

Global Salafist Jihad in UK – Strategies of Prevention

A Monograph

by

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
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
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
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Abstract

GLOBAL SALAFIST JIHAD IN UK - STRATEGIES OF PREVENTION by COL James L Murray-Playfair MBE, British Army, 63 pages.

The monograph analyses the origins of the use of violence in the name of religion by the Salafist movement in Europe in order to enable identification of key characteristics to shape national strategies of prevention that are appropriate for tackling the root causes of Islamist violence that threatens UK national interests.

The study shows how the interplay between the social, political and militant elements of the movement have given rise to the jihadist faction whose spread to the UK has been the result both of economic migration and as a response to the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. Historical analysis demonstrates how the Muslim population in Europe has developed a separate identity from that of its adopted states and identifies three strands of radical Suuni Islamist thought and practice that challenge the West. Analysis points up a range of individual motivations to radical actions for which there is some pattern but an insufficiently consistent profile to offer opportunities for proactive targeting, and a broad strategic logic based on the cost effectiveness of the suicide technique when linked to religious or political goals. In framing strategies government should therefore be less concerned with general deprivation or individual pathologies than with the broader scope of individual motivations, the strategic logic of group action and the need to empower more moderate, purist elements at the expense of the jihadists.

The principles of contemporary counterinsurgency thinking are applied to the characterisation already developed to formulate policies that are based upon isolating terrorists from their ideological, psychological and physical support while terrorist supporters are integrated back into the broader community. Recognition is given to the domestic impact of world events that flow from globalisation and the need to reframe foreign policies that take account of this mirror effect on the electorate. Immigration policies are identified as a key to reducing division, encouraging tolerance and mutual respect within the firm principle of allegiance to the nation state while preventing the creation of separate communities; this concept is described as 'constructive pluralism.'

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INTRODUCTION

The detonation in the heart of the London transport network on 7 July 2005 of four near simultaneous suicide bombs, with the killing of 52 and injuring of some 700 civilians, set off a train of events which exposed both the ease with which the technique can paralyse an urban transport infrastructure and the difficulties faced by a Western democracy in responding to this ruthless and seemingly senseless type of attack. The unwitting killing of an innocent 27-year-old Brazilian man by anti-terrorist officers of the Metropolitan Police as part of their response to a suspected second phase attack two weeks later called into question both the most appropriate tactical response to suicide bombers and the nature of the government strategy to prevent such attacks. The international dimension of UK-based Islamist fundamentalist terrorism was brought home with the attempted plot by British born immigrants of Pakistani descent to destroy 10 airliners in mid air en route to the USA in September 2006. The relatively phlegmatic public response to the bombings, the airline plot and their immediate aftermath belied the depth of public questioning about the extent and nature of the threat to British citizens - and to the rest of the world - from either home-grown or imported Muslim fundamentalist terrorism, and what should be done about it.

Whilst the British government and public may have some 30 years' experience of maintaining relative normality in the face of mainland bombings perpetrated in the name of Irish republican terrorism by the Irish Republican Army (IRA), the nature of the July 2005 bombings offered a significant departure from previous experience through both the use of suicide tactics and the coordinated nature of the attacks. That young men seemed prepared to kill themselves as a result of desperation borne out of isolation, or of a perceived failure of society at large to listen to their cause, was difficult to understand. That they were prepared to kill and indiscriminately injure a large number of innocent people in the name of religion appeared shocking. But the fact that they were third-generation immigrants who had been welcomed to the multicultural society

that is modern Britain was deeply disturbing to the public at large and raises questions that this monograph will explore. Set within the context of, on the one hand, national military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq as part of UK global counter terrorism operations and, on the other, a level of questioning amongst European political elites of the severity and nature of the threat to the continent, the bombings and attempted attacks served as the impetus to enhance immediate counterterrorism defences and examine the best national response. The plethora of questions being asked by both citizens and officials can be synthesized into three critical lines of enquiry. What were the origins of Islamist fundamentalism and how did this violent branch of a religion that is described as peaceful in government rhetoric spread its network to Europe? What is the nature of the radical branch of this form of expansionist Islam? What strategies offer the greatest likelihood of success in preventing further attacks on British interests?

In order to understand the evolution of current Islamist fundamentalist thinking one must examine its roots. Tracing its origins back to its founder Hassan al-Banna and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in the 1920s, the Salafist¹ movement has evolved from orthodox Islamic thought, bringing a potent religious creed that emphasises a return to traditional values which stress the importance of original Koranic teachings in individual behaviour. Offering its adherents a return to the caliphate and the authority of a resurgent Islam, it could be characterised as a benign political movement where it not for the jihadi faction that espouses the militant expansion of Islam, the violent overthrow of apostate regimes in the Middle East, the forcible imposition of *sharia* law and the subjugation of non-Muslims. Immigration patterns of the late 20th Century and the dispersion of the Salafist movement have spread the doctrine from the Middle East and Asia to Europe, where it now mixes with moderate followers of Islam and whose arrival has been marked by a mixture of assimilation and the retention of a separate identity. Exploiting western

¹ Salafism (the word “salaf” is Arabic for “root”) is based upon the ideology that true Islam has become misrepresented and decayed over time; its adherents call for the restoration of authentic Islam as expressed in original teachings and texts.

European liberal ideals and welcoming its generous social security handouts, the movement has used the continent as a sanctuary from where the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, DC were planned. It is in this context that political elites and the chattering classes alike debate the relative merits of segregation and integration as social policies to deal with increasing immigration.

Whilst the British government's official policy is not to negotiate with terrorists, the Madrid bombings of 2004 served to reinforce in the jihadist's mind the efficacy of using well timed and targeted violence to influence European populations' political decision-making. Britain's transition from its colonial past has served to create close trading and immigration links with a number of developing nations, some of which are exploited by terrorists either as a launchpad for regional operations or as a base for training and equipping those who plan to attack national interests at home. In addition, the domestic British Muslim constituency offers both a cultural richness from which a more nuanced analytical understanding may spring as well as the potential for domestic unrest in the face of UK foreign policies that are unpopular with the Muslim electorate.

Originally established in the aftermath of the 9/11 atrocities, UK strategies to counter the terrorist threat² lay out the broad parameters for a wide-ranging approach to the problem of global influence that is now sought by Islamist fundamentalist terrorists. They prescribe an approach for addressing the symptoms, primarily by disrupting terrorist individuals or groups and preparing the nation for attack that causes significant numbers of casualties, and offer some policies that attempt to mitigate deprivation, inequality and social injustice amongst the Muslim community in the UK. Whilst the policy was successful in framing the immediate response to the July 2005 bombings, and has been partially updated in 2006, this approach falls short of a comprehensive framework for addressing the root causes of international terrorism that is carried out in the name

² UK Counter Terrorist Strategy (CONTEST), an HMSO publication of July 2006.

of an Islamic ideology motivated by its expansionist aspirations for the caliphate. This deficit appears to spring both from a lack of understanding of the nature of the Salafist movement in Europe and an unwillingness to risk further division between British Muslims and their neighbours in the name of social cohesion. Attempts to reduce the threat to national interests from global religious terrorism either at home or abroad will be hampered in the application of the appropriate instruments of national power without such a framework of understanding. This monograph therefore aims to identify policies that are appropriate for tackling the root causes of Islamist violence that threatens UK national interests, of which the leading ideological exponent is the Salafist movement. Chapter 1 describes the historical, religious and cultural contexts of the Salafist movement and describes how it has grown from the mainstream body of traditional Islamic thought. It explains the interplay between the social, political and militant elements of the movement, which have given rise to the jihadist faction and will trace its evolution and spread as a result both of economic migration and as a response to world events including the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 to defeat the Taliban government. In Chapter 2, the body of academic thought in the political and social science arenas will offer frameworks from which to identify the key characteristics of the Salafi jihadist movement, including the European dimension. This analysis will be used as the basis for framing potential national responses. In the final section in Chapter 3, the most important question will be addressed. What are the most appropriate preventative strategies to defeat or deter this threat to UK national interests? Successful strategies can perhaps be defined as those that increase the likelihood of disrupting the current generation of jihadists while preventing the recruitment of the next generation of terrorists to this violent cause. The principles of contemporary counterinsurgency thinking will be applied to the characterisation developed in Chapter 2 and used to identify preventative strategies that offer a greater likelihood of success than relying on reducing poverty and a policy of broad social inclusivity under the banner of multiculturalism.

The working hypothesis of the monograph has stayed relatively unchanged since its inception. Its guiding precept is that analysis of the origins of the use of violence in the name of religion by the Salafist movement in Europe will identify characteristics that can be used to shape strategies of prevention to enable the more effective application of the instruments of UK national power.

ANALYSIS OF RELIGIOUS TERROR AND ISLAM IN EUROPE

This chapter will trace the rising tide of religious terrorism and show how the militant Salafist jihadi faction has grown from the mainstream body of traditional Islamic thought. It will then demonstrate how the nature of 1950s post war Asian immigration and government integration policies have led to the establishment of a well rooted Muslim community in Western Europe, whose separate social and religious identity has enabled the growth of radical activism in UK.

Religious Terror

Given the high profile and often pervasive nature of contemporary mass media coverage of religious terrorism within the Middle Eastern context, one might be forgiven for assuming that the use of violence and terror in pursuit of religious goals is a late 20th century phenomenon. Arab-Israeli wars, the Shia Muslim Iranian revolution, the rise of what the media has dubbed 'Islamic fundamentalism' and reports of sectarian slaughter in Iraq all add to this perception. However, the reality is quite different; a linguistic search identifies Latin roots for the word 'terrorism,' Shia Muslims coined the term 'assassin' during the Crusades, and the term 'thug' is the invention of a 7th Century religious cult in India in service of a Hindu goddess. In Europe, the foundation of the modern nation state and current post enlightenment secularism can trace its ancestry back to the schisms that arose from the religious nature of the 30 Years War from 1618 to 1648. Terrorism as we understand it in a modern sense can be traced to the late 1960s when left wing revolutionary groups emerged as the first postcolonial products of the Cold War.³ If the 1980s saw the first modern religious terrorist groups with the initiation of the Iranian Revolution, the 1990s were characterised by a rise in the religious dimension and motivation of trans-state

³ The word terrorism traces its linguistic roots to the Latin verb 'terrere', meaning "to cause to tremble". The term 'assassin' was coined by a radical offshoot of a Muslim Shia sect fighting to repel the Crusaders from the Islamic Caliphate in the 10th Century.

groups seeking to overturn the order in nation states or prosecute more limited goals through the use of violence. The era of globalisation and postmodernity⁴ has created a context in which national authority has been eroded and individual and local forces have attained both a greater legitimacy and increased power. An analytical snapshot of 30 of the world's most dangerous groups listed by Madeleine Albright in 1998 showed that 50 percent were classified as religious.⁵

Well-publicised attacks in the 1990s included those with a religious ideology as its basis in Tokyo, the first World Trade Centre bomb of 1993, the assassination of Yitsak Rabin by a Jewist extremist in Tel Aviv, and hijacks of French airliners by Islamic Algerians. Concurrent with this, the emergence of modern state-sponsored terrorism, some of which possesses religious motivations, has become a persistent phenomenon. While the number of attacks reduced in the 90s, their effect became more lethal through the use of more powerful techniques and more ruthless tactics; with improved state security procedures came greater terrorist innovation and the evolution of a fluid and dynamic political phenomenon associated with the violence. Religious terrorist groups of this period can be characterised by the number and variety of faiths represented, by their growing use of the suicide technique, by a deepening of the seeming primacy of their faith as motivation, and the search for single weapon systems that were capable of causing increased casualties among its victims.⁶ The list includes Islamic groups, Jewish organisations, American white supremacists and cults with Buddhist roots. The West uses a number of sometimes conflicting definitions of a terrorist; indeed one 1988 study by the United States Army found that more than one hundred definitions of the term exist and have been used.

⁴ Wikipedia defines 'postmodern' as "the term is used by philosophers, social scientists, art critics and social critics to refer to aspects of contemporary art, culture, economics and social conditions that are the result of the unique features of late 20th century and early 21st century life. These features include globalization, consumerism, the fragmentation of authority, and the commoditization of knowledge." The term is used here for its utility in framing some of the major causative factors to the relative decline in the authority of the nation state and the growth in the empowerment of the individual and trans-national movements.

⁵ "Global Terror", *Los Angeles Times*, August 8, 1998.

⁶ Hoffman, Bruce. *Inside Terrorism*. 1st ed. New York: Columbia University Press. New York 1998, 92-93.

