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**NATO MEMBERSHIP FOR BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA:
OBSTACLES AND CHALLENGES**

by

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**NATO MEMBERSHIP FOR BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA:
OBSTACLES AND CHALLENGES**

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ABSTRACT

In order to provide for its future security, Bosnia and Herzegovina aspires to NATO membership. It intends to be not only a consumer of security, but also a provider of security for its allies. Because of the history and specific regional context of its relations with its neighbors, Bosnia and Herzegovina faces many obstacles. Although Bosnia and Herzegovina is still engaged in a stabilization and reconstruction process, Sarajevo is trying to find the best possible way to achieve the goal of NATO membership. This thesis analyzes the main obstacles on the way to NATO membership, identifies ways to surmount them, and offers some recommendations for future policy. This thesis will, it is hoped, be beneficial to policymakers, who need to promote focused and united national efforts and to generate synergy to help Bosnia and Herzegovina successfully achieve NATO membership and thereby secure a better future for the country and Europe as a whole.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

A D	Anno Domini (Medieval Latin: In the year of the Lord)
AFBIH	Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina
ANP	Annual National Plan
APC	Armored Personnel Carriers
BALTDEFCOL	Baltic Defense College
BiH	Bosnia and Herzegovina
CAF	Croatian Armed Forces
DRC	Defense Reform Commission
EAPC	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
EU	European Union
EUFOR	European Force
FBiH	Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
FMF	Foreign Military Financing
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HRM	Human Resource Management
ICJ	International Court of Justice
ICTY	Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
ID	Intensified Dialogue
IFOR	Implementation Force
IMET	International Military Education and Training
IPAP	Individual Partnership Action Plans
IPP	Individual Partnership Program

JCTP	Joint Contact Team Program
KM	Convertible Mark
LTDP	Long-Term Development Plan
MAP	Membership Action Plan
MINUSTAH	United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
MoD	Ministry of Defense
MONUC	French acronym for The UN peacekeeping mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NACC	North Atlantic Cooperation Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBC	Nuclear Biological Chemical
NCO	Non-Commissioned Officers
NCT	NATO Co-ordination Team
NRF	NATO Response Force
OCC	Operational Capabilities Concept
OMLT	Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PARP	Planning and Review Process
PCC	Partnership Co-ordination Cell
PfP	Partnership for Peace
PPBES	Planning, Programming and Budgeting Execution System
RS	Republika Srpska
SDR	Strategic Defense Review
SEDM	Southeast Europe Defense Ministerial

SEEBRIG	Southeastern Europe Brigade
SFOR	Stabilization Force
SOFA	Status of Forces Agreement
STANAG	Standardization Agreements
UN	United Nations
UNDOF	United Nations Disengagement Observer Force
UNFICYP	United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
UNMEE	UN Observation Missions in Ethiopia-Eritrea
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNMIS	United Nations Mission in Sudan
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
ePRIME	Partnership Real-Time Information, Management, and Exchange System
WWI	World War I
WWII	World War II
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
ZAVNOBIH	Antifascist Council for the National Liberation of Bosnia and Herzegovina

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. BACKGROUND

After the fall of the Soviet empire, Europe found itself in a totally new security environment. Events in 1989-1991, including the fall of the Berlin Wall and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, immediately raised the question of the relevance of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the future security framework of Europe. With regard to the security issue, NATO successfully resolved its identity crisis, performed essential consolidation and reorganization, and continued with new roles, thereby serving as a central pillar of security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. “These new roles can be defined and categorized in various ways, but the two most significant new roles are clearly cooperation with former adversaries and other non-NATO countries in new institutions such as Partnership for Peace, and crisis management and peace operations beyond the territory of NATO allies.”¹

In order to enjoy the benefits of collective defense provided by NATO, Bosnia and Herzegovina has struggled to contribute to the Alliance’s collective defense posture and to join NATO as soon as possible. NATO and Bosnia and Herzegovina have had much in common in recent history and may well have a shared future. NATO’s initial post-Cold War transformation took place during the Bosnian tragedy in 1991-1995 and proved successful in charting a new course towards the future for the newly transformed NATO alliance. Following the United Nations (UN) mission failure in Bosnia in the early 1990s, Bosnia and Herzegovina saw NATO as the only intergovernmental organization capable of providing security to its citizens in the future. Looking to the past and hoping for a better future, Bosnia and Herzegovina has made a logical choice: to seek membership in the NATO alliance in order to enjoy the benefits of collective defense.

¹David S. Yost, *NATO Transformed: The Alliance’s New Roles in International Security* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998), 72.

Participation in Partnership for Peace (PfP) is broadly understood by the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina as the first important step towards NATO membership. NATO gained three new partners on 14 December 2006, with the accession of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Serbia to the Alliance's PfP program. Speaking of the new relationship with these three countries, NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer said, "This marks a moment and a beginning of much wider cooperation." Nebojša Radmanović, the Chairman of the Tripresidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, said, "The fact that Bosnia and Herzegovina is [has] joined the Partnership for Peace Programme is probably one of the biggest steps that Bosnia and Herzegovina has undertaken in its past with Euro-Atlantic integration.... We are quite aware that this is the first step and that it means that we have to take more effort towards going to Euro-Atlantic integration, and we want to do so."²

Bosnia and Herzegovina must put forth significant effort towards pursuing NATO membership. There would be many benefits on each side, but there are also many obstacles that must be overcome in order to achieve the goal. Furthermore, it is not accidental that these three countries were invited to join the PfP program at the same time. Their relations have been influenced by a common history, a shared geography, and many other factors that have shaped their destiny and that at the same time have erected some obstacles on their way to Euro-Atlantic integration. Even though the NATO membership process is not solely a Bosnian responsibility, the majority of effort regarding this process has to be accomplished by the government and people of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

B. LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH QUESTION

In order to answer the questions "why" and "how" in the enlargement process, in September 1995 the Alliance published its *Study on NATO Enlargement*.³ The principles

²NATO Update: *Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia Join NATO Partnership for Peace* (Brussels: NATO, 2006); <http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2006/12-december/e1214a.htm> (accessed 9 May 2008).

³NATO Basic Texts: *Study on NATO Enlargement* (Brussels: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, September 1995), <http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/enl-9501.htm> (accessed 19 April 2008).

articulated in the study constitute the basis of NATO's approach to inviting new members. Regarding the question "why," the answer was strengthening security in the entire Euro-Atlantic region without creating new dividing lines. The answer to the question "how" regarding enlargement reaffirms that future enlargement decisions will be made in accordance with Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty. This study offers a road map of what NATO requires from potential candidates for membership. This thesis relies on the *Study on NATO Enlargement* as a principal source as to NATO policy and as a type of conceptual literature in this research.

The existing empirical literature generally relates to the analysis of the war in Bosnia and its role in the transformation process of NATO. David S. Yost has broadly analyzed the challenges of NATO enlargement and provided an assessment of NATO transformation processes and relationships with other international organizations. His works provide a point of departure for research about NATO and the potential candidacy of Bosnia and Herzegovina for NATO membership. According to Yost, the stakes in Bosnia for the future of the Alliance are immense because of the large investment of U.S. and Allied political capital and credibility. He further stressed this significance when he cited Walter Slocombe's remarks in 1996:

Just as the NATO-Russia relationship is being forged in Bosnia, so too is the future of NATO itself. It is in Bosnia where all sixteen members of NATO, each one making a contribution, are sending the message that NATO is the bedrock on which the future security and stability of Europe will be built. It is in Bosnia that we are demonstrating that NATO can meet new challenges. It is in Bosnia where NATO is first reaping the benefits of joint peacekeeping training with our new Peace Partners. It is in Bosnia where future NATO members are showing themselves ready and able to shoulder the burdens of membership. And it is in Bosnia where we are showing that we can work together as partners with Russian forces. It is in Bosnia that NATO is working also with neutral and other non-European states in an enterprise that affects global security.⁴

⁴Walter B. Slocombe, then the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, remarks to the Atlantic Council, 14 June 1996, text furnished by the Department of Defense, p.17, quoted in Yost, *NATO Transformed: The Alliance's New Roles in International Security*, 227.

There is a consensus in the literature that the stakes in Bosnia for the future of the Alliance are substantial, and that Bosnia is going to be a significant part of that future. However, the more relevant question is how policy makers can ensure Bosnia's timely admission and integration into NATO.

Jeffrey Simon has analyzed the road map for NATO accession and the importance of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and the Membership Action Plan (MAP). Having assessed the MAP's impact on new members, he concluded in 2001:

In the defense and military spheres, all MAP members are hampered by limited resources and are struggling with force restructuring. Most MAP members made genuine efforts to commit human resources and improve interdepartmental coordination, but their defense efforts varied, and significant progress is still required.⁵

Given the experience of other countries, the preparation of Bosnia and Herzegovina for NATO membership will probably not be a simple or easy matter.

David Greenwood and the staff of the Centre for European Security Studies in the Netherlands in 2005 analyzed the western Balkan candidates for NATO membership and partnership and concluded that Bosnia and Herzegovina had sufficient credentials to enter the PfP program. They also concluded:

As for BiH's [Bosnia and Herzegovina's] longer-term NATO membership aspirations, we think that once the PfP hurdle has been surmounted the country – with help from its friends – could progress to MAP-state status fairly quickly, thanks to the impressive DRC [Defense Reform Commission]-led transformation that has taken place since 2003 and is, indeed, a continuing process.⁶

Finally, *The Path to Partnership for Peace* prepared in 2003 by the Defense Reform Commission for the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina, elaborated

⁵Jeffrey Simon, *Roadmap to NATO Accession: Preparing for Membership* (Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 2001), 8; <http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS17833> (accessed 9 May 2008).

⁶Staff of the Centre for European Security Studies, *The Western Balkan Candidates for NATO Membership and Partnership*, ed. David Greenwood (The Netherlands: Centre for European Security Studies, 2005), 84; <http://www.cess.org/publications/harmoniepapers/pdfs/HarmPap.18.colour.pdf> (accessed 11 June 2008).

PfP benefits and NATO membership requirements for Bosnia and Herzegovina in order to stress the importance and necessity of defense reform for future NATO membership. This report provides relevant analysis about the forthcoming challenges for Bosnia and Herzegovina on its way to NATO membership.⁷

In order to fill the gap in the existing literature about the prospects for NATO membership for Bosnia and Herzegovina, the broad research question examined in this thesis is the following: What are the possible obstacles facing Bosnia and Herzegovina as it pursues NATO membership, and what are the most effective solutions to overcome these obstacles? In order to answer this broad question this thesis addresses the following more specific questions: What are the main challenges in the NATO enlargement process and how are they related to the aspirations of Bosnia and Herzegovina for NATO membership? What impact could defense reform have on the NATO membership process? How can Bosnia and Herzegovina become not only a consumer of security, but also a provider of security for its allies? How have relations between the particular case study countries – Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina – and neighboring countries changed since the early 1990s? Finally, to what extent do the previous disputes among them have implications for the NATO membership process?

C. METHODOLOGY

In order to answer these questions, this thesis relies on a qualitative comparative method. The central focus resides in an analysis and comparison of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina as case studies. Data collection has been accomplished through a literature survey and via background interviews with NATO experts and with representatives of the government and Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina (AFBIH). Croatia has been chosen for a comparative case study because of the similarity in the size of its territory and population with those of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its common history within the same geo-strategic space.⁸ Croatia is an example of a

⁷Defense Reform Commission, *The Path to Partnership for Peace* (Sarajevo: OSCE, 2003), <http://www.oscebih.org/documents/12-eng.pdf> (accessed 9 May 2008).

⁸See Appendix A, Figure 1. Map of Former Yugoslavia.

successful neighboring country on its way to NATO membership.⁹ The thesis first analyzes the challenges of the NATO enlargement process and its implications for possible NATO membership for Bosnia and Herzegovina. These two case studies are then compared through an evaluation of two main variables which have a direct influence on this process: defense reform and the foreign policies of these countries.

1. *Defense reform in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina as case study countries and its impact on prospects for NATO membership*

Defense reform, as one of the most successful reforms accomplished in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina following the 1995 Dayton agreement, was undertaken in an exceptionally complicated internal political environment which will influence the future as well. In its examination of defense reform in these two countries, this thesis identifies the main achievements thus far, analyzes its impact on the NATO membership process, and compares the defense reform activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina to those which have already been conducted in Croatia. This enables the thesis to specify the remaining challenges for the future.

2. *Foreign policies of these countries and the implications for NATO membership prospects*

The main points of interest include efforts to resolve existing disputes with neighboring countries, the impact of Kosovo's future status on the NATO membership process, and cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague as longstanding obligations of these countries in the wake of the Balkan conflicts of the 1990s. These two factors, defense reform and foreign policy, are analyzed as separate but interrelated independent variables affecting the NATO membership process, which is the dependent variable.

This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter II reviews the NATO enlargement process and how Bosnia and Herzegovina fits into this process. Chapters III and IV examine Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina as case studies. The analysis concentrates

⁹ The North Atlantic Council invited Albania and Croatia to begin accession talks to join the Alliance at the Bucharest Summit in April 2008.

on defense reform and the foreign policies of these countries. It assesses the impact of these variables on prospects for NATO membership. Chapter V offers a comparative analysis of these two case studies. Chapter VI presents conclusions about the obstacles and challenges facing Bosnia and Herzegovina on its way to NATO membership, as well as recommendations about how to surmount these obstacles.

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II. NATO ENLARGEMENT PROCESS

A. INTRODUCTION

Having committed itself to gradual enlargement in 1994, NATO reaffirmed its open door policy in order to make a contribution to security in the North Atlantic area. The NATO enlargement process supports the Alliance's basic goal of enhancing security and extending stability throughout the Euro-Atlantic area. Bosnia and Herzegovina is trying to find the best possible way to actively engage in this process in order to achieve the goal of NATO membership. This chapter analyzes the process of NATO enlargement, including its mechanisms and key issues in the process affecting Bosnia and Herzegovina's bid for NATO membership. This chapter concludes with an assessment of how Bosnia and Herzegovina fits into the NATO enlargement process.

B. BACKGROUND

The bottom line is clear: Expanding NATO will enhance our security. It is the right thing to do.... We must not fail history's challenge at this moment to build a Europe peaceful, democratic, and undivided, allied with us to face new security threats of the new century—a Europe that will avoid repeating the darkest moments of the 20th century and fulfill the brilliant possibilities of the 21st.

President Clinton, 31 May 1997¹⁰

The NATO was established in 1949, after a number of Western European states, the United States, and Canada concluded the North Atlantic Treaty and formally set up post-World War II trans-Atlantic security arrangements.¹¹ The preamble to the North Atlantic Treaty states that “The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes

¹⁰*The Enlargement of NATO: Why Adding Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to NATO Strengthens American National Security* (Washington: United States Department of State, 1998); <http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/nato2.pdf> (accessed 11 June 2008).

¹¹James W. Morrison, ed., *NATO Expansion and Alternative Future Security Alignments* (Washington DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1995), 2; <http://stinet.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA304514&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf> (accessed 25 April 2008).

and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments.” In order to achieve this goal, the preamble continues, “They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area. They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defense and for the preservation of peace and security.”¹²

The basis for NATO enlargement, which is a continuous, dynamic process without deadlines and milestones for completion, is Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which is also known as the Washington Treaty.¹³ According to this article, “The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty.”¹⁴ From the beginning, NATO’s founding members envisioned the possibility of the Alliance’s transformation and set forth enlargement as one of the solutions for countries interested in joining the alliance in order to enhance their own security.

Since the creation of the Alliance by the initial 12 founding nations NATO has grown to 26 members. The accession of Greece and Turkey to the Alliance in 1952 marked the first round of enlargement. In 1955, the Federal Republic of Germany became NATO’s 15th member, and Spain became the Alliance’s 16th member in 1982. Since the reunification of Germany in 1990, the whole of Germany, including the territory of the former German Democratic Republic, has been part of NATO. On 12 March 1999, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland became the first former members of the Warsaw Pact to join NATO. Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia joined NATO on 29 March 2004.¹⁵ After NATO invited Albania

¹² *NATO Official Text: The North Atlantic Treaty* (Brussels: NATO, 1949); <http://www.nato.int/docu/basic/txt/treaty.htm> (accessed 25 April 2008).

¹³ *NATO Topics: Enlargement - How Did this Policy Evolve?* (Brussels: NATO, 2008); <http://www.nato.int/issues/enlargement/evolution.html> (accessed 9 July 2008).

¹⁴ *NATO Official Text: The North Atlantic Treaty*

¹⁵ *NATO Topics: Enlargement - How Did this Policy Evolve?*

and Croatia to begin accession talks at the Bucharest Summit in April 2008, the Allies signed the Accession Protocols with Albania and Croatia on 9 July 2008, thereby opening the way for the full NATO membership of these two countries.¹⁶ Allied leaders also invited the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia¹⁷ to begin the accession process as soon as Macedonia and Greece had reached an agreement to resolve the issue of the country's name.¹⁸ Thomas S. Szayna has suggested dividing the enlargement process into five stages:

1. Development of military cooperation with the given country under the auspices of Partnership for Peace (PfP).
2. A step-up in PfP cooperation that may include an implicit or explicit formulation of aspiration to membership by the given country and actions within PfP to advance that goal.
3. Consensus-building within NATO regarding the given country's eligibility for consideration for membership, crowned with NATO's open recognition of the aspiration.
4. Detailed scrutiny of the pros and cons of the country's potential accession and discussion of the country's shortcomings in meeting membership pre-conditions.
5. Intra-alliance bargaining as to when the country will be invited to join.¹⁹

Stage 1 is the easiest step as the PfP state and NATO begin to implement the commitment to enhance their cooperation. Stage 2 represents an additional step forward in cooperation in which states directly and actively involved in PfP activities simultaneously take actions with a view to NATO membership. How long a state will take to pass through these two stages depends mainly on the state, while stage 3 depends upon an assessment by NATO members of the country's aspirations for membership. If these aspirations are assessed by NATO members as realistic, the country proceeds to the next phase. In stage 4, NATO members analyze the country's qualifications and

¹⁶NATO Events: *NATO Allies Sign Accession Protocols for Albania and Croatia* (Brussels: NATO, 2008); <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/2008/0807-sign-alb-croatia/0807-sign-alb-croatia.htm> (accessed 14 July 2008).

¹⁷Turkey recognizes the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.

¹⁸NATO Topics: *Enlargement - How Did this Policy Evolve?*

¹⁹Thomas S. Szayna, *NATO Enlargement, 2000-2015: Determinants and Implications for Defense Planning and Shaping* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001), 44.

shortcomings according to the criteria listed in the *Study on NATO Enlargement*. Once NATO members achieve consensus and recognize the minimum criteria for NATO membership of the aspirant country, stage 5 commences. Stages 4 and 5 mainly depend on political decisions and require the aspiring country to build the necessary political support for NATO membership. In stage 5, the Parliaments of the extant members and the aspiring new members must ratify the protocols for accession to the North Atlantic Treaty. During this time, the aspirant country tends to be treated as a member.²⁰

After the end of the Cold War, NATO as a political and military intergovernmental organization attempted to build a new security framework that would increase stability and security for all countries in the Euro-Atlantic region without creating new dividing lines. NATO is viewed as one of the cornerstones of a safe and secure environment in Europe. The Alliance perceives security as a broad concept embracing political, economic, and defense components. NATO views itself as a purely defensive Alliance whose basic missions are to provide collective defense for its members and to preserve peace in the Euro-Atlantic area.²¹ As Rebecca R. Moore noted, “Indeed, the mission of Europe whole and free reflected an evolving concept of security underpinned by a considerable faith in the pacifying effect of shared democratic institutions and values.”²² In 1997 NATO’s former Supreme Allied Commander Europe, George A. Joulwan, explained, “NATO is now more than ever a political alliance, but as a military man that suits me fine. We represent shared ideals, not just tanks and soldiers. We want our values to take root in other countries because that is the best way we know to prevent conflicts from exploding into war.”²³ Bosnia and Herzegovina was the first battlefield for practicing this kind of mission. In other words, NATO reshaped its identity and built its new strategy in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

²⁰ Szayna, *NATO Enlargement, 2000-2015: Determinants and Implications for Defense Planning and Shaping*, 45-48.

