Military Interventions in Sierra Leone: Lessons from a Failed State
Abstract
This study by Larry J. Woods and Colonel Timothy R. Reese analyzes the massive turmoil afflicting the nation of Sierra Leone, 1993-2002, and the efforts by a variety of outside forces to bring lasting stability to that small country. The taxonomy of intervention ranged from private mercenary armies, through the Economic Community of West African States, to the United Nations and the United Kingdom. In every case, those who intervened encountered a common set of difficulties that had to be overcome. Unsurprisingly, they also discovered challenges unique to their own organizations and political circumstances. Serving soldiers can often profit vicariously from the mistakes of others as recounted in detailed case studies of historical events. This cogent analysis of recent interventions in Sierra Leone represents a cautionary tale that political leaders and military planners contemplating intervention in Africa ignore at their peril. Chapter 1 provides a brief historical overview of Sierra Leone from its pre-colonial origins through 1992 and the start of a decade of civil war. Chapter 2 examines the years 1993 to 1997 during which the private military organization Executive Outcomes was called in by the Sierra Leone government in an attempt to restore order and stability. Chapter 3 looks at Sierra Leone after 1997 when it again descended into chaos and analyzes the military intervention of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and its military arm, led by its largest member, Nigeria. Chapter 4 reviews the international intervention led the by the United Nations and Great Britain between 1999 and 2002. Finally, Chapter 5 provides some conclusions and insights.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 01, 2008
- Accession Number
- ADA494520
Entities
People
- Larry J. Woods
- Timothy R. Reese
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College