But from these interpretations the key elements can be synthesised as a person who “uses violence to spread fear with the goal of persuading a group to change a policy.”⁷ The term terrorist is generally preferred by governments since it denotes illegitimacy and a lack of popular support for its cause. Government opponents naturally prefer terms that reflect a movement attempting to redress grievances for which political measures may lead to resolution. These include revolutionary and insurgent,⁸ which latter term counterinsurgency theorist David Kilcullen useful defines as “a popular movement that seeks to overthrow the status quo through subversion, political activity, insurrection, armed conflict and terrorism.”⁹ That Al Qaeda possesses a degree of popular ideological Islamic support and seeks a change to the status quo through the destruction of the current world order and its replacement by an Islamic Caliphate seems clear. Bin Laden has used a range of techniques in pursuit of his cause including terrorism. The jihad can therefore best be characterised as an insurgency that uses the weapons of the weak, such as suicide bombings, against the traditional power of states and their military forces. But the nature of Islamist terrorism, with its expansionist assault on western values and the preparedness of its adherents to use suicide as a tactic gives it a relevance and prominence that sets it apart from other contemporary terrorist organisations.

⁷ Record, Jeffrey. *Bounding the Global War on Terrorism*. SCI 1988. An exhaustive definition is offered by Baur as “(1) the systematic use of (2) actual or threatened violence (3) against persons or against the vital interests of persons (ie against the terrorist’s direct target) (4) in pursuit of political, ideological, religious, social, economic, financial, and/or territorial objectives (5) whereby the violence is sufficiently random or indiscriminate (6) so as to cause fear among the members of the terrorist indirect target group, (7) thus creating a generalized climate of fear, distrust, or instability within certain sectors of society or within society at large, (8) the ultimate aim of which is to influence popular opinion or governmental policy in a manner that serves the terrorist’s objectives”. Baur, Michael. “*What is Distinctive About Terrorism?*” Paper submitted at International Conference on Understanding Terrorism at Loyola Marymount University 11-13 September 2003, 14.

⁸ Defined by O’Neill as “the struggle between a ruling and a nonruling group which uses political resources and violence to destroy, formulate or sustain the basis of its legitimacy”. If one takes this focus, Al Qaeda can be seen to undertaking a ‘military focus strategy within a global theatre of operations. O’Neill, Bard. *Insurgency and Terrorism*. 2nd ed. Dulles: Potomac Books, 2005, 15.

⁹ Kilcullen, David. *Countering Global Insurgency* dated 30 Nov 04.

Islam

In order to make sense of this rise in violence for Islam, we must examine some of the founding principles of Islam, for which consistency – in the absence of codified religious doctrine - is created by its unified ideology. Since Mohammed is perceived as the 'supreme model of human behaviour' subsequent sacred traditions are to be based upon his own exemplar of violent expansion of the caliphate through subjugation of non believers, military coup.¹⁰ The five Pillars of Islam are well known: '*shahadah*' the testimony of faith, '*salat*' the ritual of daily prayer, '*sawm*' fasting at Ramadan, '*zakat*' the paying of alms to the poor and '*hajj*' the annual pilgrimage to Mecca or one of the holy sites. Often cited as the 'forgotten pillar,' Islam's concept of warfare, '*jihad*,' holds three stages of development. Initial concepts of toleration give way to defensive actions to deter or rebuff an attacking group or ideology. This is eclipsed by offensive warfare when the conditions allow a more active approach. Literal Koranic interpretation argues that 'tumult and oppression are worse than slaughter' and therefore blood revenge and compromise of what we would see as moral principles is preferable to living under the rule of non Muslims. Within this context, the principle of 'dhimmitude' places conquered non Muslims in a state of servitude, with the choices of either conversion to Islam or the payment of an enduring tax. It is interesting that the high tide of the 7th century caliphate matches the point at which an increasing majority decided to convert rather than continue paying a tax upon religion.

From this we can draw a number of useful inferences including the prime place of external or offensive jihad and dhimmitude at the root of Islam and not as a mis-characterisation as 'a perversion of an otherwise peaceful religion.' Of perhaps greater significance the concept of peaceful coexistence appears to be an alien concept in a literal interpretation of the Koran. Within the context of third generation European Muslims who are troubled by separate state and religious identities, a key problem is that when personal distress leads individuals to seek greater

piety there is a greater chance of radicalization through literal interpretation of these key tenets. Any war of ideas will need as a result to counter both the literal interpretation of Islam as well as the religious basis of these arguments that may cause moderates to seek greater religious expansionist through violence so that they might reject literalism and the concept of open ended warfare against unbelievers. Within Islam, two other important splits exist. The factions associated with the Sunni and Shia split, whose origins date back to a dispute about leadership succession in AD 632, play an important role in defining identity and Wahhabism¹¹ has become pre-eminent in Saudi Arabia, where the state has used the sect to merge political and religious power. Salafists reject Wahhabism as lacking the purity and authenticity of the 7th century.

The Spread of Militant Islam

In identifying the roots of a more militant interpretation of Islam one must start in 1920s Egypt, where Sayyid Qutb is best known for his theoretical work on redefining the role of Islam in social and political change, which formed the doctrinal creed for the foundation of the Muslim Brotherhood by Hassan al-Banna.¹² The movement was developed as an Islamic response to the perceived problems that blighted Arabia after the Great War, when the combination of despotic monarchies and secular nationalist governments were seen as perpetuating an environment of mistrust and suspicion. This was exacerbated by foreign imperial exploitation and domestic corruption, which combined to create very poor social conditions, which the veneer of independence failed to erase. One of the early modern advocates of Islamic government through

¹⁰ The origins of the Muslim calendar lie in the date when Muhammed took on the roles of political and military leader in addition to his spiritual duties in AD 622.

¹¹ Wikipedia describes Wahhabists as those who “accept the Qur’an and hadith as fundamental texts, interpreted upon the understanding of the first three generations of Islam. It also accepts various commentaries including Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s book called *Kitab al-Tawhid* (“Book of Monotheism”), and the works of the earlier scholar Ibn Taymiyya (1263–1328). Wahhabis differ from the orthodox traditionalist Sunnis in that they do not follow any specific madhhab (method or school of jurisprudence), but claim to interpret the words of the prophet Muhammad directly.”

¹² Qutb, Sayyid. *In the Shade of the Koran*. Banna’s key publications included *Social Justice* and *Ma’alim fi-l-Tariq* (“Milestone”) both of which helped to lay the social policy foundations for the movement.

sharia law, al-Banna believed that Allah had set out a better method of social and religious organization in his dictated text through Mohammed and proposed a strict religious approach to political, economic and social issues, including the eradication of poverty and corruption as well as the expulsion of colonial or imperial influences from Arabia. His goal was enshrined as the "doctrine of reclaiming Islam's manifest destiny; an empire, founded in the seventh century, that stretched from Spain to Indonesia." Since its dramatic and popular expansion in the 1930s and 1940s, the movement has evolved into three different identities. Participation in the Egyptian elections of 1984 shows the nature of a regular Parliamentary opposition. Concern about the modalities of Islamic banking, land and tax reform and focus on public health and education within an environment of *sharia* law¹³ highlights a movement of social engineering. The elements that have descended into violent rebellion are indicative of its revolutionary appeal. It is from these ideological teachings, whose popular appeal has oscillated with government persecution, that an anti-imperialist pan Arabist resistance grew from its nationalist origins. Initially focussed on Britain's presence in Egypt, it expanded throughout the Middle East as USA took on the mantle of the main 'imperialist' in the region with its support of Israel after World War II, and eventually formed the basis of the declared jihad¹⁴ against the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. One of its more prominent proponents was Egyptian physician Ayman al-Zawahiri, who can be credited with importing the doctrine into the Al Qaeda ideology.

¹³ Sharia law is the legal framework within which the public and some private aspects of life are regulated for those living in a legal system based on Muslim principles of jurisprudence. The law deals with many aspects of daily life, including politics, economics, banking, business law, contract law, sexuality, and social issues. Many Islamic scholars accept Sharia as the body of precedent and legal theory established before the 19th century.

¹⁴ The literal interpretation of Koranic teaching leads to an interpretation of jihad as an expansionist campaign to subjugate non Muslims and the violent imposition of the Caliphate while offering demeaning servitude to these conquered peoples. For others, the term jihad means the internal struggle to pursue the path of goodness.

The Salafi Creed and Takfir.

On the more militant wing of Islam sit the Salafists, whose creed revolves around strict adherence to the concept of '*tawhid*'¹⁵ (oneness of God) with a passionate rejection of the pre-eminence of human reason, logic and power. Strict adherence to the rules of the Koran and the guidance offered by the *Sunna* (the way of the Prophet¹⁶) aims to eliminate the bias of human subjectivity and self-interest. In this interpretation, innovation and deviant behaviour become a threat to the individual's oneness with God. While traditional views of the Salafi movement have suggested a monolith, only very recent analysis¹⁷ has acknowledged the emergence of distinct factions: purists, politicians and jihadists, who share a devotion to the common creed, but differ over the issues of engagement with the modern world and the use of violence.

Purists, to maintain their authority from a self imposed isolation from the corrupting influence of politics, tend to emphasise the use of isolationist and non-violent methods of purification, education and the growth of the religion without the contagion of modern life. Engagement in politics can only act as a diversion from the 'pure' path. Politicians emphasise the application of the Salafi creed within the political arena; only by engagement with the modern world with its potentially corrupting influences on social justice and the sovereignty of God, can Salafism be promoted in a meaningful way. Taking the most militant line, jihadists, many of

¹⁵ The concept of *tawhid* is the crux of the Salafi creed, of which there are three components. One God is the sole creator and sovereign of the universe, such as in other monotheistic religions. This is reflected in the *shahada* (testimony of faith): "I testify that there is no God except Allah and that Muhammad is his messenger." There is an interesting similarity with "I believe in one God," from the Christian creed - first adopted in AD 325 at the First Ecumenical Council of Nicaea. Second, God is supreme and entirely unique, not sharing characteristics or powers with humans or any of his other creations. Because the Koran mentions God as the supreme legislator, humans are obligated to follow the *sharia* in its entirety, which leads Salafis to reject secularism and the separation of church and state because these suggest the supremacy of human made law. Third, God alone has the right to be worshipped - no intercessors such as priests or imams because this is worshipping something other than God and deviant behaviours indicates the mission is something other than God.

¹⁶ The *Sunnah* of the prophet means "the way of the prophet". Terminologically, the word '*Sunnah*' in Sunni Islam means those religious actions that were instituted by Muhammad during the 23 years of his ministry and which Muslims initially received through the consensus of companions of Muhammad (*Sahaba*), and further through generation-to-generation transmission.

whom are the product of the anti-Soviet Afghan jihad in which the ways of politics and warfare became merged, argue from their experience that only violence and a Muslim uprising will overturn apostate rulers and establish Islamist states. Ayman al-Zawahiri offered us an insight into the internal divisions of Salafism when he complained in 2004 of the purists:

You, our clerics, reconciled with tyrants and handed over the land and people to the Jews, the Crusaders, and their hangers-on among apostate rulers when you remained silent about their crimes, feared to preach the truth to them, and did not succeed in bearing the banner of jihad and monotheism ... You abandoned us in the most difficult of circumstances, and you handed us over to the enemy ...¹⁸

It is against this background that the issue of '*takfir*' must be examined since it offers both a prominent source of friction inside Islam, where it is one of the key motivations for Suuni attacks upon their co-religionists of the Shia sect, and an insight into a paradox at the heart of the problem of empowering moderate factions. Defined as "the act of declaring the incumbent rulers apostate", the practice of *takfir* has been used for centuries to overthrow Muslim rulers who renounce Islam or the Muslim way of life. Whilst the Koran provides a relatively clear set of rules handed down by Mohammed, the guidance on how all original precepts apply in the modern world is obtained from *hadith*, which provide the 'interpretation' of the Prophet's original visions from the traditions relating to the words and deeds of the Prophet. One could conceptualise the movement as a wide educational network, since Salafists spend a significant amount of their time learning about Islam; indeed many refer to themselves as "students of religious knowledge". A full understanding of both the Koran and the *hadith* is essential to gain an authoritative interpretation of *tawhid*. Since the purpose of religious scholars is to authenticate the traditions, the centrality of interpretive figures, despite the commonly accepted injunctions against the dangers of both human frailty and deviant innovation, becomes key; this therefore places a critical emphasis on the student-scholar relationship in which the scholar is seen as a repository, protector and interpreter of religious knowledge in light of changing postmodern conditions. The

¹⁷ Wiktorowicz, Quintan. *Anatomy of the Salafi Movement*. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 29: 207-239, 2006.

purists are battling to be accepted as the sacred interpreters of Islam yet are relatively poorly positioned to refute the politico and jihadi assessments of the modern world due to their self-imposed isolation. In order to maintain their authority and relevance, they need both a better understanding of their own religious doctrine and of the modern world. But to avoid losing influence they must engage more with the modern world despite the threat that this may undermine their very credibility. They alone will be able to find a way to balance this tension, but one of the analyst's primary concerns will be the way in which strategy reinforces the relative authority of each of these factions with the desired outcome being the empowerment of the purists and some of the more moderate politico at the expense of the jihadists. Whilst their generally anti-Western stance may make Western strategists uncomfortable, the purists are the least likely of the factions to espouse violence.

