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8 April 1966

ALTERNATIVE U.S. STRATEGIES FOR 1970-1980 (THE STATUS QUO -- YES OR NO?)

By

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Colonel, Infantry

SEP 27 1966

U. S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE



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USAWC RESEARCH ELEMENT
(Thesis)

Alternative U.S. Strategies for 1970-1980

(The Status Quo -- Yes or No?)

by

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US Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania
8 April 1966

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SUMMARY

In the last 25 years, the U.S. has fought two major wars, has lost nearly a half-million lives, and has given two-thirds of a trillion dollars to secure peace and create a world of free and cooperative nations. Both aims have been frustrated by aggressive communism, and the U.S. is again reluctantly at war. Since much of the world's future depends on U.S. strategic purposes, this thesis attempts to project current trends into the 1970-1980 period, examine the impact of certain alternative U.S. strategies on that environment, and determine the best strategic course of action for the United States.

The paper cites authoritative forecasts indicating that the world of 1980 will be small, saturated, tense, terrorized, and tumultuous. Power politics will prevail and will result in a wider diffusion of power centers reminiscent of the Pre-WWII era. Prognostications point to continued subtle aggrandizement by the USSR and subversive aggression by Red China, along with the likelihood that by 1980 most of peripheral Asia will have fallen into the Chinese orbit. The emerging nations will continue as focal points of marginal progress and perpetual conflict, some conflicts inducing further U.S. military involvement.

To determine how best the U.S. can cope with this future, three strategic approaches are analyzed (Peaceful Coexistence, Containment and Roll-Back). The analysis discloses that none of these concepts, applied individually, can insure both our security and our ultimate objectives. However, a strategy encompassing the most positive aspects of all three concepts offers promise, provided the U.S. rekindles its will-to-win and accepts the costs and risks implicit in a strategy of initiative.

The conclusions reached indicate that, before the mounting threat assumes unmanageable proportions, the United States must: First, abandon its traditionally moralistic attitudes toward the enduring power struggle underway; Second, remind itself that unchivalrous routes to security may have to be followed before noble works in social progress can be achieved; Third, dislocate the enemy's balance and take the line of least expectation; Fourth, substitute a new national strategy of "Attainment" for the present strategy of Containment, and a new military strategy of "Progressive Force" for the current strategy of Flexible Response; Fifth, expand its power base and conduct economic and unconventional warfare roll-back action in communist-held peripheral areas before global power conditions preclude such an offensive; Sixth, maintain a containment posture where defense is essential, and adopt peaceful coexistence attitudes where deception is useful; and Seventh, accept the costs and the leadership risks which will always be inherent in the fight to preserve a free society.

FOREWORD

For good or bad, strategy sets the course of history.

Conceived and executed consummately, it can enable a nation to achieve goals without battle. Conceived or executed poorly, it can carry a nation into both battle and defeat. Conceived or executed indifferently, it can subject a nation to the plots of others. But in no case can any nation remain immune to the momentum created by a hundred interacting national strategies. These rudimentary facts are so well known to all that perhaps we should file them under Axioms of Academic Interest and proceed with more urgent daily business. Yet, this seems to be a time when people are using such facts to measure the extent that the present strategy of the United States will shape the future.

For good or bad, the U.S. national strategy of Containment of communism is presently supported by the military strategy of Flexible Response. This strategy visualizes the deterrence of all forms of aggression and the application of appropriate military power to win any level of conflict should deterrence fail. No significant departure from that strategy in the future is foreseen by the Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff: "Although there may be some shifts in emphasis, I feel that our military strategy of the 1970's will still merit the name, 'Flexible Response'!"¹

¹General Marko G. Meadler, "How Can Military Strength Best Promote Peace?" in The General Electric Forum, Vol. 5, No. 3, p. 19.

Recognizing that much of the future depends upon how determinedly the U.S. executes its purposes, an attempt is made in this thesis to project our current strategy into the coming decade, equate that strategy to an extrapolation of current trends, and forecast the outcome. Using this forecast as a platform, an effort is then made to examine the impact of certain alternative strategies in that environment and focus on the course most advantageous to U.S. interests. In essence then, the purpose of this thesis is to suggest the general direction in which the nation should move to meet the challenge visualized in the 1970-1980 decade.

