

DIPLOMATIC LEADS: STRENGTHENING THE ROLE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE IN US REGIONAL ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY

BY

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**DIPLOMATIC LEADS: STRENGTHENING THE ROLE OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE IN US REGIONAL ENGAGEMENT
STRATEGY**

by

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ABSTRACT

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DIPLOMATIC LEADS: STRENGTHENING THE ROLE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE IN US REGIONAL ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY

When General Pervez Musharraf overthrew the Pakistani government in October 1999 his first official telephone call to a US official was not the Ambassador to Pakistan but the Commander, US Central Command, General Anthony Zinni (Priest, 2000, A01). There are likely many reasons why President Musharraf chose to call General Zinni. Yet, this indicates the amount of influence the military possesses as an element of US foreign policy. More recently, in a speech at Kansas State University, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates acknowledged this when he stated that the United States' foreign policy had become too reliant on its military and made the case that the Department of State needed additional resources, both in manpower and money, to improve its "soft power" capability (Gates, 2007, speech). The next US president has a unique opportunity which none other has had since World War II; to restructure how the United States conducts its foreign policy.

The US State Department is the lead agency whose role is to develop and implement the foreign policy of the United States. It does so principally through its regional bureaus and its country ambassadors. As stated in the Department's Strategic Plan published in 2004, the US State Department strives to "avert and resolve local and regional conflicts to preserve peace and minimize harm to the national interests of the United States (DOS, 2003)."

In comparison, the United States military is organized into six Geographical Combatant Commands (GCC).¹ Each command is structured to conduct a wide range of missions, including military operations and humanitarian assistance. With numerous

mission sets come large staffs and associated funding. The GCC missions and resources allow it to implement US foreign policy throughout its region of responsibility. In many cases, the commander has unfettered access to presidents, prime ministers, and rulers of all stripes as he conducts his assigned duties. This access permits him to operate in the diplomatic arena as a uniformed military officer.

Clearly, coordination occurs between the Department of State (DOS) and the Department of Defense (DOD) from the embassies to the Department level. However, given the immense resources of the DOD, the GCC finds itself taking on more missions, like nation-building, which are not its core competence. Is it right for the DOD and the GCC to have such a large stake, and in some instances the lead, in regional engagement? Are the two departments in sync with the objectives for a particular region? Finally, as the US reviews its foreign policy objectives, how can the two departments organize, on a regional basis, to be more effective and restore primacy to diplomacy?

The United States must return to using tried and true techniques. Rather than “adhere to the Thucydidean model of the strong doing what it has the power to do, the US must use its power to achieve its strategic objectives while not alienating the world at the same time” (Jentleson, 2007, 180). This paper will argue that the DOD has been improperly used in the area of regional engagement and will identify potential problem areas a new administration will encounter. Additionally, this work will offer some solutions and a framework to assist the United States in achieving its foreign policy objectives.

DIME vs. diMe

As the most powerful nation in the world, the United States possesses all the elements of power required to achieve successfully its basic national security goals (NSS, 2006), if applied reasonably and judiciously.² These elements, e.g. Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic (DIME), are owned by different departments within the US Government. As the Center for Strategic and International Studies' *Smart Power* report correctly identifies, civilian organizations within the US Government do the "soft power" tasks while relying on the US military to do the "hard power" ones (CSIS, 2007, 9). The challenge, of course, is not overly relying on one element of power while disregarding the others.

The watchword for the 21st century is engagement not isolationism. Engagement relies heavily on all elements of national power to be effective. Secretary Gates said,

My message is that if we are to meet the myriad challenges around the world in the coming decades, this country must strengthen other important elements of national power both institutionally and financially, and create the capability to integrate and apply all of the elements of national power to problems and challenges abroad. In short, based on my experience serving seven presidents, as a former Director of CIA and now as Secretary of Defense, I am here to make the case for strengthening our capacity to use "soft" power and for better integrating it with "hard" power (Gates, 2007, speech).