The 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was a seminal event, which initiated a barrage of hostile world opinion towards the Soviet block, including condemnation from the Islamic world, in which it was portrayed as an incursion into the Muslim nation by a foreign invader. The response from the Muslim world was a widespread call for jihad, widely supported by Arab nations including Saudi Arabia, who saw the opportunity to divert unwanted focus from domestic difficulties arising from different interpretation of Islam. If the Saudi establishment's support for the Afghan jihad offered them a chance to divert potential troublemakers from their struggle against apostate regimes in the Muslim world, for the West the goal in Asia was straightforward. As part of the doctrine of containment, Western governments sought to 'counter balance force with force' in order to stem the expansionist tide of the Soviet Union. It was therefore a strange combination of policies that found a young Osama bin Laden, a billionaire whose worldview was deeply coloured by the ideas and doctrine of the Muslim Brothers and Saudi style Wahhabism, and operating in a liberation movement with Western backing. As the combination of its leaders'

¹⁸ MEMRI, Special Dispatch Series - Number 639, 7 January 2004.

religious fervour and the widespread belief in its popular jihad mission increased, the movement's attraction grew more potent and more international.¹⁹ With the collapse of Soviet authority in Afghanistan, a new generation of jihadists, whose ideology had been forged in battle against modern western military forces, sought new challenges and new enemies with the aim of further purifying Islam. From its Afghan sanctuary, the jihad intensified in the early 90s and was exported to Bosnia, Algeria and Egypt.

Muslims in Europe

In identifying how these often competing movements within Islam took up permanent residence in Europe, we must examine both post World War II immigration and how European Muslim's worldview has been shaped. The high demand for reconstruction workers under the Marshall Plan combined with the granting of independence to former colonial states created an influx of non indigenous people. Originally itinerants rather than immigrants, France and Great Britain both received large numbers of citizens from former colonial empires in North West Africa and the Indian subcontinent. UK's Asian Muslims have been accustomed to keeping their own community cohesion within the context of the Deobandi and Barelwei²⁰ movements as a defence mechanism against the Hindu majority on the Indian subcontinent. Used to applying *sharia* law within their communities without provoking any state intervention, a culture of live and let live has evolved over time with the community preserving its own traditions and religious practices. In the 1950s and 1960s, a network of privately funded mosques was established to provide for the religious needs of the community. Supervision was placed in the hands of imams

¹⁹ In 1988 bin Laden established a database of all the Jihadists and other volunteers who had passed through his camps. This gave birth to an organisational structure built around a computer file in Arabic entitled Al Qaeda (the [data] base) which became famous 10 years later and led to Bin Laden's indictment for conspiracy.

²⁰ The Deobandi is an Islamic revivalist movement, whose thought is characterised by a strict adherence to the Sunnah (the tradition of the Prophet Muhammad) and an emphasis on *sharīa* (Islamic law) and *tasawwuf* (Islamic Sufi spirituality). Barelwei is the main orthodox movement within Sunni Islam established on the Indian sub-continent.

recruited for their basic Arabic skills, since the practice of Islam requires faithful recitation of the Arabic phrases in the Koran, whose command of English was partial and who possessed a fractured understanding of religious doctrine. Imported from the same ethno-religious group, the imams were therefore in a precarious position, with insufficient religious education to tackle non-orthodox doctrines and without enough English to express nuance and subtleties; as a result they became quite cautious in their interpretation of the religion when applied to the modern world. Caught between a lack of religious doctrine on one hand and increased questioning of traditional values on the other, the result is intense factionalism between the 1400 mosques in the UK, with enthusiastic religious neophytes often leading with home-spun versions of Islam.²¹ With employment hard to come by, worried by the education of their children who were acquiring a culture over which they had no control and experiencing the trials of immigration, the first generation of Asian immigrants to UK focused on their own basic economic security. Aggrieved by their parents' lack of status, the second generation became determined achievers within the context of British culture. This cohort possesses a larger proportion which has found economic success. Caught between mutually opposed languages, cultures and religions, - their traditional point of reference seemed obsolete and the host society impenetrable and hostile - their children in turn are attempting to reforge their identity and in many cases are turning for answers to more pious versions of Islam. In the early 1990s an entire generation of immigrant children came of age, attuned to European culture and fully aware of their rights under their host countries laws and cultural codes. Dissatisfied with and disaffected from the traditional view of Islam and subsequently rejecting assimilation, the Koranic interpretive tradition forces this generation to seek an Arabic source for reinterpretation of Islamic practice. The young urban poor of this

²¹ Of these 1400 mosques, some 97 percent are owned and maintained by Asian Muslim communities, ethnically Pakistani, Indian or Bangladeshi, and managed by imams, who have generally been recruited from similar ethnic groupings. Naqshbandi, Mehmood. *Problems and Practical Solutions to Tackle Extremism; and Muslim Youth and Community Issues*. The Shrivenham Papers August 2006 – Number 1, 9.

generation have therefore become as a result more receptive to radical Islam, in the context of which Salafist preaching possesses an aura of clarity, authenticity and truth that offers reassurance in an era of cultural and identity confusion.

Immigration Policies and Their Impact

Different national policies were taken by Great Britain and France to deal with the rising voice of Muslim immigrants and this dichotomy of identity faced by those who lived in a liberal leaning nation state but who shared cultural and religious ties with a wider brotherhood. British citizenship was generally obtained without speaking English since the state emphasised community identification over individual integration in a policy known as multiculturalism, described in the USA as diversity, thereby prolonging the tradition of the British Indian Empire where religious identity framed the nature of political representation, which was achieved by selecting notable personalities to represent each community. The country's colonial history may have engendered in some elements of society an attitude of general superiority, associated with the colonising generations and their immediate successors, in which immigrants are unlikely to pose a threat since their political and cultural power has been carefully bounded by state institutions. This factor may have contributed to the slow pace of attitudinal change, while the societal trends of Asian achievement and naturally passivity may have contributed to the relative harmony with which both groups had until recently coexisted. In the USA, the twin track policy of encouraging integration at the same time as diversity has not been without its difficulties, in some ways being responsible for the high levels of segregation, and racial tensions, evident in the south.

A social by-product of this UK approach was the raising of the profile of the Council of Mosques, which delegated a number of mediating functions including the management of unemployment, charitable work and elements of its social network. Faith based schools, especially for girls to avoid religiously banned coeducation, grew up favouring a close

community and therefore strengthened the authority of the religious hierarchy. Arguably, the relative ease with which unemployment and medical benefits have been offered by a state seeking a steady supply of cheap labour has added to the attraction of a country in which official policy allows religious identity to trump national allegiance. The subsequent mutually beneficial and reinforcing interdependence between the political and ethnic community leaders became the *modus-vivendi*, which has subsequently been exploited by radical preachers and has created a confluence for extremist Islamic teaching that has led to the coining of the capital's ironic sobriquet 'Londonistan.' Thus the UK became the axis around which the radical preaching of Islam in Europe in the 1980s revolved. In return for a generous income, UK was declared a sanctuary – the land of truce in which Muslims do not instigate violence against unbelievers and infidels – and no act of terrorism was committed nor was there any concerted attempt to stir up Indo-Pakistanis. Subsequent revisions of this relationship have led the more radical elements to declare that Europe now is characterised as '*dar al-harb*', or the land of war, in which attacks to expand Islam are authorised and in which the permissive environment of multiculturalism is exploited as a means of rejecting integration into Western society.

In contrast to the UK approach of multiculturalism, France's stronger traditions of secularism as a post enlightenment response to both the 30 Years War and the Peace of Westphalia have prevailed so that integration has become the republic's policy. The French revolutionary leaders' traditions of "liberté, égalité, fraternité, ou la mort!" required that egalitarianism before the law should take primacy over ethnic or religious diversity. There should be no parading of ethnic differences that would strike against the republican ideal of integration with the contemporary political concern being that the Arab jihadists might stir up the 3 million or so Maghreb Arabs²² now living in metropolitan France. As a different approach to the issue of post colonial immigration it offers value in comparing its effectiveness. But neither

country's immigration policies have led to wholly peaceful coexistence of Muslim minority population within their adopted nations.

Two waypoints in the friction between Islam and European culture offer insights into the nature of the potential polarity. They serve to highlight different contextual interpretation of the sense of religion and nation state. The Salman Rushdie affair of 1990 in which a novel offered a fictional reinterpretation of the Koran caused offence to many Muslims and earned its author a fatwa from the Iranian leader authorising his death. It offered the Khomeini regime the opportunity to shift the focus of its Shia Islamic revolution to the heart of Western Europe in the aftermath of the long and exhausting Iran – Iraq war, which had forced an immediate regional fight for survival over its preference for worldwide expansion. Using the fatwa as a mechanism for mobilising mass protest against western liberal norms, the affair can be seen as an attempt to deter interference with Islam by creating domestic resistance in Europe and increasing popular support for its expansionist agenda. If the Rushdie affair succeeded in expanding Iranian Islamic revolutionary objectives into the consciousness of second-generation European immigrants, the French debate over female headwear - the 'veil' - showed the extent of the potential anti-Islamic backlash. With French 2nd and 3rd generation immigrants' deeper understanding of the human rights principles of their adopted state, the debate about female attire quickly descended into conflict with an urban majority seeking visible integration. The debate was presented to, and then by, the liberal wings of society as a legitimate expression of individual freedom and belief. If they did not succeed in mobilising mass support for the Islamic revolution in Europe, the Rushdie fatwa and the virulence of the veil debate certainly increased in Muslims a sense of their difference and a raised consciousness of events in the Islamic nation where the large scale uprising of the first Palestinian intifada was then taking place.

²² France's prime external foreign policy concern at this time was in its former colony Algeria, where the Maghreb suffered a brutal civil war from 1992 to 1997.

Militant Islam in Europe

It was within the fertile soil of this European garden that the seeds of the current extremist movements were sown. Whilst space precludes a detailed analysis of each extremist Salafist movement in the UK, the emergence of the group Al Muhajiroun ('the emigrants') offers some useful indications of how such radical activist elements can be attracted to grow in a liberal democracy. With the origins of the movement rooted in its founder Omar Bakri Muhammad's history of activism in the Middle East the group drew its initial inspiration from Hizb-ut-Tahrir, a movement devoted to the establishment of the caliphate through military coup in emulation of Mohammed. Establishing its initial presence in the late 1980s, membership amongst such groups grew dramatically especially among university students where a significant presence has been established. With greater visibility came some unwanted attention from British authorities, who took an increasingly dim view of its Islamist militancy. During the 1991 Gulf War Omar Bakri orchestrated rallies and demonstrations, which included the declaration of the infamous fatwa against Prime Minister John Major. The most visible Islamic movement in the UK with branches in 30 cities, Al Muhajiroun's small formal membership of 160, with some 350 'informal members' belies its high profile public presence and profound impact on many public debates.²³

This chapter has demonstrated how the Muslim population in Europe has developed a worldview that includes a separate identity from that of its adopted states. It has further shown that there are three strands of radical Suuni Islamist thought and practice that currently challenge the West. The literal interpretation of Koranic teaching leads to an interpretation of jihad as an expansionist campaign to subjugate non Muslims and the violent imposition of the Caliphate while offering demeaning servitude to these conquered peoples. The crisis of identity affecting primarily third-generation European Muslim immigrants threatens a widespread popular search

²³ Wiktorowitz, Quintan. *Radical Islam Rising: Muslim Extremism in the West*. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005. The group espouses the establishment of the caliphate in UK

for a more pious version of Islam; the danger is that a literal translation of Koranic strictures may lead seekers into a closer society with radical preachers and jihadists. The third factor, that seems to be more contributive than primarily causal, is the interpretation of the Western presence in Middle East as an occupation that mandates a violent expulsion as a form of defensive war.

through violent means and threatens that Muslims will not rest until “the black flag of Islam flies in 10 Downing St”.