This is perhaps an overly ambitious purpose. Since all facets of the ambiguous threat and all horns of the strategic dilemma have already been examined exhaustively by many able scholars, this thesis will scarcely unveil any strikingly original concepts. However, it is hoped that the paper will help foster a deeper appreciation of the enormity and urgency of the central problem confronting our strategic planners. That problem can be stated in these three propositions:

First--in the 1950's the U.S. took a short-term view in basing its strategy on transient ownership of the atom while the Communists took a long-term view in basing theirs on permanent ownership of real estate and people--and in the 1960's the results are all too noticeable.

Second--if the vast power of the U.S. is to continue to serve the greatest world good, the U.S. may have to decide whether its strategy should be based on positively influencing future events or flexibly responding to them.

Third--if the United States means to have its history recorded as something more than a brief altruistic experiment, this may have to be the decade of decision.

No purposeful strategy for the future can be considered without first visualizing that future. Since the future approaches us only one day at a time, theoretically it should be easy to observe current trends, project the results of their interplay, and arrive at a predicted condition. Forecasting, however, is not so pat a process. Those who ten years ago cheerfully predicted the internal crumbling of the USSR can attest to the fact. Prognostications at worst are monumental traps. Prognostications at best are still the doubtful scratchings of an imprecise art. With whatever clumsy tools are available, the art must nonetheless be practiced because today's world of technology and trickery demands more than hasty improvisation.

This type of paper clearly hinges on reasoned forecasting. Yet there is neither sufficient space nor author skill to record the thorough reasoning processes which should underlie any predicted circumstance. Consequently, the writer has relied

heavily on the thoughtful deliberations of others--those few who probe the future and write in that tense. Although terse recitation of their conclusions may tend to sound arbitrary, the reader is asked to consider that seemingly bland predictions have been carefully supported in the source material. Several official long-range forecasts, while not referred to for security reasons, have provided invaluable background. These forecasts are usually prepared as input for specific plans and programs. Having had some experience in developing Army long-range strategic plans, the writer is familiar with the high caliber of talent and effort which must go into the preparation of input forecasts. They are the product of seasoned politico-military thinkers in uniform. The other two long-range studies used provided an almost indispensable foundation for the forecast portion of this thesis; and they are quoted liberally. One done under the auspices of the Syracuse Research Corporation is the splendid result of visionary research by 90 professors from the nation's universities. Another study, prepared by the Bendix Corporation for the U.S. Marine Corps, is equally perceptive in identifying the forces and trends which promise to shape the world ahead. My appreciation for the authoritative works these military and civilian scholars are able to produce in a difficult field of strategy is infinite.

No less gratitude must go to the capable and patient people of the US Army War College Library. Surrounded by shelves which prove that too many people in the world can write and too few have anything new to say, they did much to help this student distinguish soap from substance.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

"If first we know where we are, and
whither we are tending, we could better
judge what to do, and how to do it."

--Lincoln

WHERE WE ARE

The American is in an interesting predicament. He remembers that his country emerged from World War II as the wealthiest, most powerful and yet benevolent nation on earth. Since that time, a series of disconcerting discoveries has forced him to consider all sorts of new axioms alien to his traditionally forthright thinking. He is now obliged to recognize that: Allies can suddenly become formidable enemies....The vanquished seem to fare better than the victors....Generosity, with or without strings, produces hostility Defeat of the enemy is no longer the objective in war....Bigger bangs for less bucks actually cost most....Strategic objectives and capabilities must be openly advertised to the enemy in the name of credibility....Soldiers must be diplomats and social workers while civilians devise military strategy....Liberals are cautious and conservatives propose risks....International organizations generate nationalism rather than subjugate it....Ideological conflict can be ameliorated by use of the terms "profit motive" and "detente" And lately, the American has learned that the most sophisticated strategy and the most artful form of military endeavor is to "fight to negotiate."

The irony inherent in these discoveries has confused him. After 20 years of paradoxical thinking and events, he is today not sure whether the U.S. should try to stem the tide in Space or Southeast Asia; he is not sure whether the U.S. needs more missiles or more marines, more satellites or sailors, more alliances or aviators, or more morality or mettle. He vaguely suspects that a new situation is evolving where the major threat and the real enemy may not be one and the same. Worse, he is uncertain whether the United States, itself born of revolution, should now face an era of revolts by ignoring them, thwarting them, stabilizing them, supporting them, or fostering them. In short, he senses the predicament of one who is trying to repair a moving locomotive from a position on the track.