The United States learned the lessons of "non-entanglement"³ during World War II. Now the US must re-learn how to synchronize its power so that it can engage more effectively. This is a change to how business has been done over the last 20 years, but a change which needs to occur and which the world expects.⁴

In practical terms, the world views the military as being the foreign policy lead for the United States. Beginning in the 1990s the military reduced its forward presence

(Reveron, 2007, 8) but increased its forward involvement. Whether conducting disaster relief in Thailand, medical clinics in El Salvador, stability operations in Djibouti, or combat operations in Iraq, the face of US power in these very different types of operations is the military. Additionally, as the combatant commander travels around his area of responsibility, more requirements are identified and assistance requested by leaders of an individual country or the US ambassador to a country. These insights gathered by the commander and his staff are essential to the success of the GCC's mission. Therefore, the military plays a significant role in the "formulation and ... implementation of national security policy (Sokolsky, 2002, 218)." However, the "militarization" of US foreign policy did not occur overnight.

The DOD Reorganization Act of 1986, also known as the Goldwater-Nichols Act, reorganized the US military in a way which set the conditions for DOD's current situation. The Act streamlined how the DOD functioned and intended to eliminate inter-service rivalries, making the US military more effective in operational planning and execution. Additionally, only three years after the passing of the Act, the Cold War ended leaving the United States as the sole superpower. The combination of these two events left the US with a superbly trained and equipped military with no peer competitor. As a result, the military was employed in operations throughout the world, i.e. Kurdish Iraq, Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo, which were not necessarily in the vital interests of the United States. As missions were levied upon DOD, additional resources soon followed. New missions beget new resources which permitted the development of new capabilities. The military "picked up jobs like de-mining and anti-drug trafficking which formerly belonged to several federal government organizations (Priest, 2003, 22)." This

allowed the President and Congress to reduce funding to the DOS while using an existing and available tool, the military, to handle current and emerging national security requirements.

The evolution of the military into an “imperial army”⁵ produced leaders who were more than warriors but also refined statesmen, pushing these uniformed officers into the diplomatic arena as well. The commanders tangled with diplomats and intelligence agencies to shape the American security environment, thus becoming “well-funded, semi-autonomous, unconventional centers of American foreign policy.” Regionally focused and well resourced, the Geographical Combatant Commanders had access to foreign leaders and territories which stretched beyond the capabilities of the bureaus within the DOS (Sokolsky, 2002, 223).

On the other hand, the 1990s were not as kind to the Department of State. Rather than properly funding established federal departments, the administration “came to rely on the regional CinCs (Commander’s in Chief) to fill a diplomatic void (Priest, 2003, 45).” Simultaneously, the funding shortage forced the State Department to staff new embassies in Eastern Europe by reducing personnel at existing ones (Clarke, email, 2008).⁶ The failure in resourcing stripped the DOS of its ability to conduct diplomacy properly.

What is not as well-known, and arguably even more shortsighted, was the gutting of America’s ability to engage, assist, and communicate with other parts of the world – the “soft power,” which had been so important throughout the Cold War. The State Department froze the hiring of new Foreign Service officers for a period of time. The United States Agency for International Development saw deep staff cuts – its permanent staff dropping from a high of 15,000 during Vietnam to about 3,000 in the 1990s. And the U.S. Information Agency was abolished as an independent entity, split into pieces, and many of its

capabilities folded into a small corner of the State Department (Gates, 2007, Speech).

The reduction in funding permitted administrations to realize a “peace dividend” and allocate funding to its domestic agenda. But, as Secretary Gates recognizes, this action atrophied the diplomatic capabilities of the United States and resulted in a “hollow diplomatic corps” in 2007 similar to its “hollow army” of the 1970s.

Additionally, the reduction in funding affected other areas of the national power. Economic policies and assistance are key tools of statecraft a country may use to influence foreign policy issues (Borer, 2003, 51). Trade, as an essential part of the US's National Security Strategy, has long been touted as a mechanism which binds countries together and which potentially reduces the possibility of conflict. In terms of foreign policy, trade or economic assistance comes largely in the form of items with either civilian or military applications - in other words dual-use. Until the first Gulf War, the DOS and the Department of Commerce (DOC) were able to use trade as a trump card over the DOD or the CIA (Ibid, 2003, 54). Yet, as events in the Middle East spiraled towards war, a shift towards security occurred within the US government, pushing the “soft” power departments from the limelight. The reorganization of the US military, along with reduction of resources and a change in focus, has resulted in an imbalance in national power (diMe) leaving the military as the predominant instrument of choice.

