

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.					
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 31-10-2008		2. REPORT TYPE FINAL		3. DATES COVERED (From - To)	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Filling the Toolkits: The Case for a Joint Military Advisor Training Course				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) Lt Col James E. Buchman, USAF Paper Advisor (if Any): N/A				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Joint Military Operations Department Naval War College 686 Cushing Road Newport, RI 02841-1207				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Distribution Statement A: Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited.					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES A paper submitted to the Naval War College faculty in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Joint Military Operations Department. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the NWC or the Department of the Navy.					
14. ABSTRACT Military advisors, a vital part of the geographic combatant commander's overall theater plan, produce impacts at all three levels of warfare. Their challenging duties are influenced by many factors, both within and outside of the individual's span of control. Thus, it is imperative that advisor personnel be provided all the tools necessary to succeed, which is accomplished primarily via pre-deployment training. Unfortunately, the current separate approaches the Services take to deliver this training are insufficient. This paper examines past and current advisor training methodologies of each Service, identifying key shortfalls in three main areas: language training, cultural familiarization, and an understanding of how to influence. Finally, the paper draws conclusions about the future course of training and recommends the creation of a joint military advisor training course that primarily focuses on the three critical "mental skills" necessary for advisor success.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS Military Advisors, Language, Culture, Influence, Pre-Deployment Training, Joint Military Advisor Training Course, Operational Factors, CAFTT.					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 29	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON Chairman, JMO Dept
a. REPORT UNCLASSIFIED	b. ABSTRACT UNCLASSIFIED	c. THIS PAGE UNCLASSIFIED			19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code) 401-841-3556

**NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, R.I.**



**FILLING THE TOOLKITS: THE CASE FOR
A JOINT MILITARY ADVISOR TRAINING COURSE**

By

**James E. Buchman
Lieutenant Colonel, USAF**

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: _____

31 October 2008

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction	1
Discussion	2
Analysis	7
Conclusions	12
Recommendations	14
Notes	19
Bibliography	22

ABSTRACT

The military advisor, a vital part of the geographic combatant commander's overall theater plan, has impacts at all three levels of warfare. Their challenging duties are influenced by many factors, both within and outside of the individual's span of control. Thus, it is imperative that advisor personnel be provided all the tools necessary to succeed, which is accomplished primarily via pre-deployment training. Unfortunately, the current separate approaches the Services take to deliver this training are insufficient. This paper examines past and current advisor training methodologies of each Service, identifying key shortfalls in three main areas: language training, cultural familiarization, and an understanding of how to influence. Finally, the paper draws conclusions about the future course of training and recommends the creation of a joint military advisor training course that primarily focuses on the three "mental skills" necessary for advisor success.

INTRODUCTION

One of the often overlooked, yet perhaps more potent of weapons in the U.S. military arsenal is the military advisor. Their role is complex and conducted in a dynamic climate with impacts spanning tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war. They are critical enablers for geographic commanders to successfully conduct their missions in accordance with national policy. As such, it is imperative that those individuals selected for advisor duty are properly trained. T.E. Lawrence, in his “Twenty-Seven Articles”, emphasized “success (of the advisor) will be proportioned to the amount of mental effort you devote to it.”¹

While each of the Services currently operate separate pre-deployment advisor training programs, most efforts focus on the necessary physical aspects like combat employment and force protection measures, at the expense of developing critical “mental” skills. Specifically, current training methods lack a systematic way of providing new advisors with key abilities to compel their counterpart to action. This requires language immersion, cultural awareness, and an understanding of the art of influence in human interactions. Despite each Service’s effort, a notable training shortfall still exists that can best be solved via a combined approach.

The thesis of this paper is that the creation of a joint military advisor training course is essential in order to arm future advisors with critical tools necessary to positively influence their environments, and to improve the combatant commander’s ability to shape their geographic areas. While this is clearly relevant and important to all geographic combatant commands, this paper will mainly focus on CENTCOM and the ongoing Operations ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) advising efforts. To further narrow the paper’s scope, much of the discussion will center on how the Air Force has

attacked this issue. However, Marine Corps and Army advisor training efforts will also be addressed to identify any solutions that can apply to a joint training venture. Since the Navy utilizes advisors on a smaller scale, they will not be discussed in the context of this paper.

DISCUSSION

The most recent Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) clearly outlines the importance for combatant commanders to focus on security assistance (SA) programs. The QDR states that shifting our military effort to enable foreign partners via expanding their capacities, building key relationships, and establishing trust will prove especially valuable in the fight against terrorism.² The 2006 National Security Strategy identifies these SA programs as an effective means of preventing problems from escalating into full blown crises.³ This has particular relevance to the efforts to fight insurgency worldwide. In a report by the RAND Corporation, the United States currently has SA relationships with nearly 80% of nations known to contain some level of insurgent activities.⁴ The burden of these programs falls directly on the combatant commands' shoulders, as specified in unclassified portions of the Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF). This document charges combatant commanders with developing security cooperation activities and supporting plans which address advising nations to build capabilities.⁵ Commanders rely on advisors to achieve successful results.

Thus, the role of the advisor holds significant importance to combatant commands like CENTCOM, and is also held as such by the Services. For example, Army Field Manual (FM) 3-24 for Counterinsurgency describes advisors as “the most prominent group” of

personnel that serve with and maintain vital relationships with host nation forces.⁶ This claim also has doctrinal relevance in the Air Force. The service's Foreign Internal Defense (FID) document emphasizes the advisor is not only vital to U.S. interests, but is the joint force commander's most immediate point of contact with foreign counterparts. Moreover, it states the support advisors provide often has strategic relevance far beyond what direct tactical actions may bring.⁷ With their importance clear, it is useful to describe their dynamic environment in which they advise.

To illustrate, this environment can be thought of as a microcosm of the overall battlespace. Using current OIF advisors as an example, their "battlespace" is influenced by all three operational factors of space, time, and force.⁸ Dr. Milan Vego, distinguished Naval War College professor, defines factor "space" as involving both physical space and "human-space", including religious, cultural, and social influences.⁹ OIF advisors must contend with a complex "space" in conducting their duties. It often includes a dangerous combat working environment, a vastly different culture, language barriers, unfamiliar physical territory and unknown human relationships. Every aspect of "space" largely impacts an advisor's job.