The older American sees even fewer certainties around him. The world no longer exhibits the respect it had for the brisk U.S. policies of the Teddy Roosevelt era, the awe it had of U.S. power at the close of World War II, the admiration it had for U.S. selflessness during the Marshall Plan era, or the confidence it had in U.S. leadership of Free World nations during the bipolar era. Further, there are some friendly nations who have now come to doubt not only the resolve of the U.S. to defeat aggression, but even the right of the U.S. to intervene where aggression is obviously occurring. Looking back, the American is inclined to wonder where the U.S. went wrong in its actions toward the world and in its attempts to secure the peace. Looking forward, he is

tempted to wonder whether the U.S. should even attempt to salvage the world from itself again. Looking at where he is now, he is disturbed and perplexed. But in recalling where several decades of soaring slogans and strategies have brought him, he is becoming increasingly sure of at least two things:

First--the "isms" of ideology, color, ambition, and power continue to manifest themselves in perpetual global conflict.

Second--there is no cheap, clean, simple, and safe solution to the expensive, messy, complex, and dangerous problem of coping with international disorder.

These two observations are truisms of course, but they appear to have special meaning to the future role of the United States in the world arena.

CHAPTER 2

THE THREAT

KALEIDOSCOPIC MYOPIA

Most problems now plaguing free nations arise from the divergent views held by their leaders and policymakers as to the source and nature of the threat.

There are those who sense the threat in terms of an intellectual struggle--ideological, psychological or technological. There are others who view the threat as being primarily political--involving power blocs, bipolarity, third forces, poliocentrism, neutralism, nationalism or pure imperialism. Some regard the basic danger as a combination of social forces at work--economic and demographic pressures, racial conflicts, independence movements, modernization aspirations, and the simple spectre of hunger. Many regard the threat as basically a continuing military problem--involving conflicts of high, medium and low intensity. Splinter groups put the threat in terms of weaponry and targetry--damage limiting requirements, accidental nuclear war, countervalue attack, waves of conventional forces and the like. Still others take the broad historical view and consider the threat to be a dynamic melange of all these forces and pressures.

Not only is the nature of the threat a subject of disagreement among leaders and policymakers, but there is even doubt as to which of their enemies (or allies) constitute the very source of the threat.

These honest but dangerous differences in assessing the basic problem are intensified by the existence of an overstocked strategy supermarket whose revolving bookracks promise to provide the wallowing policymaker with solutions to all things.

OVER-SIMPLIFICATION AS A VIRTUE

In effect, the threat to western world security has become so broad, the problems of maintaining stability have become so intricate, the sources of unrest have become so pervasive, the possibilities of conflict have become so numerous, and strategic opinions have become so varied, that the total spectrum of disorder and warfare now seems to be without dimensions. Any attempt to expound on the long-range interaction of all the factors mentioned above would be to lead both the writer and the reader deeper into the very labyrinth from which escape is sought.¹ Thus, if trends affecting the future of the U.S. during the next decade are to be meaningfully examined in an abbreviated paper, a few dimensions and assumptions simply must be applied. Even deliberate over-simplification may lend helpful perspective in viewing an era that promises complications within its complexities.

¹Syracuse University Research Corporation, "The U.S. and the World in the 1985 Era," in Clearinghouse for Federal Scientific and Technical Information, AD 613527, Mar. 1964, p. 100, reminds: "prognostications about world power are fraught with peril, especially since military, economic, and ideological forces contain dynamic elements that catalyze each other."

ASSUMPTIONS

A projection of the world environment 5-15 years hence requires at least the assumption that a general thermonuclear war will not be deliberately initiated during that period. An opposite hypothesis would not only vitiate the purpose of a long-range forecast but would presuppose a failure of our deterrent effort. This assumption is not used to wish away the ever-present possibility of such a case nor to disregard the precariousness of nuclear proliferation. Instead, it recognizes the current tendency to deemphasize deliberate nuclear attack and abstract destruction as a rational course for any nation, and permits greater consideration of other more probable events.

A second hypothesis is based on what Professor Cheyney calls the Law of Continuity. His law embraces the not uncomical idea that "in the great majority of cases one generation goes on doing and believing what the previous one did and believed."² From this can be drawn the general assumption that within 15 years (historically, a mere flash) human nature will not change so radically as to refute all history and abolish conflict between peoples and nations.³ After more than 4,000 years of recorded warfare, the world now averages 5 wars a year. The assumption that conflict will continue appears reasonable.

