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
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

TITLE: The interagency breakdown: Why we need legislative reform to coordinate execution of the National Security Strategy

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
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Title: The interagency breakdown: Why we need legislative reform to coordinate execution of the National Security Strategy

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Thesis: In order to meet the national security demands of the 21st century, the organization of the interagency, both structure and process, requires legislative reform equivalent to an interagency Goldwater-Nichols Act.

Discussion: The United States Governments most important issue is the security of the nation. With the new threats facing our nation, the current organization of our governments departments and agencies inadequately addresses the current security threats. Over the last decade, the US has found itself in numerous complex operations that require the use of all the instruments of national power to produce a solution that comprehensively addressed the threat the nation faced. The USG response in each instance failed to achieve unity of effort in these operations because of strong bureaucratic tendencies that did not lend to departmental cooperation. Additionally, a lack of overall responsibility and accountability, combined with a lack of interagency education contributed to these deficiencies.

The situation the USG interagency faces closely resembles the dilemma faced by the U.S. military prior to the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. In order to recommend reform, the core areas that the reform needs to address require analysis. The analysis starts with the fact that the National Security Strategy is the centerpiece for developing or strategy and response to national security issues. Next, the complex problems addressed in the National Security Strategy require complex responses. Because of this, we must resolve strategic planning, crisis response, integrated planning and execution across USG departments and educate our personnel to achieve maximum effects. We must be mindful of improved response, and flexibility, while not curtailing presidential power and cooperative checks and balances within the USG. From these ideas, reform recommendations need to be sound and relevant for the security environment we currently face while focused on improving the structure and process of the interagency we have within the USG.

Conclusion: To ensure complex national security issues are addressed Congress needs to initiate Interagency reform in the form of a new National Security Act. At a minimum this act needs to address the following areas: (1) Provide Congressional oversight to the national security council (2) Reorganize the NSC to have two functional areas, one for Operational issues and future planning and the second for presidential advice. (3) Initiate a Quadrennial National Security Review. (4) Initiate interagency education that encourages participation in the interagency process. The goal of the changes is to accomplish for the interagency, what A Goldwater-Nichols accomplished for the U.S. Military, improve responsiveness, improve command relationships, and educate our interagency personnel.

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PREFACE

The purpose behind this paper is to explore the world of the interagency and how critical effective responses to issues of National Security are to the nation. The intent is not to be critical of the current political leadership or any of their decisions on the execution of national strategy. Its purpose was to address the current shortfalls of interagency oversight and the conditions required to improve these shortfalls. Much literature exists on this topic, and much has yet to be written. I have attempted to formulate a comprehensive start point for further research on future legislation to fix the current interagency problems. The result of my research have not produced a magical answer to the problems interagency face, but attempts to provide a feasible and workable starting point that can be further refined by others. The issues associated with optimization are to fix an issue in time, not to produce an enduring final answer. I hope that one day we will be able to produce legislation that can fix some of the problems we currently face and leave ourselves open to future legislation to continue to refine our nations approach to National Security.

During my research, I found many people who were supportive of my endeavors. Dr. Bechtol, thank you for your time and guidance on this project. You have been an exceptionally understanding and thoughtful mentor. Dr. Bittner, thank you for planting the seeds early on at Command and Staff College. Your class question in regards to a Goldwater Nichols Act for the interagency early in the academic year was truly the genesis of this project. Dr. Scanlon and Andrea Hamlin, without you my thoughts would have never made it into intelligible written prose. You two are truly the unsung heroes of the college. Your help and support is invaluable, keep up the incredible work, you make a difference.

To my wife and family, Thank You. You supported me by giving up our family time together to allow me to pursue my academic endeavors. This was no small task. I have spent many months away during my career and understand that any time we can find together is exceptionally valuable. Thank you again.

Mom and Dad, did you ever think this was possible? Thanks for your lifelong support.

Introduction

For the longer term, the United States government needs to improve how its constituent agencies—Defense, State, Agency for International Development, Treasury, Justice, the intelligence community, and others—respond to a complex stability operation like that represented by this decade's Iraq and Afghanistan wars and the previous decade's operations in the Balkans. They need to train for, and conduct, joint operations across agency boundaries, following the Goldwater-Nichols model that has proved so successful in the U.S. armed services.

-- Iraq Study Group Report, Recommendation 75

Based on the current challenges and threats facing the United States, the U.S. national security strategy and U.S. response to world affairs will require cooperation from all government agencies, working across traditional agency boundaries to formulate coherent and comprehensive responses. These threats and challenges pose a significant departure from the past and will define the U.S. position as a world leader in the 21st century. To address these issues the U.S. government must efficiently employ the tools at its disposal to ensure national security¹.

In order for the government to accomplish its national security mission, the four instruments of national power (i.e., Diplomatic, Informational, Military, and Economic (DIME)) need effective integration to produce optimal national security effects and support the national security strategy. Currently, governmental departments and agencies are in need of transformation². This need impedes the United States Government (USG) from effectively accomplishing missions related to national security, namely the threat posed by transnational terrorism.