²¹ *NATO Basic Texts: Study on NATO Enlargement* (Brussels: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, September 1995), <http://www.nato.int/docu/basic/basictxt/enl-9501.htm> (accessed 19 April 2008).

²² Rebecca R. Moore, *NATO's New Mission: Projecting Stability in a Post-Cold War World* (Westport: Praeger Security International, 2007), 2.

²³ NATO's former Supreme Allied Commander Europe George A. Joulwan as quoted in *Ibid.*, 2.

In order to promote positive political change in the new world order after the Cold War ended, Thomas S. Szayna concluded, “NATO’s current strategy resembles the proverbial carrot and stick. NATO’s enlargement offers the inducement of membership (the carrot) as a way to encourage peaceful transformation and integration into a larger European security community. NATO’s transformation, into a conflict prevention and management organization, provides the coercive component (the stick) that can be used to enforce peace and deter aggression in and around Europe.”²⁴ All aspirants for NATO membership serve as examples of the application of the approach presented in the “carrot and stick” strategy.

C. EURO ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP COUNCIL

In order to provide a framework for efficient cooperation with both the countries that had been members of the Warsaw Pact and with the new states born after the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), NATO created the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in 1991.²⁵ The institutional framework of the NACC was NATO’s first attempt to go beyond purely military and diplomatic contacts with the states of the former Warsaw Pact and the former USSR and to develop mechanisms whose main purpose would be to strengthen relationships of consultation and cooperation with these countries on key political and security issues.²⁶ This was the first step toward broad cooperation with former adversaries, which also included the establishment of four new institutions: Partnership for Peace (PfP); the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council; the NATO-Ukraine Commission; and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC).

²⁴Szayna, *NATO Enlargement, 2000-2015: Determinants and Implications for Defense Planning and Shaping*, 9-10.

²⁵Robert F. Simmons, "Ten Years of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council: A personal reflection," *NATO Review*, Summer 2007, available at; <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2007/issue2/english/art5.html> (accessed 11 July 2008).

²⁶Yost, *NATO Transformed: The Alliance's New Roles in International Security*, 94.

The NACC was replaced by the EAPC in May 1997.²⁷ The EAPC was NATO's attempt to create a more efficient council that would offer a more operational partnership than the NACC.²⁸ For non-NATO countries that do not want to be NATO members but do wish to contribute to Euro-Atlantic security, the EAPC provides a unique political framework to achieve this goal while maintaining their own distinct foreign and security policies. By enhancing political dialogue and practical cooperation between Allies and Partners, the EAPC provides an important contribution toward a common Euro-Atlantic security environment. With 26 Allies and 23 Partners as members, the EAPC represents a forum of 49 states.²⁹ "The EAPC's founders, the NACC members and PfP Partners, declared that its establishment would be 'a qualitative step forward in rising to a new level the dynamic and multifaceted political and military cooperation' already achieved in NACC and PfP, and that it would 'make a strong contribution to cooperative approaches to security and form an enduring part of the European security architecture.'" ³⁰

D. PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE

In order to enhance stability and security throughout Europe, NATO introduced Partnership for Peace (PfP) at the January 1994 Brussels Summit Meeting of the North Atlantic Council.³¹ Article 2 of the Partnership for Peace Framework Document states that, "This Partnership is established as an expression of a joint conviction that stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area can be achieved only through cooperation and common action." According to the PfP Framework Document, "Protection and promotion of fundamental freedoms and human rights, and safeguarding of freedom, justice, and peace through democracy are shared values fundamental to the Partnership."

²⁷NATO Handbook: *PfP - Aim and Scope* (Brussels: NATO, 2002); <http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb030201.htm> (accessed 11 July 2008).

²⁸NATO Topics: *The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council* (Brussels: NATO, 2008); <http://www.nato.int/issues/eapc/index.html> (accessed 11 July 2008).

²⁹Simmons, *NATO Review: Ten Years of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council*

³⁰Yost, *NATO Transformed: The Alliance's New Roles in International Security*, 159.

³¹NATO Handbook: *PfP - Aim and Scope*.

In addition to endorsing these basic principles, “States subscribing to this Document recall that they are committed to the preservation of democratic societies, their freedom from coercion and intimidation, and the maintenance of the principles of international law.”³² These principles have established a solid foundation for PfP members to actively participate in this partnership and proactively build a better political and security framework.

The EAPC provides the overall framework for cooperation among NATO and Partner countries. Nevertheless, the PfP has its own separate structural framework within the EAPC and maintains its own procedures. Cooperation between NATO and each one of the PfP countries is institutionalized primarily through a bilateral relationship.³³

As a significant part of this relationship, the planning and review process (PARP) was established and “designed to provide a basis for identifying and evaluating forces and capabilities which might be made available for multinational training, exercises and operations in conjunction with Alliance forces.”³⁴ The PARP is a process in which countries willing to participate are encouraged to voluntarily provide information about their ongoing reforms related to defense matters. “The information is provided in response to a ‘Survey of Overall PfP Interoperability’ issued by NATO in the autumn every second year. Participating countries also provide an extensive overview of their armed forces and detailed information of the forces which they are prepared to make available for PfP cooperation.”³⁵ After each participant country provides the required information, NATO prepares a *Planning and Review Assessment* with defined *Partnership Goals* in order to develop armed forces capable of participating in joint and

³²North Atlantic Council communiqué, *Partnership for Peace: Framework Document*, (Brussels,: NATO, January 1994); <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c940110b.htm> (accessed 18 May 2008).

³³ *NATO Handbook: PfP - Aim and Scope*.

³⁴ *NATO Handbook: The Partnership for Peace Planning and Review Process (PARP)* (Brussels: NATO, 2002); <http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb030208.htm> (accessed 11 July 2008).

³⁵ *Ibid.*

combined operations with the NATO allies. Ultimately, the *Planning and Review Assessment* and the *Interoperability Objectives* have to be jointly approved by the Alliance and the Partner country concerned.³⁶

PARP provides considerable incentives in preparing prospective members of NATO for accession. Many nations which succeeded in overcoming all the obstacles on their way to NATO membership used PARP as a means to build modern, effective, compatible, mobile, professional, well-equipped, and democratically responsible armed forces. Introduced at the November 2002 Prague Summit, PARP was designed to provide “new practical mechanisms, such as Individual Partnership Action Plans, which will ensure a comprehensive, tailored and differentiated approach to the Partnership, and which allow for support to the reform efforts of Partners.”³⁷ At the June 2004 Istanbul Summit, NATO invited Partner countries to agree with the Alliance on Individual Partnership Action Plans (IPAPs) which “include political and economic reform goals; carry over and expand PARP objectives in defense reform; set goals for cooperation in other areas, such as Civil Emergency Planning and Science; and, perhaps most importantly, suggest to Partner countries to set up an interagency process to manage these goals collectively.”³⁸ IPAPs promote active political dialogue between the Partners and NATO in order to discuss security and other issues.³⁹ IPAPs are developed on a two-year basis, and NATO usually provides country-focused assistance and advice on issues. These consultations may constitute a key part of an IPAP process with a particular Partner country.⁴⁰ The IPAP is designed for Partner countries that are not ready for participation in the Membership Action Plan yet but that have expressed a willingness to cooperate closely with NATO.⁴¹

³⁶ NATO Handbook: *The Partnership for Peace Planning and Review Process (PARP)*.

³⁷ "Prague Summit Declaration," 21 November 2002, paragraph 10, NATO Press Release (2002) 127; <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm> (accessed 18 May 2008).

³⁸ Simmons, "Ten Years of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council: A personal reflection," 38.

³⁹ Ibid., 38.

⁴⁰ *Report on the Comprehensive Review of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and Partnership for Peace* (Brussels: NATO, (2002); <http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/b021121a.htm> (accessed 11 July 2008).

⁴¹ Moore, *NATO's New Mission: Projecting Stability in a Post-Cold War World*, 61.

E. MEMBERSHIP ACTION PLAN

The Membership Action Plan (MAP) was launched in 1999 in response to lessons learned from the accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to the Alliance. MAP is the assessment process structured to prepare aspiring nations for NATO membership.⁴² According to Jeffrey Simon of the U.S. National Defense University, MAP has four essential components:

- a tailored Annual National Plan (ANP) that identifies key targets spanning the political/economic, defense/military, resources, security, and legal dimensions (dubbed “chapters” in MAP parlance) of Alliance membership
- a feedback mechanism by which NAC members and the partner can jointly assess progress
- a clearinghouse for coordinating security assistance from NATO members to the partner
- enhanced defense planning at the country level that establishes and reviews agreed planning targets.⁴³

Within the MAP process, meetings of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) take place regularly with each aspirant country in order to discuss problems and develop mutually approved plans. During these meetings, NATO civilian and military experts are available to discuss with representatives of the aspirant country all the issues related to attaining NATO membership.⁴⁴ Since its inception, the MAP process has positively influenced the growth of interministerial coordination within MAP countries and enhanced international cooperation among these countries. At the same time assisting aspirant countries to mobilize their respective societies towards reform and NATO membership, the “MAP [process] has become an increasingly important tool for member governments to build public support for NATO as well as parliamentary support for

⁴² Moore, *NATO's New Mission: Projecting Stability in a Post-Cold War World*, 60-61.

⁴³ Simon, *Roadmap to NATO Accession: Preparing for Membership*, 2.

⁴⁴ *NATO Topics: Membership Action Plan (MAP)* (Brussels: NATO, 1999); <http://www.nato.int/issues/map/index.html> (accessed 12 July 2008).

necessary resources.”⁴⁵ By assisting MAP countries in formalizing and implementing internal reforms, the MAP process has made significant contributions to the NATO enlargement process by ensuring that new NATO members are capable of contributing to the alliance’s collective defense and peace support operations. As Moore observes, “According to diplomatic representatives from those states invited to join the Alliance at Prague in late 2002, ... MAP served to shape internal political debates over both domestic and foreign policy by providing leverage for the reformist elements of their societies. One called it the ‘bible’ for NATO membership and observed that the process had served as a ‘mirror’ in front of his state’s reform efforts.”⁴⁶

Although many consider the MAP process a “bible” for NATO membership, the MAP process should not be considered a simple list of criteria for membership because “invitations to join the alliance will be based strictly on a consensus alliance decision that bringing the given state into the alliance will contribute to security in Europe.”⁴⁷

F. KEY ISSUES IN NATO ENLARGEMENT

In order to answer the questions of “why” and “how” with regard to the NATO enlargement process, the Alliance published its *Study on NATO Enlargement* in September 1995. The principles articulated in this study constituted the basis of NATO’s approach to inviting new members. However, some challenges still remain regarding this process which could have a significant impact on the NATO membership prospects of Bosnia and Herzegovina. To assess the prospects of NATO membership for Bosnia and Herzegovina, analysts must first consider the fact that Bosnia and Herzegovina has coincidentally played a significant role in shaping the NATO transformation process and took part in the evolution of NATO’s new role. The stakes in Bosnia for the future of the Alliance are immense due to the large investment of U.S. and Allied political capital and

⁴⁵ Simon, *Roadmap to NATO Accession: Preparing for Membership*, 1.

⁴⁶ Moore, *NATO’s New Mission: Projecting Stability in a Post-Cold War World*, 61.

⁴⁷ Thomas S. Szayna, *The Future of NATO and Enlargement*, Testimony for the Subcommittee on Europe of the Committee on International Relations, United States House of Representatives on April 17, 2002, (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, April 2002), 2;
<http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/2005/CT196.pdf> (accessed 23 July 2008).

credibility to date. It is worth mentioning again the words of Walter Slocombe, then U.S. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, who in 1996 commented:

Just as the NATO-Russia relationship is being forged in Bosnia, so too is the future of NATO itself. It is in Bosnia where all sixteen members of NATO, each one making a contribution, are sending the message that NATO is the bedrock on which the future security and stability of Europe will be built. It is in Bosnia that we are demonstrating that NATO can meet new challenges.⁴⁸

Given Bosnia's significant role in NATO transformation and enlargement since the early 1990s, and the high political-military stakes within Bosnia and across Europe, it is reasonable to conclude that Bosnia is also going to be a significant part of the future of the Alliance. The unsuccessful efforts of the United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU) in conflict management in Bosnia in 1991-1995 have strongly influenced the Alliance to be supportive regarding the country's membership aspiration. The western Balkans constitute a fragile region which could explode into violence easily if the situation is not maintained under control. This happened in the early 1990s, and the international community was totally unprepared. The NATO enlargement process supports the Alliance's basic goal of enhancing security and extending stability throughout the Euro-Atlantic area. By embracing Bosnia and Herzegovina, NATO would send the message that stability and security in this country and in the whole Euro-Atlantic area will be enhanced and maintained under control.

The NATO enlargement process has faced various questions and criticisms. "Some Western critics of NATO enlargement maintain that Russia's anxieties about enlargement leading to a more powerful Alliance are misplaced, contending that the addition of new members will contribute to the erosion of the Alliance's cohesion."⁴⁹ Many specialists have argued that expansion could ruin NATO by: 1) causing a loss of focus and cohesion and undermining its ability to reach consensus, and 2) jeopardizing

⁴⁸ Walter B. Slocombe, then Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, remarks to the Atlantic Council, 14 June 1996, text furnished by the Department of Defense, p. 17, quoted in Yost, *NATO Transformed: The Alliance's New Roles in International Security*, 227.

⁴⁹ Yost, *NATO Transformed*, 117.

relations between allies in favor of and against expansion.⁵⁰ The implications for NATO of adding new members depend greatly on “which states are admitted and how many states are admitted...smaller states would probably be less influential and more willing to join a consensus in NATO on most issues.”⁵¹ Bosnia and Herzegovina is not a big state, and this principle would be consistent with these circumstances. Thus, the argument that the membership of Bosnia and Herzegovina would contribute to the erosion of the Alliance’s cohesion is not credible or persuasive.

According to the *Study on NATO Enlargement*, “Enlargement should ... strengthen the Alliance’s effectiveness and cohesion; and preserve the Alliance’s political and military capability to perform its core functions of common defense as well as to undertake peacekeeping and other new missions.”⁵² With regard to decisions about who will be invited to join NATO, “Ultimately, Allies will decide by consensus whether to invite each new member to join according to their judgment of whether doing so will contribute to security and stability in the North Atlantic area at the time such a decision is to be made.”⁵³ Moreover, according to the *Study on NATO Enlargement*, “The ability of prospective members to contribute militarily to collective defense and to the Alliance’s new missions will be a factor in deciding whether to invite them to join the Alliance.”⁵⁴ Therefore, Bosnia and Herzegovina must take active measures and commit significant budgetary and political resources via participation in the PfP in order to gain strong credentials to achieve NATO membership. The criteria for membership are getting more stringent as NATO becomes larger, and this is the main challenge to Bosnia and Herzegovina on its way to NATO membership. In order to achieve this goal, Bosnia and Herzegovina must mobilize its society and national resources.

⁵⁰ Morrison, *NATO Expansion and Alternative Future Security Alignments*, 40.

⁵¹ Morrison, *NATO Expansion and Alternative Future Security Alignments*, 76.

⁵² *NATO Basic Texts: Study on NATO Enlargement*, paragraph 4.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, paragraph 7.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, paragraph 75.

Another one of the salient reservations expressed by critics of the NATO enlargement process is “the risk of an unnecessary confrontation with Russia.”⁵⁵ Russia has always been against NATO enlargement. Moscow considers NATO enlargement a process contrary to Russia’s national interests. “Since NATO countries began serious consideration of enlargement, Russian political leaders across the political spectrum, from pro-Western democrats to centrists to Communists and extreme nationalists have been strongly opposed to NATO enlargement.”⁵⁶ Interviews with NATO experts in June 2008 suggest that Bosnia and Herzegovina’s membership in the Alliance would not challenge Russian’s interests directly. Bosnia and Herzegovina is neither a former Warsaw Pact country nor a country of strategic interest for Russia, in view of its size, military potential, and natural resources. The situation of Bosnia and Herzegovina stands in contrast to Russian strategic opposition to NATO membership for former Soviet republics such as Ukraine and Georgia. The risk of a confrontation with Russia could have only indirect implications for the pace of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s progress on its way to NATO.⁵⁷ At the Bucharest Summit in April 2008, NATO members declared:

NATO welcomes Ukraine’s and Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership in NATO. We agreed today that these countries will become members of NATO...MAP is the next step for Ukraine and Georgia on their direct way to membership. Today we make clear that we support these countries’ applications for MAP.⁵⁸

Despite this huge support for NATO membership of these two countries, the main reason why these two countries are not yet included in the MAP process is the strategic opposition from Russia.

According to Mir Shakil-ur-Rahman, a Pakistani commentator on international affairs, “Russia regards the missile defense system, coupled with NATO enlargement, as

⁵⁵ Yost, *NATO Transformed*, 117.

⁵⁶ Steven Woehrel, *NATO Enlargement and Russia* (Washington: CRS 97-477 F, 1998), 1; https://www.policyarchive.org/bitstream/handle/10207/394/97-477_19980414.pdf?sequence=1 (accessed 27 July 2008).

⁵⁷ Author's interviews with NATO experts in Brussels in June 2008.

⁵⁸ Bucharest Summit Declaration, 3 April 2008, paragraph 23, *NATO Press Release (2008)049*; <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2008/p08-049e.html> (accessed 18 May 2008).

an aggressive drive by the United States to take control of Moscow's strategic backyard.”⁵⁹ The best example of disagreements within the Alliance over the accession of these countries to MAP came after the invasion of Georgia by Russian troops on 8 August 2008, when Russia launched large-scale air attacks across Georgia. According to some observers, the reason for this invasion resides in NATO's failure to offer Georgia a Membership Action Plan (MAP) at the April 2008 NATO summit, while according to others NATO's insistence that Georgia eventually would become a member provoked Russian aggression.⁶⁰ The North Atlantic Council (NAC) met in a special foreign ministerial session on 19 August 2008 and re-affirmed the Alliance's support for Georgia. In order to oversee the NATO-Georgia relationship, as a consultation mechanism the NAC decided to develop, in cooperation with Georgia, a NATO-Georgia Commission. With regard to relations with Russia, NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer underlined: “We are not closing doors,” but “we...cannot continue with business as usual...as long as Russia does not commit to the principles upon which we agreed to base our relationship.”⁶¹

If Ukraine and Georgia are not accepted in the MAP process in the near future, the same situation will probably also apply to Bosnia and Herzegovina. NATO members who presently give support to Ukraine and Georgia probably would not be so supportive of Bosnia and Herzegovina for the same reason – that is, to demonstrate their backing for Kyiv and Tbilisi in the face of Russian pressure. As a result, the tempo of Bosnia and Herzegovina in approaching NATO membership could be indirectly slowed down, and Bosnia and Herzegovina might be on the waiting list in line behind Ukraine and Georgia.⁶²

⁵⁹ Mir Shakil-ur-Rahman, "Russia Warns Georgia Against NATO Bid," *INTERNATIONAL the News*, July 11, 2008; http://www.thenews.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=123524 (accessed 27 July 2008).

