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**WINNING BODIES AND SOULS: STATE BUILDING AND
THE NECESSITY OF NATIONALISM**

by

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**WINNING BODIES AND SOULS:
STATE BUILDING AND THE NECESSITY OF NATIONALISM**

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ABSTRACT

This thesis argues the obvious, but still widely neglected point that for successful state building to occur in the post-Cold War era, nationalism remains a necessary but not sufficient condition for the emergence of a stable modern nation-state. Nationalism is both the key to state building and the central element in any explanation of the limitations of the modern nation-state and the system of sovereign nation-states in the early 21st century. Without a genuinely unifying nationalism and a strong sense of national identity, underpinned by the provision of goods and services, a modern nation-state is nothing but an ineffective bureaucratic edifice masquerading as a modern sovereign nation-state. Despite the post-Cold War resurgence in the theory and practice of state building (or nation building), the crucial role of nationalism receives virtually no attention. The term nationalism is used here in the deepest sense possible: it is not being used to describe a superficial agreement that 'we are all Iraqis now' or 'all Afghanis now' because 'we' elected a new government, usually under the auspices of the United Nations and ostensibly responsible for the 'national' territory within which 'we' live. The central point of this thesis is that despite its apparent obviousness, nationalism remains completely marginalized in the contemporary debate about the theory of, and the practice of state building. To put it in anthropomorphic terms, contemporary exercises in state building (or nation building) are wittingly, or unwittingly, facilitating the creation of a body (the 'state') without a soul (the 'nation').

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I. THE WORLD HAS BECOME NORMAL AGAIN, OR HAS IT?

For the secret of man's being is not only to live, but to have something to live for. Without a stable conception of the object of life, man would not consent to go on living, and would rather destroy himself than remain on earth.¹ – Dostoevsky

A. INTRODUCTION

Is it simply enough to exist, or is there more? The question of purpose is one of the fundamental themes in human history. It is one of existence, and one that demands resolution. The answer to this question lies, in part, in the fact that all of us seek to live for something, and to the degree we do not, we begin to die inside. And, as we die, we end as an empty husk of humanity.

This search for meaning has in times past, and will in times ahead, push humanity to organize around ideas and institutions and the symbols that embody them. Symbols have meaning and symbols inform action. There is a cycle that exists between belief and action where they reinforce and spur one another forward.² Within this cycle of belief and action, a degree of correlation is formed between the strength of a belief and the depth of its penetration into one's worldview, where the more potent the strength of the belief, the deeper it penetrates into the individual.³ It is at this point that symbols and actions deepen the individual or collective sense of purpose; resolving the tension, of which Dostoevsky speaks. Moreover, in our increasingly pluralistic age, symbol and meaning are exceedingly relevant to the central question that this thesis seeks to

¹ Fyodor Dostoevsky, *The Brothers Karamazov*, ed. Ralph Matlaw, trans. Constance Garnet, A Norton Critical Edition ed. (New York, New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1976), 235.

² For a discussion of the necessity for understanding both the orthopraxis and orthodoxy in relation to belief see Ninian Smart, *Dimensions of the Sacred: An Anatomy of the World's Beliefs* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996).

³ Heather Gregg, "Religious Dimensions of Culture" In *The Culture Handbook* (Santa Monica: RAND, Forthcoming).

answer. Why have some nation-states 'succeeded', while others have 'failed' and what are the implications for the theory and practice of state building?

The argument made here is that some nation-states have 'succeeded' while others have 'failed' precisely because 'successful' nation-states have a higher degree of 'nation-ness'. The strength of the nation-state is dependent upon the degree that the nation exists as an idea and a practice, across the bounded space over which the state claims sovereignty and is recognized as sovereign by other sovereign nation-states. The answer to the fundamental question of purpose and meaning then for the state is that it exists to the degree that its citizens perceive it to exist (and to the degree that other sovereign nation-states recognize its existence) and there is an ongoing exchange of obligations and rights that reinforce loyalty to the nation-state. Perhaps, this is to some, a seemingly irrelevant question in an increasingly globalized world. A world in which there is much talk of the end, the decline, or the crisis of the nation-state and/or the nation-state system.

For many, the move beyond the nation-state was a promising development. As Robert Kagan observed in his short work, *The Return of History and the End of Dreams*, there was a brief moment when the Berlin Wall fell in 1989 and a glimpse of a world made new was possible. A world where nation-states both grew together and disappeared: cultures intermingled, and borders opened, more than ever before, to both trade and people.⁴ This moment was one in which the cosmopolitan ideal was actualized for more than the affluent. It was a moment where everyone would perhaps become a global citizen.

Yet, this dream quickly ended. The world became normal again. The world that exists today is one where nation-states, or parts of nation-states and the people who live there, are not only transformed by the power of globalization, but are also often set against the process, which necessarily reorders and reforms

⁴ Robert Kagan, *The Return of History and the End of Dreams* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2008), 3.

the relations between state, society, and the global order. This thesis is not arguing that this will always be the case, or that the dream that was briefly glimpsed by many as the Berlin Wall came down (and celebrated by many as the 'end of history') will not one day come to pass, only that it is not yet upon us. Instead, as Benedict Anderson notes in *Imagined Communities*:

Every year the United Nations admits new members... many 'old nations' once thought fully consolidated, find themselves challenged by 'sub'-nationalisms within their borders – nationalisms which, quite naturally, dream of shedding this sub-ness one happy day. The reality is quite plain: the 'end of the era of nationalism,' so long prophesied, is not remotely in sight. Indeed, *nation-ness is the most universally legitimate value in the political life of our time.* [Italics added]⁵

Indeed, the nation-state remains as active today as it was in 1945. Although the United States is now the sole 'super power', international competition between lesser, or aspiring 'great' powers has returned. Russia, Europe, Japan, China, India, and Iran, among others, are increasingly seeking to carve out positions in the changing world order.⁶ It is perhaps with a hint of irony that these aspiring great powers are again contesting the right to resources and self-determination in the post-Soviet era in much the same way as they did in the post 1945 era, if not as coldly.

Not all agree with this assessment of the present condition of the world; that powerful states are again on the rise. For example, Phil Williams argues that the increasing number of failed, or failing, states are indicative of the demise of the state building project and the eventual passing of the nation-state system. Moreover, this trend has the potential to spawn a new "Dark Age."⁷ Others argue that globalization has already transformed state sovereignty to the point, where

⁵ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, 2nd ed. (New York: Verso, 2006), 3.

⁶ Kagan, *The Return of History and the End of Dreams*, 3.

⁷ See Phil Williams, *From the New Middle Ages to a New Dark Age: The Decline of the State and U.S. Strategy* (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2008).

we have entered the era of what Phillip Bobbitt has called “the market state,” where the market has replaced the state as the legitimate source of provision of goods and services to the people.⁸ While true in part, these positions, amongst many that have either called for or lamented the end of the nation-state, do not offer a complete picture of the current character of the global order, nor do they offer a blueprint for future action.

In *Fixing Failed States*, Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart adeptly identify the current problem. They argue that the central issue facing states today is the “sovereignty gap” between, “the de jure sovereignty that the international system affords...and their de facto capabilities to serve their populations and act as responsible members of the international community.”⁹ The reality is that a large and growing number of states today do not deliver security and development to their citizens. Put simply, there is a need for the state to do what it is supposed to do. It is not enough for states to be sovereign; there is also a necessity for the delivery of goods and services to their constituents, which will in turn invigorate the extraction of obligations from the citizens. It is against this backdrop, along with the need for an understanding of the transitional character of the changing global order and the increase in the number of failing states that this thesis argues that nationalism plays a vital role in the success of any state building project.

B. THE ARGUMENT

The 1990s saw an explosion in the study of state failure and nation building.¹⁰ Taking this renewed interest in nation building as its point of departure

⁸ See Philip Bobbitt, *The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace, and the Course of History* (Knopf, 2002).

⁹ Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart, *Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 3-4.

¹⁰ Mark T. Berger, “From Nation Building to State Building: The Geopolitics of Development, the Nation-State System and the Changing Global Order” In *From Nation Building to State Building*, ed. Mark T. Berger (New York: Routledge, 2008), 5.

this thesis moves beyond the current debate surrounding nation-state building, namely the focus on bureaucratic-technical means, and links a serious and detailed consideration of nationalism to the theory and practice of state building. There has thus far been no effort to bring the two fields of study (nationalism on the one hand, and state building on the other) into alignment. This is somewhat puzzling in that the nation-state, by definition, is both a nation *and* a state. To focus on the state, to the exclusion of the nation, is to seek a technocratic solution that satisfies only half of the equation: it is as suggested an exercise in identifying and strengthening the body, while neglecting the soul.

More specifically this thesis argues that modern nationalism has since its appearance always been and still is, the necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the emergence of a stable, modern nation-state. Moving outward from this assumption, this thesis argues that nationalism is central to both successful state building and to a proper understanding of the limits of the development of nation-states in the early 21st century. Without nationalism, a modern nation-state is nothing but a shambling bureaucratic beast that confronts, ever increasing limits on its ability to provide even the minimum basic requirements to the citizens that live within its territory.

The RAND study, *America's Role in Nation Building: from Germany to Iraq*, nicely encapsulates the neglect of nationalism in the theory and practice of the state building when it blithely observes that:

What principally distinguishes Germany, Japan, Bosnia, and Kosovo from Somalia, Haiti, and Afghanistan are not their levels of Western culture, economic development, or cultural homogeneity. Rather it is the level of effort the United States and the international community put into their democratic transformations. Nation building, as this study illustrates, is a time and resource-consuming effort.¹¹

¹¹ James Dobbins, *America's Role in Nation Building: From Germany to Iraq* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2003), xix.

This argument views nation-building projects as primarily the result of what some consider “hard power.” Specifically, the RAND study and other books in this vein focus on the tools of organized violence, state institutions, and economic/political policy instruments. The solution set becomes in this view, one where the answer is simply more money and more soldiers. This thesis by contrast argues that the crucial ingredient in the state building project is “nation-ness”. This is because unlike state building, which relies on “material factors,” nation building (I am drawing a clear distinction here between state building and nation building—a topic discussed in detail below—even though many policy-makers use the terms interchangeably) centers on “soft power”, such things as state sponsored education, national media, and the propagation of national myths and stories.¹²

This thesis does not deny the validity of “hard power” in state building. However, it does argue that to rely primarily, if not exclusively, upon throwing money and soldiers at a problem with an emphasis on building a larger administrative and technocratic structure is to invite disaster. Instead, there is need for a more holistic approach that incorporates elements of both state building and nation making. The holistic approach argued for here will be described in Chapter 3 via the Nation-State Congruence Model, which will demonstrate that the state-centric approach is not only incorrect, but is actively contributing to the failure of a number of state building projects.

C. DEFINING THE TERMINOLOGY: NATION AND STATE BUILDING, DEVELOPMENT, RECONSTRUCTION, AND THE NATION-STATE

Americans, in their abuse of the English language have not only fostered the misuse of the terms nation building and state building, but have also misconstrued what reconstruction vis-à-vis development means. The lack of clarity about these terms has led to great confusion on the part of many involved in state building projects. The misuse of terminology is evident in Michael

¹² Benjamin Miller, *States, Nations, and the Great Powers: The Sources of Regional War and Peace* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 71.

Barnett's article, "Nation Building's New Face", where he says that nation building is the, "practice of helping countries overcome conflict and build effective political institutions."¹³ Americans often use the term nation building to refer to the construction of a new political order with little or no regard for the peoples, cultures, and traditions already present.¹⁴ Nation building, as used above, is actually state building, or more precisely, institution building or capacity building.¹⁵ State building consists of the consolidation of the means of, and the monopoly over, the right to use violence, the growing of institutions to extract resources from the population and territory it controls to support security and policing activities and the provision of material benefits to the citizens of the state. By contrast, if nation building is going to have any precision as a term, it should refer to state-sponsored public education, the role of the media, and the propagation of national myths. The end goal of nation building is the merging of the population into a "more cohesive people with a common history, leading to the evolution of a national identity and transforming the centralized state into an integrated nation-state."¹⁶ State building is about building institutional capacity, nation building is about building national identity.