As illuminated in testimony before the 9/11 Commission, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld recalled how to achieve a better joint warfighting capability the Goldwater-Nichols Act forced each of the U.S. military services to "give up some of their turf and authorities and prerogatives." He furthermore stated that today's executive branch is "stove-piped much like the four services were nearly 20 years ago." He wondered if agencies might need to "give up some

of their existing turf and authority in exchange for a stronger, faster, more efficient government wide joint effort.” The 9/11 Commission reports that other key officials expressed similar views.³

This paper will explore ways, derived from historical backgrounds, to transform the bureaucratic inefficiencies resident in our current government organization into a more efficient and focused response to our nations national security needs. Relying on lessons learned from post World War II defense reform to the Goldwater-Nichols Act (GNA) of 1986 and coupled with the new national security environment, this paper will attempt to draw on these experiences and lay the framework for the necessary transformation outlined in the National Security Strategy of 2006. It will culminate with an outline for institutional change within the government in the form of a new National Security Act. The paper’s ultimate goal will be to explore the places changes can produce a “faster, more efficient government wide joint effort” for the national security environment we face in the 21st century.

U.S. Military Defense Reform, Post World War II

There are over 2,000 years of experience that tell us that the only thing harder than getting a new idea into the military mind is getting an old one out.

-- Sir Basil Liddell Hart

Throughout the history of the U.S. military, numerous individuals have addressed defense reform. Multiple presidents have enacted legislation and issued directives to make the military more efficient. Post World War II, the U.S. military consisted of the Department of War and Department of the Navy, each reporting to the president as a unique entity. This resulted in unresolved disputes between the services requiring presidential intervention. President Truman, recognizing this inability of the services to coordinate their actions, initiated the following reform:

The experiences of World War II made it clear that, for the US armed forces, future warfare would increasingly be characterized by unified operations, and that a centrally coordinated process for providing US military capabilities was needed. In a message to Congress (December 1945), President Harry S. Truman stated, "There is enough evidence now at hand to demonstrate beyond question the need for a unified department." He urged Congress to "...adopt legislation combining the War and Navy departments into one single Department of National Defense." President Truman's message led to the National Security Act (NSA) of 1947 that created the "National Military Establishment" and initiated a trend toward unification of the US armed forces that would continue throughout the remainder of the century.⁴

From this presidential direction, the military began its evolution from a service centric force to a joint, unified force that could better leverage the individual service strengths to accomplish the Department of Defense (DOD) mission. This initial reform measure curtailed service infighting that was adversely affecting the military's ability to focus on coordinating Army and Navy efforts. The legislation of 1947 made strides towards unification of the U.S. military effort; however, there remained shortcomings in the implementation and execution of this unification.⁵ Amendments made to the NSA of 1947 and additional NSA's in 1953 and 1959, [See Appendix A] further refined command relationships within the military and centralized control of the services. While military command relationships improved with these reforms, command and control issues within the services remained.

Operation Eagle Claw, the failed Iranian hostage rescue mission of 1979, highlighted military issues of command and control. The rescue force of Operation Eagle Claw included personnel and equipment from each of the various services, but lacked unified effort. The command structure between the Joint Task Force (JTF) commander and his forces was flawed; the mission designated no individual commander responsible for overall air or ground forces. Individual commanders had responsibility for their forces and their equipment, but were not responsible for coordination between units.⁶ This lack of integrated command and control, and

associated failures in training and planning resulting from this poor command and control structure, caused mission failure resulting in the loss of eight lives, one destroyed helicopter, and one destroyed transport plane. This failed operation raised congressional concern over the U.S. military's ability to plan, execute, and lead successful military operations involving more than one individual service component.

In the aftermath of the failed Iranian hostage rescue mission, another failed mission, in Beirut, Lebanon, attracted the attention of Congress. The Beirut operation began as a joint, multinational mission that focused on maintaining peace in Beirut. It failed when the Marine barracks were bombed, resulting in the loss of 241 American service members, 58 French service members, and 6 civilians. Once again Congressional concern over the command and control, organization, and employment of the U.S. armed forces resurfaced following the bombing of the Marine headquarters building.⁷ The resultant loss of life caused President Reagan to withdraw troops and brought swift congressional reaction. Congress commissioned Admiral Robert Long (US Navy retired) to investigate the reasons for the tragedy. The Long Commission Report concluded that the military chain of command was to blame. Reasons cited were differences in mission interpretation between commanders and lack of specific and timely intelligence. Congress quickly criticized the military for its ambiguous chain of command and lack of oversight due to inadequate joint processes.⁸ The sentiment of Congress was:

With the memories of the Iran hostage rescue attempt still vivid, the Beirut tragedy suggested that the deficiencies of the US armed forces that contributed to the debacle in Iran had not been corrected, but somehow had worsened. Those sentiments began to prevail, and even a successful military operation would not arrest the congressional movement toward sweeping reform of the DOD⁹

From these and other failures associated with command and control issues within the military, the pundits for military reform began to appear.

Development of the Goldwater-Nichols Act

So long as the Joint Chiefs and their organizations continue to split along service lines and exhibit gross service parochialism, their service to the nation is of limited value.

