectors (UNSCOM) monitored the destruction of a significant quantity of WMD, however, Saddam remained uncooperative and expelled the inspectors from Iraq in 1998. Between 1998 and 2002, no UN weapons inspectors were allowed back inside Iraq. From 1991-2003, UN sanctions continued to be enforced in accordance with Resolution 661. Despite sanctions and additional UNSC resolutions (see Appendix B), attempts by UN inspection teams were unable to confirm Iraq's compliance with Resolution 687. On September 12, 2002, President George W. Bush addressed the General Assembly of the United Nations alleging Saddam's non-compliance with UN Resolution 687, as well as his human rights violations and non-compliance with Resolution 1373 (sheltering and supporting terrorist organizations). The UNSC passed Resolution 1441 (the 17th disarmament resolution) on November 8, 2002, which required Iraq to declare all WMD and account for its known chemical weapons stockpiles. Saddam accepted UN Resolution 1441 on November 13 and UN inspection teams (re-designated as the UN Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission [UNMOVIC]) returned to Iraq after a four year absence. On February 5, 2003 Secretary of State Colin Powell presented the US case against Saddam Hussein to the UN, citing evidence that Saddam continued to produce WMD, evade UN weapons inspectors, and aid Al-Qaeda. President Bush remained unconvinced Saddam lacked WMD, and on March 16, 2003 advised the inspection teams to leave Iraq. Additionally, he gave the UN a final opportunity to

pass a resolution demanding Iraq disarm immediately or be disarmed by force. On March 16, 2003 President Bush gave Saddam Hussein 48 hours to go into exile or face war.³¹

US Planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom

OP-PLAN 1003-98, developed by CENTCOM commander General Tony Zinni during the Clinton Administration, planned on sending 500,000 troops for the occupation of Iraq.³² Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld believed that OP-PLAN 1003-98 was based on Cold War era doctrine involving a slow, massive buildup of forces and was therefore inadequate for an invasion of Iraq.³³ Additionally, Bush was concerned with Arab unrest by delaying action.³⁴ Invasion plans would change dramatically over the next eighteen months, beginning with Operation VIGILANT GUARDIAN and ending with COBRA II.³⁵ Lieutenant General McKiernan (Land Forces Component Commander) and other senior military leaders expressed concern on the lack of coalition forces required for an invasion and Phase IV security operations. However, Rumsfeld, assuming Iraqi security forces would handle Phase IV operations, decided to conduct the invasion with only two corps.³⁶

The Powell Doctrine Examined In Operation Iraqi Freedom

The Bush Administration failed to apply the Powell Doctrine in almost all circumstances in planning for OIF (see Appendix A). Iraq could not be verified as a vital national interest and the objectives were not clear. The administration adopted a strategy of pre-emption over containment, failing to employ non-violent means of policy. Overwhelming and decisive force necessary for Phase IV operations were discarded because the administration wanted to avoid becoming an occupation force. Instead, the administration applied a strategy of transformation, emphasizing risky, decisive operations yet failed to fully analyze Phase IV costs. The consequences of military action were addressed by senior military leaders, but they were ignored

due to the administration's dysfunctional civil-military relationship. Finally, although the public and the House initially supported the war, the administration marginalized the need for international support based on their observations of lessons from DESERT STORM.

Political Objective Important?

Saddam's threat of using or providing WMD against the US could have been considered a vital national interest had there been proof of this threat. The Bush Administration identified Iraq as part of an 'axis of evil', to include North Korea and Iran, as rogue nations bent on pursuing WMD for delivery against the US or its neighbors. Despite Bush's assessment of Iraq as a vital national interest, the CIA assessed it to be only a marginal vital interest. Of the 946 sites on the Weapons of Mass Destruction Sites List (WMSL), none could be verified as containing WMD.³⁷ Compounding this problem was a lack of spies in Iraq to assist in verifying the sites contained WMD.³⁸ Without verification of Iraq's WMD capability (or intent), Iraq could not be considered a vital national interest.

Clearly Defined and Attainable Objective?