CHARACTERISING THE SALAFIST MOVEMENT IN UK

Having identified the historical trends of UK immigration from primarily Asian countries, this chapter examines the nature of Salafist radical activists in UK and Europe as an essential first step before the framing of preventative strategies. It characterises the individual and group motivational factors for suicide terrorism and offers insights into the radicalisation process.

The western outlook leads us to wish to draw clear cut inferences about the nature of radical activists and the proponents of violence from carefully framed theory, observation and experiment. But such objective analysis is problematical when applied to an examination of Salafist movement and suicide terrorism. In addition to the obvious problems of researchers' personal security while conducting fieldwork, activists have become increasingly suspicious of outsiders and the very nature of the suicide technique means that candidate interviewees have yet to follow through on their quest for Paradise. In addition, the Western analytical construct which examines in turn 'theory, history, doctrine, practice' is constrained by important gaps in theory.²⁴ Existing theory of how individuals are drawn into extremist organisations or how they become willing to sacrifice themselves is primarily based on analysis of Western activism, such as that shown by nuclear extremists, animal rights activists and opponents of abortion, in which concern for the cause is already evident in society and the activist's rhetoric appeals to a more widely held sense of outrage. Therefore the individual is recruited primarily to the organisation rather than to the creed. This is summed up well in 1995 by one of the leading researchers into social movements in western society, James Jasper, who analysed the recruiting process among animal rights and anti-nuclear protesters:

²⁴ In this context, 'doctrine' is characterised by religious readings, codification of norms, summaries of key theological thinking and teaching as well as modern interpretations. In the Islamic religion, this is the Koran and the interpretive hadith.

for strangers to join a movement, they must already have opinions and feelings of their own: they already detest abortion or care deeply about animals. They are recruited to a group or movement, not converted to a belief system.²⁵

While the body of literature on Western 'issue-activism' is reasonably comprehensive with empirical evidence underpinning its main conclusions, studies of Islamist activism and the radicalisation process are characterised more by their authors' confident assertion than by authoritative statistical probability analysis. There is an exploding body of scholarship about Muslim communities in the West, but few either address the radical fringe and how individuals move from moderate to extremist views or offer comprehensive and practical strategies to mitigate the characteristics of the contemporary nature of Salafist suicide terrorism.

Rooted in the exemplar of the personal conduct of Muhammad, who evolved from religious preacher in Mecca to political leader when he fled to Medina, the Islamic faith offers both a religious creed and a political prospectus. This duality at the heart of Islam becomes more concentrated in effect, and initiates a stronger counteraction, in its more radical forms. Islamism - perhaps not a "blend of politics and church" but better described as "both fully politics and fully religion" - goes against one of the basic tenets of the modern world in blurring the boundaries between religion and politics. In doing so it creates a dichotomy for the West. If it is political it can be fought; if it is a religious organism moral conscience and national constitution both dictate that it should be tolerated. Whilst it is probably true that the moderate peaceful followers of Islam offer little security threat to Europe, we must examine the extreme end of the movement, the jihadists or the literalists, and their connection with those less committed to the pursuit of violence. An examination of the nature of the Salafist in Europe must consider three interlinked questions: what is the individual motivation? What is the group logic? What is the process whereby the individual becomes radicalised: what causes an individual to move from an attitude

²⁵ Jasper, James M and Poulsen, Jane. *"Recruiting Strangers And Friends: Moral Shocks And Social Networks In Animal Rights And Antinuclear Protests"*. Published in Social Problems, November 1995.

of moderation in religious matters in which risk does not enjoy a priority, to one who is prepared to undertake high-risk activism in pursuit of a cause wider than himself on behalf of the group?

Suicide Killing

But first it is important to understand the context and motivation of the suicide bomber. In prosecuting their campaign of violence, the jihadists have turned in increasing numbers to the use of the powerful technique of suicide bombing, for which our understanding will be increased if we first examine the western precepts upon which our view of self-harm is based. Whilst the stigma of suicide may have retreated somewhat in liberal Western society, the prevailing perspective is that it is a negative and undesirable outcome, in which an individual's despair overwhelms the desire for life. One of the leading support web sites for those contemplating suicide offers a range of self-help books, guides to beating depression, and telephone counselling help lines in a sincere attempt to prevent suicides; it is appropriately named suicide.com. A website sponsored by Metanoia illustrates the contemporary Western position on self-harm with its neutral, non accusatory and forgiving tones to potential suicides:

when pain exceeds pain-coping resources, suicidal feelings are the result.
Suicide is neither right nor wrong; it is not a defect of character; it is morally neutral. It is simply an imbalance of pain versus coping resources.²⁶

A significantly different view comes to light when one examines the origins of the suicide technique in the Islamic context. Shia Iran was the birthplace of the first suicide bomber in 1980, when a 13-year-old boy,²⁷ responding to the Khomeini inspired jihad to defend his anti Shah revolution against the invading Iraqis, strapped explosives to his chest and detonated his bomb next to an Iraqi tank. The ensuing explosion destroyed the tank and caused the attack to falter. The action was set within the context of the Iranian supreme religious and political leader calling

²⁶ A website sponsored by Dr David Conroy PhD with the aim of raising awareness of suicide counselling and prevention measures. Its URL is <http://www.metanoia.org/suicide/spagebw.htm>.

²⁷ 13-year-old Hossein Fahmideh subsequently enjoyed a very public martyrdom within the Persian tradition, which dates back to the Battle of Karbala in 680 AD in which the Sunni-Shia clash resulted in the Shia Caliph beating the Sunni pretender Imam Hussein.

for increased personal sacrifice on the battlefield to repel the Iraqi invader in an echo of the Battle of Karbala in AD 680, in which 73 male Shia Muslims, led by Hussein ibn Ali, laid down their lives to defend their sect of Islam against an invading superior force of the Suuni Umayyad caliph, which numbered some 4000. The significance of the event is less in the blunting of a tank attack by a young boy prepared to sacrifice his life than in the subsequent “martyrdom” in which the principles of duty to the community or pursuit of the cause of Allah are emphasised over the “suicide”, which we tend to interpret as an act of desperation. In a contrasting Christian context, a martyr is usually an innocent person who, without seeking death since suicide has historically been seen as sinful, is murdered or put to death for his religious faith or convictions. An example of this interpretation is the persecution of early Christians in the Roman Empire, who often declined to defend themselves, in what they saw as an imitation of Jesus Christ's willing sacrifice.

The effectiveness of the suicide technique was such that it was quickly exploited by Hezbollah in Lebanon, who enjoyed significant backing from their co-religionists the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, in response to the Israeli invasion in June 1982.²⁸ The Shia terrorist group included Western interests in its range of targets when it struck the US Embassy on 18th April 1983 and the Marine Barracks on 23rd October 1983 after which knowledge of the technique and its effectiveness quickly spread to Gaza where the Suuni group Hamas exploited it to deadly effect, motivated more by its effectiveness than a specific linkage to the Shia sect of Islam. Other terrorist groups were not slow to take this weapon into their armoury due to the powerful nature of the popular cult of martyrdom and the effectiveness of the technique.²⁹ The combination of an extremist worldview in which return to the traditional Islamic principles, including the forceful subjugation of non Muslims, is sought using suicide techniques offers a significant challenge to

²⁸ The Shia terrorist grouping received military and logistic backing by Iranian Revolutionary Guards. Baer, Robert. *The Cult of the Suicide Bomber*, The Disinformation Company, March 2006.

²⁹ One of the most successful bomb makers, the West Bank based Yahya Ayyash, with 10 successful bombs in 18 months, received such adulation that 500,000 people attended his funeral of the

Western democracies. Since counterstrategies will be hampered by both liberal constraints on attacking religion and the extreme cost effectiveness to our enemies of the suicide technique, it is important to understand the motivating factors.

Individual Motivations

Traditional studies from the 1980 and 1990s tended to treat the suicide attack as but one of many tactics used but do not shed much light on the more recent 21st century rise of this method as described by Hoffmann in 1998, Jenkins in 1985 and Laqueur in 1987.³⁰ A small number of studies that address explicitly suicide terrorism focus on the irrationality of the act of suicide from the perspective of the individual attacker, using western norms on suicide as a benchmark. As a result, they focus on individual motives – whether religious indoctrination, deprivation, psychological predispositions – rather than the group's strategic logic. This first wave of explanations of suicide terrorism was conducted when the trends of disadvantage and social exclusion were consistently identified as motivations for terrorist attacks, primarily by Hamas and the Algerian terrorists attacking France at the time.³¹ Motivating factors associated with pathology - social exclusion, deprivation - which cause the individual to rebel against the establishment in an act of desperation, revenge or as a lone wolf (Stern 2003) does not seem a valid characterisation of the jihadists following Al Qaeda's ideology. The conclusions of a number of these early studies offered trends in participation more usually associated with European secular left wing or nationalist terrorist groups such as Bader Meinhof, ETA and the IRA, rather than the wave of religious terrorist groups from the early 21st-century. As the graph of suicide attacks has risen in the early years of 21st-century, such theories have seemed to

Israeli security forces assassinated him using a cell phone device. Baer, Robert. *The Cult of the Suicide Bomber*, The Disinformation Company, March 2006.

³⁰ Hoffman Bruce. *Inside Terrorism*. New York: Columbia University Press. New York, 1998. Jenkins, Brian N. *International Terrorism*, RAND Corporation, Washington DC, 1985. Laqueur, Walter. *The Age of Terrorism*. Boston Little Brown, 1987.

become distanced from reality. The British bombers of Mike's Bar in Tel Aviv in 2003 had a thoroughly Western upbringing, were well educated and came from caring communities; the 9/11 bombers did not come from backgrounds of social exclusion or deprived neighbourhoods; the perpetrators of the London bombings had university degrees, were active in social work and two had pregnant wives and young children.

Many other popular analyses of the roots of radical Islamism adopt the underpinning logic that individual and group grievances account for a mass behaviour which responds to exogenous threats by an individual frustration and motivation that results in violent acts.³² This logic suggests a direct causal relationship in which the fruits of postmodernism, such as globalisation, fragmentation of authority, rampant consumerism and the nature of knowledge as a commodity, which cause individual and group distress that reaches a crescendo which turns into violent action and therefore participation is the result of "irrationality". This essentially 'monolithic' view sees the situation as exacerbated by the continuing corruption of 'apostate' establishments in Muslim countries, Islamic stagnation, the failure of postcolonial nationalist projects and the lack of social mobility as a result of poor economic conditions. However the model, which seems to reflect the intellectual influence of Marxism, fails to account for a number of factors. Several countries with high levels of deprivation exhibit low levels of Islamist fundamentalism; the argument does not account for the relative harmony with which Muslims live in India, where after partition in 1947 they number 174 million or 16 percent of the total population. India has the second-largest population of Muslims in the world after Indonesia and can offer its citizens only 115th place among 162 countries based on the human development index.³³ As Leon Trotsky wryly observed: "the mere existence of privation is not enough to

³¹ Gunning, Jeroen. "Terrorist Networks in Europe: Making Sense of Al Qaeda in Europe". RUSI Conference on 'Muslims in Europe post 9/11', 25-26 April 2003.

³² See for example "The Age of Horrorism" by Martin Amis in The Guardian 10 September 2006.

³³ The Human Development Index (HDI) is a comparative measure of life expectancy, literacy, education, and standard of living for countries worldwide.

cause an insurrection: if it were, the masses would be always in revolt". The theory does not explain why some choose to join Islamist groups while others do not nor does it account for why some move beyond moderate Islam to pursue the path of violence.

With a background in both forensic psychiatry and intelligence analysis and basing his work on the biographies of 172 terrorists, Marc Sageman (2004) examined the social movement of the global Salafi jihad, and identifies the contributions of psychology or mental illness, terrorist personality, pathology, and sociology namely geographical origins, socioeconomic status, education, faith as a youth, occupation, family status, relative deprivation, as individual causative motivations for jihadi violence.³⁴ Examining Afghan combatants, he refuted the traditional notions that an individual turned to terrorism because of poverty, trauma, madness or ignorance. His conclusions suggested that this form of terrorism was an emergent quality of the social networks formed by alienated young men who become transformed into fanatics seeking martyrdom. This key study rejects many of the traditional theories of behaviour, concluding that global Salafi jihadists are generally middle-class, educated young men of caring and religious families with strong positive values of religion and spirituality as well as concern for their communities. His model asserts that there is no common profile, no easy answer but there are nevertheless patterns: individuals displayed social and emotional alienation which was evident in some form of distress. Useful though this contribution to our understanding of both the more recent context and the social nature of the network is, the 172 terrorists interviewed are not suicide bombers; the study lacks an analysis of the European dimension and fails to address the group strategic logic of the suicide attack. Whilst he offers useful evidence for individual motivations, his analysis does not explain why group decision makers prefer suicide bombings to other techniques nor how radicalisation occurs.

