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THESIS

**THE EFFECTS OF JAPAN'S APOLOGY FOR WORLD WAR
II ATROCITIES ON REGIONAL RELATIONS**

by

Emily A. Cathey

December 2008

Thesis Advisor:
Second Reader:

Alice L. Miller
Edward A. Olsen

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ON REGIONAL RELATIONS**

Emily A. Cathey
Lieutenant, United States Navy
B.S., United States Naval Academy, 1999

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**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
December 2008**

Author: Emily A. Cathey

Approved by: Alice L. Miller
Thesis Advisor

Edward A. Olsen
Second Reader

Harold A. Trinkunas, Ph.D.
Chairman, Department of National Security
Affairs

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ABSTRACT

This thesis explores the impact of atrocities that Japan committed against its neighbors during and prior to World War II on Japan's relationships with its neighbors, China and the Republic of Korea. The issues of Japan's wartime treatment of Comfort Women, the atrocities of the Rape of Nanking and Japanese chemical and biological testing on humans, remain contentious with the governments and the people of China and the Republic of Korea, who feel that Japan has never fully apologized for its actions during World War II. They assert that Japan feels no remorse, as evidenced by treatment of World War II in Japanese school textbooks and by government officials visiting Yasukuni Shrine, where Japan's war dead are commemorated. The Japanese counter that they have offered sincere apologies. Consequently, this lingering animosity still affects Tokyo's efforts to achieve its foreign policy goals and expand its international influence, among other things, through seeking a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council and by possibly amending Article 9 of its Constitution. Additionally, this discord affects Japan's regional relations. Japan, China and the Republic of Korea all share an interest in regional stability and their economies are inextricably linked. Nevertheless, discord over these historical questions complicates relations that are already strained by competition for natural resources and by competing sovereignty claims.

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I. INTRODUCTION

The 1930s and 40s are defined by the expansion of two countries across the borders of their neighbors in the pursuit of furthering their own nationalistic desires and the devastating wars the rest of the world fought to stop their aggression. Both Germany and Japan inflicted massive damage on both the civilian populations and military forces of their neighbors, yet both countries have experienced vastly different relationships in the post war era. While Germany has assimilated relatively easily back into the European realm, Japan has not enjoyed the same return to harmonious relations with its neighbors. Unlike Germany, Japan, in the eyes of its neighbors, has never fully apologized to its neighbors for its actions or admitted full culpability for the atrocities it committed within the region. As a result, Japan's relationships with its neighbors, specifically China and Korea, are marred by the inherent distrust that the governments and the citizens of these two countries harbor toward Japan.

This thesis examines the relationship between Japan and its neighbors and, in particular, the role that Japan's actions in World War II still exert in every interaction, both in government and in society, with China and the Republic of Korea. The exploration of these atrocities, Japan's treatment at the Tokyo Tribunal, and its revitalization shortly thereafter provides an understanding of the lingering resentment of the Japanese and its influence on Japan's foreign policy goals. Also, Tokyo's reaction to its history plays a vital role in the intricacies of this dynamic. The consistent apologies

issued by numerous Japanese prime ministers and other government officials, coupled with the seemingly insincere nature of these apologies, shade every interaction between the governments and affects foreign policy plans. This first chapter presents a basic overview of these issues. The following chapters provide an in-depth discussion of the nuances of Japan's history, their effect on current relations with China and the Republic of Korea, and the role of the apology in current and future interactions.

Many Japanese prime ministers, such as former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, have offered statements of regret and remorse over the "tremendous damage and suffering for the people of many countries, particularly those of Asian nations"¹ caused by Japan's past aggression. However, these statements are generally not accepted by these Asian nations, principally China and the Republic of Korea, as being sincere, because they perceive that the actions of the Japanese government in atoning for past atrocities do not align with its rhetoric. This dichotomy is particularly evident in Japan's handling of several key issues stemming from World War II: the military's recruitment and subsequent use of women coerced into service for soldiers, known as Comfort Women, the Rape of Nanking as the Japanese Imperial Army overtook the city, and the chemical and biological testing and experimentation conducted on humans and cities in China. These actions committed by the Japanese are taken as representative of the barbarous treatment of the people of the nations that

¹ "Japanese PM apologizes over war," BBC News, 22 April 2005, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/asia-pacific/4471495.stm>, accessed 10 May 2008.

they conquered, and they play a fundamental role in straining relations between Japan and its two closest neighbors, China and the Republic of Korea.

Additionally, from the perspective of some of Japan's neighbors, post-World War II efforts did not satisfactorily hold Japan accountable for the atrocities it committed during this period of aggression. Although the Tokyo Tribunal prosecuted high ranking Japanese leaders and other government officials for general actions of crimes against humanity, the trials failed to hold these leaders responsible for many of the specific wrongs committed or define a punishment system limiting those individuals convicted from holding public office. Specifically, the Tribunal did not address the issues of Comfort Women and the biological and chemical experimentation. The trials also failed to achieve acceptance either within Japan or among the victim countries, due to a common belief that the trials were merely a tool for "victor's justice."² This notion stems from the Western composition of the court, the seeming hypocrisy of representatives from nations involved in colonization on the court, and the allowance of convicted "Class A" war criminal to hold government office after the signing of peace treaties 12 years later. The proceedings also did not hold the Emperor, Hirohito, accountable for any of Japan's actions. While he did renounce his divinity, he was not prosecuted, resulting in a Japanese society that was able to place blame solely on its military leaders.³ Furthermore, the United States

² John W. Dower, *Embracing defeat: Japan in the wake of World War II*, (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1999), 461, 465.

³ Herbert P. Bix, *Hirohito and the making of modern Japan*, (New York, New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2000), 574-575.

played a very instrumental role in shaping and easing a post-war Japan through the recovery process. Ensclosed as the de facto leader of the Allied occupation, the United States established a government structure for post-war Japan that implemented facets of the bureaucratic system that are still in place in Japan today, penned a new Constitution that renounced the act of war as a foreign policy option,⁴ and aided the revitalization of the Japanese economy and state to provide a counter to the rising communist threat within the region in the late 1940s.⁵ As a result, Japan transitioned into a thriving economic powerhouse that nevertheless still suffers strained relations with its closest neighbors due to its wartime actions.

Second, the aftermath of World War II resulted in the complete revision of the Meiji constitution. With a “no war” provision in the postwar “peace” Constitution, Article 9 stipulates that “the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.”⁶ This article has served as the basis for Japan’s foreign policy strategy and has resulted in a Japan that has centered its diplomatic endeavors on its status as an economic powerhouse. Japan’s adoption of the role of a “nation of peace” contains three specific pillars that have defined Japan’s international interaction since its revitalization:

4 Marius B. Jansen, *The making of modern Japan*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000), 669.

5 Bix, 625, 635.

6 The Constitution of Japan, Chapter II, Article 9, 03 November 1946, <http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c01.html#s9>, accessed 11 May 2008.

diplomatic support of the United Nations, collaboration between "Free World" nations, and focus on the Asian nations.⁷

However, over the past several years, the ruling party in Japan, the Liberal Democratic Party, has been actively seeking to make Japan a larger player in global security affairs. The addition of a fourth pillar, the "Arc of Freedom and Prosperity," expands Japan's traditional foreign policy objectives to include an added focus on spreading the values of freedom, democracy and human rights from Northern Europe through the Middle East to Northeast Asia, while still maintaining its stance as a "nation of peace." Key steps to achieve this aim include amending Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, seeking a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, actively participating in Gulf War II, and increasing monetary aid and peacekeeping endeavors to foreign countries through the United Nations and through the directed efforts of Official Development Assistance (ODA). In support of this new measure, the Japanese government has increased its monetary aid to foreign countries, comprising 19.47 percent of total United Nations (UN) contributions in 2005,⁸ and has provided troops for service in Iraq and an oiler to support Coalition Forces in the Arabian Gulf during Gulf War II.

Although several Japanese leaders have issued statements expressing remorse and regret for the events in the past, no statement has adequately expressed the degree

⁷ Aso Taro, "Message from the Minister of Foreign Affairs," (Japan) Ministry of Foreign Affairs diplomatic blue book 2007 summary, March 2007, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2007/message.pdf>, accessed 31 May 2008.

⁸ "UN Reform: Japan speaks up," Japan Echo, Vol. 32, special issue, 2005, www.japanecho.co.jp/sum/2005/32sp05.html, accessed 10 May 2008.

of culpability necessary for the statements to be accepted as sincere by China and the Republic of Korea and not be seen as a means to an end. Both countries find these statements insincere because of the actions of the Japanese government in redressing the past atrocities.⁹ The government continues to fail to recognize the legal claims of the Comfort Women, as exemplified by court rulings against awarding reparations to the victims. This perceived failure to acknowledge past wrongdoings is also seen in the historical narratives that Japanese lawmakers sanction for publication in Japanese school textbooks, which do not accurately describe the role that Japan played in World War II.¹⁰ Additionally, Japanese government officials, including prime ministers, have paid visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, a memorial dedicated to Japanese war dead. Since the Shrine also houses "Class A" War Criminals from World War II, the Chinese and Koreans consider that these official visits as intended to honor Japanese past aggression, an act in direct opposition to the rhetoric of remorse uttered by Japanese politicians.¹¹ Therefore, these events, coupled with a rise in Japanese nationalism, often inflame and reignite the unresolved issues between Japan and its neighbors, negatively affecting Japan's drive to expand its foreign policy objectives.

⁹ Sheila Smith, "Ties that bind," South China Morning Post, 21 May 2008, www.scmp.com, accessed 27 May 2008.

¹⁰ Anthony Faiola, "Japanese schoolbooks anger South Korea, China," The Washington Post, 06 April 2005, ProQuest Document ID 817661671, accessed 10 April 2005.

¹¹ Anthony Faiola, "Koizumi stirs anger with war shrine visit," The Washington Post, 15 August 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/08/14/AR2006081401425.html?nav=rss_world, accessed 08 June 2008.

Third, Japan's actions during World War II stimulate a sincere fear of a resurgent militarist Japan in the people of both China and the Republic of Korea.¹² Although the governments of both countries must manipulate this concern of their countrymen, they also use the apology issue as a means of leverage with their interactions with Japan. By rehashing previous wrongs, the governments act to shape the reactions of their people, while simultaneously limiting the responses of Tokyo. This influence is generally accomplished through the publication of reactions to events in various media.

However, Beijing and Seoul utilize this political tool in limited fashion, as the futures of their countries are inextricably linked with Japan. All three governments share a concern for economic stability and regional security. The economies of Japan, China and the Republic of Korea are dependent upon each other for their continued prosperity. In 2006, China and Japan conducted \$130 billion in trade with each other,¹³ while Japan accounts for one sixth of Korea's total imports and exports.¹⁴ The three countries also believe that North Korea poses the largest threat to regional security and that cooperation is the only method to neutralize Pyongyang. Seeking to prevent North Korea's nuclearization, Tokyo, Beijing and Seoul have entered into various cooperative structures, such as the Six Party Talks, to facilitate the process.

¹² Ng Tze-wei, "Old rivals still wary of each other despite diplomatic thaw," 03 June 2008, www.scmp.com, accessed 05 June 2008.

¹³ Central Intelligence Agency Factbook China, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ch.html#Econ>, accessed 11 June 2008.

¹⁴ Central Intelligence Agency Factbook Korea, South, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ks.html#Econ>, accessed 11 June 2008.

Despite these links of strong trade relations and mutual desire to maintain regional stability, China and the Republic of Korea remain distrustful of Japan due to disagreements over current territorial claims and energy sources in the East China Sea and the Takeshima (Dokdo) Islands. China and Japan dispute the territorial boundary of the East China Sea and its estimated seven trillion cubic feet of natural gas and approximately 100 billion barrels of oil.¹⁵ Both countries continue to claim ownership of the area and its resources. Additionally, the Republic of Korea clashes with Japan over the proper naming and ownership of the body of water that separates the two countries and small islands in that sea. The Sea of Japan (East Sea) is located between Korea's eastern shore and Japan's western coastline, and both countries claim that its name for the body of water possesses historical precedence. Similarly, both countries lay historical claim to a small island chain in the sea, the Takeshima or Dokdo Islands.

Thus, although China and the Republic of Korea possess sufficient motivation for solid relations with Japan in their shared need for economic prosperity and regional security, many factors hinder their cooperation. Current debates over ownership rights of territories and natural resources, coupled with the lingering fears from World War II atrocities, result in a Japan that must balance these concerns with its own shifting foreign policy intentions. Therefore, as Japan continues to pursue its expanded role in the diplomatic arena, its government should engage both

¹⁵ Anthony Faiola, "Japan-China oil dispute escalates," The Washington Post, 22 October 2005, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/21/AR2005102101933.html>, accessed 10 June 2008.

the people and the governments of China and the Republic of Korea. Japan's leaders should continue to express remorse, reassuring neighbors of its peaceful intent, address World War II issues while balancing support for own people, and continue to engage the governments and the people of China and the Republic of Korea diplomatically, economically and socially. By accomplishing these items, Japan can act to resolve the tensions between its history and its neighbors and successfully move toward a future not encumbered by its past.

This introduction has provided the background for the next sections, which focus on the history of Japan's World War II actions and aftermath, Japan's foreign policy goals and its growing role in foreign affairs, the various unresolved issues lingering from World War II, and the role of the apology in Japan's interactions with China and the Republic of Korea. Together, these stressors impede possible avenues for Japan to achieve balance with its neighbors and its foreign policy goals.

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II. HISTORICAL ASPECTS OF APOLOGY

A. WORLD WAR II INFLUENCES

In July 1853, United States Commodore Matthew Perry steamed into Edo Bay, instigating the process that would eventually open Japan up to its neighbors and the West. In the early 1600s, the ruling shogunate adopted a policy of exclusion and since then, Japan's rulers had maintained an isolated front in all foreign policy matters, from trade to diplomacy. However, after Perry's visit, the Japanese, possessing poor coastal defenses, felt pressured into accepting treaties with the United States, and subsequently the Dutch, Russians, French and British, in order to avoid the show of force and resulting devastating wars that had occurred in China.¹⁶ Although this process of opening up Japan was much less divisive than the Chinese experience, the treaties still subjected Japan to unfavorable trade relations with foreign governments. Forced to take a subservient role and viewed by the Western nations as inherently unequal, by 1868 the new Meiji government had implemented efforts to transform Japan into a strong economic and industrialized nation that could compete militarily and achieve equality with the West.¹⁷ It is this emphasis on military might and national pride that eventually resulted in a strong Japanese nation, desirous of overcoming past slights and proving its equality to the world.