There has also been a great deal of misuse of the terms reconstruction and development. Reconstruction is the restoration of a war torn society to something resembling its pre-conflict condition. Development, however, refers to the establishment of institutions where there was none previously, or at least a fundamental transformation and/or modernization of pre-existing institutions. When used with qualification (as in political development, or social development) the meaning is clear. When used without qualification, it is generally referring to

¹³ Michael Barnett, "Nation Building's New Face," *Foreign Policy*, Nov-Dec 2002, 98.

¹⁴ Francis Fukuyama, "Nation-Building and the Failure of Institutional Memory" In *Nation-Building: Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq*, ed. Francis Fukuyama (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2006), 3.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Miller, *States, Nations, and the Great Powers: The Sources of Regional War and Peace*, 71-72

economic growth, or economic progress. There is, of course, a gap between the two terms. Since 1945, there are obvious cases where the U.S., presided over successful reconstruction: Japan and Germany after World War II being the classic examples.¹⁷ The reason for success in one, but not in the other, is that in reconstruction there already exists political and social infrastructure to some degree. The solution set is a matter of introducing capital and/or resources.¹⁸ Development is a more complex challenge insofar as, at the outset, there is little or no 'modern' infrastructure an external actor will by necessity need to build the capacity for the state. Further complicating this is the fact that when one comes to the matter of social, cultural, or political and even to a lesser extent, economic, development, things can get somewhat, complicated

Finally, it is of use to consider the delineation between state and nation, as well as setting out a definition of the nation-state. The state is the institution that maintains a monopoly on the use of coercive force within a society. There is of course, behind this definition, the Hobbesian notion of the social contract by which the populace divests the right to violence willingly. They give this to the state with the spoken (constitution) or unspoken (social convention) understanding that the state will act on behalf of the interests of the population within its territory.¹⁹ This means that the state, as an agent for the people, sanctioned to commit and retain the use of violence, must organize along institutional lines that facilitate some degree of efficiency. Following Max Weber, Jeff Goodwin offers an excellent definition of the state when he notes that it consists of, "those core administrative, policing, and military organizations, more or less coordinated by an executive authority, that extract resources from and administer and rule (through violence if necessary) a territorially defined national

¹⁷ Fukuyama, *Nation-Building and the Failure of Institutional Memory*, 5.

¹⁸ As suggested in Dobbins, *America's Role in Nation Building: From Germany to Iraq*.

¹⁹ I use 'state' here to cover monarchy, democracy and dictatorship.

society”.²⁰ As Anthony Smith reminds us, in relation to V. I. Lenin’s observation almost a hundred years ago, at its most fundamental, the state is “the standing army, police, and officialdom.”²¹

The nation differs from the state in that while the state refers to the institutions of government, the nation refers to the people who comprise the nation. Joseph Stalin, in his study of the national question, argued that a ‘nation’ was “a historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifest in a common culture.”²² This definition touches all the significant factors, such as, common language, common culture, and a common history. Nationalism and nation making then, is a process whereby people seek to define who they are in terms of a national identity.²³

So, what does the amalgamation of the two look like? The relative coherence of a nation-state lies in the length of the hyphen between the two.²⁴ The most common use of a hyphen is to indicate how two words are combined to produce a distinct meaning. This is to say that the words that are joined by the hyphen build off each other, thereby providing us with a distinct term. Working back, the longer the hyphen, the weaker the combined meaning. Turning to define a nation-state, it is precisely the temporal proximity of the two words that provide the strongest definition. Or, put another way, it is only in those instances where nation and state are virtually inseparable that the entity concerned can

²⁰ Jeff Goodwin, *No Other Way Out: States and Revolutionary Movements* (Cambridge University Press, 2001), 12.

²¹ Anthony D. Smith, "The Ethnic Sources of Nationalism" In *Ethnic Conflict and International Security*, ed. Michael E. Brown (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 11.

²² Cited in Mark T. Berger and Devleena Ghosh, "Geopolitics and the Cold War Developmental State in Asia: The Culture of National Development and the Development of National Culture in Independent India, 1947-2007," *Geopolitics* 14, no. 1 (2009 (Forthcoming)), 1.

²³ Vera Tolz, "Forging the Nation: National Identity and Nation Building in Post-Communist Russia," *Europe-Asia Studies* 50, no. 6 (1998), 993.

²⁴ This comment is attributed to Dr. Marcos Berger, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 2007.

truly be called a modern nation-state. For example, Cynthia Enloe and Mostata Rejai, in their article "Nation-States and State-Nations", argue that, "a major variable distinguishing one pattern of nationalism from another has been the interplay between 'nation' and 'state.'" This is ultimately "a relationship between national identity and political autonomy, between national integration and political sovereignty."²⁵ This delineation between the nation and the state is extremely helpful in that it highlights the two key aspects of the nation-state. This delineation points to the idea that the, "state, in other words, is primarily a political-legal concept, whereas *nation* is primarily psycho-cultural [*italics added*]." Therefore, states may exist when there is no nation (one thinks of the present situation in Iraq). Conversely, a nation may exist where no state does (such as Palestine). It is only, "when the two coincide, when the boundaries of the state are approximately coterminous with those of the nation," that the resulting conglomeration may be called rightly, a nation-state and is recognized as such by other nation-states and the United Nations (UN). A nation-state is a nation *and* state, "[which] possesses political sovereignty. [And] it is socially cohesive as well as politically organized and independent."²⁶

An even more important aspect of defining the nation-state is the emphasis on nationalism or the spirit of the nation. "At the most general level, nationalism refers to an awareness of membership in a nation (potential or actual), together with a desire to achieve, maintain, and perpetuate the identity, integrity, and prosperity of that nation."²⁷ The nation-state is thus a complex amalgamation of a shared identity and the effective fit of the nation and the state. It identifies itself in terms of one specific 'nation' where individuals are horizontally bonded citizens. This creates an 'identity of character' where the

²⁵ Cynthia H. Enloe and Mostafa Rejai, "Nation-States and State-Nations," *International Studies Quarterly* 13, no. 2 (Jun., 1969), 140-158, <http://links.jstor.org>, 140.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 143.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 141.

state is congruent with the nation.²⁸ Ernest Gellner speaks to this when he says that, “nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent.”²⁹ The nation-state then is the ideal form of a political organization, when the political boundaries (the state) are congruent with the ethnographic or linguistic frontiers (nation).³⁰

D. METHODOLOGY

This thesis will first consider the theory and practice of state building. The discussion will be set within the historical context of decolonization and the Cold War, before turning to more contemporary concerns about state building. The reason for starting at this point is that while nationalism can be traced to the emergence of the enlightenment in Europe, the beginnings of the nation-state system as it is known today begins with the establishment of the United Nations (UN) after 1945.³¹ Moreover, it is through the UN that the nation-state became *the* unit of analysis for geopolitics and international relations down to the present. Through this investigation of the theory and practice of state building it will be shown how state building in the post 1945 era through the end of the Cold War has increasingly delinked the people from the state, or put another way, how state building projects have increasingly weakened the connection between the nation and the state.

²⁸ Adrian Hastings, *The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion, and Nationalism* (Cambridge: The Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, 1997), 3.

²⁹ Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 1.

³⁰ Hans Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism* (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1958), 17.

³¹ Anderson describes the emergence of nationalism as the result of the dissipation of the dynastic and cosmological hold upon humanity beginning during the enlightenment. However, there are others, notably Adrian Hastings and Anthony Smith who trace the rise of nationalism much further back in time. This is a type of proto-nationalism or ethno-nationalism grounded in ethnic causality as opposed to the historical conjuncture outlined by Anderson. See Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, 12-19; Hastings, *The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion, and Nationalism*; and Anthony D. Smith, *National Identity* (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1991).

Second, this thesis will offer a solution to this problem. In particular, this thesis argues that nationalism is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for successful nation-state development. This will include examining nationalism via reference to the primordial or ethnocentric and modernist schools of nationalism.³² Building on this discussion, this thesis will outline a model for understanding nationalism in relation to nation building and/or state building. This model, the Nation-State Congruence Model, argues that there is a dynamic at work wherein the health of a nation-state is dependent on the congruence between the nation as an imagined community and the state as a capable and limited entity.³³ The assertion becomes then, that as the nation has become increasingly delinked from the state, the proper understanding of state or nation building is to reemphasize the construction of a national consciousness or national identity through its proper vehicle, that of nationalism understood rightly.

Finally, this thesis will turn to current state building practices of the post 1975 era focusing on the ineffectual policies that have driven the state building project to the brink of ruin. This thesis argues that the current solution set, which as the Nation-State Congruence Model predicts, is woefully inadequate for successful state building. This is due in part to the focus by recent efforts on the construction of bureaucratic edifices to the detriment of a realized and inclusive

³² There is a subset of the nationalism debate that terms the modernist approach as the “civic” approach. The emphasis in the civic nationalism is on liberal “inclusiveness” wherein, “elites are not threatened by democratization, and when representative and journalistic institutions are already well established before the mass of the population gains political power.” This is not in opposition to the modernist school, but is instead a subcategory of it in that the principles of civic nationalism rise out of increasing modernization. See Jack Snyder, *From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2000), 38-39.

³³ This model is built upon the work of Ernest Gellner, Eric Hobsbawm, and Benedict Anderson who argue that the state = nation = people. Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*; Miller, *States, Nations, and the Great Powers: The Sources of Regional War and Peace*; Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*; and specifically E. J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 19.

national identity. In response to the inadequacies of the current practices, this thesis concludes by offering solutions for the reorientation of the state building project.

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II. SEEKING THE MODERN STATE I: THE RISE OF THE STATE IN THE POST 1945 WORLD

The great and chief end, therefore of men uniting into commonwealths, and putting themselves under government, is the preservation of their property.³⁴ –John Locke

A. INTRODUCTION: THE HEART OF THE MATTER

The greatest of human endeavors is the consolidation of powers within one body, for all bodies, for the protection of life and liberty for the betterment of all. It is to this end that societies have organized throughout history and moreover it will continue to be the purpose for which societies will continue to organize. Even in this new age of globalization, the fundamental question of security for the preservation of property must have an answer. For this very reason, the state building project is ultimately about the construction of an organization that will guarantee the preservation of these values. The question then, when reflecting on the history of state building over the past sixty years, is to what degree the sundry modes of action have achieved the movement of personal sovereignty into a body politic that delivers the unspoken agreed upon guarantee of preservation of property.

This agreement, considered the foundational social contract, has been implemented in a way that means various things to different people, yet the basic formula is unchanged; people demand from their government the protection of their persons, property, and their way of life. All people want a roof over their head, food on the table, and the possibility of advancement or betterment of their situation. This leads to the question of this chapter: what are the characteristics of a modern state and have the various state building projects in the post 1945 era met these conditions?

³⁴ John Locke, *Two Treatises of Government* (New York: Hafner Publishing Co, 1965, originally published in 1680), 184.

Samuel Huntington helps frame this question by stating that, “the most important political distinction among countries concerns not their form of government, but their degree of government.”³⁵ The heart of the matter concerning the success and failure of the modern state is, as Huntington notes, less about how one governs - social, democratic, communist, and autocratic – and revolves instead on how well one governs. The degree of efficacy is whether one provides security and development for their citizens, *not* whether their bureaucratic agencies are properly aligned and established. This distinction places the emphasis on *that* one governs instead of *how* one governs.

This is the same argument that Douglas Borer and Mark Berger make in “All Roads Lead to and from Iraq: the Long War and the transformation of the nation-state system”. They argue that the Cold War was less a “contest over the basic structure of the nation-state system,” and more of a struggle about “how the people of each nation-state would choose their leaders and organize their national societies.”³⁶ The Cold War was a global struggle between Washington and Moscow, but a deeper and significant battle was also taking place within the societies themselves. Could state-socialism deliver goods and services to their citizens to the same degree that the democratic capitalist model provided for theirs? In one sense then, it was not a struggle against the ‘other’, but rather a struggle with the ‘self’.³⁷

This chapter will discuss sovereignty and legitimacy, and the nature of the social contract as it relates to the nation-state. Then it will consider the rise of development economics and the shift in state building theory in the early 1970s due in part to the effects of the Vietnam War and the apparent failure of state-

³⁵ Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), 1.

