Excess Material Support: The Unrecognized Operational Risk
Abstract
Excessive material support to the Theater Operations carries strategic risks. Whether the risks are those experienced by LTG Heiser in the congested rail yards of France and Korea, or as suggested by Clausewitz as an encumbrance of little use in rapid operations, the U.S. military must assess its stock levels, account for them in military planning, and determine the risk they impose on the force. The baggage trains of Clausewitz's early 19th century armies have evolved into the enormous logistics organization found in the U.S. Army's forces in Iraq today. Balancing the "Tooth-to-Tail" ratio, those who fight and the material essential to the battle versus those who support and the material required to sustain the army in the field, ensures a flexible and maneuverable combat force. As we begin preparations to withdraw our forces from Iraq we find ourselves face to face with Clausewitz's encumbrance. After 5 years of combat and stability operations throughout Iraq the Coalition and U.S. Joint Forces have massed approximately 106,000 truckloads of equipment, supplies, and munitions in Iraq. Regardless of the desired withdrawal timeline sought by the Obama administration, the volume of excess materials will slow the withdrawal of forces from Iraq. To provide recommendations on reducing our volume in Iraq, we should first focus on how we built our current material situation and its associated risks. This paper will define these associated risks and offer recommendations to reduce them. Complementary material to this research project is extracted from published historical works, on line sources, and interviews conducted with 1st Sustainment Command (Theater) logisticians.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Feb 17, 2009
- Accession Number
- ADA497742
Entities
People
- Lawrence D. Moreland
Organizations
- United States Army War College