Challenges

Today, the United States has a defense department which is regionally focused and organized to conduct operations across the entire spectrum of conflict, from civil disturbance to nuclear war. The military has developed capabilities which allow it to move manpower and materiel to any point on the globe rapidly, planting the Stars and

Stripes by merely landing a military transport aircraft. In a world of instant communications and 24-hour news coverage, this image rapidly transmits a message to the world that the US is engaged. Using military personnel to deliver and distribute humanitarian relief is a positive image, for sure; but is it the right message? Is there a better means to achieve the same effect? Although this example speaks to capability, it gets at some of the challenges associated with right-sizing the foreign policy wardrobe.

The first challenge is the US national security message. The DOS published its strategic vision entitled "*Transformational Diplomacy*" which espouses building stable and productive democratic societies in the world (DOS, 2007, 10). This joint document between DOS and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) establishes a road map for the US's diplomatic effort. While this document supports the 2006 National Security Strategy (NSS) and signals a departure from the Bush doctrine of unilateral intervention (White House, 2002, 5), its importance is hobbled by the message received by foreign nations, cultures, and organizations. Currently, the national security message which loudly resonates overseas is the Global War on Terror (GWOT).⁷

By using the term "Global War on Terror" (GWOT), the United States immediately militarizes its foreign policy (Hopkins, Keaney, 2007, interview). GWOT biases policy decisions toward a military solution and marginalizes the other elements of national power. The change in tone between the 2002 and 2006 NSS indicates that the current administration recognizes the negative effects its previous message had on the international community. The United States now must change its actions.

The second challenge is overcoming inertia. National Security Presidential Directive 44 charges the DOS with coordinating and leading US efforts for stabilization and reconstruction activities (White House, 2005). This directive recognizes the requirement for nation-building as a key component of effective engagement.

Additionally,

One of the most important lessons of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan is that military success is not sufficient to win: economic development, institution-building and the rule of law, promoting internal reconciliation, good governance, providing basic services to the people, training and equipping indigenous military and police forces, strategic communications, and more – these, along with security, are essential ingredients for long-term success (Gates, 2007, speech).

However, the other federal departments lack the “go forward” ability to conduct these activities effectively in a meaningful and long-term manner. Secretary Gates recognized this by implementing DOD Directive 3000.05, *Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction*. This directive recognizes that work, currently being conducted by the US military, is best done by civilian agencies (DOD, 2005).

Nonetheless, it codifies stability and reconstruction as a core competence for the armed forces.

The military is an objective-oriented organization driven by mission accomplishment. However, by institutionalizing nation-building tasks, the DOD is gaining yet another capability which will produce more missions. The lessons of Afghanistan and Iraq are clear; someone has to do the job. Yet Robert Thompson’s experiences in Malaysia and Vietnam taught him that each department of a government must be held responsible for doing those tasks under its mandate. If permitted, the military will end up running the entire reconstruction effort (Thompson, 1967, 82). Once

this has happened, convincing national leadership to divert resources to the right departments in order to develop this expeditionary capability will be difficult to overcome.

The third challenge is coordination. Both the DOS and DOD are regionally focused, just focused differently. At the DOS, the Under Secretary for Political Affairs⁸ supervises eight bureaus, each headed by an Assistant Secretary, six of whom oversee a particular area of the globe.⁹ These bureaus develop policy and make recommendations to the Secretary and to individual country ambassadors (DOS, 2007, website). The country ambassadors are appointed by the President and work for the Secretary of State. The country ambassadors work closely with the respective regional bureaus to coordinate policy and positions on specific issues. However, there is not one civilian, on par with the GCC, who has the authority or responsibility for implementing a strategy in one of these regions.

The US military is organized into six geographical commands also responsible for portions of the world. Under this plan, each regional command is led by a four-star flag officer who reports directly to the Secretary of Defense (DOD, 2007, website). In addition to commanding forces allocated to him, each officer is responsible for developing engagement strategies which may include military exercises, conferences, exchanges, and education, to name a few. Each command is also responsible for all military operations which occur in areas under its purview. Although there are DOD personnel attached to the DOS and vice versa, there are no GCC liaison officers in any of the DOS's bureaus to facilitate coordination (Hopkins, 2007, interview).