U.S. objectives for Operation Iraqi Freedom were not clearly defined and attainable. A top secret National Security Presidential Directive, titled, "Iraq: Goals, Objectives, and Strategy," outlined U.S. objectives: "To conduct policy in a fashion that minimizes the chance of a WMD attack against the United States, U.S. field forces, our allies and friends. To minimize the danger of regional instabilities. To deter Iran and Syria from helping Iraq. And to minimize disruption in international oil markets."³⁹ While the invasion of Iraq did eliminate its potential to deliver or supply WMD, the remaining objectives have not yet been attained.

All Non-Violent Policy Means Failed?

The Bush Administration did not employ all non-violent policy means to enforce UN Resolution 687. Instead, the administration adopted a policy of pre-emption over containment, justifying their use of force. Bush's focus on pre-emption placed a primacy on military action over other instruments of national power. Bush elaborated pre-emption in his 2002 National Security Strategy by focusing on the changing security environment since the end of the Cold War, "Given the goals of rogue states and terrorists, the United States can no longer solely rely on a reactive posture as we have in the past. The inability to deter a potential attacker, the immediacy of today's threats, and the magnitude of potential harm caused by our adversaries' choice of weapons, do not permit that option." Bush's NSS identified pre-emption as a legitimate justification for use of force under international law, but determined that it must be adapted to terrorists and rogue states that don't use conventional means.⁴⁰

Dick Cheney, having initially supported containment after DESERT STORM, now saw it as ineffective, with forced regime change as the only viable option.⁴¹ Twelve years of containment failed to make Saddam compliant with UN Resolution 687. Seventeen UN resolutions were passed in an effort to enforce Iraq's disarmament of WMD, but Saddam continued to elude weapons inspectors. Saddam, believing that the threat of WMD was the primary reason the US did not invade Iraq in 1991, deliberately avoided full disclosure regarding his WMD capabilities.⁴² Although UN Resolution 1441 stated Iraq would face serious consequences for continuing to violate its obligations, it did not authorize UN members any means necessary to enforce the resolution (see Appendix B). Further, UNMOVIC Chairman Hans Blix reported Iraq was cooperating with the inspectors (including destruction of his Al-Samoud 2 ballistic missiles) and that no WMD were found.⁴³ Although slow in producing

results, UN efforts and other non-violent policy means to enforce Iraq's obligations should have continued before resorting to force.

Military Force Achieve the Objective?

Military force necessary to minimize regional instability in Iraq was disregarded because of the Bush Administration's reservations about becoming an occupation force. Bush entered his presidency on a campaign critical of Bill Clinton's unsuccessful humanitarian interventions such as in Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo.⁴⁴ Rumsfeld believed Clinton era nation-building led to a culture of dependency among the locals in those countries.⁴⁵ Additionally, the US military under Clinton saw a 33% reduction in active forces and a 27% cut in the defense budget. In his 2000 campaign speeches, Bush said, "Our military is low on parts, pay, and morale. This administration had its chance. They have not led. We will".⁴⁶ The Bush Administration's disdain for nation-building led limited the size of the force he employed in OIF. Instead, he opted for a new strategy of transformation in applying military force.

Risks and Costs Fully and Frankly Analyzed?

The administration did not fully analyze the risks and costs in applying force because it did not support Bush's transformation strategy. This strategy relied on technological superiority and rapid, decisive, risk based application of force.⁴⁷ In sharp criticism of his own father's plans, during a speech at the Citadel in 1999, Bush claimed the Gulf War took too long to prepare, and he intended to force new thinking and hard choices on the military.⁴⁸

Donald Rumsfeld cited OEF as a model for the administration's transformation strategy. Specifically, he noted minimal collateral damage from precision guided munitions, small teams of special operations forces on the ground vice a massive US invasion force, and an emphasis on Afghans taking responsibility for rebuilding their own country. He further believed his

transformation strategy would work even better in Iraq due to more time allocated for Phase IV planning and better resources (oil) and infrastructure in Iraq.⁴⁹ Most significantly, in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), Rumsfeld decided to “move away from the ‘two major theater war’ construct,” an approach calling for two massive occupation forces. The QDR opted instead to have the ability to “swiftly defeat two aggressors at the same time,” while preserving only one occupation force capability.