Additionally, Vego states that the factor of "time" is valuable, as it is the only factor you cannot get back. More importantly, the lack of it can force the operational commander to act in haste.¹⁰ For the OIF advisor, this is often a critical predicament. On the one hand, they are loyal to their chain of command (and eventually up to the CENTCOM Commander) which specifies timelines and milestones to achieve in accordance with the overall campaign plan. At the same time, they must contend with the priorities and pace of effort of the Iraqi counterparts that they advise. Often these two timelines are not in synch, complicating the advisor's job and making the relationship with their counterpart at times precarious.

As for the factor of “force”, Vego explains that the “available combat potential” of the military force to accomplish the mission includes elements such as leadership, manning, morale, equipment, tactics, doctrine, and training.¹¹ With any advisory situation, the skills, experience, personality, qualifications, and training—especially pre-deployment training—constitutes the force that the OIF advisor brings to the “fight.” Finally, Vego emphasizes the need to properly evaluate space-time-force factors and to balance them in order to accomplish a specific military, theater-strategic, or intermediate operational objective.¹²

This requirement to balance space-time-force factors identifies the critical need for the OIF advisor. The best means of overcoming factors “space” and “time” is to counter with a sufficient factor “force.” More specifically, the quality of pre-deployment training an advisor receives is absolutely essential to overcome these limitations, and can make or break their ability to succeed in their duties. Pre-deployment training becomes arguably the most important of the force aspects to consider due to the time-critical nature of the training; in other words, it is the one variable that can be used to enhance the new advisor’s abilities as they are preparing to deploy. So, who is responsible to prepare military advisors for the specific environment they will face and tasks that will be required of them? Joint Publication 3-07.1 states combatant commanders are charged with the direction of all joint training of assigned forces, and for coordinating with the services regarding specific training requirements. The services, in turn, are responsible for providing trained forces to the combatant commands.¹³ In the case of advisors, the traditional home for training rests within each Service’s special operations communities.

According to RAND, the 6th Special Operations Squadron (6 SOS) has been tasked since 1994 with Air Force advisor training and the advising of foreign forces for U.S.

combatant commanders.¹⁴ In the past, this arrangement was sufficient to meet demand for advisors. However, that changed particularly with the advent of OEF and OIF, as the overwhelming need for advisor training capacity was more than special operations forces (SOF) in each Service could handle. FM 3-24 highlights the shift of responsibility for this training and execution role from SOF. It now labels it a core competency of regular and reserve units by explaining while SOF may be ideal for the job, “their limited numbers restrict their ability to carry out large-scale missions to develop host nation security forces.”¹⁵ Thus, a new method for training and generating advisor capacity was quickly needed in order to meet expanding requirements, which resulted in an ad-hoc approach between CENTCOM and the Services.

As this requirement increased, the Air Force’s OIF approach was a collaborative training effort led by the Coalition Air Force Transition Team (CAFTT), the organization tasked with advising the Iraqi Air Force. This effort included USCENTAF, Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC), the Air Force’s Special Operations School (USAFSOS), 6 SOS, and the Defense Language Institute (DLI).¹⁶ Lt Col Michael Bauer, a former Military Transition Team (MiTT) commander within CAFTT, described the first iteration as a five week course modeled after the Army’s MiTT training conducted at Fort Riley, Kansas. This course consisted of combat skills training including convoy procedures, weapons familiarization, and force protection, along with a brief focus on Iraqi culture and Arabic language. It also gave overviews of the CAFTT mission, combat aviation advisory operations, and lessons learned.¹⁷ As described by then-Brigadier General Robert Allardice, CAFTT Commanding General, later groups of new advisors received different versions of pre-deployment training. Some only attended Joint Special Operations University’s Middle

East Orientation Course (MEOC), while others were sent to Camp Bullis, Texas to attend a combat convoy operations course modified to include some culture and language training.¹⁸

Recently, the Air Force has continued to evolve this training for future CENTCOM advisors. In a March 2008 media release from the Air Force Expeditionary Center at Fort Dix, New Jersey, they announced the completion of the first newly-revised Air Advisor Course class. In addition to a combat skills phase, it includes a cultural awareness phase with language instruction tailored to either OEF or OIF needs.¹⁹ In recent testimony to the House Armed Services Committee, Mr. Joseph McDade, Air Force Director of Force Development, stated this curriculum provides approximately seven days worth of classroom culture and language training. It also offers a day of cross-cultural negotiations training, a critical skill that is a “unique and overlooked capability.”²⁰ Also, Air Education and Training Command (AETC) submitted a solicitation for interest and capability statements to consider contractor-led training. In the performance work statement, the training would consist of 21 days of combat skills, cultural awareness, language, counterinsurgency training, and other subjects.²¹

The Army, for its part, has expanded their pre-deployment advisor training by tasking the First Infantry Division at Fort Riley, Kansas to conduct this training. A review of their notional training calendar and lesson descriptions shows that in addition to reinforcing vital combat skills required for the deployment, the training focuses on language, culture, advisor duties, and role-playing scenarios.²² The Marines have also significantly modified their previous training plan to train advisors. Andrew Milburn and Mark Lombard, Marine officers with Iraqi Army advisory experience, explain that this training evolved from three days of briefing-centric training to a 21-day course that included language and cultural skills

along with critical combat training.²³ Per the base’s website, this task was recently turned over to the Advisor Training Group at Twentynine Palms Marine Corps Base, California.²⁴

So, at face value, it appears each of the Services is providing their advisors with a training focus sufficient to bolster their individual factor “force.” Thus, they should be able to adequately deal with operational factors of space and time to accomplish their deployed missions to OIF and OEF. Unfortunately, a closer look illustrates that, despite strong efforts from each Service, there are still significant shortcomings in pre-deployment advisor training that warrant combatant commander attention. A joint advisor training effort is the solution.

ANALYSIS

Retired Air Force Major General Edward Lansdale said of his experiences advising in both the Philippines and Vietnam that in order to succeed in the role, advisors “should spend every moment possible in gaining understanding of its people and then act within earned friendship.”²⁵ In essence, he marked the value of study for building trust, a critical enabler for an advisor’s success. Norman Brozenick, a former 6 SOS Commander, adds that forging trust to advise forces is nearly impossible without a respect for foreign culture and politics, and solid communication skills.²⁶ Merged with what the Air Force’s FID doctrine calls the advisor’s “tradecraft”—abilities gained through experience, self-study, and training—these are the qualifications, skills, and personality relating to the operational factor “force” that fills the advisor’s toolkit.²⁷ Pre-deployment training can clearly deliver an immediate impact.