An organizational comparison of the two departments quickly demonstrates lack of common ground. Each department has divided the world differently, possibly because of internal resources, religion or tribal concerns, or simple geography. At first glance this might appear to be a significant issue. However, these differences in regional construct have less effect on the implementation of a regional security plan than does the lack of a coordinating capacity between the Bureaus and the GCC. In other words, “an ambassador’s focus on one country and a combatant commander’s focus on an entire region necessitate coordination (Reveron, 2007, 16).” Thus, there is a need for a “super” ambassador with authority to coordinate and implement a comprehensive regional engagement strategy.

Obstacles

The path to a more effective engagement capability is not an easy one. It is riddled with obstacles that can slow down or even prevent progress. Bureaucracies naturally resist change as it affects predictability, whether of people, organization, or process. Nevertheless, a change in mindset must occur in order to remove these obstacles and return primacy to diplomacy.

One major obstacle will be convincing Congress of the need for change. In theory, members of Congress (a very diverse body) would agree that improvements are needed in how the United States conducts foreign policy. However, persuading them to reallocate funding is a different matter. This is largely due to the DOS having no domestic constituency (Clark, D, 1987, 134). The State Department represents the diplomatic interests of the United States overseas. However, it is charged also with presenting foreign issues to the federal government, sometimes being the bearer of bad

news. Additionally, whereas the DOD spends large amounts of money domestically, the DOS uses very little of its budget at home. These circumstances make it very difficult for the DOS to gain additional leverage within the government and be allowed to lead. Therefore, the administration's ability to convince a vote-conscious Congress could prove to be difficult.

Another hindrance would be the DOD. A reallocation of funding by Congress would most likely occur at a cost to the DOD. Although the military would welcome a smaller budget if it accompanied a reduction in mission requirements, the Armed Services¹⁰ would resist this change, as budgeted money would affect the Services ability to man, train, and equip its forces. However, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen, while Chief of Naval Operations, indicated that he would be willing to reallocate money to the DOS currently budgeted to the military "assuming it was spent in the right place (Gates, 2007, speech)."

A third challenge would be the DOS. As early as 1983, William Bacchus observed that the State Department does not have the required competence to develop and coordinate a synchronized, cohesive foreign policy (Clark, D, 1987, 132). Because of a reduction in funding and a shortfall in manning, the potential of the State Department to develop this capability has not greatly improved. There is no formal education system within the DOS to develop young Foreign Service Officers (FSO) as he / she progresses through a career (Whitaker, 2007, interview). Even given an increase in funding and manpower, it will take the DOS several years to grow the required faculty.

Lastly, but most significantly, is presidential willingness to force change. The conduct of foreign policy is one of the key responsibilities of the executive branch. Since World War II, each president has approached foreign policy differently, some keeping very tight hold on the reins while others were more decentralized (NSC website, 2007). Regardless, if the next administration is serious about reforming international relations, it will require the spending of political capital by the president to gain the required changes.

Problems

There are three factors which hamper the DOS effectiveness: 1) the national narrative; 2) resources; and 3) professional education. In the current national narrative, and at the core of the problem, is that America has made the GWOT the central component of its engagement strategy. The United States' "success and failure will turn on the ability to win allies and strengthen old ones both in government and civil society. The key is not how many enemies the United States kills, but how many allies it grows (CSIS, 2007, 10)." As noted above, GWOT militarizes the US foreign policy, thus having a detrimental effect on the coordinated use of national assets as well as the willingness of others to work with the US.

Secondly, the DOS lacks the required raw resources. Zbigniew Brzezinski observed, "The paradox is that the global military credibility of the US has never been higher, while its political credibility has never been lower (Brzezinski, 2003, speech)." The DOS ability to conduct effective diplomacy has atrophied over the last two decades mostly because of reductions in raw resources; "more money is not a substitute for an effective foreign policy, but an effective foreign policy will simply be impossible without

more money (Priest, 2003, 45).” If the DOS is to take over doing the “soft” power tasks, as Secretary Gates suggested, it will need proper funding, manning, and time to achieve this. The administration must request and Congress must appropriate and authorize additional resources to the DOS.

