

MILITARY ALLIANCES AND COALITIONS: GOING TO WAR WITHOUT FRANCE

BY

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ABSTRACT

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This paper examines American involvement in military alliances and coalitions. The research focuses on how history, foreign policy decisions, defense spending, and key allies have created and shaped the American military instrument of national power and multinational relationships.

In 1939, the United States was not bound to any military treaty, nor did it have any troops stationed in a foreign country. Today, the United States is the world's only super power, with a worldwide military presence. The US Army alone has 255,000 soldiers deployed in nearly 80 countries overseas.¹ It is a member of several military alliances, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which are largely the legacy of post-World War II treaty agreements for regionally based collective security and Soviet Communist containment.

Post-Cold War, geopolitical changes have spawned a different breed of multinational military force—the *ad hoc* coalition. The 1991 Gulf War ushered in the modern military coalition. Now, post-9/11, US troops lead Multi-National Force-Iraq, a “coalition of the willing.”

With further geopolitical changes, increasing globalism, and the rise of nonstate actors and terrorism, The United States continues to look to multiparty, multinational forces, but in a different, unipolar context. This reframing to build military consensus beyond traditional alliance-based organizations to achieve foreign policy objectives is also necessitated in part by our partners' decreased military spending and willingness to fight.

This paper summarizes the effects of US history, foreign policy, defense spending trends, and multilateral relationships and make recommendations on how best to proceed with multinational alliances and coalitions in a post-9/11 world.

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MILITARY ALLIANCES AND COALITIONS: GOING TO WAR WITHOUT FRANCE

Introduction

In 1939...America had no entangling alliances....The dominant political mood was isolationism....A half century later....The United States had military alliances with fifty nations....²

–Stephen Ambrose and Douglas Brinkley, *Rise to Globalism*

How did the United States become a signatory power in so many treaties, and when did it decide that these formal multinational alliances were important to its national interests?

The United States' transformation from a colony to a super power and its rise to globalism provide the short answers to the questions. Fueled by abundant natural resources, democracy, capitalism, economic growth, and military might, the United States became a tipping power after World War I, a super power after World War II, and a hyperpower after the Cold War.

However, US interaction with these alliances has changed over time, largely influenced by world events, foreign policy, defense spending, and relationships with its multinational partners.

Alliances and Coalitions

The United States has a half-century long relationship with formal multiparty military alliances such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). US Department of Defense (DoD) Joint Publication 3-16, Multinational Operations, defines an alliance as:

A relationship that results of a formal agreement (e.g., treaty) between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives that further the common interests of the members.³

These traditional alliances have provided economic, political, and military utility for more than 50 years, but their limitations and liabilities have also been demonstrated.

In addition, the European drive towards unification has competed with and complicated military decision-making with the trans-Atlantic NATO alliance.⁴

As the world has globalized and moved away from the context in which these alliances were formed post-World War II, to a post-Cold War and now post-9/11 world, these alliances have grappled with the dynamics imposed by global threats, new regional problems, and new state and nonstate actors. As a result, the emergent trend since the 1990s has been the reliance on ad hoc coalitions to achieve foreign policy objectives.

DoD Joint Publication 3-16, Multinational Operations, defines a coalition as:

An ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action and coalition action as a multinational action outside the bounds of established alliances, usually for single occasions or longer cooperation in a narrow sector of common interest.⁵

The modern coalition emerged during the first Gulf War in 1991. Post-World War II alliances, such as the NATO alliance, failed to address the modern challenges of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. While many countries were willing to contribute military forces to drive Saddam Hussein's army from Kuwait, the formal alliance language simply did not exist.

The 9/11 attacks highlighted the limitations of static traditional alliances, which were designed for collective regional defense against non-traditional, out-of-area threats. The 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq reframed the coalition's basis of action from that employed in Operation Desert Storm. These willing coalition partners went forward without a UN Security Council official resolution. Consequently, this coalition of the willing formed to fill a policy gap inherent in existing traditional multiparty alliances to conduct forced intervention.⁶

Once the bedrock of US defense against the Soviet Union in the Cold War, the NATO alliance has been accused of losing its relevance and strength. Despite this criticism, the NATO alliance continues to play a key role providing trained and capable military forces to ad hoc coalitions.⁷

The United States' foundational support of and participation in long-standing multinational alliances has served it well over the last half-century. Though largely successful, these alliances have not been without political and financial challenges. Coalitions have proven useful in bridging the gap necessary to build political consensus

for military action when UN Security Council sanctions or formal alliance language does not exist. They have been credited with quickly building purposeful and capable military forces beyond traditional structured alliance force providers. Coalitions have also served as a forcing function to alliances to deploy out of area.

Despite economic and military dominance, the United States does not remain unchallenged. The United States still finds itself vulnerable, threatened, and agitated. Foreign policy formulation over time has relied heavily on the formation of multinational alliances and coalitions for both economic and military ends. The United States has shown both reticence and reliance toward these treaty commitments, but they have produced some key strategic and enduring relationships. Throughout, the US military has demonstrated that it could perform capably in both multilateral alliance and coalition environments—and unilaterally.

How the United States moves forward into the 21st Century post-Iraq regime change and how it chooses to resolve conflict is still yet to be determined. The United States is somewhat conflicted when it comes to war—should it fight multilaterally or unilaterally, and should it rely on alliances or coalitions of the willing? Since the United States is one of the very few countries in the world that can do both, it has a choice. This paper shows how history, foreign policy, defense spending trends, and multinational relationships have and will continue to influence American decisions on the use of the military instrument of power and how they directly affect the outcome.

American Foreign Policy Benchmarks

Foreign politics demands scarcely any of those qualities which a democracy possesses; and they require, on the contrary, the perfect use of almost all those faculties in which it is deficient.⁸

—Alexis de Tocqueville, 1835

Detachment and Nonintervention

Entangling Alliances

In his 1796 farewell speech, President George Washington said, “The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is in extending our commercial relations but to have with them as little political connections as possible. It is our true policy to steer

clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world.”⁹ His intent was for the United States to adopt a noninterventionist and detached policy (also known as *isolationist*¹⁰) internationally, in particular to avoid war in Europe, principally with Britain and France. Considered the first US foreign policy benchmark, Washington’s noninterventionist statements were shared by the vast majority of the founding fathers.

In his 1801 inaugural speech, Thomas Jefferson echoed and reinforced Washington’s policy saying, “peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none.”¹¹ This Jeffersonian¹² American foreign policy view emphasized safeguarding domestic democracy and was deeply skeptical of foreign alliances, for fear that entanglements would increase the risk that the United States would have to fight an unwanted war. Author Walter Russell Mead said that this Jeffersonian view believed the United States’ “liberty at home” would be jeopardized and lost, “if we get too involved overseas.”¹³

As late as 1821, Secretary of State John Quincy Adams reiterated the detached and noninterventionist policy in a speech to the House of Representatives on Independence Day. He said, “[The United States] goes not abroad, in search of monsters to destroy...by enlisting under other banners than her own, were they even the banners of foreign independence, she would involve herself beyond the power of extrication.”¹⁴ Geography and self-sufficiency of resources allowed the United States to remain detached and somewhat isolated, largely consumed with gradual territorial and economic expansion – the idea of *manifest destiny*.¹⁵

The Monroe Doctrine

In 1823, President James Monroe nuanced the detached policy by declaring the United States would stay out of European affairs, so long as Europe stayed out of the western hemisphere.¹⁶ He said:

In the wars of the European powers in matters relating to themselves we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy to do so. It is only when our rights are invaded or seriously menaced that we resent injuries or make preparation for our defense.¹⁷

The Monroe Doctrine reinforced US noninterventionist policy in Europe as the United States was expanding across the North American continent. President Monroe

reiterated the neutralist tone as he concluded, “It is still the true policy of the United States to leave the parties to themselves, in hope that other powers will pursue the same.”¹⁸

World War I—Toward Internationalism

American foreign policy would remain largely detached and neutral for more than a century.¹⁹ But despite steadfast proclamations and practice,²⁰ American noninterventionist and detachment policy would eventually prove insufficient to keep the country out of world war. The United States became the “reluctant internationalist”²¹ beginning with World War I.²²

In his second inaugural speech (March 1917), President Woodrow Wilson foreshadowed change to his popular US neutralist policy. He said, “We are provincials no longer. The tragic events of the thirty months of vital turmoil through which we have just passed have made us citizens of the world. There can be no turning back.”²³ Germany’s decision to launch submarine warfare brought the United States into the war just a month later (April 1917).²⁴ President Wilson’s reversal became formal in his 1917 War Address to Congress stating, “The world must be made safe for democracy.”²⁵ Specifically regarding the infeasibility of further neutrality he confessed:

When I addressed the Congress on the 26th of February last I thought that it would suffice to assert our neutral rights with arms, our right to use the seas against unlawful interference, our right to keep our people safe against unlawful violence. But armed neutrality, it now appears, is impracticable.... Neutrality is no longer desirable where the peace of the world is involved and the freedom of its peoples.... We have seen the last of neutrality in such circumstances.²⁶

Regarding multilateral relationships, President Wilson said, “A steadfast concert for peace can never be maintained except by a partnership of democratic nations.”²⁷ World War I established the United States as a respected world power giving the Allies decisive victory in Europe and a somewhat disproportionate voice in shaping the peace afterwards.

At the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, Wilson announced his Fourteen Points plan, intending to guide foreign policy in the aftermath of the war.²⁸ The fourteenth point was a “general association” of nations to “protect political independence and territorial integrity.”²⁹ This “general association” was later named the League of Nations.

But noninterventionist sentiment remained.³⁰ Despite Wilson's personal initiative, investment, and commitment, the US Senate neither ratified the charter nor allowed the United States to join the League of Nations.³¹ Preservation of American sovereignty became paramount. Its champion was Republican Senator Henry Cabot Lodge Sr.