¹⁶ John K. Fairbank, Edwin O. Reischauer, and Albert M. Craig, *East Asia: Tradition and transformation*, revised ed. Harvard University (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1989), 487-488.

¹⁷ Ibid., 504-507.

Thus, with the First Sino-Japanese War in 1894-1895, an increasingly nationalistic Japan tested its military might toward its neighbors. The Russo-Japanese War, the first victory of an Asian nation over a Western power, in 1904-1905, shortly followed Japan's victory over China. In 1905, Japan adopted Korea as a protectorate, and five years later, it officially annexed the country, establishing a Japanese government under a Governor-General of Korea.¹⁸ Japan's expansion continued and in 1931, it invaded Manchuria, and by 1937, the Imperial Army had overtaken Shanghai, Nanking and Beijing in the second Sino-Japanese War.¹⁹ This march to conquer Southeast Asia continued until Japan's defeat by the Allied Forces in 1945.

While war is rife with death and destruction, international rules exist to keep the battle from being waged directly against civilian population. However, during its aggressive rise in Asia, the Japanese government and military forces committed several acts that overstepped these bounds and resulted in the exploitation and death of thousands of individuals: specifically, the procurement of comfort women, the Rape of Nanking, and chemical/biological weapons testing and experimentation on individuals and cities in northeast China. These issues remain contentious within Chinese and Korean societies and continue to plague the mending of ties between Japan and its nearest neighbors.

¹⁸ Fairbank, Reischauer, Craig, 553-557. Provides more in depth overview of Imperial Japan's demonstration of military force in the turn of the twentieth century.

¹⁹ Ibid., 705-709, 713-715.

Moreover, the revitalization of Japan's economy and government structure after its crushing defeat in World War II resulted from the process and outcome of the Tokyo Tribunal and the direct involvement of the United States in recovery efforts, as communism swept into northeast Asia. While the Tokyo Tribunal did hold key government officials and military leaders accountable for their general crimes against humanity and for their actions in the Rape of Nanking, it did not address all of the crimes committed, such as the chemical/biological testing and the Comfort Women.

Additionally, the trials and the subsequent recovery efforts allowed for continuity of government structure and did not hold the Japanese Emperor responsible for any actions. Furthermore, the United States, deeply involved in both processes, ultimately promoted Japan's economic recovery in order to use the country as a base for struggles against the rise of communism in the region, a threat made more real in the late 1940s with the fall of China and Russia's successful testing of an atom bomb. As a result, the 1950s saw a Japan that had economically recovered from its devastating defeat. Also during its revitalization, Japan adopted a constitution that embraced the notion that it would never use war as a means to achieve political gain or resolve international disputes and that it would never raise military forces for any other matter than self defense.²⁰ As a result, these various

²⁰ The Constitution of Japan, 03 November 1946, <http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c01.html#s9>, accessed 11 May 2008.

influences in Japan's post-war recovery have impacted the ability of Japan to normalize relationships with China and the Republic of Korea.

B. UNRESOLVED FACTORS FROM WORLD WAR II

In its march through the countries of Asia, the Japanese committed many acts of war against its neighbors. However, several of these incidents still engender great distrust toward the Japanese by the people and the governments of these countries, specifically China and the Republic of Korea. The treatment of Comfort Women, the Rape of Nanking and the Chemical/Biological testing both in the postwar efforts and today do not leave the Chinese and Koreans satisfied that Japan has properly atoned for its actions and has resulted in continued tensions between the countries.

1. Comfort Women

The phrase "comfort women" is the accepted English translation of the Japanese word, "ianfu," used to describe the thousands of women that the Japanese Imperial Ministry forcibly recruited or tricked in order to provide sexual services for the members of the Japanese Imperial Army prior to and during World War II.²¹ These women, often raped 20 to 30 times a day by the soldiers, have not received recognition or reparations from the Japanese government, and their struggle for acknowledgement of the wrongs committed against them remains a source of tension between Japan and its neighbors.

²¹ David Andrew Schmidt, *Ianfu-The Comfort Women of the Japanese Imperial Army of the pacific war: Broken silence*, (Lewiston, New York: The Edwin Mullen Press, 2000), 2.

The total number of women enslaved by the Japanese is often estimated at 100,000 to 200,000, with approximately 30% not surviving their experience.²² Women from colonized Korea comprised the vast majority of the group, approximately 80%, but the Japanese also drafted women from Taiwan, China, Philippines, Burma, Thailand and the Dutch East Indies (Indonesia).²³ These women mostly consisted of young females, as young as 13, from lower class, poor families.

The Japanese employed several schemes to entrap these girls, usually involving local subcontractors to broker the deals. While all of the methods utilized deceit as its base, the most popular means of recruitment, especially in Korea, involved promising the women opportunities for factory work in Japan with a decent wage or even an education. These women initially entered the arrangement freely, believing that they would be able to provide for themselves and their families.²⁴ One 17 year old girl recounts her experience of being drafted by a Korean man, Oh, for work in a silk factory:

He added that the factory would pay travel expenses and that many girls would be going. He also said that I could leave at any time if I didn't like the work there. Oh came and asked me if I wanted to go, and I answered that I would like to, given such good terms.²⁵

²² Schmidt, 2.

²³ Chunghee Sarah Soh, "Human rights and humanity: The case of the 'Comfort Women,'" The Institute for Corean-American Studies (ICAS) Lectures, No. 98-1204-CSSb, 04 December 1998, www.icasinc.org/lectures/css11998.html, accessed 10 April 2005.

²⁴ Yuki Tanaka, *Japan's Comfort Women: Sexual slavery and prostitution during World War II and the US occupation*, (New York: Routledge, 2002), 38.

²⁵ Ibid., 39.

Eventually, however, they wound up in various comfort stations, not working for wages in a factory as promised. Similarly, yet not as frequently, some families exchanged their daughters for a fee, based on the same false premise that their daughters would be working in factories, not in comfort stations.²⁶ In a third method, most commonly practiced in China and the Philippines, the women were simply abducted off of the streets.²⁷ Regardless of how the women were gathered, they were not prepared for their ultimate destination.

Once the women were dispersed to the various comfort stations throughout the Japanese Army posts, they were medically examined and then forced to allow the Japanese soldiers to rape them repeatedly. Hwang Kum-ju was one of the first women to testify in public.

There were so many soldiers. Sometimes, we had to do it with twenty to thirty soldiers a day. I think ours was the only comfort station in that area, and soldiers and officers came whenever they had some spare moments. Higher-ups came freely, and at night, we usually slept with officers. Women who contracted venereal diseases were simply left to die or shot. Anyone resisting the advances of the men was beaten.²⁸

As another woman recounts,

Twelve soldiers raped me in quick succession, after which I was given half an hour rest. Then twelve more soldiers followed. They all lined up outside the room waiting for their turn. The next morning, I was too weak to get up...I could

²⁶ Tanaka, 42.

²⁷ Ibid., 45-48.

²⁸ Hyun Sook Kim, "History and memory: The "Comfort Women" controversy," in *Positions East Asia culture critique: Special issue The Comfort Women colonialism, war and sex*, ed. Chungmoo Choi, volume 5 number 1 Spring 1997 (Duke University Press, 1997), 96-97.

not eat. I felt much pain... I could not resist the soldiers because they might kill me. So what else could I do? Every day, from two in the afternoon to ten in the evening, the soldiers lined up outside my room and the rooms of the six other women there...²⁹

Women who did resist were beaten, stabbed or killed.³⁰

The Japanese government established these military brothels as a result of lessons learned from previous campaigns. The unruly advance into the Chinese city of Nanking in 1937 resulted in the looting of the city and the raping and killing of many of the civilian population. The military and government leaders felt that by providing women for their soldiers, they would not be as likely to rape the civilian women of the towns they overtook, thereby lessening the amount of antagonism that the civilians felt toward their conquerors.³¹ The military authorities also believed that providing the comfort women for the use of their soldiers would increase troop morale and reduce the amount of unauthorized absences of the soldiers, thereby keeping them on the front lines.³² Additionally, by establishing a controlled environment that was free of sexually transmitted diseases, as the women were regularly checked, the army increased the health and well being of their troops.³³

At the conclusion of World War II, the military brothels were disbanded, and the women were allowed to return to their homes. However, the Tokyo War Crime

²⁹ Kim, 1.

³⁰ Ibid., 1.

³¹ Ibid., 28.

³² Schmidt, 87-89.

³³ Ibid., 87-89.

Tribunal held no Japanese official accountable for his actions against the Comfort Women, and the women themselves did not speak out against their captors.³⁴ The only military tribunal to try Japanese soldiers occurred in current day Jakarta, where the court convicted several Japanese military officers of forcing approximately 35 Dutch women into the comfort stations.³⁵ For the women, returning home often did not bring happiness. Asian culture placed a very high value upon virginity; it was an unmarried woman's greatest asset. Any encounter prior to marriage brought great shame upon the woman and significantly reduced her worth. As a result, as these comfort women returned to their families, they could not share their experiences, leaving them unable to heal emotionally.³⁶ As one woman shared, "From that time (the time of her escape) I have lived a life of avoiding people out of fear of having to reveal my disgraceful past. I decided not to marry because I was so ashamed of my past."³⁷ Therefore, the existence of the Comfort Women remained hidden until the late 1980s, when Korean women began to speak out about their experiences. In 1991, a group of Koreans filed the first class action lawsuit against the

³⁴ Schmidt, 109.

³⁵ Chunghee Sarah Soh, "The Comfort Women Project," <http://userwww.sfsu.edu/~soh/comfortwomen.html>, accessed 10 April 2005.

³⁶ Chunghee Sarah Soh, "Human rights and humanity: The case of the 'Comfort Women,'" The Institute for Corean-American Studies (ICAS) Lectures, No. 98-1204-CSSb, 04 December 1998, www.icasinc.org/lectures/css11998.html, accessed 10 April 2005.

³⁷ Schmidt, 143-144.

Japanese government demanding compensation for the violations of human rights under Japanese colonial rule that were committed against Korean citizens.³⁸

This lawsuit directly resulted from the denial in 1990 by the Japanese government of official involvement in the recruitment of comfort women.³⁹ This rhetoric also effected the formation of the Korean Council for the Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan, i.e., the Korean Council, a group that has played a prominent role in seeking justice for these women. This group has lobbied for an official apology, reparations, admittance of guilt, and the inclusion of the occurrence included in teachings in schools.

By the mid-1990s, the Japanese government admitted culpability and official involvement in the recruitment and use of comfort women. Nevertheless, they continue to assert that they are not responsible for paying reparations to the women because any legal responsibility for compensations was settled through the San Francisco Peace Treaty, the Joint Communiqué of the Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China and other bilateral treaties with individual countries.⁴⁰ However, the government did create the Asian Women's Fund, which functions as a non-profit foundation and uses a combination of government funds and private donations to provide financial support and programs for each survivor and to

³⁸ Chunghee Sarah Soh, "The Comfort Women Project," <http://userwww.sfsu.edu/~soh/comfortwomen.html>, accessed 10 April 2005.

³⁹ Chunghee Sarah Soh, "The Comfort Women Project," <http://userwww.sfsu.edu/~soh/comfortwomen.html>, accessed 10 April 2005.

⁴⁰ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "Historical issues Q&A," January 2006, www.mofa.go.jp/policy/q_a/faq16.html, accessed 31 May 2008.

sustain activities that address the issue of violence against women. The women who accept atonement money from the AWF also receive a written apology from the prime minister on behalf of the government, "expressing apologies and remorse directly to each former 'comfort woman.'"⁴¹ Government officials maintain that they support the Asian Women's Fund (AWF) out of a moral responsibility, since all legal obligations have already been concluded through the various bilateral treaties.⁴²

Despite this proffer of government monetary support, many of the former comfort women still reject the atonement money from the AWF. These women maintain that the Japanese government has managed to give an appearance of support and remorse, while actually not accepting full responsibility for the heinous nature of the crimes committed against the women.⁴³ By emphasizing the moral nature of their response, it negates the legal aspect of the comfort women system falling into the war crime category. Additionally, the apology issued contains vague language concerning remorse and concerns over "women's honor and dignity,"⁴⁴ while

⁴¹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "Recent policy of the Government of Japan on the issue known as 'Comfort Women,'" April 2007, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/women/fund/policy.html>, accessed 07 June 2008.

⁴² Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "Recent policy of the Government of Japan on the issue known as 'Comfort Women,'" April 2007, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/women/fund/policy.html>, accessed 07 June 2008.

⁴³ Chunghee Sarah Soh, "Human rights and humanity: The Case of the 'Comfort Women,'" The Institute for Corean-American Studies (ICAS) Lectures, No. 98-1204-CSSb, 04 December 1998, www.icasinc.org/lectures/css11998.html, accessed 10 April 2005.

⁴⁴ C. Sarah Soh, "Japan's responsibility toward Comfort Women survivors," The Institute for Corean-American Studies (ICAS) Special Contribution, No. 2001-0501-CSS, May 2001, www.icasinc.org/lectures/soh3.html, accessed 10 April 2005.

failing to mention that the horrors committed were the direct result of Japan's aggressive actions and colonization of the region.

Additionally, in April 2007, Japan's Supreme Court ruled on the first set of lawsuits concerning the Comfort Women. Although several lawsuits have been working through the appeal process, this first case to reach the Supreme Court concerned two young Chinese girls who were abducted and forced to work as sex slaves for the Japanese military during World War II over a period of several months. The Court ruled in favor of the Japanese government, stating that the 1972 Communiqué with China, in which Beijing renounced the paying of war reparations by Tokyo, absolved the Japanese government of any future monetary claims. As a result, the individuals were not entitled to individual legal reparations.⁴⁵

The issue of comfort women remains unresolved in Asia today. These women seek redress from the Japanese government, while the government believes that it does not owe anything more to them. The latest round of statements from former Japanese Prime Minister Abe in March 2007 belies of intentions of recanting the 1993 admission of official military involvement in the recruitment of women. While still apologizing to the comfort women, Abe denied that the military had forced these women into sexual slavery, stating that "there is no evidence to prove there was coercion, nothing to support it."⁴⁶ As a result, the

⁴⁵ Norimitsu Onishi, "World War II sex slaves lose in Japanese court," 28 April 2007, www.iht.com/articles/2007/04/28/asia/web0428-japan-41373.php, accessed 30 April 2008.