⁶⁰ Jim Nichol, *Russia-Georgia Conflict in South Ossetia: Context and Implications for U.S. Interests* (Washington: Congressional Research Service, 2008).

⁶¹ Jaap de Hoop Scheffer quoted in "NATO's Foreign Ministers Reiterate Their Support to Georgia," *NATO News* (2008); <http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2008/08-august/e0819a.html> (accessed 25 August 2008).

⁶² Author's interviews with NATO experts in Brussels in June 2008.

The implications of the NATO enlargement process for the cohesiveness of the Alliance and the potential risk of confrontation with Russia should not have a big impact on Bosnia and Herzegovina's journey towards NATO membership. The main challenge for Bosnia and Herzegovina remains within the country itself.

G. CONCLUSION

After the end of the Cold War, NATO recognized the opportunity to transform itself to build a new security structure to address emerging threats. Facing new threats in the post-Cold War environment and being aware of the new roles that the NATO alliance has to undertake in order to achieve its goals, the Allies have established institutions such as Partnership for Peace, the NATO-Russia Council, the NATO-Ukraine Commission, and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. In addition, the NATO enlargement process has played a significant role in enhancing the existing structure of security in the Euro-Atlantic region. NATO enlargement has threatened no nation, and it has contributed to developing a broad European security architecture based on real cooperation throughout the whole of Europe, thereby enhancing stability and security for all. NATO has been deeply involved in the recent history of Bosnia and Herzegovina and remains strongly committed to supporting Bosnia and Herzegovina in its aspirations and progress toward NATO membership.

Any country aspiring to NATO membership needs to fulfill two steps: active participation in the PfP program and the MAP. The primary purpose of these two steps is to enhance the readiness of the aspirant country for the responsibilities of NATO membership, even though poor participation in PfP or the MAP process does not necessarily preclude any decision by the Alliance on future membership. However, the NATO enlargement process has created some challenges to the Alliance regarding the prospects of aspiring countries. The cohesiveness of the Alliance is one of the most prominent challenges that will become more pressing as the Alliance becomes larger. In order to maintain and strengthen its cohesiveness, NATO has to firmly enforce accepted criteria for the accession of new members. For Bosnia and Herzegovina, this means the thorough implementation of PfP programs. The mobilization of the country's entire

society is necessary to meet these criteria, unless NATO decides to give priority to the idea that integration within the Alliance is a condition of stabilization, rather than the other way around, based upon the political and strategic circumstances. In that case, NATO could invite Bosnia and Herzegovina to join the Alliance before the full satisfaction of the membership criteria.

One of the salient concerns in the NATO enlargement process is the risk of a confrontation with Russia. In the context of Bosnia and Herzegovina's bid for NATO membership, this risk is considered manageable. However, the tempo of Bosnia and Herzegovina's journey toward NATO membership could be indirectly slowed down if NATO continues to postpone decisions on inviting Ukraine and Georgia to participate in the MAP process.

Despite these broad strategic and political factors, Bosnia and Herzegovina fits well in the NATO enlargement process. There is a consensus among NATO members that Bosnia and Herzegovina will be welcome to join NATO as soon as it completes all the necessary reforms and meets its obligations.

III. CROATIA – CASE STUDY

A. THE WAY TO NATO MEMBERSHIP

The countries that join us can be rightly proud of what they have achieved in meeting NATO's demanding criteria for membership. The many years of hard work within the Membership Action Plan have paid off. Due to your hard work, Allies can be confident that your admission to the Alliance will strengthen NATO.

NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer ⁶³
3 April 2008

With these words the NATO Secretary General finally announced that Allied leaders had agreed to invite Albania and Croatia to begin accession talks with NATO. In this meeting Allies once again “reaffirmed their commitment to keeping NATO’s door open to any European democracy willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership, in accordance with Article 10 of the Washington Treaty.”⁶⁴

The Republic of Croatia, part of the Euro-Atlantic community, has recognized NATO membership as one of the most important aims of its foreign policy. Being aware of global political, economic and security challenges, Croatia wants to actively participate in the creation of a global European security policy through a Euro-Atlantic framework; and only NATO membership can provide security and help assure the territorial integrity of Croatia. In order to achieve this goal, Croatia has undertaken many economic, political, legislative, and defense reforms. “In May 2006, American Vice President Richard [Dick] Cheney heightened the political dynamics of this issue when he indicated that he was ‘tremendously impressed’ with Croatia’s foreign policy choices and suggested that Croatia was making especially good progress toward membership in NATO.”⁶⁵

⁶³“NATO Decision on Open-Door Policy,” NATO News (2008), <http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2008/04-april/e0403h.html> (accessed 3 August 2008).

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵Richard Cheney, “Vice President’s Remarks at a Dinner with Prime Minister Ivo Sanader of Croatia” (6 May, 2006), as quoted in Ryan C. Hendrickson and Ryan P. Smith, “Croatia and NATO: Moving Toward Alliance Membership,” *Comparative Strategy* 25, no. 4 (2006), 297, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01495930601028630> (accessed 13 May 2008).

Croatia started the intensification of diplomatic efforts toward Euro-Atlantic integration in the 1990s, after the “Homeland War” ended. In 1996 Croatia officially defined membership in NATO and the EU as two supremely important aims for Croatia’s foreign policy. Because of the nature of Franjo Tudjman's authoritarian regime in 1990s, Croatia had not been taken seriously as a potential partner until Tudjman’s death in 1999. Entering the PfP program was the first step toward Euro-Atlantic integration. On 25 May 2000, Minister for Foreign Affairs Tonino Picula of Croatia signed the PfP Framework Document, and Croatia became a member of PfP program and EAPC. With this step, Croatia assumed the obligation to implement policies that include preserving democracy, respecting the UN Charter, resolving all disputes by peaceful means, respecting the integrity of international borders, and complying with all agreements regarding non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Croatia gave NATO its first Survey of Overall PfP Interoperability in October 2000 and immediately began participating in the PARP process. Croatia submitted its Individual Partnership Program (IPP) for 2001 and its Presentation Document to NATO at the end of 2000. In order to enhance coordination and cooperation with NATO, on 13 February 2001 Croatia established its Mission to NATO in Brussels, Belgium. In June 2001 a PfP Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) was signed between Croatia and NATO.⁶⁶

Within the IPP, Croatia has initiated various PfP program activities that have provided a better understanding of the overall PfP process and enabled Croatia to strengthen its own status as a reliable partner. Through the IPP Croatia has specified areas for cooperation with NATO and has gradually undertaken increasingly more activities which have been revised annually. These activities have been implemented through seminars, courses, conferences and military exercises. Recently, many activities in the IPP were focused on the preparation of units designated for NATO-led Peace Support Operations. Additionally, through participation within PARP, Croatia has gradually improved the interoperability of its defense system with NATO. Croatia has defined its own Partnership Goals, which in priority have usually been related to the units

⁶⁶ MORH on-Line / NATO PfP (Zagreb: Ministry of Defense, Croatia, 2008), http://www.morh.hr/nato/documents/hrvatska_pfp.asp (accessed 4 August 2008).

that Croatia intended to assign to NATO PfP operations. PARP is one of the most important tools in the PfP program, providing transparency in defense planning to both sides, Croatia and NATO.⁶⁷

In 2001 Croatia was offered an Intensified Dialogue (ID) with NATO, as a substitute tool for those aspirant countries that have not yet been invited to MAP status. This dialogue has been implemented in the form of intensified consultation between parties in the NAC and national representatives at the head of state and ministerial level, in order to clarify the most important types of activities crucial for enhanced cooperation in the political, military, financial and security fields. ID has served as a temporary framework on the way to MAP.⁶⁸

On 15 May 2002, in Reykjavik, Croatia was invited to join the MAP. It was once again a reaffirmation of NATO's "open door policy." Though participation in the MAP does not guarantee accession to NATO membership, this was an important step forward for Croatia in order to implement all the reforms necessary for NATO membership. Taking advantage of this plan, Croatia succeeded in undertaking many reforms; and through its Annual National Plan (ANP) Croatia has defined all the necessary steps to be taken. MAP includes not only defense and military issues, but also political, economic, security, resource and legislative concerns. The MAP plan therefore helped Croatia to consolidate not only the efforts of the Ministry of Defense, but those of all of Croatian society towards the common aim of NATO membership.⁶⁹ The possibility of gaining EU and NATO membership was the driving force in motivating Croatian society to initiate and implement the many reforms needed to accomplish the mission. "Without the option of NATO and EU membership and the potential benefits they may bring, the Croatian

⁶⁷MORH on-Line / NATO PfP/PARP (Zagreb: Ministry of Defense, Croatia, 2008), http://www.morh.hr/nato/documents/hrvatska_parp.asp (accessed 4 August 2008).

⁶⁸MORH on-Line / NATO PfP /Intensified Dialog (Zagreb: Ministry of Defense, Croatia, 2008), http://www.morh.hr/nato/documents/dijalog_nato_rh.asp (accessed 4 August 2008).

⁶⁹MORH on-Line / NATO PfP/MAP (Zagreb: Ministry of Defense, Croatia, 2008), http://www.morh.hr/nato/documents/hrvatska_map.asp (accessed 4 August 2008).

government would have not initiated the defense reform process at this pace.”⁷⁰ Not surprisingly, the policy of “stick and carrot” was applied in Croatia as in all other countries seeking NATO membership in last two decades.

On 3 April 2008, the NATO Allies decided to invite Croatia and Albania to begin accession talks to join the Alliance. NATO heads of state and government congratulated Croatia and Albania “on this historic achievement, earned through years of hard work and a demonstrated commitment to our common security and NATO’s shared values.”⁷¹ In addition, NATO declared, “The accession of these new members will strengthen security for all in the Euro-Atlantic area, and bring us closer to our goal of a Europe that is whole, free, and at peace.”⁷² On 9 July 2008 the Accession Protocols with Albania and Croatia were signed by NATO allies. Ratification of these two protocols by the current NATO allies will bring about the full NATO membership of these two countries.⁷³

B. DEFENSE REFORM

NATO is the main promoter of defense reform in the Euro-Atlantic area, mainly through its PfP and MAP mechanisms. Defense reform was a huge challenge for Croatia because it was a test of its ability to adopt and implement the standards and procedures of NATO. NATO’s complex defense reform program involves the improvement of civil-military relations, military reform in order to make the armed forces compatible and interoperable with the NATO structure and standards, and modernization of the armed forces in order to cope with new global threats and contribute to NATO-led crisis response operations.⁷⁴ This study’s analysis of defense reform in Croatia includes

⁷⁰ Tobias Pietz, *Defense Reform and Conversion in Albania, Macedonia and Croatia* (Geneva, Switzerland: DCAF Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2006), 38., http://hei.unige.ch/sas/files/portal/spotlight/country/eu_pdf/europe-alb-cro-mac-2006.pdf (accessed 30 July 2008).

⁷¹ Bucharest Summit Declaration, 3 April 2008, paragraph 2; <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2008/p08-049e.html> (accessed 18 May 2008).

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ NATO Events: NATO Allies Sign Accession Protocols for Albania and Croatia (Brussels: NATO, 2008), <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/2008/0807-sign-alb-croatia/0807-sign-alb-croatia.htm> (accessed 14 July 2008).

⁷⁴ Pietz, *Defense Reform and Conversion in Albania, Macedonia and Croatia*, 9.

achievements in civil-military relations and military reform. It also examines the modernization plans of the Croatian Armed Forces (CAF) and their ability to contribute to peacekeeping missions.

1. Achievements

a. Civil-Military Relations

One of the most important preconditions for successful defense reform is civilian and democratic oversight of the armed forces in order to provide strong political support and to ensure the allocation of sufficient resources. At the same time, the preparation and critical analysis of strategic papers presents a foundation for any kind of reform. The importance of civil-military relations has been underlined in the *Study on NATO Enlargement*, which concludes that “enlargement will contribute to enhanced stability and security for all countries in the Euro-Atlantic area by encouraging and supporting democratic reforms, including civilian and democratic control over the military.”⁷⁵

Civil-military relations in Croatia were stagnant in the 1990s because of Croatia's unique history. Croatia was formerly a communist-ruled country with an inherited legacy of “Homeland War” and troubled civil-military relations under Franjo Tudjman. During the “Homeland War” the Army was considered a protector of the state and there was no clear line between the government and the military. “The country has been characterized as a ‘totalitarian dictatorship’ during these years, with Tudjman at the helm.”⁷⁶ After the “Homeland War” (1991-1995) the Army was politicized by Tudjman and mainly used as a tool to control the state. Until Tudjman’s death in 1999 Croatia could not improve its civil-military relations and could not enhance cooperation with NATO.

⁷⁵ *Study on NATO Enlargement* (Brussels: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, September 1995), paragraph 3, <http://www.nato.int/docu/basic/txt/enl-9501.htm> (accessed 19 April 2008).

⁷⁶ Hendrickson and Smith, "Croatia and NATO: Moving Toward Alliance Membership," 298.

After Tudjman died and his ruling party lost elections, a new era of democratization began in Croatia. "Its parliamentary representation crashed from 59 percent of seats to just 29 percent in January and February 2000 elections."⁷⁷ The democratically elected president, Stipe Mesić, and the government of the new Prime Minister, Ivica Račan, expressed their willingness to interact with and eventually join the European Union and NATO. Relating to democratic control over the Armed Forces, Ivica Račan observed in 2000:

Establishing democratic control over the armed forces and defense reforms are mutually reinforcing efforts and therefore need to be tackled together. New legislation is being prepared to expand parliament's oversight of the military, a corps of civilian defense experts is being created, and defense standards and procedures designed to increase transparency are being introduced.⁷⁸

Indeed a newly elected government opened a new page in Croatia's history. More democracy and enhanced transparency in every segment of Croatian society have helped Croatia to undertake essential steps toward a better future while still dealing with many legacies remaining from the former regime and other episodes in Croatian history.

b. Military Reform

As a consequence of the many political games of numerous parties, military reform in Croatia between 2000 and 2003 did not make any improvement in restructuring and modernizing the CAF. Under external pressure within the PfP program, in 2002 the Croatian parliament accepted the first *National Security Strategy and Defense Strategy* for Croatia. Without adoption of these strategic documents, admission of Croatia to MAP in 2002 would have not been possible. In 2005 Croatia took the first

⁷⁷ Kristan J. Wheaton, "Cultivating Croatia's Military," *NATO Review* 48 (Summer/Autumn 2000), 10, <http://www.nato.int/docu/rev-pdf/eng/0002-en.pdf> (accessed 9 August, 2008).

⁷⁸ Ivica Račan, "Making Up for Lost Time," *NATO Review* 48 (Summer/Autumn 2000), 9, <http://www.nato.int/docu/rev-pdf/eng/0002-en.pdf> (accessed 8 August, 2008).

serious step forward relating to military reform, completing and adopting the Strategic Defense Review (SDR).⁷⁹ In the preface to the SDR President Stjepan Mesić stated that,

The security changes and risks that marked the beginning of the 21st Century have introduced a new set of rules for all of us. Therefore, it is necessary for us to change and adapt our defense capabilities, as well as the way we think and behave in order to meet the new requirements. Fully committed to promoting peace and security, we will develop a defense system and Armed Forces that meet modern requirements and are based on the realistic capacities at our disposal. This very document perhaps best demonstrates the course Croatia will embark on in contributing to developing good neighborly relations, peace and stability in the region.⁸⁰

The course Croatia would embark on was to undertake comprehensive reforms that would enable it to meet new challenges. In the same document Minister of Defense Berislav Rončević noted that,

In order to achieve a full operational capability of the defense system, it is necessary to begin training and equipping our units for the entire spectrum of operations. We will be able to achieve this through a modern and flexibly organized defense system that will primarily be founded on well-trained, equipped and mobile armed force.⁸¹

Assessment of the security environment in the region suggests that a direct, conventional threat to Croatia is not likely, although it cannot be completely excluded. In view of the possible need to deal more with asymmetric and transnational threats, and having to cope with complex security issues, the SDR suggests a new type of military structure with a military doctrine and standards compatible with those of NATO and the development of corresponding capabilities based on existing and future threats. The risk and threat assessments along with the growth of international obligations have directly influenced how future CAF missions and tasks will be defined. Croatia has recognized collective security as the most beneficial strategy, particularly with regard to the economy. Croatia has to ensure that sufficient resources are allocated to defense by

⁷⁹ Pietz, *Defense Reform and Conversion in Albania, Macedonia and Croatia*, 36.

⁸⁰ Republic of Croatia, *Ministry of Defense, Strategic Defense Review* (Zagreb, Croatia: Ministry of Defense, 2005), http://www.morh.hr/katalog/documents/SPO_eng.pdf (accessed 30 June 2008).

⁸¹ Ibid.

planning well-balanced budgets that provide defense expenditures sufficient for fulfilling the role of the CAF. According to the SDR, “The role of the CAF is to provide for national defense, support Croatia's foreign and security policy, and assist civil authorities in emergency and crisis situations.”⁸² The Croatian Constitution, Defense Law and the Armed Forces Service Law define the organization and command of the CAF.

According to these laws, the President of the Republic of Croatia is the Supreme Commander of the CAF. “The CAF are organized into staffs, commands, units and organizations, and they consist of branches, services and specialties. The branches are: the Croatian Army, the Croatian Navy and the Croatian Air Force and Air Defense.”⁸³ The new force structure has to be reorganized through the rationalization of numbers of command levels in order to provide effectiveness and an appropriate division of responsibilities within a single command and control system. The future size of the CAF is going to be reached by reducing the current force through a phased approach and gradual transformation to the new structure.⁸⁴ As the Table 1 shows, on 31 December 2007 Ministry of Defense (MoD) and CAF personnel totaled 22,650.

CATEGORY	NUMBER OF PERSONNEL
OFFICERS	4.638
NCOs	6.750
ENLISTED	6.082
ACTIVE	17470
STATE OFFICIALS	5
CIVIL SERVANTS	1.808
CIVIL EMPLOYEES	3.367
CIVIL SERVANTS AND EMPLOYEES	5.180
Total	22650

Table 1. The structure of personnel in the MoD and CAF on 31 December 2007 ⁸⁵
(From: 85)

⁸² Republic of Croatia, *Ministry of Defense, Strategic Defense Review*, 16.

⁸³ *Annual Exchange of Information on Defense Planning 2008 - VIENNA DOCUMENT 1999* (Zagreb, Croatia: Ministry of Defense, [2008]), http://www.morh.hr/katalog/documents/OSCE_2008.pdf (accessed 30 June 2008). Also see Appendix B, Figure 2. Basic Organizational Structure of the CAF and Appendix C, Figure 3. Organizational Structure of the CAF.

⁸⁴ Republic of Croatia, *Ministry of Defense, Strategic Defense Review*, 26.

⁸⁵ *Annual Exchange of Information on Defense Planning 2008 - VIENNA DOCUMENT 1999*, 14.