American Sovereignty

As chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee³² in 1919, Lodge successfully led the fight against American participation in the League of Nations. He specifically objected to Article 10 of the charter,³³ which required all signatory nations to deploy troops to repel external aggression of any kind against any League member.³⁴ In a dramatic speech, Senator Lodge stated that he loved only the American flag, and could not devote himself to “a mongrel banner created for a League”³⁵ that would threaten the sovereignty of the United States by binding it to worldwide peacekeeping organization with all of its attending international commitments—commitments that the United States would not or could not keep.

The United States had become the tipping power of the war and its absence as a League member significantly weakened the League's potential power.

Interwar and World War II—Toward Alliances

The United States had entered the World War I despite strong non-interventionist national sentiment. After the war, it largely returned to isolationism and protectionist economic policies.^{36,37} But the world had become more interconnected, especially with the growing trans-Atlantic tie. War in Europe again raged in the late 1930s and although the United States tried to avoid direct participation through lend-lease policies, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 would change all of that. The United States entered World War II as a reluctant entrant again on the side of the Allies, principally the United Kingdom and France, and against the Axis powers of Germany, Italy, and Japan. American foreign policy had sought to “safeguard democratic values in the United States and other like minded states” and oppose fascism and communism because it served to

threaten not only the United States, but the democratic environment the United States sought to build and prosper.³⁸

The United States had again earned its reputation as a great, defensive power. But this time, the United States would not “retrench and turn inwards,”³⁹ either physically or in policy. Unlike after World War I, when the United States declined to impose its will on other nations and offer bold leadership,^{40,41} it would now opt to do both. In his fourth Inaugural Address, President Franklin D. Roosevelt said:

Today, in this year of war, 1945, we have learned lessons—at a fearful cost—and we shall profit by them. We have learned that we cannot live alone, at peace, that our own well-being is dependent on the well-being of other nations. We have learned that we must live as men, and not as ostriches, nor as dogs in the manger. We have learned to be citizens of the world, members of the human community.⁴²

Global Entanglement and Interventionism—The End of “Exceptionalism”

Internationalism and Multilateralism

After World War II, the United States’ participation in the creation of the United Nations signaled a major shift in US foreign policy from detachment and neutrality to internationalism and collective security. The United Nations represented perhaps the first permanent link to American entanglement with a multipolar, multilateral world.

The United Nations was founded in 1945 with 51 original members.^{43, 44} The Allies intended for the United States to take a large stake in the world and the United Nations to prevent a repeat of the failure of the League of Nations. President Roosevelt’s aim was to convince the American public to accept a more active role in world politics, prevent a return to detachment, and reject any post-war world that resembled the failed prewar predecessor.⁴⁵ In this role, the United Nations assumed many of the League’s procedures and peacekeeping functions; however, it lacked the multilateral power to commit nations to war found in Article 10 of the League of Nations Charter.

The UN Security Council permanent membership of countries reflected the victorious postwar powers: China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. UN members were viewed as sovereign countries, and thus the United Nations did not become a world government, and to this day has no power to make laws.⁴⁶ It did,

however, seek to provide the means to help resolve international conflict and formulate policies on matters affecting every country. How the United Nations accomplishes its charter is largely left to the five permanent members of the Security Council.

Since 1945, UN membership has grown significantly to 192 member countries (2006), with representation from approximately 90 percent of the world's countries.⁴⁷ Many arguments have been made as to the efficacy of the United Nations and specifically the permanent members of the Security Council: The Security Council is unable to act clearly and decisively when confronted by crisis; the five original permanent UN Security Council members represent the end of WW II and do not represent the state of the world since; there are few consequences for member countries that violate Security Council resolutions.

Pactomania⁴⁸

Despite an aversion to “entangling alliances,” the United States continued to engage in a series of formal security alliances.⁴⁹ This change was cemented in 1949 when the US agreed to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization for the specific, collective defense of Europe. Here, an attack against any member was viewed as an attack against all.⁵⁰ The NATO alliance played the prominent role in the American foreign policy grand strategy of containment during the Cold War.

The aftermath of World War II sealed the fate of future American detachment and non-interventionism, essentially ended American *exceptionalism*—a belief that the United States as a nation was “qualitatively different than others” based on “widely shared beliefs about individual liberties, limited government, and vigorous civil society.”⁵¹ In an ever-growing effort to define the lines of Soviet containment outside of Europe, the United States sought to clarify matters by creating a network of bilateral and multilateral alliances that would more explicitly define the physical containment belt. The NATO alliance would represent the largest, most durable, and most significant investment of the United States’ new multilateral alliance formation.

After NATO was formed, other multiparty alliances followed in rapid succession, including the 1947 RIO Treaty (Organization of American States); the 1951 Australia, New Zealand, and the United States (ANZUS) Treaty; the 1954 Southeast Asia Treaty

Organization (SEATO); and the 1959 Central Treaty Organization (CENTO).⁵² By 1959, the United States was committed to five major multilateral treaties, in five different geographic regions, and with 41 different countries.⁵³ Further, the United States had committed to four separate bilateral security guarantees in Southeast Asia with Japan, the Philippines, Taiwan, and South Korea. In an effort to define the boundaries of containment, the United States grew the number of multilateral and bilateral agreements, not only increasing the structure, but also the commitment to an evolving static and bipolar order.⁵⁴ The United States had become the undisputed leader of the free world. It had been characterized not as an imperialist that sought to reap a country's natural resources, markets, or labor, but rather as a hegemonic state that sought the use of countries for *security imperialism*—a network of perches for military action against the Soviet Union.⁵⁵

The United States' "Unipolar Moment" and Unilateralism

Following the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States emerged as the single dominant world power. This *unipolar moment*⁵⁶ is described as "American preeminence...based on the fact that it is the only country with the military, diplomatic and economic assets to be a decisive player in any conflict in whatever part of the world it chooses to involve itself."^{57,58} US foreign policy had migrated from collective security to unilateralism.

While the United States was riding high with unsurpassed economic, military, and cultural power in the new unipolar world in the 1990s, much of the world saw the United States as "arrogantly concerned with narrow American interests at the expense of the rest of the world."⁵⁹ The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks served to reinforce this notion by accelerating the way the United States exercised its military power—more unilaterally and with less internationalism. Some countries viewed the United States, "as focusing on the hard power of our military might rather than our soft power as we turned our backs on many international treaties, norms, and negotiating forums."⁶⁰ The United States would later be labeled unilateralist for the mostly-American strike against the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2001 and the 2003 regime change in Iraq.

The United States' "go it alone" approach described an American independence from traditional alliances and multiparty engagement. The United States became frustrated with the inherent war-making limitations of formal alliances and impatient with the economic and diplomatic instruments of power via UN internationalism. Consequently, the United States pursued a sovereign foreign policy focused on self-reliance and bilateral arrangements with like-minded allies to form coalitions.⁶¹

The allied military limitation's gap was again highlighted after 9/11. Despite immediate NATO Article 5 invocation—"that an armed attack against one or several members shall be considered an attack against all"⁶²—the United States relied mainly on its own forces in Afghanistan. The United States assessed the Allies simply lacked the military capabilities to conduct a swift high-tech campaign with minimum civilian and military casualties.⁶³ Article 5 stipulates unilateral US military action appeared to be the most expeditious method for policy implementation, and in the end, the United States' preferred method to solve the new and unique challenges associated with terrorism, weapons of mass destruction proliferation, and Middle East democratization.

The 2002 National Security Strategy reinforces the flexibility theme vs. the burdensome stakeholder building and maintenance process in formal alliances. It states, "America will implement its strategies by organizing coalitions—as broad as practicable—of states able and willing to promote a balance of power that favors freedom."^{64, 65} The Strategy also reiterates the United States' leadership position with regard to multilateralism, while emphasizing a strong sentiment for the United States to act unilaterally, unbound from circumstances that would impede its interests. It says:

In exercising our leadership, we will respect the values, judgment, and interests of our friends and partners. Still, we will be prepared to act apart when our interests and unique responsibilities require. When we disagree on particulars, we will explain forthrightly the grounds for our concerns and strive to forge viable alternatives. We will not allow such disagreements to obscure our determination to secure together, with our allies and our friends, our shared fundamental interests and values.⁶⁶

Pre-emption

In addition to unilateralism, President George W. Bush's 2002 National Security Strategy emphasized another significant theme—pre-emption. Joint Publication (JP) 1-

02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, defines a pre-emptive attack as, “an attack initiated on the basis of incontrovertible evidence that an enemy attack is imminent.”⁶⁷ Pre-emption is qualitatively different than prevention. JP1-02 defines preventive war as, “a war initiated in the belief that military conflict, while not imminent, is inevitable, and that to delay would involve greater risk.”⁶⁸

Though pre-emption is not new, its explicit mention marked a dramatic change from the reactionary foreign policy the United States practiced as a great defensive power in the previous century. The main reason for the change was the assertion that deterrence was no longer a viable strategy in the post-9/11 world given the new threat actors, possible methods of attack, and scale of damage that they could produce on the United States.⁶⁹ Containment, nuclear retaliation, and “mutual assured destruction” were of a bygone, bipolar era against a rational and risk-averse Soviet adversary. Islamic extremists and the *Axis of Evil*—Iraq, Iran, and North Korea—presented far different challenges.⁷⁰

President Bush’s administration also emphasized that international law had long recognized pre-emption—that a nation need not suffer an attack before it could lawfully take action to defend itself against forces that present an “imminent danger of attack.” The 2002 National Security Strategy stated, “Legal scholars and international jurists often conditioned the legitimacy of pre-emption on the existence of an imminent threat—most often a visible mobilization of armies, navies, and air forces preparing to attack.”⁷¹ The 2002 National Security Strategy made the case for pre-emption:

The United States has long maintained the option of pre-emptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction—and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act pre-emptively.⁷²

Defense Spending^{73,74,75,76}

Americans spend more on NATO than all the European allies put together. Without America, NATO does not exist.⁷⁷

—Former Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi, 1997

While the policies and politics of partnerships matter, so does the purse. As most NATO-member countries reduced their defense spending post-Cold War, so, too, was their ability to commit forces reduced.