- General Donn A. Starry USA
"Review of Strategic Planning" September 1981

The aforementioned military failures reinforced the congressional perception that the U.S. military was in need of reform.¹⁰ Congress directed the Senate Armed Services committee staff to conduct a study of the organization and decision-making procedures of the Department of Defense. The initial study concluded with a staff study titled Defense Reorganization; The Need for Change (informally called the Locher Report), which confirmed the congressional consensus that the U.S. military needed reorganization.¹¹ While illuminating a wide range of Department of Defense issues, it provided seven recommendations for overhaul of the Department of Defense. These objectives were:

- To reorganize DOD and strengthen civil authority
- To improve the military advice provided to the President, NSC, and the Secretary of Defense
- To place clear responsibility on the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands for the accomplishment of missions assigned to those commands
- To ensure that the authority of commanders of unified and specified combatant commands is commensurate with the responsibility of those commanders for the accomplishment of missions assigned to those commands
- To increase attention to strategy formulation and contingency planning;
- To provide for the most efficient use of defense resources
- To improve joint officer management policies
- Otherwise to enhance the effectiveness of military operations and improve DOD management and administrations.¹²

The report helped structure debates and clarify issues regarding defense reform.¹³ The significance of this report was its ability to take the initiative on reorganization and put tangible reform measures in front of Congress for discussion. In a parallel sequence of events, President

Reagan, under pressure due to fiscal mismanagement within the DOD, established the Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, informally known as the Packard Commission to explore defense appropriations and reform. While also proposing changes within the military, the changes proposed by the Packard Commission also began to receive attention within Congress.¹⁴ With defense reform momentum building within Congress, the military reform transitioned from being a possibility to a probability.

Championed by Senator Barry Goldwater and Representative William F. Nichols, the reform initiative, while meeting stiff resistance by the Secretary of Defense, service chiefs, and Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) it slowly began to gain traction. Remaining resolute in their decision to reform the military, they continued on their quest.¹⁵ Over the course of four years and encompassing numerous debates, the legislation began to take form, and the ideas began to spread and take hold throughout Congress. The result was legislation codified by both the Senate and House of Representatives and passed into law on October 1 1986 as the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.

The Goldwater-Nichols Act: A Success Story

One of the landmark laws of American History, [This law] is probably the greatest sea change in the history of the America military since the Continental Congress created the Continental Army in 1775.

-- Congressman Les Aspin,
Speaking as the Chairman of the House Armed Service
Committee in 1986

Applauded by many as watershed legislation, the Goldwater-Nichols Act was successful overall in accomplishing its desired objectives. The role of the Secretary of Defense as detailed in the GNA clarified his position and authority, firmly placing him in charge of military decision-making. Regarding military advice to the president, the designating of the Chairman of the JCS as the principle advisor to the president, GNA shifted responsibilities from the service

chiefs to the JCS Chairman. This allowed Service chiefs to provide service specific expertise, but allowed the Joint Staff to develop information and advice for the Chairman of the JCS to advise both the Secretary of Defense and the President. The authority and responsibility of the combatant commanders was clearly increased. The restructured military operational chain of command now ran from the President, through the Secretary of Defense, to the combatant commanders, [See Appendix E]. Additionally, the responsibility for planning and executing joint operations rested solely with the combatant commander, and service chiefs were tasked with “training, organizing and equipping” their respective service members for use by the combatant commanders.

Joint officer management dramatically improved with the GNA. The GNA established procedures for the selection, education, assignment and promotion of joint duty officers and incentives these duty assignments. The incentives encouraging joint duty were a clear delineation of a joint duty requirement for selection to flag/general officer and incentivized promotion for those serving in joint billets.

An area not so successfully reformed by GNA was the formulation of strategy and contingency planning. With no requirement for an overarching National Security Strategy, at the time, there was no clear vision to guide this planning process. When recognized, the GNA was amended to require the president to produce an annual National Security Strategy (NSS), which would be the vision necessary to develop these plans. This area currently languishes due to presidents’ failure to produce the NSS annually and the lack of synchronization between the military funding and the national security strategy goals and aims.

Overall, the Goldwater-Nichols Act receives praise both inside and outside the military. General Norman Schwarzkopf, Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander during Operation

Desert Shield/Storm, noted that the Goldwater-Nichols Act established clear lines of command authority and allowed him the freedom to execute effective combat operations during Operation Desert Storm.¹⁶ Dr. James Locher III, former staff member for the Senate Committee on Armed Services and proponent of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation, noted that Goldwater-Nichols has profoundly enhanced the joint war fighting capability of the U.S. armed forces.

While not necessarily perfect, the Goldwater-Nichols Act enabled and directed the U.S. military to operate across formerly parochial service boundaries. The restructuring of the chain of command and empowering of key individuals within the Department of Defense allowed the military to overcome entrenched bureaucracies and strong service views and accomplished significant defense reform. Many of these reforms were envisioned, but not successfully initiated, as far back as the National Security Act of 1947.

U.S. Interagency: What It Is and How It Operates

In the Department of State, you have the glory of the office, to fly around in a big plane and to appear at international meetings. But you don't have the clout. The Secretary of Defense spends money while the Secretary of State begs for money. That's a big difference"¹⁷

-- Former U.S. National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski

The Department of Defense defines the interagency as the USG agencies and departments, including the Department of Defense. It further defines interagency coordination as the coordination that occurs between the elements of Department of Defense and engaged USG agencies for achieving an objective.¹⁸ For this paper, the interagency is defined as those federal agencies that support the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of national power. Interagency operations are defined as coordination of DIME instruments that support the U.S. national security strategy. In its most basic form, the Department of State controls many of the actions associated with the diplomatic, foreign policy, and informational

instruments of national power. The Department of Defense controls the military instrument, and the Department of Treasury and National Economic Committee (NEC) control many of the aspects of the economic instrument.

The Department of Defense is the largest of the aforementioned departments. It is a centralized department led by the Secretary of Defense, which provides military advice to the President and has the largest budget of any department within the U.S. government. Its principle strength lies in its sheer size, military capability and presence.