⁴⁶ Norimitsu Onishi, "Japan's Prime Minister denies responsibility for wartime brothels," 28 April 2007, www.iht.com/articles/2007/03/02/news/japan.php, accessed 30 April 2008.

Comfort Women issue remains an area of contention in the normalization of relations between Japan and her neighbors.

2. Rape of Nanking

In December of 1937, Japanese troops rolled into the city of Nanking, China, a thriving city on the Yangtze River that was then serving as the capital of China. With the Japanese army and navy looming over the city, the Chinese government under Chiang Kai-Shek vacated Nanking to establish a new capital up the river. Over the next six weeks, Japanese soldiers, unencumbered by oversight from their leaders, systematically looted homes and shops, raped approximately 20,000 women and girls, and slaughtered anywhere from 50,000 to 200,000 civilians in the city.⁴⁷ This episode defines one of the most contentious historical issues in Sino-Japanese relations, and its treatment provides a basis for the difficulties they still experience in mending ties.

In 1928, the Chinese government transferred its capital to the city of Nanking from Peking. The organization of the capital in a new city resulted in a large influx of government personnel and infrastructure, representatives and outposts from several foreign nations, and foreign aid workers and missionaries. As a result, the population of the city nearly quadrupled in size, to total about one million people, by the mid-1930s.⁴⁸ This number also included thousands of refugees that had fled their

⁴⁷ "Chinese City remembers Japanese 'Rape of Nanjing,'" 13 December 1997, www.cnn.com/WORLD/9712/13/remembering.nanjing/, accessed 09 August 2004.

⁴⁸ Ming-Hui Yao, "Basic facts on the Nanjing massacre and the Tokyo war crimes trial," September 2003, www.cnd.org/njmassacre/nj.html, accessed 08 March 2005.

homes as the Japanese armies continued inland. Thus, with the Japanese armies advancing upon Nanking from multiple directions in November 1937 and with a lack of order within the city itself due to the recent departure of the Chinese government, a group of Westerners, working under the auspices of the Red Cross, formed a Safety Zone to protect the refugees and civilian population of the city.⁴⁹ A map depicting the area and a letter delineating its intent was passed to the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Expeditionary Army, who replied that "he was duly informed,"⁵⁰ and that "if there are no Chinese army and military institutions in the refugee zone, then the Japanese army will not willfully attack it."⁵¹

However, when the Japanese soldiers entered the city on 13 December 1937 and for the next six weeks, they committed a litany of atrocities against the civilians of Nanking, breaking both humanitarian law and the international law of armed conflict. These actions include the mass execution of Chinese citizens, the looting and burning of shops and homes, and the raping of women and girls that occurred both in and outside of the established Safety Zone.⁵²

Dr. Robert Wilson, an American surgeon working in a hospital in Nanking during the siege, chronicled the event in a series of letters to his family. He commented that

⁴⁹ Xu Zhigeng, *Lest we forget: Nanjing massacre, 1937*, (Beijing, China: Chinese Literature Press, 1995), 56-57.

⁵⁰ Zhigeng, 57.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 57.

⁵² International Military Tribunal for the Far East, "Judgment of the international military tribunal for the Far East, in documents on the rape of Nanking, ed. Timothy Brook, (Ann Arbor, Michigan: The University of Michigan Press, 1999), 258-260.

the slaughter of civilians is appalling. I could go on for pages telling of the cases of rape and brutality almost beyond belief... Murder by the wholesale and rape by the thousands of cases. There seems to be no stop to the ferocity, lust, and atavism of the brutes.⁵³

In one instance, the Japanese troops arrested anyone considered to be a Chinese soldier and sent them all to an area outside of the city, where they were all systematically shot with machine guns. Those who survived were bayoneted.⁵⁴ In other cases, the Japanese entered homes and shops at will, looting and vandalizing at will. The Nanking International Safety Zone Committee estimated that the Japanese looted approximately 73 percent of Nanking's buildings, burned 24 percent of the city, and burned 40 percent of peasant houses and crops.⁵⁵ Additionally, Miner Searle Bates, an American minister living in Nanking and highly involved in the establishment of the Safety Zone, penned daily letters to the Japanese Embassy in which he depicted the events occurring in the city walls and asked for help to quell the violence.

It is said on every street with tears and distress that where the Japanese Army is, no person and no house can be safe. Surely this is not what the statesmen of Japan wish to do, and all the residents of Nanking expect better things from Japan...This letter is written in a courteous and friendly spirit, but it reflects something of

⁵³ Robert Wilson, "The family letters of Robert Wilson," in Documents on the rape of Nanking, ed. Timothy Brook, (Ann Arbor, Michigan: The University of Michigan Press, 1999), 214.

⁵⁴ Zhigeng, 82-83.

⁵⁵ Kasahara Tokushi, "Remembering the Nanking massacre," in Nanking 1937: Memory and healing, eds. Fei Fei Li, Robert Sabella and David Liu, (Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 2002), 76.

the unhappy despair in which we have lived since the Japanese Army invaded the city five days ago. Immediate remedy is greatly needed.⁵⁶

The major violence ended after the first six weeks, although the Japanese held the city until the end of World War II. Unlike other atrocities, the Tokyo War Crime Tribunal prosecuted the Japanese leaders immediately responsible for the soldiers who committed these actions in Nanking. However, the incident still invokes great passion and controversy among the citizens and governments of both China and Japan.

3. Biological and Chemical Warfare

In 1932, the Japanese government established a base near Harbin, a metropolitan city in the northeast corner of China. They used the facility for the development of chemical and biological weapons and for the research and practice of battlefield surgery techniques. Known as Unit 731 and headed by Lt General Ishii Shiro, the scientists and doctors stationed in the unit utilized members of the local population and Chinese soldiers to conduct their multiple experiments and test their theories.⁵⁷ The unit was disbanded at the defeat of the Japanese in 1945. However, none of the members of Unit 731 or any members of the Japanese government was held accountable at the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal for the atrocities committed.⁵⁸

⁵⁶ Miner Searle Bates, "Excerpts of letters to the Japanese Embassy, December 14-27, 1937," in *Eyewitnesses to massacre: American missionaries bear witness to Japanese atrocities in Nanjing*, ed. Zhang Kaiyuan, (Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, Inc. and Yale Divinity School Library, 2001), 8-9.

⁵⁷ Peter Li, "Japan's biochemical warfare and experimentation in China," in *The search for justice: Japanese war crimes*, ed. Peter Li, (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2003), 289-290.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 298.

Additionally, several of the doctors continued to lead successful careers in post-war Japan. Furthermore, although the Japanese have accepted responsibility for removing chemical weapons remaining in China, their courts have ruled that Japan is not responsible for paying reparations to victims of the experiments.⁵⁹ This ruling upholds the belief that Japan has completed all moral responsibilities to its victims from its aggression in Asia and lends credence to lack of necessity that the Japanese feel to issue any more of a concrete apology to its neighbors.

The Japanese Imperial government established Unit 731 in order to conduct research into chemical and biological warfare methods and battlefield surgery techniques. Historians estimate that Unit 731 killed anywhere from 3000 to 12,000 of the local populace⁶⁰ in conducting their research and that the biological weapons developed at the base were responsible for up to 250,000 deaths in China alone.⁶¹ The subjects, referred to as "maruta," or wooden logs, mostly consisted of Chinese soldiers and civilians brought in from the surrounding fields and towns but also included some captured Russians, British and Americans.⁶² Researchers conducted multiple types of experiments on the subjects to test different effects of virus and bacteria and

⁵⁹ "Tokyo court rejects bio-warfare claims," 27 August 2002, <http://edition.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/east/08/27/japan.trial/index.html>, accessed 31 October 2004.

⁶⁰ Matthew Forney and Velisarios Kattoulas, "Black Death," Time Asia Magazine, 09 September 2002, www.time.com/time/asia/magazine/printout/0,13675,501020909-346284,00.html, accessed 22 August 2004.

⁶¹ "Tokyo court rejects bio-warfare claims," 27AUG02, <http://edition.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/east/08/27/japan.trial/index.html>, accessed 31 October 2004.

⁶² Li, 290-291.

to trace the effects of different elemental conditions on the human body. In some of these tests, the scientists would freeze subjects alive to analyze frostbite, burn them alive to track human combustion, place them into vacuum chambers and hang them by their ankles to watch the body react.⁶³ In other experiments, the researchers would infect the individuals with different diseases, such as the plague, cholera and anthrax, track the progress of the diseases through the body, and then dissect the infected while alive to annotate the internal damage to the body by the disease.⁶⁴ The Japanese Army then transferred practices developed at Unit 731 to numerous cities in China for both field tests and biological attacks. In several cases, they dropped plague infested rats and sacks filled with fleas, rice and wheat into cities, handed out treats and food latent with bacteria, and infected local water supplies.⁶⁵

The members of Unit 731 did not limit their experimentation to chemical and biological warfare. They also expanded their research to practice and improve techniques for battlefield surgery.⁶⁶ In this area, surgeons would perform vivisections on Chinese captives. Dr. Yuasa Ken, an army surgeon, who later served as chief of general affairs at the hospital noted that:

⁶³ Matthew Forney and Velisarios Kattoulas, "Black Death," Time Asia Magazine, 09 September 2002, www.time.com/time/asia/magazine/printout/0,13675,501020909-346284,00.html, accessed 22 August 2004.

⁶⁴ Li, 290.

⁶⁵ Ibid., 292-297.

⁶⁶ Noda Masaaki, "One Army surgeon's account of vivisection on human subjects in China," in *The search for justice: Japanese war crimes*, ed. Peter Li, trans. Paul Schalow, (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2003), 146-154.

It was never the case that we used prisoners for vivisection just because there were extra prisoners available. It was always, 'We need them, so get them for us.' They were necessary for surgery practice in order to save the lives of Japanese soldiers, you see. Chinese people were arrested for that purpose alone.⁶⁷

The surgeons used these opportunities to practice techniques that they would learn in the field and performed procedures ranging from appendectomies to amputations to bowel resections.⁶⁸

The conclusion of World War II brought an end to the activities at Unit 731. However, the Tokyo Tribunal did not charge any members of Unit 731, including Lt General Ishii, or any other government leader for these atrocities, and Japanese leaders have since failed to offer an apology related specifically to the actions at Unit 731. Additionally, the Japanese government did not acknowledge the existence of the program or accept responsibility until a 2004 Tokyo High Court ruling stated that Japan did have a biochemical weapons facility in China, whose "main objective was to research, develop and manufacture biological weapons."⁶⁹ However, the Court did not require the government to pay indemnities to individuals affected by the activities of Unit 731, arguing that a national government is not responsible for reparations to an

⁶⁷ Noda Masaaki, "One Army surgeon's account of vivisection on human subjects in China," in *The search for justice: Japanese war crimes*, ed. Peter Li, trans. Paul Schalow, (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2003), 148.

⁶⁸ Masaaki, 146-154.

⁶⁹ Matthew Forney and Velisarios Kattoulas, "Black Death," *Time Asia Magazine*, 09 September 2002, www.time.com/time/asia/magazine/printout/0,13675,501020909-346284,00.html, accessed 22 August 2004.

individual and that any monetary compensation issues were resolved by previous treaties with government entities.⁷⁰

Although the Japanese government has taken responsibility for removal and destruction of the remaining weapons,⁷¹ the actions of Unit 731 and the lack of a specific apology by the Japanese government engenders much animosity from the Chinese toward the Japanese and adds one more layer of controversy between Japan and its neighbors.

C. TOKYO WAR CRIME TRIALS

From 1946 through 1948, the Allied Forces convened war trials in Tokyo to prosecute the leaders of the Imperial Japanese government and military forces at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. More commonly known as the Tokyo war crimes trial or the Tokyo tribunal, these proceedings focused on the main criminals and some lower echelon war criminals, allowing local military tribunals to handle the majority of the accused. Led primarily by the United States, the Tokyo tribunal, for the most part, did hold Japanese leaders accountable for their actions in Asia. However, the trials did not satisfactorily account for all of the atrocities that occurred, the actual administration of the trials had multiple shortcomings, and the resulting negative effects have lasting implications in Asia today.

⁷⁰ "China recalls germ warfare experiments," 06 May 2005, www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-05-08/content_439983.htm, accessed 22 May 2005.

⁷¹ Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Japan's efforts toward early destruction of ACW in China," 16 April 2008, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/disarmament/cwc/paper0804-2.pdf>, accessed 30 May 2008.

1. Background of Trials

Upon the conclusion of World War II in Asia, the Allied Powers opted to follow the example set at the trials at Nuremberg that processed Nazi leaders for "crimes against humanity," while opting to add the charge of "crimes against peace."⁷² Spearheaded by the United States, as the leading vested party in Japan, the Allied Forces formed the Tokyo tribunal to prosecute the major players of Japan's Imperial Government and its military. The conglomerate of Allied prosecutors, headed by American Joseph Keenan, divided the accused into three distinct categories based on the magnitude of their crimes. Broadly defined, "Class A" criminals, the highest level, included those who committed "crimes against peace," "Class B" defined those who committed "crimes against humanity," and "Class C" included individuals accused of more direct involvement, including higher level planning, authorizing or failing to prevent the atrocities.⁷³ The Tokyo tribunal focused its efforts primarily on the "Class A" criminals.

Additionally, victor nations held approximately 50 military tribunals at various locations throughout Asia. These trials, which occurred between 1945 and 1949, indicted 5700 individuals for "Class B/C" war crimes.⁷⁴ These tribunals levied most of their charges against enlisted personnel and against a few officers for specific

⁷² Maria Hsia Chang and Robert P. Barker, "Victor's justice and Japan's amnesia: The Tokyo war crimes trial reconsidered," in *The search for Justice: Japanese war crimes*, ed. by Peter Li, (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2003), 38.

⁷³ "Basic facts on the Nanjing massacre and the Tokyo war crimes trial," September 1993, www.cnd.org/njmassacre/nj.html, accessed 08 March 2005.