Unfortunately, the analysis to follow shows there are serious disconnects in the Services’ separate efforts that can likely be solved via a joint approach to advisor training.

Certainly for most personnel performing advisory duty in the OIF or OEF combat zones, a focus on necessary “physical” skills such as combat lifesaving, weapons proficiency, and force protection is essential. But what appears to be consistently lacking centers on some of the key “mental” tools that enable advisors to overcome space and time considerations. Simply put, there is not enough emphasis on a comprehensive understanding of language and culture, as well as on the critical importance of the ability to influence in the success of advisory duty.

A closer look at the Army’s advisor training schedule at Fort Riley gives an example. During the entire 60-day pre-deployment training, 42 hours are dedicated to either Arabic (for OIF) or Dari (for OEF) language training. 24 hours are spent in culture immersion lessons, intended to establish a “baseline understanding” through historical, cultural, and religious briefs.²⁸ This averages out to only one hour a day for critical language training and cultural issues. The course also includes a few lessons on the role of the advisor, gaining influence, counterinsurgency, and “leader meets” where advisor students attend, but not necessarily participate in, role-playing sessions. The rest focuses on required combat skills.²⁹

The same can be said of the Marines’ advisor training course schedule. Of the 19 training days available, one day is identified as dedicated to language and culture training, while 12 days are allocated for “Advisor 201/202” refresher and immersion training.³⁰ In addition to the amount of language and culture focus being insufficient, even the utility of the advisor training is suspect. Brett Friedman, a Marine officer serving as an advisor in Iraq in 2008, characterizes this “201” and “202” training as two briefing slide presentations full of important information but with minimal time allocated. Of the language training, he asserts it consists primarily of review sessions with instructor demonstration of canned phrases.³¹

Unfortunately, the Air Force effort has met with similar results. Prior to the recent stand-up of the new Air Advisor Course, advisors attended either MEOC or the modified version of the two week combat convoy operations course at Camp Bullis. The MEOC course, as specified by the Joint Special Operations University, emphasizes cross-cultural communication and Middle Eastern history, politics and religion, but is taught lecture style and only lasts five training days.³² During the Camp Bullis course, most time was spent on combat training, with brief sessions on cultural indoctrination and a one-hour cultural event. Also, only 30-45 minutes daily was allocated to language study, consisting of review of basic Arabic phrases.³³ The feedback from those who attended these courses and deployed for OIF air advisor duty was consistent. While acknowledging the value of combat lessons, the vast majority advocated reducing the time spent on these lessons and increasing the emphasis on language, culture, history, politics, and advisor tactics, techniques and procedures.³⁴

As for future Air Force training, AETC's solicitation for a contracted solution states the proposed curriculum would consist of 30 hours of language training, 16 hours of culture, cross-cultural, and negotiation training, and 13 hours of mission operations training including advisor roles and responsibilities. Notably, this proposal includes a focus on Sub-Saharan Africa and Indonesia with no anticipated requirement until the 2010 fiscal year.³⁵ While it is a positive indicator of an expanded advisor training vision beyond current CENTCOM needs, the time allotted for language and cultural focus by the Air Force, and all Services, is still lacking. Thus, it is important to further analyze the value of each of the key advisor tools.

Dr. Gerald Hickey, in his extensive RAND research on Vietnam advisors, believed communication was essential, emphasizing basic language knowledge can help an advisor measure confidence levels, comprehension ability, and truthfulness of his advisee.³⁶ Those

training Vietnam advisors seemed to agree, since in his Combat Studies Institute writings, Robert Ramsey stated 50 percent of Army and Marine advisor training was dedicated to language immersion.³⁷ According to Sam Sarkesian, Political Science Professor at Loyola University, this was no small feat considering the total U.S. advisor count in Vietnam soared from 800 to over 23,000 by the mid-1960's!³⁸ Clearly they realized the benefits of language training go beyond an ability to communicate. Milburn and Lombard add the advisor can gain significant credibility and status in the counterpart's eyes with even a working usage of the host language.³⁹ At the DoD strategic level, McDade concurs by stressing this training is "a 'must pay' to ensure that we have the capability to provide Joint Force Commanders with culturally-skilled, language-capable Airmen they need to accomplish their missions."⁴⁰

Understanding the cultural environment—the second of the critical mental skills—is closely related to language capabilities. Then-Lieutenant General David Petraeus stated "cultural awareness is a force multiplier ... and that people are, in many respects, the decisive terrain ... we must study that terrain in the same way that we have always studied the geographic terrain."⁴¹ This should be a call to action for combatant commanders as they are charged with directing advisor training. Simply put, a basic indoctrination in culture is not enough. Edward Stewart, a PhD who studied Vietnam advisor issues, said many advisor problems stemmed from a lack of familiarity with cultural patterns, leading to friction.⁴²

In her Naval Postgraduate School thesis on culture's importance as it pertains to pre-deployment training, Jennifer Chandler suggests that current training fails to attain the proper higher levels of learning. Rather, this familiarization lacks the cross-cultural communication piece, which she defines as providing awareness of our own biases while understanding both similarities and differences between given cultures.⁴³ Perhaps this might be changing across

the Services, however. For example, Dan Henk, Deputy Director of the Air University Culture and Language Center at Maxwell AFB, Alabama, describes one dimension of cross-cultural competence as “deep cultural expertise.” Careful study of ideas like subordinate-leader relationships, he asserts, can help the military member—in this case, advisor—build relationships and the ability to influence the counterpart.⁴⁴ Perhaps now-Major General Allardice summed it up best saying differences in cultures must be accounted for by advisors when trying to influence, for not doing so will result in frustration and a waste of resources.⁴⁵

This drives the discussion to the third, and often least considered yet important mental tool for the advisor, the ability to influence to effect results. On the one hand, this ability constitutes a valuable mix of the individual’s personality and experience. According to a study of military advisors in Korea led by the Human Resources Research Organization, the ability of an advisor to influence a counterpart depended largely on the perceptions of how sincere, competent, and trustworthy the advisor was.⁴⁶ In most cultures like in OIF and OEF, the issue of trust can be either the primary key to success or, if lacking, the doorway to doom. Advisors must build trust by demonstrating to their advisees they have the experience to be relevant. As important, advisors must draw on personality traits to, as Milburn and Lombard describe, display a good mix of persistence, forcefulness, and patience to maintain trust.⁴⁷