The Department of State serves as the lead foreign affairs agency within the USG and serves as the Presidents principal foreign policy advisor. It is a centralized department led by the Secretary of State, with a budget much smaller than the DoD. One of the principle strengths of the department is its wealth of knowledge of foreign governments and cultures obtained from experiences of operators and Foreign Service officers operating in different countries.

The National Security Council

The National Security Council was established by the National Security Act of 1947 (PL 235 - 61 Stat. 496; U.S.C. 402) and amended by the National Security Act Amendments of 1949 (63 Stat. 579; 50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.). The declaration states:

In enacting this legislation, it is the intent of Congress to provide a comprehensive program for the future security of the United States; to provide for the establishment of integrated policies and procedures for the departments, agencies, and functions of the government relating to National Security” With the function of “the Council shall be to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security.¹⁹

The intent of the legislation was to provide presidential advice on national security and provide vehicle for interagency integration. This also granted the president executive privilege regarding

the composition and makeup of the National Security Council (NSC) in order to be able to tailor it to his/her needs. The National Security Act also directed interagency oversight and enabled departmental coordination via the National Security Council.

The function of the Council shall be to advise the President of with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security to enable the military services and other departments and agencies of the government to operate more effectively in matters involving national security.²⁰

While initially designed to integrate operations across government departmental agencies, the NSC quickly became more an advisory group to the president than one integral in coordinating interagency operations.

Because of the executive privilege granted to the president in the formation of this council, presidents have historically tailored NSC's to their liking and chosen their National Security Advisors based on their personality or leadership style. Presidents have also varied the composition and constituency of the NSC. The NSC has fluctuated from as few as 12 officers (under President Kennedy) to as many as 225 officers currently under President Bush [See Appendix C for the current NSC structure]. The NSC fluctuation in size and responsibility is a result of differing expectation of each president on the roles and responsibilities of the council. Each president has tried various attempts to optimize the functioning and efficiency of the NSC [See Appendix B] and each has met with varying levels of success.

Changes in National Security

The United States is at war, and success in the war will require the coordinated efforts of all the instruments of U.S. and partner national power. In fact, the principal thrust, must come from instruments of national power and influence outside the Department of Defense.

--National Military Strategic Plan for
the War on Terrorism

While the bipolar world of the Cold War ended and the rise of transnational terrorism grew in stature, the U.S. was slow to respond. Terrorism, addressed as a national security issue in presidential directives as far back as President Reagan, never reached the forefront of national consciousness until September 11, 2001. Until the fateful attacks, terrorism seldom registered as important to the U.S. government. As noted by the 9/11 Commission report, individual Representatives and Senators took steps in addressing terrorism as an issue of national security, but "In fact, Congress had a distinct tendency to push questions of emerging national security threats off its own plate, leaving them for others to consider."²¹ However, because of the end of the Cold War and emerging post 9/11 security environment, transnational terrorism has fundamentally changed the security landscape of the United States.²² Effective response to the new security threat lies in leveraging the DIME on the new threats of transnational terrorism.

Current Issues with U.S. Government Departments and Agencies

"Major institutions of American national security were designed in a different era to meet different challenges. They must be transformed."²³

--United States National Security Strategy

With fundamental changes in the national security environment, USG departments and agencies are still oriented on a Cold War view of national security, whereby each department contributes by operating singularly along departmental lines. These departments fail to realize this view of national security is no longer applicable to the roles governmental departments need to execute within the 21st century national security framework. This new environment requires departments that previously were able to play only a domestic role, now finding themselves involved in foreign and national security policies.²⁴ Because of these outdated perspectives, governmental departments are ill suited to operate in the current security environment.

Currently, for the departments and agencies to be successful, they must rely solely on an increased collaboration between departments. The downfall of this collaboration is its susceptibility to friction resulting from poor personal relationships, bureaucratic inequities, and its vulnerability to political risks. This collaboration, further complicated by policy disagreements and “turf battles”, results from divergent political philosophies, differing departmental objectives and priorities, and disagreements about the dynamics and implications of evolving situations in the world.²⁵ The complex issues that face the departments are further complicated by departmental differences regarding the ends ways and means best suited to solve national security issues. These differences make policy formulation difficult, as noted by a former NSC staff member who stated, “The easiest outcome to produce in the interagency process is to prevent policy from being made.”²⁶

Post 9/11 Interagency Operational Failures

U.S. responses to complex emergencies to date have been largely ad hoc and plagued by poor planning, slow response time insufficient resources, and little unity of effort among agencies. This continuous cycle – in which the U.S. government cobbles together plans, people, and resources for stabilization and reconstruction efforts before, during or after major combat operations – puts unnecessary strains on the U.S. military, undermines success, and must be broken.

-- Beyond Goldwater Nichols: U.S. Government
and Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era.

U.S. involvement in Afghanistan reflects the need for transformation of the interagency process. When the planning for the possible conflict began, the Department of State and Department of Defense planners adopted different approaches to build coalition support. The Department of State planners looked to build as large a base of international support as they could, while Department of Defense planners, understanding the increased planning factors involving multinational coalition operations,²⁷ were primarily interested in obtaining militarily

significant, not symbolic, coalition partners.²⁸ The inherent differences in these approaches to planning are problematic and can lead to confusion on the roles and importance of coalition partners.