³⁶ Mark T. Berger and Douglas A. Borer, “All Roads Lead to and from Iraq: The Long War and the Transformation of the Nation-State System,” *Third World Quarterly* 28, no. 2 (2007), 460.

³⁷ Borer and Berger go on to suggest that the ‘Long War’ is less about the ‘West’ versus Islam and more about the struggle within Islam between modernists and violent neo-traditionalists. *Ibid.*, 461.

driven development projects. The purpose here is to explain the dynamics that are in play, as one approaches the state building project, so that it is possible to design a better solution set for future state building projects.

B. SOVEREIGNTY AND LEGITIMACY IN POLITICAL ORDER

Sovereignty is distinct from legitimacy. The former is a formal, de jure recognition of one sovereign nation-state by another and since 1945 includes membership in the UN. Legitimacy on the other hand is the de facto degree of support a government or state has from within its territory and from without. A state can be sovereign and devoid of legitimacy. The degree of legitimacy is dependent on its citizens. Thus, state building (where the state in question is already sovereign and all state building projects focus on sovereign states) is about building legitimacy. Legitimacy flows from the fulfillment of the social contract where the state delivers goods and services to its citizens.³⁸ Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart aptly note that there is a consensus now emerging that “sovereign” states are those, “that actually perform the functions that make them sovereign”.³⁹ That is, sovereignty and legitimacy can converge and ideally, a sovereign nation-state should be a legitimate nation-state. Whether it is or not, is *the* challenge of the modern state building project and is prerequisite for the construction of a state.

As previously defined, the state is the rightful employer of violence.⁴⁰ However, if we stop with a vulgar reading of Max Weber, where the monopoly of violence in the hands of a sovereign state defines the state, we deny a more penetrating truth. Elsewhere, Weber articulates a more functional view where the states’ basic institutions – the legislature, the police, the judiciary, and the civil

³⁸ I define legitimacy as a form of trust in that what a state is receiving is a vote of confidence in its ability to deliver goods and services and that translates into loyalty and the meeting of obligations, such as payment of taxes or service in the armed forces.

³⁹ Ghani and Lockhart, *Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World*, 4.

⁴⁰ As discussed in Goodwin, *No Other Way Out: States and Revolutionary Movements*, 12.

military administrations – become the *mechanisms* to consolidate, organize, administer and maintain the use of violence.⁴¹ Thus, it is that the state is composed of those institutions that maintain the capacity for coercive force, both over their own populations as well as the external threats. The state is more than the legal author of violence; it is instead the organism that is responsible for protecting the populace from not only the external threat, but the internal as well. The state then becomes Leviathan, an entity that exists over and for, yet subject to, the people it governs.⁴²

We must not overlook the issue of the states' exclusive monopoly of violence. It is through this function that goods and services can be delivered, thus fulfilling the social contract. Take, for example, an academic institution where the overarching responsibility on the part of the institution is to produce educated individuals who are better educated than they were before they attended. With the goal of assisting or providing for the proper management of student's the institution must maintain the right to exercise discipline over the student. More closely though, when a student attends an institution, they are in one sense surrendering the right to do whatever they desire – they cannot skip classes or fail to turn in assignments. If they do so, the institution has the right to do violence to them, such things as suspension or expulsion. The necessity is grounded in the need to maintain order within the institution so that it can properly educate an individual. It is precisely because the institution maintains the right of and the capacity for violence that goods and services can be delivered.

As such, this idea of the state rests on two linked, but mutually exclusive, concepts that the repository of state power is in either a person or a group. Niccoló Machiavelli said that, "all states and dominions which hold or have held

⁴¹ Ghani and Lockhart, *Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World*, 117.

⁴² Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan Or the Matter, Forme & Power of a Common-Wealth Ecclesiasticall and Civill* (New York: Barnes & Noble, Inc., 2004, Originally Published in 1651), 108.

sway over mankind are either republics or monarchies.”⁴³ What he is indicating is that power is a zero sum game whereby one actor imposes their will on another. His second suggestion is what we today understand as the republican or democratic model, which is more in line with the thinking of John Locke, who was influential in the development of the idea of the modern democratic state. The idea of the republic is one where power arises from the coming together of a group in cooperation of achieving a common goal, a view derivative of Hobbes’s view of the state as an independent, omnipotent, god-like entity empowered by a social contract.⁴⁴ In this way, the two repositories of sovereign power within a state are 1) the rule of the elite, whether it is a person or family, and 2) the rule of a bureaucracy, nominally elected, republican in nature. The distinction is necessary for a proper understanding of the source of legitimacy for the state. In the former, legitimacy is something taken, or if not taken, it is at least held. Conversely, the latter suggest that the source of legitimacy is bound inseparably to the will of the people (or as Kant has criticized, to the tyranny of the masses.)

It is precisely the active abdication of personal sovereignty to a state that forms the foundation for the modern state. John Locke said that, “every man, by consenting with others to make one body politic under one government, puts himself under an obligation to every one of that society to submit to the determination of the majority, and to be concluded by it.”⁴⁵ This is the concept of the republic at its most basic level and a proper understanding of this directly impacts the functionality of the state. In a very real sense, the state must recognize the inherent responsibility for its citizens to provide protection for an individual’s property (lives, liberties, and estates).⁴⁶

⁴³ Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Prince*, trans. Luigi Ricci (New York: New American Library, 1999), 33.

⁴⁴ Ghani and Lockhart, *Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World*, 117.

⁴⁵ Locke, *Two Treatises of Government*, 169.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 184.

To recapitulate, the state is defined here as the sovereign modality for the use of force. To perform this function, the state is composed of institutions with the capacity for the execution of this function. There are two overarching forms that the state can take, the first being a monarchy and the second a republic. While the former was the standard for the majority of human history, the latter is now in the *de jure* majority worldwide. Due to this arrangement there exists a social contract between the state and the citizen, even in those extant constitutional monarchies (such as Britain and Thailand), while Saudi Arabia and Brunei are the exceptions that prove the rule. It is widely accepted that the state is responsible for providing goods and services to its citizens.⁴⁷ The debate is about the extent and type of goods and services, the method of delivery and the obligations that go with them. With this in mind, it is now possible to begin to describe this dynamic.

Aldous Huxley in, *A Brave New World*, captures the tension inherent in the role of the state and the function it serves, namely, the meeting of the expectations of its citizens. The character called the Controller, when asked why the population cannot have a copy of *Othello*, remarks that, “Our world is not the same as Othello’s world. You can’t make flivvers without steal – and you can’t make tragedies without social instability. The world’s stable now. People are happy; they get what they want, and they never want what they can’t get.”⁴⁸ The implication is that for a sovereign government to achieve legitimacy it must meet the needs and desires of its citizens. Conversely, an imbalance between desires and their receipt will lead social decline and collapse. This dynamic is described in the legitimacy model below (Figure 1).

⁴⁷ Ghani and Lockhart, *Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World*, 21.

⁴⁸ Aldous Huxley, *Brave New World* (New York: Harper Perennial, 1998), 220.




Figure 1. The State Function-Legitimacy Dynamic⁴⁹

In this model, the state and the society are shown as existing in a dynamic relationship wherein each is dependent upon the other. As previously argued, a state is necessary for the provision of social order due to the nature of this world. As such, the state is obligated to provide goods and services through state functions.⁵⁰ To the degree that the state is capable and, in actuality performs, these basic functions, the citizens will return legitimacy to the state thereby increasing the capacity of the state for delivery of goods and services. This

⁴⁹ Adapted from Gordon McCormick, "A Systems Perspective on Insurgency," Lecture #3 (Naval Postgraduate School, 2007); and Chalmers Johnson, *Revolutionary Change*, 2nd Edition ed. (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1982), 58.

⁵⁰ State Functions are those things that a state must do to fulfill the aspirations of the citizens for inclusion in the political process. Examples would be the rule of law, the establishment of a market, and the provision of a secure environment. For a comprehensive list see Ghani and Lockhart, *Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World*, 124-166.

legitimacy is a form of social capital (or degree of trust) where the citizens' belief in the state's capacity for provision of goods and services begins a mutually reinforcing synergistic effect.

This is the greatest failing of states in the post 1945 era. They are sovereign in the sense that they are incorporated; yet they fail to deliver even the most basic goods and services. Therefore, they do not carry any semblance of legitimacy. This creates a sovereignty gap between the state and the society, wherein the sovereignty is in a sense wrested from the citizen in that the cycle of delivery of goods for legitimacy is broken. The government then becomes illegitimate. It is striking then, that the shared perception among the intelligentsia is that the nation-states of this world remain sovereign, "regardless of their performance in practice – and the de facto reality that many are malfunctioning or collapsed states, incapable of providing their citizens with even the most basic services, and where the reciprocal sets of rights and obligations are not a reality."⁵¹ What is it that constitutes a modern state? What is the measure of success? A modern state is one in which the state performs state functions for its population. A successful state is one that has bridged the 'sovereignty gap'. A sovereign state is one that actually performs the functions that makes it legitimate, and make it sovereign in a *de jure* and a *de facto* form.⁵² Having laid down the relationship between state and citizen the next section will consider state building in historical context.

C. STATE BUILDING IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT: THE RISE OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS AND THE FAILURE OF SOUTH VIETNAM: STATE BUILDING IN THE POST 1945 ERA

The basic challenge in state building has been a lack of agreement on what states should and should not do and how best it should carry out its various

⁵¹ Ghani and Lockhart, *Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World*, 21.

⁵² Ibid., 4-5.

functions once there is agreement as to what they are.⁵³ This section will first discuss the rise of development economics out of the Second World War and then it will outline the change in economic policy and the rise of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) resultant of the impact of the Vietnam War.

The world after 1945 was a markedly different one than what existed prior to World War II. The significant change, among many, was seen in the decline of colonial power and the rise of the nation-state as the vehicle for modernity as codified in the United Nations.⁵⁴ The belief and enthusiasm for state-led development in the late 1940s through the end of the Vietnam War is grounded theoretically in Modernization Theory. This theory suggests that a 'modern' society is one in which its people are literate, urban dwelling, and more affluent financially. This notion deeply influenced the work of the economists of the era such as, Rostow, Kuznets, Cherery, and Taylor, who came to emphasize the importance of structural change as it relates to the rise of per capita income, the decline of agrarian society, and the rise of industry.⁵⁵ David Epstein, et al, in their article "Democratic Transitions" argue persuasively that Modernization Theory constitutes a genuine relevance to the linkage between Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and democratic regime stability. Modernization Theory argues, that as societies develop economically they will be less tolerant of oppressive political regimes.⁵⁶

Of particular note, Walt Whitman Rostow was especially influential in the formation of Modernization Theory and the subsequent establishment of this theory in the framework of the U.S. foreign policy. Rostow's most famous contribution to the field was his theory regarding the stages of economic growth.

⁵³ Ghani and Lockhart, *Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World*, 6.

⁵⁴ Berger, "From Nation Building to State Building: The Geopolitics of Development, the Nation-State System and the Changing Global Order," 12.

⁵⁵ David Epstein, et. al, "Democratic Transitions," *Midwest Political Science Association* 50, no. 3 (2006): 551-569, 552.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

Rostow first postulated this theory as an opposition to the Marxist view where the world would necessarily move towards communism. At this time, in the early 1950s, there was a definite fear on behalf of the U.S. government that the increasing poverty in many of the newly formed nation-states would provide a ground in which the communist rhetoric would find root. With this consideration, Rostow, along with the likes of C.I.A. chief, Allen Dulles, sought to codify an American alternative to the socialist agenda. This was the beginning of Modernization Theory. The real significance of this model though, is seen in the effect it had on American policy makers of the early 1950s. Rostow's theory offered an appealing analytical tool for the post colonial world because all nations were merely at different stages of economic growth.⁵⁷ Moreover, the way forward, since the path is linear, is paved by bringing "developed" and "modern" societies into contact with "traditional" ones. Thus, the, "lessons of America's past demonstrated the route to genuine modernity... the United States could drive stagnant societies through the transition process."⁵⁸ This, of course, offered hope to democratic countries in the wake of the growing communist threat. Additionally, this theory was compounded by the fact that the successes of the German and Japanese military occupations seemed contingent on the transformation of their industry, economy, and society via the state-centered model. These successes only served to reinforce the developmental model created by Rostow.