Croatia is a country in transition, with a military that was established in 1991. The CAF developed during the period 1991-95, when they fought for the independence and autonomous existence of a newly created state. "These forces were rapidly formed from a combination of the old Yugoslav system, overseas experiences of numerous volunteers (such as those from the French Foreign Legion) and a slowly emerging indigenous system."⁸⁶ The CAF have been developed based on restricted offensive and territorially-based self-defense capabilities which could not conduct any large-scale offensive operations. Croatia's defense potential has been gradually weakening due to a lack of money, an inadequate personnel policy, and poorly maintained weapon systems and equipment.⁸⁷ Greater human, material and financial resources are crucial prerequisites in order for the CAF to be functional.

According to the SDR, the personnel structure of the CAF in 2005 was primarily the result of a poor personnel management system, the legacies of wartime, and the establishment of the CAF during war in the early 1990s. This document elaborates a series of shortfalls, which "include an 'aging force', where the average age of personnel is inadequate, a relatively excess number of management personnel, lack of qualified personnel and inadequate personnel placement."⁸⁸ The document emphasizes that the lack of a consistent Human Resource Management (HRM) policy is one of the main reasons for the current situation. One of the most important prerequisites for success across the reform agenda is the quality of personnel.

As Pietz noted in 2006, "the military education of CAF personnel is still very low... a lot of 'uneducated heroes' were promoted during the war to positions where they now face tensions with old JNA-educated officers and young officers who have undertaken advanced training at Western military academies."⁸⁹ Furthermore, various

⁸⁶ "Military Reforms See Croatia March Towards NATO Berth," http://www8.janes.com/Search/documentView.do?docId=/content1/janesdata/mags/jir/history/jir2005/jir01307.htm@current&pageSelected=allJanes&keyword=croatia&backPath=http://search.janes.com/Search&Prod_Name=JIR& (accessed 13 May 2008).

⁸⁷ Republic of Croatia, Ministry of Defense, *Strategic Defense Review*, 15.

⁸⁸ Ibid., 33.

⁸⁹ Pietz, *Defense Reform and Conversion in Albania, Macedonia and Croatia*, 36.

educational programs have been started, but their success has been diminished by the selection criteria and the use made of graduates afterwards. In choosing people for study abroad, for instance, language skills have often been more important than qualifications for the course or the improvement of knowledge and skills in high demand. Upon returning from a course, officers have been put in positions having little or nothing to do with their newly-acquired abilities. The fact that there is no proper personnel planning and career system in place and the period needed for recruitment of new personnel and cadets mean that it will be a long time before the organization as a whole is up to the tasks facing the CAF.⁹⁰ Proficiency is also hard to achieve with the unsatisfactory age structure within the armed forces and the “inverted personnel pyramid with too many chiefs and no Indians (and few coming in).”⁹¹ This is the reality that the CAF have to transform in order to achieve a more efficient and transparent HRM policy in order to professionalize and gradually renew personnel in the CAF able to meet new challenges.

Modern weapon systems, military equipment and other technical means are crucial for executing missions in modern warfare. Currently, limited amounts of weapons and military equipment are produced in Croatia. Existing equipment is largely of Eastern European origin, including the former Yugoslavia, as well as some limited quantities from Western countries. All of the equipment is old and incompatible with NATO standards. The uncontrolled import of military equipment and weapons has resulted in a variety of different types and models of particular classes of weapons. Interoperability is important for a materiel management system because it requires the adoption and implementation of a series of NATO standardization agreements (STANAGs).⁹² For the CAF, increasing the level of interoperability is its highest priority. In order to achieve this goal, membership in the NATO PfP program — and

⁹⁰ Staff of the Centre for European Security Studies, *The Western Balkan Candidates for NATO Membership and Partnership*, ed. David Greenwood (The Netherlands: Centre for European Security Studies, 2005), 53-54.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 53.

⁹² Republic of Croatia, Ministry of Defense, *Strategic Defense Review*, 34-35.

especially in the MAP — is crucial. The exchange of information and conduct of military exercises contribute to the improvement of the CAF's capabilities and enables the CAF to perform their numerous roles.⁹³

Many military bases and infrastructure assets have to be maintained, regardless of whether those facilities are currently in use. In order to solve this problem, Croatia has to define prospective and non-prospective locations. Divesting the government of non-perspective locations would free critical human and financial resources which could be used for enhancing defense reform.⁹⁴

One of the NATO recommendations for admission into the Alliance is to have armed forces with a well-balanced budget structure. The recommended allocation prescribes 50% of the budget for personnel expenses, 30% for operational costs, and 20% for equipment, modernization and related expenses. A well balanced budget structure includes providing the financial framework for the CAF necessary for maintaining the capabilities required by NATO standards. NATO standards require defense budget allocations around 2% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Currently in Croatia the portion of the state budget allocated to defense is 1.83% of GDP.⁹⁵ For Croatia this poses a significant challenge along with the other reforms that must take place. Related to this issue, as the SDR suggests, “the success of Croatia's defense reform efforts directly depends on strong political support from the national leadership and its corresponding commitment to provide adequate resources.”⁹⁶

2. Plans for the Future

In order to fulfill its missions, Croatia has to develop armed forces capable of meeting new threats with small, professional, and quickly deployable units. Besides the obligation of the CAF to make contributions to the collective defense of the Alliance and to assist civilian institutions within the country, the ability to contribute to Allied crisis

⁹³ *Annual Exchange of Information on Defense Planning 2008 - VIENNA DOCUMENT 1999*, 8.

⁹⁴ Republic of Croatia, Ministry of Defense, *Strategic Defense Review*, 36.

⁹⁵ See Table 2 for changes in GDP, state budget, and the defense budget 2002-2008.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 37.

response missions abroad is another key dimension that Croatia has to take into consideration. According to the CAF Long-Term Development Plan (LTDP), these capabilities have to be developed through advances in human resources, material resources, the logistical system, doctrine and training, international military cooperation, and research and development. The CAF LTDP is a document which provides the framework for gradual implementation of defense reform in the period 2006-2015. The objective of this plan is to determine the financial framework and military capabilities that are going to be developed and maintained within that framework. The course of this development has been proposed in the SDR through defining the vision of the CAF as follows:

- A CAF numerical size that will not exceed 16 000 active military personnel, 2 000 soldier-trainees (overall annual contingent) and up to 6 000 contract reserve members;
- The CAF will be manned exclusively with a volunteer contingent by 2010;
- Abandonment of the present territorial principle of force organization;
- The CAF service commands will have a primary role in the preparation of forces, while the CAF General Staff will be responsible for the conduct of operations;
- A separately organized joint command will provide support in the segment of logistics, health care and personnel;
- The land forces will be the incumbent of CAF joint operations conduct, by developing and maintaining balanced capabilities to respond to modern security challenges;
- 8% of the active land component will be deployed or ready to be deployed to international military operations, while 40% will possess capabilities to participate in operations outside the territory of the Republic of Croatia;
- Members of the contract reserve will prepare to participate in operations inside and outside Croatian territory;
- Naval forces will develop capabilities for surveillance and protection of the maritime space of the Republic of Croatia, as well as support for the land forces in joint operations;

- The air forces will maintain capabilities for surveillance and protection of Croatian air space, as well as support for the land forces in joint operations;
- CAF capabilities will be achieved and maintained through adequate training of units and CAF members, as well as through procurement of the necessary weaponry and equipment.⁹⁷

In order to realize this vision the next key challenges will be the most salient.

The CAF have to achieve a fully professional personnel structure and contract reserve. In order to achieve this, the HRM policy has to be carefully implemented through four main HRM functions: recruitment and selection, professional development, personnel support and separation process.⁹⁸ Military education has to be fully supported by the civilian education system and complemented by military curricula. This goal requires a common effort by military and civilian institutions together and time for its implementation.

In order to meet the needs for new capabilities, the CAF have to allocate resources for the modernization and procurement of weaponry and military equipment. Each branch of service has established a series of defense procurement priorities. In order to improve mobility, the Croatian Army concentrated on the procurement of wheeled armored vehicles. To this end, a contract was signed in October 2007 between the MoD and Finland's Patria Vehicles. By 2015 the Army plans to have 126 new APCs (Armored Personnel Carriers). Modernization of existing M-84A tanks is planned to occur from 2011-2015.⁹⁹ In order to provide an effective air capability, the Croatian Air Force has to undertake efforts to procure a modern combat aircraft. The Croatian MoD is planning to initiate the process of procurement of 12 new fighter aircraft by the end of 2009, with an introduction into service planned by 2011. The Croatian Air Force also

⁹⁷ Croatia, Ministry of Defense, *The Croatian Armed Forces Long-Term Development Plan* (Zagreb, Croatia: Ministry of Defense, 2006), 5-6, <http://www.morh.hr/katalog/documents/CAF%20LTDP%202006-2015.pdf> (accessed 30 June 2008).

⁹⁸ Republic of Croatia, Ministry of Defense, *Strategic Defense Review*, 33.

⁹⁹ "Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - the Balkans - Croatia Procurement," Jane's (2008), http://www8.janes.com/Search/documentView.do?docId=/content1/janesdata/sent/balksu/croas150.htm@current&pageSelected=allJanes&keyword=tank&backPath=http://search.janes.com/Search&Prod_Name=BALKSU&keyword=#toclink-j0011130009682 (accessed 14 May 2008).

requires additional new basic training aircraft. The acquisition of the turboprop Pilatus PC-9M Advanced Turbo Trainer in 1996 and the Jet Ranger III helicopter has significantly enhanced training. So far only five Zlin Z 242 L training airplanes have been procured. A contract for ten new Mi-171Sh helicopters has been signed between the Croatian MoD and the Russian state-owned defense export agency Rosoboronexport as a part of an effort by Russia to reduce its debt to Croatia. The Croatian Navy will be equipped with a new patrol ship which will ensure its capability to control territorial waters and protect the ecological fishing zone in the Adriatic Sea.¹⁰⁰ All of these efforts in the modernization and procurement of weapons and equipment will enable the participation of the CAF in NATO-led operations as fully professional and highly mobile forces.

Along with the modernization and procurement of weaponry and military equipment, the CAF has to reduce the number of military sites through a process called “conversion.” Conversion is the process of selling sites that are not considered of prospective utility for the CAF in the long term and modernizing the sites that the CAF plan to retain. The military sites to be retained have to be modernized in order to improve the quality of life and working conditions of CAF units. This process requires a structured and detailed approach in order to produce the requisite benefit. This is a costly process because all abandoned military sites are potentially ecological hazards that have to be rehabilitated in a proper manner.¹⁰¹

In order to achieve all of the goals defined in the CAF LTDP, a stable supply of financial resources is necessary for defense needs at a recurring annual level of 2% of GDP. This is one of the main prerequisites for reliable financing, without which Croatia, as a member of NATO, will not be able to achieve and maintain the desired level of capabilities in its armed forces. Table 2 shows the trend of changes in GDP, the State Budget and the Defense Budget from 2002 to 2008. According to this table the proportion of spending on defense in the state budget and in GDP was lowest in 2007, and in 2008 has slightly increased, but is still less than the recommended 2% of GDP.

¹⁰⁰“Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment – The Balkans – Croatia Procurement,” Jane’s (2008).

¹⁰¹ Pietz, *Defense Reform and Conversion in Albania, Macedonia and Croatia*, 46.

(In millions of Euros)

YEAR	GDP	STATE BUDGET	DEFENCE BUDGET	PORTION OF STATE BUDGET	
				in GDP	in STATE BUDGET
1	2	3	4	$5=4/2*100$	$6=4/3*100$
2002	24.574	11.224	635	2,58%	5,65%
2003	26.447	12.052	673	2,54%	5,58%
2004	28.367	14.234	596	2,10%	4,18%
2005	30.407	14.101	562	1,84%	3,98%
2006	33.868	15.082	575	1,69%	3,81%
2007	36.524	16.044	610	1,66%	3,80%
2008	40.899	17.401	749	1,83%	4,30%

Table 2. Changes in GDP, State Budget and the Defense Budget 2002 – 2008.¹⁰²
(From: 102)

C. FOREIGN POLICY

1. Participation in Peacekeeping Missions

One of NATO's recommendations for admission into the Alliance is the participation of aspirant countries in peacekeeping operations in order to demonstrate a willingness and ability to share international security burdens. "NATO Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer has repeatedly emphasized that NATO's success in the peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operation in Afghanistan is the alliance's number one priority."¹⁰³ Aware of the difficulties associated with developing capabilities for peacekeeping missions, NATO has encouraged candidate states to develop "niche capabilities" to assist NATO missions.¹⁰⁴ Croatia's contribution in Afghanistan to date is 200 troops in Mazar-e-Sharif and Faizabadan in northern Afghanistan. According to the Annual Readiness Report of the Croatian Defense System for 2007, the number of

¹⁰² *Annual Exchange of Information on Defense Planning 2008 - VIENNA DOCUMENT 1999*, 27.

¹⁰³ Hendrickson and Smith, "Croatia and NATO: Moving Toward Alliance Membership," 302.

¹⁰⁴ "Niche capabilities" are defined as contributions consisting of technologically advanced, deployable, interoperable, and sustainable forces including land, sea, and air elements ready to move quickly in order to assist NATO missions.

personnel in Afghanistan is planned to increase to 300 in 2008. Croatia also leads Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLT) that train Afghan forces and participate in a military medical team with Albania and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. According to some independent assessments, it is not clear if Croatia has committed the financial resources necessary to carry out all the obligations planned for the future.¹⁰⁵ Due to a lack of logistical capabilities, Croatia will likely continue to need support from its allies in order to continue to participate in international missions.

In terms of cooperating with the UN, on 28 March 2008, the Croatian Parliament decided that CAF units would participate in the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) peace support mission in the Golan Heights. Up to 100 CAF members will replace Slovak soldiers within the Austrian-led battalion in order to control the separation zone between Israel and Syria. In total, Croatia has deployed 46 CAF members to 13 UN peace support operations.¹⁰⁶ Table 3 shows the CAF contributions to the UN operations. Overall, the CAF's efforts in the missions outside of Croatia have generated applause from the U.S. government regardless of the fact that the participation of Croatian troops consisted largely of non-combat missions.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁵ Paul Gallis and others, *Enlargement Issues at NATO's Bucharest Summit* (Washington: Congressional Research Service, [2008]), <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34415.pdf> (accessed 18 August 2008).

¹⁰⁶ *Annual Exchange of Information on Defense Planning 2008 - VIENNA DOCUMENT 1999*, 8.

¹⁰⁷ Hendrickson and Smith, "Croatia and NATO: Moving Toward Alliance Membership," 302.

No.	Country	Mission Name	Numerical status			Note
			officers	NCOs	enlisted	
1.	India – Pakistan	UNMOGIP	8	-	-	-
2.	Ethiopia – Eritrea	UNMEE	4	-	-	-
3.	Sudan	UNMIS	5	-	-	-
4.	Georgia	UNOMIG	3	-	-	-
5.	Cyprus	UNFICYP	4	-	-	-
6.	Western Sahara	MINURSO	7	-	-	-
7.	Liberia	UNMIL	5	-	-	-
8.	Ivory Coast	UNOCI	2	-	-	-
9.	Haiti	MINUSTAH	3	-	-	-
10.	Nepal	UNMIN	2	-	-	-
11.	Sierra Leone	UNIOSIL	1	-	-	-
12.	Lebanon	UNIFIL	1	-	-	-
13.	Burundi	BINUB	1	-	-	-
TOTAL MEMBERS			46	-	-	-

Table 3. Overview of CAF Member Participation in UN Peace Support Missions¹⁰⁸
(From: 108)

Besides UN peace support missions, during 2008 the CAF will devote special emphasis to equipping and training units declared for participation in NATO-led operations. These units include one motorized infantry company, one engineer platoon for mine clearing, one military police platoon, one special operations platoon, one Nuclear Biological Chemical (NBC) platoon for decontamination, two medical teams, one transport helicopter crew, and one engineer platoon for horizontal construction.¹⁰⁹

According to the CAF LTDP Croatia intends to gradually increase its participation in NATO-led missions to 600 members in 2010 and more than 700 members after 2012. Croatia will continue to participate in UN missions with up to 150 personnel. Between 2011 and 2015 Croatia plans to have 600 personnel with rotation or a reinforced battalion (up to 1000 CAF members) without rotation available for participation in NATO-led crisis response operations. According to the plan, NATO and EU staff positions will be filled with around 100 CAF officers and *non-commissioned* officers (NCOs). Moreover, the CAF will participate in NATO Response Force (NRF) and EU Battle Groups.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁸ *Annual Exchange of Information on Defense Planning 2008 - VIENNA DOCUMENT 1999*, 17.

¹⁰⁹ *Annual Exchange of Information on Defense Planning 2008 - VIENNA DOCUMENT 1999*, 17.

¹¹⁰ Croatia, Ministry of Defense, *The Croatian Armed Forces Long-Term Development Plan*, 67.

2. Relations with Neighbor Countries

Croatia has no major outstanding issues with its neighbors. Key issues to date have been the implementation of the Dayton Accords, the return of refugees and displaced persons from the war of 1991-1995, and the resolution of border disputes with Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, and Montenegro.

Relations between Croatia and Serbia have noticeably improved since Ivo Sanader, Croatia's Prime Minister, visited Belgrade on 15 November 2004 and since Boris Tadić, Serbia's president, visited Zagreb on 24 June 2007 and "apologized to Croats for war crimes committed by those 'acting on behalf of my people.'"¹¹¹ Relating to the issue of the return of refugees and displaced persons, Croatia has made significant, but not sufficient, progress. Over 300,000 Serb refugees fled Croatia during the 1991-1995 war, and about half of them have returned, according to the Croatian government.

Regarding the Kosovo issue, Croatia cautiously postponed the recognition of Kosovo's independence in order to not alienate Serbia by being among the first countries to do so. Despite the fact that "Serbian President Boris Tadić warned that recognition of Kosovo's independence would have 'deep political and economic consequences' for Croatia,"¹¹² Croatia recognized Kosovo as an independent state on 19 March 2008.

In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia has played a largely positive role. Regarding its obligation to respect the Dayton Accords, Croatia has encouraged ethnic Croats in Bosnia to build their future within the country called Bosnia and Herzegovina rather than seek intervention from Croatia. Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina have undertaken efforts to resolve their issue over a coastal zone. There are some pending issues concerning the delimitation of land and river borders between these two countries. The implementation of the Agreement on Use of Ploče Port in Croatia is an ongoing process as well as talks about the agreement on settling property issues and transit through Neum, a small port in Bosnia and Herzegovina which divides the continental part

¹¹¹ Eric Jansson, "Healing the Wounds of War," *Financial Times*, 12 November 2007, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1381600071&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD> (accessed 20 August 2008).

¹¹² Gallis and others, *Enlargement Issues at NATO's Bucharest Summit*, 14-15.

of Croatia. Related to these issues are ongoing talks about the initiative by the Republic of Croatia on construction of a Komarna-Pelješac Bridge which would connect the Pelješac peninsula to the Croatian mainland. Bosnia and Herzegovina has protested that it will close its way to international waters, and this plan has not been endorsed by the Bosnia and Herzegovina authorities.¹¹³ Negotiations are still being held. Both countries are striving to resolve these issues in the near future.

