The Balance Sheet of the Battle of Crete: How Allied Indecision, Bureaucracy, and Pretentiousness Lost the Battle

Abstract

The Allied strategy for defending Crete was plagued by a series of compromises at the national and theatre level. The disorder caused by the fractured and often changing strategy made it nearly impossible for subordinate commanders to establish priorities of effort and establish a synchronized operational concept. Consequently, the tactical commander, Major General Sir Bernard Cyril Freyberg, was unable to organize, equip and resource his defense properly. The Allied strategy was unsuccessful for two reasons. First, the development of Allied strategy resembled that of a pinball game rather than a deliberative, objectives-based process. Rather than forcing the Germans into a predictable move, counter-move contest, the indecisive Allied strategy caused them to out-maneuver themselves, resulting in available Allied combat power not being employed. Second, an overall lack of unity of command plagued the implementation of strategies. Politicians, the General Staff, and subordinate commanders who disagreed with the strategy did their best to derail it or not support it. Not only were the Allies strategically out-maneuvered due to these factors, but the consequences of these strategic errors were visited on operational and tactical units in a dramatic fashion. The operational commanders tasked to provide forces, equipment, resources, and support to the effort considered Greece and eventually Crete economy of force operations and released resources without reducing their own capabilities. The Allies failed to clearly define, articulate, and implement the strategic objectives of their entry into Greece. As a result, subordinate commanders were unable to create operational level unity of command and synchronize their efforts to achieve the Allied objectives. Consequently, CreForce and its commander were unable to obtain, organize, and synchronize the elements of combat power necessary to defend Crete, and they lost the battle.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Apr 01, 2008
Accession Number
ADA491531

Entities

People

  • Kelsey A. Smith

Organizations

  • Marine Corps University

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Air Platforms
  • C4I
  • Ground and Sea Platforms
  • Human Systems
  • Weapons Technologies

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Air Defense
  • Air Force
  • Aircrafts
  • Command And Control
  • Guns
  • Marine Corps
  • Middle East
  • Navy
  • Neurobehavioral Manifestations
  • New Zealand
  • North Africa
  • Second World War
  • Security
  • Ships
  • United States
  • Warfare
  • Weapons

Readers

  • Military History / Militaries and War Studies
  • Strategic Security Studies
  • Systems Analysis and Design