Defense Against Rocket Attacks in the Presence of False Cues
Abstract
Rocket attacks on civilian and military targets, from both Hezbollah (South Lebanon) and Hamas (Gaza strip) have been causing a major operational problem for the Israeli Defense Force for over two decades. In recent years, U.S. forces have faced similar attacks in Afghanistan and Iraq against both remote military outposts and in the heart of Baghdad (Green zone). The insurgents are using mortars and short-range rockets, whose launch platforms have a very low signature prior to launch. The insurgents have adopted a "shoot and scoot" tactic, making it hard to detect them in time to retaliate effectively. In this thesis, the author presents a new analytic probability model that addresses this tactical situation. The defender's decision tradeoffs are explored and quantified. A new counter mortar/rocket tactic is suggested and explored using the probability model. Also, an extended simulation model is developed to explore the scenario in which the defender is using a sensor that is subject to false positive detections.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Dec 01, 2008
- Accession Number
- ADA494100
Entities
People
- Lior Harari
Organizations
- Naval Postgraduate School