Thirdly, the DOS fails to educate effectively its FSOs on how the US military prepares and projects power. The DOS uses its Foreign Service Institute to provide initial training to new officers as well as periodic specialty training during an FSO’s career. Unfortunately, only a very few Ambassadorial-level FSOs, a handful of senior military officers, and a select number of Senior Executive Service (SES)¹¹ civilians attend the FSI’s six-month long “senior officer course” (Clarke, email, 2008). Moreover, the DOS’s education system is lacking in integrating the aspects of DIME with the interagency process. A major hindrance to the program is the State Department’s shortage of personnel. At any one time the DOD has 10-15% of its personnel in training, yet the DOS lacks a similar labor pool (Cohen, 2007, interview). Although some FSOs are able to attend military schooling, like the Command and General Staff College or one of the five national war colleges, it is not routine. It should be mandatory for all. “Political leaders who do justice to the view of strategy as integration must understand a fair amount about military operations in order to judge what demands can reasonably be made. Hardly any politicians have such knowledge or the time and willingness to acquire it (Betts, 2001-2, 24).” Therefore, an educational system, i.e. a National Security University, must be created and implemented to develop junior and mid-level FSOs to understand the capabilities and limitations of the military and its contributions to national security strategy (Whitaker, 2007, interview). If the State

Department is going to lead, its members must recognize the tools available and how to integrate these tools most effectively.

Recommendations

I never found a way to effectively join forces with the State Department to link their plans with mine. I had no way to get answers to questions like, What's the diplomatic component of our strategy? What's the economic component? How is aid going to be distributed?

*General(Ret) Anthony Zinni
Former CENTCOM Commander*

The DOS and the DOD are each organized to conduct their business abroad. However, only the DOD is organized and resourced properly to carry out effectively its assigned missions. There is no question the military plays an essential role in shaping the global environment. Daily, the combatant commanders are engaged throughout his Area of Responsibility (AOR) shaping the US's security environment (Reveron, 2007, 3). Country ambassadors are empowered and responsible for all actions within his / her assigned country. Yet, at the regional level, a diplomatic equivalent to the combatant commander does not exist. If the United States intends to remain engaged using a regionally-focused approach, several changes are needed to make this occur and make it effective.

1. Develop a national narrative which speaks to our national heritage and ideals. A positive, proactive unifying message is needed (Hopkins, 2007, interview). There are two audiences for this narrative: the domestic one and the international one. Currently, the message which resonates with both audiences is the "Global War on Terror." However, GWOT is a means, not an end in itself. The actions of the United States over

the last 7 years have tarnished its image. A first step for the next administration is to craft a message which clearly states our objectives in an affirmative manner.

2. Establish regional ambassadors. Regional organizations already are open to US representation, e.g. the African Union (AU); the European Union (EU); and the Organization of American States (OAS). In every case, the US Mission lacks the authority to coordinate and execute the regional strategy within these respective organizations. One possible solution is to create and provide resources for a regional, or “super” ambassador, who is on par with the combatant commander with authority to synchronize, coordinate, and implement the regional engagement strategies. In many cases the US Missions, which are already established, could initially assume the role as the regional ambassador. This “super” ambassador could leverage the existing regional organizations to solve issues more effectively than by going to a global organization like the United Nations (Jentleson, 2007, 188).

Effective engagement relies more on the means employed toward an end and focuses on rewards more than on punishment. Additionally, successful engagement is most likely when all elements of established power are used, i.e. carrots and sticks approach (Borer, 2003, 22). Therefore, the “super” ambassador must be empowered to coordinate and implement all elements of national power, to include the military.¹²

The DOD recently activated Africa Command (AFRICOM) with its primary charge to cultivate security, not fight a war. Unique to this command's structure is a senior FSO as Deputy to the Commander (AFRICOM website, 2007), in addition to the traditional political advisor assigned to each of the combatant commands.¹³ The civilian deputy is responsible to the AFRICOM commander to coordinate all non-kinetic

activities within the commander's AOR (Braum, 2008, email). While an FSO in this position is a positive step toward putting diplomacy on an equal footing, the general is still in charge. To signal a truly significant change in how the United States conducts foreign policy, a civilian must become the "go-to" person. At the regional level, this team of civilian- and military-led organizations could advance the agenda of the United States more effectively.