This theoretical base directly led to the explosion of the nation-state system and the subsequent undertaking of state building projects. Many of these projects were, in the early years, riding upon the zeal of the American modernization model and development economics. Much of this confidence was based in the experiences of the American "New Deal" projects of the 1930's –

⁵⁷ Mark H. Haetele, "Rostow's Stages of Economic Growth" In *Staging Growth: Modernization, Development, and the Global Cold War*, eds. David C. Engerman and others University of Massachusetts Press, 2003), 83-86.

⁵⁸ Michael Latham, *Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and "Nation Building" in the Kennedy Era*. The University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 4.

such as the Tennessee Valley Authority and the rapid industrialization, modernization, and urbanization associated with the American industrial complex. This excitement, coupled with the onset of the Cold War and the communist “scare” led to a great deal of enthusiasm for state-led development projects such as major infrastructure improvements.⁵⁹ One such enthusiast, Arthur Schlesinger Jr., even went so far as to declare that the economic and social reforms encapsulated in the New Deal were a “weapon” with which the United States could outbid all communists for the support of the people of Asia.⁶⁰ This desire to “outbid” the communists is readily seen in U.S. involvement in state building in Vietnam (French-Indochina).

In the early 1950’s the U.S. faced a difficult policy decision, whether to support French Colonial policy, or seek to break from “old-fashioned colonial attitudes” with regards to the challenges in Vietnam. On the one hand, France was necessary in the defense of Vietnam and the containment of the Soviet threat in Southeast Asia. On the other, the U.S. did not want to work against France and end up involving itself more than necessary. This hedging led to a development strategy where the U.S. sought to deal directly with the Vietnamese government by providing around \$50 million for various projects between 1950-1952. However, the U.S. hopes of spending their way to success did not lead to the desired end state as the country increasingly descended into the First Indochinese war.⁶¹

The Geneva Accords of 1954, brought about by the cessation of hostilities between the French and the Vietminh, began a process that would bring the U.S. even deeper into the development process of now South Vietnam, and ultimately into a full scale conflict as the policies failed. Between 1955 and 1961, the U.S. poured over \$1 billion in economic and military aid into South Vietnam. This

⁵⁹ Fukuyama, “Nation-Building and the Failure of Institutional Memory,” 5.

⁶⁰ David Ekbladh, “From Consensus to Crisis” In *Nation Building: Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq*, ed. Francis Fukuyama (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2006), 21.

⁶¹ George C. Herring, *America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975*. 2nd ed. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986), 18-20.

staggering number placed the tiny nation of Vietnam as the fifth leading recipient of U.S. aid during this time period. Moreover, by the late 1950s there were roughly 1500 U.S. citizens working in southern Vietnam, assisting the government in various ways, and making the U.S. mission in Saigon the largest in the world.⁶²

Another example of the state-centric aid policy in South Vietnam during this time period is seen in the economic-import program. Under this program Vietnamese importers ordered export goods from foreign firms, while Washington paid the bill. Then, when the goods arrived, the Vietnamese importers paid into a common fund in the national bank. This fund was then used to cover operating expenses for the Vietnamese government as well as building project throughout the country.⁶³ This program demonstrates a focus on centralizing an economy through the civil government. The point of emphasis is on seeking to build the state institutions through direct involvement. This reliance on importing foreign goods, through the use of a state-centered program is one of the foundational tenants of modernization theory of this time. Still, the failure of Modernization theory, as seen in the slide to war in Vietnam, had lasting impacts on politicians as they sought to link development and security in the 1960s and 1970s.

Samuel Huntington perhaps best codified the theoretical crisis of nation building in the late 1960s in his work, *Political Order in Changing Societies*. As mentioned at the outset, he postulated that the key measure of a government was the degree to which it governed. Subsequently, he questioned whether the efforts of development economics over the previous twenty years had brought about the changed world promised with the establishment of the United Nations. He argued that the central issue in the late 1960s and early 1970s was the, “apparently remorseless tendency for the economic gap to broaden [between developed and undeveloped countries].” He also noted that there was a similar gap emerging in the political realm, between highly developed political systems

⁶² Herring, *America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975*, 56-57.

⁶³ *ibid.*, 60.

and underdeveloped political systems. This led him to the central argument of his book: political instability is a function of, “rapid mobilization of new groups into politics coupled with the slow development of political institutions.”⁶⁴

When this took place, the challenge increasingly became the way that political instability undermined traditional sources of state authority by creating new associations that were unable to effectively “associate together.”⁶⁵ The situation is one where the rates of growth in social mobilization and political participation are high, and the rates of growth in political organization and institutionalization are low.⁶⁶ The result is that there is a lag in “appropriate” political participation or political inclusion. More broadly, the critique is that it was a waste of the previous twenty years to focus on the development of national economies at the expense of political infrastructure. In effect, by not considering that political inclusion was vital to the stability and potential for growth, the state building project of developmental economics had brought about a situation where the state was unable to meet the demands of its citizens. This theoretical framework laid the foundation for the new direction that state building took in the early 1970s under the administration of Richard M. Nixon (1969-1974).

Under Nixon, two things happened that changed not only state building, but also the political economy of the world order more generally, ushering in the early vestiges of the globalization project. These changes included the shift in economic policy away from fixed exchange rates, the end of the gold standard, the deregulation of the financial section and the transition from state-sponsored to private economic development through the open market. The Vietnam War

⁶⁴ Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, 1-3.

⁶⁵ I define political instability by the negative consequences it has on the state building project. Political instability inhibits state building in that there is not a ‘secure’ environment where legitimate political processes can take place. Huntington grounds his assessment in the rise of insurgencies, revolts, and wars in the period between 1958 and 1965. There is a rise of over twenty conflicts per year. Thus, the question of whether developmental economics as a model for state growth is appropriate. *Ibid.*, 4.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 5.

served as a watershed event in the realm of state building.⁶⁷ In *The Battle for Asia*, Mark Berger argues that the rise of the US-led globalization project, and the transformation of the nation-state system, was part of the growing diffusion of neo-liberalism and the prominence of neo-classical economics in the last two decades of the Cold War. By the 1980s, specifically, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank increasingly advised governments around the world that the underdevelopment they were experiencing was the result of excessive state intervention in the economy.⁶⁸ Essentially, it was a move away from Development Economics to Neo-Classical Economics. There were profound implications for state sovereignty, starting with Nixon taking the US dollar off the gold standard and the subsequent rolling back over the 1970s and 1980s of fixed exchange rates.⁶⁹

The impact of this move by Nixon is sovereignty moved out of the hands of the government and into the hands of private banks and financial institutions in particular. Berger notes four results from Nixon's actions:

1. They insured that private banks (particularly US-based banks) began to play a much greater role in global finance.
2. Government supervision of global financial organizations was dramatically weakened.
3. Currency exchange rates and financial systems of other nation-states, particularly in Latin America, Africa, and Asia were increasingly influenced by trends in the financial markets of the United States.
4. Growing competition within the banking systems of the various countries in the OECD was encouraged, while the government of

⁶⁷ James M. Carter, *Inventing Vietnam: The United States and State Building, 1954-1968* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

⁶⁸ Mark T. Berger, *The Battle for Asia: From Decolonization to Globalization* (New York, New York: Routledge Curzon, 2004), 4.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 120.

the US was increasingly able to more or less determine the regulatory framework for global financial markets.⁷⁰

This shift is a radical departure from the classic state legitimacy model (Figure 1). The onset of globalization resulted in the state losing the positive social capital feedback in increasing measure to the global market (Figure 2). For the state, this represented a negative return on its investment and necessarily decreased its capacity to provide basic state functions. While Figure 1 represented a synergistic “virtuous” cycle that was mutually reinforcing, Figure 2 represents a debilitating cycle with negative consequences.




Figure 2. Delinking of the Dollar and the Loss of State Legitimacy

A second result of the Vietnam War was a shift in U.S. aid policy. USAID was heavily involved in the war in Vietnam. This involvement solidified Nixon’s decision that the U.S. “cannot – and will not – conceive all the plans, design all the programs, execute all the decisions, and undertake all the defense of the free

⁷⁰ Berger, *The Battle for Asia: From Decolonization to Globalization*, 120.

nations of the world.”⁷¹ This new policy was a result of the challenges that USAID faced in Vietnam, the least of which was the challenge of trying to engage in ‘development’ in a war zone.⁷² The failings of USAID (though arguably not entirely their fault) led congress to vote down the president’s request for more aid in 1971, a first in American foreign policy and indicative of the new direction.⁷³

James Grant and other individuals saw state-led development in crisis and began arguing for a change to U.S. policy regarding state building. They awakened the smoldering suspicion on state-led projects that often were broadly conceived and widely implemented technological and infrastructure projects. In fact, it was due to Grant and others that led to the “New Direction” policies in 1973. One of the outcomes of this was seen in the reduction of USAID worldwide staff from 18,030 to 8,489.⁷⁴ (The effects of this are still being felt today in the understaffing of the State Department and their subsequent establishment of the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization in 2004.⁷⁵) The U.S., among other donors, had their conceptual framework, derived from developmental economics tested during the Vietnam War. As Washington’s effort to create a stable and independent sovereign nation-state of South Vietnam figuratively and literally went up in flames new models of development filled the gap, regardless of whether development economics was the cause of failure in Southeast Asia.

With the retreat from state-led development in the 1970s, there was a rise by the 1980s in the number and type of NGOs. Backed by the United Nations and the World Bank, NGOs saw a rise in popularity, primarily in that they were

⁷¹ Ekbladh, “From Consensus to Crisis,” 31.

⁷² Ibid., 30.

⁷³ Ibid., 31.

⁷⁴ Ibid., 32.

⁷⁵ However, only 75 persons staffed this office, which was designed to help orchestrate joint efforts across the U.S. Government.

not “the state”.⁷⁶ While previously, NGOs had been auxiliaries to the development project, they now emerged as the decision makers and policy developers for state building projects. Coincidentally, the World Bank under Robert McNamara saw its loan portfolio increase from \$800 million to over \$12 billion from 1968 to 1981.⁷⁷ This is a clear indication of the increased role of international organizations as the influence of the state development economic model waned.

In this way, the rise of the market and international aid community vis-à-vis the state-led development economic model further separated the state from the society. As Ghani and Lockhart note, ceding state functions to an outside agency results in the severance of the critical link of accountability between the state and its citizens.⁷⁸ Figure 3 represents this changed dynamic that was a result of the Vietnam War.

⁷⁶ Both institutions were backers of NGOs, or more precisely worked through NGOs. In the post-1975 era the UN and World Bank sought increasingly to co-opt NGOs in new ways, a shift from previous working arrangements.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 34-35.

⁷⁸ Ghani and Lockhart, *Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World*, 28.




Figure 3. The Impact of the International Aid in the Vietnam Era

The market and International aid have superseded the state as the provider of goods and services.⁷⁹ Thus, it is that the state is no longer receiving the legitimacy, which the social contract indicates it *ought* to receive. The state then becomes increasingly irrelevant and unable to control society within its formal territorial boundaries. There is cessation of return on investment for the state because the nation no longer “trusts” or deems the state worthy of social capital. Thus, at this point, the nation-state is effectively failing. The social contract has been broken, the nation no longer validates the existence of the state. Figure 3 represents not only the global order after Nixon, but describes the breakdown of the nation-state. The Vietnam War and the change in economic

⁷⁹ I use the term “international aid” to refer to the greater international community. This can be, but is not limited to NGOs, other governments, and businesses; in short, the greater international community. The emphasis on aid is international in that the estate for their action is in theory benevolent.

theory and aid policy that came in its wake radically reshaped the traditional understanding of the social contract between the state and the society.