⁷⁴ John W. Dower, *Embracing defeat: Japan in the wake of World War II*, (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1999), 447.

crimes against prisoners, in direct conflict to the makeup of the personnel indicted by the Tokyo tribunal, which limited its constituents to the top level leaders of the war effort.⁷⁵ Of these Japanese charged by the outlying tribunals, 4403 received some form of punishment, including the execution of 920, the acquittal of 1018, and never trying 279.⁷⁶ Although these military trials held the actual perpetrator of the war crimes personally responsible, they received no attention in Japan or in its neighboring countries. This lack of public knowledge and proliferation of evidence and trial results greatly enhanced the sentiment outside of Japan that the Japanese were not sufficiently punished for their actions. Inside the country, this inaction failed to provide the Japanese citizens exposure to the full spectrum of events that had occurred outside of the country.⁷⁷

Although the Tokyo trials received a great deal of press both inside Japan and in the international community, the process and the eventual outcomes did nothing to alter these pressing sentiments. With the singular focus on prosecuting the leaders, the "Class A" criminals, the Tokyo tribunal convened on May 3, 1946 and did not pass down its verdicts until the November of 1948. The 11 member bench consisted of eight Westerners and only three Asians. In a majority vote of seven to four, the court found 25 military and government leaders guilty and sentenced seven of them to death, sixteen to life imprisonment and two to shorter

⁷⁵ John W. Dower, *Embracing defeat: Japan in the wake of World War II*, (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1999), 447.

⁷⁶ Dower, 447.

⁷⁷ Tokushi, 88.

prison sentences.⁷⁸ The seven, who were hanged, most notably included General Iwane Matsui, whose troops were responsible for the Rape of Nanking, and General Hideki Tojo, the prime minister of Japan from 1941-1945, who claimed responsibility for all military and political actions of Japan. Both of these individuals are now interred at the Yasukuni Shrine.⁷⁹

2. Failures of Trials

However noble the intent of the trials, they failed to address critical aspects of the atrocities committed by the Japanese. First, the trials omitted several key incidents that occurred during the Japanese campaign. Both the retention and use of Comfort Women and the testing conducted by Unit 731 were absent during all trial proceedings.⁸⁰ The prosecutors did not include either event in charges against the war criminals, nor did they raise them as evidence within the trials themselves. In fact, Lt General Ishii Shiro, commander of Unit 731, escaped prosecution in exchange for conferring the results of his unit's work to the United States.⁸¹ Also, although prosecutors did charge members for the atrocities committed during the Nanking Massacre, the evidence was not released to the public.⁸² Additionally, the existence of language barriers, the lack of availability of trial transcripts to

⁷⁸ "Basic facts on the Nanjing massacre and the Tokyo war crimes trial," September 1993, www.cnd.org/njmassacre/nj.html, accessed 08 March 2005.

⁷⁹ "Basic facts on the Nanjing massacre and the Tokyo war crimes trial," September 1993, www.cnd.org/njmassacre/nj.html, accessed 08 March 2005.

⁸⁰ Maria Hsia Chang and Robert P. Barker, 50.

⁸¹ Ibid., 51.

⁸² Tokushi, 88.

Japanese public, and the lengthy 31 months of trials resulted in a Japan that was separated from the entire process. By the time the verdict was announced, in November 1948, the perspectives of both the world and Japan had changed greatly; former allies were now actively divided by political ideologies, and Japan was deeply involved in a solid recovery from the war. As a result, it was very easy for the Japanese people to become removed from trials.⁸³

Second, the conduct of the trials and its ultimate outcomes left many Japanese and neighboring countries with the sense that the trials provided an opportunity for the exercise of "victor's justice."⁸⁴ This sentiment arose primarily because of the seemingly hypocritical nature of various aspects of the trials. First, the composition of the justices promoted this sense of victor's justice, due to the primarily Western composition of the court.⁸⁵ The Asian community, the victim of Japan's aggression, was only represented initially by China. Eventually, two more judges, one from India and one from the Philippines, were added to provide some counterbalance to the bench. Since Korea was still a protectorate of Japan, it was not considered a sovereign nation, and therefore did not warrant an individual seat on the bench. The bench also included a member from the Soviet Union. The inclusion of the Soviet Union in the trial process offended the Japanese. They argued that the Soviet entry into the war against Japan in 1945 violated the Neutrality Pact that

⁸³ Dower, 453-454, 469.

⁸⁴ Ibid., 461.

⁸⁵ Dower, 465.

both countries had signed in 1940. Since the Japanese believed that the Soviet Union had committed the same act for which they, themselves, were now being tried, they felt it was hypocritical for the Soviets to pass judgment on them.⁸⁶ As a result, the presence of the Soviet judge furthered the notion of "victor's justice."

Furthermore, many Japanese and several of the dissenting judges felt that countries who had engaged in colonization and who still actively governed colonies had no right to try Japan for exhibiting similar traits in acquiring the land of its neighbors.⁸⁷ For example, the British did not relinquish their colonial control of India until the trials were already in progress. The Indian representative on the bench, Justice Roling Pal, in referring to Japan's takeover of Manchuria, noted that "it would be pertinent to recall to our memory that the majority of the interests claimed by the Western Prosecuting Powers in the Eastern Hemisphere including China were acquired by such aggressive measures."⁸⁸

Additionally, the proceedings lost merit due to actions that occurred in the decade after the war. By 1957, all of the "Class A" convicted felons, who had been sentenced to prison terms vice execution, had had their sentences commuted by the countries that had comprised the Allied powers.⁸⁹ Furthermore, two members of this group

⁸⁶ Marius B. Jansen, *The making of modern Japan*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000), 673.

⁸⁷ Dower, 470-472.

⁸⁸ Dower, 471.

⁸⁹ "Basic facts on the Nanjing massacre and the Tokyo war crimes trial," September 1993, www.cnd.org/njmassacre/nj.html, accessed 08 March 2005.

achieved significant success in the Japanese government. Kishi Nobusuke was elected as Japan's Prime Minister in 1957, and Mamoru Shigemitsu served as a foreign minister in 1954. The rise of convicted war felons left two distinct impressions on Japan and her neighbors. For the Japanese, it furthered the notion that they had paid for their wrong doings during the war, and for her neighbors, it buoyed their belief that for the Japanese, aggression did not result in punishment.⁹⁰ These sentiments have added to the difficulty in normalizing relations between Japan and her neighbors.

Third, although the Tokyo tribunal did convict several high ranking Japanese leaders, it did not prosecute the Emperor, Hirohito. In fact, the prosecution was under strict orders not even to allow the mention of the emperor's name during testimony.⁹¹ While admitting his own personal responsibility for actions taken during the war, General Tojo additionally testified that "none of us (Japanese) would dare act against the emperor's will."⁹² However, within a week, Tojo recanted his previous testimony and countered with a second statement indicating Emperor Hirohito's past and present desire for peace.⁹³ By resting blame for Japan's aggression squarely on the shoulders of its military leaders, the Allied Forces were able to argue that the emperor was merely an ill-advised figure head, who was led astray by his zealous advisors. Leaving the emperor blameless and removing the mantle of

⁹⁰ Allen S. Whiting, *China Eyes Japan*, (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: The University of California Press, 1989), 65.

⁹¹ Jansen, 673.

⁹² Ian Buruma, *Inventing Japan: 1853-1964*, (New York: Modern Library, 2003), 147.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, 147.

responsibility from him enabled the Allied Forces to leave him as a figurative leader in Japan to promote stability during the dismantling of the Meiji state and the building of a democratic one.⁹⁴ This transformation required that Emperor Hirohito renounce his position as a deity and accept that of a human as the "symbol of national unity," thereby separating the Shinto religion from the affairs of government.⁹⁵

The retention of the emperor also functioned to uphold the order that had been established by the Allied forces in Japan. General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP), noted that arresting Emperor Hirohito would require a million men to maintain order in Japan and that "civilized practices would largely cease, and a condition of underground chaos and guerilla warfare in mountainous and outlying regions would result."⁹⁶ Furthermore, the Japanese soldiers and sailors had just waged a war across Asia in the name of Emperor Hirohito. By removing the responsibility for the war from him and transferring it solely to the military and policy advisors, the Japanese citizens, who identified with their emperor and fought for him, could be innocent, too.⁹⁷ Thus, this transference of responsibility has helped to increase the difficulty in today's society of reconciling the tensions between Japan and her neighbors.

⁹⁴ Herbert P. Bix, *Hirohito and The making of modern Japan*, (New York, New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2000), 574-575.

⁹⁵ Bix, 575.

⁹⁶ Jansen, 669.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 674.

Overall, the trials held Japan accountable for its aggressive actions in Asia prior to and during World War II, and they administered punishment to the senior leaders. However, several facets of the trials ultimately promoted difficulties within Japan and neighboring countries. The length and lack of public knowledge about the processes of the trials, the prevalent sense of “victor’s justice” experienced by multiple countries, and the placement of blame on the military had an impact that still affects Japan, China and the Republic of Korea today. As these countries work to normalize relations, the idea of the definition of an appropriate apology continues to plague their efforts.

D. POST-WAR RECOVERY

Concurrent with the conduct of the Tokyo tribunal, the reconstruction of its cities and infrastructures occupied Japan. While the Japanese citizens focused on rebuilding their individual lives, the Allied forces, placed under the command of General Douglas MacArthur, began to breakdown the Meiji State and replace it with a more democratic form of government. Since the United States had been the country most heavily involved in the Pacific War, it played a vital role in the post-war transition of the Japanese governing structure.

1. The New “Peace” Constitution

The Meiji government formed in the late 1860s, culminating from the civil war and the subsequent overthrow of the feudal system. The new government established itself as a constitutional monarchy, adopting nominal western political, military and judicial systems and

uniting the country under the name of the emperor through the adoption of a constitution. The Meiji Constitution served as the centerpiece of Imperial Japan, and it reestablished the role of the emperor as the gods' divine representative on earth.⁹⁸ Therefore, by linking the beliefs of the Shinto religion into the affairs of state, the leaders provided a means for all of the different factions to unite. In fact, the Fifth Article of the Charter Oath stipulated that "knowledge shall be sought throughout the world so as to strengthen the foundation of imperial rule."⁹⁹ Additionally, the leaders of the new Meiji government formed an imperial army that linked conscripted service to the state as service to the emperor himself, creating a bond of nationalist pride and military service.¹⁰⁰

In forming a post-war Japanese government, MacArthur needed to remove both of these institutions from the constitution and from actual practices, while still establishing a stable functioning governing structure.¹⁰¹ He accomplished this feat by maintaining the same parliamentary system and by drafting a new constitution that removed the military component and intent to wage war and established the emperor as a symbol, separate from constitutional authority. Known as the "Peace Constitution," Article 9 states that the "Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling

⁹⁸ Bix, 27-32.

⁹⁹ Jansen, 338.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., 34.

¹⁰¹ Jansen, 669.

international disputes."¹⁰² In order to provide assurance that Japan would not take up arms, the Constitution also stipulates that the government would not form any military forces that could be used to assert its positions outside of its borders.¹⁰³

Having removed the potential for military capability, MacArthur also needed to ensure that the role of the emperor transitioned to one that only involved participation in ceremonial duties and not in actual government.¹⁰⁴ Retaining the emperor was an essential aspect of maintaining order in the post-war society. However, in order to establish a functioning constitutional government, General MacArthur needed to remove both the Shinto religion and the emperor from the governing institutions.¹⁰⁵ Therefore, Article 4 of the new constitution provides that "the Emperor shall perform only such acts in matters of state as are provided for in this Constitution and he shall not have powers related to government."¹⁰⁶ Thus, by providing a new constitution that excised the military and the emperor's divinity, MacArthur established a path for future development for Japan that would be based on a fully democratic system and status as a peaceful nation.

¹⁰² The Constitution of Japan, 03 November 1946, <http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c01.html#s9>, accessed 11 May 2008.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ Jansen, 669.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., 669.

¹⁰⁶ The Constitution of Japan, 03 November 1946, <http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c01.html#s9>, accessed 11 May 2008.

2. Japan's Revitalization

However, as the United States led Japan through its post-war reconstruction, international dynamics began to change. 1949 saw the successful testing of an atomic bomb by the Soviet Union and the victory of the communist party in China. A year later, with the Soviet Union firmly entrenched above the 38th parallel in northern Korea, war broke out between the two governing bodies on the Korean peninsula. With the encroachment of communism into Asia, the United States believed that democracy needed to be preserved and furthered in the region.¹⁰⁷ As a result, American leaders began to push for the revitalization of Japan's economy in order to create a stronghold for democracy in Asia. Thus, the repentant phase of Japan's recovery was short lived. The United States ended its occupation in 1950, and in September 1951, 48 democratic countries signed a peace treaty at a formal peace conference in San Francisco. Coming into effect in April 1952, the San Francisco Peace Treaty restored sovereignty to Japan, while keeping the country under the umbrella of the United States.¹⁰⁸

E. CONCLUSION

The aggression of the Japanese in Asia prior to and throughout World War II resulted in strained relationships with its closest neighbors, China and the Republic of Korea. The commitment of several atrocities, including comfort women, Rape of Nanking and the chemical/biological experimentation of Unit 731, and the means in which these actions were addressed at the Tokyo tribunal have further

¹⁰⁷ Bix, 625, 635.

¹⁰⁸ Bix, 647-648.

hindered Japan's ability to normalize relations. The decision of the Tokyo tribunal to charge only a few, specific "Class A" war criminals with "crimes against peace," did not promote an overarching sense of guilt throughout Japan. The Trials also failed to garner much weight with the Japanese and the neighboring China and the Republic of Korea because of the complete omission of atrocities as the Comfort Women and the Chemical/Biological testing, the sense of "victor's justice," and the lack of prosecution of then Emperor, Hirohito. Furthermore, the revitalization of Japan's economy only a few years after the war's end, coupled with its normalization at the San Francisco Peace Conference in the early have increased the difficulty for Japan to deal with her past properly in order to move forward today.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁹ Buruma, 152.

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III. IMPACTS OF APOLOGY ON JAPAN'S FOREIGN POLICY ROLE

Since the revitalization of its economy in the 1950s, Japan has become a top world player in the economic realm. Despite an economic downturn in the late 1990s and early 2000s, in 2007, Japan ranked second behind the United States in nominal gross domestic product, at 4.4 trillion US dollars and third in purchasing power parity at 6.6%, just after the United States and China.¹¹⁰ Although an economic powerhouse, current Japanese leaders desire to expand its diplomatic influence and "to make every effort to expound the aims of Japan's diplomacy and ensure that these aims are transmitted at home and overseas."¹¹¹

Already a major contributor within the region through its participation in organizations such as Six Party talks, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Plus Three (ASEAN Plus Three), the Japanese government is amending its foreign policy agenda to add a focus on spreading the values of freedom, democracy and human rights from Northern Europe through the Middle East to Northeast Asia, while still maintaining its stance as a "nation of peace." Key steps to achieve this aim include amending Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, seeking a permanent seat on the

¹¹⁰ International Monetary Fund, "2008 world economic outlook database," April 2008, <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2008/01/weodata/weorept.aspx?sy=2006&ey=2013&scsm=1&ssd=1&sort=country&ds=.&br=1&c=924%2C922%2C134%2C528%2C158%2C111&s=NGDPD%2CNGDPDPC%2CPPPSH&grp=0&a=&pr.x=61&pr.y=13>, accessed 26 May 2008.