The ability to influence also boils down to the advisor’s ability to negotiate, or “sell” ideas in a convincing manner to elicit a positive response. Kent Strader, an Army officer with Saudi National Guard advising experience, argues the ability to negotiate, especially in the Arab culture, is inseparable from advising.⁴⁸ For the most part, this skill is relatively foreign to most military members and thus must be developed. Highlighting the value of one approach in building interacting skills in advisors, a study was undertaken in 1966 by the Air

Force's Aerospace Medical Research Labs. Subjects were divided in two groups; one group learned skills via reading training manuals with a few role-playing sessions, while the other included a study of their videotaped sessions. Students who were hands-on via this self-confrontation process learned faster and were found superior in retaining the critical skills.⁴⁹ This interacting learning method is effectively applied to "sales" training today by the Air Force Recruiting Service in their recruiter course. Students are given seven separate "lab" events where they are put into a specialized recruiting "office" with prospective "recruits." Not only are they critiqued by the role-playing instructors, but they are also able to self-study their sales improvement as the course progresses.⁵⁰ This example of experience-based training, if expanded, could build the advisor's influence ability with lasting mission impact.

In summary, three key tools—language familiarity, an understanding of culture, and the ability to influence—are vital to be an effective advisor. Yet, each Service's training is sub-optimal with regard to all three. While a joint approach seems sensible, there are counter-arguments to this idea. John Nagl, advocate of a permanent Army advisor corps, believes advisor training can effectively be embedded within the corps.⁵¹ A RAND study suggested the Air Force expand the 6 SOS into a wing that would handle all air advisor training needs.⁵² Others like Bauer claim pre-deployment language training is too late to carry any meaningful impact.⁵³ He also implies an emphasis on more training would extend the advisor training pipeline and subsequently lengthen an already-long deployment.⁵⁴ Cost would certainly be another sticking point in any joint training effort; for example, Bauer cites a previous idea for revising Air Force pre-deployment advisor training carried with it a two-year, 15 million dollar price tag.⁵⁵ Finally, the argument could also be made that rather than creating a new course, each Service should expand their programs as needed to provide better

training in key areas. While each of these potential points of contention or alternate ideas have merit, they don't necessarily override the benefits to be gained from the pursuit of a joint alternative.

CONCLUSIONS

Each Service's current advisor pre-deployment training is improving, but possesses a heavy emphasis on physical combat skills at the expense of the mental skills the advisor role depends upon. This leaves a capability shortfall inherent in most advisors as they perform their duties. The solution to filling this gap lies in developing a joint military advisor training course that offers a comprehensive focus on the fundamentals—language, cultural, and influence skills—required of the advisor. It would serve as the basic, in-depth training for all advisors-to-be. Upon completing this course, they would then attend service-specific training focusing on combat skills and mission tasks tailored to the deployed environment. Despite concerns over this idea, there are clear reasons why a joint advisor training course would be an essential benefit for advisors and, as a result, for their geographic commanders.

First and foremost, there is no denying the impact the advisor can have across all three levels of warfare. Even a tactical or operational level advisor, as FM 3-24 declares, can have long-term strategic implications.⁵⁶ The GEF charges combatant commanders with developing plans that provide for advising partner nations, yet the predominant focus of the overall current advisor training effort, with few exceptions, focuses on CENTCOM. This begs the question, what are we doing to build a permanent training capacity that is able to meet the needs of all geographic commands? A steady-state joint advisor course which

focuses on world-wide projected requirements can ensure fully trained and capable advisors are ready to make positive impacts for each combatant command at all levels of war.

In this day and age, it is clear the U.S. military will continue to gravitate more and more towards joint endeavors across the entire spectrum of operations. From permanent basing to support agencies to task forces, the joint approach is the way our military operates, now and in the future. The QDR shows that “jointness” applies to training, by specifying advances in joint training are “urgently needed” to prepare for future operations.⁵⁷ There are also doctrinal roots; for example, the Air Force’s FID doctrine states advisory efforts should be integrated at joint levels.⁵⁸ Thus, higher level guidance supports a joint training solution.

This concept is not only important to senior leaders, but it also holds value to advisors poised to take on this difficult mission. It is imperative that advisors understand roles and missions of sister Services to be effective and knowledgeable with a foreign armed force. For an OIF example, an Air Force advisor must understand the Army’s counterinsurgency capabilities and how they apply when building a credible supporting Iraqi Air Force. A joint pre-deployment training course would be an effective way for future advisors from all services to study with, and learn from, each other to gain this critical knowledge. Combatant commanders certainly ensure their regular forces are trained to fight together in the joint arena, so why would they not do the same with regard to their joint advisor team?

Unity of effort would be another great benefit of a joint course. Each Service has aspects of their training that, if expanded upon, would no doubt benefit all advisors. Whether it is specific curriculum, tactics, techniques, and procedures, or service-specific institutions or resources, synthesizing all the best resources into one combined course would have a powerful potential to greatly expand the value of advisor training. Also, each Service has

professional expertise and lessons learned that, if tapped in a unified effort, can bring a wealth of benefits to all U.S. advisors deploying to a given region. Bringing together all language, culture, and influence training in a single effort would arm advisors with sufficient factor “force” to overcome all time and space challenges presented during their tours of duty.

RECOMMENDATIONS

There are voices who have called for important key improvements to advisor training. People like Bauer, Clark, Chandler, Brozenick, Fox, and others have advocated individual pieces of the discussion for increased language, culture, and influence training, with a mix in favor of either continued Service or joint efforts.⁵⁹ However, to date there has not been a call for a comprehensive joint effort that focuses intently and solely on all three enabler skills while leaving the physical skill training to the Services. That is the purpose of this thesis.