Relations between Croatia and Slovenia have fared well except for a disagreement over the maritime boundary between the two countries. However, in August 2007, the two countries agreed to refer the dispute for arbitration by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) at The Hague.¹¹⁴ Croatia wants to avoid conflict with Slovenia, which, as a member of the European Union, could veto Croatia's application for membership unless it agrees to Slovenia's position on this issue. The Slovenian government denies exploiting its EU membership status in this fashion.¹¹⁵

Croatia for a limited time unilaterally declared an "ecological and fisheries protection zone" in order to preserve fishing stocks and to reduce pollution. The zone covered an area of approximately 30 000 kilometers outside of Croatian territorial waters. On 1 January 2008 Croatia began asserting its jurisdiction in this area over the strong objections of neighboring Slovenia and Italy. In order to preserve its ambitions to join the EU Zagreb suspended the zone on 15 March 2008.¹¹⁶

Since 2003, Croatia, Albania and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia have participated in the Adriatic Charter. This is an American initiative that promotes

¹¹³ Commission Staff Working Document, *Bosnia and Herzegovina 2007 Progress Report* (Brussels: Commission of the European Communities,[2007]), 22, see also Appendix D, Figure 4. Map of Komarna-Pelješac Bridge;
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2007/nov/bosnia_herzegovina_progress_reports_en.pdf (accessed 3 October 2008).

¹¹⁴ Gallis and others, *Enlargement Issues at NATO's Bucharest Summit*, 14.

¹¹⁵ Richard Bernstein, "A Balkan Border Dispute is Nonviolent but Nettle some," *New York Times*, 18 July 2006, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1078768051&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD> (accessed 20 August 2008).

¹¹⁶ Barbara Štor, "One Step Forward, Two Steps Back," *Slovenia Times*, 4 April 2008, <http://www.sloveniatimes.com/en/inside.cp2?uid=4D1166B7-563E-270B-4692EB40BDDF647A&linkid=news&cid=BEAF1BF5-A047-2FFA-3BC2-D2EA2CC627CE> (accessed 17 October 2008).

cooperation among the three countries in defense reforms and other areas in order to boost their prospects of NATO membership. Croatia also participates in the Southeast Europe Defense Ministerial (SEDM) and the Southeastern Europe Brigade (SEEBRIG).¹¹⁷

3. Cooperation with International Criminal Tribunal for War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)

Croatia has significantly improved its cooperation with the ICTY since 2001. Until that time Croatia actively protected indicted individuals from the tribunal. Croatia's unwillingness to cooperate with locating and transferring alleged war criminal General Ante Gotovina¹¹⁸ was a major obstacle in its efforts to join the EU and NATO. EU members deferred any initiative relating to the opening of membership talks with Croatia. Croatia increased its efforts and captured Gotovina in 2005.¹¹⁹ Since the arrest and extradition of Gotovina to the ICTY, Croatia's international political legitimacy has increased, and further integration with Euro-Atlantic institutions has been encouraged. Through Gotovina's case, Croatia resolved the matter of ICTY cooperation, and this opened the road toward membership in Euro-Atlantic institutions.¹²⁰ Interviews with NATO officials suggest that if Croatia had not captured Gotovina, Croatia would have never been invited to join NATO, regardless of the many other measures Croatia took in order to join NATO.¹²¹

¹¹⁷ Štor, "One Step Forward, Two Steps Back," *Slovenia Times*.

¹¹⁸ Ante Gotovina is a former lieutenant general of the Croatian Army who served in the 1991-1995 war in Croatia. He was indicted in 2001 by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. The indictment accused him of a "joint criminal enterprise" in an effort to expel Krajina Serbs from Croatia in 1995 during Operation Storm at the end of the Croatian War. After spending four years in hiding, he was captured in Tenerife on 7 December 2005. The trial of Ante Gotovina commenced on 11 March 2008.

¹¹⁹ Hendrickson and Smith, "Croatia and NATO: Moving Toward Alliance Membership," 302.

¹²⁰ Julie Kim, *Balkan Cooperation on War Crimes Issues* (Washington: Congressional Research Service [2008]) (accessed 18 August 2008).

¹²¹ Author's interviews with NATO experts in Brussels in June 2008.

D. CONCLUSION

Croatia has made a significant change in its attitude toward Euro-Atlantic integration since 2000, when it decided that only membership in NATO could bring it into the family of states which enjoy the benefits of security in the Euro-Atlantic area. Actively participating in the NATO PfP Program and MAP, Croatia addressed NATO's demands for more democratic civil-military relations and a reorganized, mobile, and modernized military. Croatia's foreign policy has become much more aligned with that of NATO. The Croatian government has made many efforts to reduce of the number of personnel and increase the professionalism of the active and reserve components of the CAF. Croatia as a whole has made a significant effort to increase the mobility of the CAF through the modernization and procurement of new weaponry and military equipment. After adopting the SDR, Croatia made leaps forward and developed the CAF LTDP, which was gradually implemented. Croatia has shown its willingness to actively participate in peacekeeping missions led by NATO and the UN with the prospect of greater contributions in the future. Croatia no longer has major issues with its neighbors. In order to achieve NATO membership, Croatia resolved outstanding issues of ICTY cooperation and thus finally made its objective feasible.

Croatia, however, still has a number of areas for improvement. Much will depend on the government's ability to implement its recently proposed reforms in military force structure. The most salient immediate problem is Croatia's human, materiel and financial resource allocation. Even upon full membership in NATO, this could affect Croatia's ability to cooperate within the Alliance. In its CAF LTDP, Croatia has provided a roadmap to solve these problems. These problems require an effort from the whole society, the allocation of sufficient financial and materiel resources, and the time needed for implementation of the program. Moreover, the CAF will not be fully modernized until 2015, and they are able to provide only small contributions to various peacekeeping operations. Due to a lack of logistical capabilities, the CAF will likely continue to need support from their allies in order to actively participate in peacekeeping missions. A number of new Alliance member states already have provided meaningful contributions to Alliance security, and Croatia has showed its continuing willingness to contribute. It is

evident that Croatia has made significant efforts in defense reform and foreign policy in order to join NATO. It is also evident that the CAF are still not ready for the full spectrum of NATO missions. NATO's decision to invite Croatia to join the Alliance is founded on the assessment that, although militarily Croatia is not yet ready to undertake all missions, it has the potential for greater contributions in the future. It appears that the declaration of an independent Kosovo in February 2008, combined with the politico-strategic situation in the region, may have helped to open the door for Croatia's membership in the Alliance, because the NATO Allies wish to promote regional stability.

IV. BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA – CASE STUDY

A. THE WAY TO NATO MEMBERSHIP

The complex history of Bosnia has lasted more than a thousand years. The first surviving mention of Bosnia as a territory occurred in the politico-geographic handbook written in 958 A.D. by the Byzantine Emperor Constantine Porphyrogenitus.¹²² Bosnia emerged as an independent state for the first time in 1180. This medieval Bosnian state was distinguished by three powerful rulers: Ban Kulin, Ban Stephen Kotromanić and King Stephen Tvrtko.¹²³ As a consequence of the rise of Ottoman power, Bosnia was conquered by the Turkish Army in 1463 and remained under Ottoman rule for almost five centuries. At the Congress of Berlin in 1878, it was decided that Bosnia and Herzegovina, “while still in theory under Ottoman suzerainty, would be occupied and administered by Austria-Hungary.”¹²⁴ Bosnia remained under Austro-Hungarian rule until 1914, when World War I (WWI) was initiated in Sarajevo by the assassination of Austro-Hungarian Archduke Franz Ferdinand. After WWI Bosnia became a part of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes until January 1929. At that time King Alexander suspended the constitution and changed the name of the country to Yugoslavia.

In the wake of World War II (WWII), despite the fact that Yugoslav leaders tried to implement a conciliatory policy towards Germany, Yugoslavia was invaded on 6 April 1941. After eleven days the Yugoslav Army capitulated to the German High Command.¹²⁵ In November 1943, at the time of the founding session of the Territorial

¹²² Noel Malcolm, *Bosnia: A Short History* (New York: New York University Press, 1994), 10.

¹²³ Ban Kulin ruled from 1180 to 1204, Ban Stephen Kotromanić from 1322 to 1353, and King Stephen Tvrtko from 1353 to 1391. Under the rule of Ban Stephen Kotromanić Bosnia expanded to include the principality of Hum (Hercegovina); and under the rule of King Stephen Tvrtko Bosnia expanded further to the south to include a large part of the Dalmatian coast. This made Bosnia the most powerful state in the western Balkans at that time. See also Noel Malcolm, *Bosnia: A Short History* (New York: New York University Press, 1994), 13.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, 134.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, 173.

Antifascist Council for the National Liberation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ZAVNOBIH), Bosnia and Herzegovina was promised that it would have separate status within Yugoslavia as a “country of Serbs, Croats and Muslims — ‘their common and indivisible homeland’ — over which no single national group had exclusive rights.”¹²⁶

Following WWII Bosnia and Herzegovina was one of six republics in the Yugoslav federation. Following the decision by the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina to establish an independent country, which was made via a national plebiscite in March 1992, the Serb-led Yugoslav National Army commenced a siege of Sarajevo using snipers with telescopic sights to kill civilians as they tried to find food and water.¹²⁷ This aggression could be characterized by two features that, according to Hungarian analyst Andras Riedlmayer, “had little to do with military objectives: the mass expulsion of civilians driven from their homes, robbed, raped, and murdered for being of the ‘wrong’ ethnicity and religion; and the deliberate targeting and destruction of cultural, religious, and historic landmarks by nationalist extremists.”¹²⁸

After many atrocities, including actions condemned by authoritative observers as genocide,¹²⁹ the long nightmare in Bosnia and Herzegovina formally ceased with the signing of the Dayton Agreement in November 1995. This agreement stopped the war, but “established what has been described as ‘one of the most complicated and wasteful systems of government ever devised.’”¹³⁰ Nevertheless, while still struggling to build a functional state, Bosnia and Herzegovina has made progress in many fields relating to the

¹²⁶ Mitja Velikonja, *Religious Separation and Political Intolerance in Bosnia-Herzegovina*, 1st ed. (College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 2003), 183.

¹²⁷ Maya Shatzmiller, *Islam and Bosnia: Conflict Resolution and Foreign Policy in Multi-Ethnic States* (Montréal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2002), 98.

¹²⁸ Ibid., 98-99.

¹²⁹ On 26 February 2007 the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled that the 1995 massacre of about 8,000 Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica was genocide, as it considered the question of Serbian responsibility. It is the first time that the ICJ, the supreme United Nations court set up to deal with disputes between states, has ruled in a genocide case. Genocide was made an international crime under a 1948 treaty. See: “UN Gives Landmark Ruling on Bosnian genocide”, *Global Policy Forum*, 26 February 2007. <http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/icj/2007/0226cleared.htm> (accessed 18 November 2008).

¹³⁰ Ian Traynor (2005) cited in Gerard Toal, John O’Loughlin and Dino Djipa, “Bosnia-Herzegovina Ten Years After Dayton: Constitutional Change and Public Opinion,” *Journal of Economic Literature* (2005), <http://www.colorado.edu/IBS/PEC/johnno/pub/Dayton10yrsafter.pdf>; (accessed 27 August 2008).

stabilization and reconstruction process. One of its greatest achievements is defense reform. This reform was one of the main preconditions for Bosnia and Herzegovina to begin its integration into Euro-Atlantic organizations. The process of integration includes PfP membership, which is widely regarded as a first step towards both Euro-Atlantic and European integration.

The Bosnian Presidency first expressed the goal of membership in European and Euro-Atlantic security institutions in June 2001, during a visit by NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson. Lord Robertson outlined many reforms needed for Bosnia and Herzegovina, such as “the adoption of a State Defense Law, State command over the armed forces, democratic and parliamentary oversight of the armed forces, the formation of the BiH [Bosnia and Herzegovina] Ministry of Defense (MoD), transparent military budgets, common equipping and training standards, strengthening of state-level Institutions and the fulfillment of obligations to ICTY [International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia] under the Dayton Peace Accords.”¹³¹ After a huge effort undertaken in a few years, and despite failing to obtain an invitation to join PFP at the Istanbul Summit in 2004, Bosnia and Herzegovina was invited to join PFP at the Riga Summit on 29 November 2006.¹³²

In the period immediately following its entry into the PfP program, Bosnia and Herzegovina demonstrated its commitment to fulfill PfP goals. In this regard, the activities that have been completed by Bosnia and Herzegovina up to the beginning of 2008 are presented in Table 4.

¹³¹ James Staples, "Defense Reform and PfP in Bosnia and Herzegovina," *RUSI Journal* 149, no. 4 (August 2004), 34.

¹³² "Riga Declaration," NATO Press Release (2006)150 (2008), <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2006/p06-150e.htm> (accessed 15 May 2008).

BiH Presentation Document for PfP was developed and submitted.
Individual Partnership Program (BiH IPP) was developed by BiH and accepted and approved by the NAC and BiH.
NATO Security Agreement was signed and certified.
The National Security Authority was established to implement provisions of the Security Agreement in order to be able to exchange classified information between NATO and BiH.
The ePRIME (Partnership Real-Time Information, Management, and Exchange System) communication system was established in BiH.
BiH joined the Planning and Review Process (PARP); 31 PARP-related BiH partnership goals with NATO have been identified.
The PfP Status of Forces Agreement (PfP SOFA) and its Additional Protocols have been signed and ratified.
The NATO Co-ordination Team at the level of the BiH Council of Ministers was established.
The procedure for the appointment of the Head of the BiH Mission to NATO was accomplished.
The procedures for opening the BiH Mission to NATO HQ in Brussels were begun.
The second BiH IPP (Bosnia and Herzegovina Individual Partnership Program) for 2008-2009 was prepared.
At the end of 2007 the BiH Presidency requested the enhancement of co-operation between NATO and BiH at the level of IPAP (Individual Partnership Action Plan).
NATO approved the institutionalization of co-operation with BiH at the level of IPAP.

Table 4. Bosnia and Herzegovina's commitment to PfP goals ¹³³ (After: 133)

These efforts have been welcomed by NATO countries, which have encouraged ambitious and substantive Action Plans to further the Euro-Atlantic aspirations of Bosnia and Herzegovina and which will offer assistance in reform efforts towards this goal. At the Bucharest Summit on 3 April 2008, NATO members decided to invite Bosnia and Herzegovina to begin an Intensified Dialogue (ID), which will include discussions on

¹³³ Bosnia and Herzegovina - NATO Individual Partnership Action Plan - Presentation Document (Sarajevo: Ministry of Defense of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2008), 4.

political, military, financial, and security issues.¹³⁴ This was another step forward to NATO membership for Bosnia and Herzegovina.

B. DEFENSE REFORM

1. Achievements

In a 2004 interview, the High Representative/European Union Special Representative (HR/EUSR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Paddy Ashdown, said:

‘[I]f there is one issue that everybody in every ethnicity, every political party and every corner of the country is agreed upon, it is that Bosnia and Herzegovina’s ultimate destination is Europe’: so there is a clear understanding across the society that ‘the only possible future for this country is via integration in Euro-Atlantic structures.’¹³⁵

This shared understanding created sufficient preconditions for successful defense reforms in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Defense reform was “one of the top-priority objectives for both NATO members and Partnership countries in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council/Partnership for Peace (EAPC/PfP) community.”¹³⁶ As noted in the Partnership for Peace Presentation Document, “the reform of the defense system, as an exceptionally important element of the state structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina, focuses on two key issues: 1) establishment of a single defense system under efficient command and control of functional state institutions, and 2) restructuring of the Armed Forces to enable the implementation of legitimate defense goals of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its foreign political aspirations in terms of security, specifically collective defense and

¹³⁴ "Bucharest Declaration," NATO Press Release (2008)049 (2008); <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2008/p08-049e.html> (accessed 18 May 2008).

¹³⁵ Ashdown quoted in Staff of the Centre for European Security Studies, the Western Balkan Candidates for NATO Membership and Partnership, ed. David Greenwood (The Netherlands: Centre for European Security Studies, 2005), 83; <http://www.cess.org/publications/harmoniepapers/pdfs/HarmPap.18.colour.pdf> (accessed 11 June 2008).

¹³⁶ István Gyarmati and Theodor Winkler, *Post-Cold War Defense Reform: Lessons Learned in Europe and the United States*, 1st ed. (Washington, D.C: Brassey's, 2002), 189.

security.”¹³⁷ After a great deal of effort was undertaken in just a few short years, a single defense establishment and a single military force emerged in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

a. Civil Military Relations

Bosnia and Herzegovina was created according to the Dayton Peace Agreement, and it is characterized by a weak central state with two relatively strong entities: 1) the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) and 2) the Republika Srpska (RS). Bosnia and Herzegovina therefore has an unusually complex state structure, including a complicated defense structure. At the end of the war in 1995, Bosnia and Herzegovina formally had two armies: the FBiH Army and the RS Army. In reality the FBiH Army was deeply divided along ethnic lines so these two armies actually represented three armies: one Bosniac, one Croat (as components of the FBiH Army), and one Serbian (the RS Army). This resulted in two separate defense systems for the two entities comprising the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina.¹³⁸ Thus, the central state did not have effective control over the military, be it command and control or oversight, because the separate military forces were organized and commanded at the level of the FBiH and the level of the RS, as two official entities of the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina. James R. Locher III, then co-chairman of the Defense Reform Commission of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Michael Donley, then a special adviser to the Defense Reform Commission, noted that

The communist inheritance included highly politicized command elements, weak civilian control below the head of state, almost no connectivity or communication between the Defense Ministries and general staffs, lack of transparency in budgeting and administration, and

¹³⁷ *Bosnia and Herzegovina - Partnership for Peace - Presentation Document* (Sarajevo: Ministry of Defense of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2006), 6; http://www.mod.gov.ba/eng/dwn/prez_dokum_e.pdf (accessed 10 September 2008).

¹³⁸ Merijn Hartog, “Defence Reform and PfP Aspirations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Serbia and Montenegro,” in Jos Boonstra, ed., *Defence Reform Initiative for Bosnia and Herzegovina /Serbia and Montenegro, the DRINA Project* (Groningen, The Netherlands: The Centre for European Security Studies, 2005), 2; <http://www.cess.org/publications/occasional/pdfs/occasional2.pdf> (accessed 1 September 2008).

weak parliamentary oversight. The post-war environment was characterized by fragmented political authority and lack of trust.¹³⁹

The best indication of such weak civil military relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina at that time was the illegal export by Republika Srpska of arms technology to Iraq in August 2002, more commonly known as the Orazo affair.¹⁴⁰ The public and international awareness of such poor state control over the military on an entity level was simply unacceptable. Paddy Ashdown, speaking on the Orazo affair on 21 February 2003, noted: "This scandal... goes to the very heart of inadequate control of the Armed Forces and the military industrial complex... We need to assess... the degree and extent of the systematic failure [and] to take action that responds to these issues."¹⁴¹

This scandal highlighted the fact that contemporary legal, organizational, and institutional arrangements for the management and oversight of the armed forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina had not been adequate. An essential reform priority was the adoption of a legal framework in order to "strengthening State-level command and control and establishing full democratic civilian oversight and control over all armed forces and defense structures."¹⁴² On 9 May 2003, the High Representative established the Defense Reform Commission (DRC) in order to recommend specific reforms to the defense system in Bosnia and Herzegovina.¹⁴³ The DRC's work resulted in the adoption

¹³⁹ James R. Locher III and Michael Donley, "Reforming Bosnia and Herzegovina's Defense Institutions," *NATO Review* (Winter 2004); <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2004/issue4/english/military.html> (accessed 1 September 2008).