The United States' recent experience in Iraq also demonstrated the failure of governmental agencies to plan and integrate across functional agencies. Evidence in Iraq suggests, "US government structures, programs and resource planning for S&R (Stability and Reconstruction) in Iraq fell manifestly short, including failure of the interagency process for policy-making, inadequate planning, serious underestimation of costs and requirements (both military and civilian)."²⁹

Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) planners and commanders were informed the Department of State would be the lead agency for post conflict operations in Iraq. General Tommy Franks, CENTCOM Commander, was not an advocate of the military performing nation building functions. As his planners developed battle plans for the military defeat of Iraq, insufficient effort addressed post conflict resolution.³⁰ The Defense Department, however, eventually did agree to take the lead on post war efforts in Iraq. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld assumed "[T]hat he and his department would not be organizing a massive nation building program, but facilitating Iraqi efforts to secure and reconstruct their own country, using their oil exports to finance whatever was needed."³¹

Once Sadaam Hussein had fallen and U.S. forces became established in theater, coordination between Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) administrator, and Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, Commander of coalition ground forces Iraq, could have not been worse. While both men had their plans and strategies for Iraq, they failed to accomplish anything more than ad hoc policy coordination.³² With the CPA lacking

security, the CPA was unable to gain influence outside Baghdad and implement policy that would help to govern Iraq. The military, conversely, found itself developing policies and aiding in governance (without input from the CPA) in their respective areas of operation.

These failures to conduct thorough planning and poor coordination during execution shows an inability to execute a coherent national strategy. The result of this failed policy after the U.S. occupation was widespread chaos, delays, and civil unrest that enabled the insurgency we now face to take root in Iraq.³³ The resulting mission in Iraq has come at the cost of over \$413 billion, 3,901 U.S. fatalities, and over 90,000 Iraqi civilian deaths.³⁴

Efforts to Improve Interagency Response

The underlying problem in improving interagency response is that no one has been successful in providing oversight that overcomes the inefficiencies of the USG departments and agencies. Although each president has sought to improve the interagency efficiency, none has been successful in providing the oversight necessary to overcome the interests of the departments and agencies involved. In May of 1994, President Clinton signed Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25 establishing U.S. Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations. The purpose of the directive was to improve peace operations via interagency policy review. This required extensive consultations from dozens of Members of Congress from both parties.³⁵ Later in his presidential term (1997), President Clinton signed PDD 56, which explained the key instruments of his administration's policy on managing complex contingency operations. Government officials promulgated PDD 56 for use as a handy reference for interagency planning of future complex contingency operations.³⁶ While these directives were useful and readily available, they failed to produce tangible interagency coordination measures.

Following President Clinton, President Bush attempted to clarify the roles and responsibilities of interagency operations by issuing National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 1, which outlined how the NSC should advise and assist the president in integrating all aspects of national security policy as it affects the United States - domestic, foreign, military, intelligence, and economics (in conjunction with the NEC). NSPD 1 furthermore reiterated that the National Security Council system is a process to coordinate executive departments and agencies in the effective development and implementation of those national security policies.³⁷ While instrumental in directing specific actions, these responses failed to utilize a holistic approach to the national security effort.

Recognizing interagency coordination shortfalls of the presidential directives and attempting to facilitate interagency reform, Senators Nunn and Lugar, initiated congressional legislation directed at interagency coordination for post conflict Stabilization and Reconstruction efforts. In response to this legislation, the Department of State stood up the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization in July 2004. This office established recognition that the U.S. government needs to have the institutional capacity within the Department of State to deal with issues relating to conflict, preparing for these issues ahead of time, and responding to these issues after armed conflict has ended.³⁸ While enjoying limited success, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization has not had widespread impact on interagency operations.

None of the attempts to resolve interagency coordination issues has been able to effectively harness the inherently complex interagency operations and achieve a unity of effort. The unity of effort desired being the departments and agencies acting and coordinating efforts in the name of national security interests at the expense of parochial departmental interests.

Goldwater-Nichols Correlation to the Interagency

The interagency is plagued with many of the same problems experienced by the Department of Defense prior to the Goldwater-Nichols Act. U.S. Government departments and agencies over time have tended toward bureaucratic stove piping. They also exhibit many of the parochialisms demonstrated by the services prior to the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. The lack of clear leadership and responsibility within the interagency for national security issues are reminiscent of the military prior to the Goldwater-Nichols Act. In addition, the interagency lacks the ability to coordinate effective strategy and planning development. A final point of friction within the interagency is the lack of interagency education and training necessary to increase awareness and cooperation within the interagency framework.

While not a direct correlation to the military, the joint force is not a mirror image of the interagency, but resembles it in many aspects. The NSC is the primary coordination apparatus within the interagency. The presidential determination of the organization and composition of the interagency is problematic. The limited continuity of the NSC from administration to administration, that remains with the president to tailor the NSC to his personal style, restricts the ability of the NSC to provide clear leadership and direction to the interagency.

Restructuring Interagency Operations: Using Goldwater-Nichols as a Model

Reformers have the idea that change can be achieved by brute sanity
--George Bernard Shaw

The Goldwater Nichols Act of 1986 is a positive example of how organizational restructuring can produce beneficial results in meeting the strategic needs of the United States. Prior to the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, the U.S. military was unable internally to effectively transition to an efficient unified joint fighting force required to serve national defense needs. Because of congressional legislation, the military found itself forced to answer to Congress and

comply with requirements for joint integration. This legislation, which remodeled the Defense Department in 1986, is a positive example of how organization restructuring can produce beneficial results in meeting the strategic needs of the United States. Current interagency operations are in need of similar legislative reform to better leverage the instruments of national power to meet the goals of the National Security Strategy.

