MAGTF Targeting
Abstract
The relatively weak targeting effort by the MAGTF in the Persian Gulf conflict is a result of our history, our amphibious doctrine, an inadequate personnel structure to support such large/complicated operations, and the lack of specific targeting education. The Marine Corps entered the modern age of warfare in WWII. Our current targeting doctrine was written amphibious operations and relatively limited wars as its focus. Until recently our targeting process was reactive pro-active. Even today it does not bridge the gap between amphibious and joint targeting, nor is it taught throughout our education system. Educating the total targeting team, including the Target Information, Target Intelligence, and Liaison Officers will provide them a common language for both internal and joint use. Providing manned structure spaces in the MAGTF command elements will replace the ad hoc relationships recently experienced. Doctrine that can span the spectrum of conflict will ensure a common starting point for all future conflicts. We have to make some modifications in our doctrine and training relating to targeting; we have to actively train officers to target properly; and we have to create and staff billets for professional contribute in the next joint conflict.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 01, 1991
- Accession Number
- ADA492642
Entities
People
- R. L. Polak
Organizations
- Marine Corps University