¹⁴⁰ Heinz Vetschera and Matthieu Damian, "Security Sector Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina: The Role of the International Community," *International Peacekeeping* Vol.13, No.1 (2006); <http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdf?vid=5&hid=105&sid=e150e90e-f36a-474b-9306-e69cb200254a%40sessionmgr107> (accessed 17 November 2008).

The Orazo affair started in October 2002 when the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia, following U.S. intelligence reports, conducted an unannounced search of the Orazo factory premises in the northern Bosnian Serb town of Bijeljina, and found evidence of the company's illegal trade with Iraq. The evidence showed that the Orazo factory was providing Iraq with spare parts needed to refurbish Soviet-era MiG 21 combat aircraft. Some high-ranking Bosnian Serb Army officers were directly involved in this illegal export activity.

¹⁴¹ Defense Reform Commission, *The Path to Partnership for Peace* (Sarajevo: OSCE, 2003); <http://www.oscebih.org/documents/12-eng.pdf> (accessed 9 May 2008).

¹⁴² *Ibid.*, 34.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*

of the Defense Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina on 1 December 2003.¹⁴⁴ This law clearly codified state-level command and control of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Armed Forces, created the Bosnia and Herzegovina Ministry of Defense, and established mechanisms for Bosnia and Herzegovina parliamentary control and oversight of the Armed Forces.¹⁴⁵ This also resulted in the creation of the “Joint Committee for Defense and Security Policy and Monitoring of the Work of Defense and Security Structures on the BiH Level” in the BiH Parliamentary Assembly.¹⁴⁶ This was the initial step toward effective consolidation of civil military relations by establishing the foundation of democratic oversight and control over the Armed Forces. This is an ongoing process that has become progressively more effective.

b. Military reform

Within the period between May and September 2003, after a long period of consensus building and negotiation, the DRC reached unanimous agreement on a 293-page report setting out the way forward.¹⁴⁷ The Path to Partnership for Peace report proposed a new defense structure for the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It distinguished between two chains of command: Operational and Administrative.¹⁴⁸ The Operational Chain of Command is responsible for the employment of military forces, while under the Administrative Chain of Command the two entity Ministries of Defense are responsible for organizing, manning, equipping and training the respective entity armies. This structure was supported by a new Bosnia and Herzegovina Defense Law, though it was just an intermediate step in a longer-term vision to consolidate the entity forces in a single national military establishment.

¹⁴⁴ Defense Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina, *BiH Official Gazette*, No 43/03, 1 December 2003.

¹⁴⁵ Staples, "Defense Reform and PfP in Bosnia and Herzegovina," 36.

¹⁴⁶ Christian Haupt and Daniel Saracino, "Defense reform in BiH and SCG: Possible Sharing of experiences and the Potential for Further Cooperation" in Boonstra, *Defense Reform Initiative for Bosnia and Herzegovina /Serbia and Montenegro, the DRINA Project*, 59.

¹⁴⁷ Locher and Donley, *Reforming Bosnia and Herzegovina's Defense Institutions*.

¹⁴⁸ See Appendix E, Figure 5. Organizational Structure of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Armed Forces in 2003.

In the unofficial benchmark document issued by the North Atlantic Council, aside from legislative benchmarks, there were also personnel, institutional, restructuring, budgetary, and non-DRC benchmarks. The new national Minister of Defense, Nikola Radovanović, and two of his deputies took office on 15 March 2004. The changing structure of the armed forces requires a reduction of forces in order to meet the optimum size for the political and economic realities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. At the end of the war in 1995 the process of downsizing commenced with an aim of reducing the number of men under arms at that time (250,000). By 1998 this number had been reduced to 35,000 and in 2002 the total was 19,800. In 2004 the Bosnia and Herzegovina Presidency adopted a decision on the size and structure of the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina.¹⁴⁹ According to this decision the two entity armed forces together would be limited to a total of 12,000 soldiers (8,000 soldiers for the FBiH Army and 4,000 soldiers for the RS Army). Moreover, the number of conscripts was initially reduced to 12,600 (8,400 in the FBiH Army and 4,200 in the RS Army) and the reservist strength was set at 60,000 members (40,000 in the FBiH Army and 20,000 in the RS Army).¹⁵⁰ This represents a reduction of 95 percent in less than ten years, and of 66 percent in less than three years. As James Staples noted, “This is unrivalled in modern times.”¹⁵¹

According to a DRC report based on international estimates, Bosnia and Herzegovina’s spending on defense was bigger than that of other European countries of similar size, which is noteworthy in view of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s limited economy. Inability to afford a military establishment of such a large size was the main reason why reducing the size of the armed forces and resolving outstanding personnel issues were major priorities for reform. Without significant reform in the defense system Bosnia and Herzegovina would remain incapable of fulfilling PfP membership requirements. Among the non-DRC benchmarks for PfP was full co-operation with the ICTY, which had been a

¹⁴⁹ Presidential Decision Number 01-414-06/04, 24 March 2004.

¹⁵⁰ Vetschera and Damian, "Security Sector Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina: The Role of the International Community, " 35.

¹⁵¹ Staples, “Defense Reform and PFP in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” 37.

long standing prerequisite for the acceptance of Bosnia and Herzegovina into European and Euro-Atlantic structures. On 18 June 2004, Nikola Radovanović, Minister of Defense of Bosnia and Herzegovina, noted that “the main obstacle towards BiH joining PFP is lack of co-operation with the Hague tribunal.”¹⁵²

In order to be successful, all reforms require an effective implementation process. The DRC has given considerable attention to implementation and recommended the establishment of a Transition Management Office, with duties to oversee, assist, and support the implementation process of defense reform.¹⁵³ Defense reform had to continue in order to establish a modern and affordable defense system. By mid-2004 defense reform had already greatly advanced beyond the “Dayton agenda.” During 2004 and 2005 defense reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina was, according to some observers, a “coercive process.” The local officials were coerced by NATO because they had blocked defense reform in early 2004. Local officials had not nominated qualified candidates for top positions, and had not secured funding for the state-level institutions. Moreover, the entity parliaments had not acted to match their laws to the new national state laws.¹⁵⁴

Defense reform processes in the Western Balkans and elsewhere in the Euro-Atlantic region are usually led, observed, and influenced by international organizations. Defense reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina was observed by NATO as the DRC co-chair. In the summer of 2005 the entities had agreed to combine their armed forces and defense ministries and adopt the requisite constitutional amendments. At the end of 2005 the Parliaments had adopted proposed laws regarding the transfer of all defense responsibilities and personnel from the two entities to the central state.¹⁵⁵

In 2006 defense reform continued to progress, following the country’s adoption in December 2005 of the Defense Law, which reflects the recommendations of

¹⁵² Staples, “Defense Reform and PFP in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” 37.

¹⁵³ Defense Reform Commission, *The Path to Partnership for Peace*, 6.

¹⁵⁴ International Crisis Group, *Ensuring Bosnia's Future: A New International Engagement Strategy* (Sarajevo: International Crisis Group, [2007]), 16, http://doc.operationspaix.net/serv1/ICG_ensuring_bosnias_future_2007-02-15_.pdf (accessed 12 September 2008).

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

the Defense Reform Commission in order to meet the objective of creating a single military force.¹⁵⁶ In January 2006 all defense-related tasks and personnel were transferred to the State Ministry of Defense. In June 2006, the presidency made a decision on the definitive size, structure, and stationing of the Armed Forces.¹⁵⁷ Conscription was terminated in January 2006, and the Armed Forces are now an all-volunteer force. Since July 2006 the approved Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina structure has 10,000 professional military personnel, 5,000 active reserve members, and 1,000 civilians.¹⁵⁸

The force structure is composed of two commands: the Operational Command and the Support Command, which are subordinated to the Chief of the Joint Staff. Under the Operational Command there are three Infantry Brigades, an Air Force and Air Defense Brigade, and the Tactical Support Brigade. Under the Support Command there are three subordinated commands: the Personnel Management Command, the Training and Doctrine Command, and the Logistic Command. According to the Bosnia and Herzegovina Constitution, the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces is comprised by all three members of the collective Bosnia and Herzegovina Presidency, who are, by law, to perform together the function of Commander in Chief. Considering the command responsibilities from top to bottom within the adopted command structure in Bosnia and Herzegovina's defense system, the chain of command goes from the Bosnia and Herzegovina Presidency through the Minister of Defense to the Chief of the Joint Staff and on to the Commanders of the subordinate Operational Command and Support Command and then to the commanders of subordinate headquarters and units.¹⁵⁹ The success in defense reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina to

¹⁵⁶ Defense Reform Commission 2005 Report, *AFBIH: A Single Military Force for the 21st Century* (Sarajevo: Ministry of Defense of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2005); <http://www.mod.gov.ba/eng/dwn/2005DRCReport-English.pdf> (accessed 13 September 2008).

¹⁵⁷ Freedom House Report, *Nations in Transit 2007 - Bosnia and Herzegovina*, 2007); http://www.freedomhouse.hu/images/fdh_galleries/NIT2007/bosnia_line%20edited_office%20reviewed.pdf (accessed 13 September 2008).

¹⁵⁸ Bosnia and Herzegovina - NATO Individual Partnership Action Plan - Presentation Document, 28.

¹⁵⁹ Defense Reform Commission 2005 Report, *AFBIH: A Single Military Force for the 21st Century*, 191. See also Appendix F, Figure 6 Organizational Structure of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Armed Forces in 2005.

date has provided all the necessary preconditions for its implementation, the consolidation of existing personnel and material infrastructure, and the modernization of all capacities in the near future in order to adjust them to NATO standards.

2. Plans for the Future

Despite the fact that certain element of the defense structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina were inherited from the previous communist regime and the fact that the country is still struggling with open wounds produced by three-and-a-half years of war in 1992-1995, this country is still managing to meet nearly all of NATO's expectations. Achievements in defense reform are remarkable. According to the NATO Headquarters Sarajevo Commander, Major General Richard Wightman, U.S. Army, "Defense reform in particular remains one of the key reform successes in BiH [Bosnia and Herzegovina] and continues to serve as an example of what can be achieved when there is unity, co-operation and dialogue among all peoples."¹⁶⁰ Defense reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina is in the implementation phase. So far defense reform has been focused more on structural (or "hardware") changes in the system than on culture and mentality (or "software") changes. As a former Naval Postgraduate School student, Lieutenant Colonel Janos Szonyegi, Hungarian Army, noted,

In an established democracy, with strong traditions of civilian control of the armed forces, the process of defense reform can be limited to 'a change of *hardware*', like restructuring or professionalization. In post-communist societies, however, the biggest challenge is arguably the 'change of *software*', namely the whole culture and mentality of the defense establishment.¹⁶¹

¹⁶⁰ Wightman quoted in Antonio Prlenda, "General Wightman: BiH Defence Reform is a Success," *Southeastern European Times* (August 8, 2008); http://balkantimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/articles/2008/08/18/reportage-01 (accessed 21 August 2008).

¹⁶¹ Janos Szonyegi, *The Pace of Peace on the Viability of Bosnia and Herzegovina Twelve Years After Dayton* [Electronic Resource] (Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School, June 2007), 92; <http://bosun.nps.edu/uhtbin/hyperion-image.exe/07Jun%5FSzonyegi.pdf> (accessed 21 August 2008).

Bosnia and Herzegovina is a country which indeed needs refurbished “software” in order to be ready for the future. This is a process which needs a substantial allocation of time, effort, and resources.

According to an assessment by the *Jane's* organization, the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina at the present time are not capable of conventional combat operations on any scale. Regardless of the many achievements thus far, the transition to a unified military establishment has been completed only on paper. The military is still organized according to separate doctrines; and it remains politically divided, differently equipped, and operationally ill-matched and uncoordinated. Owing to these deficiencies, the situation in the Armed Forces cannot be corrected any time soon, given the low levels of funding and a widespread public view of the Armed Forces as a low priority. *Jane's* considers Bosnia and Herzegovina “a deeply divided nation, with serious implications for the armed forces.”¹⁶² Among the positive trends that may further boost the transformation of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Armed Forces are the opportunities presented by entry into PfP and ID.

The stated desire of the Armed Forces to meaningfully participate in multinational operations should reinforce this trend. *Jane's* considers that “The hard work required to prepare for demanding UN, EU, NATO or coalition operations may enhance national identity and deflect tendencies to look for regional or ethnic authentication.”¹⁶³ As US Army Major General Richard Wightman, then commander of the NATO Headquarters Sarajevo, noted,

defense reform also entails the obligations that BiH [Bosnia and Herzegovina] has incurred as well as the commitments that have been made within the framework of PfP, including reform goals within the Planning and Review Process (PARP), as well as wider security and political obligations that BiH will incur as the Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) process develops.¹⁶⁴

¹⁶² Jane's, "Bosnia and Herzegovina Armed Forces," (2008); http://search.janes.com/Search&Prod_Name=BALK& (accessed 14 May 2008).

¹⁶³ Ibid.

¹⁶⁴ Prlenda, "General Wightman: BiH Defence Reform is a Success."

In the IPAP for 2008-2010, Bosnia and Herzegovina addresses the necessity to initiate a Defence Review by the end of 2008. This Defence Review will aim at the development of affordable, flexible, modern, and capable Armed Forces that reflect the security requirements of the country and that are capable of sustaining operations within available resources. The Defence Review is expected to provide the basic preconditions for future defence reform. This includes the identification of necessary capabilities for the defence of the country, assistance to civilian authorities, and participation in peace support operations. According to the IPAP, "Other aspects of Defence Review will include personnel issues (relations between officers, NCOs and professional soldiers), education and training policy, logistic capacities for support, plans for equipment modernisation, issue of military bases and disposal of surplus armaments and military equipment."¹⁶⁵ As a priority in the Defence Review, Bosnia and Herzegovina plans to update its Defense Planning Policy and develop its Defense Resources Management Policy. This will create preconditions for the Bosnia and Herzegovina Ministry of Defense to develop policies and regulations that will support a multi-year planning system. Croatia has already established its own defense planning system on the levels of strategic planning, developmental planning and operative planning. The same system could be used in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well.¹⁶⁶ Moreover, while relying on these policies, the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina Joint Staff will develop a defense strategy in order to define activities and procedures to fulfill assigned missions in an effective and financially sustainable manner.¹⁶⁷

Bosnia and Herzegovina plans to establish military education systems organized in a way which would provide highly educated and trained personnel capable of speaking the same language as current NATO member states.¹⁶⁸ Various educational programs

¹⁶⁵ *BiH NATO Individual Partnership Action Plan (Period 2008-2010)* (Sarajevo: Ministry of Defense of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2008), 12.

¹⁶⁶ *Annual Exchange of Information on Defense Planning 2008 - VIENNA DOCUMENT 1999* (Zagreb, Croatia: Ministry of Defense [2008]), 11, http://www.morh.hr/katalog/documents/OSCE_2008.pdf (accessed 30 June 2008).

¹⁶⁷ *Bosnia and Herzegovina - NATO Individual Partnership Action Plan - Presentation Document*, 25.

¹⁶⁸ Staff of the Centre for European Security Studies, *The Western Balkan Candidates for NATO Membership and Partnership*, 17.

have been started, but poor selection criteria for qualified personnel for these programs have led to sub-optimal results. In choosing people for studies abroad, language skills have often been more important than the technical qualifications for success in the program. Graduates of these courses have been employed in positions that have not taken full advantage of their new training and qualifications. Professional officers are aware of the necessity for recruitment of new personnel and cadets and the fact that there is no proper personnel planning and career system in place. The assessments of professional military officers in the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina suggest that some period of time will be needed before the organization as a whole will be able to accomplish the tasks facing the Bosnia and Herzegovina Armed Forces.¹⁶⁹

In order to enhance and to make its contribution to the overall NATO/PfP training and education system, Bosnia and Herzegovina — with the sponsorship of the United Kingdom — established the Peace Support Operations Training Centre (PSOTC) on 10 November 2003 in Butmir, near Sarajevo.¹⁷⁰ This center officially received the status of a PfP training centre in November 2007.¹⁷¹ Bosnia and Herzegovina seeks to further develop the expertise and professionalism of the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina through cooperation with the Baltic Defense College (BALTDEFCOL), the George C. Marshall Centre for Security Studies, the NATO School in Oberammergau, the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, and the NATO Defense College in Rome. Bosnia and Herzegovina will also continue to send students to other institutions that have also made great contributions to professional development and specialized training in countries such as China, Croatia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Norway, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. The United States of America, through the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) Program, the International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program, and the Joint Contact Team Program (JCTP), contributes significant military assistance to the

¹⁶⁹ Author's interviews with representatives of the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Sarajevo in July 2008.

¹⁷⁰ Besnik Cukali, "SFOR - Peace Support Operation Training Centre," NATO (2003), <http://www.nato.int/sfor/indexinf/articles/031211a/t031211a.htm>; (accessed 13 September 2008).

¹⁷¹ *Bosnia and Herzegovina - NATO Individual Partnership Action Plan - Presentation Document*, 17.

Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina and will, it may be hoped, remain Sarajevo's key strategic partner.¹⁷² Bosnia and Herzegovina is committed to developing and implementing a system based on the existing civilian education system combined with basic military training in the military units.¹⁷³

The unsatisfactory age structure of personnel, with more older than younger officers for certain positions, within the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina is similar to Croatia's existing "inverted personnel pyramid with too many chiefs and no Indians (and few coming in)." These structural shortcomings have proved to be among the main reasons for low efficiency within the organization. A military organization has to have the right proportion of professional ranks at all levels in order to fulfill its mission.¹⁷⁴ This is the reason why human resources management is considered a crucial requirement for future effectiveness. Experience with countries in transition has proved that the leadership's determination is crucial, because the personnel in big organizations such as defense ministries and military services are resistant to any kind of change.¹⁷⁵ The system should provide a framework whereby the selection of personnel qualified to be promoted to higher ranks will be done according to their abilities and educational achievements. An effective system should make clear to all individuals what is expected from them and what they need to do to develop their skills in order to make progress in their careers.

Ethnic representation principles complicate the personnel management system in the Bosnia and Herzegovina Armed Forces. Certain positions have to be manned by personnel of particular nationalities regardless of the fact that the qualifications for particular duties are questionable for some of them. Excessive reliance on ethnic representation principles has resulted in increasingly hollow units in the structure of the Armed Forces. Particular ethnic groups have not been able to provide sufficient numbers

¹⁷² *Defense White Paper of Bosnia and Herzegovina* (Sarajevo: Ministry of Defense of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2005), 18-19; http://www.mod.gov.ba/eng/eng_whitebook.html (accessed 13 September 2008).

¹⁷³ *Bosnia and Herzegovina - NATO Individual Partnership Action Plan - Presentation Document*, 27.

¹⁷⁴ Staff of the Centre for European Security Studies, *The Western Balkan Candidates for NATO Membership and Partnership*, 53.