This joint military advisor training course should be led by U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) to take advantage of their experience in FID and SA areas. They, in turn, would coordinate with training and education commands from each Service to build this course. While it could potentially be housed at one of the current Service training locations, this course should remain a separate entity from the current advisor training courses. The length of the training course should first be based on the specific learning objectives identified by the Services in working with SOCOM curriculum planners. Then, a team of academic experts should conduct a systematic evaluation of objectives and desired levels of learning to come up with the required course duration. This way, instead of building to fit

inside a given block of days, the course will be constructed to reinforce the key mental skills the advisor needs.

Careful consideration should be given to cadre selection. The faculty should consist of a mix of both military and civilians with valued experience or expertise in one or more of the fundamental skills. Qualifications should include regional expertise, experience working with foreign cultures and languages, and extensive interaction with foreigners, especially in advisory roles. The highest qualified individuals should be sought from DoD, government agencies like the State Department, university educators, and from foreign nationals with relevant expertise in a given region. These people could be hired as permanent faculty or perhaps brought in on a routine or temporary basis to teach parts of the curriculum. Thought should also be given to contracting options as this can provide valued stability and continuity to the training. Instructors should either be required to have spent recent time in the region or to periodically travel to that region in order to ensure currency and relevancy of experience.

This should be a permanent course, with size of class enabling students plenty of direct-experience training, while being of sufficient size and frequency to meet combatant commander needs. It would focus on the primary fundamentals that pertain to the role of the advisor in any given environment. In other words, the course would not provide important pre-deployment combat skills training such as force protection, weapons qualifications, or combat lifesaving training. This training should be handled by each individual Service in follow-on training that is tailored to the specific needs of each given mission environment.

The joint advisor training course would contain a heavy dose of culture and language immersion each training day. Led by military and civilian regional experts with the help of resources from entities like the Army's Defense Language Institute, these lessons should

provide a comprehensive study of political, religious, social, cultural, and historical issues pertinent to the advisor's deployed area. Multiple hands-on cultural exercises will boost student learning and help quickly break down any stereotypes or aversions individuals may have before they experience them first hand in theater. A sizeable portion of time each day must be devoted to language training. The training should use classroom group study and technology for self-study and immersion. Methods must maximize student practice of conversational language use to gain practical experience, rather than just focus on rote memorization of key words.

Developing influencing ability should rely heavily on study of interpersonal skills and how they apply between differing cultures to build confidence in negotiation tactics. This training ties into culture immersion lessons, but should also include study of the military dynamics in the deployed region. The student should be familiarized with the structure and capabilities of the host nation's armed forces to be aware of the future counterpart's working environment. In particular, this training should include a number of role-playing scenarios. Some can be informal instructor-led exercises, but most need to allow direct student involvement. These scenarios would emphasize individual or very small group dynamics, with realistic settings and use of multimedia equipment. This would enable students to join faculty in directly reviewing and critiquing their performance to expedite their learning curve. Finally, lessons learned from previous advisory experience, both in general and tailored to the region to be deployed, should be incorporated to the maximum extent possible.

In summary, the advisor training challenge is not easy. Major General Allardice forewarns that new advisors need to be "ready to sprint a marathon".⁶⁰ To effectively and properly fill our military advisors' toolkits with skills necessary to succeed in a complex

operational space-time-force environment, it will take a paradigm shift in the way each Service currently does its training. It will incur some financial cost in tough economic times for our military, and will require valued additional time away from home station for those selected for this duty. Despite the difficulty, it is time to revise our training approach.

The role of an advisor is a difficult yet important one. David Kilcullen, a leading counterinsurgency (COIN) expert, says to win the COIN fight the host nation people “must respect you, accept that your actions benefit them, and trust your integrity and ability to deliver on promises.”⁶¹ The exact same can be said of the advisor’s challenge as well. To succeed in this task is a daunting one, considering complex factor “space” considerations of unfamiliar cultures and often dangerous working conditions. Combine this with difficult time factors and it is clearly imperative that we arm these human “weapon systems” with the best training available. When this training is combined with each individual’s experience, personality, and abilities, the combatant commanders can rest assured that their advisors will have the “force” needed to provide the maximum positive influence at all levels of warfare.

NOTES

¹ T. E. Lawrence, "Twenty-Seven Articles," in *Advice For Advisors: Suggestions and Observations From Lawrence to the Present*, Global War on Terrorism Occasional Paper 19, ed. Robert D. Ramsey (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006), 9.

² Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (Washington, DC: DoD, 6 February 2006), 17, <http://www.defenselink.mil/qdr/> (accessed 13 October 2008).

³ U.S. President, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: White House, 2006), 16, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/> (accessed 13 October 2008).

⁴ Alan J. Vick et al., *Air Power in the New Counterinsurgency Era: The Strategic Importance of USAF Advisory and Assistance Missions*, Research report no. MG-509 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2006), 128, <http://www.dtic.mil/> (accessed 13 October 2008). Available as Defense Technical Information Center Report (DTIC) ADA455092.

⁵ Department of Defense, *Guidance for Employment of the Force, 2008-2010* (U) (Washington, DC: DoD, May 2008), 8, 39. (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified.

⁶ U.S. Army, *Counterinsurgency*, Field Manual (FM) 3-24 (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, 15 December 2006), 6-17, <https://portal.nwc.navy.mil/academics/jmo/> (accessed 1 October 2008).

⁷ U.S. Air Force, *Foreign Internal Defense*, Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-3.1 (Washington, DC: Department of the Air Force, 15 September 2007), 4, 55-59, <http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/> (accessed 13 October 2008).

⁸ In the following description of operational factors, the author's personal advisory experience is used as reference points for the discussion. He served in the Coalition Air Force Transition Team (CAFTT) as an A-7 Training and Recruiting Advisor to the senior Iraqi Air Force headquarters staff from March thru September 2007. CAFTT, based out of Baghdad as a sub-organization of the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I), is the unit tasked with rebuilding, training, and advising the Iraqi Air Force.

⁹ Milan N. Vego, *Joint Operational Warfare* (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, 2007), III-7.

¹⁰ Ibid., III-19.

¹¹ Ibid., III-33.

¹² Ibid., III-4.

¹³ Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID)*, Joint Publication (JP) 3-07.1 (Washington, DC: CJCS, 30 Apr 04), IV-1.

¹⁴ Vick et al., *Air Power in the New Counterinsurgency Era*, 115-120.

¹⁵ U.S. Army, *Counterinsurgency*, 6-3.