These reductions mean that these NATO countries—thought to be among the world’s most robust militaries—are less capable of deploying, maintaining, and supporting meaningful and significant forces for prolonged periods.⁷⁸ Some are restricted by non-financial constraints, principally policy or political will. Some with the will lack war fighting capability, but can offer symbolic participation and political support. The result is “coalitions du jour,” with diverse capabilities, contributions, and staying power. Consequently, the partners are not viewed equally based on their relative political and military contributions.

The NATO Example

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization stands as the largest and best example of a modern-era alliance and multilateral organization that has endured with a successful track record—that of one actually working.⁷⁹ During the Cold War, the NATO alliance played a dual role of Soviet military deterrence and Western political unity. The alliance has also demonstrated a capacity to adjust and expand membership, post-Cold War and post-9/11. It currently consists of 26 independent member countries.⁸⁰ It has attracted some Central European countries, recently freed from Soviet occupation, on the condition that they meet democratic standards^{81,82} Figure 1 shows the entry year of the European member nations.

Despite expansion, many observers felt that more had to be done to keep the NATO alliance viable—it had to go “out of area or out of business.”⁸³ The NATO alliance has demonstrated willingness to participate in combat as evidenced in the Yugoslav/Balkan wars and as part of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) - Afghanistan after the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States. On September 12, 2001, the NATO alliance invoked Article 5 for the first time in its history.⁸⁴ NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson announced that the alliance would take actions deemed necessary, including the use of force. However, he qualified the statement, adding that NATO members would respond “commensurate with their judgment and resources.”⁸⁵

The sentiment of most countries was not to increase their defense spending to fight a “global war on terror,” despite their condolences to the United States for the tragedy of September 11, 2001. Several key European countries believed that terrorism was a criminal act best dealt with by police, security, and intelligence forces, rather than action that warranted an offensive response by military forces. These countries further opined that the problems in the Islamic world were best handled with “nuanced diplomacy” and support from moderate states, not war.⁸⁶




Figure 1. NATO expansion.⁸⁷

Nevertheless, the NATO alliance ultimately took responsibility for leading ISAF-Afghanistan in August 2003.^{88,89} ISAF-Afghanistan is NATO's first and largest ground

operation outside the Euro-Atlantic area. It operates under UN mandate, which it states it will continue to do according to current and future UN Security Council resolutions.^{90,91}

ISAF's mission was initially limited to Kabul but was expanded to support the Government of Afghanistan beyond Kabul when the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1510 on 13 October 2003.^{92,93} Figure 2 shows the ISAF-Afghanistan geographic stationing as of December 2007.




Figure 2. ISAF-Afghanistan disposition.⁹⁴

Ongoing NATO deployments and enlargement do not guarantee perpetuity for this or any alliance, as skeptics note that “no alliance in history has ever survived

victory.”⁹⁵ However, others assert, “NATO survived by transforming itself”⁹⁶ and is therefore not the “same” alliance. Nevertheless, NATO enlargement does not necessarily equate to more capability or equitable burden sharing, “for it ignores the severe financial constraints and adverse political factors affecting both new and current European members of NATO.”^{97, 98}

One of the newer NATO members, the Czech Republic (1999), has emphasized the long-standing NATO burden-sharing issue. Dinah Spritzer wrote in the Prague Post “People talk about new members like the Czech Republic not contributing enough to NATO, but what they do not realize is that the Western Europeans have failed to keep their promises since the 1950’s.”⁹⁹ The assertion is supported by NATO defense spending records, which show the Czech Republic has achieved an average defense expenditure as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of 2 percent during 2000-2004. Of the alliance members, only France, Greece, Italy, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States equaled or exceeded the Czech Republic’s defense spending as a percentage of GDP.¹⁰⁰

Despite spending levels, NATO’s enlargement and reinvention is seen as a sign that the alliance is vital and will continue not only to survive, but also to demonstrate purposeful growth and adaptation.¹⁰¹

Defense Expenditures¹⁰²

The United States spends more than anybody else in the world on defense, nearly half of the global defense budget.¹⁰³ It also spends more on defense than all the NATO European allies combined. Within the NATO alliance, the United States spends the most in terms of percentage of GDP and consequently spends the largest amount in annual expenditures—the US GDP is the world’s largest.¹⁰⁴ Figure 3 shows a comparison of the defense expenditures as a percentage of GDP over time between the United States and the rest of the NATO alliance. Figure 4 shows a comparison of the total defense expenditures over time between the United States and the rest of the NATO alliance.




Figure 3. NATO defense expenditures as a percentage of GDP.¹⁰⁵

The spending disparity has been a source of tension since the Cold War. In 2002, NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson said, “Mighty Europe remains a military pygmy.”¹⁰⁶ Today, the gap is perhaps the most alarming statistic with regard to the NATO alliance. The peace dividend that NATO countries enjoyed after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 resulted in European defense spending dipping below 3 percent of GDP. Recently, the spending gap has grown, along with the related technology gap. In 2006, only eight NATO countries spend at or above 2 percent of GDP on defense. Currently, European NATO members combined spend about one half of what the United States spends on defense, while accounting for only about an estimated 15 percent of NATO’s overall capability.¹⁰⁷




Figure 4. Total NATO defense expenditures.¹⁰⁸

According to NATO defense budget figures for 2006, the United States allocated about \$527 billion (4 percent of GDP) for the Department of Defense—a 5-percent increase from fiscal year 2005.¹⁰⁹ This sum dwarfed the respective defense expenditures of fellow NATO members in 2006: the United Kingdom spent \$60 billion (2.5 percent of GDP); France \$55 billion (2.4 percent of GDP); Germany \$38 billion (1.3 percent of GDP); Italy \$33 billion (1.8 percent of GDP); Canada \$15 billion (1.2 percent of GDP) and Spain \$14 billion (1.2 percent of GDP). Figure 5 shows the 2006 NATO defense expenditure by country. Consequently in 2006, the United States provided 66 percent of the overall total NATO defense expenditure and represented the majority of NATO’s military capabilities. As the NATO alliance considers the possibility of further enlargement or additional “out-of-area” deployments such as ISAF-Afghanistan, it must address defense spending inequities between member nations.¹¹⁰




Figure 5. 2006 NATO country defense expenditures.¹¹¹

Spending Floors

In 1977, NATO members pledged to increase their individual defense spending 3 percent per year in real terms for the 1979–86 period.¹¹² The objective, as then-Secretary of Defense Harold Brown explained, was “to ensure that alliance resources and capabilities—both conventional and nuclear—would balance those of the Soviet bloc.”¹¹³ the United States spent an average of almost 6 percent of GDP on defense during this time frame, and met the objective six of the seven years, increasing spending an average of 3.4 percent per year.¹¹⁴ Although most NATO members did not attain the spending target each year, Brown was pleased with NATO's progress, stating he thought his most important achievement at that point had been the revitalization of the NATO alliance.¹¹⁵ However, these increases were to be short-lived. After the Cold War “victory,” most NATO countries further decreased their defense spending below 2 percent of GDP.¹¹⁶

In the late 1990s, the NATO alliance again devised plans to narrow the spending gap between the United States and other members through a program of increases in military spending as a percentage of GDP. Most major European allies and the United States alike found themselves stretched by worldwide interests and deployments, and

recent combat strains caused by the Balkan wars. In 1999, then-Secretary of Defense William Cohen said that all NATO members should spend 2 percent of their GDP on defense.¹¹⁷ Since then, the NATO alliance established an unofficial 2 percent of GDP floor on defense spending.¹¹⁸ This 2-percent solution, like the earlier 3-percent per year increase in spending solution during the late 1970s, was intended to increase alliance capabilities and burden sharing, and to minimize “free-riding.”

Since 2000, NATO reports that only nine of the 26 member countries have maintained levels at or very near the 2-percent spending floor: Greece, Turkey, France, United Kingdom, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Romania, Italy, and the United States.^{119,120} Of these it is notable that three—Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, and Romania—are newer Central European alliance members.¹²¹ A member since 1999, Poland has spent 1.8 percent of GDP each year since 2000.¹²²

The unwillingness of European NATO members to increase military spending to a level that would provide agreed-to capabilities troubles the United States, which has been among the few original members that have continually exceeded spending floors. In 2006 at the Riga, Latvia NATO Summit, President Bush urged countries to increase defense spending to develop needed defense capabilities.¹²³ The United States has averaged 3.7 percent of GDP on defense spending 2000-2006.¹²⁴ The rest of the alliance combined spent an average of 1.8 percent of GDP on defense during the same time frame.^{125,126}

Defense Gap

A consequence of under-funded alliance defense spending by NATO-Europe and Canada is a troubling technology and troop gap between these countries and the United States. In 1999, NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe General Joseph Ralston warned, “Europe’s shrinking defense industrial base and limitations in production of advanced military capabilities could lead to a future where only the United States has the ability to engage globally.”¹²⁷

Even the most advanced NATO allies have not been able to keep up with the United States technologically,¹²⁸ and evidence is mounting that many NATO countries cannot afford to both modernize and support deployments simultaneously.¹²⁹ This is

unfortunate, as the NATO partner has already made the tough foreign policy and political decision to deploy troops, only to find that it does not possess the capability commensurate to the commitment. This incongruence is largely because the countries generally do not possess expeditionary force capability, nor do they possess a robust enough force structure to maintain a credible deployed force until the mission is complete.¹³⁰

The smaller defense budgets have also produced a troop shortage that counters the alliance's needs for robust and flexible forces that are able to deploy worldwide and fight counterinsurgencies, as evidenced in ISAF-Afghanistan.¹³¹

Primary technology gaps most acknowledged are in command and control and intelligence gathering and sharing. Logistics, in the form of insufficient transport and sustainment, and survivability also remain as major shortcomings.^{132,133} Deploying forces and keeping them supplied from the national base requires dedicated transport that most countries do not possess organically.