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 55.

of personnel. This problem has been exacerbated by the necessity for a balanced representation of different ethnic groups in the senior military positions at different levels of commands. Human resource management in Bosnia and Herzegovina will have to develop effective mechanisms in order to provide functional personnel management in a society whose multiethnic composition is still under the stress of ethnic representation principles.¹⁷⁶

Regarding military infrastructure, there are plans to reduce the number of weapon storage sites and ammunition storage sites in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Sites that will not serve defence roles will be transferred to civilian authorities for future use. The status of defence property with no prospective interest and the status of temporarily retained immovable property, along with measures reducing the number of locations in accordance with the Bosnia and Herzegovina Presidency Decision, are planned to be resolved by the end of 2009. The consolidation of military infrastructure is considered a crucial element contributing to the operational readiness of the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina and will be analyzed within the Defence Review.¹⁷⁷

In order to provide transparent defense planning and stable defense budgeting in the future, BiH intends to introduce the Planning, Programming and Budgeting Execution System (PPBES).¹⁷⁸ The budget in 2007 was 285 million convertible marks (KM), which is about 1.5% of national GDP. Plans are in place for the period 2008-2010, to gradually increase the defense budget as well as its proportion of GDP, from 1.69% in 2008 to 1.9% of GDP in 2010. The published draft budget for 2008 includes personnel costs of about 81%, operation and maintenance costs of about 15.7%, and procurement and construction costs of about 3.3% of the overall budget. Personnel costs are planned to be reduced to about 71 percent of the overall budget in 2010. Currently, the budget for 2008 does not incorporate major programs of modernization of armaments and military equipment. Because defense expenditures progressively increase, the budget required for

¹⁷⁶ Author's interviews with representative of Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Sarajevo in July 2008.

¹⁷⁷ *BiH NATO Individual Partnership Action Plan (Period 2008-2010)*, 14.

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 13.

2009 is 381.2 million KM, and for 2010 it will be 433.2 million KM.¹⁷⁹ The allocation of greater amounts for personnel costs than for the costs of infrastructure, equipment, and training, requires more attention. The defense budget has to be structured in order to further decrease personnel costs and increase funds for training and modernization. Bosnia and Herzegovina is unlikely to undertake any significant defense procurement through at least 2010 due to other demands on its limited defense resources.

Bosnia and Herzegovina is strongly committed to attaining full NATO membership. In order to fulfil its commitment, Bosnia and Herzegovina has an obligation to improve its coordination with NATO. The defence reform process in Bosnia and Herzegovina is in reality initiated and led by external actors—above all, NATO. The Alliance has served as the driving force but has also caused some dizziness on the side of Bosnia and Herzegovina, because of the multiplicity of new NATO requirements. According to officials in the Ministry of Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina, this fact has also affected the relationship between NATO staff and Ministry of Defence staff in Sarajevo. Some NATO staff members have taken a superior position in their relations with the staff in the Ministry of Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and this has sometimes caused friction in cooperation.¹⁸⁰

Moreover, the fulfillment of the many obligations regarding various NATO programs needs more initiative from the entire society of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In accordance with the Bosnia and Herzegovina Presidency Decision on strengthening co-operation with NATO at the IPAP level in order to improve inter-ministerial co-operation with NATO, in September 2007 Sarajevo established the Bosnia and Herzegovina Council of Ministers NATO Co-ordination Team (NCT). In 2008 Bosnia and Herzegovina plans to establish a Mission to NATO HQ in Brussels and a Liaison Team in the Partnership Co-ordination Cell (PCC) in Mons.¹⁸¹

¹⁷⁹ *Bosnia and Herzegovina - NATO Individual Partnership Action Plan - Presentation Document*, 30.

¹⁸⁰ Author's interviews with representatives of Ministry of Defense of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Sarajevo in July 2008.

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 33-34.

Overall, specific tasks in the medium term will include full implementation of the agreed force structure in accordance with the Bosnia and Herzegovina Presidency decision that defines the current size and structure of the country's armed forces. In other words, the implementation should include well-developed plans, policies and doctrine as a foundation for establishing the main preconditions for development of units adequately equipped, trained, and supported by the full range of defense operating systems such as personnel and resource management: planning, programming, and budgeting; education and training; and acquisition and procurement. All of these steps will be accompanied by the effective transfer of movable property and the implementation of all requirements related to the storage of weapons and ammunition. These challenging tasks will require decisive action for their full implementation.¹⁸²

C. FOREIGN POLICY

1. Participation in Peacekeeping Missions

The formal eligibility criteria for NATO membership were initially outlined in the 1995 *Study on NATO Enlargement*. According to this document, the criteria include the ability and willingness to make a military contribution to the alliance. The *Bosnia and Herzegovina - Partnership for Peace - Presentation Document* reiterated the government's policy that "members and units of the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina have contributed to and will continue to actively contribute to international peace missions, in accordance with the requirements of the international community, its own human and technical resources, and decisions of relevant institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina."¹⁸³

The government of Bosnia and Herzegovina understands that, in order to join the NATO Alliance, the state has to express its willingness and readiness to participate in NATO-led peacekeeping operations. Bosnia and Herzegovina plans to develop and establish the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina Operational Capabilities Concept

¹⁸² *Defense White Paper of Bosnia and Herzegovina*, 11.

¹⁸³ *Bosnia and Herzegovina - Partnership for Peace - Presentation Document*, 5.

(OCC), which is going to be a significant challenge accompanied by the overall defense reform process that is already underway. The creation of all necessary preconditions for training and equipping nominated units in accordance with NATO requirements and standards is a priority in the near term. Bosnia and Herzegovina has nominated the EOD (explosive ordnance disposal) unit and infantry units for participation in NATO and non-NATO-led exercises and crisis management operations. Since June 2005, the EOD Unit has successfully completed five six-month rotations participating in Operation Iraqi Freedom in Iraq.¹⁸⁴ In addition to an EOD unit, on 27 August 2008 Bosnia and Herzegovina deployed an infantry platoon on a sustainable basis. The unit's mission is to provide security for the "Victoria" military base in Iraq.¹⁸⁵ Bosnia and Herzegovina's officers also participate in UN observation missions in Ethiopia-Eritrea (UNMEE) and the Congo (MONUC). Besides military officers, members of police structures in Bosnia and Herzegovina have participated in UN missions in Liberia (UNMIL), Haiti (MINUSTAH), Sudan (UNMIS) and Cyprus (UNFICYP), and a diplomat has been appointed head of the OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) Mission to Turkmenistan.¹⁸⁶

Bosnia and Herzegovina has not participated in any NATO-led missions to date; and participation in such missions should be a priority in order to improve cooperation with NATO. Current reform processes, including problems with shortages and inadequacy of equipment as well as the lack of deployable logistic support, are currently the main factors that severely constrain the operational capabilities of the Armed Forces. But as these problems are resolved, Bosnia and Herzegovina plans to assign more units to operations outside the national territory. One of the constraints that puts additional pressure on already limited financial resources is the fact that deployments abroad are currently covered from the defense budget. Bosnia and Herzegovina should explore possibilities to finance deployments of military units outside the national territory from

¹⁸⁴ *Bosnia and Herzegovina - NATO Individual Partnership Action Plan - Presentation Document*, 27.

¹⁸⁵ "News: BiH AF Infantry Unit in Iraq," Ministry of Defense of Bosnia and Herzegovina; <http://www.mod.gov.ba/bos/news.php?id=510> (accessed 18 September 2008).

¹⁸⁶ *Bosnia and Herzegovina - NATO Individual Partnership Action Plan - Presentation Document*, 27-28.

budgets other than the defense budget. This would leave more consistent funding to be allocated for the improvement of the training, equipment and modernization of the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina.¹⁸⁷

2. Relations with Neighboring Countries

Bosnia and Herzegovina's relations with its neighbors Croatia, Montenegro, and Serbia have been fairly stable since the signing of the Dayton Agreement in 1995. According to Bosnia and Herzegovina's foreign policy, the improvement of co-operation with neighboring countries, based on common interests and respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, is among its highest priorities. In order to enhance its own foreign policy, Bosnia and Herzegovina intends to initiate a series of activities to intensify cooperation in all areas of mutual interest. Some of the crucial areas for cooperation are economic, cultural, political, and security concerns, as well as efforts to resolve issues related to the demarcation of borders with neighboring countries. For the sake of strong cooperation with NATO, Bosnia and Herzegovina is committed to constructively act in order to resolve any kind of specific issues with its neighbors.¹⁸⁸

With respect to the relations between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia, there are a few issues that may influence Bosnia and Herzegovina's prospects for NATO membership. Among the most salient are the possible implications of Kosovo's declaration of independence. Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina agreed to open full diplomatic relations in 1996.¹⁸⁹ According to the formal eligibility criteria for NATO membership, "States which have ethnic disputes or external territorial disputes, including irredentist claims, or internal jurisdictional disputes, must settle those disputes by peaceful means in accordance with OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) principles. Resolution of such disputes would be a factor in determining whether

¹⁸⁷ Author's interviews with NATO experts in Brussels in June 2008.

¹⁸⁸ *BiH NATO Individual Partnership Action Plan (Period 2008-2010)*, 6.

¹⁸⁹ Tracy Wilkinson, "Bosnia, Serbia Move to Open Full Diplomatic Relations," *Los Angeles Times*, Vol 116, October 4, 1996; <http://tech.mit.edu/V116/N48/bosnia.48w.html> (accessed 19 September 2008).

to invite a state to join the Alliance.”¹⁹⁰ Bosnia and Herzegovina should thoroughly comply with this principle. According to the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (the “Parties”), recognizing the need for a comprehensive settlement to bring an end to the tragic conflict in the region: “fully respecting the sovereign equality of one another, shall settle disputes by peaceful means, and shall refrain from any action, by threat or use of force or otherwise, against the territorial integrity or political independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina or any other State.”¹⁹¹

This, however, does not mean that territorial aspirations by neighboring countries such as Serbia have disappeared. Milosevic’s election defeat in 2000 left his successors with a choice of whether to take advantage of the Russian veto over Kosovo’s future status (and to continue to insist on maintaining Republika Srpska as a separate entity within Bosnia, with the potential option to promote its independence or to seek its annexation to Serbia) or to seek a settlement of Serbia’s outstanding “national” issues and turn the country towards a European and Euro-Atlantic vocation.¹⁹² This choice still has not been made by Belgrade. Serbia is still struggling with defining its political and strategic course towards a better future. Problems could arise in Bosnia because some political factions in Republika Srpska may claim that it, like Kosovo, should declare independence. The issue of Republika Srpska’s status, which some erroneously regard as parallel to that of Kosovo, is in fact substantially different from that of Kosovo. The Kosovo issue is the product of a lengthy negotiation on the international level while the creation of Republika Srpska is a result of the Dayton Agreement and of the process by which Bosnia and Herzegovina was established.

¹⁹⁰ *Study on NATO Enlargement* (Brussels: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, September 1995), 6; <http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/enl-9501.htm> (accessed 19 April 2008).

¹⁹¹ *The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1995*, Article I; http://www.ohr.int/dpa/default.asp?content_id=379 (accessed 19 September 2008).

¹⁹² Daniel Serwer, *Coming Soon to a Country Near You: Kosova Sovereignty* (Brussels: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2007), 5.

Moreover, Serb secession from Bosnia and Herzegovina, likely followed by Croat secession, would create a rump Islamic Republic dependent on the Muslim world, a result that neither Washington nor Brussels (nor Belgrade, nor Zagreb) wants.¹⁹³ The top international envoy in Bosnia and Herzegovina, High Representative Miroslav Lajčak, has repeatedly stressed that the Dayton Peace Agreement, which ended the 1992-1995 war, guarantees Bosnia and Herzegovina's territorial integrity and does not provide for border changes. "Republika Srpska does not have the right to secede from Bosnia, [and] at the same time no one can unilaterally abolish Republika Srpska," Lajčak said in February 2008.¹⁹⁴ The stakes in the Balkans are as high as ever, owing in part to the refusal of Belgrade and Moscow to recognize Kosovo's independence.¹⁹⁵ Kosovo made a historic choice by declaring independence. Serbia will have to make its own historic choice: either for a better future as part of the European Union (and other European and Euro-Atlantic institutions), or for isolation, stagnation, and decline. That choice will significantly affect the prospects for security and prosperity in this part of Europe.

Overall, the relations between Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Serbia have been marked with continued mutual visits of state officials, at all levels. Bosnia and Herzegovina is willing to continue to seek solutions together with the Republic of Serbia in terms of further development of bilateral relations in all fields, such as the demarcation of the border between Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Serbia and the resolution of pending issues concerning the demarcation of the border in the area of the Drina River. The fact that these two states are bounded by the same trade area is the main reason that economic and trade co-operation between the Republic of Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina has to be developed; it is in the interests of both states.¹⁹⁶

¹⁹³ Daniel Serwer, *Coming Soon to a Country Near You: Kosova Sovereignty* (Brussels: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2007), 17-18.

¹⁹⁴ "Bosnian Serb Nationalists Threaten Secession," *Reuters*, February 12, 2008; http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/features/2008/02/15/feature-01 (accessed 19 September 2008).

¹⁹⁵ Oksana Antonenko, "Russia and the Deadlock Over Kosovo," *Russie.Nei.Visions* no. 21. (2007), 18-19.

¹⁹⁶ *Bosnia and Herzegovina - NATO Individual Partnership Action Plan - Presentation Document*, 9.

With respect to relations between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina continues to seek solutions for pending issues, as discussed in Chapter III. Co-operation in border management; combating organized crime, illegal trafficking and smuggling; and provision of support in legal matters continue to be the main areas of interest for improvement.

Regarding relations between Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Montenegro, there are no remarkable issues that could have a significant impact on relations between the two states. Sarajevo supports the initiation of procedures for the clarification of borders between Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Montenegro. In order to affirm the mutual desire of both countries for further enhancement of co-operation, the Embassy of the Republic of Montenegro in Sarajevo and the Embassy of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Podgorica opened in December 2007.¹⁹⁷

3. Cooperation with International Criminal Tribunal for War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)

Cooperation with the ICTY (International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia) is a longstanding obligation for Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia. This was a prerequisite for PfP membership of these two countries. At NATO's Istanbul Summit in June 2004, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia were not invited to PfP membership because of unsatisfactory cooperation with the ICTY. At the Riga Summit in November 2006 this threshold condition was considered in the following way:

Taking into account the importance of long term stability in the Western Balkans and acknowledging the progress made so far by Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia, we have today invited these three countries to join Partnership for Peace and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. In taking this step, we reaffirm the importance we attach to the values and principles set out in the EAPC and PfP basic documents, and notably expect Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina to cooperate fully with the ICTY. We will closely monitor their respective efforts in this regard.¹⁹⁸

¹⁹⁷ *Bosnia and Herzegovina - NATO Individual Partnership Action Plan - Presentation Document*, 10.

¹⁹⁸ Riga Declaration, paragraph 7.

On 21 July 2008, the Serbian government arrested former Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic, a longtime high profile fugitive who successfully avoided capture for 13 years. Radovan Karadžić and General Ratko Mladić, the two most wanted war criminals, are under indictment for genocide and crimes against humanity perpetrated during the 1992-1995 Bosnian war. General Ratko Mladić is still at large and has to date successfully escaped justice. Full cooperation with the ICTY was a key requirement of external international organizations for the eventual membership of the western Balkan countries in the European Union and NATO. The recent arrest of Karadžić proved this strategy successful. However, this pressure on countries for greater cooperation with the ICTY has occasionally come under criticism and has been characterized as unfair.¹⁹⁹

The Serbian government has recently shown closer cooperation with the ICTY. In June 2007 former General Zdravko Tolimir, a top aide to General Mladić, and Vlastimir Đorđević, a former Serbian police commander, were arrested and delivered to The Hague. On 11 June 2008, Serbian authorities also arrested Stojan Župljanin, a security and police commander and aide to wartime Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić. According to some analysts, Serbia's ambitious drive to achieve EU membership candidacy resulted in the surprising arrest of Karadžić, which gave hope that two remaining indicted war crimes suspects, Ratko Mladić and Goran Hadžić, may also soon be arrested. Ratko Mladić was commanding general of the Bosnian Serbs during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Goran Hadžić is a former political leader of breakaway Serbs in Croatia.

Cooperation with the ICTY is a necessary condition in order to attain full stability in both countries (Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina) and in the region. Some observers believe that Western institutions have to find a way to sustain Serbia's Western integration prospects and association in view of the implications of Kosovo's declaration of independence in February 2008. Others believe that the longstanding "conditional"

¹⁹⁹ Julie Kim, *Balkan Cooperation on War Crimes Issues* (Washington: Congressional Research Service, 2008) (accessed August 18, 2008).

policy of the European Union needs to be maintained because it has proven to be the most effective tool to bring remaining war crimes suspects to justice.²⁰⁰

D. CONCLUSION

Defense reform is one of the most important steps toward NATO membership. The achievements in Bosnia and Herzegovina have been remarkable so far; however, the Bosnia and Herzegovina Armed Forces still require huge improvements in order to meet NATO standards. Taking into consideration its limited military assets, Bosnia and Herzegovina has to decide on a field of specialization that it could offer to the Alliance and its partners as its niche contribution to world peace and security.²⁰¹ Relations between Bosnia and Herzegovina and its neighbor countries — Croatia, Montenegro, and Serbia — are considered fairly stable, but there is still room for improvement.

The profound internal crisis in Serbia since Kosovo's February 2008 declaration of independence has had a remarkable influence on the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, despite the repeated reaffirmations of many international officials that the Dayton Agreement is the strongest guarantor of Bosnia's political and territorial integrity. Kosovo's independence and possible secession attempts by the Republika Srpska may slow the process of NATO enlargement in this part of the Balkans.

Regarding cooperation with the ICTY, there still remains a key question: should Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia be integrated into NATO as soon as possible to promote stability and security in South-East Europe (and in order to capture the war crime suspects with the full use of the NATO apparatus) or should both these countries be required to first catch the most wanted suspects for trial by the tribunal in The Hague by themselves as proof of their good intentions, before they are admitted to the Alliance? The most probable outcome may well be the latter, as the longstanding conditional policy

²⁰⁰ Julie Kim, *Balkan Cooperation on War Crimes Issues* (Washington: Congressional Research Service, 2008) (accessed August 18, 2008). 3-4.

²⁰¹ Sven Alkalaj, "The Road to PfP Membership: Development and Enhanced Cooperation between BiH and NATO," in Jos Boonstra, ed., *Defense Reform Initiative for Bosnia and Herzegovina /Serbia and Montenegro*, 45; <http://www.cess.org/publications/occasional/pdfs/occasional2.pdf>, (accessed 21 March 2008).

of the European Union has proven to be the most effective tool to bring war crimes suspects to justice. Overall, regardless of its numerous obstacles, Bosnia and Herzegovina is firmly on its way to NATO membership.

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V. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter offers a comparison of the case studies of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The similarity in the size of their territories and populations, and their common history within the same geo-strategic space, are the main reasons why Croatia has been chosen as a comparative case study to illuminate the circumstances of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Croatia is also an example of a successful neighboring country on its way to NATO membership. This fact gives further relevance to this comparative analysis. In order to define the main challenges for Bosnia and Herzegovina related to NATO membership, this chapter explores the principal similarities and differences between the Croatia case study and the Bosnia and Herzegovina case study. These two case studies are compared through an evaluation of two key variables: defense reform and the foreign policies of these countries.

B. DEFENSE REFORM

1. Similarities

- Both countries experienced the same kind of war within the same time framework and ended the war with similar war legacies that have had almost identical, usually negative, effects on the defense reform processes in both countries before and during their implementation.
- The possibility of gaining EU and NATO membership was the driving force motivating both countries to initiate and implement defense reform. In each case NATO has been the main promoter of defense reform, mainly through its PfP and MAP mechanisms in which both countries are taking an active role. Participation in these programs is crucial for these countries and has direct implications for the pace of defense reform.