A reformulated National Security Act needs to address the current governmental shortfalls existing within interagency coordination among governmental departments. The new National Security Act needs to address the following issues:

1. Directed congressional oversight for the National Security Council. Included in this is appointing the National Security Advisor in the same manner as the secretaries of the other governmental departments.
2. Reorganize the structure of the NSC to strengthen interagency functionality and to improve the NSC's ability to advise the president. The National Security Advisor should be a permanent member of the NSC and the NSA elevated to a senior cabinet level position. The NSA would then be accountable to Congress in the same manner as the other departmental secretaries. The next part of this change would be to reorganize the NSC along operational and advisory lines [See Appendix D]. The NSA would be in charge of the principals committee, which would be primarily responsible for operational responses to interagency issues. The NSA's responsibilities would include ensuring the proper integration and application of all executive branch resources toward the attainment of national security objectives, as directed in the National Security Act of 1947. The NSA would have the responsibility and authority to coordinate and direct the activities of individual agencies pertinent to the pursuit of national security objectives. This authority would include the tasking of agencies to participate in the development of plans,

provision of resources, and execution of future operations that would encompass the entire range of missions related to national security. Once implemented within the NSA, these structural changes would ensure governmental agencies would be organized and directed towards effectively addressing national security issues. This responsibility includes building contingency plans for areas of instability that would include the involved governmental organizations (i.e. DoD, USAID, etc.), personnel, and monetary estimates of supportability.

The Deputy NSA would hold a position as a sub cabinet level advisor to the president. The Deputy NSA would be an advisor selected by the president in much the same manner as the current NSA. The Deputy NSA would be in charge of the Deputy Committee members and be primarily responsible for providing advice to the president regarding national security. This advisory role would cut out a layer of the current bureaucracy and more easily allow the flow of unbiased information to reach the president.

Although at first glance this organization appears awkward, it would function in much the same manner as the current Department of Defense. The NSA would be akin to the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy NSA would function in an advisory role similar to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

3. Require the interagency equivalent of a Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) for National Security, labeled a Quadrennial National Security Review (QNSR), on a four-year basis. Just as "The QDR will lay the groundwork for addressing security challenges of this very uncertain future. It provides a chance to reflect on what we have accomplished and where we need to go. The QDR is what one might call a vector; it is a vector for the future of the joint force. It has both direction and magnitude."³⁹ the proposed QNSR would provide a common groundwork and direction for the departments and agencies associated with national security. The conduct of the

review would require a defined national interagency strategy that would be consistent with the President's most current National Security Strategy. This would require defining necessary interagency personnel structure levels, infrastructure, and the interagency budget plans sufficient to provide for national defense across a full range of missions called for in the National Security Strategy. Additionally, it would identify a budgetary plan and any additional resources needed to carry out national security missions. The purpose for a QNSR would be to force the NSC to coordinate with governmental agencies to formulate a unified plan for national security issues. This document would first be submitted to Congress for approval and then to the President for final approval. This document would:

- a. Provide a more efficient use of interagency organizations. This would necessitate a review of departmental organizations structure to address overlap within departments to provide for the necessary efficient management of government departments. Its focus would be to optimize efficiency by reducing redundant functions with the U.S. government.

- b. Resolve budget issues. The departmental reviews would need to address not only eliminating inefficient and duplicative programs within the departments, but also have the budgetary means to be able to produce money for departmental programs that would be required with respect to national security. The Office of Management and Budgeting (OMB) would oversee funding issues and would be instrumental in providing initial funds for the restructuring process.

6. Education would be necessary for interagency personnel. For personnel to reach the Senior Executive Service or General/Admiral (Executive) level they would be required to work and receive credit for interagency experience. This experience would include a formal academic program and work experience within the interagency.

7. The final goal of the legislation would be to make interagency operations more effective by improving the management and administration of the interagency process. This catchall would allow for other improvements as seen necessary for the overall good of the reorganization.

Scope of Reform

The scope and vision of this reform needs to be far reaching. Historically, limited objectives have proven to be ineffective. Just as the Russian threat and nuclear war revealed itself after World War II, driving national security to the forefront of American thought, history once again shows we are in a rapidly changing national security environment, similar in magnitude to the changing environment after WWII. Just as the government reorganized our national security posture then, they need to address the current national security situation. In four months, President Truman was able to pass the Truman Doctrine, Marshall Plan, and the National Security Act of 1947 that would ultimately lay the framework for national security through the Cold War.⁴⁰ The Global War on Terror requires the United States to adopt new, comprehensive legislation to guide the country through a changing national security environment.

To date, the U.S. Government has only passed marginal measures to leverage the interagency. The interagency process needs the flexibility to address issues associated with national security across traditional government boundaries. A systematic interagency process needs the ability to incorporate itself early in the identification phase of an issue through conflict resolution. Interagency planners need the ability to leverage governmental departments to incorporate their strength in conflict resolution for the situation at hand.

The aforementioned improvements will significantly enhance national responses to transnational terrorism. Government departments will receive direction to operate on a more

coordinated basis. Departments sharing assets will experience monetary gains, based on efficiencies gained in cross-departmental utilization of assets. Personnel will be better able to understand the functioning of other departments and agencies and will therefore be more equipped to resolve conflict. With focused efforts, these effects will serve to reduce U.S. government's expenditures and casualties associated in future conflict.