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III. THE NECESSITY OF NATIONALISM

Nationalism is first and foremost a state of mind, an act of consciousness, which since the French Revolution has become more and more common to mankind. The mental life of man is as much dominated by an ego-consciousness as it is by a group-consciousness. Both are complex states of mind at which we arrive through experiences of differentiation and opposition, of the ego and the surrounding world, of the we-group and those outside the group... this group consciousness will strive towards creating homogeneity within the group, a conformity and like-mindedness which will lead to and facilitate concerted common action.⁸⁰

– Hans Kohn

A. INTRODUCTION

The argument so far has centered on the rise and decline of the nation-state between the 1940s and the 1980s. The changing patterns of globalization, and the inability on the part of many nation-states and the international community to integrate the state into the new order, has fundamentally altered the relationship between the state and the nation. The challenge then, for the state building project, is to re-link the nation and the state. Nationalism is the most expedient, and perhaps the only way contemporary, and future, state building projects can succeed. The state's effectiveness relates directly to the degree that the nation is in alignment with the state. Seth Kaplan noted that, "a country's ability to advance is crucially tied to its citizens' ability to cooperate – both among themselves and in partnership with the state."⁸¹ In essence, the more homogenous the society, the easier it is to interact, or the lower the

⁸⁰ Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism*, 10-11.

⁸¹ Seth D. Kaplan, *Fixing Fragile States: A New Paradigm for Development* (Wesport: Praeger Security International, 2008), 8.

transaction costs.⁸² Thus, the degree of nation-ness that exists in a nation-state is central to state strength and capacity for state-development and stability because it allows and facilitates “concerted common action.”⁸³

This chapter argues for the necessity of nationalism in the practice of state building and, in so doing, demonstrates that the goal ought not to be just state building, but nation making. This chapter will begin by considering competing theories of nationalism. It will then offer a definition of nationalism that considers the relationship of the nation to the state and what it is that nationalism actually does. Finally, this chapter will describe the Nation-State Congruence Model as a way of explaining the dynamic between the nation and state and thereby demonstrate the role that nationalism plays, or should play in state building.

B. COMPETING THEORIES OF NATIONALISM

The first goal in understanding nationalism’s role in state building is to describe it as a noun, that is to say, what it is. This, of course, presents a challenge immediately in that nationalism is not a unified school of thought. There are two distinct approaches to this subject: ethno-nationalism and modernism.⁸⁴ The former school is founded on sociological or ethnic nationalism,

⁸² I use the term homogenous liberally here, meaning homogeny in the inclusive sense as opposed to a more limited view of homogeny centered on identifiers such as race, religion, or locality. In the liberal sense homogeny, as I refer to it here, is more in line with Gellner who says that nationalism is, “the establishment of an anonymous, impersonal society, with mutually substitutable atomized individuals, held together above all by a shared culture of this kind, in place of a previous complex structure of local groups, sustained by folk cultures reproduced locally and idiosyncratically by the micro-groups themselves.” Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, 57.

⁸³ Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism*, 10-11.

⁸⁴ Some writers argue that there is a third school of nationalism. They do this by dividing what I consider “ethno-nationalism” into ethnocentric and primordial (and perhaps a further variance in religious nationalism). Jack Eller considers nationalism as the link between the Ethnic group and the macro group, such as the Umma or Christendom. Indicating a pre-existence of the idea of the nationalism and that it is bound up in blood, kinship, or religious ideology. However, I feel that definitions based on ethnies, religion, and primordial givens fall into the amorphous term “culture” and are therefore better considered together. Jack D. Eller, *From Culture to Ethnicity to Conflict: An Anthropological Perspective on International Ethnic Conflict* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1999), 20-21.

as argued by the likes of Anthony Smith and John Hutchison. This school has also been called the 'primordialist' approach due to the belief that a pre-existent nation or national identity is foundational to the idea of the nation-state.⁸⁵ The argument is that there are cultural givens, such as blood, language, race, and religion that funnel in to the 'essence' of the nation.⁸⁶ These givens are the things that to one degree or another are transcendent to a given people and are in a sense inherited, not constructed. Nationalism then is a cultural phenomenon.⁸⁷ Anthony Smith says in his work, *National Identity*, that central to the myth of nationalism is, "the idea that nations exist from time immemorial, and that nationalists must reawaken them from a long slumber to take their place in a world of nations."⁸⁸ To Smith, an ethnic community is, "a named human population with a myth of common ancestry, shared memories, and common cultural elements, a link with historic territory, and a measure of solidarity."⁸⁹ To the primordialist, a nation is a community of shared values, traditions, and history that have, "evolve[d] out of an unplanned historical-evolutionary process."⁹⁰

Montserrat Guibernau offers an excellent criticism of the ethnocentric approach to understanding the origins of nationalism. Simply put, her argument is that by assuming cultural givens, one ignores the fact that 'culture' is dynamic and ever changing. Things such as religion and language are not static and often change over time.⁹¹ A great example of this is the case of the Protestant Reformation and the change, not only religiously that it brought in the Catholic Church, but the widespread social and civic changes that it brought about in Europe, many of which are still resonating throughout the world today. Vinjayedra

⁸⁵ Hastings, *The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion, and Nationalism*, 8.

⁸⁶ Montserrat Guibernau, *The Identity of Nations* (Malden: Polity Press, 2007), 15.

⁸⁷ Smith, *National Identity*, vii.

⁸⁸ Ibid., 19-20.

⁸⁹ Smith, "The Ethnic Sources of Nationalism," 28-29.

⁹⁰ Fukuyama, "Nation-Building and the Failure of Institutional Memory," 3.

⁹¹ Guibernau, *The Identity of Nations*, 15.

Rao and Michael Walton point out that culture, "is not a set of primordial phenomena permanently embedded within national or religious or other groups, but rather a set of constituted attributes, constantly in flux, both shaping and being shaped by social and economic aspects of human interaction."⁹²

The second school belongs to the modernist approach as championed by scholars such as Kohn, Hobsbawm, Gellner, Breuilly, and Anderson. Generally, in the modernist approach, nationalism is seen as the vehicle for modernity. Correspondingly, this line of thought places nationalism, as a recent phenomenon that occurs only as a result of the industrial revolution and, in one sense, is dependent upon modernization.⁹³ Hobsbawm says that, "the basic characteristic of the modern nation and everything connected with it is its modernity."⁹⁴ He goes on to say that even the etymology of the word nation is of recent invention. This view stands in opposition to others who maintain that there is a degree of 'naturalness' in the nation in the sense that it has already existed. Modernists view the nation-state as something that is not a naturally occurring phenomenon. It is not a natural 'sociopolitical' form, nor does it arise out of pre-existing human norms.⁹⁵ However, some modernists will argue that nationalism has arisen out of a conflux of cultural norms, whether the forces of the Enlightenment as Anderson argues,⁹⁶ or as a result of the forces of industrialization and the natural progression as humanity has moved from an agrarian age into an industrial one.⁹⁷ Still, in both cases nationalism is inextricably linked to the changing global order of the modern era. It is then, to

⁹² Vinjayedra Rao and Michael Walton, "Culture and Public Action: Relationality, Equality of Agency, and Development" In *Culture and Public Action*, eds. Vinjayedra Rao and Michael Walton (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), 4.

⁹³ Hastings, *The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion, and Nationalism*, 8-11.

⁹⁴ Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780*, 14.

⁹⁵ Kathleen Weekly, "Nation Building in Post-World War II Philippines" In *From Nation Building to State Building*, ed. Mark T. Berger (New York: Routledge, 2008), 82.

⁹⁶ Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, 12.

⁹⁷ Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, 38.

the modernist that, “nationalism is not older than the second half of the eighteenth century.”⁹⁸ Nationalism arose in the vortex of political, economic, and intellectual developments that had been building for some time and it could not have developed apart from the notion of popular sovereignty and nationalism is the process by which the people are integrated into a common political form.⁹⁹

The modernist view places the origins of nationalism in the age of Enlightenment when men began to apply systematic thinking in all areas of the human experience. During the enlightenment there was a swelling in the reinterpretation of the state, man, and the society that brought out, “the dusk of religious modes of thought. The century of the Enlightenment, of rationalist secularism... With the ebbing of religious belief, the suffering which belief in part composed did not disappear... What then was required was a secular transformation of fatality into continuity, contingency into meaning... few things were (are) better suited to this end than an idea of nation.”¹⁰⁰

The human desire for purpose and meaning sought out new vessels as the old were put down. As the religious and dynastic reasons for living faded with the dawning of the Enlightenment, nationalism became an obvious outcropping. Anderson notes that:

The slow, uneven decline of these interlinked certainties, first in Western Europe, later elsewhere, under the impact of economic change, ‘discoveries’ (social and scientific), and the development of increasingly rapid communications, drove a harsh wedge between cosmology and history. No surprise then that the search was on, so to speak, for a new way of linking fraternity, power and time meaningfully together.¹⁰¹

⁹⁸ Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism*, 3.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 4.

¹⁰⁰ Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, 11.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 36.

Nationalism was the output for those seeking new ways of linking fraternity, power, and time. Thus, dynasties and religion passed from the forefront of humanity's thinking as the modality for framing existence and were replaced by the nation-state as the repository for meaning. This is significant in that as meaning moves from finite definitions of space and time to a more transcendent or non-temporal frame of reference, these nationalisms become transferable. This is to say that the individuals are able to see themselves apart from a god or king. Thus, nationalism or nation-ness is modular, which is to say that they are transferable to other social terrain.¹⁰² The nation-state, because of 'nation-ness', becomes the vehicle for modernity.

Perhaps a broader perspective, wherein both schools of thought are considered, is of more use. This bi-partisan position is best laid out by Adrian Hastings who says that, "in the later period nationalism may often have preceded nations rather than the reverse, in the earlier period it is far truer to say that nations as they grew more self-conscious, or came under threat, produced nationalisms."¹⁰³ Another way of reconciling the ethno-modernist debate is to see nationalism as Jack Snyder describes it, in light of civic and ethnic nationalisms.¹⁰⁴ He classifies civic as those nationalisms that are liberal and inclusive. Conversely, ethnic nationalism will seek to exclude some groups at the expense of others.¹⁰⁵ Returning to the greater point, there are cases of nations arising out of a specific ethnies, such as Japan, even as there are cases of a multi-ethnic nation, such as Spain as well. Each has specific historical trajectories that would suggest different paths to nationhood. Still, this thesis

¹⁰² Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, 4.

¹⁰³ Hastings, *The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion, and Nationalism*, 11.

¹⁰⁴ Snyder, *From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict*, 25.

¹⁰⁵ Anthony Smith does go to great lengths to describe ethnicity as something transferrable; yet, he seeks this to the degree that his definition of nation or ethnies is little differentiated and becomes so general as to be unwieldy. See Smith, "The Ethnic Sources of Nationalism."

argues for the modernist interpretation as the one that serves a more inclusive role because it is not tied to notions of ethnicity, but instead supports a more civic or liberal polity.

C. NATIONALISM DEFINED

What is nationalism? Nationalism is the highest order of identity as related to by the individual wherein they imagine themselves to be part of a greater whole, specifically the nation. Kohn notes that nationalities “come into existence only when certain objective bonds delimit a social group.” These objective bonds are shared things, saying, doings, and experiences. These ‘things’ are the tangible manifestation of a deeper level of consciousness. Furthermore, these characteristics are such things as, “common decent, language, territory, political entity, customs and traditions, and religion.” Yet, the most important factor is the decision to form the nation, this is to say that while each characteristic lends nation-ness, it is the decision to become the nation whereby the imagined becomes the community.¹⁰⁶ This ideal is grounded in the post-enlightenment ideology where by one may for the first time see themselves as more than part of a family, clan, or religion. Thus, nationalism is an imagined community (nation), both limited and sovereign.¹⁰⁷

1. The Nation as Imagined

A nation ultimately exists in the minds of its citizens, who may never meet, but live and die as one nation.¹⁰⁸ This view of nationalism encompasses the belief among a people that they are distinct from another nation because of particular attributes. This modern sense of identity, which is fluid and dynamic and includes such things as common culture, history, kinship, language, religion,

¹⁰⁶ Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism*, 13-15.

¹⁰⁷ Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, 6-7.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 6.

territory, a founding moment, and a shared sense of destiny. This implies that the identity of a nation arises from the, “consciousness of forming a group on the ‘felt’ closeness.”¹⁰⁹ This felt closeness could remain latent for years. However, once awakened, this imagined closeness, which is more effervescent than real, provides a ‘feeling’ that links the disparate peoples of a nation together. This internalization of a common feeling of togetherness will charge the person emotionally thus giving the person a distinctively psychological dimension to their understanding of identity. This aspect of an imagined community describes the transcendent nature of a nation. There is, in a nation, an aspect in which there is understanding of what it means to be a citizen beyond that which is written in something like a constitution or code of law. This may include, but is not limited to, culture. It is the way in which people, of disparate neighborhoods and counties, conceive of themselves as a nation. A nation imagined is how people of diverse heritage and social class can regard themselves as one society.