However, the administration’s use of military force while minimizing the US military footprint overseas created problems in effectively planning Phase IV operations. Phase IV planning began in earnest less than two months before the invasion.⁵⁰ As a result, the cost in money, resources, personnel, and casualties were not fully analyzed.

Consequences Considered?

Despite the lack of Phase IV planning, the consequences of employing military force against Iraq were addressed by the administration’s senior military leadership. However, they were viewed by the top civilian leadership as being out of touch with the administration’s strategy of pre-emption and transformation. The civilian leadership lacked combat experience, yet micromanaged the military’s operational and tactical planning for the war, creating a dysfunctional civil-military relationship.

Powell noted a significant lack of combat experience in the administration, specifically Bush, Cheney, Rice, and Rumsfeld.⁵¹ Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage stated he was not sure Bush had the foreign policy experience required to be president or understood the implications of the United States as a world power.⁵² The Administration, lacking the military or foreign policy experience, implemented a civil-military relationship radically different from those used in previous administrations. Previous administrations encouraged civilian leaders to

cede tactical and operational realms to military professionals in exchange for unquestioning subordination to civilian control of politics and grand strategy. The Bush Administration believed that civilian leaders needed to overcome military resistance or incompetence by probing deeply into all military matters, including tactical and operational levels.⁵³

Rumsfeld was nominated as Secretary of Defense by Dick Cheney, who saw Rumsfeld as an individual with views on civil military relations similar to his own. In contrast, Bush Sr. didn't trust Rumsfeld, viewing him as arrogant, self-important, too sure of himself, and Machiavellian.⁵⁴ Rumsfeld was skeptical about Army leadership, which he considered to be old fashioned, wedded to heavy forces, and too slow to change.⁵⁵ In order to break through the military's archaic resistance to change and adapt towards a new enemy, Rumsfeld believed he needed to get in the weeds with the planning process. As a result, he heavily micromanaged his military officers. This was exemplified when he discarded the Time Phased Deployment List (TPFDL) for bringing troops into theater and personally supervised each unit scheduled for deployment.⁵⁶

Senior military advice, such as General Shinseki's estimate on the number of troops required for Phase IV operations, fell on deaf ears or was ridiculed by Rumsfeld. Shinseki, who commanded forces in Bosnia, understood the sheer numbers of troops required to effectively secure Iraq. Powell pressed the Administration for greater numbers of troops for Phase IV operations, to no avail.⁵⁷ Lieutenant General Newbold, Director for Operations in the JCS, retired in protest four months prior to the invasion of Iraq. He states, "Commitment of our forces to this fight was done with a casualness and swagger that are the special provinces of those who have never had to execute these missions...or bury the results."⁵⁸ Senior military leaders knew

the plan to invade Iraq was flawed, but chose inaction, believing the principle of obedience doesn't allow for respectful dissent.

Public and International Support?

Public support for the war was initially favorable. In a March 2003 Gallup survey, 76% of respondents supported the war in Iraq.⁵⁹ Congress passed a resolution (296-133) authorizing the military force, and the Senate supported the resolution by a vote of 77 to 23.⁶⁰

However, Bush viewed the requirement for a large coalition in Iraq through lessons learned from DESERT STORM. The administration believed that forming a coalition similar to the one used in Operation DESERT STORM would inhibit the United States' ability to remove Saddam Hussein from power. Powell contended that taking on Iraq would make it hard, if not impossible, to assemble a coalition. Rumsfeld countered that a coalition that was not willing to stand with the United States was one that was not worth having. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) General Shelton said attacking Iraq without clear provocation would upset the Middle East and hamper any coalition building effort.⁶¹ Rumsfeld noted the fragility of the coalition in DESERT STORM and the problems associated with multilateralism in accomplishing desired objectives. He believed that wars benefit from the coalition of the willing, but they should not be fought by committee. According to Rumsfeld, the mission must determine the coalition or the mission will be "dumbed down to the lowest common denominator."⁶²