²Ibid., p. 3, citing excerpt from J.M. Robinson, The Human Comedy. London: The Bodley Head, 1937, p. 73.

³Charles C. Lerche, Jr., Principles of International Politics, p. 137, says: "International conflict is an inevitable feature of world politics....No state can hope to escape conflict with other states in the accomplishment of even its minimum policy objectives".

One final working assumption seems essential to keeping the subject within bounds. It is assumed that the United States will undertake no major revision of its current policy and strategy and will continue to carry these out in generally the same manner as during the past two decades. Although such an assumption will somewhat determine or condition the tone of the forecast, the writer is aware of no evidence which would support any assertion to the contrary.

On the basis then that conflicts will continue to occur but will not in the next 15 years culminate in an all-out nuclear war, the forecast which follows will attempt to estimate the general conditions which will prevail if the United States adheres to its present course in the face of the kaleidoscopic threat to its stature and security.

CHAPTER 3

THE FORECAST

WHITHER WE ARE TENDING

For the foreseeable future the world will continue to be marked by a basic cleavage in understanding between two segments of mankind. For centuries, one small group of the earth's inhabitants has flourished in a rapidly advancing civilization while a large portion of humanity has struggled in a relatively primitive environment. Moving through history at different speeds and on different planes, and absorbed with their own forms of conflict, these two societal segments have failed to recognize each other's basic purposes and needs. Today, the small advanced segment has already brought the nation-state system to a high pitch, has already flexed its technological muscles in global wars and space, has conducted experiments in collective security and world organization, and now seems to be looking once more toward purely national interests. The larger and more primitive portion of humanity is only now beginning to enter that turbulent epoch, hoping to telescope centuries of development into years. Although some degree of mutual human awareness between the two societies has come about lately, the fundamental incompatibility in understanding will continue to be the root of the world's problems.

By 1980, the world will be small, saturated and tense. It is virtually so today, of course. It will be no less 15 years hence because, in addition to the described societal gap in growth-rate, the forces of technology, demography and nationalism will have had 15 extra years in which to exert their pressures.

Easily foreseen are sprawling communications media enabling nations to peer more critically into the affairs of distant neighbors. Clearly apparent are the doubling populations and new nations striving for well-being and identity. Also obvious is an upsurge of nationalism which by 1980 may overshadow all else.

It is within this broad historical context that the more definitive characteristics of the 1970-1980 period can better be examined.

PREDICTIONS ON POWER

The most conservative prediction that can be made about the coming decade is that power and its realities will be with us. It is already clear that the next 15 years will produce the stress and sweat of an important period in power politics during which the vital elements of those national strengths which comprise power will be acquired, threatened, or lost. The indicators are numerous. In the political, psychological and military fields, new power gains can be foreseen for several nations now approaching a technological capability to produce nuclear weapons or nuclear materials.⁴ As to the power factor of geography, few would deny the likelihood of Red China acquiring an increased geographical base during the next 15 years, years, to say nothing of broader strength in the pure military sense. In the emerging nations, most of their power resides in essentially undeveloped assets in demography, geography, natural resources and human energy; but here too it is plain that these nations will be both the subject and the object of intense power plays in the future. Certainly the USSR will become discontent with diminished political and military power resulting from its estrangement, if not divorce, from Red China. China may find it equally unendurable.

⁴Syracuse University Research Corporation, "The U.S. and the World in the 1985 Era," in Clearinghouse for Federal Scientific and Technical Information, AD 613527, Mar. 1964, p. 112, foresees Japan, India, Israel and several other states acquiring a nuclear capability by 1985, and rates Belgium, Canada, Italy and Sweden as having the current capacity to manufacture nuclear weapons if they choose. The Syracuse forecast predicts that: "...for reasons of insecurity, prestige or military economy, a dozen or more nations will have nuclear weapons in their arsenals by 1985."

The leadership element of national power will also come into question and produce serious reactions as the facts of attrition visit the aging DeGaulle, Erhard, Tito, Mao, Ho, Chiang and Sukarno. Not the least important indicator of power shifts lying ahead is the lessening influence the U.S. will be able to exert over an increasingly independent Europe which is now convinced of its own economic strength and a softened Soviet threat.