2. The Nation Fraternal

A nation is imagined as a *community*, because, regardless of how disproportionate the distribution of wealth or power is, the nation always conceives of itself in deep, horizontal comradeship. It is this fraternity that ultimately makes so many people willingly give their lives for their nation.¹¹⁰ This fraternal feeling is based on such things as values, beliefs, customs, conventions, habits, languages, and practices of a nation. The culture of a nation allows for a shared feeling of solidarity for a nation by allowing its citizens to imagine themselves as distinct from other nations.¹¹¹

In a very fundamental way, meanwhile, national history makes people closer to their ancestors and this strengthens their subjective belief in being part

¹⁰⁹ Guibernau, *The Identity of Nations*, 11-12.

¹¹⁰ Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, 7.

¹¹¹ Guibernau, *The Identity of Nations*, 13.

of an extended family. "Feelings of transcendence and immortality are infused into individuals made aware of their role as pieces of a chain, that in spite of some transformations, remains constant and unique."¹¹² History provides an identity of belonging to something larger than oneself. A nation exists then, when the idea of the nation is powerful enough to bring together disparate individuals into a communal conception of brotherhood. It is this precise aspect of community that ultimately binds all citizens in a way where they are no longer north or south, black or white, but rather a people. In this way, the imagined *community* defines a nation.

3. The Nation as a State

A nation is imagined as *limited* because even in the largest of them, such as China or India, there are finite, if somewhat elastic at times, boundaries. Furthermore, no nation imagines itself as coterminous with all mankind. Even the most messianic of nationalists do not profess of a day when all man will join their nation, even if it were possible.¹¹³ People are tied to the land in which they live. Even in today's society one finds that where they live determines what type of food they eat, where their children go to school, what style of home they live in, and what they do for entertainment. The land in which they live dictates to all areas of life. This is true today just as much as it was a hundred years ago. However, there is a difference today and this is seen in the rise of mass media and universal education. It is through these two mediums that people from London and Bath, while geographically separate, can nonetheless conceive of themselves as from England.¹¹⁴

Historically, it is easy to identify with the immediate area, this is tribalism, but it is through education and the mass media that one is able to conceive of

¹¹² Guibernau, *The Identity of Nations*, 21.

¹¹³ Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, 7.

¹¹⁴ Guibernau, *The Identity of Nations*, 21-23.

them territorially. Benedict Anderson highlights this rise of mass media and education through the recounting of the process by which Siam came into being. Anderson, drawing on Thai historian Thongchai Winichakul, notes that until the ascension of Rama IV in 1851 there were only two types of maps existent in Siam, the first was a 'cosmograph' (the formal representation of the Three Worlds of traditional Buddhist theology), and the second type consisted of diagrams for military campaigns and coastal shipping. What is interesting about these two maps were that neither demarcated borders and were almost always generated locally for local use. Then with the rise of print capitalism and education in Siam, in the 1870's, Thai leaders began to think of boundaries as segments of, "a continuous map-line corresponding to nothing visible on the ground, but demarcating an exclusive sovereignty wedged between other sovereignties." Accordingly, in 1882, Rama V established a special school for cartography in Bangkok. The rise of print capitalism and the new conceptions of spatial reality had significant impact on Thai politics in that for the first time the term 'country' came into the lexicon of the Thai.¹¹⁵ Thus, bounded political space is central to the creation of a national identity. In part, the definition of a nation is to the boundaries within which it exists. A nation is American and therefore is not Canadian. In this way, the nation is limited to geo-spatial and semi-ethnic boundaries. However, this is not to say that a nation is necessarily homogenous, only that it is homogenous in respect to other nations.

4. The Nation as Social Contract

Lastly, a nation is imagined as being, or aspires to be, a *sovereign* state because it is made up of individuals who are willing to divest themselves of their right to violence, thus, empowering the state to actualize the concept of nation-ness. This imagining of sovereignty is a result of the convergence of the twin historical arcs of the death of cosmological and dynastic realms. The idea of a

¹¹⁵ Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, 171-173.

nation came into being in the age of Enlightenment and Revolution, necessarily destroying the concept of a divinely –ordained, hierarchal dynastic realm.¹¹⁶ The nation then becomes the symbol of mankind's liberation from God and monarchy by appropriating power for itself in the form of the nation-state. Thus, the people come to rule themselves.

The transition in which people come to rule themselves is easily seen in post World War II Japan. Here this element of post-war enlightenment came to pass in Japan as a result of the emperor descending from on high. It must be remembered that the emperor was a direct descendent of the sun goddess Amaterasu and ruled a theocracy. The Japanese lived in a world where the emperor embodied the nation – the emperor was the national polity.¹¹⁷ This is why the shift from a cosmological dynasty to a sovereign nation-state is so striking. Individual Japanese sovereignty arose through two events that radically altered the way in which the people saw themselves. The two watersheds were the emperor's declaration of humanity and his country tour.

In the first address to his subjects since the radio announcement of capitulation, the emperor again addressed his people through a press release entitled, "Rescript to Promote National Destiny." Popularly known as his declaration of humanity, this statement was met with great acclaim from the international community¹¹⁸; however, it had a much greater resonance with the Japanese. The key paragraph follows:

I stand by my people. I am ever ready to share in their joys and sorrows. The ties between me and my people have always been formed by mutual trust and affection. They do not depend upon mere legends or myths. Nor are they predicated on the false

¹¹⁶ Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, 7.

¹¹⁷ Kenneth B. Pyle, "Some Recent Approaches to Japanese Nationalism" In *Modern Japan: An Interpretive Anthology*, ed. Irwin Scheiner (New York: MacMillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1974), 126.

¹¹⁸ John W. Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1999), 308.

conception that the Emperor is divine, and that the Japanese are superior to other races and destined to rule the world.¹¹⁹

The second event that changed the way the people began to view themselves in regard to the emperor was a series of tours that saw the emperor travel a total of 165 days and close to 33,000 kilometers over several years. These tours marked the beginning of the transformation of the monarch into a celebrity.¹²⁰ The tours were an exceedingly painful undertaking for the rigidly formal Hirohito. However, he bore up under the weight of them in, “such stolid, uncomplaining discomfort that, in unanticipated ways, he actually became an intimate symbol of suffering and victimization of his people. As often as not, they felt sorry for him.”¹²¹ To the people, it was like the day that you finally realized that your father was human and this brought both embarrassment as well as revelation. There is a saying in Japan that, “you can gaze upon the lords, but looking at the shogun will make you blind; and the emperor cannot be seen at all.”¹²² It was this mix of imperial mysticism, combined with the exposure of the man behind the curtain that the common man was not supposed to pay mind to, that, “touched a sad, but subdued chord of nationalism, or at least national regret”¹²³ in the people. To them the emperor had descended; sovereignty had come to the people.

D. THE EFFICACY OF NATIONALISM

Nationalism lowers transaction cost in a society by providing a common culture and context, which all citizens are able to drawn on. Thus, the efficacy of nationalism is that it allows for increasing measures of connectedness in a society. Shortly after the American Revolutionary War, George Washington, now

¹¹⁹ Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II*, 314.

¹²⁰ Ibid., 330.

¹²¹ Ibid., 331.

¹²² Ibid., 332.

¹²³ Ibid., 334-335.

fifty-two returned to Mount Vernon to take stock of his life and the future of the nation. His property was run down after eight years of absence due to service to his nation. His personal estates were scattered and in disarray, not unlike the state of the fledging nation, and not for the first time he mused that the main problem facing America was that of the tyranny of distance. America was a vast country and growing more every year. His diaries show what was of chief concern to him: the impact of distance on American economy, social life, and opportunity.¹²⁴ For Washington, if the nation was to survive, it must begin to see itself as such.

What Washington has so adeptly touched upon is truly a challenge of the nation-state today. The challenge is how does one govern the diversity that exists within its borders. This challenge is often compounded by the fact that as early America was spread geographically, so too in this day the citizens of a nation are spread throughout the world, many carrying several passports from various countries. Washington sought to bring America closer though a series of civil engineering projects aimed at increasing the rapidity of travel for the citizens of the thirteen colonies, projects such as a series of locks on the Potomac and Ohio Rivers.¹²⁵ These efforts were for the purpose of increasing communication between the disparate localities. Nationalism is a way of organizing a society for effective mobilization; it is in this sense a form of politics.¹²⁶ It is the ability to communicate that lowers the transaction cost in an organization and nationalism does this by fostering a common culture thereby providing common language and shared identity. All societies need symbols and rituals to survive, foster cohesion, and affirm the collective values and ideas that they create.¹²⁷

¹²⁴ Paul Johnson, *George Washington: The Founding Father* (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2005), 79-80.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, 80-82.

¹²⁶ John Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State*, 2nd ed. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1993), 1 and 14.

¹²⁷ Guibernau, *The Identity of Nations*, 32.

E. THE NATION-STATE CONGRUENCE MODEL

Ernest Gellner describes nationalism as a political principle that holds that the political and national units are congruent. This is a theory of political legitimacy where the ethnic boundaries do not cut across political ones.¹²⁸ Put another way, the political boundaries are drawn in accordance to those who consider themselves as a singular national unit. In answer to the question of who is a nation, Gellner asserts that a nation exists when two men, “share the same culture, where culture in turn means a system of ideas and signs and association and ways of behaving and communicating...and only if they recognize each other as belonging to the same nation.”¹²⁹ This is describing the equation laid out by Hobsbawm where by the nation = state = people.¹³⁰ This equation finds its roots in both the American and French bill of rights, though it is more implicit in the French model. The French Declaration of Rights of 1795 states that, “Each people is independent and sovereign, whatever the number of individuals who compose it and the extent of territory it occupies. This sovereignty is inalienable.”¹³¹

The simple question now follows as to why it is important that nationalism binds a people and lowers the transaction cost associated with the consolidation of a society. The answer to this is seen in the Nation-State Congruence Model that states that the degree to which the nation and state are in agreement will indicate the relative stability or instability of the nation-state. Put another way, for a state to function, the nation, or nationality of its citizens must be in agreement with the territorial limits and capacity of the state. The extent of the congruence between the nation and state is seen in the proportional ratio of the geopolitical boundaries of the state and the national aspirations of those citizens living within

¹²⁸ Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, 1.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, 7.

¹³⁰ Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780*, 19.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, 19.

the state. Or, said another way, “the extent to which the current division of a given region into territorial states reflects the national affiliations of the main groups in the region and their aspirations to establish states and/or to revise existing boundaries.”¹³² This is seen in Figure 4 below.




Figure 4. The Nation-State Congruence Model

In Figure 4, the dynamic is demonstrated where by if a society is realized within its own mind primarily as a nation, but is not constructed as a state territorially; then the result is an “unrealized” nation. The examples of this are seen in such communities as Quebec or Scotland where there exists the idea of the nation, but not a national state. Often, these “nations” make up a larger state. Conversely, if a case arises such as Iraq where in there is a state apparatus that is not realized by its citizens as a nation then the nation-state may be said to be failing. It is then, only when there exists the idea of a nation that is congruent to finite borders that a nation-state exists. This is what is meant by the congruency of the nation and state.

¹³² Miller, *States, Nations, and the Great Powers: The Sources of Regional War and Peace*, 55.

Kathleen Weekly makes this point abundantly clear regarding the Philippines. She says that, “the nation as an ideological construct cannot be separated from the state as a set of politico-economic structures.” The state reproduces the nation through such things as passports, postage stamps, and pledges of allegiance – acts that remind the people that they are citizens. The fewer of these reminders of citizenship, the weaker the tie between the state and people, and it is when these linkages begin to break down, as in the case of Chinese Filipinos or the Muslims of Mindanao, that the conception of the nation begins to fade.¹³³ Therefore, the tighter the linkage between the state and the nation, the greater is the degree of nationalism existent in the nation-state.