³⁴ Sageman, Marc. *Understanding Terror Networks*. 1st ed. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Philadelphia 2004.

However, if this analysis of the social network holds true, Bin Laden's most successful decision may have been to allow the global Salafi movement to evolve spontaneously and naturally, in using a dis-aggregated rather than hierarchical chain of command and offering a free franchise to local and regional groups who wish to prosecute their own contextualised form of jihad. While his hands-off policy may have been partially wished upon him by the destruction of his Afghan sanctuary in 2001, its evolution has built-in greater robustness and flexibility with the opportunity for local actors to exploit regional grievances in contrast to the more traditional terrorist leaders approach of tight centralised control.

While individual susceptibility may account for the initial attractiveness of high risk activism, it is important to understand the group's logic for action before identifying the nature of the radicalisation process. Even traditional explanations, with their focus on individual motives, fail to explain the rise in suicide terrorism, and so it is important to examine the role of the decision maker, the motivation of the group and its strategic logic. Possible explanations include economic factors although but studies that follow this thesis have showed poor results, and a number of commentators attempt to explain suicide terrorism as a form of competition between radical groups; this theory appears initially beguiling due to the factional nature of Islam but in the end does not appear convincing as a prime cause.

Pape's comprehensive 2005 analysis offers an alternative explanation of the causal logic of suicide terrorism.³⁵ His study of 462 individual suicide terrorists, 18 suicide campaigns and 58 'occupations' by democratic states underpins his claim that the key is not religious expansionism but the nationalist goal of compelling "democracies to withdraw military forces from the terrorists' national homeland."³⁶ In framing suicide terrorism as "a strategy for weak actors" in which the traditional scales of international coercion, in which strong states pressurise weak ones,

³⁵ He claims to have compiled the world's first "database of every suicide bombing and attack around the globe from 1980 through to 2003 - 315 attacks in all." In addition he has profiled 462 individual suicide terrorists.

are overturned in favour of 'one man, one bomb, one strategic step', he offers the view of a defensive jihad as a response of foreign occupation of either an Arab state or the wider nation of Islam:

the presence of American military forces for combat operations on the homeland territory of the suicide terrorists is stronger than Islamic fundamentalism in predicting whether individuals from that country will become al-Qaeda suicide terrorists.³⁷

That Al Qaeda thinks strategically does not seem open to question; a September 2003 planning document³⁸ articulates a coherent strategy for persuading the United States and its allies to leave Iraq by splitting the coalition through domestic attacks on those coalition partners who seem the most vulnerable due to strong domestic opposition to military action in the Middle East. Events in Spain in March 2004 seem to bear out this thesis. As a weapon of the militarily weak, who have placed democracy in their sights, exploiting individual propensities through a group logic of strategic effectiveness the suicide weapon offers a clear and significant threat to the west.

That the method has evolved from its first use by the 13-year-old Iranian Shia Hussein Fahmideh through Hezbollah's use in the Lebanese war with Israel to successful prosecution by the Suuni group Hamas - and has therefore passed not only from one Islamic sect to another but has been used by Christian and secular groups as well - should not surprise us. Indeed this evolution is indicative of the delinking between the suicide technique and religion. Instead, the patterns of timing, the essentially nationalist goals of its perpetrators (Hamas aims to either destroy Israel or reclaim previously held Islamic land for Muslims), Al Qaeda's prime objective is to end American occupation of the Arabian Peninsula) and the targets selected (not Canterbury Cathedral or The Dome Of The Rock, but financial and commercial centres) suggest aims that are wider than religion:

³⁶ Pape, Robert.. *Dying To Win - the Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism*. 2005.

³⁷ Ibid, 82-92.

³⁸ "Jihadi Iraq, Hopes And Dangers," a document dedicated to Yusuf al-Ayiri (Key Al Qaeda ideologist and media coordinator killed in a May 2003 attack in Riyadh). Posted on a web page called

the latest and greatest of these aggressions, incurred by the Muslims since the death of the Prophet ... is the occupation of the land of the two holy places [the cities of Mecca and Medina] - the foundation of the house of Islam ... it is essential to hit the main enemy who divided the Umma [the Muslim community] into small and little countries and pushed it, the last few decades, into a state of confusion ... Clearly after belief (*Imman*) there is no more important duty than pushing the American enemy out of the holy land [Arabia].³⁹

Debunking the theory of an expansionist Islam bent on world domination as "pure fantasy"

Pape's theory usefully reduces Islamic fundamentalism from the media's "monolith" yet is somehow unsatisfying for its single dimensional strategy. His theory does offer a useful characterisation of 34 primarily Suuni countries with Salafi-influenced population and important non Salafi-influenced countries with a majority of nevertheless susceptible Suuni populations.

Whilst analysts differ over whether the "near enemy" or the "far enemy" is Al Qaeda's prime target, there is evidence that its current strategy is bent upon provoking an international scale cycle of violence and repression that will mobilise the Suuni masses.⁴⁰ Indeed it is possible that, where the intifada and 9/11 failed, events in Afghanistan and Iraq (combined with US support for Israel's policy in the occupied territories) may be triggering a radicalisation of the masses that Al Qaeda had hoped for. The April 2006 US National Intelligence Estimate assesses that:

whilst the global Jihadist movement has become decentralised and more diffuse, events in Iraq are shaping a new generation of terrorist leaders and operatives ... its spread outweighs its vulnerabilities ... anti-US and anti- globalisation sentiment is on the rise. The radicalisation process is occurring more quickly, more widely and more anonymously with the growth of the Internet.⁴¹

Notwithstanding recent observations that UK's continued presence in Iraq is not helping to improve local or regional security: "whatever consent we may have had in the first place, may

"Global Islamic Media" and later on the Norwegian defence research establishment web page, Forsvarets Forskingsinstitutt.

³⁹ Bin Laden, Osama. "Declaration Of War Against The Americans Occupying The Two Holy Places," August 23, 1996.

⁴⁰ For example Henzel (2005) identifies the nature of an internal Islamic civil war; Kepel (2004) offers a more cohesive focus upon the West. Henzel, Christopher. *The Origins of Al Qaeda's Ideology - Implications for US Strategy*. Parameters Spring 2005. Kepel, Gilles. *The War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West*. Cambridge. Harvard University Press 2002.

have turned to tolerance and has largely turned to intolerance"⁴² the argument falls short of suggesting a prime causal linkage with Islamist terrorism. The theory fails to account for the presence of Moroccans, Tunisians, Indonesians or Turks in the Al Qaeda attacks he analyses, since those countries seem not to be primarily touched by US presence. In addition there is no evidence to suggest that American military 'occupation' in Arab countries causes British born Asian Pakistanis in London to attack their fellow countrymen. Pape's conclusion that "the taproot is American military policy" and that therefore a withdrawal by the West from the Arab Middle East would reduce the number of attacks, seems insufficient.

Radicalisation

If a range of individual motives offer 'propensity' and the cost effectiveness of the suicide technique is attractive to decision-makers, we must now examine the process of radicalisation: what persuades people of otherwise moderate views to kill in the name of Allah? Social movement theory offers three factors that lead to collective action for human beings. First, selective incentives are identified to attract participants. Next the recruitment process is carried out through a framework of social networks. Last, the principle of 'framing', in which the individual interprets causation according to his world view, offers an explanation for the final step of commitment through the candidate's cognitive structure for understanding the environment. In this theory, incentives, networks and framing are all part of a more general "process of persuasion".⁴³ Incentives work well in voluntary non-violent organisations; social networks have a more important role in generating the trust, cohesion and solidarity required for riskier ventures and framing is important to our understanding of the causative links in the

⁴¹ Declassified Key Judgements of the National Intelligence Estimate. "*Trends in Global Terrorism: Implications for the United States*" (2006).

⁴² Comments made to the Daily Mail newspaper by the British Chief of the General staff, General Sir Richard Dannatt, as reported in the BBC on 13 October 2006.

⁴³ Wiktorowicz, Quintan. *Radical Islam Rising: Muslim Extremism in the West*. Rowman and Littlefield 2005, chapter 3.

process of moving from moderate to extremist. The key role played by socialisation in drawing the individual from low risk activism to high-risk perpetration of violence cannot be understated. In the same way that military culture emphasises the bonds of camaraderie and its associated modalities to provide the unit cohesion necessary for success in combat, so a terrorist group must find mechanisms that bind the individual to the group goal. Wiktorowitz offers the useful insight that only with a shared worldview and the bonds of human kinship can the risks of terrorism be undertaken - the resulting network of shared meaning is the basis of a common identity and frequently involves a risky activism in the name of God.⁴⁴

The process of radicalisation can be triggered by some form of personal crisis which shakes previously held certainty, initiates a period of questioning and then propels the individual to embrace a set of beliefs of a more extreme nature. Acceleration seems possible where Islam plays a greater role in the individual's self-identity, where the threshold of social cohesion is low or where the depth of crisis, personal trauma or sense of grievance is significant. Therefore third generation European Muslims whose sense of commitment to modern secular society is low, who have extensive personal experience of Islam or who judge that accepted religious teaching and education has become corrupted by western influences may be considered more susceptible to the attraction of radical leaders. Wiktorowitz characterises this as a "cognitive opening that leads to religious seeking" in his study of Al Muhajiroun. While established family and social links may still offer the traditional route to radical activism, new paths are created by charities and cultural societies, professional associations, mosques, religious and language lessons, in which the individual believes that he is acting in his own rational self interest. Since membership of even radical activist movements is voluntary, direct coercion of individuals is unlikely to be successful in transforming a moderate into an extremist. While assessing the validity of an Islamic religious interpretation is problematical for the West it is an area in which there is a need to develop both

⁴⁴ Ibid, 17.

competence and currency. The Islamic religious environment could be characterised as a competitive marketplace of alternative religious interpretations in which the reputation of religious authorities is key to their success in achieving a monopoly on interpreting the sacred tradition. This focus on authenticity and the validity of religious rulings thereby adds significant weight to the role played by the imams whose role in the radicalisation process becomes pivotal. Viewing individual behaviour as the rational pursuit of self-interest only makes sense if we understand the relative importance attached to "self-interest through the achievement of paradise" and "sense of community". In contrast to the Western concept of community, in which the rise of religion in public life was originally seen as ameliorating societal problems by encouraging adherence to work based on the communal good (thereby subordinating individual self-interest in favour of action based on the principle of advantage in the community), Islam subordinates society's needs to those of individuals whose self-interest is based on the premise of personal salvation. From this we can see that Islamist activists engage in actions for the collective good because that is what it takes to protect their spiritual self-interest; even seemingly altruistic behaviour can be understood as rational pursuit of self-interest. The failure to act jeopardises salvation. Mother Teresa is famously quoted as drawing this parallel: "works of love are always a means of becoming closer to God."⁴⁵

Only a very recent August 2006 study for the UK Defence Academy by Naqshbandi gives us a feel for the scale of the theological and ethnic diversity of Muslim communities in the UK. He characterises the environment is one in which terrorists are exploiting the internal, that is to say intergenerational and attitudinal practice of Islam in the UK and external factors, namely racial, Islamophobic pressures and a sense of powerlessness, to encourage greater radicalisation. Their aims are to influence international policy in their favour – specifically undermining military intervention abroad – and drive a wedge between Muslims in the West and their host

⁴⁵ Teresa, Mother. *A Simple Path*. Ballentine Books 1995.

communities. The Muslim community is poorly equipped to deal with such tensions not so much due to extremist initiatives but as a result of their own community feelings. First-generation immigrant parents are poorly positioned to offer any coherent Islamic worldview in the face of disaffected youth while widespread skill and resource poverty in mosques undercuts the already unrepresentative religious leadership. Factionalism within the Muslim community adds to a story of dysfunction and neglect. Most Islamic movements seem to attract youth to perfectly wholesome expressions of self or community in which engagement is a means towards realising their legitimate stake in society rather than attempts at isolationism. Parental and religious leadership failings leaves a vacuum where you are left to act for themselves and where their subsequent search for a more pious orthodoxy plays into the cycle of radicalisation. Recruitment into extremism follows in which the recruits are largely self-propelled rather than cultivated by a network.⁴⁶ If the individual propensity for radicalisation can be characterised as the supply, the strategic logic that drives group action can be seen as demand. The trick is to disrupt the supply chain.