¹¹¹ Aso Taro, "Message from the Minister of Foreign Affairs," (Japan) Ministry of Foreign Affairs diplomatic blue book 2007 summary, March 2007, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2007/message.pdf>, accessed 31 May 2008.

United Nations Security Council, actively participating in Gulf War II, and increasing monetary aid and peacekeeping endeavors to foreign countries through the United Nations and through the directed efforts of Official Development Assistance (ODA).

However, before Japan can achieve success outside of its region, it must first address the treatment of the outstanding issues remaining from World War II. Additionally, Japan's neighbors, most notably China and the Republic of Korea, do not accept the apologies voiced by various Japanese leaders and prime ministers as being sincere. This lack of trust is reflected in both the controversy of historical accounts of World War II in history textbooks, in the visits of national leaders to the Yasukuni War Shrine, and in the lack of reparations to the victims of the aggression. Also, these issues, coupled with a rise in Japanese nationalism, incite great animosity and subsequent nationalist movements in Japan's neighboring countries, furthering the difficulty in normalizing relations.

A. JAPAN'S FOREIGN POLICY AGENDA

1. Traditional Role

Historically, Japan has embraced its role as a "Nation of Peace," based on Article 9 of its Constitution and on its lack of military action in over 60 years. In that endeavor, Tokyo's traditional foreign policy objectives have included three pillars: diplomatic support of the United Nations, collaboration with Free World Nations, and adherence to its position as an Asian nation.¹¹² As a

¹¹² Taro, "Message from the Minister of Foreign Affairs."

member of several key organizations, Japan plays an active role in regional and international affairs of state. Participation in regional activities, such as APEC, ASEAN Plus Three and Six Party Talks, allows Japan to influence cooperation and direction of significant regional matters and areas of concern, both economically and diplomatically. Japan's membership in the G8 and the United Nations (UN), including service as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, expands its participation into areas outside of the Asian-Pacific realm and lays the ground work for future changes in Japan's foreign policy goals. Additionally, Japan is the world's second largest contributor of Official Development Assistance (ODA), donating 13.1 billion US dollars in 2005.¹¹³

2. Changes in Foreign Policy Goals

Japan's leaders have taken actions that have served to extend Japan's influence into areas outside of economic and regional policy spheres. In November 2006, then Minister for Foreign Affairs Aso Taro announced the addition of a fourth pillar to Japan's foreign policy objectives. This new vision, as outlined in the 2007 Diplomatic Bluebook, would create "a region of stability and plenty with its basis in universal values such as freedom, democracy, fundamental human rights, the rule of law, and the market

¹¹³ Statistical annex of the development co-operation report 2005, "Chart: Net official development assistance by Donor Country: 2002-2005," <http://www.globalpolicy.org/soecon/develop/oda/tables/aidbydonor.htm>, accessed 27 May 2008.

economy and creating an Arc of Freedom and Prosperity."¹¹⁴ The intent of this new direction is to provide developing countries, stretching from Northern Europe through the Middle East and Southeast Asia to Northeast Asia, with political stability and economic prosperity through peaceful means.¹¹⁵ In order to accomplish this goal successfully, Japan has taken steps to alter its interaction in the international arena.

a. Amendment of Article 9

First, Japanese lawmakers have proposed legislation to amend Article 9 of the Constitution. Article 9 currently prohibits Japan from maintaining military forces that would enable the country to assert itself outside of its borders, and it renounces Tokyo's right to use force or wage war. However, both major parties, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP), interpret the constitution to allow for self defense forces for use to thwart off any external attack and as an extension of the police force to uphold internal discipline.¹¹⁶ In support of this interpretation, Japan currently employs 240,000 personnel in its Ground, Maritime and Air Self Defense Forces.

¹¹⁴ Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Overview, A new pillar for Japanese diplomacy: Creating an arc of freedom and prosperity," (Japan) Ministry of Foreign affairs diplomatic blue book summary 2007, March 2007, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2007/chapter1.pdf>, accessed 01 June 2008.

¹¹⁵ Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Overview, A new pillar for Japanese diplomacy: Creating an arc of freedom and prosperity," (Japan) Ministry of Foreign affairs diplomatic blue book summary 2007, March 2007, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2007/chapter1.pdf>, accessed 01 June 2008.

¹¹⁶ "Japan takes first step in revising Pacifist Charter," People's Daily Online, 15 May 2007, http://english.people.com.cn/200705/15/print20070515_374662.html, 26 May 2008.

However, in May 2007, the Diet passed the National Referendum Law to alter Article 9. Deliberations will occur for three years, until May 2010, on the exact wording and inclusions in the referendum. Altering the Constitution requires a two thirds majority in both Houses of the Diet, which will necessitate cooperation from both of the major parties, and a simple majority in a national referendum. While the LDP and the DSP agree, in general, for the necessity to amend Article 9, they do not concur on the specifics for inclusion within the bill. Furthermore, while polls demonstrate that approximately half of Japan's population supports the amendment,¹¹⁷ "there are people among the general public who fear that revising the Constitution will turn (Japan back) into a prewar militant nation,"¹¹⁸ according to Hideo Otake, a political science professor at Doshisha Women's College of Liberal Arts. A change in Article 9 also instills fear in Japan's neighboring countries. Chinese citizens still labor under a healthy mistrust of the Japanese as a result of the perceived lack of remorse from actions in World War II, and they believe that a Japan in possession of military capability would reform into a militaristic society.¹¹⁹

b. Bid for UNSC Permanent Seat

Intrinsically linked to the revision of Article 9 is Japan's desire for a permanent seat on the United

¹¹⁷ Hisane Masaki, "Head wind for Japanese change," The Asia Times Online, 20 April 2007, <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/ID20Dh01.html>, accessed 26 May 2008.

¹¹⁸ Masami Ito, "Diet clears path to referendum on Constitution," The Japan Times Online, 15 May 2007, <http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20070515a1.html>, accessed 26 May 2008.

¹¹⁹ Ng Tze-wei, "Old rivals still wary of each other despite diplomatic thaw," 03 June 2008, www.scmp.com, accessed 05 June 2008.

Nations Security Council (UNSC). Japan has served on the UNSC as a non-permanent member for a total of 18 years since its acceptance into the UN in 1956, with its most recent stint in 2005-2006. In his policy speech in January 2008 to the 169th Session of the Diet, Japanese Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda expressed that Japan was a "Peace Fostering Nation," and

in order to fulfill its role as a "Peace Fostering Nation," Japan needs to broaden the stage where it conducts its diplomatic activities. For this, we will pursue the goal of becoming a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council and will work towards United Nations reform.¹²⁰

However, while Japan has embraced a role as a peace building nation, its desire for a permanent seat in the UNSC raises doubts in the international community. One vital aspect of the UNSC is its authority to impose sanctions and military actions upon other nations. As a permanent member, Japan, without a military force, would be able to vote for action against another country, yet its own troops would not participate in that mission. In fact, Japan's current guidance, the International Peace Cooperation Law enacted in 1992, delineates specific requirements in order for the Self Defense Forces to participate in UN actions. This law stipulates that all

¹²⁰ Yasuo Fukuda, "Policy speech to the 169th session of the Diet," 18 January 2008, http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/hukudaspeech/2008/01/18housin_e.html, accessed 28 May 2008.

parties must be in a cease-fire and allow Japanese presence, that Japan can withdraw troops at any time, and that Japanese forces will only fire in self defense.¹²¹

While these provisions are quite advantageous for Japanese troops, they are not beneficial for the other countries conducting the UN action and greatly hinder support for Japan's bid for a permanent seat on the UNSC. Therefore, an amendment to Article 9 would foster support among other countries for Japan, yet neither action is endorsed by Japan's neighbors, specifically China. China's UN Ambassador, Wang Guangya, has openly opposed the proposal to include Japan in the UNSC as a permanent member, stating that Japan has not atoned for its wartime past.¹²² However, Japanese policy makers counter that Japan, as the second largest monetary contributor to the UN at 19.5% of all annual UN funding,¹²³ already plays a vital role in UN missions, regardless of any modification to Article 9.

c. Contributions to Counter-terrorism Measures

Although Japan's constitution still reflects its peace clause, the country's leaders have contributed to counter-terrorism measures through troop support. From 2001 to 2007 under the Anti-terrorism Special Measures Law and then in February 2008 under the Replenishment Support

¹²¹ Phar Kim Beng, "Japan's battle for a Security Council seat," Asia Times Online, 17 January 2003, <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/EA17Dh01.html>, accessed 28 May 2008.

¹²² "China opposes UNSC enlargement with Japan," The China Daily, 03 June 2005, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-06/03/content_448242.htm, accessed 28 May 2008.

¹²³ "Japan's Security Council dreams clouded with neighbor's wary," The China Daily, 08 May 2005, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-05/08/content_440128.htm, accessed 28 May 2008.

Special Measures Law, "Japan has been contributing to peace and stability of the international community by conducting refueling activities to vessels participating in the OEF-MIO (Operation Enduring Freedom-Maritime Interception Operations)"¹²⁴ in the Indian Ocean. By maintaining Maritime Self Defense Force vessels in the Indian Ocean, Japan provides a steady supply line for all coalition vessels entering and exiting the Arabian Gulf and, through March 2006, has supplied them with more than 110 million gallons of fuel and 621,000 gallons of water.¹²⁵ Also from February 2004 through July 2006, the Japanese government under Prime Minister Koizumi formed the Japanese Iraq Reconstruction and Support Group (JIRSG), which consisted of 600 Ground Self Defense Forces deployed to the Southern Iraqi city of Samawah to support humanitarian efforts. These troops, the first deployed since World War II, assisted in reconstruction efforts for the town, including water purification and the restoration of public buildings. They did not participate in any military campaigns, were not permitted in combat zones and were only permitted to fire weapons in self defense.

However, the deployment of forces to Iraq drew much ire from adversaries inside Japan. Although the Koizumi government argued that JIRSG was an integral part

¹²⁴ Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Japan's international counter-terrorism cooperation, February 2008, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/terrorism/coop0208.pdf>, accessed 28 May 2008. OEF is the campaign against the Taliban and terrorism in Afghanistan, and MIO are efforts enacted after the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait by the United Nations Security Council that allow for the monitoring of naval merchant traffic in order to prevent the smuggling of contraband from Iraq.

¹²⁵ Taro Aso, "Japan and NATO in a new security environment" (speech given at NAC Meeting in Brussels, Belgium, 04 May 2006), <http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/fm/aso/speech0605.html>, accessed 01 June 2008.

of endorsing Japan's efforts to support humanitarian missions, his opponents believed that Japanese troops overstepped the bounds of humanitarian support by entering the war in Iraq and that their forces should have served in the UN sanctioned campaign in Afghanistan.¹²⁶ Additionally, critics maintained that the construct of the Iraqi War made it difficult to discern the confines of a combat zone, making the participation of Japanese troops a violation of the constitution by shifting from a mission of providing aid to one of troops engaged in military action outside of Japan's borders.¹²⁷ Yasuo Ichikawa, a member of Japan's parliament, added that "the SDF (Self Defense Force) deployment to Iraq wouldn't be a problem if it really were for humanitarian reasons. But it is first and foremost a show of support to the U.S. The U.S. invaded Iraq without a U.N. resolution, and Japan is now aiding in that act."¹²⁸

Furthermore, while this act has served to strengthen Japan's bid for a permanent UNSC seat within North America and Europe, it did not endear Japan to its nearest neighbors.¹²⁹ By deploying the JIRSG, Japan demonstrated to Western countries that it was willing to commit personnel as well as money to UN efforts, a concern of UN members in supporting Japan's bid. Conversely, this

¹²⁶ Christopher Griffin and Dan Blumenthal, "Japan: A Liberal, nationalistic defense transformation," Asian Outlook: American Enterprise Institute Online, 17 November 2005, http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.23464/pub_detail.asp, accessed 28 May 2008.

¹²⁷ Jim Frederick, "Asia enters the fray," Time Asia, 9 February 2004, http://www.time.com/time/asia/2004/peace_troops/story.html, accessed 28 May 2008.

¹²⁸ Ibid.

¹²⁹ Alan Boyd, "India, Japan still shooting for Security Council," Asia Times Online, 26 February 2004, www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/FB26Dh03.html, accessed 28 May 2008.

measure fostered distrust among Japan's World War II victims, most specifically from China and the Koreas, that Japan was expanding its area of influence without properly atoning for its past.

d. Expansion of ODA

Finally, Tokyo intends to use ODA to help achieve the "Arc of Freedom and Prosperity." Traditionally, Tokyo has relied heavily on ODA as its primary means of providing support to struggling countries in order to promote international security and prosperity and trust in Japan and its people, utilizing four basic measures: sustainable growth, support for social development, addressing global issues and peace building.¹³⁰ In FY2006, Japan donated a net total of 11,187.07 million US dollars in grant aid, loan aid and technical cooperation¹³¹ to achieve these goals. With the addition of the fourth pillar in foreign diplomacy goals, the use of ODA will be expanded to

secure Japan's national interests within a globalizing world by responding accurately to new international environment characterized by the rise of such countries as China and India, and also by planning and implementing international cooperation that is more closely in accordance with diplomatic policy.¹³²

¹³⁰ Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Japan's official development assistance white paper 2007," December 2007, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/white/2007/ODA2007/html/honpen/index.htm>, accessed 28 May 2008.

¹³¹ Ibid.

¹³² Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Japan's foreign policy in major diplomatic fields," (Japan) Ministry of Foreign Affairs diplomatic blue book summary 2007, March 2007, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2007/chapter1.pdf>, accessed 01 June 2008.