Unlike the DOS's bureaus, which are located in Washington, D.C., the "super" ambassador and his / her staff must be stationed forward in the region. This puts the regional team in the same time zone as the target audience; therefore, the team is working on customer rather than D.C. time (Clark, W, 2001, 400). It can "live" the new national narrative as part of the local community. It also permits easier movement throughout the region. The regional team would support the bureaus by refining and implementing directives from Washington and providing feedback on policy effectiveness.

To be effective, the regional designs of the DOS and the DOD would need to change. As described earlier, each department has divided the world differently. In order for the regional ambassador and the combatant commander to operate effectively, the two departments must agree on a common regional design so that each is working toward a common objective using a common map. Rather than using either department's current structure, one option is to use existing relationships with a regional organization, like the AU, to determine the AOR.

The "super" ambassador selection is paramount. Country ambassadors are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate; so should the regional

ambassador be. However, the regional ambassador's qualifications and experience must supersede political considerations. Former state governors, foreign policy elites, country ambassadors, or retired four-star generals are all possibilities. Key is the proven ability of this individual to lead a large organization effectively. The "super" ambassador would ensure the coordinated employment of all "soft" and "hard" power within a region.

3. Liaison Teams must be established at DOS from the Combatant Commands (COCOMs). Currently, members of the Office of Secretary of Defense and of the Joint Staff are present at the State Department. However, there are no liaison officers at the regional bureaus (Hopkins, 2007, interview). Given each department's regional focus, the sharing of information between regional bureaus and commands only makes sense. One of the tenets of DOD transformation is the flattening of organizations through rapid sharing of information (DOD website, 2007). Yet, when it comes to sharing information and coordinating actions between departments, the flow is still too vertical. Liaison teams are a small cost in manpower for the immense gain obtained in effectiveness.

4. The President and Congress must resource "soft" power. In recent years, "funding for non-military foreign affairs programs has increased..., but it remains disproportionately small relative to what we spend on the military and to the importance of such capabilities." The US spends \$36 billion on State Department foreign affairs activities, which is "less than what the Pentagon spends on health care alone (Gates, 2007, speech)."

Another area of concern is manpower. The DOS is currently hiring more personnel but will have roughly 6600 career diplomats, or "less than one aircraft carrier

battle group (Barnes, 2007, A1).” Obviously, the use of these new resources to build the State Department’s required capability will take time.

5. Move and enlarge regional-focused educational institutions currently run by DOD under the DOS’s regional ambassadors. The DOD operates several schools designed to train foreign defense civilians and military officers in security issues and civil-military relations; two of these are the George C. Marshall European Center for Strategic Studies and the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation.¹⁴ These institutions serve a great purpose in advancing the US security interests in the attending officer’s home country through a better understanding of regional challenges. Yet, these schools could serve a greater purpose by expanding its student base, including US civil service, and its curriculum to cover a broader foreign policy agenda.

Recommended Regional Team Framework

The regional team structure is similar in design to a country team’s organization. It would be positioned with an already existing regional organization, e.g. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia for the AU; Brussels for the EU. Similar in concept to the Civilian Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program developed in Vietnam (Historynet.com, 2007), the regional ambassador would pull together all the various US military, civilian, and intelligence agencies involved in the region and report to the Secretary of State. Significant to this team is the inclusion of country ambassadors and the combatant commander as integral members. The relationship between the regional ambassador and the combatant commander is not intended to supplant the Secretary of Defense in his / her wartime role but to bring synergy to the interagency process. If the President decides to use force, the combatant commander would take orders from the

SECDEF in accordance with the Goldwater-Nichols Act. The proposed relationship between the regional ambassador and the combatant commander is for steady-state operations to facilitate a cohesive approach to regional engagement.

Conclusion

Arguably the most important military component in the War on Terror is not the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we enable and empower our partners to defend and govern themselves.