All this is not to suggest that suddenly, the future offers nothing but an explosive seeking and flaunting of power. Indeed, there will probably be several important moderating factors at work.

One factor which will tend to moderate the use of militant power is seen in the vastly expanding network of international agreements. Aside from the numerous political alliances in force, nations of the world are becoming virtually enmeshed in a web of social, technical, trade and transportation agreements and conventions. For example, the number of international conferences in these fields in which the U.S. alone has participated has doubled during the last three decades, and it currently numbers over 300 such conferences a year.⁵ Nations are becoming so intricately bound to each other in these quasi-political fields that any attempt on the part of one to extricate itself for the purpose of a power play will cause others to apply pressure on the offender.

⁵Elmer Plischke, Conduct of American Diplomacy, p. 488.

Moreover, it is foreseen that as the world community becomes more experienced and resourceful in the public airing of issues and in the muffling of conflict, "international resources will be quickly mobilized to soothe felt needs...before tempers are strained to the breaking point."⁶ While this view expressed by the Syracuse Research group may seem somewhat romantic, there can be no doubt that the expansive social and economic accords being reached today are gradually providing a stronger body of international law for the future.

The United Nations of course represents a significant second factor tending to ameliorate future power conflicts. The 1964 financial crisis over payment for the Congo intervention made it obvious to the UN that its procedures for peacekeeping operations must be clarified and strengthened. Studies toward this end are already underway. An assessment of its future role made by a group of scholars in the field of international relations is worthy of reflection:

"By 1985, there will be a small standing UN force composed of national contingents under permanent UN command, constantly and immediately available from their sovereign nations for UN police activities anywhere in the world...It will continue to reflect, as an organization, the power of the world, and it will prove effective in its undertakings so long as it does reflect the real power of the world...By 1985 it will be impossible to keep any international political issue out of the discussions of the UN...because of its vital importance to the whole community in preventing

⁶ Syracuse University Research Corporation, op. cit., p. 115.

violence...Neither the U.S. nor the USSR by 1985 will be physically coerced by the weaker states of the United Nations; nor will the developed areas be forced against their will to give economic aid to the underdeveloped areas; but neither the strong nor the wealthy will be able to flee from the opinion of mankind in the UN."⁸

The third moderating factor might be called educated enmity. It relates to the increasing subtlety and skill with which nations now seek to impose their political will on others without resort to unbridled military power. Few will dispute that major nations now display far greater finesse in the use of power than they did 25 years ago. Today, for the price of a popular treatise on strategy, national leaders can determine precisely at what rung their nations are poised on the ladder of escalation, and what reaction the next step upward is likely to produce.⁹ Only the options to be offered and accepted need be determined. And it is significant that more attention is now paid to providing an adversary with a graceful exit than with a final blow. While this form of international fencing seems almost bizarre, mutual understanding and precise temperance in the application of force are becoming the trademarks of maturity in the nuclear age. There is of course the much discussed possibility that proliferation will reverse this prudent trend. It will at least multiply the chances of war by miscalculation or accident, especially if a newly acquired nuclear capability is rattled by a hotheaded and otherwise weak nation.

⁸ Syracuse University Research Corporation, op. cit., p. 116-117.

⁹ Herman Kahn, On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios, pp. 41-51.

But barring such spontaneous nuclear combustion, it is visualized that a larger nuclear club membership will not necessarily raise the probability of deliberate nuclear war. It has already been seen in Korea, Cuba and Vietnam that "...while nuclear capabilities threaten a quick escalation of conflict they also force a quicker international demand for peaceful accommodation or at least a more careful use of power."¹⁰ Existing nuclear nations understand this clearly. They are reluctant to risk either condemnation or retaliation by others. It is doubtful that newer nuclear nations will be any less cautious, especially when they discern that they, too, have become potential nuclear targets for others. It thus appears that the unrestricted use of power will continue to be regarded by most nations as an unsophisticated and hazardous course of action, proliferation notwithstanding.*

¹⁰Syracuse University Research Corporation, op. cit., p. 113 .