Most European allies are simply not capable of forced intervention because they lack the wherewithal, and some are deemed overly reliant on collective defense for national security.¹³⁴ The impact of NATO allies' low defense spending, growing technology gaps, and inadequate deployable force structures means that the US will continue to bear the burden in alliance operations in the foreseeable future.

The Symbolism of France

In many ways, the US relationship with France is symbolic of the challenges of multinational relationships in general—agreeing on unanimity of purpose, defining equitable burden sharing, and achieving a balance of power.

France is the United States' oldest ally—its military participation was decisive to the outcome of the American Revolution. Since then, the United States has fought with France through two world wars. More American soldiers have been killed on French soil than on that of any other country.¹³⁵

Over the last two centuries, the Franco-American relationship has changed, and the balance of power and roles has essentially reversed. The United States is now the economic and military powerhouse, and the world's leader.

Critics have questioned France's relevance in modern war fighting. As France was openly at odds with the United States on the eve of the US-led Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, former Deputy Undersecretary of Defense Jed Babbin dismissed the country, saying, "Going to war without France is like going deer hunting without an accordion. You just leave a lot of useless, noisy baggage behind."¹³⁶

What about going to war without France? Is France just "useless and noisy baggage," representative of what then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld called in 2003 "old Europe"¹³⁷—a weakened, aged ally with internationalist rhetoric, clinging to a faded colonialist history? Or does France represent something larger and more meaningful—a bellwether of sentiment for Europe or the broader world, which resents US economic strength, military power, and cultural influence?

To answer the question of whether France remains necessary to alliance and/or coalition war fighting, one should consider economic, military, and diplomatic factors.

Economics

With the world's sixth-largest economy, France has the economic capacity to become a bona fide military *hard power*—one with the power to coerce, largely through military might.¹³⁸ But it is unwilling to commit the monetary and manpower resources to match its self-image.

According to NATO, France spent 2.4 percent of its GDP, or about \$54.5 billion, on defense in 2006.¹³⁹ In comparison, the United States spent 4 percent of its GDP, or \$527.6 billion, on defense in 2006.¹⁴⁰ Though France is meeting NATO's unofficial floor of 2 percent of GDP on defense spending¹⁴¹ and is the third largest contributor to common budgets for NATO operations,¹⁴² France's current expenditure reflects its lowest recorded percentage of GDP spent on defense and marks the continuation of a downward trend since NATO started keeping track in 1949.¹⁴³ Figure 6 shows a comparison of the defense expenditures as a percentage of GDP over time between the United States and France.

Factors for the difference include different spending priorities and threat perceptions.¹⁴⁴ European officials note their countries generally have focused on European security, while the United States has a global presence and interests.¹⁴⁵




Figure 6. USA-France defense expenditures as a percentage of GDP.¹⁴⁶

Military

In 2001, France ended formal conscription and restructured its forces.¹⁴⁷ Despite a force structure decrease, the military's internal ability to deploy forces overseas has actually improved with the elimination of the restrictions related to conscription.¹⁴⁸ Its army currently has a troop strength of about 135,000, approximately 50,000 fewer soldiers than the US Marine Corps (185,000).^{149,150} In 2006, France had 365,000 military personnel (1.6 percent of the labor force) and was the third-largest force size in NATO, behind the United States (1.4 percent of the labor force) and Turkey (2.2 percent of the labor force).¹⁵¹

A founding member of NATO, France withdrew from all military planning in the alliance in 1966 and largely takes part in only political decisions. Consequently, it remains outside NATO's integrated military command and nuclear cooperation and is not

able to command any of the leadership positions.¹⁵² As a result, it has little say in the strategic direction of the alliance.¹⁵³

When France decides to commit troops, it is usually among NATO's largest contributors. France did participate in the UN-sanctioned interventions in the first Gulf War, Bosnia, Afghanistan, Congo, the Ivory Coast, and Haiti, and it participated in NATO's campaign in Kosovo, even though there was no UN resolution.¹⁵⁴ France also readily contributes forces to the NATO Reaction Force, which it considers confined to Article 5 missions, and participates in NATO air, land, and sea training exercises.

As of December 2007, France had about 1,200 ground troops supporting NATO-ISAF in Afghanistan.¹⁵⁵ Most of them were stationed around Kabul and not engaged in active combat.¹⁵⁶ France makes a distinction between ISAF's mission, which they believe is to stabilize, and that of the US-led mission (Operation Enduring Freedom) to fight the Taliban and al Qaeda.^{157,158}

French ground forces in Afghanistan represent 6 percent of what it has operationally deployed worldwide and constitute about 5 percent of total ISAF ground forces.¹⁵⁹ France ranks seventh among contributing nations to ISAF-Afghanistan behind (in descending order) the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, Canada, and the Netherlands, and is in a near-tie with Turkey and Poland.¹⁶⁰

In a January 2008 Pentagon briefing with US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and the French minister of defense, Gates was asked about the decision to send an additional 3,200 US Marines to Afghanistan. He said, "They (the NATO allies) know that we already have more than half of the troops on the ground in Afghanistan. I made the decision after consulting with the president to send the additional Marines principally because it did not appear that that requirement would be satisfied by anybody else."¹⁶¹ The next month, after additional ally resistance for more NATO troops, Gates said, "I worry a great deal about the alliance evolving into a two-tiered alliance, in which you have some allies willing to fight and die to protect people's security, and others who are not."¹⁶² Though not alone among NATO members, France appears unwilling to commit significant quantities of ground troops into active combat.¹⁶³

Diplomacy

Diplomatically, France still plays an influential role as one of the five permanent members on the UN Security Council. As such, it holds veto power, which it has used sparingly compared with the United States.^{164,165}

France sees the Security Council as its “last line of defense” against American power.¹⁶⁶ UN critics have charged that the Security Council’s structure is outdated and its performance inadequate. They have called for abolishing or changing permanent membership on the Security Council and/or limiting or abolishing the veto.¹⁶⁷ If successful, these changes would serve to marginalize France more than other Security Council members, as its influence and power is largely diplomatic, with greater emphasis on soft power roles for its military.¹⁶⁸

Post-World War II French defense and security policy is based on national independence and is not bound to NATO military operations that France believes lack UN underpinnings and therefore the force of international law.^{169,170} Then-President Jacques Chirac said in 1999 that France would never accept that a “regional defense organization arrogate to itself the role of the world's gendarme (policeman),” which, he added, was the place of the UN Security Council.¹⁷¹

While France’s conviction that it must maintain independent security and defense policies¹⁷² is admirable, its resolve comes at a cost to the alliance in internal arguments and policy gaps. Independent players inside an organization are arguably harder to govern, something no alliance needs to deal with, especially one like NATO, which has contributed so much to the security and stability of Europe in general and France in particular.

Strategic Roles

US defense analyst Dan Goure characterizes France as a “medium-sized power with super-sized ambitions that really wants increased worldwide power and influence.”¹⁷³ He summarizes:

France is no longer a great power, its influence will not come as a result of the size of its military or the robustness of its economy. It will come from imposing on the international system a system of procedures, rules and regulations that will

constrain the ability of more powerful states, and particularly the United States, to act without France's assent.¹⁷⁴

Though among the most capable in Europe, France's military is not the formidable hard power it was in La Grande Armée (the Great Army) under Napoleon (1805-1814).¹⁷⁵ But it doesn't have to be. France's use of soft power makes it more powerful than it would otherwise be.¹⁷⁶ US military strategist Thomas Barnett describes the American military as a *leviathan force*—one that can use both nuclear and traditional war-fighting elements, deterrence, and has the capacity to “rapidly intervene to change/shore up or eliminate unstable regimes.”¹⁷⁷ France's military is more suited to perform tasks in what Barnett describes as the *system administrator*—the country that focuses on “post-war phase counter insurgency and nation building.”¹⁷⁸

Perhaps France is the peacekeeping force of choice. US Congressional Research Service analysts deem it as “only one of the two European allies that possess flexible, mobile forces that can sustain themselves long distances from their territories.”¹⁷⁹ France does possess UN Security Council membership and close relations with parts of the Arab world and former colonies, notably in Africa and Indochina.¹⁸⁰

Future prospects

In May 2007, France elected a new leader with a new mandate—Nicolas Sarkozy.¹⁸¹ His victory was viewed by the US State Department as a signal that the French people approve of economic and social reforms, as well as closer cooperation with the United States.¹⁸² In his first speech as president-elect, Sarkozy assured his “American friends” that they could rely on France's friendship.¹⁸³ He also said that he supported a European Union defense force that would “complement, not compete with NATO.”¹⁸⁴ In addition, he has publicly expressed support for the “principle of French reintegration into NATO”—something that may be a bridge too far.^{185,186,187} Nevertheless, Sarkozy's pro-US statements have been regarded as a refreshed Franco-American relationship.¹⁸⁸

Sarkozy has announced that France would remain committed to Afghanistan for “as long as necessary.”¹⁸⁹ He said that French troops could intervene on an as-needed basis outside Kabul to assist allies in trouble; the deployment of additional operational

monitoring and liaison teams with the Afghan army, including one to support the Dutch forces; the transfer of the French air force detachment from Central Asia to Kandahar; and increased French-German cooperation aimed at setting up Afghan military schools for logistics and engineering.¹⁹⁰

These are positive steps in the relationship with the United States' oldest ally. The United States needs to seize the opportunity and recognize the different attitude that now exists in France and the diplomatic contributions it can make to complement American power. Despite the recent acrimony, France and the United States still do share many common interests and values around which to coalesce.¹⁹¹ Strong common interests and economic ties exist between the two countries, in sufficient quantity, to move the selective partnership along the continuum to a broader partnership.

