Integrating Monetary and Non-monetary Reenlistment Incentives Utilizing the Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism (CRAM)

Abstract

This research addressed the potential retention and cost impacts of providing an optimal individualized portfolio of non-monetary and monetary incentives to influence reenlistment and retention behavior in enlisted Sailors by exploring three mechanisms for administrating enlisted retention: a purely monetary auction, a Universal Incentive Package (UIP) auction, and the Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism (CRAM). The mechanisms were simulated, their outcomes compared and their respective strengths and weaknesses were explored. CRAM clearly outperformed the monetary and UIP auctions. Cost savings to the Navy ranged from 25 to 80% over monetary incentives alone. Additionally, this research addressed the force-diversifying potential of CRAM. It was shown, for the sample used, that offering certain non-monetary incentives changed the demographic mix of Sailors retained. By allowing Sailors to choose only those benefits which suit them, the Navy can eliminate the waste associated with unwanted benefits while at the same time empowering its members.

Open PDF

Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Dec 01, 2008
Accession Number
ADA493817

Entities

People

  • Brooke Zimmerman

Organizations

  • Naval Postgraduate School

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Biomedical
  • Ground and Sea Platforms
  • Human Systems

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Administrative Personnel
  • Business Administration
  • Computers
  • Employment
  • Enlisted Personnel
  • Management Personnel
  • Military Personnel
  • Millenials
  • Motivation
  • Naval Operations
  • Naval Personnel
  • Organizational Structure
  • Personnel Management
  • Public Policy
  • Recruiting
  • Students
  • United States

Readers

  • Naval Personnel Management
  • Systems Analysis and Design