The United States Government Interagency Process and the Failure of Institution Building in Iraq

Abstract

The United States Government (USG) has been at war in Iraq for over five years. In that time, while there have been many tactical successes, the USG has been unable to fully succeed strategically because of an inability to help the Government of Iraq (GoI) become a fully functioning and sovereign government that is able to provide for the needs of its people. This study uses the war in Iraq as an illustrative case study to examine the weaknesses in USG capability to help build partner capacity and to conduct reconstruction and stabilization. The research leveraged numerous books, articles, reports, and very extensive interviews with senior leaders involved in both the war in Iraq and the broader USG mission of capacity building. The project makes a series of recommendations to support the development of a USG doctrine for stability operations, and provides a series of options for structure and command and control for further study and research.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Jun 12, 2008
Accession Number
ADA493728

Entities

People

  • Guy T. Cosentino

Organizations

  • United States Institute of Peace

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Biomedical
  • Cyber
  • Energy and Power Technologies
  • Human Systems

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Department Of State
  • Employment
  • Failed States
  • Governments
  • Interagency Coordination
  • International Organizations
  • Military History
  • Military Science
  • National Governments
  • National Politics
  • National Security
  • Organizational Structure
  • Personnel Management
  • Political Systems
  • Public Policy
  • United States Government
  • War Colleges

Readers

  • Military and Counterinsurgency Studies.
  • Systems Analysis and Design

Technology Areas

  • Fully Networked C3
  • Fully Networked C3 - Command and Control