¹⁶ Michael J. Bauer, "An Iraq C-130 Aviation Advisor Mission and Lessons for the Future" (research report, Maxwell AFB, AL: Air Force Fellows Program, College of Aerospace Doctrine Research and Education, 2007), 55-56, <http://www.dtic.mil/> (accessed 27 August 2008). Available as Defense Technical Information Center Report (DTIC) ADA476930.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Robert R. Allardice and Kyle "Brad" Head, "The Coalition Air Force Transition Team: Rebuilding Iraq's Air Force," *Air and Space Power Journal* 21, no 4 (Winter 2007): 12. (Note: Information also taken from author's personal experience at having attended both courses in February thru March 2007 just prior to his deployment.)

¹⁹ Scott T. Sturkol, "Airmen Complete First Air Advisor Course," *Air Force Link*, 10 March 2008, 1, <http://www.af.mil/news/> (accessed 13 October 2008).

²⁰ Joseph M. McDade, Jr., "Testimony," House, *Language and Culture Transformation Efforts: Presentation to the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the Committee on Armed Services*, 110th Cong., 2nd sess., 10 September 2008, 9, <http://www.culture.af.edu/> (accessed 13 October 2008).

²¹ Federal Business Opportunities, "Air Advisor Training, Solicitation Number FA3002-09-R-0011," 3, 14-15, <https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity&mode=list&tab=list> (accessed 13 October 2008).

²² First Infantry Division, "Standard (60 day) Training Model-24 Jan 08," "1-1ID Welcome Letter," and "Standard Training Model Notes-24 Jan 08," Fort Riley, KS, <http://www.riley.army.mil/units/trainingteam.aspx>, select '1-1ID Welcome Letter' and 'Training Models and Notes' links. (accessed on 13 October 2008).

²³ Andrew R. Milburn and Mark C. Lombard, "Marine Foreign Military Advisors: The Road Ahead," *Marine Corps Gazette* 90, no 4 (April 2006): 63, <http://www.mca-marines.org/GAZETTE/> (accessed 25 August 2008).

- ²⁴ Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center, "ATG 101: Advisor Training Group Command Brief," Twentynine Palms Marine Corps Base, CA, <http://www.29palms.usmc.mil/base/atg/>, select 'ATG 101' link. (accessed 13 October 2008).
- ²⁵ Edward Geary Lansdale, *In the Midst of Wars: An American's Mission to Southeast Asia* (New York, NY: Harper and Row, 1972), 373.
- ²⁶ Norman J. Brozenick, Jr., "Another Way to Fight: Combat Aviation Advisory Operations" (research report, Maxwell AFB, AL: Air Force Fellows Program, Air University, 2002), 14, <http://www.dtic.mil/> (accessed 25 August 2008). Available as Defense Technical Information Center Report (DTIC) ADA420700.
- ²⁷ U.S. Air Force, *Foreign Internal Defense*, 35-36.
- ²⁸ First Infantry Division, "Standard (60 day) Training Model-24 Jan 08."
- ²⁹ Ibid.
- ³⁰ Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center, "ATG 101."
- ³¹ Brett A. Friedman, "Training in Transition," *Marine Corps Gazette* 92, no 6 (June 2008): 36, <http://www.mca-marines.org/GAZETTE/> (accessed 25 August 2008).
- ³² Joint Special Operations University, "Middle East Orientation Course," Hurlburt Field, FL, <https://jsoupublic.socom.mil/usafsos/courses/meoc/index.php>, (accessed 21 October 2008).
- ³³ Information is based on the author's personal experience while attending this pre-deployment training at Camp Bullis, TX from 25 February thru 9 March 2007.
- ³⁴ While deployed as a CAFTT advisor, the author was tasked to solicit comments from fellow CAFTT advisor personnel serving throughout Iraq regarding the pre-deployment advisor training they received. The summary of results cited is a consolidated analysis of email responses received from both individuals and groups of CAFTT advisors during the period of solicitation from 22 Jul – 13 Aug 2007.
- ³⁵ Federal Business Opportunities, "Air Advisor Training," 14-15.
- ³⁶ Gerald C. Hickey, "The American Advisor and His Foreign Counterpart: The Case of Vietnam," in *Advice for Advisors*, 175.
- ³⁷ Robert D. Ramsey III, *Advising Indigenous Forces: American Advisors in Korea, Vietnam, and El Salvador*, Global War on Terrorism Occasional Paper 18 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006), 40-42, <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/army/> (accessed 21 October 2008).
- ³⁸ Sam C. Sarkesian, *Unconventional Conflicts in a New Security Era: Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam*, Contributions in Military Studies, Number 134 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1993), 97.
- ³⁹ Milburn and Lombard, "Marine Foreign Military Advisors," 64.
- ⁴⁰ McDade, Jr., "Testimony," 10.
- ⁴¹ David H. Petraeus, "Learning Counterinsurgency: Observation from Soldiering in Iraq," *Military Review* 86, no 1 (Jan/Feb 2006): 8, <http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/index.asp/> (accessed 21 October 2008).
- ⁴² Edward C. Stewart, "American Advisors Overseas," in *Advice for Advisors*, 19.
- ⁴³ Jennifer V. Chandler, "Why Culture Matters: An Empirically-Based Pre-Deployment Training Program" (masters thesis, Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2005), 31-48, <http://www.dtic.mil/> (accessed 27 August 2008). Available as Defense Technical Information Center Report (DTIC) ADA439382.
- ⁴⁴ Holmes, Erik, "Skills For a Global Mission," *Air Force Times*, 20 Feb 07, 3-4, <http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/> (accessed 20 September 2008).
- ⁴⁵ Robert Allardice and Craig Prather, "Foreign Assistance Missions: Developing Senior Leaders," *Air Land Sea Bulletin*, no 2008-2 (May 2008): 6-7.
- ⁴⁶ Dean K. Froehlich, *The Military Advisor as Defined by Counterparts* (professional paper no. 9-70, Alexandria, VA: Human Resources Research Organization, 1970): 6, <http://www.dtic.mil/> (accessed 3 September 2008). Available as Defense Technical Information Center Report (DTIC) ADA0705699.
- ⁴⁷ Milburn and Lombard, "Marine Foreign Military Advisors," 62.
- ⁴⁸ O. Kent Strader, "The Role of the American Advisor," in *Advice for Advisors*, 99.
- ⁴⁹ Herbert T. Bacchus and Philip H. King, *Acquisition and Retention of Cross-Cultural Interaction Skills Through Self-Confrontation. Final Report Apr 1965-Sep 1965* (abstract of research report, Wright-Patterson AFB, OH: Aerospace Medical Research Labs, 1966), <http://eric.ed.gov/ERICWebPortal/>, record no. ED016935 (accessed 3 September 2008); and Bacchus and King, *A Summary of Research in Training for Advisory Roles in Other Cultures by the Behavioral Sciences Laboratory. Final Report 1963-1966* (abstract of research report, Wright-Patterson AFB, OH: Aerospace Medical Research Labs, 1966), <http://eric.ed.gov/ERICWebPortal/>, record no. ED016934 (accessed 3 September 2008).

