Testing Galula in Ameriyah: The People Are the Key
Abstract
Critics of the Army's focus on counterinsurgency operations (COIN) have argued recently that the Army has developed a dogmatic approach to COIN. In particular, they question the assertion in Field Manual (FM) 3-24, "Counterinsurgency," that the insurgents' ability to sustain popular support [for their cause] or at least acquiescence [to it] is essential for an effective insurgency in the long term and is usually one of the insurgent's centers of gravity. However, based on 14 months of COIN operations in northwest Baghdad, including in the Sunni neighborhood of Ameriyah, I think the authors of FM 3-24 got it right. While some have argued that the Army is approaching COIN in a dogmatic fashion, I disagree. I, for one, had not completely read the new FM, since it came out after we deployed. However, based on my previous study of COIN, I saw that gaining the trust of the local populace was essential to our operations. At least for our unit, it worked. When we returned stateside, I had time to reflect and further study COIN, this time with a level of personal experience. Recently, I read David Galula's "Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice" for the first time and found that, while his essay focuses on communist and colonial insurgencies, much is relevant to our current fight in Iraq. Like the authors of FM 3-24, Galula sees the support of the population as essential to defeating an insurgency. He sets forth four laws for conducting a counterinsurgency campaign: (1) the support of the population is as necessary for the counterinsurgent as for the insurgent, (2) support is gained through an active minority, (3) support from the population is conditional, and (4) intensity of effort and vastness of means are essential.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Apr 01, 2009
- Accession Number
- ADA497119
Entities
People
- Dale Kuehl