- The Armed Forces of these countries were established during the war from a combination of the old system of the Yugoslav People's Army and a slowly emerging indigenous system based on restricted offensive and territorially-based self-defense capabilities. These origins have had a negative influence on the creation of a new and totally different defense system based on a significantly different military doctrine.
- The personnel structure of both Armed Forces was primarily the result of a poor personnel management system and the legacies of war. Both Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina faced shortfalls in their military establishments such as an "aging force," a lack of qualified personnel, inadequate personnel placement, and an inverted personnel pyramid—that is, disproportionate numbers of higher ranking officers in relation to other personnel. For both military establishments there have been huge consequences for the pace of defense reform.
- The weapon systems and equipment in both countries are old and incompatible with NATO standards. The uncontrolled import of military equipment and weapons during the war in 1991-1995 has resulted in a variety of different types and models of particular classes of weapons; and this has contributed to a low level of interoperability with NATO.
- In order to develop Armed Forces with a well-balanced budget structure both countries have struggled to achieve the financial framework necessary for maintaining the capabilities required by NATO standards. The recommended allocation of 50% of the budget for personnel expenses, 30% for operational costs, and 20% for equipment has not been achieved yet in either country, nor has either Zagreb or Sarajevo attained the recommended defense budget allocation of 2% of the national Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Defense ministries in both countries are

struggling to obtain sufficient funds and to gain wide political support for the whole society from the implementation phase of the defense reform process.

2. Differences

- Different internal political struggles within the countries in the post-Dayton era resulted in an earlier consolidation of Croatia's political elite and an earlier redirection of policy toward the EU and NATO than occurred in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In Croatia it was Tudjman's regime that represented a key obstacle to Croatia's Euro-Atlantic integration; in Bosnia and Herzegovina problems with the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement resulted in the slow integration of the defense structures of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This is the main reason why defense reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina started later, and why the pace of defense reform has been slower than in Croatia.
- The different ethnic structures of the Armed Forces in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina have provided different predispositions relating to the achievement of consensus in defense-related issues. Achieving consensus in Croatia, with its Croat majority, is comparatively easy and prompt. Bosnia and Herzegovina, with two entities, three constitutive ethnic groups, and four religions, is a country where the achievement of consensus in defense matters is closely connected to other political decisions at the state level and is, indeed, a long process.
- Comparing the difference in ethnic representation in the Croatian Armed Forces, in which the ethnic composition is comparatively homogeneous, with that in the Bosnia and Herzegovina Armed Forces, it is apparent that the latter is much more complex. An over-emphasis on ethnic representation principles in BiH has resulted in increasingly hollow unit structures, because particular ethnic groups have not been able to provide sufficient numbers of personnel. Furthermore, the necessity for balanced

ethnic representation in the command positions at all levels leads to the conclusion that the challenges for human resource management in Bosnia and Herzegovina are more sensitive and complex than those in Croatia. These challenges require decisions that will achieve balanced ethnic structures but without any loss of effectiveness in the performance of their duties.

- The different levels of international involvement related to expertise in defense reform in these two countries have affected reform processes in various ways. NATO has been the main promoter of defense reform in Croatia, together with the OSCE. In Bosnia and Herzegovina the involvement of international organizations has been more intensive. That is an indicator of how much more complex the situation has been in Bosnia and Herzegovina than in Croatia. Moreover, the presence of NATO forces (including IFOR, the Implementation Force, and SFOR, the Stabilization Force) and European Union forces (above all, EUFOR, the European Force) has positively affected integration processes within the military forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina before and after the initiation of the defense reform process.
- Differences in the constitutions of these two countries have had effects related to defense property issues. While Croatia did not have problems with movable and immovable defense property, the complex state system in Bosnia and Herzegovina, founded in the Dayton Accords, has been reflected in problems of transferring movable and immovable defense properties from the entity level to the state level. These problems have had a huge influence on the implementation phase of the defense reform process in Bosnia and Herzegovina and have directly affected the readiness of the Armed Forces and the pace of defense reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

C. FOREIGN POLICIES

1. Similarities

- Both countries have demonstrated an ability and willingness to make a military contribution to the Alliance in order to fulfill the eligibility criteria for NATO membership. Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina are fully committed to assigning units for operations outside their national territory, depending on their current capabilities and readiness. They are particularly devoted to the development of military niche capabilities in order to contribute to the security of the Euro-Atlantic area.
- Since the signing of the Dayton Agreement in 1995, relations among Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina and their neighbors have been fairly stable and have improved over time. Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia have no major outstanding issues with their neighbors. In order to strengthen their cooperation with NATO, both countries are committed to constructively act in order to resolve any specific issues with their neighbours as well as any pending issues between themselves.
- The longstanding obligation of cooperation with the ICTY is a common characteristic of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Keeping in mind that this is a necessary obligation, these countries are fully committed to fulfilling all obligations related to the arrest and extradition of individuals accused of war crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia.

2. Differences

- Croatia has undertaken more extensive efforts than Bosnia and Herzegovina in peacekeeping missions. Likewise, Croatia has participated in NATO-led operations. Participation in NATO-led operations is more appreciated by the Alliance than any other contribution by a candidate for NATO membership. Croatia intends to gradually increase its participation

in NATO-led missions while Bosnia and Herzegovina is committed to supporting NATO-led peacekeeping operations. Bosnia and Herzegovina is willing to participate in the NATO-led mission in Afghanistan, but still is unable to do so due to its engagement in the coalition mission in Iraq and its preoccupation with the implementation phase of the defense reform.

- Kosovo's February 2008 declaration of independence has had a different impact on relations between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia when compared to the impact on relations between Croatia and Serbia. Croatia has recognized Kosovo in order to strengthen its relationship with the larger states of the European Union, while simultaneously jeopardizing good relations with Serbia. However, Bosnia and Herzegovina has not recognized Kosovo as an independent country in order to maintain domestic stability and to counteract Republika Srpska's tendencies to secede from Bosnia and Herzegovina. These implications of Kosovo's independence for Bosnia and Herzegovina's relations with Serbia are more sensitive than the implications for the relations between Croatia and Serbia. Dealing with this issue will undoubtedly have an impact on relations between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia in the long run.
- Croatia has resolved the matter of ICTY cooperation and has thereby opened the road toward membership in Euro-Atlantic institutions, while the cooperation of Bosnia and Herzegovina with the ICTY is still considered unresolved. Despite much criticism that this conditional status should not be applied to Bosnia and Herzegovina, the recent arrest of many "most wanted" persons accused of war crimes committed during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992-1995 has proved that this policy still works.

D. CONCLUSION

The comparison of defense reform processes and foreign policies of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina concludes that the similarities and differences between these nations provide important insights into the most critical areas in a country's aspiration to NATO membership. The experiences and lessons learned in Croatia could be used in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well. The similarities in the defense reform processes confirm that all post-communist countries have common historical legacies that need time and adequate policies to overcome, while the differences highlight the areas that have to be analyzed more cautiously and thoroughly. Similarities and differences in the foreign policies of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina represent the complexity of contemporary international relations in a region which requires both a sensitive and comprehensive approach. Overall, this comparative analysis serves as a foundation to define the main obstacles facing Bosnia and Herzegovina as it pursues NATO membership, and serves as a roadmap to the most effective solutions to overcome these obstacles.

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VI. CONCLUSION

In 1992 Bosnia and Herzegovina seized the opportunity and chose to become an independent country in what has been recognized as a brave and correct choice by the rest of the world, considering the country's long and complex history. Unfortunately, in the 1990s, Bosnia and Herzegovina sank into a dark period of its history when genocide occurred in the heart of Europe. In order to respond to the crisis in the Balkans, NATO redefined its own purposes and helped Bosnia and Herzegovina survive. Bosnia and Herzegovina recognized in NATO an opportunity to build its own international position as a member of the Alliance. In choosing a course for integration into the NATO Alliance, Bosnia and Herzegovina has encountered many challenges and obstacles. These obstacles and the recommended policies for surmounting them are as follows:

- The NATO enlargement process itself has created some challenges to the Alliance, and the most prominent concern the cohesiveness of the Alliance and the risk of confrontation with Russia. These challenges become more pressing as the Alliance grows larger. In order to surmount this obstacle Bosnia and Herzegovina has to mobilize the country's entire society and thoroughly implement PfP programs. The risk of a confrontation with Russia in the context of Bosnia and Herzegovina's bid for NATO membership is not as influential as with respect to former Soviet republics. However, the tempo of Bosnia and Herzegovina's journey toward NATO membership could be indirectly slowed down if NATO continues to postpone decisions on inviting Ukraine and Georgia to participate in the MAP process. Bosnia and Herzegovina fits well in the NATO enlargement process, but it still has to actively lobby for a better position in the overall NATO enlargement process. The Bosnia and Herzegovina Mission to NATO in Brussels has to be strong for this reason.
- By participating in the PfP program Bosnia and Herzegovina has initiated various activities that propel it forward. NATO and other international

organizations are consistently the main promoters and play a leading role in the overall reform process. The external international organizations have fostered a situation in which progress is expected to begin based exclusively on their initiative. Bosnia and Herzegovina has to take the initiative in the overall reform process, and undertake proactive measures within the PfP mechanisms. Sarajevo should actively participate in and organize affordable programs and exercises according to its own capacities. Bosnia and Herzegovina has the requisite expertise and ability to take the initiative in certain domains on the way to NATO membership; and such a vigorous approach is necessary if Bosnia and Herzegovina really wants to expedite movement toward NATO membership. The NATO Co-ordination Team (NCT) should be used as the main hub of initiative in order to surmount this obstacle and provide the synergy of employing the entire state apparatus to move toward NATO membership.

- European and Euro-Atlantic international organizations and Bosnia and Herzegovina have made considerable efforts to adopt all the laws necessary for the normal functioning of the defense system in Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, Bosnia and Herzegovina currently has no plan related to the future development and modernization of its Armed Forces, which presents a significant obstacle for NATO membership. In order to glean insight into the future Bosnia and Herzegovina has to perform a Strategic Defense Review (SDR) to determine the current state of its Armed Forces. The main precursor to this is the establishment of a defense planning system on the levels of strategic planning, developmental planning and operative planning. Strategic planning documents would include: the National Security Strategy, the Defense Strategy, the Military Strategy and the Strategic Review of the Status of Military Capabilities. Development planning documents would include a Long Term Development Plan covering a period of ten years and a Mid Term Development Plan covering a period of six years. Operative planning

documents would cover the management of personnel and material resources and directly connect the planning functions with programming and budget development. These documents will enable Bosnia and Herzegovina to achieve the main preconditions for stable and speedy movement toward NATO membership.

- As a consequence of wartime legacies, Bosnia and Herzegovina inherited shortfalls such as an “aging force,” a lack of qualified personnel, inadequate personnel placement, and an inverted personnel pyramid (a disproportionate number of higher ranking officers in relation to other personnel), which present an obstacle to NATO membership. As the next priority Bosnia and Herzegovina has to establish a Human Resource Management (HRM) system that will establish an effective personnel policy in order to have qualified personnel in the appropriate positions and thereby facilitate further development. Principles of ethnic representation have to be respected within the HRM system, but to the degree that appropriate qualifications for certain positions are met without jeopardizing the functional effectiveness of the Armed Forces.
- The lack of a standardized military education system in Bosnia and Herzegovina poses a significant obstacle for the country on its way toward NATO membership. Bosnia and Herzegovina currently plans to have military education systems organized in a way that would provide highly educated and trained personnel capable of speaking NATO’s official languages – English and French. In order to establish an effective military education system Bosnia and Herzegovina has to develop and implement a system based on the existing civilian education system combined with basic military training. Bosnia and Herzegovina also has to make full use of opportunities for professional development and specialized training in allied countries, various military programs offered by the United States, and the NATO/PfP training and education system, including the Peace Support Operations Training Centre (PSOTC) in Sarajevo.

- Modernization of equipment and weapon systems in the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina is one of the main challenges for NATO membership. Affordability for the country and compatibility with NATO standards are the most important requisites for future development. Existing equipment and weapons are generally old and incompatible with NATO standards. The uncontrolled import of military equipment and weapons has resulted in a variety of different types and models of particular classes of weapons. Bosnia and Herzegovina has to find a way to modernize its armed forces and to increase the level of interoperability with NATO members. In order to achieve this goal, Bosnia and Herzegovina has to actively take advantage of its membership in the NATO PfP program. The Strategic Defense Review (SDR) of the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina has to identify the main challenges within the current materiel management system in relation to the vision of the desired niche capabilities that Bosnia and Herzegovina wants to develop in order to properly focus its future procurement and modernization efforts. These efforts will be addressed in the next step, the creation of the Long Term Development Plan (LTDP) of the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This requires the allocation of financial resources that will be guaranteed by the state and implemented through a well-balanced budget structure. Bosnia and Herzegovina should explore possibilities to finance deployments of military units outside the national territory from budgets other than the defense budget. This would enable the government to provide more consistent funding for the improvement of the training, equipment and modernization of the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
- The defense property of Bosnia and Herzegovina presents a huge challenge for the country. This obstacle has to be surmounted by action at the highest levels under the initiative of the Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina in order to define competences between the entity and

the state levels. The defense system in Bosnia and Herzegovina is organized on the state level, and therefore the state has to have control over defense property in order to perform its role.

- Participation in NATO-led peacekeeping missions remains the main priority in order to demonstrate Bosnia and Herzegovina's ability and willingness to make a military contribution to security in the Euro-Atlantic area. The LTDP has to present the vision of certain niche capabilities that Bosnia and Herzegovina will develop. Bosnia and Herzegovina has to be able to achieve a level of readiness such that 8% (800 personnel) of the active land component will be deployed or be ready to be deployed to international military operations, while 40% (4,000 personnel) will possess capabilities to participate in operations outside the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bosnia and Herzegovina should be able to develop units suitable for participation in NATO-led operations such as: an infantry platoon, an engineers' platoon for mine clearing, an Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) platoon, a military police platoon, a special operations platoon, a Nuclear-Biological-Chemical (NBC) platoon for decontamination measures, medical teams, and a crew with a transport helicopter. In order to achieve this goal, participation in NATO-led peacekeeping missions has to be the highest priority in the mission set of the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
- Maintaining and improving relations with neighboring countries will continue to be a challenge for Bosnia and Herzegovina in the future. The history of the Balkans shows that stability in this part of the world has always been fragile and needs constant upkeep. Bosnia and Herzegovina has both internal and external challenges relating to relations with its neighbors. Internal issues in Bosnia and Herzegovina are usually related to external influences and, as such, have to be remedied. Bosnia and Herzegovina has to deal with the recognition of Kosovo as an independent country with exceptional attention. Sarajevo's diplomacy in this regard

will be highly dependent on developments in the political landscape in Serbia. Serbia will have to make its own historic choice either for a better future as part of the European Union (and other European and Euro-Atlantic institutions) or for isolation, stagnation and decline. That choice will significantly affect the future prospects of this part of Europe. Although Bosnia and Herzegovina has much less influence than Serbia in dealing with this issue, Bosnia and Herzegovina still has to put significant effort into improving relations with neighboring countries and influencing the crucial areas requiring cooperation—economic, cultural, and political. With a view to strong cooperation within NATO, Bosnia and Herzegovina has to be committed to constructively acting to resolve specific issues with its neighbors.

- Cooperation with the ICTY (International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia) remains the main obstacle for Bosnia and Herzegovina as a longstanding condition for NATO membership. Bosnia and Herzegovina has shown a strong willingness to cooperate with the ICTY, but obviously this cooperation does not depend only on Bosnia and Herzegovina itself. Bosnia and Herzegovina has to continue to fully support international and domestic institutions in order to find, arrest, and deliver suspected war criminals to the ICTY. It is hoped that General Ratko Mladić, the primary obstacle for Bosnia and Herzegovina on the way to NATO membership, will soon be arrested, as was the case with his political leader Radovan Karadžić.

In conclusion, this thesis has shown that Croatia has made significant efforts in defense reform and foreign policy in order to join NATO; however, it is also evident that the CAF (Croatian Armed Forces) are still not ready for employment in the full spectrum of NATO missions. NATO's decision to invite Croatia to join the Alliance is founded on the assessment that, although militarily Croatia is not yet ready to undertake all missions, it has the potential for greater contributions in the future. It appears that the declaration of independence by Kosovo in February 2008, combined with the politico-strategic

situation in the region, may have helped to open the door for Croatia's membership in the Alliance, as the NATO Allies wish to promote regional stability.

A similar scenario could apply to Bosnia and Herzegovina. That is, the politico-strategic situation in the region could play to the advantage of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The main challenges and obstacles for Bosnia and Herzegovina in its pursuit of NATO membership have been identified and analyzed, and recommendations for their resolution have been suggested. Clearly Bosnia and Herzegovina faces more obstacles and challenges on its way to NATO membership than have been analyzed in this thesis. The variables considered in this thesis are, however, among the critical ones. The Alliance's 1995 *Study on NATO Enlargement* has clarified a set of principles and requirements as the basis of NATO's approach to inviting new members. Bosnia and Herzegovina is well on its way to meeting these requirements and surmounting all the challenges and obstacles on its rocky path to NATO membership.

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APPENDIX A



Figure 1. Map of Former Yugoslavia²⁰² (From: 202)

²⁰²[http://www.google.com/imgres?imgurl=http://www.yale.edu/gsp/former_yugoslavia/images/former_yugoslavia_base_map.gif&imgrefurl=http://www.yale.edu/gsp/former_yugoslavia/index.html&h=299&w=390&sz=25&tbnid=L_jRCoX2t50J::&tbnh=94&tbnw=123&prev=/imag\(TRUNCATED\)](http://www.google.com/imgres?imgurl=http://www.yale.edu/gsp/former_yugoslavia/images/former_yugoslavia_base_map.gif&imgrefurl=http://www.yale.edu/gsp/former_yugoslavia/index.html&h=299&w=390&sz=25&tbnid=L_jRCoX2t50J::&tbnh=94&tbnw=123&prev=/imag(TRUNCATED)) (accessed 25 August 2008).

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APPENDIX B




Figure 2. Basic Organizational Structure of the Croatia Armed Forces²⁰³ (From: 203)

²⁰³ *Annual Exchange of Information on Defense Planning 2008 - VIENNA DOCUMENT 1999, 23.*

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APPENDIX C




Figure 3. Organizational Structure of the Croatia Armed Forces²⁰⁴ (From: 204)

²⁰⁴ Annual Exchange of Information on Defense Planning 2008 -VIENNA DOCUMENT, 23.

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APPENDIX D



Figure 4. Komarna- Pelješac Bridge²⁰⁵ (From: 205)

²⁰⁵See: http://www.edubrovnik.org/most_kopno_peljesac/most_s_pristupnim_cestama.pdf ; (accessed 3 October 2008)

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APPENDIX E




Figure 5. Organizational Structure of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Armed Forces in 2003²⁰⁶
(From: 206)

²⁰⁶ Defense Reform Commission, *The Path to Partnership for Peace*, 11.

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APPENDIX F




Figure 6. Organizational Structure of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Armed Forces in 2005²⁰⁷

(From: 207)

²⁰⁷ *Bosnia and Herzegovina Armed Forces Structure*, Bosnia and Herzegovina Ministry of Defense, http://www.mod.gov.ba/eng/eng_jstaff.html (accessed 24 August, 2008).

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