- ⁵⁰ Air Force Recruiting Service, “U.S. Air Force Fact Sheet: Becoming a Recruiter,” <http://www.rs.af.mil/library/factsheet.asp?id=5468> (accessed 2 October 2008); and Air Force Recruiting School, “Air Force Recruiter Course,” <https://www.my.af.mil/gcss-af/afp40/USAF> (accessed 2 October 2008). (Note: Information also partially based on author’s experience as a commander of an Air Force recruiting squadron, from June 2005 thru February 2007.)
- ⁵¹ John A. Nagl, *Institutionalizing Adaptation: It’s Time For a Permanent Army Advisor Corps* (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, June 2007): 5, <http://www.cnas.org/en/cms/?145/> (accessed 25 August 2008).
- ⁵² Vick et al., *Air Power in the New Counterinsurgency Era*, 136.
- ⁵³ Bauer, “An Iraq C-130 Aviation Advisor Mission and Lessons for the Future,” 57.
- ⁵⁴ Ibid., 61.
- ⁵⁵ Ibid.
- ⁵⁶ U.S. Army, *Counterinsurgency*, 6-18.
- ⁵⁷ Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, 77.
- ⁵⁸ U.S. Air Force, *Foreign Internal Defense*, 58.
- ⁵⁹ Todd J. Clark, “Selection of Military Advisors” (masters thesis, Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2007): 27-30, 61-62, <http://www.dtic.mil/> (accessed 3 September 2008). Available as Defense Technical Information Center Report (DTIC) ADA475784; Joe Fox and Dana Stowell, “American Advisors: A Way Ahead,” *Air Land Sea Bulletin*, no 2008-2 (May 2008): 28-29; Bauer, “An Iraq C-130 Aviation Advisor Mission and Lessons for the Future,” 62, 67-70; Chandler, “Why Culture Matters,” 46-49, 53-54; Brozenick, Jr., “Another Way to Fight,” 67, 78-80, 84. (Note: Each of these listed sources provides various suggestions on how to improve training of advisors.)
- ⁶⁰ Allardice and Head, “The Coalition Air Force Transition Team,” 11.
- ⁶¹ David Kilcullen, “Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-Level Counterinsurgency,” Defense and the National Interest Website, 1, http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/pdf/kilcullen_28_articles.pdf, (accessed 13 October 2008).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Air Force Recruiting Service. "U.S. Air Force Fact Sheet: Becoming a Recruiter."
<http://www.rs.af.mil/library/factsheet.asp?id=5468> (accessed 2 October 2008).
- Air Force Recruiting School. "Air Force Recruiter Course." Information found at Air Force Portal website: <https://www.my.af.mil/gcss-af/afp40/USAF/> (accessed 2 October 2008).
- Allardice, Robert and Craig Prather. "Foreign Assistance Missions: Developing Senior Leaders." *Air Land Sea Bulletin*, no 2008-2 (May 2008): 4-8.
- Allardice, Robert R. and Kyle "Brad" Head. "The Coalition Air Force Transition Team: Rebuilding Iraq's Air Force." *Air and Space Power Journal* 21, no 4 (Winter 2007): 5-12.
- Bacchus, Herbert T. and Philip H. King. *Acquisition and Retention of Cross-Cultural Interaction Skills Through Self-Confrontation. Final Report Apr 1965-Sep 1965*. Abstract of Research Report, Wright-Patterson AFB, OH: Aerospace Medical Research Labs, 1966. <http://eric.ed.gov/ERICWebPortal/>, record no. ED016935 (accessed 3 September 2008).
- . *A Summary of Research In Training for Advisory Roles in Other Cultures by the Behavioral Sciences Laboratory. Final Report 1963-1966*. Abstract of Research Report, Wright-Patterson AFB, OH: Aerospace Medical Research Labs, 1966. <http://eric.ed.gov/ERICWebPortal/>, record no. ED016934 (accessed 3 September 2008).
- Bauer, Michael J. "An Iraq C-130 Aviation Advisor Mission and Lessons for the Future." Research report, Maxwell AFB, AL: Air Force Fellows Program, College of Aerospace Doctrine Research and Education, 2007. <http://www.dtic.mil/> (accessed 27 August 2008).
- Brozenick, Norman J. Jr. "Another Way to Fight: Combat Aviation Advisory Operations." Research report, Maxwell AFB, AL: Air Force Fellows Program, Air University, 2002. <http://www.dtic.mil/> (accessed 25 August 2008).
- Chandler, Jennifer V. "Why Culture Matters: An Empirically-Based Pre-Deployment Training Program." Masters thesis, Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2005. <http://www.dtic.mil/> (accessed 3 September 2008).
- Clark, Todd J. "Selection of Military Advisors." Masters thesis, Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2007. <http://www.dtic.mil/> (accessed 3 September 2008).