Western European Muslim immigrants portray the image of a population riven with contradiction and confused loyalties. At one extreme, Europe is the land of unbelief (*dar al-harb*), in which Koranic teaching argues for the imposition of Islamic *sharia* law to purify and subjugate human frailties. At the other extreme, it is home to second and third-generation immigrants who have never lived in a predominantly Islamic country and who have experienced the personal freedom, liberal education and economic opportunity of democratic societies. They feel themselves pulled in both directions and suffer a crisis of identity in which religion, country, community and language jostle for primacy in a confusing blend of competing interests. If our prime aim is to prevent radicalisation from spawning the next generation of terrorists one of the

⁴⁶ Naqshbandi, Mehmood. *Problems and Practical Solutions to Tackle Extremism; and Muslim Youth and Community Issues*. The Shrivenham Papers – Number 1. Published by UK Defence Academy August 2006.

most important battlegrounds becomes the war for Muslim minds. In addition to Palestine, Iraq and Afghanistan, or focus must take in European capitals where Islam is already a growing part of the West. If integration has succeeded the new generation may become the Islamic vanguard of the next decade offering a new vision of Islam and a way out of the failed political projects that has paralysed many of their countries of origin.

Europe on the Frontline

The 2004 attacks in Madrid and then the July 2005 London bombings have established Europe as a new front line in the Islamist fundamentalist campaign. Before 9/11, Europe provided sanctuary from where Al Qaeda's planners could conceive, plan and prepare attacks. Germany was favoured due to their security forces' ignorance of Middle Eastern networks - most German Muslim immigrants were of Turkish and Kurdish descent - and whose national legal foundation is based upon the principle of a strict burden of proof as a defence against the possibility of a return of fascism. Spain is of interest to the enemy both as a US military coalition partner and as the locus of the high tide of Islamism in the seventh century. Its large Moroccan population possess networks and contacts, which make the country an important crossroads for jihadists across the Straits of Gibraltar from the Muslim Magreb. France has faced two waves of Islamist terrorism; in the 1980s the Lebanese Shia linked to Khomeini's Iranian revolution ... populated Paris and the country's postcolonial period has generated Algerian terrorism that stalks the streets of several large French cities. London has been a sanctuary for global Islamists extremism since the 1980s, when its Muslim population, liberal immigration policies and generous social payments attracted a number of key activists. A number of Britons have been involved in Islamist terrorism. Seven UK citizens were captured in Afghanistan during the U.S.-led war against the Taliban, 8 British nationals were arrested by London's Metropolitan police in March 2004 in the largest antiterrorism operation since 9/11. The next month, British intelligence uncovered and disrupted the plot to initiate a chemical device in Birmingham, England by alleged

Al Qaeda sympathisers. The "shoe bomber" Richard Read, who attempted to blow up the 747 transatlantic flight to Boston, was brought up in South London by an English mother and a Jamaican father. Mike's Bar in Tel Aviv was destroyed in April 2003 by 2 young men from Derby. The Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl was kidnapped and brutally slain by a British-born graduate of the London School of Economics.⁴⁷ Scotland Yard estimates that as many as 3000 Britons have participated in Al Qaeda training camps. More recently the Director General of MI5 assessed that some 200 groupings or networks, totalling over 1600 identified individuals who are actively engaged in plotting, or facilitating, terrorist acts are currently being tracked and monitored by the British security services.⁴⁸ Despite a degree of doubt amongst European political elites, it seems clear that the continent presents an opportunity of unparalleled significance to Al Qaeda.

The Future

In charting the way forward there appear to be two broad paths. The positive, optimistic view of the future would see the majority of young Muslims in Europe as modern in line with their status as some of the newest citizens. If they can be persuaded that their best interests will be served by greater assimilation, they will be able to offer the net blending of European and Muslim cultures as an alternative to increasingly extreme religiosity and can offer a good example by re-exporting their values to the Muslim countries from which they originated. With the first generation of university graduates already beginning to take their place in the European work market they have a good understanding both of Islam and the traditions of Western democracy and human rights; they are in a prime position to build bridges, compromise between both sets of values, and establish a peaceful and constructive path for their countries of origin who are emerging from the quagmire of Islamic stagnation or who choose not to become devoted

⁴⁷ "Camp X-Ray Britons Named," BBC 7 January, 2002 and BBC, 6 April 2004.

⁴⁸ Manningham-Buller, Eliza. Director-General of MI5 Speech to RUSI 9 November 2006.

literalists. This offers a triumph of national identity over an extreme version based on religious creed and would offer a positive form of constructive pluralism. Of the 2006 Channel 4 poll, 33 percent of the 1000 Muslims questioned, "strongly disagreed" with the concept of UK as an Islamic state compared with 17 percent who favoured the proposition. The view is well articulated by Farhaan Wali, a 22 year old British Muslim MA Politics student:

The most problematic thing for me was adopting the right perspective. One way of dealing with it is to isolate yourself from a culture that is so at odds with your faith. But the Koran preaches integration, not isolation. Integration causes problems. There was a big push after September 11 for greater integration with Muslims, but what does integration mean? And that is the challenge for a lot of Muslims now. We live in Britain, we interact and so forth, but in terms of integration we are not going to adopt certain values that will contradict Islam. We need to find a balance.⁴⁹

A more pessimistic view sees these same young people polarised, driven by a rigid Islamic identity and leading them to reject integration into the religious and cultural community. It sees them embracing a cultural separatism from European values, from which a minority will spiral into violence. The resulting backlash would be an increased likelihood of the silent majority turning inwards, closing their communities both to the European population and the future immigrants from Muslim countries. The 2006 poll found that 93 percent of respondents defined religion as "all important"; 33 percent preferred the concept of *sharia* law to the current UK legal system and 14 percent answered that they "belonged to Islam and did not feel a strong sense of belonging to Britain."⁵⁰

In shaping policies that tends towards the optimistic outcomes, radicalisation is the key 'system' to be understood. The strategist must attain clarity on both the nature of the pull of the 'rational actor' decision maker and the push supplied by a combination of individual motivations and the tendency towards orthodoxy. This is a key area for focus in preventing the formation of the next generation of radical activists. In our own terms, success can be defined as the disruption of the current generation and the prevention of the next generation. But an alternative

⁴⁹ "Believers try to live with a free and easy culture": Guardian 18 June 2002.

approach may be to attempt to define failure in their terms in order to attempt to identify the point at which the strategic logic of suicide terrorism fails and attacks cease since they are not perceived to be continuing in the group self-interest.

Analysis of the nature of the Salafist jihad therefore appears to offer either a range of individual motivations to which there is some pattern but an insufficiently consistent profile to offer opportunities for proactive targeting, or a broad strategic logic based on cost effectiveness of the suicide technique when linked to religious or political goals. For a strategy to be successful it must be founded upon analysis that draws out the essential nature of the problem and counters its appeal to potential adherents. It follows that UK counter terrorist strategy should focus both at the individual level (both motivations and grievances) and in a manner that undercuts the strategic logic of the group's decision makers. So in framing strategies we should be less concerned with general deprivation or individual pathologies than with the broader scope of individual motivations, the strategic logic of group action and the need to empower more moderate, purist elements at the expense of the jihadists.

⁵⁰ MORI Poll conducted for Channel 4 dated May 2006.

STRATEGIES OF PREVENTION

Having gained insights into key elements of the European Muslim world view and characterised some of the individual and group motivations that lead to extremist violence and suicide terrorism, this chapter describes the misunderstanding of strategy theory that underpins the UK counter terrorist strategy. The section then develops preventative strategies that are better tailored to achieving strategic goals, being based upon a better analysis of the nature of the problem that they seek to resolve. The key elements of successful policies are framed within the dual logic of isolating the terrorist from his ideological support and integrating terrorist supporters into a more cohesive society. Originally conceived as a response to the 9/11 attacks in New York and Washington DC, the 2003 UK long term strategy for countering international terrorism aims “to reduce the risk from international terrorism, so that people can go about their daily lives freely and with confidence.”⁵¹ Divided into four strands, it seeks to *prevent* terrorism by tackling the radicalisation of individuals, *pursue* terrorists and those who sponsor them, *protect* the public and UK interests and *prepare* for the consequences of another attack. The latter two elements are self evident and are not discussed further. The pursuit strand is concerned primarily with reducing risk to the public by disrupting terrorist cells through good intelligence, prosecution through the judiciary and international cooperation. With its purpose focussed primarily on the symptoms of violent prosecution of jihad represented by the current generation of terrorists, its intent is focussed on immediate threats rather than long term solutions. Yet, stretching the medical analogy further, it is clear that the prevention of the next generation of terrorists is likely to have a longer lasting effect than the cure offered by disrupting the current generation. National security and public safety rightly mandate the allocation of significant resources to countering immediate threats, but a more promising longer term solution for international terrorism will need to incorporate sustained effort to reduce the rate at which

⁵¹ CONTEST, July 2006, 9.

individuals are persuaded that radical activism is worthwhile. The current approach under the prevent strand shows a focus upon: tackling radicalisation through reducing disadvantage largely through the lens of existing equal opportunity legislation; deterrence of those who facilitate acts of terror by widening the definitions of 'support to terrorism' and 'unacceptable behaviour'; and an information campaign, dubbed the "battle of ideas," to challenge the ideological motivations exploited by extremists. It makes the mistake of allowing constitutional or moral reluctance to counter the Islamist threat to persuade the public to mischaracterise the religion as peaceful at its core.

Misunderstanding Strategy

Although the concept is often misapplied to a broad concept or a grouping of disparate ideas, the theory of strategy is well documented and is used in a generally accepted format throughout the West. The term has been well defined as "the pursuit, protection, or advancement of [national] interests through the application of the instruments of power" reflecting "a preference for a future state or condition." The focus of successful strategic design is "how leadership will use the power available to the state to exercise control over sets of circumstances and geographic locations to achieve objectives that support state interests". The 'ends, ways, means' construct includes the evaluation of risk, which increases if the 3 components are out of balance.⁵²

The nature of the concepts (means) whereby national objectives will be obtained must be matched to an accurate characterisation of the environment. For instance if one were to characterise the jihadi enemy as hierarchical in nature, one might conclude that targeted killings senior leaders might be successful in disrupting centralised command and control. If one took the view that the enemy system had evolved into a more federated series of franchises, a strategy that

⁵² Yarger, Richard. *Towards a Theory of Strategy: Art Lykke and the Army War College Strategy Model*. Carlisle Papers 2002.

tackled those elements that bound together this more disparate grouping, such as ideology, might be more appropriate. A national strategy that lacks a clear articulation of objectives, concepts and linked resources does not fulfil the requirements of Art Lykke's strategy model and therefore falls into the category of broad concept, or rhetoric. Since CONTEST has yet to be followed in the public domain by a document that lays out either specific ends or identifies which instruments of national power are to lead each strand of the policy it risks being consigned to the last category in which there is a risk that inappropriate concepts will be employed and instruments of national power will be poorly targeted. This situation is exacerbated if the nature of the Salafi jihad has not been correctly identified and an accurate characterisation of both individual and group motivations is lacking.

One of the leading initiatives to reduce the scale of radicalisation under the prevent strand is the Preventing Extremism Together (PET) Working Group, which draws its authority from consultations conducted during a series of high profile Home Office Ministerial visits to cities with large Muslim populations. The group's recommendations bear the hallmarks of a consultation exercise with a community that sees itself under threat rather than an empirical analysis of how to reduce extremism. Of the 64 specific proposals, only 5 include language that suggests a focus on challenging the ideology of extremism, marginalising extremists or practical steps towards empowering more moderate elements. Although the value of schemes to assist work training, reduce unemployment, raise educational standards and improve faith sensitivity is undoubtedly of broad social value, there is little intellectual energy devoted to a better understanding of radicalisation and methods to blunt its effect, a paucity of measures to empower imams to counter the literal interpretation of the Koran and no thought of separating terrorists from the population or explaining external factors.⁵³ With its exclusive focus upon ways this element of the strategy lacks direction, authority and looks likely to be ineffective in achieving

the policy goal of prevention. One of the first steps forward should be the articulation of a unifying strategy that can link and coordinate the ends to be achieved by the concepts to be employed by the different instruments of national power.