Instead, international support for the war was based on a coalition of the willing, but the administration would invade Iraq unilaterally if necessary. Kuwait was willing to provide staging areas for US forces and Saudi Arabia would provide air bases (although Saudi Arabia was reserved in their open support for the war). Turkey, although initially willing to support the

US with staging areas for an invasion, canceled the option. The US responded by attempting to coerce Turkey through NATO.⁶³

Powell Doctrine as Applied in Future Wars

Critics of the Powell Doctrine such as Max Boot believe that it means an all or nothing approach, the US wins with overwhelming force, suffers few casualties, and leaves immediately. Boot further contends that few missions satisfy the Powell Doctrine 'checklist' and if strictly applied, the Powell Doctrine may become a recipe for inaction.⁶⁴ However, Powell noted that almost all wars are limited and that fixed rules or principles (i.e. a checklist) can't be applied in the application of force.

The country needs to be very selective in determining political objectives vital enough to commit military forces. Clear, attainable objectives are often difficult to obtain because chance, friction, and uncertainty that occur often cause political objectives and force requirements to change. At the same time, use of force as a last resort may conflict with time constraints in sustaining public and international support. Regarding casualties, Powell noted that while the US military has a primary role in the nation's application of power, this application often entails a human cost. Therefore, military force should not be applied casually in the future and technology cannot serve as a substitute for well trained troops.⁶⁵

The U.S. needs to take a hard look at the consequences of applying military force in future wars, since these wars (as Iraq and Afghanistan have proven) usually result in nation-building and occupation duties. Madeleine Albright once asked General Powell, "What's the point of having this superb military that you're always talking about if we can't use it?"⁶⁶ This comment exemplifies inexperienced civilian casualness towards the application of military force. On the other hand, senior military leaders such as Lieutenant General Chiarelli have stated that

the military needs to embrace nation-building and accept the fact that the military will assume the primary role in such endeavors. He further elaborates that popular support and national commitment will determine our success in nation building.⁶⁷ However, public support is often more difficult to sustain in prolonged operations than it is to obtain. By June 2007, the percentage of respondents supporting the Iraq War dropped to 36%. Vietnam experienced similar figures. In 1965, 65% of respondents supported the war. By 1972, the percentage dropped to 32%.⁶⁸ Regarding the Korean War, 78% of respondents supported the war, seven months later the percentage dropped to 51%. Two months after Kuwait was liberated, 58% of respondents believed the US should have continued the war to remove Saddam from power.⁶⁹ Based on a historical analysis, it is likely that a subsequent occupation of Iraq would have shown a similar drop in public support over time.

Summary

The Powell Doctrine should be applied before planning to commit military force in order to ensure the commitment is successful. The success of Operation DESERT STORM can be attributed to the application of the Powell Doctrine in planning the operation. In contrast, many of the failures of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM can be attributed to the operation's disregard for the Powell Doctrine. The doctrine is not a recipe for success in applying military force, but rather applies a critical analysis of the circumstances involved with using force.

The political objectives in DESERT STORM were important because Iraq's invasion of Kuwait threatened regionally stability and the world oil market. These objectives were clearly defined and attained once Iraq was evicted from Iraq. Non-violent policy means, to include sanctions and diplomatic engagement, failed to evict Iraq from Kuwait. Although non-violent means could have continued before resorting to force, President Bush was concerned about the

fragility of the coalition with continued delay. The coalition's use of military force to achieve its objectives was overwhelming and decisive. Over 737,000 coalition forces were used to liberate Kuwait. President Bush fully understood the risks and costs of using military force, 12-16 thousand friendly casualties were estimated in the liberation of Kuwait. Although Bush could have exceeded the UN mandate and invaded Iraq, he understood the consequences for such actions. These consequences included fracturing the coalition and becoming mired in a protracted occupation of Iraq. Lastly, Bush had wide public support and received legitimate authorization to employ force from the House and United Nations.