In order to accomplish this strategic alignment of ODA use with the advancement of national interests in the international community, the distribution of ODA will focus on enhancing infrastructures, empowering individuals, securing intellectual advances, promoting energy conservation and alternate sources and developing economic activity.¹³³ By hosting the 2008 G8 Hokkaido Toyako Summit and the 4th Tokyo International Conference on African Development, by serving as the Chair of the UN Peacebuilding Commission, and by contributing to Peace Keeping Operation Centers in Africa and Southeast Asia, Tokyo is already demonstrating change in this new direction.

B. UNRESOLVED ISSUES FROM WORLD WAR II

Even as Tokyo amends its foreign policy objectives to enhance its role in the international community, it still faces criticism from its neighbors for its inability to resolve actions from World War II. Japan feels that it has adequately apologized for the atrocities committed, such as the Comfort Women, the Rape of Nanking and Unit 731, through multiple statements from prime ministers and through the various peace treaties it has signed with neighboring countries. However, these nearest neighbors, specifically China and South Korea, do not believe that Japan has satisfactorily resolved these matters.¹³⁴ They assert that although Tokyo has issued statements of deep

¹³³ Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Japan's foreign policy in major diplomatic fields," (Japan) Ministry of Foreign Affairs diplomatic blue book summary 2007, March 2007, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2007/chapter1.pdf>, accessed 01 June 2008.

¹³⁴ Roh Moo-hyun, "Asahi Shimbun interview with ROK President Roh," interview by Yoichi Funabashi, Asahi Shimbun, 03 November 2007, Open Source Center Document ID JPP20071103004001.

remorse, its actions do not align with its rhetoric, as evidenced by the accounts of World War II in history textbooks, by official visits to Yasukuni Shrine and by lack of reparations to victims of its aggression.¹³⁵

Furthermore, they believe that a strong Japan will revert to its militaristic tendencies. Therefore, as Japan continues to advance in the international community, its leaders must reach an understanding of its past that reconciles with its vision for the future without engaging the ire of its neighbors.

1. Japan's Apology

First, Tokyo feels that it has offered numerous and adequate apologies for the atrocities it committed during its invasion of China and Korea. According to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

Japan has always engraved in mind feelings of deep remorse and heartfelt apology with regard to the tremendous damage and suffering that it caused in the past through its colonial rule and aggression to the people of many countries, particularly those of Asian nations. On various occasions, Japan has clearly expressed these feelings of remorse and apology, and its resolve to ensure that such an unfortunate history is never repeated...¹³⁶

Leaders in the government have issued these apologies during speeches, in formal meetings with the aggrieved nations' leaders and in official agreements with both China and the Republic of Korea. Examples of these expressed

¹³⁵ Sheila Smith, "Ties that bind," South China Morning Post, 21 May 2008, www.scmp.com, accessed 27 May 2008.

¹³⁶ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "Historical issues Q&A," January 2006, www.mofa.go.jp/policy/q_a/faq16.html, accessed 31 May 2008.

sentiments of "heartfelt remorse" include the 1965 Republic of Korea-Japan Joint Communiqué, 1972 Joint Communiqué of the Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China, the 1998 Japan-China Joint Declaration on Building a Partnership of Friendship and Cooperation for Peace and Development, and the 1998 Japan-Republic of Korea Joint Declaration: A New Japan-Republic of Korea Partnership towards the twenty-first century.

Additionally, Prime Ministers from Tomiichi Murayama in 1995, Junichiro Koizumi in 2005,¹³⁷ and Shinzo Abe in 2006¹³⁸ in various speeches and statements have also expressed "feelings of deep remorse and heartfelt apology" for the "tremendous damage and suffering to the people of many countries, particularly those of Asian nations, through its colonial rule and aggression."¹³⁹

2. Reception by China and the Republic of Korea

However, many Chinese and Korean citizens and government leaders do not believe that the expressions of remorse repeatedly uttered by the Japanese government are sincere. They feel that Tokyo merely states the correct rhetoric but that the government's treatment of key issues, such as accounts in history textbooks of Japanese actions in Korea and China prior to World War II, official state

¹³⁷ Junichiro Koizumi, "Statement by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi," 15 August 2005, http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/koizumispeech/2005/08/15danwa_e.html, accessed 26 September 2008.

¹³⁸ Shinzo Abe, "Press conference by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe following his visit to China," 08 October 2006, http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/abespeech/2006/10/08chinapress_e.html, accessed 12 June 2008.

¹³⁹ Tomiichi Murayama, "Statement by Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama 'On the occasion of the 50th Anniversary of the war's end,'" 15 August 1995, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/press/pm/murayama/9508.html>, accessed 07 June 2008.

visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, and the lack of reparations to individuals wronged by the Japanese during occupation, denotes its true intent. Furthermore, this distrust is exacerbated by a rise in nationalism in Japan, despite continued assertions by government leaders of being a peaceful nation.

a. Japanese Textbooks

The first issue that earns the distrust of neighboring countries is the approval of history textbooks by the Ministry of Education that reflect a revised history of Japanese actions and responsibilities in Asia prior to and during World War II. The Minister of Education directly approves every textbook that is allowed for use to teach students. The Japanese textbook companies submit their product to the Ministry of Education, who then reviews them to ensure compliance with specific guidelines provided by the Textbook Authorization and Research Council. A list of approximately eight approved textbooks is posted annually from which the local school systems can choose.¹⁴⁰ This process ensures that the government of Japan is directly involved in what information is being disseminated in the classrooms.

Thus, critics argue that the process ensures that the texts only give a cursory explanation of the events leading up to Japan's defeat in 1945 and that they minimize the aggressive role that Japan played in many of the atrocities that they committed in Asia. Specifically, they cite the failure of the textbooks to mention the existence

¹⁴⁰ Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology of Japan, http://www.mext.go.jp/english/org/f_formal_16.htm, accessed 08 June 2008.

of Comfort Women, the events of the Nanking Massacre, and the experimentation of Unit 731.¹⁴¹ For example, one of the approved history textbooks for use beginning in April 2006, New Social Studies: History (new edition),¹⁴² barely mentions the seizing of Nanking in December 1937:

The fighting spread from northern China to central China, and by the end of the year Japanese forces had occupied the capital Nanking. In the process, a great number of Chinese civilians were killed, including women and children (the Nanking Incident). However, Chiang Kai-shek continued to resist the Japanese, transferring his base to Hankou and then to Chongqing.¹⁴³

The textbook also includes a footnote that references the Rape of Nanking: "This incident was termed the Nanking Massacre and criticized internationally, but the Japanese people were not informed about it."¹⁴⁴ Additionally, the texts treat the occupation of Korea and the aggression into China and countries in Southeast Asia similarly, resulting in increased friction between the countries.

This treatment of history in the textbooks is important not only because of the immediate impact on international relations but also the future of those same

¹⁴¹ Anthony Faiola, "Japanese schoolbooks anger South Korea, China," The Washington Post, 06 April 2005, ProQuest Document ID 817661671, accessed 10 April 2005.

¹⁴² The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan commissioned the translations of textbooks approved in April 2005 for use beginning in April 2006 into English, Chinese and Korean. These translations started to become available on 31 March 2008 on the internet via the JE Kaleidoscope website, www.je-kaleidoscope.jp/.

¹⁴³ Tokyo Shoseki, New social studies: History (new edition), translated by JE Kaleidoscope, 31 March 2008, www.je-kaleidoscope.jp/english/text5.html, accessed 03 June 2008, chapter 6 page 20.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., chapter 6 page 20.

relationships, as the texts and subsequent lessons learned affect the perspective of the leaders of future generations. This lack of historical understanding propagated in the classrooms worries Japan's neighbors. Xu Dunxin, a former Chinese Ambassador to Japan, spoke on the importance of accurate accounts of history in textbooks and in classrooms. He asserted that parents send their children to school in the hope that they will obtain a "bright future" and that they will learn to "engage in good undertakings,"

but if the history education – particularly modern history education – that they get in school is distorted and wrong, and they have this sort of attitude when they do business, it is possible that in the future the business negotiations may become deadlocked or collapse. Therefore, such instructional materials are misleading people's children, and using it to teach younger generations will not benefit them.¹⁴⁵

Therefore, both the Chinese and the Koreans feel that Japan's failure to address these historical events properly in the classroom indicates that the government is truly not remorseful because they are not teaching their youth accurately.

b. Yasukuni Shrine

The official visits by members of the Japanese Diet and by prime ministers to the Yasukuni Shrine also cause China and Korea to view Japan's apologies as lacking sincerity. The Yasukuni Shrine was established in 1869 by

¹⁴⁵ Xu Dunxin, "Japan: Former Chinese Ambassador to Japan interviewed on Sino-Japanese relations," interview by Wang Guopei, 23 April 2008, Open Source Center Document ID CPP20080424066002, accessed 03 June 2008.

Emperor Meiji in order to commemorate those individuals who died in service to their country. It is a shrine rooted in the Shinto faith that houses the souls of almost 2.5 million Japanese military dead. In 1978, 1068 convicted war criminals from World War II, including 13 Class "A" war criminals and Imperial Prime Minister Hideki Tojo, became enshrined at Yasukuni.¹⁴⁶ As a result, foreign dignitaries and ordinary citizens view official visits by prime ministers, cabinet members and members of the Japanese Diet as admiration of Japan's aggressive past and as marking a return to the militarism that defined the early 20th century.¹⁴⁷

Additionally, former Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi paid regular visits to the Shrine during his tenure, even attending on August 15, the anniversary of Japan's surrender to Allied Forces that concluded World War II. He asserted that his trips were made in order to remember Japan's aggression leading up to World War II and to use those mistakes as a reminder never to wage war and repeat that history. In an observation after a visit to Yasukuni in 2002, he elaborated on his belief that

the present peace and prosperity of Japan are founded on the priceless sacrifices made by so many people who lost their lives in war. It is important that throughout the days to come we

¹⁴⁶ "Where war criminals are venerated," 14 January 2003, <http://edition.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/east/08/13/japan.shrine>, accessed 31 October 2004.

¹⁴⁷ Anthony Faiola, "Koizumi stirs anger with war shrine visit," The Washington Post, 15 August 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/08/14/AR2006081401425.html?nav=rss_world, accessed 08 June 2008.

firmly adhere to the resolution to embrace peace and renounce war to ensure that we never resort to tragic war.¹⁴⁸

However, each one of Koizumi's visits to the Shrine resulted in an increase in distrust between Japan and her neighbors and a hindrance in the development of friendly relations as expressed by officials from both South Korea and China.

c. Reparations

In addition to a sincere apology, many Chinese and Koreans feel that the government of Japan should pay reparations to the aggrieved individuals, most notably the Comfort Women, for the damage that they incurred at the hands of the Japanese during World War II. Tokyo does contribute funds to the Asian Women's Fund as atonement money for the hardships that the women endured. However, it does not consider the money reparation based on the belief that reparations are owed to government entities, not individuals, and on the fact that Japan settled the monetary issue with both China and the Republic of Korea in the San Francisco Peace Treaty and in separate agreements with each government.¹⁴⁹ Furthermore, the Japanese Courts have upheld the legality of the Japanese government's claim. Additionally, in March 2007, then Prime Minister Shinzo Abe claimed that no evidence existed that demonstrated that the army forced the Comfort Women to

¹⁴⁸ Junichiro Koizumi, "Observation by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi on the visit to Yasukuni shrine," 21 April 2002, www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/koizumispeech/2002/04/21syokan_e.html, accessed 03 December 2004.

¹⁴⁹ Norimitsu Onishi, "World War II sex slaves lose in Japanese court," 28APR07, www.ihf.com/articles/2007/04/28/asia/web0428-japan-41373.php, accessed 30 April 2008.

provide services at the military comfort stations.¹⁵⁰ Although he apologized after his remark, his statement, coupled with the lack of reparations, further solidified critics' belief that the apologies uttered by numerous Japanese leaders are just rhetoric and not sincere.

d. Rise of Japanese Nationalism

Furthermore, Japan's neighbors distrust the intentions of Tokyo due to a rise in nationalism within Japan. Both China and Korea associate this national pride with the expansionism of World War II. Since the issues stemming from the Japanese invasion of the two countries still linger unresolved and without an acceptable apology, the hint of a resurgence of Japan often angers many Chinese and Koreans, despite multiple assertions by Japanese leaders that Japan desires to be a leader of peace. Specifically, Prime Minister Fukuda has expressed this goal in numerous speeches for Japan to "play its role as a 'Peace Fostering Nation' that contributes to peace and development in the world."¹⁵¹

As the nationalistic movement grows in Japan, both China and Korea experience an escalation of their own nationalism, which is often expressed in various fora throughout both countries. Groups within each country have protested both former Prime Minister Koizumi's repeated

¹⁵⁰ Hiroko Tabuchi, "Japan orders history books to change passages on forced World War II suicides," The San Diego Union-Tribune, 30 March 2007, www.signonsandiego.com/news/world/20070330-0757-japan-forcedsuicides.html, accessed 03 June 2008.

¹⁵¹ Yasuo Fukuda, "Address by H.E. Mr. Yasuo Fukuda, Prime Minister of Japan at the session on 'The responsibility to protect: Human security and international action,'" speech given at Davos, Switzerland, 26 January 2008, www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/wef/2008/address.html, accessed 27 May 2008.

trips to the Yasukuni Shrine and the approval of history textbooks that gloss over Japan's aggression in World War II. This nationalism also resulted in an outbreak of anti-Japanese riots in China in May 2005 in response to Japan's desire for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.¹⁵² Therefore, Japan's nationalism is not viewed by its neighbors as a positive method of bringing a country together in order to move forward. Instead, China and Korea see this trend as hazardous to their own well-being based on the fact that Japan has failed to apologize sincerely to its neighbors and to allay their fears of a resurgence of Imperial Japan.

C. CONCLUSION

Finally, although a world economic power, Japan is actively seeking to expand its influence into the diplomatic arena. Touting itself as a "Nation of Peace" that seeks greater international influence in order to further peaceful development around the world, Japan has already undertaken several endeavors that help push this updated foreign policy goal. By amending Article 9 of its constitution, petitioning for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, participating in Gulf War II, and altering its function of ODA loans, Japan has encountered some internal debate and much external resistance from its neighboring countries. This lack of support is a direct result of Tokyo's inability to resolve its position on issues still stemming from World War II. China and the Republic of Korea feel that the Japanese government has failed to offer a sincere apology for the atrocities

¹⁵² Sunny Lee, "China, Korea: More nationalist than thou," Asia Times Online, 14 May 2008, Open Source Document ID CPP20080515721009, accessed 09 June 08.

committed as Japan expanded across Asia in order to further its foreign policy objectives. As a result, Tokyo needs to find a balance of assuring its close neighbors of a sincere apology and peaceful intent and pursuing its own new, expanded agenda.