Possible Government Responses

The characterisation drawn in Chapter 2 leads us to conclude that socialisation and radicalisation are at the heart of the process that attracts individuals to the use of violence. Our objective needs to reduce the scale of potentially disaffected individuals becoming more radicalised and therefore adopting terrorist tactics in the name of the global Salafi jihad. The strategic objective for *prevention* can therefore be described as ‘reducing the rate at which Muslims in UK are drawn towards radicalisation by the Salafist ideology.’ Before framing potential government responses the options from existing prevention theory, doctrine and practise must be examined. Criminality and drug addiction offer two methodologies for which prevention strategies are well codified but both theories are based primarily upon individual activity and motivations which, despite the wider factors of procurement and marketing of illegal products, generally occur in the absence of a systemic group logic such as is seen in Islamist fundamentalist radicalisation and violence. The same degree of interlinked networking or degree of active socialisation of future members does not exist and therefore such an approach does not match the environment. Conceived for practical use in developing countries in which systemic strains have created instability, strategies for conflict prevention as used by USAID or DfID offer a methodology to analyse both the nature of the systemic problem and potential solutions. Conflict Assessment Tools are attractive for their holistic approach and for their ability to identify nuance and cope with a degree of complexity. USAID can for example often predict which specific improvements in local governance, linked to improvements in the delivery of basic services, are

⁵³ UK Counter Terrorist Prevention Project: ‘*Preventing Extremism Together*’ Community Project. Working Document on Policy Recommendations dated Sep 2006.

likely to reduce inter-ethnic strife and violence. But the focus on developing nations undercuts its utility in a western democracy in which good governance and acceptable law enforcement practises are to be expected.⁵⁴

Turning to the principles of western counter insurgency doctrine there are more fruitful opportunities if we are prepared to identify useful principles that may apply in the current circumstances rather than adopt a policy of wholesale application of expeditionary concepts that were designed for external application. O'Neill (2003) defines insurgency as "the struggle between a ruling and a non-ruling group which uses political resources and violence to destroy, formulate or sustain the basis of its legitimacy" which offers a useful characterisation of the West's confrontation with the Salafi jihad. Echoing Clausewitz's dictum that "no one starts a war without being clear in his mind what he wants to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it,"⁵⁵ he warns that government analysis of the nature of the challenge and their early actions will have a prime effect upon the outcome:

as soon as the challenge is in the open, the success of the operation depends not primarily on the development of insurgent strength, but more importantly on the degree of vigour, determination and skill with which the incumbent regime acts to defend itself, both politically and militarily.

Arguing for policies that mitigate popular grievances or undercut insurgent strengths, such as those adopted by Oman in the Dhofar war, his theory holds the prospect of increased popular consent for legitimate government while support for extremists is eroded. By contrast, repressive policies by elite regimes will be counter-productive as they offer good opportunities for insurgents to exploit fears of externally imposed policies.⁵⁶

Contemporary US military counter insurgency (COIN) doctrine identifies eight historical principles, many of which have been drawn from British experience, and five contemporary imperatives that offer a useful construct for design and execution of a counter insurgency

⁵⁴ US Agency for International Development. *Fragile States Strategy and Conflict Assessment Framework*. December 2004.

⁵⁵ Clausewitz, Carl Von. *On War*, Oxford. Princeton University Press, 1984, 579.

campaign.⁵⁷ Despite that fact that these manuals were written with expeditionary operations rather than domestic application in mind, their distillation of enduring truths about the nature of a struggle between legitimate and illegitimate actors has resonance for the UK campaign. A number of these counter insurgency principles can be assumed to hold good in the domestic arena: HM Government does have 'good coordinating government machinery,' a sound understanding of 'the importance of intelligence and information' and it is to be hoped that the rule of law underpins legitimacy. From this mix of enduring tenets then, 3 are of particular interest. The principle of 'isolating the insurgents from their cause and support' as seen in the US 'clear, hold, build' approach in Iraq has a relevance in the contemporary domestic environment while 'support the host nation' can be interpreted as the imperative to underpin legitimate local actors. British practise would add a focus upon providing security in areas critical to success and then gradually expanding government control using a long term methodical approach, characterised as the 'oil slick policy' in the British COIN doctrine of 2001⁵⁸. The imperative to 'learn and adapt' has immediate application in studies of the nature of radicalisation and the adjustment of immigration policy, conditional support for the religious infrastructure and applying the norms of cultural awareness to policing methods.

An Appropriate Government Response.

If current COIN doctrine offers useful insights into the importance of first securing the civil population and the likely success to be drawn from separating the insurgent from his base of

⁵⁶ O'Neill, Bard. *Insurgency and Terrorism*, Dulles, 2005.

⁵⁷ US COIN Doctrine, Field Manual 3-24 dated June 16th (Final Draft). Historical principles are listed as: Legitimacy is the main Objective; Unity of Effort is Essential; Political factors are Primary; Counter insurgents must Understand the Environment; Intelligence drives Operations; Insurgents must be Separated from their Cause and Support; Security under the Rule of Law; and the Need for a Long Term Commitment. Contemporary Imperatives described are: Manage Information and Expectations; Use an Appropriate level of Force; Learn and Adapt; Empower the Lowest levels; and Support the Host nation. The British COIN Manual of 2001 lists principles of Political Primacy; Coordinating Government Machinery; Intelligence and Information; Separate the Insurgent from his Support; Neutralise the Insurgent and Long Term Post Insurgency Planning.

support, how can these principles be applied? Four concepts offer a framework for achieving the goal of prevention. First, terrorists must be isolated from the ideological, psychological and physical support from their base in the community so that their violent expansionist creed can be more widely rejected as just another form of human subjugation. Concurrently, those who support a radical approach but who fall short of supporting violence must be integrated back into the broader community, whose cohesion must be strengthened to support the moderate majority. Legitimate government must recognise the powerful forces of globalisation and take account of the mirror effect of external events in the Muslim world on their own electorate in the framing of foreign policy. Last, national immigration policies must be adjusted to allow the inflow of human talent in a manner that reduces division, encourages tolerance and mutual respect within the firm principle of nation state allegiance while preventing the creation of separate communities; I describe this concept as 'constructive pluralism.'

Isolate the Terrorists

The principle of 'isolating the insurgents from their cause and support' applies in physical, ideological and psychological dimensions. While the strategic hamlets concept would be inappropriate, countering extremist ideology head on and reducing the degree of popular and ideological support for literal Koranic interpretations does apply. Since 'one size fits all' profiling will miss a substantial number of potential suicide terrorists and technology does not offer a panacea to the complex technical problems of identification and recognition of explosives and initiation means, solutions are more likely to sit in the realm of human interaction. In a conceptual framework 'clear, hold, build' applies to active national security measures to constrain terrorist acts and movement, backed up by sustained local community policing with social and economic regeneration initiatives.

⁵⁸ Field Manual Volume 1 Part 10: *Counter Insurgency Operations (Strategic and Operational Guidelines)* dated July 2001.

An isolation strategy must accept that at its core Koranic teachings give Islam a consistent expansionist religious ideology; that although many moderates willingly compromise their religious absolutism to incorporate the concept of the modern nation state, peaceful coexistence is not an Islamic concept. Jihad, *sharia* law and dhimmitude are concepts that do not respond easily to modern interpretation and so it is important not to mischaracterise Islam as a naturally peaceful religion.

In attempting to defuse extremism, the importance of tackling the radicalisation process cannot be understated. The flow of new recruits to the process, the supply, must be cut off through measures that undercut grievances and minimise the propensity for successful misrepresentation of history or current policy. At the same time the extremists' literal interpretation, the demand, will need to be modified to create a more liberal form of piety. In turn this means enhancing the capability and the credibility of the moderates, including the Salafi purists, some of the politicians and, critically, the factionalised imams. These efforts will enhance the moderating influence over those who would become more extreme.

Practical measures will be needed to highlight the contrast between extremist idealism and reality by allowing greater porosity of Islamic communities such that external concepts can be presented, digested and incorporated. External speakers to community events, bilateral visits, cultural exchange, representation of the Islamic community by existing Muslims and the newly converted in wider national life will allow a more balanced representation of Western liberal democratic traditions and practise that will isolate extreme ideologies and expose their inconsistencies.

It is essential that the imams' ability to interpret – and reject – home spun religious doctrines is improved. Mosque resources will need to be augmented, religious and language skills training – both English and Arabic – introduced and madrasa curriculum development will be required. Initiatives to train imams in religious concepts and codes of conduct would be useful. From the foundation of a better understanding of both orthodox and unorthodox schools

of thought, they will be empowered to reduce the sectarianism that creates a vacuum which radical preachers exploit.

A number of studies have shown the beneficial effect that women can have in reducing conflict. Possessing a natural gift for sustaining communities and possessing high levels of social and emotional intelligence, their influence can be decisive in shaping the worldview of future generations as well as taking leadership roles for the current generation. This constructive role in British and Muslim society will be enhanced by more modern and liberal interpretations of Islam that counter the 24 percent of Muslims in a 2006 Channel 4 poll, who agreed that 'Muslim women were treated as second class citizens' compared with the 56 percent who disagreed. 63 percent of the sample felt that 'women are respected in British society'. An interesting YouGov poll in 2005 found that the proportion of Muslim men who say that they feel no loyalty to Britain (18 percent) is more than 3 times higher than the proportion of women who say the same. British Muslim men are also far more likely than women to say that Western society is decadent and immoral forums for Muslim women. Positive outcomes will be enhanced by fora that provide a platform for the expression of women's issues within Islam and British society.

Isolation of extremist theology and practice will be enhanced when the concepts are countered head on in a proactive information campaign - a war of ideas - that isolates the terrorists ideology in the public mind. Suitably nuanced so that it is not misrepresented as espousing "a clash of civilisations", this robust dialogue will need to highlight the inconsistencies of the literal Koranic textual interpretation and offer moderating concepts in order to highlight the small constituency and appeal of the jihadists. Intervening in the press, broadcasting and on the internet, the campaign would use Muslim journalists to undermine negative stereotypes and offer the logic of peaceful coexistence. The mischaracterisation of a 'monolithic' Islam will need to be deconstructed. General (Retired) Zinni warns of the dangers of oversimplification:

We have drawn a line where everything on this side is evil and everything on this side is good. Then we have problems with the nuances. I'm wary of people that have short answers...they are our big enemies here.⁵⁹

Integrate Terrorist Supporters into the Broader Community

The challenge of integrating terrorist supporters into the broader community is not underestimated but the history of successful counterinsurgency campaigns suggests that it is a key step in reducing the momentum towards violence. This measure supports the prime objective of isolating the extremists' ideology and has all to do with improving the sense of social cohesion felt in the community both between Muslims and non Muslims as well as between those of the same faith. Underpinning this logic is the fact that, although Al Qaeda has been successful in generating small bands of operators, to date it has been less successful in building the wider constituency which would be essential for success in their long-term campaign. Integrating Salafist jihadists supporters into the broader community will dent its appeal and reduce the spread of its violent ideology. The approach must recognise that the issue of local support, as well as external influences, is fundamental for our own long-term success, given that MI5 reports of 2006 indicate that a base of local support is already being built.⁶⁰ Improving community cohesion and its sense of solidarity will turn the bonds of kinsmanship exploited in radicalisation against those who use it as a recruiting tool.

Part of the wider application of this strategy will be tackling the petty abuse that has grown since 9/11, much of it below the level of criminal process, and which is so strongly felt in the Muslim community. People in positions of community authority must be encouraged to speak out and non Muslim witnesses exhorted to report racism and Islamophobia. The mystification of the state security apparatus will make community policing methods more accessible, increased mutual trust and might improve the flow of intelligence. More Muslims are required in the

⁵⁹ BBC News Website 6 Feb 06.

⁶⁰ Manningham-Buller speech 9 November 2006.

voluntary sector where they could help in youth work and lead youth organisations in which high-calibre non Muslim instructors would mix with them to teach sports, outdoor activities and offer English and Arabic language training. The Muslim community is badly underrepresented in the emergency services, where there is an urgent need to recruit more special constables, magistrates, rehabilitation volunteers, the scenario planning teams, paramedics, ambulance drivers and firemen.

Recognition of the Muslim role at high levels of society must be given by the provision of considered advice on government policy, and a more representatively prominent role for the Muslims community in British international relations. In education, the tendency towards isolationist single faith single sex schools is not helpful. Despite a minority preferring such an approach, there is a large percentage who believe that a more integrated approach is better; this latter majority of those who have managed to balance the competing demands of religion and host state. Higher education is an area for particular emphasis, where the environment of natural debate and questioning has helped the spread of a number of violent societies.