In contrast, the political objectives in IRAQI FREEDOM failed to conclusively demonstrate that Iraq possessed WMD and was a threat to the U.S. Further, although UN Resolution 687 was clearly defined and achieved, the remaining political objectives (i.e. minimize regional instabilities, etc.) were not clear and have not yet been attained. Twelve years of containment as a non-violent policy means to obtain Saddam's compliance with Resolution 687 was unsuccessful. However, UN inspection teams were receiving progress with Iraq in achieving compliance before Iraq was invaded. The Bush administration should have continued UN inspection efforts as a non-violent policy before resorting to force. Military force partially achieved the political objectives by minimizing Iraq's WMD threat to the US. However, military force was insufficient to achieve the other objective of minimizing regional instabilities. The risks and costs involved in Phase IV operations were not fully and frankly analyzed because the administration marginalized this phase. Senior military leaders addressed the administration regarding consequences for invading and occupying Iraq (i.e. casualties, regional instability, etc). However, the administration disregarded the military leadership's advice. Lastly, the American public supported an invasion of Iraq and the House legitimized the President's use of force.

However, the President failed to gain international support for force through a UN Resolution, thus losing international legitimacy.

Both campaigns demonstrate the importance of applying the Powell Doctrine towards planning future wars. The doctrine was an outgrowth of lessons applied from campaigns which failed to properly apply military force. While the Powell Doctrine cannot guarantee success in the next war, it can help ensure those same lessons aren't repeated.

Notes

¹ The term Powell Doctrine originated from an article written by then CJCS General Colin Powell for Foreign Affairs Magazine, titled "US Forces: Challenges Ahead" (Winter 1992/93), 4.

² John F. Troxell, "Military Power and the Use of Force," *US Army War College Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy*, (July, 2004), 225-226.

³ Douglas A. Borer, "Problems of Economic Statecraft: Rethinking Engagement." *US Army War College Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy*, (July, 2004), 250-253.

⁴ US Department of Defense, *Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress*, (Washington: April, 1992), 83.

⁵ Gary R. Hess, *Presidential Decisions for War: Korea, Vietnam, and the Persian Gulf Crisis*. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 157-161.

⁶ US Department of Defense, *Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress*, (Washington: April, 1992), 2-16.

⁷ *Ibid*, 1-87.

⁸ *Ibid*, 44-45, 257.

⁹ *Ibid*, 294.

¹⁰ Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *The General's War, the Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf*, (Canada: Little, Brown and Company, 1995), vii-viii.

¹¹ Gary R. Hess, *Presidential Decisions for War: Korea, Vietnam, and the Persian Gulf Crisis*. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 163.

¹² US Department of Defense, *Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress*, (Washington: April, 1992), 19.

¹³ *Ibid*, 19.

¹⁴ Gary R. Hess, *Presidential Decisions for War: Korea, Vietnam, and the Persian Gulf Crisis*. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 172-173.

¹⁵ *Ibid*, 176, 206, 208.

¹⁶ *Ibid*, 192-193, 208.

¹⁷ Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *The General's War, the Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf*, (Canada: Little, Brown and Company, 1995), 124-141.

¹⁸ Gary R. Hess, *Presidential Decisions for War: Korea, Vietnam, and the Persian Gulf Crisis*. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 13.

¹⁹ Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *The General's War, the Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf*, (Canada: Little, Brown and Company, 1995), 313-317.

²⁰ Gary R. Hess, *Presidential Decisions for War: Korea, Vietnam, and the Persian Gulf Crisis*. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 13.

²¹ *Ibid*, 162, 221-222.

²² Frank Newport, David W. Moore, Jeffrey M. Jones, "Special Release: American Opinion of the War," Gallup, March 21, 2003, <http://www.gallup.com/poll/8068/Special-Release-American-Opinion-War.aspx> (accessed December 02, 2007).

²³ Gary R. Hess, *Presidential Decisions for War: Korea, Vietnam, and the Persian Gulf Crisis*. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 194.

²⁴ *Ibid*, 26.

²⁵ *Ibid*, 180-182.

²⁶ George H.W. Bush and Brent Scowcroft, "Why We Didn't Remove Saddam," *Time*, (March 02, 1998).

