A CBO Study: Rethinking the Trident Force
Abstract
What forces will the United States require to deter nuclear war in the post-Cold War period? A nuclear attack on this country is less likely than it has been or decades: the Soviet Union has collapsed; the chances of a major war occurring in Europe are significantly diminished; and Russia and the United States, motivated by two arms reduction treaties and several unilateral initiatives, are reducing the size and readiness of their nuclear arsenals. Nevertheless, some uncertainty about the future remains. Russia's democracy is fragile, and its nuclear arsenal will continue to be extensive until early in the next decade. How should the United States structure its nuclear forces to account for these factors while also responding to pressure to reduce spending for national defense? The D5 submarine-launched ballistic missile is the only nuclear weapon that the United States will continue to buy throughout the 1990s, and as a result, its future is a key issue in the debate about restructuring U.S. nuclear forces. This study, requested by the House Committee on Armed Services, analyzes the costs and effects of several alternatives to the Navy's plans for the D5 missile and the Trident ballistic-missile submarine force in which it is deployed. In keeping with the mandate of the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) to provide objective analysis, this study makes no recommendations.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jul 01, 1993
- Accession Number
- ADA493212
Entities
People
- David Mosher
- R. W. Thomas
- Raymond Hall
- Robert F. Hale
Organizations
- Congressional Budget Office