Recommendations

There is one thing worse than fighting with Allies, and that is fighting without them.¹⁹²

—Winston Churchill

History, foreign policy, defense spending, and allies have all served to shape the American military instrument of national power and its relationship with multinational partners. The following recommendations are proposed as sensible options for how the United States should proceed with multinational alliances and coalitions in a post-9/11 and post-Iraq regime change world.

1. Maintain commitments to existing multinational alliances.

Commitment to multinational partnerships, both multilateral and bilateral, has served as the foundation for US foreign policy since World War II and continues to resonate in US joint military doctrine.¹⁹³ George Washington would likely have not condoned these entanglements, but he may have warmed up to them given the events of the 20th Century. Multilateral alliances, such as the NATO alliance, and specific bilateral agreements with Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines have been tremendously beneficial to US democracy building and Cold War victory.

Other bilateral agreements, for example with Australia, have been crucial for cementing enduring relationships and security interests far from the United States. The breadth of these partnerships, to include military exchanges, training exercises, and assistance programs, has proved vital for military deterrence and intervention. These formal partnerships have been burdensome, some more than others, but ultimately they have been fruitful.

In the case of multilateral alliances such as the NATO alliance, member countries have long provided capable forces for collective security, deterrence, and peacekeeping, and some have done so for combat. Several NATO countries “have and continue to provide bases and facilities rent-free, various tax exemptions, and reduced-cost services.”¹⁹⁴ And more recently, alliance members have formed the starting point for ad hoc coalitions of the willing.¹⁹⁵ Alliance members’ military troop contributions are noteworthy because they tend to be the most responsive and the best trained and equipped forces.

As the NATO alliance contemplates its role in the 21st Century, it needs to be prepared to act as a force provider. Since key members are familiar with US doctrine, they make the most immediate and effective contribution. As former Assistant Secretary of Defense and author Joseph Nye, Jr. said:

Because they train together, NATO countries can operate effectively even when not all members of the organization are officially involved. For example, NATO did not conduct the Gulf War in 1991 or the initial Afghan campaign, but NATO planning and training meant that members could cooperate effectively when called upon to do so.¹⁹⁶

More crucially, after 9/11 when the United States asked all NATO allies for a range of specific measures to retaliate against terrorists, such as enhanced intelligence support, blanket overflight rights for US and other allied aircraft, and access to ports and airfields, the NATO alliance responded within a day.¹⁹⁷ As Lord Robertson said, “The old world coming to support the new, to reverse Winston Churchill's famous phrase.”¹⁹⁸

With increasing globalism, even the 2002 US National Security Strategy recognizes that, “No nation can build a safer, better world alone.... Alliances and multilateral institutions can multiply the strength of freedom-loving nations.”¹⁹⁹ Alliances can also bolster the force needed in a post-combat operation phase and any

stability phase that may be required for tasks such as providing security and training police and military forces.

2. Define and measure “equitable” burden-sharing mechanisms and mandate equal defense spending floors linked to GDP in formal alliances, such as the NATO alliance.

Many countries received a peace dividend at the end of the Cold War. European NATO countries decreased their defense expenditures by 22 percent between 1992 and 1999.²⁰⁰ But today, the worldwide situation requires a reversal of the decreased defense spending rates. Cumulative costs to honor Article 5 (collective defense), the NATO Response Force, out-of-area operations, and the 2006 Riga NATO Summit, which adjusted the 2002 Prague Capabilities Commitments, clearly indicate that alliance members need to increase defense spending. The NATO alliance must strictly enforce the 2-percent floor by 2010 and phase in a 3-percent per year expenditure increases from 2010-2015.

In practical terms, European allies need to spend more on their military operational capabilities to address evolving defense needs. Though arguably since 2001, some NATO European allies have increased their expeditionary, power projection, and insurgency fighting capabilities, much more needs to be done. NATO partners need to acquire capabilities as specified by the 2006 Riga summit in the areas of secure communications, airlift, aerial refueling, precision guided munitions, special operations, intelligence and surveillance, missile defense, and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense.^{201,202}

Though an alliance member country may be small, it could possess a significant capability. Members can provide diverse contributions, militarily or otherwise, and should be given credit. Small and niche capabilities are meaningful. This is especially important for newer NATO alliance members, for example, Romania has alpine troops, Hungary has engineer troops, and the Czech and Slovak Republics have chemical and biological troops.²⁰³ The alliance should seek to leverage all niche capabilities and understand the best application of a partner’s forces given the military, political, and force structure capabilities—in pre-, during, and post-conflict phases.

3. Seek UN Security Council resolutions for use of military force.

The “UN resolution” has been the model since the end of the Cold War for the United States. Since the end of the Cold War, UN Security Council resolutions have given the United States the basis for military intervention, and, more important, have given other countries the basis for deploying troops for forced interventions or peacekeeping, both with and independent of the United States. With a UN resolution it becomes a UN war, not just a US war.²⁰⁴ The UN resolution provides legitimacy to American action, in ways the US could not do unilaterally.²⁰⁵ Absent this crucial mandate, the international legitimacy argument is lost, and only through significant efforts can it be partially overcome—and then for a finite period of time.

UN Security Council resolutions also help reinforce commitments that have already been made when the going gets tough or in difficult political situations. When the UN Security Council resolutions were passed in support of Afghanistan, US National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice said, “In fact, I think that what you will see is that some of the countries that have had particularly difficult domestic situations, some of our coalition partners, will find this resolution makes them capable of staying the course.”²⁰⁶

4. Maintain unilateral military action and pre-emption capability, but employ them judiciously.

The United States has proven that it is among only a very few countries in the world that can and will employ military forces unilaterally for forced intervention. In a 2003 article assessing the impact of the Iraq campaign on the NATO alliance from a US perspective, defense analyst Thomas Donnelly wrote, “The simple fact is that, as demonstrated in Operation Desert Storm, the Balkans and Afghanistan, and as a matter of strict combat capacity, the United States finds it easier to act unilaterally when the missions are more challenging.”²⁰⁷ Despite the United States’ unique military might, it should not have to be the world’s policeman. The 2002 National Security Strategy and Joint military doctrine rightfully asserts that multinational efforts will be sought when possible but stops short of dictating them when American national interests and sovereignty are hindered or jeopardized.^{208,209}

In the case of pre-emption, the “why now?” must be justified. Pre-emption is an internationally accepted unilateral action. However, why a country chooses to pursue this course is open to challenge, especially the intelligence used to justify the action. The international threshold of legitimacy may be higher than the strength of the intelligence that supports the pre-emption, especially after the justification used for the 2003 Iraq invasion. In a world with terrorists and weapons of mass destruction, the United States cannot risk a “retaliate only” policy; it must preserve the option of pre-emption. Therefore, this means strengthening US intelligence capability, careful and specific military planning, and near-flawless surgical execution—much like the Israeli pre-emptive attacks on Iraq’s nuclear facility in 1981 and their alleged attack on a Syrian nuclear facility in 2007.

5. Build coalitions to augment alliance efforts.

As for coalitions, perhaps they are best left to short-duration military operations or as a mechanism to allow broader non-alliance member participation. Military coalitions have generally been successful, and they have served as a forcing function for world military forces, alliances, and international organizations to adapt to a changing world. Rather than being used as a primary mechanism to build and employ military forces, ad hoc war coalitions are likely better used to allow non-alliance member countries to support an existing alliance effort than used as the primary mechanism to attract core alliance members. The 2002 National Security Strategy includes this idea:

Coalitions of the willing can augment these permanent institutions. In all cases, international obligations are to be taken seriously. They are not to be undertaken symbolically to rally support for an ideal without furthering its attainment.²¹⁰

6. Restructure the NATO alliance to correct inequities in countries’ contributions, recognizing soft power and stabilization capabilities as well as hard power and combat capabilities.

Nobody wants to create an overt tiered system of countries in a multiparty alliance, but informally it already exists. All members are not equal in their contributions to the enterprise. Some countries are capable and willing to act; others remain on the sidelines, regardless of the situation. Moreover, some countries are better suited to hard

power missions while others are better suited to soft power missions. To balance uneven multiparty membership, NATO should recognize countries' capabilities and should develop a set of metrics to grade members on their responsiveness, durability, and reliability.²¹¹

Domestic political concerns, power-sharing arrangements, and demographics influence countries' abilities to contribute to the alliance. US Joint doctrine recognizes this shortcoming as a planning consideration stating, "[D]ifferences in laws, doctrine, organization, weapons, equipment, terminology, culture, politics, religion, and language within alliances and coalitions must be considered."²¹²

In addition, some alliance members have long colonial histories or economic relationships with certain parts of the world, some still struggling with decolonization. These relationships should be leveraged.

Alliance members should have realistic expectations and know what their contribution requirement is, understanding they are accountable to the whole to avoid free-riding. If a country cannot send troops, it can send diplomats, civil administrators, engineers, health care workers and other personnel essential to the mission and peacekeeping, stabilization and security.

7. Prioritize key enduring partners—the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand—for combat operations and interoperability.

The United States must continue to strengthen military capability and interoperability with its closest and most reliable partners, countries with which the United States shares language, values and culture, and comparable political, government, and economic systems. These countries have proven they will "fight hard and take casualties" and "punch above their weight class"; they are our most trusted partners.²¹³

The United States must continue to build increased interoperability and defense cooperation with them through organizations such as the ABCA Armies' Program (United States, Britain, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand Armies). Common interests and values have led to trusted, durable, and reliable partnerships with these three countries that are unequalled elsewhere. The 2006 National Security Strategy acknowledges and endorses this idea:

Relations with the most powerful countries in the world are central to our national security strategy. Our priority is pursuing American interests within cooperative relationships, particularly with our oldest and closest friends and allies.²¹⁴

Conclusion

The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is in extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little political connection as possible. So far as we have already formed engagements, let them be fulfilled with perfect good faith. Here let us stop.²¹⁵

—George Washington, 1796

At the dawn of the last century, the United States embraced the detached and neutral foreign policy its founding fathers had strongly advocated. Since then, it has expanded across North America, grown its economy into the world's largest, shaped its military into the world's mightiest, and fought and won two world wars. Such seismic changes and events propelled the United States into entanglements with partner countries that were designed to beat back Communism and eventually win the Cold War. Today, the United States seeks to defeat transnational radical Islamists that employ terrorism. It is impossible now for the United States to withdraw from these entanglements, nor should it want to.