²⁷ Colin L. Powell, "U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead," *Foreign Affairs*, (Winter, 1992/93), 4.

²⁸ Richard B. Cheney, "Interview with Dick Cheney." By C-SPAN. *C-SPAN*, April 15, 1994.

²⁹ Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *The General's War, the Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf*, (Canada: Little, Brown and Company, 1995), 11-12.

³⁰ Joseph S. Nye, *After the Storm: Lessons From the Gulf War*, (Lanham: Madison Books, 1992), 278-279.

³¹ Kenneth Katzman, "Iraq: Former Weapons Programs, Human Rights Violations, and U.S. Policy," *CRS Report for Congress*, (October 15, 2004), 2-4.

³² Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor. *Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq*. (New York: Pantheon Books, 2006), 26-32.

- ³³ Ibid, 4, 7-9, 59.
- ³⁴ Ibid, 48.
- ³⁵ Ibid, 21, 34-37, 48-50, 54, 87.
- ³⁶ Ibid, 91-94, 101-105.
- ³⁷ Ibid, 80-81.
- ³⁸ Ibid, 124-126.
- ³⁹ Bob Woodward, *Plan of Attack*. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004), 154-155.
- ⁴⁰ President of the United States of America: *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*. (Washington, DC: The White House, September, 2002), 13-16.
- ⁴¹ Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor. *Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq*. (New York: Pantheon Books, 2006), 13.
- ⁴² Ibid, 64-65, 118-119.
- ⁴³ Bob Woodward, *Plan of Attack*. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004), 315-318.
- ⁴⁴ Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor. *Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq*. (New York: Pantheon Books, 2006), 503-504.
- ⁴⁵ Donald H. Rumsfeld, "Beyond Nation Building," Defense Link, February 14, 2003, <http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=337> (Accessed January 25, 2008).
- ⁴⁶ Michael C. Desch, "Bush and the Generals," *Foreign Affairs*, (May/June, 2007).
- ⁴⁷ President of the United States of America: *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*. (Washington, DC: The White House, September, 2002), 13-16.
- ⁴⁸ Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor. *Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq*. (New York: Pantheon Books, 2006), 5.
- ⁴⁹ Donald H. Rumsfeld, "Beyond Nation Building," Defense Link, February 14, 2003, <http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=337> (Accessed January 25, 2008).
- ⁵⁰ Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor. *Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq*. (New York: Pantheon Books, 2006), 503.
- ⁵¹ Bob Woodward, *State of Denial: Bush at War III*. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006), 143.
- ⁵² Ibid, 9.
- ⁵³ Michael C. Desch, "Bush and the Generals," *Foreign Affairs*, (May/June, 2007).
- ⁵⁴ Bob Woodward, *State of Denial: Bush at War III*. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006), xi-xii.
- ⁵⁵ Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor. *Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq*. (New York: Pantheon Books, 2006), 8.
- ⁵⁶ Ibid, 96-99.
- ⁵⁷ Bob Woodward, *Plan of Attack*. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004), 125-126.
- ⁵⁸ Gregory S. Newbold, "Why Iraq was a Mistake," *Time*, (April 09, 2006).
- ⁵⁹ Jeffrey M. Jones, "Latest Poll Shows High Point in Opposition to Iraq War," Gallup, July 11, 2007, <http://www.gallup.com/poll/28099/Latest-Poll-Shows-High-Point-Opposition-Iraq-War.aspx> (accessed December 02, 2007).
- ⁶⁰ Bob Woodward, *Plan of Attack*. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004), 203-204.
- ⁶¹ Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor. *Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq*. (New York: Pantheon Books, 2006), 16-17.
- ⁶² Donald H. Rumsfeld, "Transforming the Military," *Foreign Affairs*, (May 01, 2002).
- ⁶³ Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor. *Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq*. (New York: Pantheon Books, 2006), 81-82, 84-86, 110-115.
- ⁶⁴ Max Boot, *The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power*. New York: Perseus Books, 2002, 318-320.
- ⁶⁵ Colin L. Powell, "U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead," *Foreign Affairs*, (Winter, 1992/93), 2-6.
- ⁶⁶ Robert Brigham, *Is Iraq Another Vietnam?* (New York: Public Affairs, 2006), 225.
- ⁶⁷ Peter W. Chiarelli and Stephen M. Smith, "Learning From Our Modern Wars: The Imperatives of Preparing for a Dangerous Future," *Military Review*, (September-October, 2007), 2-15.
- ⁶⁸ Jeffrey M. Jones, "Latest Poll Shows High Point in Opposition to Iraq War," Gallup, July 11, 2007, <http://www.gallup.com/poll/28099/Latest-Poll-Shows-High-Point-Opposition-Iraq-War.aspx> (accessed December 02, 2007).