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IV. IMPACTS OF APOLOGY ON REGIONAL RELATIONS

The role of the apology by Japan for the atrocities that it committed in its sweep across Asia in the first half of the twentieth century, figures prominently in the current relationship that Japan enjoys with its closest neighbors, China and the Republic of Korea. In fact, the issuance and subsequent reception of the "heartfelt remorse" defines the interaction of the government leaders. In general, Tokyo offers an apology; Beijing and Seoul counter with their belief in the insincerity of the remark, usually in reaction to an announcement by Japan of a new foreign policy undertaking, visit to Yasukuni Shrine, or amendment of history textbook. Sincere animosity and fear of military resurgence of the Japanese exist among ordinary Chinese and South Korean citizens and remain a legitimate concern for their governments to manage.

However, both of these governments use the apology issue in order to provide them leverage with Tokyo in pursuing diplomatic endeavors. Often using the media as a conduit, this rehashing of World War II issues allows them to guide the reactions to events by their own countrymen, as well as Tokyo. However, this political tool can only be used to a certain extent, as the futures of these countries are inextricably linked in joint desires for both economic and regional stability. Despite this necessity for increased cooperation, several current day factors stress this venture of regional support, including territorial disputes coupled with future energy source concerns. Therefore, Japan must find a balance between furthering its

own changing foreign policy goals, while still addressing the apology issue and legitimate fear of a remilitarized Japan remaining from World War II.

A. ROLE OF THE APOLOGY

This struggle to find the balance for the government's responsibility for apologies and reparations owed to the victims of Japan's aggression and its desire to expand its foreign policy agenda is the basis of its national identity. This phenomenon shades every interaction with its neighbors, and it provides the Chinese and South Korean governments a natural leverage in negotiations, when conducting diplomatic ventures.

1. Reception of Apology by China and Republic of Korea

These governments only possess this capability because many Chinese and South Koreans still feel much distrust of the Japanese and fear of a resurgence of military might.¹⁵³ Many of these citizens suffered first hand from Japanese aggression, or they had immediate family members that did, and the memories of these events are still rooted deep in their daily existence. Their impression of Japan is still based on the actions of the Imperial regime and often does not reflect any current understanding of modern day Japan. This fear is perfectly exemplified by the response of the Chinese public to the possibility of using Japan's Air Self Defense Force planes to fly relief supplies into China in May 2008 after the devastating earthquake that shocked China's Sichuan province. Citing that Beijing expressed that the sight of Japanese military forces landing in China

¹⁵³ Ng Tze-wei, "Old rivals still wary of each other despite diplomatic thaw," 03 June 2008, www.scmp.com, accessed 05 June 2008.

could result in an unintended renewal of anti-Japanese sentiment, the Japanese opted to charter commercial planes, instead, at the behest of Beijing.¹⁵⁴ Therefore, Japan must still be mindful of the second level consequences of its interactions with its neighbors.

2. Use of Apology by China and Republic of Korea

In addition to this real fear, the Chinese and South Korean governments use the media to impress upon their constituents a desired reaction to a specific occurrence in interactions between the governments, as a means to maintain a basic level of distrust of the Japanese in society. This method works especially well in China. The media plays such an important role in portraying the government's opinion on any given issue, as the major newspapers, such as the China Daily, are censored by the government. For example, a visit by former Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi to the Yasukuni Shrine was normally followed by a rush of newspaper articles discussing his sojourn and chronicling every lingering World War II atrocity, including Tokyo's inability to atone properly for its actions and current diplomatic disagreements.¹⁵⁵ This pattern allows for the aggrieved governments to shape the perception of the Japanese in their countries in order to provide them with leverage when interacting with Japanese government officials.

¹⁵⁴ "Japan decides not to use SDF aircraft to help quake victims in China," The Asahi Shimbun, 30 May 2008, www.asahi.com/english/Herald-asahi/TKY200805300185.html, accessed 30 May 2008.

¹⁵⁵ A search on any internet search engine of "Yasukuni" or "Japan textbooks" or "Comfort Women" yields numerous articles that follow this pattern. For an example, please see: "Koizumi Visits Yasukuni War Shrine," 16 October 2005, <http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/asiapcf/10/16/shrine.koizumi/>, accessed 16 June 2008.

However, because the reactions of the people toward the Japanese are still rooted in an innate distrust that has been bolstered by their own governments, their response cannot always be controlled. In April 2005, Koizumi announced Japan's intention to seek a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, and he simultaneously visited the Yasukuni Shrine. The Chinese citizens reacted by instituting a boycott of Japanese goods and by rioting against local Japanese shop owners, which was not the desired level of response anticipated by Beijing.¹⁵⁶ Despite this occasional lapse, the Chinese and Koreans are quite adept at using the lingering World War II issues to their advantage, and it is a measure that Japan must be able to address as they forward their foreign policy goals.

B. CURRENT RELATIONSHIPS WITH CHINA AND REPUBLIC OF KOREA

In addition to World War II issues, Japan must also balance the requirements of current issues affecting relations with China and the Republic of Korea. These three countries are closely tied to each other in a common thread for regional cooperation, through their inextricably linked economies and their shared regional security concerns with nuclear talks with North Korea. This connection requires Japan to maintain dialogue flowing between the three countries. However, Japan also faces several issues with each country that threaten to disrupt this effort of cooperation, including territorial disputes over the East China Sea, the Sea of Japan (East Sea), and the Takeshima (Dokdo) Islands.

¹⁵⁶ "PRC Central Media not obligated to report on violent anti-Japanese protests," South China Morning Post, 04 April 2005, FBIS ID FEA20050404002267, accessed 05 April 2005.

1. Regional Cooperation

a. Economy

First, China, the Republic of Korea and Japan are all in possession of globally strong economies that are connected and thus dependent upon each other to remain successful. Although China remains fervently dedicated to its socialist structure, it has embraced economic changes that have allowed China and Japan to accept each other as trading partners. Thus, by 2001, Japan had transitioned into China's top trading partner, with the two countries conducting over 130 billion US dollars worth of trade by 2006.¹⁵⁷ Also, both countries rely on the other for basic goods, as Japan receives over 20% of its imports from China,¹⁵⁸ while China imports almost 15% of its total from Japan.¹⁵⁹ Additionally, Japan and the Republic of Korea enjoy a similarly strong trade relationship, and their exchanges comprise roughly one sixth of South Korea's total imports and exports.¹⁶⁰ Therefore, both China and South Korea benefit from solid trade relations with Japan, adding incentives for continued cooperation.

b. Regional Security

Second, China, South Korea and Japan's shared interest in regional stability, limits China and South

¹⁵⁷ Central Intelligence Agency Factbook China, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ch.html#Econ>, accessed 11 June 2008.

¹⁵⁸ Central Intelligence Agency Factbook Japan, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ja.html#Econ>, accessed 11 June 2008.

¹⁵⁹ Central Intelligence Agency Factbook China.

¹⁶⁰ Central Intelligence Agency Factbook Korea, South, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ks.html#Econ>, accessed 11 June 2008.

Korea's ability to raise too many objections to Japan's apology. For all three countries, North Korea poses the greatest threat to the stability of northeast Asia. All three countries are opposed to its nuclearization, and all three governments seek to prevent any further development, especially after Pyongyang's successful underground testing in October 2006.¹⁶¹ As a result, Beijing and Seoul view cooperation with Tokyo as a necessity to contain North Korea, and they have entered into various structures to facilitate this cooperation. The three governments utilize the Six Party Talks, a forum designed specifically to engage the North Korean government over its nuclear development, as their primary means to resolve this issue.¹⁶²

Furthermore, leaders from the three governments understand that cooperation and active participation in various regional fora is necessary to promote regional stability. In that vein, in a joint press statement at the Seventh Summit Meeting among the People's Republic of China, Japan and the Republic of Korea in January 2007, they announced their belief that:

the strengthening of future oriented trilateral cooperation among the three countries both serves the fundamental and long-term interests of the peoples of the three countries, and is of great significance for peace, stability and prosperity in Asia.¹⁶³

¹⁶¹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of the Republic of Korea, "Diplomatic white paper: Part 2," 27 December 2007, <http://www.mofat.go.kr/english/political/whitepaper/index.jsp>, accessed 11 June 2008.

¹⁶² Ibid.

¹⁶³ "Joint press statement of the seventh summit meeting among the People's Republic of China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea," 14 January 2007, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/pmv0701/joint070114.pdf>, accessed 11 June 2008.

Continuing to support this joint cooperation, the foreign ministers from Japan, China and Republic of Korea held their second foreign ministers' trilateral meeting in June 2008 in Tokyo and discussed the regional and international situation and trilateral cooperation. Thus, China and South Korea were motivated by regional security concerns to limit their opposition to the apologies issued by Japanese leaders.

2. Regional Stressors

However, although Beijing and Seoul are tied to the Fukuda government through their advantageous trade relations and their shared desires for regional security, both of these leaders remain distrustful of the Japanese. In addition to the disputes over World War II concerns, this lack of trust stems from current disagreements over territorial claims and energy sources in the East China Sea and the Takeshima Islands for China and South Korea, respectively.

a. East China Sea

First, the controversy between China and Japan surrounding the territorial boundaries of the East China Sea and its natural gas reserves adds to the strained relationship between the two countries. Situated between Japan's Ryukyu Islands and China's eastern coastline, official surveys state that the East China Sea contains an estimated seven trillion cubic feet of natural gas and

approximately 100 billion barrels of oil.¹⁶⁴ Both countries claim rights to the energy reserves. China bases its claim that the fields lie within its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) because they are located on the natural continental shelf that extends from China's mainland. Japan, on the other hand, states that the resources fall within 200 nautical miles of its coast, placing them within its EEZ. Both root their claims in international treaties; China cites the 1958 Geneva Convention of the Continental Shelf, while Japan follows the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea, thereby giving neither country the advantage through law.¹⁶⁵

As a result, the rights for tapping these natural resources equates to disagreement between the two governments. In a joint statement issued by Hu Jintao and Yasuo Fukuda at the conclusion of Hu's visit to Japan in May 2008, the leaders barely addressed the issue, only promising to "work together to make the East China Sea a sea of peace, cooperation, and friendship."¹⁶⁶ However, Beijing and Tokyo did reach an agreement in June 2008 for joint exploration of the oil fields. Although Japan's Minister for Foreign Affairs Masahiko Koumura deemed "this agreement...the first step toward realizing the common

¹⁶⁴ Anthony Faiola, "Japan-China oil dispute escalates," The Washington Post, 22 October 2005, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/21/AR2005102101933.html>, accessed 10 June 2008.

¹⁶⁵ "Defense scholar reviews incidents of Chinese vessels in waters near Japan," 15 January 2003, FBIS Document ID JPP20040917000008, accessed 03 December 2004.

¹⁶⁶ Hu Jintao and Yasuo Fukuda, "China-Japan joint statement on all-round promotion of strategic relationship of mutual benefit," 22 May 08, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/yzs/gjlb/2721/2724/t440431.htm>, accessed 12 June 2008.

understanding between leaders of the two countries (on) the East China Sea,"¹⁶⁷ they have not settled the particulars of the arrangement.¹⁶⁸ Thus, the development of the resources in the East China Sea, while firmly progressing toward resolution, still remains an issue that threatens to strain the relationship between China and Japan.

b. Sea of Japan/East Sea

Second, Japan and the Republic of Korea clash over the proper name of the Sea of Japan/East Sea (Nihon kai/Dong hae) and the ownership of Takeshima (Dokdo) Island. This inability to reach an agreement on the proper names and ownership of the body of water and the island greatly increases the tension between the two countries.¹⁶⁹ The Sea of Japan (East Sea) is located between South Korea's eastern shore and Japan's western coastline, and both countries claim that its name for the body of water possesses historical precedence.

Japan states that the Sea of Japan has been the recognized historical name, internationally, since the early 1800s, a time of international isolation for Japan. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, this timeframe establishes that the world used this name for the body of water prior to the awareness by the Japanese of its

¹⁶⁷ Masahiko Koumura, "Joint press conference by Minister of Foreign Affairs Masahiko Koumura and Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry Akira Amari (Regarding Cooperation between Japan and China in the East China Sea)," 18 June 2008, http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/fm_press/2008/6/0618.html, accessed 18 August 2008.

¹⁶⁸ Koumura.

¹⁶⁹ Both countries have placed extensive documentation, including pamphlets and videos, on their ministry of foreign affairs' websites that supports their claims to ownership and namesake. The amount of proof provided by both countries denotes the importance of this issue to both countries.

use and before its colonization of Korea in the early 1900s, thereby negating the South Korean argument.¹⁷⁰ Also, in its position paper to the United Nations, Japan further supports its claim by referencing a 2005 survey conducted by its Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the maps, atlases and textbooks of 67 countries from organizations such as ASEAN and G8. According to the Ministry's findings, over 90% of the textbooks and atlases and over 80% of the maps label the disputed body of water as the Sea of Japan, and not the East Sea.¹⁷¹

However, South Korea claims that no single name dominated as a designation for the body of water and that the use of the name, Sea of Japan, did not begin until the early 1900s, during Japan's dominance of the region. They also state that, as a protectorate of Japan, they were not granted any rights as a sovereign nation to present their name, East Sea, at the 1929 Monaco Conference of the International Hydrographic Organization. This meeting resulted in the release of the first edition of the "Limits of Oceans and Seas," the definitive reference for cartographers, in which the term Sea of Japan is used vice the East Sea.¹⁷²

¹⁷⁰ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "A historical overview of the name 'Sea of Japan,'" March 2006, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/maritime/japan/pamph0606.pdf>, accessed 13 June 2008.

¹⁷¹ "Japan position on the name 'Sea of Japan' in relation to papers prepared for 15(b) of the agenda," submitted by Japan to the Ninth United Nations Conference on the Standardization of Geographical Names, New York 21-20 August 2007, 24 August 2007, <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/geoinfo/9th-UNCSEGN-Docs/E-CONF-98-CRP-88.pdf>, accessed 13 June 2008.

¹⁷² Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of the Republic of Korea, "East Sea: An overview," 2007, <http://www.mofat.go.kr/english/political/hotissues/eastsea/index.jsp#>, accessed 13 June 2008.