- Clinton, Thomas E. Jr. "Lessons Learned from Advising and Training the Republic of South Vietnam's Armed Forces." Masters Thesis, Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2007. <http://www.dtic.mil/> (accessed 3 September 2008).
- Escandon, Joseph E. "The Future of Security Force Assistance: Is the Modular Brigade Combat Team the Right Organization?" Masters thesis, Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2008. <http://www.dtic.mil/> (accessed 3 September 2008).
- Federal Business Opportunities. "Air Advisor Training, Solicitation Number FA3002-09-R-0011." <https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity&mode=list&tab=list> (accessed 13 October 2008).
- First Infantry Division. "Standard (60 day) Training Model-24 Jan 08", "1-1ID Welcome Letter", and "Standard Training Model Notes-24 Jan 08." Fort Riley, KS. <http://www.riley.army.mil/units/trainingteam.aspx>, select '1-1ID Welcome Letter' and 'Training Models and Notes' links. (accessed 13 October 2008).
- Fox, Joe and Dana Stowell. "American Advisors: A Way Ahead." *Air Land Sea Bulletin*, no 2008-2 (May 2008): 26-30.
- Friedman, Brett A. "Training in Transition." *Marine Corps Gazette* 92, no 6 (June 2008): 34-36. <http://www.mca-marines.org/GAZETTE/> (accessed 25 August 2008).
- Froehlich, Dean K. *The Military Advisor as Defined by Counterparts*. Professional Paper no. 9-70, Alexandria, VA: Human Resources Research Organization, 1970. <http://www.dtic.mil/> (accessed 3 September 2008).
- Hickey, Gerald C. "The American Military Advisor and His Counterpart: The Case of Vietnam." In *Advice For Advisors: Suggestions and Observations From Lawrence to the Present*, Global War on Terrorism Occasional Paper 19, edited by Robert D. Ramsey III. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006.
- Holmes, Erik. "Skills For a Global Mission." *Air Force Times*, 20 February 2007. <http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/> (accessed 20 September 2008).
- Inside the Army. "Advisory Teams Seen as Long-Term Presence in Iraq and Afghanistan." *InsideDefense.com*, 12 March 2007. <http://lexis-nexis.com/> (accessed 3 September 2008).
- Inside the Pentagon. "Army Opposes Permanent Advisor Corps to Train Foreign Forces." *InsideDefense.com*, 13 September 2007. <http://lexis-nexis.com/> (accessed 3 September 2008).

- Kilcullen, David. "Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-Level Counterinsurgency." Defense and the National Interest Website. http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/pdf/kilcullen_28_articles.pdf (accessed 13 October 2008).
- Lansdale, Edward Geary. *In the Midst of Wars: An American's Mission to Southeast Asia*. New York, NY: Harper and Row, 1972.
- Lawrence, T.E. "Twenty-Seven Articles." In *Advice For Advisors: Suggestions and Observations From Lawrence to the Present*, Global War on Terrorism Occasional Paper 19, edited by Robert D. Ramsey III. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006.
- Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center. "ATG 101: Advisor Training Group Command Brief." Twentynine Palms Marine Corps Base, CA. <http://www.29palms.usmc.mil/base/atg/>, select 'ATG 101' link. (accessed 13 October 2008).
- Metrinko, Michael J. *The American Military Advisor: Dealing With Senior Foreign Officials in the Islamic World*. Research report no. 869, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute and Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2008. <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/> (accessed 12 September 2008).
- Milburn, Andrew R. and Mark C. Lombard. "Marine Foreign Military Advisors: The Road Ahead." *Marine Corps Gazette* 90, no 4 (April 2006): 62-65. <http://www.mca-marines.org/GAZETTE/> (accessed 25 August 2008).
- Nagl, John A. *Institutionalizing Adaptation: It's Time For a Permanent Army Advisor Corps*. Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, June 2007. <http://www.cnas.org/en/cms/?145/> (accessed 25 August 2008).
- Petraeus, David H. "Learning Counterinsurgency: Observation from Soldiering in Iraq." *Military Review* 86, no 1 (Jan/Feb 2006): 2-12. <http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/index.asp/> (accessed 21 October 2008).
- Pugmire, Marvin S. "Unconventional Airmen: Present and Future Roles and Missions for 6th SOS Combat Aviation Advisors." Strategy Research Project, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2000. <http://www.dtic.mil/> (accessed 24 August 2008).
- Ramsey, Robert D. III. *Advising Indigenous Forces: American Advisors in Korea, Vietnam, and El Salvador*. Global War On Terrorism Occasional Paper 18. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006. <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/army/> (accessed 21 October 2008).

- Ryan, Sean. "Being an Advisor: What You Always Wanted to Know!" *Air Land Sea Bulletin*, no 2008-2 (May 2008): 12-15.
- Sarkesian, Sam C. *Unconventional Conflicts in a New Security Era: Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam*. Contributions in Military Studies, Number 134. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1993.
- Stewart, Edward C. "American Advisors Overseas." In *Advice For Advisors: Suggestions and Observations From Lawrence to the Present*, Global War on Terrorism Occasional Paper 19, edited by Robert D. Ramsey III. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006.
- Strader, O. Kent. "The Role of the American Advisor." In *Advice For Advisors: Suggestions and Observations From Lawrence to the Present*, Global War on Terrorism Occasional Paper 19, edited by Robert D. Ramsey III. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006.
- Sturkol, Scott T. "Airmen Complete First Air Advisor Course." *Air Force Link*, 10 March 2008. <http://www.af.mil/news/> (accessed 13 October 2008).
- U.S. Air Force. *Foreign Internal Defense*. Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-3.1. Washington, DC: Department of the Air Force, 15 September 2007. <http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/> (accessed 13 October 2008).
- U.S. Army. *Counterinsurgency*. Field Manual (FM) 3-24. Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, 15 December 2006. <https://portal.nwc.navy.mil/academics/jmo/> (accessed 1 October 2008).
- U.S. Congress. House. *Language and Culture Transformation Efforts: Presentation to the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the Committee on Armed Services*. 110th Cong., 2nd sess., 10 September 2008. <http://www.culture.af.edu/> (accessed 13 October 2008).
- U.S. Department of Defense. *Guidance for Employment of the Force, 2008-2010* (U). Washington, DC: DoD, May 2008. (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified.
- U.S. Department of Defense. *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*. Washington, DC: DoD, 6 February 2006. <http://www.defenselink.mil/qdr/> (accessed 13 October 2008).
- U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID)*. Joint Publication (JP) 3-07.1. Washington, DC: CJCS, 30 April 2004.
- U.S. President. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*.

Washington, DC: White House, 2006. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/> (accessed 13 October 2008).

Vego, Milan N. *Joint Operational Warfare*. Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, 2007.

Vick, Alan J., Adam Grissom, William Rosenau, Beth Grill, and Karl P. Mueller. *Air Power in the New Counterinsurgency Era: The Strategic Importance of USAF Advisory and Assistance Missions*. Research report no. MG-509. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2006. <http://www.dtic.mil/> (accessed 13 October 2008).