⁶⁹ Frank Newport, David W. Moore, Jeffrey M. Jones, "Special Release: American Opinion of the War," Gallup, March 21, 2003, <http://www.gallup.com/poll/8068/Special-Release-American-Opinion-War.aspx> (accessed December 02, 2007).

APPENDIX A

APPLICATION OF POWELL DOCTRINE IN OPERATION DESERT STORM AND IRAQI FREEDOM

Powell Doctrine	DESERT STORM	IRAQI FREEDOM
1. Political objective important?	Yes	Yes* No
2. Clearly defined and attainable objective?	Yes	No
3. All non-violent policy means failed?	Yes	No
4. Military force achieve the objective?	Yes	No
5. Risks & costs fully and frankly analyzed?	Yes	No
6. Consequences considered?	Yes	No
7. Public and international support?	Yes	Yes** No

*Removing Saddam's regime could be considered important (i.e. a vital national interest) provided there was definitive proof he had WMD and provided it to terrorist organizations for use against the US.

**The American public supported the war and the House legitimized the use of force in Iraq. However, the war lacked international legitimacy through a UN Resolution.

APPENDIX B
UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS AGAINST IRAQ

RESOLUTION	DATE	DESCRIPTION
582	February 24, 1986	Deplores the use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq War
612	May 09, 1988	Condemns Iraq's use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq War.
620	August 26, 1988	Condemns Iraq's use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq War.
660	August 02, 1990	Condemns the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and demands a withdrawal of Iraqi troops.
661	August 06, 1990	Placed economic sanctions on Iraq in response to the invasion of Kuwait.
678	November 29, 1990	Iraq must comply fully with UNSCR 660 (regarding Iraq's illegal invasion of Kuwait) "and all subsequent relevant resolutions." Authorizes UN Member States "to use all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660 and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area."
686	March 2, 1991	Iraq must release prisoners detained during the Gulf War. Iraq must return Kuwaiti property seized during the Gulf War. Iraq must accept liability under international law for damages from its illegal invasion of Kuwait.
687	April 3, 1991	Iraq must "unconditionally accept" the destruction, removal or rendering harmless "under international supervision" of all "chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of agents and all related subsystems and components and all research, development, support and manufacturing facilities." Iraq must "unconditionally agree not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons or nuclear-weapons-usable material" or any research, development or manufacturing facilities. Iraq must "unconditionally accept" the destruction, removal or rendering harmless "under international supervision" of all "ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 KM and related major parts and repair and production facilities." Iraq must not "use, develop, construct or acquire" any weapons of mass destruction. Iraq must reaffirm its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

		Creates the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) to verify the elimination of Iraq's chemical and biological weapons programs and mandated that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) verify elimination of Iraq's nuclear weapons program. Iraq must declare fully its weapons of mass destruction programs. Iraq must not commit or support terrorism, or allow terrorist organizations to operate in Iraq. Iraq must cooperate in accounting for the missing and dead Kuwaitis and others. Iraq must return Kuwaiti property seized during the Gulf War.
688	April 5, 1991	"Condemns" repression of Iraqi civilian population, "the consequences of which threaten international peace and security." Iraq must immediately end repression of its civilian population. Iraq must allow immediate access to international humanitarian organizations to those in need of assistance.
707	August 15, 1991	"Condemns" Iraq's "serious violation" of UNSCR 687. "Further condemns" Iraq's noncompliance with IAEA and its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Iraq must halt nuclear activities of all kinds until the Security Council deems Iraq in full compliance. Iraq must make a full, final and complete disclosure of all aspects of its weapons of mass destruction and missile programs. Iraq must allow UN and IAEA inspectors immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access. Iraq must cease attempts to conceal or move weapons of mass destruction, and related materials and facilities. Iraq must allow UN and IAEA inspectors to conduct inspection flights throughout Iraq. Iraq must provide transportation, medical and logistical support