In order to resolve this issue, Japan and the Republic of Korea submitted position papers to the Ninth United Nations Conference on the Standardization of Geographical Names held in New York from 21-30 August 2007. The Conference requested the countries continue to work out a viable solution and report to the tenth conference and that "individual countries could not impose specific names on the international community and standardization could only be promoted when consensus existed."¹⁷³ Since this step failed to produce a resolution, the leaders of both countries have promised to work to find an acceptable name. However, no progress has been made by either country, resulting in a point that allows for much tension between the two countries.

c. Takeshima/Dokdo Islands

Similarly, the debate between South Korea and Japan over the ownership and rightful name of a small group of islands located in the southern Sea of Japan (East Sea) provides another opportunity for an increased strain in the relationship between the neighbors. Known as the Takeshima Islands in Japan and the Dokdo Islands in Korea, the current dispute over ownership dates to the San Francisco Peace Treaty, and both countries claim history as its ally. Japan states that it had established sovereignty over the land by the mid-seventeenth century, when fisherman utilized the islands as a stopping point for fishing. The San Francisco Peace Treaty returned sovereignty to Japan and South Korea, restoring South Korea's lands subsumed by

¹⁷³ United Nations, "Ninth United Nations Conference on the standardization of geographical names," New York, 21-30 August 2007, <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/geoinfo/9th-UNCSGN-Docs/E-CONF-98-136-Report.pdf>, accessed 13 June 08.

Japan during colonization. However, although the treaty delineated specific islands for inclusion in this release of land back to South Korea, it did not specifically list the Takeshima (Dokdo) Islands. This exclusion cemented Japan's belief in full ownership of the land.¹⁷⁴ As a result, Tokyo feels that the Republic of Korea's subsequent habitation of the main island is "an illegal occupation undertaken on absolutely no basis of international law...and has no legal justification,"¹⁷⁵ and it strongly protests its presence on the island. Japan has also requested to resolve the issue in the International Court of Justice, which South Korea declines.

The South Korean government counters that it is unnecessary to go to Court because "Dokdo so clearly belongs to Korea from the perspective of history, geography, and even international law (and) since Japan has neither sovereignty or control over the island, it has nothing to lose even if goes to Court."¹⁷⁶ Furthermore, South Korea also references historical facts to prove its ownership of the islands. It claims that multiple maps dating back to the mid-fifteenth century depict Dokdo as a part of the Korean state. Seoul also asserts that Japan illegally incorporated the islands in 1905, and at the conclusion of World War II, manipulated the wording in the San Francisco Peace Treaty in order to keep the land from

¹⁷⁴ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "The ten issues of Takeshima," February 2008, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/takeshima/pamphlet_e.pdf, accessed 13 June 08.

¹⁷⁵ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "The ten issues of Takeshima," February 2008, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/takeshima/pamphlet_e.pdf, accessed 13 June 2008.

¹⁷⁶ Korean Culture and Information Service, "History of and sovereignty over Dokdo," 23 March 2007, http://www.korea.net/News/Issues/issueDetailView.asp?board_no=15896, accessed 13 June 2008.

being specifically listed and under Japanese control.¹⁷⁷ Thus, each country jockey for soul ownership of the islands in order to take advantage of its fertile fishing fields, adding one more area of concern for Japan in managing its relationship with its neighbors.

Therefore, while Japan faces difficulty in managing its actions from World War II with China and South Korea, it also must account for current stressors in affecting the relationships. While vital economic ties and shared regional security concerns increase the necessity of cooperation between the countries, territorial disputes threaten the potential for strain between the three governments.

C. THE WAY AHEAD

As Japan continues to strive to fulfill its altering foreign policy goals, its leaders must account for several competing factors that negate Japan's ability to move forward in the international arena. First, unresolved issues from World War II still shade the interactions with its neighbors, China and South Korea, and the perception of Japan shared by the citizens of these countries. While real distrust stills exists within the populace of the region, the governments are adept at utilizing this fear as leverage in their interactions with Tokyo. Additionally, Japan must balance this understanding with current regional concerns, including the necessity for cooperation to enjoy continued trade relations and to suspend the nuclearization of North Korea and for disagreements over territorial

¹⁷⁷ Korean Culture and Information Service, "History of and sovereignty over Dokdo," 23 March 2007, http://www.korea.net/News/Issues/issueDetailView.asp?board_no=15896, accessed 13 June 2008.

claims in the East China Sea and the Sea of Japan (East Sea). Therefore, in order to accomplish this feat, Tokyo's path for progression should address both the governments and the people of its neighbors. Japan's leaders should continue to express remorse, reassuring neighbors of its peaceful intent, address World War II issues while balancing support for own people, and continue to engage the governments and the people of China and the Republic of Korea diplomatically, economically and socially.

1. Continuance of Apology

First, in order to increase its influence in the international arena, Tokyo should continue to proffer apologies to its neighbors for the atrocities committed during World War II. These apologies should be balanced to express the "heartfelt remorse" of the Japanese while still allowing for Japan to take the necessary steps to implement its foreign policy agenda. In October 2006 at a press conference during the first visit to China by a Japanese prime minister since 1999, the Prime Minister Shinto Abe expressed that:

I said we shall look at past history squarely and shall continue to conduct itself as a peaceful nation. Japan has come through the 60 years of the postwar period on the basis of the deep remorse over the fact that Japan in the past has caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of the Asian countries, and left scars in those people. This feeling is shared by the people who have lived these 60 years and is a feeling that I also share. This feeling will not change in the future.¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁸ Shinto Abe, "Press conference by Prime Minister Shinto Abe following his visit to China," 8 October 2006, http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/abespeech/2006/10/08chinapress_e.html, accessed 12 June 2008.

His words perfectly blend the remorse of the past while looking forward to future endeavors. It also stresses Japan's continued role as a "nation of peace." This function is extremely important to Japan as it moves forward in fulfilling its foreign policy goals because it gives the country a unique position in the international community. This status as a "nation of peace" provides Tokyo with the ability to promote its peacekeeping operations, thereby extending its influence with multiple foreign governments and people.

2. Sincerity of Apology

Additionally, Japan should act to emphasize the sincerity of the apologies. Government leaders can negate the negative reception of the apologies by adopting altered behaviors with the Yasukuni Shrine and the content of history textbooks. Although China and the Republic of Korea both react to any visit by any government official to the Yasukuni Shrine, limiting the number of visits and visitors can reduce the amount of resultant friction, while still allowing for the visits to occur. Also, ensuring that the dates of any visits do not correspond to an important anniversary of any event from World War II and eliminating visits by the current prime minister would also minimize the impact of the visits.

Furthermore, the Japanese government, specifically the Minister of Education, should not approve any more textbooks that do not, at a minimum, include the basic facts concerning the Comfort Women, Unit 731 and the Rape of Nanking. Mentioning these atrocities not only appeases the complaints from neighbors but it also teaches the youth

to increase awareness for the future generations. It also demonstrates to the international community a true understanding and acceptance of past wrongs, signifying that Japan is truly ready to assume further responsibility in the international community. Therefore, by coupling repentant action with the words of the apologies, Japanese leaders prove their commitment to peace and remorse.

3. Engagement of China and Republic of Korea

Third, in order to improve relations with China and South Korea, Japan should engage both the governments and the people diplomatically, economically and socially. Consistent interaction in these realms will help ease tensions between the leaders and the citizens of the neighboring countries. Through diplomatic endeavors, Tokyo can aid understanding by increasing the interaction with government counterparts in Beijing and Seoul. Better and more frequent communication between multiple levels of government officials provide a more receptive forum for expressing both foreign policy goals and the desire to remain a peace nation. It also aids in gaining the trust of the people. Seeing their leaders consistently and easily interact with their former enemy can help soften the view of the Chinese and South Korean citizens toward the Japanese. Various diplomatic endeavors include conducting meetings at various conferences and official visits to China and South Korea, as well as hosting leaders from the two countries in Japan. Economic engagement can also help ease tensions and help Japan implement its foreign policy goals. The economies of Japan, China and the Republic of

Korea are already tightly linked. Thus, continued solid trade relations can act as a base to establish commonalities in diplomatic and social realms.

Additionally, Tokyo should focus on winning the hearts and minds of the people of China and South Korea, by engaging both countries on a social level. Many citizens of the neighboring countries still feel a great deal of animosity toward the Japanese, as their only memories are of the brutalities suffered during World War II. Therefore, Tokyo should seek opportunities that can help gain the trust of the Chinese and Korean populace and change the perception of Japan as a militaristic society into Japan's status as a "nation of peace." In fact, Japan is already investing in programs, such as cultural exchanges between students and sister city/sister state ventures, to promote friendship and understanding between Japan and China and Japan and South Korea. Thus, by continuing and expanding these venues, Japan can lessen the animosity and constraints against its expansion of foreign policy goals.

D. CONCLUSION

Finally, Japan faces several challenges within its region as it seeks to alter its role in the international community. In order to expand its area of influence outside of regional affairs and the world economic realm, Tokyo must first reach an understanding with its neighbors, China and the Republic of Korea, concerning the outliers from World War II and the perception of the apology in the societies. This acceptance of the apology is aided by a shared desire for continued economic growth and for

regional security in containing North Korea. Despite these ties, improved relations are hindered by the inability to settle territorial disputes with both China and South Korea. However, Japan has several options that should provide a way to maintain its country's own needs while still allowing for development of its relationships with its nearest neighbors. By stressing its desire to maintain its status as a "Nation of Peace" and by engaging the governments and the people of China and the Republic of Korea diplomatically, economically and socially, Tokyo can stabilize its regional position and forward its foreign policy goals.

V. CONCLUSION

Japan's nationalistic rise in the first half of the twentieth century and the subsequent damage Japan's military inflicted upon the towns and civilian populations of its neighboring countries still influences the relationships that Japan shares with them today. The subjugation of the women from various countries, especially Korea, that the Japanese occupied to provide sexual services for the military members, the rampant looting, raping, burning and killing of civilians and their homes and stores when the Japanese entered the Chinese city of Nanking, and the experimentation on Chinese cities and citizens into biological and chemical warfare and battlefield surgery techniques resulted in an animosity toward the Japanese that still lingers with the Chinese and Koreans. This resentment is also sharpened by the perceived lack of accountability by the Japanese for their actions at the Tokyo Tribunal at the end of the war. The post-war trials held by the Allied Powers prosecuted only the very top leaders of Imperial Japan. They did not address all the atrocities committed, and Hirohito, the Japanese Emperor, escaped accountability and prosecution. These failures of the Tokyo Tribunal, coupled with the revitalization of Japan's economy shortly after the conclusion of the Trials to counter an increasing spread of Communism, resulted in feelings among people in China and South Korea that Japan did not and subsequently has not fully apologized for the atrocities committed during World War II.

This issue of apology plays an important role in relations today between Japan and her two neighbors, China and the Republic of Korea. Tokyo maintains that numerous leaders and government officials have repeatedly apologized for Japan's actions during World War II. However, both Beijing and Seoul counter that these apologies were not sincere, as evidenced by trips by Japanese government officials to the Yasukuni War Shrine, a memorial that houses convicted Class "A" criminals from World War II and by the failure of the Japanese government to pay reparations to victims of Japan's past aggression. In its response, Tokyo asserts that the visits to Yasukuni Shrine serve as a reminder of what not to do and that governments are not obligated to pay reparations to individuals, only to other governments. Thus, the Japanese believe that since the issue of reparations between Japan and China and the Republic of Korea had already been concluded via treaties, the Japanese government is not responsible for payments to individuals.

Despite the real fears felt by the people of China and South Korea, the governments share common interests with Japan in the need of regional security and economic strength. These collective concerns over the stability and nuclearization of North Korea and multiple links in the economies of the three countries result in cooperation between Tokyo, Beijing and Seoul to ensure success and stability in those two areas. However, regional issues do exist that add stress to this cooperation; disagreements over names and ownership of territories and joining seas stand to add tension to the relationships that Japan shares with China and the Republic of Korea.

Additionally, the perception in China and the Republic of Korea that Japan's apology lacks sincerity affects Japan's ability to achieve its foreign policy goals. Since World War II, Tokyo has focused on regional concerns and has projected itself as a "nation of peace." Thus, by fully embracing the "no war clause" in its constitution, Japan emerged as an economic powerhouse in the international arena. However, Tokyo is now extending its foreign policy reach beyond the region. Through its bid for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council to supplying logistical support for Operation Iraqi Freedom, Japan is pressing beyond the constraints of its constitution and elevating the concerns of its neighbors. China and South Korea do not support Japan's expanding foreign policy efforts, as they still equate this expansion with Japan's militaristic rise that resulted in World War II.

As a result, Japan must balance the inherent mistrust of China and the Republic of Korea and their shared desire for regional security and economic prosperity with its own aspiration to advance its influence in international affairs. Success in this endeavor will require allaying the fears of the Chinese and Korean citizens that Japan is not now and never will return to its militaristic path of the past. Acceptance of this by the governments of the neighboring countries will negate their ability to capitalize on their peoples' fears by continual references to the World War II atrocities, thereby altering the dynamic of relations between the three countries. However, due to the inherent competition between China and Japan for international success and regional supremacy, neither

country will ultimately adopt an overall Asia First diplomatic policy. Although they may support joint measures that enhance regional standings, ultimately, the intense competition and rivalry will cause each country to act to further their own country's interests without damaging their intertwined economic ties.

This dynamic between the countries in Northeast Asia also affects the role that the United States plays in the region. A traditional ally of Japan, the United States is heavily invested in the country. With its large military presence and strong economic ties, Washington and Tokyo both generally act to support the continuation of their relationship. Therefore, a changing dynamic in the interactions between Japan, China and the Republic of Korea would affect the position that Washington currently holds with Japan. As Japan strengthens its regional role, its relationship with the United States could suffer. An appearance of severing ties with Washington could promote regional support and raise Japan's standing. However, it is ultimately in Japan's best interest to maintain a solid relationship with Washington in order to counter China's rapid growth and future potential for regional dominance and position as international superpower.

Finally, Japan's apology for the atrocities that it committed upon its neighbors during World War II still affects its relations with them today. The lingering animosity, the perception of the lack of sincerity in the offered apologies, and the use of the historical events by China and the Republic of Korea for political purposes continue to complicate relations between Japan and its neighbors. Therefore, in order for Japan to move forward

with its new foreign policy goals, it must reach resolution with its neighbors by convincing both the people and the governments of its continued peaceful aims.

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