As the world's "reluctant" leader, the United States has assumed a large diplomatic, economic, and military burden—one that it will likely continue to carry in the foreseeable future. It must continue to take on a disproportionate share of the world's problems and set a firm, well-developed and long-term example.

Globalization, terrorism, and non-state threats have rendered obsolete the techniques used in the 20th century. Developing a foreign policy grand strategy that is fiscally and militarily achievable is as difficult now as it was in the past with containment of the Soviet Union in the Cold War. International economic interdependency and geopolitical disorder challenge how the United States defines its role in the world, identifies its enemies, and the grand strategy it uses to achieve American interests. Author Gary Wills writes, "To lead in the 21st century, the United States will have to learn to acknowledge the world outside its borders and listen to others' opinions, act in

partnership with other nations, and get used to persuading allies rather than browbeating them.”²¹⁶ The United States can benefit from international partnerships, multinational alliances, and international organizations. The challenge is determining to what extent and to what end each contributes its political capital, personnel and purse.

The US relationship with France serves as an illustrative example of the difficulties associated with stakeholder management within alliances and coalitions. Militarily France is not required for decisive action (hard power), but their international support at the strategic level and contributions in stability and peacekeeping efforts (soft power) is preferred, appreciated, and necessary in the end. France cannot be ignored without consequences. As one UN diplomat said, “It matters to matter for France.”²¹⁷ France cannot help the United States much at the tactical level in military combat, but it can hurt the United States at the strategic level in diplomacy.

The United States has a tradition of unique and successful foreign policy—one that should be continued, balancing idealism with realism, exceptionalism with multilateralism, and sovereignty with internationalism. It has relied on soft and hard power to achieve its goals. But as Joseph Nye, Jr. cautions, “It is a mistake to count too much on hard or soft power alone. The ability to combine them effectively is ‘smart power.’”²¹⁸ In 2002 Nye wrote, “Military power alone cannot produce the outcomes we want on many of the issues that matter to Americans.”²¹⁹

More recently, the case for *smart power* has been made in a place ruled by hard power—the Pentagon. In November 2007 Secretary Gates spoke to “make the case for strengthening our capacity to use ‘soft’ power and for better integrating it with ‘hard’ power.”²²⁰ Regarding soft power, he said, “There is a need for a dramatic increase in spending on the civilian instruments of national security—diplomacy, strategic communications, foreign assistance, civic action, and economic reconstruction and development.”²²¹ Later he spoke about the need for “increasing the capacity of America’s civilian tools of statecraft and for better integrating them with the hard power of our military,” emphasizing “military success is not sufficient.”²²²

In December 2007, former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage and Joseph Nye, Jr. advocated in a *Washington Post* editorial that the United States increase its soft power efforts to match its hard power capabilities (smart power). They wrote,

“We should reinvigorate the alliances, partnerships, and institutions that allow us to address numerous hazards at once without having to build a consensus from scratch to respond to every new challenge.”²²³

While the United States must maintain the capabilities to act unilaterally, it should put equal emphasis on improving the selective and broad partnerships worldwide to which it has already committed its formidable resources, requiring that each country bear its fair share of the burden, and recognizing that each country has valuable contributions to make.

George Washington had it right—where the United States has engagements, they should be fulfilled—otherwise the United States should stop with entanglements. Its time to take a look at the established alliance commitments and international institutions that the United States is involved in, and find ways to make them work.

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³ Joint Publication 3-16, "Multinational Operations," March 7, 2007, pp. GL-5, 11 Jan. 2008 <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_16.pdf>.

⁴ Lord Robertson, "NATO reaffirms Treaty commitments in dealing with terrorist attacks against the US, NATO Update, September 12, 2001. NATO formal press release states that NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson, consulted with EU High Representatives for Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana and Ambassadors from partner countries prior to the September 12, 2001 press conference that announced that Article 5 of the Washington Treaty would be invoked in dealing with terrorist attacks against the US. <<http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2001/0910/e0912a.htm>>.

⁵ Joint Publication 3-16, "Multinational Operations," March 7, 2007, pp. GL-6, 11 Jan. 2008 <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_16.pdf>.

⁶ Joint Publication (JP) 3-16 (Multinational Operations) makes an important distinction between operations conducted under the auspices of an Alliance and those under a Coalition: "Operations conducted with units from two or more allies are referred to as combined operations," while "Operations conducted with units from two or more coalition members are referred to as coalition operations. JP 3-16 also mentions other possible arrangements that include, "...supervision by an intergovernmental organization such as the United Nations or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe."

⁷ The executive summary of Joint Publication 1 (Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States) articulates the differences between alliances and coalitions in multinational operations. It states, "Multinational operations are usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance. Other possible arrangements include supervision by an IGO such as the UN or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Other commonly used terms for multinational operations include allied, bilateral, combined, coalition, or multilateral, as appropriate. An alliance is a relationship that results from a formal agreement (e.g., treaty) between two or more nations Guidance for Multinational Operations for broad, long-term objectives that further the common interests of the members. Operations conducted with units from two or more allies are referred to as combined operations. A coalition is an ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action. Coalitions are formed by different nations with specific objectives, usually for a single occasion or for longer cooperation in a narrow sector of common interest. Operations conducted with units from two or more coalition members are referred to as coalition operations."

⁸ Alexis De Tocqueville (translated by Henry Reeve), "Democracy in America, Volume 1," 1899, pp. 245.

⁹ George Washington, "Farewell Address," September 19, 1796. 17 Sept. 2007 <<http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/washing.htm>>.

¹⁰ Hook and Spanier make a distinction between isolation and detachment foreign policies. For elaboration see Steven W. Hook and John Spanier, "American Foreign Policy Since World War II," 2007. They opine that isolation, defined as "complete noninvolvement" is "...frequently (and erroneously) used to define early American Foreign Policy" and is not synonymous with detachment. Detachment, they assert, "refers to a pervasive sense that the United States should be actively engaged in global commerce

but have “as little political connection as possible” with other countries – the stance recommended by President George Washington in his Farewell Address.”

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¹² Walter Russell Mead, “Special Providence, American foreign policy and how it changed the world,” 2002, pp. xvii.

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¹⁴ John Quincy Adams, (US Secretary of State) “Independence Day Speech to the US House of Representatives,” July 4, 1821. 11 Nov 2007. <<http://www.fff.org/comment/AdamsPolicy.asp>>

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¹⁶ Walter Russell Mead, “Special Providence, American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World,” 2002, pp. 58-59.

¹⁷ James Monroe, "Seventh Annual Message to Congress," December 2, 1823. 17 Sept. 2007
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¹⁸ James Monroe, "Seventh Annual Message to Congress," December 2, 1823. 17 Sept. 2007
<<http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/jeffer.htm>>.

¹⁹ The 1898 Spanish-American War and the 1907 worldwide deployment of America’s “Great White Fleet” are examples where the US did not follow a detached or neutral foreign policy during this time frame.

²⁰ President Theodore Roosevelt is credited to have acknowledged the importance of balance of power and advocated a more “robust” approach to world affairs.

²¹ Fraser Cameron, “US Foreign Policy after the Cold War: Global Hegemon or Reluctant Sheriff?” 2005, pp. 3.

²² John L. Gaddis, “The Cold War: A New History,” 2005, pp. 16.

²³ Woodrow Wilson, “Second Inaugural Address,” March 5, 1917. 11 Nov. 2007
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²⁹ Woodrow Wilson, "Fourteen Points Speech," January 8, 1918. 23 Oct. 2007 <<http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/wilson14.htm>>.

³⁰ John L. Gaddis, "The Cold War: A New History," 2005, pp. 16.

³¹ According to the Norwegian Nobel Institute, Woodrow Wilson was awarded the Nobel for Peace in 1920, as the President of the USA and founder of the League of Nations. 1 Mar. 08 <http://nobelpeaceprize.org/eng_lau_list.html>

³² According to the official Senate Foreign Relations Committee website, "The Committee reviews and considers all diplomatic nominations and international treaties, as well as legislation relating to U.S. foreign policy." 12 Jan. 2008 <<http://foreign.senate.gov/>>

³³ Article 10 states, "The members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled."

³⁴ It has been suggested that Senator Lodge was also motivated to defeat American participation in the League of Nations by political concerns, his strong dislike of Woodrow Wilson, and his eagerness to find an issue for the Republican Party to run on in 1920.

³⁵ Henry Cabot Lodge, "Case against the League of Nations – I think of the United States first speech," August 12, 1919. 11 Jan. 2008 <<http://www2.volstate.edu/socialscience/FinalDocs/WWI-20/lodgeagainst.htm>>.

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³⁷ John L. Gaddis, "The Cold War: A New History," 2005, pp. 16.

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³⁹ Peter Trubowitz, Emily O. Goldman, Edward Rhodes, Editors, "The Politics of Strategic Adjustment: Ideas, Institutions, and Interests," 1999, pp.5.

⁴⁰ Peter Trubowitz, Emily O. Goldman, Edward Rhodes, Editors, "The Politics of Strategic Adjustment: Ideas, Institutions, and Interests," 1999, pp.5.

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⁸¹ Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "NATO after Riga," December 14, 2006, 18 Jan. 2008 < <http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/nye40>>.

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⁸³ Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "NATO after Riga," December 14, 2006, 18 Jan. 2008 < <http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/nye40>>.