Secretary Robert Gates

The champion football coach Vince Lombardi once commented, "I never lost a game, I just ran out of time". The US must implement its foreign policy in a cohesive, coordinated, synchronized manner as the US does not control time. The next president will have a fleeting window of opportunity to change how the United States engages the world. It must develop a national message which translates to the world that it is no longer business as usual. It must develop a grand strategy which acknowledges the relative power of the United States while at the same time, recognizing the importance of other nations in global stability (Jentleson, 2007, 186). This can best be accomplished by a new regional ambassador and by engaging forward.

Bringing the capabilities of the United States to bear using all tools available can only be accomplished by a better understanding of regional issues which would achieve the nation's basic foreign policy objectives. The objectives can most effectively be achieved by focusing on a region with a dedicated, synchronized, educated, and trained organization - an organization focused on diplomacy, development, and defense.

As previously stated the US military has gradually reduced its forward presence footprint but increased its forward involvement. However, the DOS needs to increase

its forward-engagement capability. The next administration must return primacy to diplomacy as it begins to formulate its foreign policy. The increased use of DOD assets, beginning in the Clinton Administration, has diverted the focus of diplomacy from the Department of State. For sure, there are essential, mutually-supporting roles for both departments in the achievement of the nation's strategic objectives. However, the nations of the world are looking for a new, distinct approach to global leadership. This can only occur if the State Department is funded properly and allowed to lead.

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Endnotes:

¹ The Combatant Commands are: Africa Command (AFRICOM); Central Command (CENTCOM); European Command (EUCOM); Northern Command (NORTHCOM); Pacific Command (PACCOM); and Southern Command (SOUTHCOM).

² As stated in the 2006 National Security Strategy, the US goals are: champion aspirations for human dignity; strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends; work with others to defuse regional conflicts; prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends with weapons of mass destruction (WMD); ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade; expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy; develop agendas for cooperative action with other main centers of global power; transform America's national security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the 21st century; and, engage the opportunities and confront the challenges of globalization.

³ Term developed by Dr. Joel Sokolsky, Dean of Arts, RMC.

⁴ As of April 2007, multinational polling conducted by World Public Opinion.Org concludes publics around the world do not support the US being the sole world leader and desires the US to change how it conducts its foreign policy while continuing to cooperate multilaterally in global issues.

⁵ Term credited to Robert Kaplan's *Imperial Grunts: The American Military on the Ground*.

⁶ Walter S. Clarke is a former Senior Foreign Service Officer in the U.S. Department of State, with over 25 years of experience in African affairs during his 36year diplomatic career. Mr. Clarke was State Department Advisor to the President and Professor of International Relations at the U.S. Naval War College, in Newport, Rhode Island, 1987-89. He served as Chargé d'Affaires, a.i., at the American Embassy in Djibouti from 1977-1980. Mr. Clarke also has extensive experience in West and Central Africa and Latin America, having served at diplomatic posts at Abidjan, Bogota, Bujumbura, Douala, Lagos, Madrid and San José.

⁷ Another term used by the US military rather than GWOT is "The Long War."

⁸ The Under Secretary for Political Affairs is the Department's third-ranking official and its senior career diplomat. He serves as the day-to-day manager of overall regional and bilateral policy issues, and oversees the bureaus for Africa, East Asia and the Pacific, Europe and Eurasia, the Near East, South and Central Asia, the Western Hemisphere, International Organizations and International Narcotics and Law Enforcement.

⁹ Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs; Bureau of African Affairs; Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs; Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs; Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs; Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs; Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs; Bureau of International Organization Affairs.

¹⁰ Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines. Coast Guard falls under Department of Homeland Security.

¹¹ SES civilians are equivalent to general officers in the US Military.

¹² The intent is not for the regional ambassador to command the military in a combat role. This clearly falls under the responsibility of the Secretary of Defense.

¹³ The civilian deputy in AFRICOM is responsible for all non-kinetic activities within the command. The Political Advisor, now called the Foreign Policy Advisor, keeps the commander apprised of foreign policy issues related to the commander's area of responsibility.

¹⁴ The George C. Marshall European Center for Strategic Studies is located in Garmisch, Germany; The Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation is located at Fort Benning, Georgia.