Conclusion

The key to the United States success in the global long war in the years ahead is the development of a coordinated, multi-agency capacity for irregular warfare.
--Multi-Service Concept for Irregular Warfare

In analyzing these departments and agencies, the issues are clear. The current interaction of government agencies, working on an outdated vision of national security, and with their differing processes, cultures, and prospective, are failing. They attempt to serve the needs of the nation, but find themselves acting in the best interests of their departments or overcome by personality conflicts. This is where historic lessons learned from the DoD need to be leveraged across the entire U.S. government interagency process.

National security issues need a comprehensive plan. Interagency reform is the way to accomplish this task. Currently, the U.S. government experiences undue friction coordinating across governmental boundaries. The objective would be to synchronize the instruments of national power to have a more efficient methodology for addressing conflict in the 21st century. The reforms would serve to unify the departments and agencies, while still maintaining oversight from Congress and the President and would be in line with the vision of our founding fathers while dramatically enabling the USG to act with regard to national security issues.

A reform of this type will require major effort and meet stiff resistance. Certainly, critics within the USG would assert claims that national security will be impossible with the

aforementioned new reforms. The Goldwater-Nichols Act demonstrated that reforming one governmental department required a great effort. Reforming more than a department, multiple departments and agencies across the USG, is a daunting task that will require a concerted effort and a thorough understanding of the advantages this reform would offer.

Some of the positions presented will be controversial. Getting a departmental secretary to cede his position to someone other than the president will be difficult. Departmental secretaries must understand that the president will not be able to oversee all the conflicts that arise. As a result, someone with the authority to run the day-to-day operations of the interagency associated with national security is imperative.

Currently, the interagency process is failing the United States' national security needs; to rectify this, new congressional legislation is necessary. This legislation must cross-departmental boundaries and transform governmental departments and agencies responsible for national security interests within the interagency framework. In order to meet the national security demands of the 21st century, the structure of interagency organizations, as well as the process used to coordinate these organizations, legislative reform equivalent to an interagency Goldwater-Nichols Act will be required.

Summary of National Security Acts

NSA 1947

This National Security Act realigned and reorganized the United States' armed forces, foreign policy, and Intelligence Community apparatus in the aftermath of World War II. It merged the Department of War and the Department of the Navy into the National Military Establishment (NME) headed by the Secretary of Defense. It was also responsible for the creation of a separate Department of the Air Force from the existing United States Army Air Forces.

Aside from the military reorganization, the act established the National Security Council, a central place of coordination for national security policy in the Executive Branch, and the Central Intelligence Agency, the United States' first peacetime intelligence agency.

NSA 1949

This act was a result of the Hoover Commission and Forrestal (Former Navy Admiral), then Secretary of War, realizing changes were necessary to the NSA 1947. This new National Security Act renamed the NME as the Department of Defense changed the statutory membership of NSA, established the Chairman of the JCS position it eliminated the three service secretaries from Council membership and added the Vice President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff as permanent advisers to the Council. Additionally it expanded the Secretary of Defense and his staff's power. It created NSC standing committees to deal with issues such as internal security.

1958 Amendment to NSA

This Amendment resulted from President Eisenhower's perception, revealed in his state of the Union Address, that DoD needed major revision to provide for more effective, efficient, and economical administration, to eliminate duplication, and to encourage more comprehensive policies and programs. This amendment redefined and strengthened the Secretary of Defense's role, especially over the military departments, to enabling him more direction, authority and control over the services. Additionally, it elevated the status of the JCS Chairman and doubled the joint staff size.

With this amendment, the Chairman of the JCS becomes a voting member of the JCS and changed the chain of command such that operational chain of command was to run from the President to Secretary of Defense and through the JCS to the commanders of unified and specified commands (Although never really recognized by the services).

NSA 1986 - (The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986)

This National Security Act reworked the command structure of the United States military. It increased the powers of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. It made the most sweeping changes to the United States Department of Defense since the department's establishment. Among other changes, Goldwater-Nichols streamlined the military chain of command, which now runs from the President through the Secretary of Defense directly to unified combat commanders, bypassing the service chiefs, who now possessed a clear an advisory role in national defense issues.

Appendix A

Historical Evolution of the National Security Council

While initially designed to integrate operations across governmental and departmental agencies, the NSC quickly became more of an advisory group to the president than one integral in coordinating interagency operations. Since the birth of the NSC, each president has changed the composition and constituency of the council to fit his leadership style. They all tried varied attempts to optimize the functioning and efficiency of the NSC. Each met with differing levels of success.

Beginning with President Truman, the NSC provided the president advice on matters of foreign policy and national security. It did not coordinate the activities of the different departments. President Truman personally chose to keep the council at a distance to ensure it was not in a position to dictate national policy to the president, but rather to advise him on national security issues. He preferred to coordinate most national security issues via informal meetings, until the breakout of the Korean War.

Under President Eisenhower, the NSC found itself institutionalized. Eisenhower, who had a strong military background, was comfortable with the structure provided by the NSC and set up an extensive network of committees and staff arrangements. Under Eisenhower, the NSC took on a distinctly rigid style of organization with large staffs focused on planning and policy. This change in structure placed the NSC at the center of national security policy making. Eisenhower's NSC did come under criticism for being inflexible, overstaffed, and unable to respond to immediate crisis.