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⁹⁰ NATO Factsheet, "NATO in Afghanistan," July 5, 2007, 15 Jan. 2008 <<http://www.nato.int/issues/afghanistan/040628-factsheet.htm>>

⁹¹ ISAF is not a UN force, but it is deployed under a mandate of the UNSC (four UNSCRs - 1386, 1413, 1444 and 1510 - relate to ISAF), 15 Jan. 2008 <<http://www.nato.int/issues/afghanistan/040628-factsheet.htm>>

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⁹⁵ Josef Joffe, "How America Does It," *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 1997, pp. NN.

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The DoD states, "...defense expenditures are defined as outlays made by national governments specifically to meet the needs of the armed forces. In this context, the term "national government" limits "defense expenditures" to those of central or federal governments, to the exclusion of state, provincial, local, or municipal authorities." Therefore, "Defense spending figures depicted...for the United States are based on the NATO definition and therefore may differ somewhat from other U.S. defense spending figures provided to Congress or used within the Department of Defense. NATO's definition of defense spending includes spending on programs funded outside of the Department of Defense, namely, the Department of State's International Security Assistance Programs, and the defense-related portions of the Coast Guard and the Department of Energy." <http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/allied_contrib2004/allied2004.pdf>

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- ¹²⁶ Europe has also made the claim that the US has security commitments beyond NATO concerns.
- ¹²⁷ Pierre Sparaco, “Aviation Week & Space Technology,” 6 March 2000, p. 24.
- ¹²⁸ Michele Zanini, Jennifer Morrison Taw, “The Army and Multinational Force Capability,” RAND, MR-1154, 2000, p. 22.
- ¹²⁹ Yochi J. Dreazen, “Troop Needs Open NATO Rift,” *The Wall Street Journal*, February 8, 2008, pp. A8.
- ¹³⁰ John E. Peters, Stuart Johnson, Nora Bensahel, Timothy Liston, Traci Williams, “European Contributions to Operation Allied Force: Implications for Transatlantic Cooperation”, RAND, MR-1391, 2001, p. 59.
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- ¹³² Lord Robertson, “NATO’s Future”, February 3, 2002, 20 Jan. 2008 <<http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s020203a.htm>>.
- ¹³³ Carl Ek, “NATO’s Prague Capabilities Commitment,” *Congressional Research Service Report for Congress*, January 24, 2007, pp. 2.
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- ¹³⁵ U.S. Department of State, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, “Background Note: France,” August 2007, 20 Jan. 2008 <<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3842.htm#relations>>
- ¹³⁶ Jed Babbin, “Interview with Chris Matthews,” *Hardball*, January 30, 2003, 10 Oct. 2007 <<http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5334121/print/1/displaymode/1098/>>.

¹³⁷ Donald Rumsfeld, "Secretary Rumsfeld Briefs at the Foreign Press Center," January 22, 2003, 19 Nov. 2007 <<http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=1330>>

¹³⁸ Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone," 2002, pp. 8. Nye also describes soft power as the power to co-opt or persuade through such "intangible" factors as culture, values and institutions.

¹³⁹ NATO Information for the Press, "NATO-Russia Compendium of Financial and Economic Data Relating to Defence," December 20, 2007, pp.10, 11 Jan. 2008 <<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2007/p07-141.pdf>>.

¹⁴⁰ NATO Information for the Press, "NATO-Russia Compendium of Financial and Economic Data Relating to Defence," December 20, 2007, pp.10, 11 Jan. 2008 <<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2007/p07-141.pdf>>.

¹⁴¹ NATO Information for the Press, "NATO-Russia Compendium of Financial and Economic Data Relating to Defence," December 20, 2007, pp.10, 11 Jan. 2008 <<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2007/p07-141.pdf>>.

¹⁴² Embassy of France in the United States, Facts on French Defense, "French Contributions to NATO," January 25, 2008, 30 Jan. 2008 <<http://www.ambafrance-us.org/news/statmnts/2008/Contributions%20To%20NATO.pdf>>

¹⁴³ NATO Information for the Press, "NATO-Russia Compendium of Financial and Economic Data Relating to Defence," December 20, 2007, pp.10, 11 Jan. 2008 <<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2007/p07-141.pdf>>.

¹⁴⁴ General Accounting Office, "NATO: Implications of European Integration for Allies' Defense Spending," *Report to the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations, U.S. Senate*, June 1999, pp. 8.

¹⁴⁵ General Accounting Office, "NATO: Implications of European Integration for Allies' Defense Spending," *Report to the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations, U.S. Senate*, June 1999, pp. 9.

¹⁴⁶ <http://www.nato.int/issues/defence_expenditures/index.html>.

¹⁴⁷ George A. Bloch, French Military Reform: Lessons for America's Army?, "Parameters," Summer 2000, pp.33-45. Bloch additionally notes that conscripts were confined to French borders (without approval of the National Assembly) and served only 10-month obligations – something that challenged the French military's need to deploy overseas for international obligations. Conscription had been valued in France for the numerous social and nationalistic benefits.

¹⁴⁸ George A. Bloch, French Military Reform: Lessons for America's Army?, "Parameters," Summer 2000, pp.33-45. Bloch asserts that the end of conscription did improve the French military's internal ability to deploy forces overseas with the elimination of restrictions, from 12,000 to 60,000 troops.

¹⁴⁹ Embassy of France in the United States, Facts on French Defense, "French Armed Forces," January 29, 2008, 30 Jan. 2008 <<http://www.ambafrance-us.org/news/statmnts/2008/French%20Armed%20Forces.pdf>>

¹⁵⁰ "Armed Forces Strength Figures," *U.S. Department of Defense*, December 31, 2007, 5 Feb. 2008 <<http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/MILITARY/ms0.pdf>>

¹⁵¹ NATO Information for the Press, “NATO-Russia Compendium of Financial and Economic Data Relating to Defence,” December 20, 2007, pp.10, 11 Jan. 2008 <<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2007/p07-141.pdf>>.

¹⁵² French generals have commanded KFOR three times and ISAF under Eurocorps once.

¹⁵³ France participation in the NATO Allied Command for Transformation (ACT) in Norfolk, Virginia (Rear-Admiral Christian Canova, French Navy Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, Future Capabilities, Research & Technology), and the Allied Command Operations (ACO) – Eurocorps in Strasbourg (France) (Major-General Philippe Sommaire, French Army Deputy Commanding General) by Flag level officers with the corresponding staff and budget contributions is seen as signs of French reintegration with NATO. See NATO website <<http://www.nato.int/structur/structure.htm>>

¹⁵⁴ Paul Gallis, “France: Factors Shaping Foreign Policy, and Issues in the U.S-French Relations,” *Congressional Research Service Report for Congress*, May 19, 2006, pp. CRS-8.

¹⁵⁵ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, International Security Assistance Force, “ISAF troops ISAF placemat, December 5, 2007, 20 Jan. 2008 <http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/isaf_placemat.pdf>

¹⁵⁶ Doug Sanders, “Sarkozy wants troops deployed with U.S. in Afghanistan,” *The Globe and Mail*, February 27, 2008, 3 Mar 07 <<http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20080227.wfranceaghan27/BNSStory/Afghanistan/>>. The article also reports, “The handful of NATO countries that are directly fighting the Taliban insurgency in the south, including Canada, Britain, the United States and the Netherlands, have encountered stiff Taliban resistance, with Canada suffering the highest casualty rate, and have been imploring other NATO countries for assistance.”

¹⁵⁷ Paul Gallis, “France: Factors Shaping Foreign Policy, and Issues in the U.S-French Relations,” *Congressional Research Service Report for Congress*, May 19, 2006, pp. CRS-16.

¹⁵⁸ The October 17, 2001 Congressional Research Service Report entitled, “Operation Enduring Freedom: Foreign Pledges of Military & Intelligence Support,” pp. CRS-4, (<<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/6207.pdf>>) said that French special forces were positioned overseas, ready to be deployed if necessary to support the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom. The report also stated that President Chirac pledged to “play our part in a spirit of solidarity and responsibility,” and has agreed to commit French forces to participate in the Afghan offensive. Further it reported that French satellites and intelligence agents were on the ground in Afghanistan working with the anti-Taliban forces reconnaissance and targeting.

¹⁵⁹ Embassy of France in the United States, Facts on French Defense, “*French Armed Forces*,” January 29, 2008, 30 Jan. 2008 <<http://www.ambafrance-us.org/news/statmnts/2008/French%20Armed%20Forces.pdf>>

¹⁶⁰ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, International Security Assistance Force, “ISAF troops ISAF placemat, December 5, 2007, 20 Jan. 2008 <http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/isaf_placemat.pdf>

¹⁶¹ U.S. Department of Defense News Transcript, “Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and French Minister of Defense Herve Morin,” January 31, 2008, 31 Jan. 2008 <<http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4130>>

¹⁶² Yochi J. Dreazen, “Troop Needs Open NATO Rift,” *The Wall Street Journal*, February 8, 2008, pp. A8.

¹⁶³ Doug Sanders, "Sarkozy wants troops deployed with U.S. in Afghanistan," *The Globe and Mail*, February 27, 2008, 3 Mar 07
<<http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20080227.wfranceaghan27/BNStory/Afghanistan/>>.

¹⁶⁴ The United Nations Security Council is composed of five permanent members: China, France, Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States. Ten non-permanent members are elected by the General Assembly for two-year terms, and not eligible for immediate re-election. The United Nations officially states, "Each Council member has one vote. Decisions on procedural matters are made by an affirmative vote of at least nine of the 15 members. Decisions on substantive matters require nine votes, including the concurring votes of all five permanent members. This is the rule of "great Power unanimity", often referred to as the "veto" power. Under the Charter, all Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council. While other organs of the United Nations make recommendations to Governments, the Council alone has the power to take decisions which Member States are obligated under the Charter to carry out." 20 Jan. 2008
<<http://www.un.org/sc/members.asp>>

¹⁶⁵ Associated Press, "U.S. among top veto users on council," March 10, 2003, 30 Jan. 2008
<<http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/03/10/sprj.irq.us.un.veto.ap>>

¹⁶⁶ Howard LaFranchi, "Behind the NATO Rift: Their Roles in World," *Christian Science Monitor*, October 16, 2002, 31 Jan. 2008 <<http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/1016/p02s01-wogi.html>>

¹⁶⁷ G. John Ikenberry, Anne-Marie Slaughter, "Forging A World Of Liberty Under Law, U.S. National Security In The 21st Century," *Princeton Project on National Security*, September 27, 2006, pp. 7, 23-25.

