Revisiting COIN Theory and Instruction
Abstract
The Van Deman Program in the Military Intelligence Officer Basic Course (MIOBC) has as its pinnacle goal the production of premier analysts for today's Army. I propose that the focus of the MIOBC program at large should be what the Van Deman Program aims for, and that all graduates of MIOBC, not simply that handful in every class, are the best analysts they can be. To achieve this goal, I believe certain fundamental changes must be made to the MIOBC points of instruction (POI). I focus my changes on the counterinsurgency component of instruction because not only is it the new focus of the Army as a whole, but it also has been the hardest area to teach, understand, and apply to the tactical environment. We have within the Army a strategic bias towards understanding one side of the insurgency/COIN equation. When David Galula wrote "Counterinsurgency Warfare," he did so because he believed that there was plenty of research on insurgencies, but not nearly enough on how to fight insurgencies, the COIN side. I would argue that, today, we have overdeveloped the COIN side and virtually abandoned the core reason for needing COIN in the first place -- the insurgency side. For these reasons, I have placed my focus on revisiting COIN POI within MIOBC.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Mar 13, 2009
- Accession Number
- ADA494865
Entities
People
- Allison Y. Pan