Seth Kaplan makes this argument in a slightly different form in *Fixing Fragile States*. He says that, “inappropriate institutions cause fragile states and that only by redesigning those institutions can dysfunctional places craft the commercial environments necessary to attract investment – without which no development can occur or be sustained – and jumpstart a self-sustaining cycle of growth.”¹³⁴ While this may seem to contradict the earlier claims about nationalism as a necessary condition, it is in effect supporting the claim in that what Kaplan is referring to here is one of organizational fit. What is meant, is that a failing state is one where the state apparatus is not in congruence with the national leanings. Thus, the very fiber of the nation-state has a built in disconnect. Or, as noted before, in a failing state the hyphen is long indeed.

To recapitulate, nationalism is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for state development. This is to say that nationalism must be present, though nationalism alone is not a sufficient condition for a successful outcome. This assertion has been argued for by demonstrating that linkage between the people and the state through the concept of social contract where by the state is responsible for the delivery of basic goods and services to its citizenry. This is, as

¹³³ Weekly, “Nation Building in Post-World War II Philippines,” 83.

¹³⁴ Kaplan, *Fixing Fragile States: A New Paradigm for Development*, 2.

Toby Dodge describes, the 'ideal' state where the state is, "legitimized by its ability to deliver public goods to the population contained within its recognized borders, through a differentiated set of centralized governmental institutions". For Dodge, "its capacity is ultimately grounded in the extent to which its administrative staff successfully upholds the claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force."¹³⁵

This thesis has argued that by the 1970s there an increased delinking of the state from its ability to provide these services was getting underway. Moreover, the state building projects of today have nation-state-disconnect built into their very fiber, much more than in the past. With this established the thesis considered the changing role of nationalism. To demonstrate the veracity of the overall argument, the thesis showed that a successful nation-state is dependent upon the congruence of the nation and the state. Therefore it can be said that nationalism, or nation-ness, is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for a successful sovereign state.

¹³⁵ Toby Dodge, "Iraq: Contradictions of Neoliberal State Building" In *From Nation Building to State Building*, ed. Mark T. Berger (New York: Routledge, 2008), 185.

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IV. SEEKING THE MODERN STATE II: THE FAILURE OF AND NEED FOR REORIENTING THE STATE BUILDING PROJECT IN AN INCREASINGLY GLOBAL WORLD ORDER, 1975 -2010

The greatest of humane Powers, is that which is compounded of the Powers of most men, united by consent, in one person, Naturall, or Civill, that has the use of all their Powers depending on his will; such as the Power of a Common-wealth: Or depending on the wills of each particular; such as is the Power of a Faction, or of divers factions leagued.¹³⁶ – Thomas Hobbes

A. INTRODUCTION

This thesis has been considering state building in an historical context in an effort to ascertain the role of nationalism in the state building project. It has traced the origins of state building through development economics and modernization theory, which focused on state-led processes. These theories ultimately proved inadequate for the state building project because they did not provide linkages between the state and the society (nation) in that they did not account for a cultural dimension of growth. In this respect they ultimately served as their own harbingers of failure. The state building projects that began after World War II, and in many ways began in reaction to colonialism, could not keep pace with an increasingly global society, especially after the New Direction policies Nixon introduced in the 1970s. The shift in state building went from an approach where the state controlled the entire project, to one where the economy, and more precisely, the world markets and the spirit of liberal capitalism, controlled the state. Consequently, the world and the nation-state system is today in increasing disarray.

Because of the reaction against state-led development, the state building project has become, and as Chapter II delineated, an increasingly delinked and

¹³⁶ Hobbes, *Leviathan Or the Matter, Forme & Power of a Common-Wealth Ecclesiasticall and Civill*, 51.

fragmented project. Further complicating this is the emasculation of the instruments of power that a state may bring to bear. Current state building practices are set within the neoclassical economic model. They are operating with a neo-democratic development model that focuses on technocratic means that inevitably leads to a world of more and more de jure sovereign nation-states and fewer de facto sovereign nation-states. Mark Berger argues that, "at this world-historical juncture the nation-state system and the pursuit of modernity via that nation-state generally, or nation building more specifically is the key obstacle to the achievement of a genuinely emancipatory modernity in a global era of emergent oligopolistic capitalism."¹³⁷

However, the nation-state may still serve as a means to modernity and benefit from globalization. The problem is the current form of the sovereign modern nation-state. Stable states are necessary for development. Meanwhile, regional frameworks are dependent upon stable states for economic and political wellbeing.¹³⁸ We need a new understanding of the role and purpose of the nation-state. To this end, this chapter will first consider contemporary theories of state building. It will reflect on the rise of neoclassical and neo-democratic development theory and the cost of seeking a technocratic state building project. Next, it will offer an alternative to the current paradigm by considering what is necessary for the reorientation of the state building project. To do this, this chapter will conclude by revisiting the Nation-State Congruence Model and offer suggestions for actualizing a re-imagined nation-state.

¹³⁷ Mark T. Berger, "Keeping the World Safe for Primary Colors: Area Studies, Development Studies, International Studies, and the Vicissitudes of Nation Building," *Globalizations* 4, no. 4 (2007), 431.

¹³⁸ See Ghani and Lockhart, *Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World*, 4; and Miller, *States, Nations, and the Great Powers: The Sources of Regional War and Peace*, 73.

B. CURRENT THEORIES OF STATE BUILDING: POST VIETNAM WAR TO THE PRESENT

Two crucial errors pervade the theory and practice of state building today. The first is its reliance on neo-classical economics and the second is that it uses a flawed formulation of what the democratic process entails. The solution is to rediscover that nation-ness matters. This section will consider neo-classical economics and contemporary theories of democratization that in large part provide the basis for the theory and practices of state building today.

The rise of neo-classical economics by the 1970s and 1980s grew out of the failure of development economics and classic modernization theory.¹³⁹ However, neoclassical economics, and its progeny Rational Choice Theory (RCT), which became a key strand of thought within political science, have not successfully addressed the social dynamics of the nation-state, much less its place in a regional or global economic framework.¹⁴⁰ Neo-classical economic theory assumes that markets are a given. Countries are assumed to not only accumulate capital, but save it as well. At the same time, they assume that capital, along with technology, flows freely across borders thus achieving a semblance of equilibrium naturally and necessarily.¹⁴¹ Jeffrey Sachs points out “the optimism of neoclassical economics is sustained by the view that flawed economic institutions are swept away by institutional competition or through public choice.”¹⁴² In the neoclassical model, it is common to believe that less-developed countries can easily be set on the path to developed status given the appropriate means.¹⁴³ The formula is Capital + Labor + Technology = Economic

¹³⁹ Berger, “Keeping the World Safe for Primary Colors: Area Studies, Development Studies, International Studies, and the Vicissitudes of Nation Building”, 432.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., 433.

¹⁴¹ Jeffrey Sachs, “Notes on a New Sociology of Economic Development” In *Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress*, eds. Lawrence E. Harrison and Samuel P. Huntington (New York: Basic Books, 2000), 30.

¹⁴² Ibid., 31.

¹⁴³ Fukuyama, “Nation-Building and the Failure of Institutional Memory,” 6.

Development. The solution set is one where the right arrangement of key variables will produce a similar outcome, regardless of the particulars of the case. This solution set resonates with Henry Mintzberg's theory of organizational design, which stresses that because organizations have natural structures, harmony among the various parts may be the deciding factor in organizational success.¹⁴⁴ In this fashion, the solution set for state building becomes merely a proper alignment of institutions, which is of course presupposing that there is a nation to begin with.¹⁴⁵ Neoclassical economics, meanwhile, regards economic growth as something that occurs with little or connection to state processes. In addition, there is no mention in the neoclassical model of the role of culture or society.¹⁴⁶ It is not surprising that the neoclassical model in its purest form did not last far beyond the early 1990s. Meanwhile, beginning with the fall of the Berlin wall, a shift began wherein RCT entered the development debate. RCT argues that individuals and groups act rationally in response to the information at their disposal.¹⁴⁷ In the early 1990s, both neoclassical economists and proponents of RCT pointed to the "Asian Miracle" as evidence of what can be accomplished if the actors made rational decisions concerning economic development.¹⁴⁸

The path by which a nation-state moves towards democracy is eerily similar to the economic development trajectory prescribed by neoclassical economics. The contemporary state building project operates on the assumption

¹⁴⁴ Henry Mintzberg, *Organization Design: Fashion Or Fit?* (Harvard Business Review, 1981).

¹⁴⁵ The Nation-State Congruence Model (figure 4) points instead to the fact that institution building, with out consideration for national consciousness will merely lead to a failed state. Institution building is but one aspect of the state building project.

¹⁴⁶ This is the argument that Sachs is making, that there are other factors involved in development beyond the basic neoclassical factors. Specifically he names geography, social systems, and positive feed back mechanisms. For more see Sachs, "Notes on a New Sociology of Economic Development."

¹⁴⁷ Berger, "Keeping the World Safe for Primary Colors: Area Studies, Development Studies, International Studies, and the Vicissitudes of Nation Building," 433.

¹⁴⁸ Berger, *The Battle for Asia: From Decolonization to Globalization*, 164-165.

that all one needs is a constitution, a vote, and bingo: you have a democracy. This formulation is like the neoclassical economic model of capital, labor, and technology in that just as economists viewed the infusion of capital and technology as sufficient conditions for economic growth, the technocratic approach to democratization views the introduction of a constitution and universal suffrage as sufficient conditions for democracy, state-development, and stability.

In September of 2003, Paul Bremer, then the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Iraq, released a curious op-ed article in the *Washington Post*. This article, apparently not approved by the administration in Washington, laid out a seven-step road map for the transfer of power from the Americans to the Iraqis. This road map boiled down to three goals essentially: a constitution, elections, and transfer of power. Once it became evident that this plan was going to take a *long* time, the administration in Washington released a revised version that actually sought to transfer sovereignty on a shortened timeline – a mere eight months. What is more astounding is that the second plan actually called for a transfer of power prior to the establishment of a constitution and elections.¹⁴⁹

Another example of the neo-democratic development model is the work of Larry Diamond, who spent a period in Iraq, ostensibly as a senior advisor on democratization to Paul Bremer. In an essay, reflecting on what “went wrong” in Iraq; Diamond argued that they should have held elections as early as possible in order to put a uniquely Iraqi face on the government. It was his belief that this would have led to a greater sense of legitimacy for the government of Iraq.¹⁵⁰ However, he does note that this may not be advisable in all cases. The point here though, is that there exists to this day, a predilection to emphasize the

¹⁴⁹ Thomas E. Ricks, *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq* (New York: Penguin Books, 2006), 254.

¹⁵⁰ Larry Diamond, "What Went Wrong and Right in Iraq" In *Nation Building: Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq*, ed. Francis Fukuyama (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2006), 183-184.

importance of elections, early and often, to facilitate democratization. Thus, it is that a constitution + elections = democracy.

In general, the assumptions made by neoclassical economic and neo-democratic political models are that there exists a natural inclination to move towards social order. This is to say that both approaches disavow the notion of a social contract where by an individual invests their “choice” in an institution when a reciprocal relationship has been established, not before. In short, culture matters, society matters, and the nation matters. The current state building theories have naively assumed liberal democratic institutions are *naturally occurring phenomena*. Thus, the continued failing of the neo-economic and neo-democratic models is based in the fact that natural ordering in society does not occur. The market and international actors will continue in the most Hobbesian of conflicts in a true war against all and subsequently will expand the legitimacy gap. Daniel W. Drezner’s article, “Sovereignty for Sale” provides a good example of the problem. In it he keenly observes, that the while the nation-state is under siege by bureaucracies and capital markets, more often than not, “sovereignty’s erosion is as likely to occur by choice as by force.” He goes on to say that, “today, many small countries voluntarily auction off their sovereignty to the highest bidder, reaping great rewards in the process.”¹⁵¹ Drezner proceeds to illustrate this point by relating several interesting historical and current facts.

In the 19th century, Hawaiian sugar producers compromised their sovereignty to gain access to the US market duty-free. During the Cold War, Third World rulers were not shy about trading basing rights or UN votes in exchange for superpower protection or foreign aid.¹⁵² Consider also the market for Country-Code Domain Names (CCTLDS) on the World Wide Web. These are the two letter designators for web addresses such as .uk for Great Britain or .de for Germany. In all there are 243 CCTLDS, one for every sovereign country and

¹⁵¹ Daniel W. Drezner, “Sovereignty for Sale,” *Foreign Policy* 126 (2001), 76, <http://links.jstor.org> (accessed Dec 12, 2007), 76.

