The Decision to Not Invade Baghdad (Persian Gulf War)
Abstract
The National Security Council (NSC) is a showcase of the highest level of governmental interagency operations in America and the President chairs it. Its regular attendees are the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Defense, and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the statutory military advisor to the Council and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is the intelligence advisor; others may be invited or asked to attend when appropriate. The Persian Gulf War lasted 42 days. The three air phases took 38 days. The ground war only took 4 days. Kuwait had been liberated, but Saddam Hussein remained in power! President George H. W. Bush had met the challenge of Saddam's invasion of Kuwait, but had not removed his challenger. Why was Saddam left in power? Why didn't we go to Baghdad? Was the decision based upon a decision-making model in which all the alternatives were weighed and the best alternative was selected? Was it based upon the advice of the person who was most influential? Or was it solely the President's decision to not go any further? This paper attempts to provide answers to these questions by analyzing the decision-making process used by the George H. W. Bush National Security Council to go to war and to end the war. The author also makes recommendations on how to improve the interagency decision-making process for the future.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Apr 12, 2007
- Accession Number
- ADA493626
Entities
People
- Lawrence K. Montgomery Jr.
Organizations
- University of Texas at Austin