Reflect the External Reality in Foreign Policy

Islam has reached a cross roads in its global development and appeal in the 21st century, having faltered as a revolutionary force with its failure to mobilise western Muslims through either of the two intefada or the export of the Shia revolution although, ironically, recent events in Iraq may have regenerated this momentum. The Islamist expansionist has a choice between political normalisation within the framework of the modern nation state or a continued move towards a closed scripturalist, conservative view of Islam that rejects the national dimension in favour of the *umma*, the universal community of all Muslims regardless of state allegiance or territory. Its selection of the latter course, with its embrace of trans-national modalities, seeks to appeal to rootless Muslims in Europe, who can in turn exploit policies of multiculturalism as a way of rejecting integration into Western society. The West's strategy must therefore account for

the resulting deterritorialisation and adapt methods more in tune with the global nature of the struggle.

Kilcullen's (2005) characterisation of the jihadists as actors in a global Salafist insurgency gives us insights into the motivating ideology and the importance of disrupting the trans-national links that both bind regional groupings and offer them the strategic flexibility to evolve, adapt and transform to exploit local conditions.⁶¹ The strategy must therefore accept that the trends of globalisation feed the nature of this trans-national threat and then take steps that mitigate the negative effects of the spread of radicalism in parallel with the burgeoning growth of networks and deterritorialisation through migration.

There should be no doubt that UK foreign policy choices reflect back in the current environment to the domestic electorate. While an overemphasis of this factor would lead to unnecessary caution and potentially appeasement of radical groups, account must be taken of the clear evidence that events on Baghdad or in Waziristan reflect back to Bradford. Even if the moderate Muslim majority do not believe such misrepresentation, the fact that 11 percent of Muslims polled in 2006 believed that "the July 2005 bombings were justified by UK's participation on the war on terror" should give analysts pause for thought; as a minimum an information campaign should aim to reduce mistrust and lay out more objective analysis.⁶²

UK foreign policy must reflect and be tailored for this new reality that has recently been reinforced by findings that "a majority of Muslims felt more strongly about foreign than domestic policies, especially those linked to the Middle East."⁶³ While the complexity, long standing enmities and mutual mistrust cannot be underestimated, resolution of the Israeli-Palestine question would serve to undercut both the sense of exclusion and the misrepresentation of the conflict that has fuelled violence since the founding of the modern Zion in 1948. The Middle East

⁶¹ Kilcullen, David. *Countering Global Insurgency* 30 November 2004.

⁶² MORI Poll for Channel 4 dated May 2006.

⁶³ Kohir, Shaister. Muslim Voice UK Poll July 2006: '*Understanding the Other Perspective*'.

Peace Plan (MEPP) is a case of an initiative both stalled by lack of political support but also not widely enough debated by leaders in the domestic polity. The nature of the debate needs to be reframed from one of mutual hostility for failure to make progress since 2002 to one of cooperative working to resolve outstanding roadblocks.

Reform is urgently needed in the energy markets, not so much for sustainable exploitation of the earth's natural resources but to reduce the growth of Western dependence upon minerals from regions riven by deep internal conflicts, strong anti Western sentiment or both. With both UK and US national oil production failing to match steadily increasing domestic demand, increased imports exacerbate risk at a time when rising demand from surging Asian economies is driving prices higher. The UK Environment Minister made the link between energy security and national military strategy in 2004:

For the US alone, oil imports, or imports of other sources of oil, such as natural gas liquids, will have to rise from 11m barrels per day to 18.5m barrels per day by 2020. Securing that increment of imported oil - the equivalent of total current oil consumption by China and India combined - has driven an integrated US oil-military strategy.⁶⁴

Constructive Pluralism

The characterisation drawn in Chapter 2 showed up some of the pitfalls of different immigration policies; UK's multiculturalism⁶⁵ has led to an increasingly separate sense of identity by much of the Asian Muslim community while French full integration has led to the 'pied noir' underclass whose sense of injustice is matched by their social exclusion and economic deprivation. With the debate favouring policy changes for fear of the creation of cultural ghettos that could undermine national unity, there is a danger of the pendulum swinging towards the wider embrace of mono-culturalism. Both Netherlands' and Denmark's right of centre

⁶⁴ Meacher, Michael. *Plan Now For A World Without Oil*. Speech reported in Financial Times 5 January 2004

⁶⁵ I define this as an "an ideology advocating that society should consist of, or at least allow and include, distinct cultural groups, with equal status". Multiculturalism contrasts with the mono-culturalism which was historically the norm in the nation-state.

governments have recently reversed the national consensus in favour of a normative cultural unity with its return to the origins of the founding of the modern nation state.

By contrast continuous mass immigration into the USA has been a feature of the nation's economy and society since the first half of the 19th century, in which it was seen as a permanent choice for a new country. The absorption of the stream of immigrants became known as the 'melting pot' in which all immigrant cultures are mixed and amalgamated without state intervention. Critics of this policy point to its failure to include social mobility for US-born black people and the erosion of groups' individual heritage in a process of assimilation in which the imported culture is dominated by a mutually exclusive sense of national unity dating back to the founding fathers:

Providence has been pleased to give this one connected country to one united people — a people descended from the same ancestors, speaking the same language, professing the same religion, attached to the same principles of government, very similar in their manners and customs... This country and this people seem to have been made for each other, and it appears as if it was the design of Providence, that an inheritance so proper and convenient for a band of brethren, united to each other by the strongest ties, should never be split into a number of unsocial, jealous, and alien sovereignties.⁶⁶

A policy is therefore required that does not result in the creation of either a dominant supremacist group or ghettos of separate identity exacerbating social exclusion. Such a policy must form the basic component of the structure of the state, be based upon social cohesion and tolerance of difference but must reflect allegiance to the precepts of the nation-state which are part of a contract of residence. One might call this a policy of 'constructive pluralism' in which minority groups within a society can maintain that cultural differences but share overall political and economic power providing they are prepared to accept the conditionality that comes with giving primacy to the host nation. Representation would naturally be conducted through the mechanisms evolved from the national culture which in this case is the Member of Parliament not the imam. As an interesting aside, a mere six per cent of British Muslims think that the Muslim

⁶⁶ Jay, John. First American Supreme Court Chief Justice

Council of Britain (MCB) represents them, and 51 per cent feel that no existing Muslim institution does so.⁶⁷ The policy will offer a midway between ghettos and forced inclusion, framing a pluralism in which cultures can coexist peacefully within the national unifying precepts of inclusivity and a sense of broader community.

Hand in glove with these initiatives must go measures to balance national labour requirements for economic growth with the demand for social cohesion. This means the introduction of conditionality into immigration policy so that more responsive immigration filters can deny residents to those unwilling to adopt the cultural norms of the host state. Founded upon the principle of harmonious coexistence of different ethnic groups, the policy would welcome those able and willing to speak the language and adopted national laws.

A framework of preventative strategies must be based upon an accurate characterisation of the nature of the threat to national interests. This chapter offers such a framework. It advocates isolating terrorists from their ideological, psychological and physical support so that their violent expansionist creed can more easily be rejected by potential recruits. Concurrently, terrorist supporters must be integrated back into the broader community, whose cohesion must be strengthened to support the moderate majority. Government must recognise the domestic impact of world events that flow from globalisation and reframe foreign policies that take account of this mirror effect on their own electorate. Last, national immigration policies must be adjusted to allow the inflow of human talent in a manner that reduces division, encourages tolerance and mutual respect within the firm principle of nation state allegiance while preventing the creation of separate communities; I describe this concept as 'constructive pluralism.'

CONCLUSIONS

This monograph set out to analyse the origins of the use of violence in the name of religion by the Salafist movement in Europe in order to enable identification of key

⁶⁷ Mirza Munira. *Living Apart Together, British Muslims and the Paradox of UK Multiculturalism*.

characteristics to shape national strategies of prevention that are more appropriate for tackling the root causes of Islamist violence that threatens UK national interests.

Chapter 1 described the historical, religious and cultural contexts of the Salafist movement and identified how it grew from the mainstream body of traditional Islamic thought. Explanations of the interplay between the social, political and militant elements of the movement were offered, which show the rise of the jihadist faction whose spread to Europe and to the UK has been the result both of economic migration and as a response to world events including the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 to defeat the Taliban government. Historical analysis has demonstrated how the Muslim population in Europe has developed a worldview that includes a separate identity from that of its adopted states and has further shown that there are three strands of radical Suuni Islamist thought and practice that currently challenge the West. The literal interpretation of Koranic teaching has led to a narrative in which jihad is seen as an expansionist campaign to subjugate non Muslims and to impose the Caliphate while offering demeaning servitude to conquered peoples. The crisis of identity affecting third-generation European Muslim immigrants is leading to an increasingly widespread search for a more pious version of Islam to counteract what is seen as decadence and a lack of spirituality in the west. The inherent danger in this is that a literal translation of Koranic strictures may lead religious seekers into the closer society of radical preachers and jihadists. The third key strand of radical thought is the interpretation and mis-representation of the Western presence in the Middle East as an occupation that mandates a violent expulsion as a form of defensive Islamic war. The nexus of the global Salafist jihadist creed and the significant growth in the use of the suicide bombing technique possesses a significant destructive power that threatens the west in a conflict of identity and ideas in which Europe's liberal traditions and growing Muslim populations make it a key battleground.

In the second section, analysis from political and social science disciplines offered frameworks from which to identify the key characteristics of the Salafi jihadist movement, including the European dimension; this step is critical since a preventative strategy will only be successful if it is founded upon analysis that draws out the essential nature of the movement that will then enable government to counter the appeal of its ideology to its potential adherents. This analysis pointed up a range of individual motivations to radical actions for which there is some pattern but an insufficiently consistent profile to offer opportunities for proactive targeting, and a broad strategic logic based on the cost effectiveness of the suicide technique when linked to religious or political goals. Individual motivations and grievances can combine to make a particular person more susceptible to the radicalisation process, for which a detailed understanding has not yet been developed. The analysis shows that UK counter terrorist strategy should focus both at the individual level, to counter both motivations and grievances, and in a manner that undercuts the strategic logic of the group's decision makers. In framing strategies government should be less concerned with general deprivation or individual pathologies than with the broader scope of individual motivations, the strategic logic of group action and the need to empower more moderate, purist elements at the expense of the jihadists.

The final part of the monograph addressed the most important question. What are the most appropriate preventative strategies to defeat or deter the threat of radical activists pursuing Islamist goals which are inimical to UK national interests? Successful strategies can be defined as those that increase the likelihood of disrupting the current generation of jihadists while preventing the recruitment of the next generation of terrorists to this violent cause. While there may be unpublished work and policy papers that are not in the public domain, the current strategies appear to rely more on reducing poverty and a policy of broad social inclusivity under the banner of multiculturalism than on tackling the individual and group motivations that are used to increase radicalisation. When the principles of contemporary counterinsurgency thinking are applied to the characterisation already developed they offer strands of preventative strategies that

offer a greater likelihood of success when linked to an accurate characterisation of the nature of the threat to national interests. The paper argues for preventative strategies that are based upon isolating terrorists from their ideological, psychological and physical support so that their violent expansionist creed can more easily be rejected by potential recruits. Concurrently, terrorist supporters must be integrated back into the broader community, whose cohesion must be strengthened to support the moderate majority. Government must recognise the domestic impact of world events that flow from globalisation and reframe foreign policies that take account of this mirror effect on their own electorate. Last, national immigration policies must be adjusted to allow the inflow of human talent in a manner that reduces division, encourages tolerance and mutual respect within the firm principle of nation state allegiance while preventing the creation of separate communities; I have described this concept as 'constructive pluralism.'

But perhaps the last word should go to an author who has done a great deal to publicise the nature of the Koranic school of Islam and the dangers to the west of failing to understand the literal nature of the texts from which spring an expansionist version of Islam. Upon being invited by Al Qaeda to join Islam and renounce Christianity Andrew Spencer's succinct response offers a masterful rendition of both sensible preventative policy and a clear indication of the potential danger for the west if those policies are not enacted:

Meanwhile, Adam, I have an invitation of my own for you: I invite you to accept the Bill of Rights, and enter into the brotherhood of Thomas Jefferson and James Madison. My invitation does not focus on my religion, although I invite you to that also, but rather on a framework within which people of differing faiths can live in peace, harmony, and mutual respect – provided that none of the groups involved cherishes supremacist ambitions to subjugate the others.⁶⁸

⁶⁸ Spencer, Andrew. 'My Invitation from al Qaeda'. Front Page Magazine 6 September 2006.

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