¹⁶⁸ France has been particularly involved in Africa over the years and is playing a leading role in Chad and Darfur. France also played a significant role in Lebanon (2006). In these cases, the French military demonstrated autonomous military capability in crucial soft power roles. French European Union building efforts have enabled them to attain powerful positions in the EU defense force and contribute among the most capable defense forces.

¹⁶⁹ U.S. Department of State, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, "Background Note: France," August 2007, 20 Jan. 2008 <<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3842.htm#relations>>

¹⁷⁰ Michéle Bacot-Decriaud, "France and NATO: Between Atlantic and European Logic," *Institute of Political Studies, University Lyon 2, France*, 2003, 28 Jan. 2008
<<http://www.nato.interhouse.hu/letoltes/bacotdeciaud.pdf>>.

¹⁷¹ Michael Gonzalez, "Can America Trust the French?," *Wall Street Journal*, November 23, 1999, pp. A22.

¹⁷² Michéle Bacot-Decriaud, "France and NATO: Between Atlantic and European Logic," *Institute of Political Studies, University Lyon 2, France*, 2003, pp. 115, 28 Jan. 2008
<<http://www.nato.interhouse.hu/letoltes/bacotdeciaud.pdf>>.

¹⁷³ Dan Goure, "What France really wants, A medium-sized power with super-sized ambitions," *MSNBC*, March 13, 2003, 20 Jan. 2008 <<http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/3070299/>>

¹⁷⁴ Dan Goure, "What France really wants, A medium-sized power with super-sized ambitions," *MSNBC*, March 13, 2003, 20 Jan. 2008 <<http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/3070299/>>

¹⁷⁵ Paul Gallis, "France: Factors Shaping Foreign Policy, and Issues in the U.S-French Relations," *Congressional Research Service Report for Congress*, May 19, 2006, pp. CRS-15.

¹⁷⁶ Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Joanne J. Myers, Carnegie Council interview on the book "Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics," April 13, 2004, 2 Feb. 2008 <<http://www.cceia.org/resources/transcripts/4466.html>>

¹⁷⁷ Thomas P.M. Barnett, "Blueprint for Action: A Future Worth Creating," 2005, pp. 1.

¹⁷⁸ Thomas P.M. Barnett, "Blueprint for Action: A Future Worth Creating," 2005, pp. 1.

¹⁷⁹ Paul Gallis, "France: Factors Shaping Foreign Policy, and Issues in the U.S-French Relations," *Congressional Research Service Report for Congress*, May 19, 2006, pp. CRS-16.

¹⁸⁰ Paul Gallis, "France: Factors Shaping Foreign Policy, and Issues in the U.S-French Relations," *Congressional Research Service Report for Congress*, May 19, 2006, pp. CRS-4.

¹⁸¹ It is important to note that some foreign policy experts, e.g. Joseph S. Nye, Jr. feel that France is still concerned that America's influence in NATO is too large, and is opposed to a global role in which NATO establishes special partnerships with Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and other countries. They further worry that with NATO's global ambition, particularly in East Asia, that it could produce friction with China.

¹⁸² U.S. Department of State, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, "Background Note: France," August 2007, 20 Jan.2008 <<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3842.htm#relations>>

¹⁸³ U.S. Department of State, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, "Background Note: France," August 2007, 20 Jan.2008 <<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3842.htm#relations>>

¹⁸⁴ U.S. Department of State, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, "Background Note: France," August 2007, 20 Jan.2008 <<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3842.htm#relations>>

¹⁸⁵ U.S. Department of State, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, "Background Note: France," August 2007, 20 Jan.2008 <<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3842.htm#relations>>

¹⁸⁶ Lisa Bryant, "France Considers Rejoining NATO's Military Wing," *Voice of America*, September 24, 2007, 28 Jan. 2008 <<http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2007-09/2007-09-24-voa9.cfm>>

¹⁸⁷ Some key obstacles still exist to French NATO reintegration, such as key command billets, for example the Joint Forces Command-Naples (formerly Atlantic Fleet-South), and the French view that NATO is an "alliance of equals" between the US and the EU rather than the US and the 25 other independent alliance members.

¹⁸⁸ U.S. Department of State, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, "Background Note: France," August 2007, 20 Jan.2008 <<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3842.htm#relations>>

¹⁸⁹ Embassy of France in the United States, Facts on French Defense, "French Military Presence In Afghanistan," January 25, 2008, 30 Jan. 2008 <<http://www.ambafrance-us.org/news/statmnts/2008/France%20in%20Afghanistan.pdf>>

¹⁹⁰ Embassy of France in the United States, Facts on French Defense, “*French Military Presence In Afghanistan*,” January 25, 2008, 30 Jan. 2008 <<http://www.ambafrance-us.org/news/statmnts/2008/France%20in%20Afghanistan.pdf>>

¹⁹¹ U.S. Department of State, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, “*Background Note: France*,” August 2007, 20 Jan. 2008 <<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3842.htm#relations>>

¹⁹² Carlo D’Este, “Eisenhower: A Soldier’s Life,” 2002, pp. 693.

¹⁹³ Joint Publication 1, “Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States,” May 14, 2007, pp. VI-1, 11 Jan. 2008 <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp1.pdf>. American Joint Publication 1 states: “International partnerships continue to underpin unified efforts to address 21st century challenges. Shared principles, a common view of threats, and commitment to cooperation provide far greater security than the United States could achieve independently. These partnerships must be nurtured and developed to ensure their relevance even as new challenges emerge. The ability of the United States and its allies to work together to influence the global environment is fundamental to defeating 21st century threats. Wherever possible, the United States works with or through others nations, enabling allied and partner capabilities to build their capacity and develop mechanisms to share the risks and responsibility of today’s complex challenges.”

¹⁹⁴ US Department of Defense, “Allied Contributions to a Common Defense 2000, Chapter 3, Assessment of Country Contributions,” March 2000, 18 Nov. 2007 <http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/allied_contrib2000/Allied2000-Chap-3.html>

¹⁹⁵ US Department of Defense, “Allied Contributions to a Common Defense 2000, Chapter 3, Assessment of Country Contributions,” March 2000, 18 Nov. 2007 <http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/allied_contrib2000/Allied2000-Chap-3.html>

¹⁹⁶ Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “NATO after Riga,” December 14, 2006, 18 Jan. 2008 <<http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/nye40>>.

¹⁹⁷ Lord Robertson, “The Future of the Transatlantic Link,” October 24, 2001, 20 Jan. 2008 <<http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s011024a.htm>>.

¹⁹⁸ Lord Robertson, “The Future of the Transatlantic Link,” October 24, 2001, 20 Jan. 2008 <<http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s011024a.htm>>.

¹⁹⁹ The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2002, September 17, 2002, pp. Preface, 11 Jan. 08 <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf>>.

²⁰⁰ Carl Ek, “NATO’s Prague Capabilities Commitment,” *Congressional Research Service Report for Congress*, January 24, 2007, pp. CRS-4.

²⁰¹ Carl Ek, “NATO’s Prague Capabilities Commitment,” *Congressional Research Service Report for Congress*, January 24, 2007, pp. CRS-3.

²⁰² Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “NATO after Riga,” December 14, 2006, 18 Jan. 2008 <<http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/nye40>>.

²⁰³ Carl Ek, “NATO’s Prague Capabilities Commitment,” *Congressional Research Service Report for Congress*, January 24, 2007, pp. CRS-3.

²⁰⁴ Anthony Zinni, "Remarks at Center for Defense Information Board of Directors Dinner," May 12, 2004. 15 Jan. 2008 <<http://www.cdi.org/program/document.cfm?DocumentID=2208>>.

²⁰⁵ Anthony Zinni, "Remarks at Center for Defense Information Board of Directors Dinner," May 12, 2004. 15 Jan. 2008 <<http://www.cdi.org/program/document.cfm?DocumentID=2208>>.

²⁰⁶ Robin Wright, Dana Milbank, "U.S. Bends to France, Russia on U.N. Iraq Resolution," *Washington Post*, June 8, 2004; pp. A04, 15 Jan. 08 <<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A23393-2004Jun7.html>>

²⁰⁷ Tom Donnelly, "Rethinking NATO," *NATO Review*, Summer 2003, 30 Jan. 2008, <<http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2003/issue2/english/art2.html>>

²⁰⁸ The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2002, September 17, 2002, pp. Preface, 11 Jan. 08 <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf>>.

²⁰⁹ Joint Publication 1, "Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States," May 14, 2007, pp. VI-1, 11 Jan. 2008 <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp1.pdf>.

²¹⁰ The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2002, September 17, 2002, pp. Preface, 11 Jan. 08 <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf>>.

²¹¹ Andrew F. Krepinevich, "A Strategy for a Long Peace, Testimony before the Senate Committee on the Budget," February 12, 2001, 24 Oct. 2007 <<http://www.senate.gov/~budget/republican/about/hearing2001/Krepinevich.htm>>.

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²¹³ Max Boot, "Allies on the cheap," *Los Angeles Times*, February 28, 2007, pp. A21.

²¹⁴ The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2006, March 16, 2006, pp. 35, 11 Jan. 08 <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/nss2006.pdf>>.

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²¹⁶ Garry Wills, "Bully of the Free World," *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 1999, pp. 50.

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<<http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4130>>

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