Counterinsurgency and the Surge in Iraq: Balancing Doctrine and Strategy
Abstract
The Surge strategy employed in Iraq in 2007 was effective not only because of the increased troop strength but also because lessons learned since the initial invasion in March 2003 were employed and emerging Counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine published in FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency was implemented simultaneously. Doctrine captured in FM 3-24 is important because it is grounded in historical lessons as well as recent experiences. It provides a flexible framework for leaders at every level to adopt in conducting COIN operations. As the asymmetric threat of the 21st century evolves, it is especially important that the doctrine is understood, and that leaders at all levels rapidly share effective tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) as they apply to the specific environment. This must be done with an emphasis on linking the strategic to the tactical level of war to defeat the threat. As the Army transforms and looks to the future, it must implement cultural changes based on the lessons learned in Iraq, especially within the framework of junior leader training and education. We must also maintain the Army's core competencies as well as improve civil / military cooperation to defeat the 21st century threat along the full spectrum of conflict.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Feb 17, 2009
- Accession Number
- ADA494761
Entities
People
- Robert F. Mclaughlin
Organizations
- United States Army War College