Mitigating Insider Sabotage and Espionage: A Review of the United States Air Force's Current Posture
Abstract
The security threat from malicious insiders affects all organizations. This problem is especially difficult to address because there is no definitive profile for malicious insiders; organizations have placed their trust in these individuals; and insiders have a vast knowledge of their organization's personnel, policies, and information systems. The purpose of this research is to analyze to what extent the United States Air Force's (USAF) security policies address this problem. The policies are reviewed in terms of how well they align with best practices published by Carnegie Mellon University and additional factors this research deems important, including motivation, organizational priorities, and social networks. The research offers actionable recommendations that the USAF could implement to better prevent, detect, and respond to insider attacks. The most important course of action is to utilize its workforce to the fullest. All personnel should be trained on observable behaviors that can be precursors to malicious activity. In addition, supervisors need to be the first line of defense by monitoring for stress, unmet expectations, and disgruntlement on the part of their subordinates. The research also proposes three new best practices for the USAF regarding screening for prior behaviors, predispositions, and technical incidents of concern; issuing sanctions for inappropriate technical acts; and requiring supervisors to take a proactive role.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Mar 01, 2009
- Accession Number
- ADA497807
Entities
People
- Erika C. Leach
Organizations
- Air Force Institute of Technology