¹⁵² *Ibid.*, 76.

territory. It would follow that the number of websites registered in a country would correspond to the country's size or development level yet site registered in the Turks and Caicos exceed those registered in Finland. And, Tonga (independent only since 1970) has more sites than Greece or Turkey. Why, because these small countries have found it rather easy to sell their sovereignty to corporations. Drezner concludes that small countries pursuing economic freedom by selling their sovereignty would do well to remember that sovereignty, unlike tourism or agriculture is a non-renewable resource.¹⁵³ Mark Berger makes a similar argument in his article, "States of Nature and the Nature of States". He says that, "the uneven spread of globalization has pushed nation-states in many parts of the world well beyond the limits of their potential as institutions to provide security and development for the majority of their citizens."¹⁵⁴ The failure of the nation-state in a globalized world is that as they integrate into the world economy they increasingly sell or relinquish their sovereignty. Order, in the nation-state is not naturally occurring. In this context, what is the course for the future? The answer is a reshaping of the state building project via a renewed emphasis on a greater alignment of nation and state.

C. CONSTRUCTING THE NATION-STATE: THE RESHAPING OF THE STATE BUILDING PROJECT

The nation-state is imagined along particular lines and therefore has particular characteristics. This thesis has described the nation-state as an imagined community that is metaphysical, fraternal, territorially defined, and based upon a social contract. This thesis has also argued that the idea of the nation came into being only in the wake of the crossing of particular historical arcs, namely the waning of dynastic power and pre-modern cosmology. Moreover, since the onset of industrialization, ideas regarding, "nation-states,

¹⁵³ Drezner, "Sovereignty for Sale," 77.

¹⁵⁴ Mark T. Berger, "States of Nature and the Nature of States: The Fate of Nations, the Collapse of States and the Future of the World," *Third World Quarterly* 28, no. 6 (2007), 1203-1204.

republican institutions, common citizenships, popular sovereignty, national flags and anthem....and the liquidation of their conceptual opposites: dynastic empires, monarchical institutions, absolutisms, subjecthoods, inherited nobilities, serfdoms, ghettos, and so forth,” have become transferable.¹⁵⁵ In other words, the nation-state and the ideology that surrounds it, is as Anderson notes, a cultural artefact of a particular kind, one that is transferable from one society to another.¹⁵⁶ Thus, the American notion of liberal democracy is not limited to America. It can, and is, re-imagined and spread around the world.

Meanwhile, the Nation-State Congruence model indicates that where there are state structures, but no idea of nation-ness, no nation-state exists (Figures 4 and 5). Conversely, if there *is* a sense of nationalism and yet not state institutions, there exists an unrealized state. The current theory and practice of state building has not addressed this dynamic because it has focused on the market and institutions as the end in themselves when in fact they are but means to the end, which is a stable nation-state. Because of this, there is a dramatic need to reshape the state building project. Figure 5 describes the two movements necessary to the success of a state building project.

¹⁵⁵ Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, 81.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 4.




Figure 5. The Nation-State Congruence Model II

The first dynamic (A) is the process by which an unrealized nation is brought into congruence with an actualized state. This dynamic (A) is that of state building where there is a realignment of the state apparatus to more accurately reflect the unrealized nation. As previously discussed, this process includes the consolidation of the monopoly on violence by the state over a population. However, there are occasions where this will prove impossible, for example Palestine or India-Pakistan in 1947-1948, where the proper response is, or might have been to redraw territorial boundaries. Other mechanisms for this are the strengthening of state capacity, which allows the state to provide essential goods and services to its citizens.¹⁵⁷ Ghani and Lockhart describe these mechanisms as state functions and suggest ten functions that a state must carry out in order to fulfill its citizen's aspirations for inclusion and

¹⁵⁷ Miller, *States, Nations, and the Great Powers: The Sources of Regional War and Peace*, 71.

development.¹⁵⁸ They are: rule of law, a monopoly on violence, administrative control, sound management of public finances, creation of citizenship rights through social policy, provision of infrastructure services, formation of a market, management of public assets, effective public borrowing, and investment in human capital.¹⁵⁹ Ghani and Lockhart assert that it is when these functions are carried out that there begins a clustering effect that is synergistic and creates a, “virtuous circle in which decisions in the different domains reinforce enfranchisement and opportunity for the citizenry.”¹⁶⁰ These are the civic institutions whereby a government performs the functions that its population expects it to.¹⁶¹

The second dynamic (B) described in Figure 5 is that of nation building wherein strategies are employed to create a sense of nationalism.¹⁶² This dynamic is the most overlooked and yet most necessary for the establishment and health of the nation-state. This is the process by which a state enfranchises its citizens. This is done through the fulfillment of the social contract, which creates buy-in to the idea of the nation. Still, it is not enough to simply fulfill the social contract; there must be an effort to frame the nation within the borders of the state thereby bringing the nation into a congruent relationship with the state.

¹⁵⁸ Ghani and Lockhart, *Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World*, 124.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid., 125-162.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid., 163.

¹⁶¹ Ibid., 4.

¹⁶² As discussed previously nationalism is used in reference to civic nationalism that is grounded in liberal democratic ideals. This is in opposition to ethno-nationalism that more often than not forces greater division. For an excellent treatment of this I again refer you to Snyder, *From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict*.

This process refers to growing loyalty of the citizens to the state.¹⁶³ There are several methods through which this is accomplished.

At the most basic level, the necessary condition for implementing the second dynamic (B) is the art of association. De Tocqueville, when describing America, points to this as the key factor that allows for consensus on the larger items. Free institutions, he argues, “provide a thousand reminders to each citizen that he lives in society. They constantly impress this idea upon his mind, that it is duty as well as self-interest to be useful to one’s fellows.”¹⁶⁴ Civil and political associations work to carry people beyond individualism.¹⁶⁵ Thus, a necessary condition for the movement from a state to a nation is the growing of what Snyder calls a “thick” network of liberal conceptions. This “thick” web, which consists of liberal institutions, values, interest-group bargains, and social ties allow for the channeling of political participation in liberal directions.¹⁶⁶ Without these associations, and more precisely, the *ability* to associate, the movement from failed-state to nation-state will not take place. There is a need to first undergird the process with a conception of society that extends beyond the immediate. This is the first principle of nation building, the process of conceiving of the nation as something larger than its individual member’s sense of personal identity. This leads to the second aspect of nation building – social capital.

Social capital is defined as the instantiated set of informal values and norms that are held by a group or society that allows for mutual cooperation.¹⁶⁷

¹⁶³ Miller takes this aspect as being done through non-material things such as public education, media, and propagation of national myths. However, these are physical in that they are shared things, things that are tangible. They are only non-material in the sense that they are producing an imagined nation as opposed to physical infrastructure. Miller, *States, Nations, and the Great Powers: The Sources of Regional War and Peace*, 71.

¹⁶⁴ Alexis De Tocqueville, *Democracy in America: And Two Essays on America*, trans. Gerald E. Bevan (London: Penguin Books, 2003), 595.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid., 604 and 591.

¹⁶⁶ Snyder, *From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict*, 316-317.

¹⁶⁷ Francis Fukuyama, "Social Capital" In *Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress*, eds. Lawrence E. Harrison and Samuel P. Huntington (New York: Basic Books, 2000), 98.

Social capital allows for lower transaction cost between individuals in a society because it has to do with the amount of trust in a society. The importance of this is crucial when it comes to nation building. Social capital is generated among the citizens as they enter into civil and political associations with each other. They begin to trust one another and this ultimately allows for increased levels of cooperation. At the same time, there is a level of social capital that is created through the delivery of basic goods and services to the citizens by the state. When the state provides these services, the nation begins to trust the state as the legitimate fulfiller of the social contract.

A third predominant factor in the rise of a cohesive national identity is that of an extensive vernacular literature.¹⁶⁸ Gellner speaks extensively of this particular point, emphasizing that it is only through the process of universal education that a modern society is able to achieve a form of cohesiveness. This is a necessary condition in that education allows for the modularization of the individual within society, thus allowing for social mobility.¹⁶⁹ The tenet of social mobility is what the idea of liberal democracy is built upon. Unlike in a previous era, when everyone's place in the world was determined by birth and locked in by hereditary law the idea of the nation is grounded in an understanding of popular sovereignty wherein all men are created equal. For example, in his proclamation in 1945 of a Vietnam independent from French rule, Ho Chi Minh quoted extensively from Thomas Jefferson and opened his remarks with the statement, "We hold these truths to be self-evident."¹⁷⁰ Literacy, education, and a diffuse vernacular not only allow for greater and easier lines of communication, but also in actuality allow for a greater degree of egalitarianism.

A fourth factor that leads to the rise of a national identity is that of conflict. Adrian Hastings argues that, "a long struggle against an external threat may also

¹⁶⁸ Hastings, *The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion, and Nationalism*, 2.

¹⁶⁹ Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, 33-35.

¹⁷⁰ Herring, *America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975*, 3.

have a significant effect.”¹⁷¹ Similarly, Bruce Porter has argued that, “war is a demonstrably organized and *organizing*, phenomenon... a powerful catalyst of *change*... states make war, but war also makes states. The origins of the modern state, its rise and development, are inextricably linked with violent conflict and military power.”¹⁷² This creation of common enemies is powerful because it often leads to the consolidation of a sense of community among the individuals of a society¹⁷³ provided that the conflict is intrastate.

In summary, nation building (dynamic B in Figure 5) is the process by which the construction of the “image” of a nation takes place. This is done by the construction of a common history and a shared culture over a demarcated geographic space. It includes the creation of symbols that have meaning and the sharing of ideas and ideology.¹⁷⁴ Most importantly though, it is about consensus building by which the nation is brought into congruence with the state. The congruence of the nation and state is the process of nation-state building. It is precisely to the degree that the two are brought into alignment that there will exist a stable nation-state. Thus, nationalism is a necessary condition for state building.

¹⁷¹ Hastings, *The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion, and Nationalism*, 2.

¹⁷² Bruce D. Porter, *War and the Rise of the State: The Military Foundation of Modern Politics* (New York: The Free Press, 1994), xiv-xv and 1.

¹⁷³ Guibernau, *The Identity of Nations*, 25.

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 25.

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V. CONCLUSION

This paper began with a statement that the world has become normal once more. While there is a degree of accuracy in this statement, it is not entirely true. There has been a resurgence of major powers, as well as a rise of the rest. Yet, the world is still remarkably different from the one in which the idea of the nation-state was born some two hundred years ago. The past sixty years has seen a decline in state-centered development, the rise of a global market, and the introduction of transnational actors who answer to neither state nor nation. Consequently, there has been a movement of popular sovereignty, and the resulting social capital, away from the state. Meanwhile, the hyphen between nation and state has grown longer.

The nation-state must now seek its place in a new global order. What is interesting to note is that this does not necessarily involve a fundamental change in the global political economy, but it does involve moving the level of analysis upward and downward. The movement upward is one of layering where liberal democratic nationalistic ideals – liberty, equality, and fraternity – are not subsumed by the onset of globalization, but are instead buttressed by it.¹⁷⁵ In this way, globalism is merely an expansion of existing values and beliefs. In fact, for the true liberal it is the logical manifestation of the process. Similarly, there is a movement of sovereignty downward. These new or strengthened levels of identity necessarily expand the individual's level of responsibility by expanding their degree of connectedness. In short, personal sovereignty not only moves downward, but upward as well.

For the nation-state as we know it to survive and prosper, there is a need for the reorientation of state building projects to encompass a far better understanding of the role of democratic or civic nationalism. The reason for this is that nationalism is a necessary condition for state development. Without a

¹⁷⁵ Guibernau, *The Identity of Nations*, 195.

genuinely inclusive nationalism or national identity the nation-state is either unrealized or failing. In either case the cause of regional stability is hurt, if not side tracked all together. Thus the nation-state must be reoriented within its own context as well as the greater global order. This is the only way that leads to greater stability in the nation-state and region in the early 21st century. Thus, without a vibrant and inclusive nationalism, a modern nation-state is nothing but a hollow and shambolic bureaucratic edifice with steadily increasing limits on its ability to provide even the most minimum requirements to the citizens that live within its territory.

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