President Kennedy, sensitive to the criticisms of the large, bureaucratic NSC under Eisenhower, deconstructed much of the structure of the Eisenhower NSC, even though he elevated the position of the National Security Advisor, and relied primarily on the State Department for managing foreign policy issues. Ultimately, President Kennedy relied more on flexible, informal arrangements within the government organization than the formal NSC structure.

President Johnson further allowed the structure and formality of the NSC to diminish. Johnson preferred small, informal settings and conducted most NSC business at his Tuesday luncheon meetings. While he still looked to the National Security Advisor for advice, he relied heavily on the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State for national security advice.

Under the guidance of presidents Nixon and Ford, the NSC became more robust than previous NSC's. During the Nixon and Ford administrations, Henry Kissinger's close personal relationship with Nixon and Ford's inexperience in foreign affairs⁴¹ allowed Kissinger to rise to a position of dominance in foreign policy under both presidents. This dominance culminated with Kissinger as both the National Security Advisor and Secretary of State and therefore responsibly for policymaking and execution.

President Carter, cognizant of the Kissinger influence reorganized the NSC to make the NSA an advisor to foreign policy decisions while conducting many of the functions of the NSC meetings over Friday breakfasts.

Appendix B


President Reagan, in an attempt to respond to rivalries between the NSC and department of State, put the NSA under the White house Chief of Staff, thereby limiting his influence and ability to advise the president.

President Bush, having served as Vice President under Reagan, sought to elevate the role of the NSC to its role as the principal advisor to the President on interagency issues.

President Clinton sought to expand the role of the NSC and include economic issues in national security issues. He and created the position of Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, which was a position, intended to serve the president as a senior economic adviser to coordinate foreign and domestic economic policy. He established this through creation of the National Economic Council (NEC).

President Bush relies on his NSA and secretary of defense for planning and execution of foreign policy issues.

Current NSC Organization




Source: NSPD 1

URL <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-1.htm>

Appendix C

Regional PCC's




Functional PCC's (Chair Designated by Functional Area)




Source: Source: NSPD 1

URL <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-1.htm>

Proposed NSC Organizational Chart (Operational)




Regional PCC's



Source: Author


Proposed NSC Organizational Chart (Policy/Advisory)



Source: Author



Department of Defense




Prepared by: Organizational & Management Planning, ODASM,
OSD
Date: January 2008

** CY 2008

Source: DOD Organization Chart

<http://www.defenselink.mil/odam/omp/pubs/GuideBook/Pdf/DoD.PDF>

Appendix E



** Pre GNA

Source: James R. Locher III, *Victory on the Potomac: The Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon*. Pg 14

Appendix F

Acronyms

CENTCOM – United States Central Command
CPA – Coalition Provisional Authority
DIME – Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic
DoD – Department of Defense
JTF – Joint Task Force
NEC – National Economic Council
NSA – National Security Advisor
NSC – National Security Council
OEF – Operation Enduring Freedom
OIF – Operation Iraqi Freedom
PDD – Presidential Decision Directives
US AID – United States Agency for International Development
USG – United States Government

Notes

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⁵ Ibid.,

⁶ Gregory P. Gass "Command and Control, the Achilles Heel of the Iranian Hostage Rescue Mission" Newport, RI: Naval War College, 1992.
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⁷ Lovelace

⁸ Ibid.

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¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ James R. Locher III, *Victory on the Potomac: The Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon*. (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2002) 116-117.

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¹³ James R. Locher III, *Victory on the Potomac: The Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon*. (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2002) 357-358.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 76.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 8-12.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 440.

¹⁷ David J. Rothkopf, *Running the World The Inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of American Power*. (New York: PublicAffairs 2006) 181. Source: from David Rothkopf interview of Zbigniew Brzezinski, 21 May 2004.

¹⁸ Joint Publication 1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms pg 272

¹⁹ U.S. Government. National Security Act of 1947 Washington, D.C.: 1947, 5.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 7.

²¹ National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. *The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report*. New York: W. W. Norton, 2004. 105.

²² Ibid., p. 103-105.

²³ U.S. Government. National Security Strategy of the United States of America. URL <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html>

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Alan G. Whitaker, Frederick C. Smith, and Elizabeth McKune, The National Security Policy Process: The National Security Council and Interagency System. Annual Update April, 2007 pg 27.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 27.

²⁷ Joint Publication 3-16 Multinational Operations p I-1.

²⁸ Nora Bensahel and Anne M. Moisan. "Repairing the Interagency Dialogue." *Joint Force Quarterly*: JFQ, no. 44, Jan. 2007. 106.

²⁹ Ellen Laipson and Maureen S. Steinbruner, "Iraq and America: Choices and Consequences" (Washington, D.C.: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2006): 137.

³⁰ Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II : 139.

³¹ Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II :141-142.

³² Nora Bensahel and Anne M. Moisan. 106.

³³ Ibid., p. 106.

³⁴ Estimates are derived from The Brookings Institute, *Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction and Security in Post-Sadaam Iraq*. January 28, 2008 Available at: <http://www.brookings.edu/saban/iraq-index.aspx>

³⁵ William J. Clinton Presidential Decision Directive 25: Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations. Washington, D.C.: The White House, May 1994.
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³⁶ William J. Clinton Presidential Decision Presidential Decision Directive 56: Managing Complex Contingency Operations. Washington, D.C.: The White House, May 1997.
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³⁹ Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Edmund P. Giambastiani, Jr, Pentagon Press Briefing 1 Feb 2006

⁴⁰ Rothkopf pg 40-41.

⁴¹ U.S. Government. "NSC History." (1 November 2007).
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