		for UN and IAEA inspectors.
715	October 11, 1991	Iraq must cooperate fully with UN and IAEA inspectors.
949	October 15, 1994	"Condemns" Iraq's recent military deployments toward Kuwait. Iraq must not utilize its military or other forces in a hostile manner to threaten its neighbors or UN operations in Iraq. Iraq must cooperate fully with UN weapons inspectors. Iraq must not enhance its military capability in southern Iraq.
1051	March 27, 1996	Iraq must report shipments of dual-use items related to weapons of mass destruction to the UN and IAEA. Iraq must cooperate fully with UN and IAEA inspectors and allow immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access.
1060	June 12, 1996	"Deplores" Iraq's refusal to allow access to UN inspectors and Iraq's "clear violations" of previous UN resolutions. Iraq must cooperate fully with UN weapons inspectors and allow immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access.
1115	June 21, 1997	"Condemns repeated refusal of Iraqi authorities to allow access" to UN inspectors, which constitutes a "clear and flagrant violation" of UNSCR 687, 707, 715, and 1060. Iraq must cooperate fully with UN weapons inspectors and allow immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access. Iraq must give immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to Iraqi officials whom UN inspectors want to interview.
1134	October 23, 1997	"Condemns repeated refusal of Iraqi authorities to allow access" to UN inspectors, which constitutes a "flagrant violation" of UNSCR 687, 707, 715, and 1060. Iraq must cooperate fully with UN weapons inspectors and allow immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access. Iraq must give immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to Iraqi officials whom UN inspectors want to interview.
1137	November 12, 1997	"Condemns the continued violations by Iraq" of previous UN resolutions, including its "implicit threat to the safety of" aircraft operated by UN inspectors and its tampering with UN inspector monitoring equipment. Reaffirms Iraq's responsibility to ensure the safety of UN inspectors.

		Iraq must cooperate fully with UN weapons inspectors and allow immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access.
1154	March 2, 1998	Iraq must cooperate fully with UN and IAEA weapons inspectors and allow immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access, and notes that any violation would have the "severest consequences for Iraq."
1194	September 9, 1998	"Condemns the decision by Iraq of 5 August 1998 to suspend cooperation with" UN and IAEA inspectors, which constitutes "a totally unacceptable contravention" of its obligations under UNSCR 687, 707, 715, 1060, 1115, and 1154. Iraq must cooperate fully with UN and IAEA weapons inspectors, and allow immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access.
1205	November 5, 1998	"Condemns the decision by Iraq of 31 October 1998 to cease cooperation" with UN inspectors as "a flagrant violation" of UNSCR 687 and other resolutions. Iraq must provide "immediate, complete and unconditional cooperation" with UN and IAEA inspectors.
1284	December 17, 1999	Created the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspections Commission (UNMOVIC) to replace previous weapon inspection team (UNSCOM). Iraq must allow UNMOVIC "immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access" to Iraqi officials and facilities. Iraq must fulfill its commitment to return Gulf War prisoners. Calls on Iraq to distribute humanitarian goods and medical supplies to its people and address the needs of vulnerable Iraqis without discrimination.
1441	November 08, 2002	Called for the immediate and complete disarmament of Iraq and its prohibited weapons. Iraq must provide UNMOVIC and the IAEA full access to Iraqi facilities, individuals, means of transportation, and documents. States that the Security Council has repeatedly warned Iraq and that it will face serious consequences as a result of its continued violations of its obligations

Source: United Nations Security Council Website
(http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions.html) (Accessed January 26, 2008)

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