*This view is by no means universal or even popular. A contrary stand is taken by Robert W. Tucker, "Stability and the Nth Country Problem," Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) Study Memo No. 5, Wash., D.C., 8 Nov. 1961, p. iv: "It is likely that nuclear diffusion will prove destabilizing if for no other reason than that it will present us with a novel world, and one substantially less secure than the present world. The acquisition of nuclear weapons may be expected to have a sobering effect upon nations, but any increase of prudence may be more than offset by the insecurity many nations will experience." However, the writer of this thesis supports the Syracuse viewpoint. Proliferation will not necessarily create a world of cocked nuclear pistols, and even if it does, that fact alone will tend to force all nations to limit their objectives and their ambitions. Greater prudence has already been demonstrated; the lack of it has not. The essential factor to be recognized is that acquisition of a nuclear capability by an otherwise small power represents international prestige and deterrence against encroachment by a local neighbor. Example: France v. Germany.

A fourth factor which may tend to moderate the use of power cannot go unmentioned: Arms control and disarmament movements. Certainly, genuine agreements in this regard, however small, may induce major powers to shy away from any action jeopardizing further agreement and ease of tension. On the other hand, such agreements must still hang on the thin thread of international trust--a virtue often stretched beyond endurance. Recognizing this, most observers hold little optimism for arms control to have any noteworthy impact on power politics during the next decade. "It is unrealistic...to expect that nations will give up their arms until there are marked changes in national rivalries and relationships and unless an acceptable substitute for force can be found...."¹¹

In effect, future forays for the sake of power will be somewhat tranquillized by a tighter linkage of economic and social accords, by a stronger UN peacekeeping effort, and by a greater fear of escalation as nuclear proliferation occurs. However, these hopeful trends are more hopeful than they are trends. Nations will continue to remember that "...the political geography of the world has been fixed more by power than by principle."¹²

And the prime catalyst for power ventures will continue to be nationalism.

¹¹Joseph I. Coffey, "A Stable Military Environment" Bendix Corporation Study on Arms Control, July 1965, p. 2.

¹²Vernon Van Dyke, International Politics, p. 54.

PRESSURE + POWER + NATIONALISM = CONFLICT

The old international energy equation is still sound.

"No more potent force exists today than nationalism for incurring tensions, inflaming hatreds and exalting the sovereign ideal of a strong national state."¹³

"It will take new forces at least as powerful and new adjustments at least as painful to destroy the nation-state. Nor is nationalism an ancient force weary and spent from long usage. On the contrary, it is a relatively new development that is only now coming into its own in much of the world. To believe that nationalism will vanish because it is dangerous or that nations will wither away because there are better ways of organizing mankind is naive...The nation is the major unit in world politics today, and it is likely to remain so for some time to come."¹⁴

It matters little whether the term nationalism or neo-nationalism is applied. The national drive underlying Ghana's emerging quest for world identity and African leadership is basically the same as the neo-national drive underlying France's renewed quest for independent grandeur and European leadership. "Nationalism is the strongest ideology extant. It is the most potent of the dynamic forces which guide the behavior of statesmen. Desires connected with nationalism have influenced international relations in the last century to an extent which would be difficult to exaggerate. By every sign, they will continue to do so."¹⁵

¹³ Stephen S. Goodspeed, The Nature and Function of International Organization, p. 18.

¹⁴ A.F.M. Aron, World Politics, p. 50

¹⁵ Vernon Van Dyke, op. cit., p. 58.

CHIPS OFF THE OLD BLOC

The long term effects of nationalism may not be all bad. Although nationalistic drives will frequently tilt U.S. dreams of a stabilized and cooperative West, these drives will also continue to have a deepening impact on the adversary East. Current trends suggest that the Soviet Union is becoming more Russian, and its Asian counterpart (while still exalting Marx) is behaving increasingly Chinese.¹⁶ Indeed, much of the ideological framework of international communism is obviously coming unglued. Africa and Indonesia have not been completely sold on Red China's vituperative version of the ideology and East Europe is cautiously testing Moscow's leadership. Peking and Moscow are now indisputably at odds with each other. These events appear to bode well for the West, the West's own internal stresses notwithstanding.

But one stark fact remains: Whether motivated jointly by a roughly common ideology or motivated independently by nationalistic ambitions, neither the USSR nor Red China has lost, will lose, or can lose its taste for expansion. "It would be a fatal error to assume that the Kremlin has already given up its objectives simply because the danger of universal conflagration is dwindling."¹⁷ After a meteoric rise to world power in only 45 years, she is rarely pausing to review her economic and political modus operandi, and regrouping herself to suit the times.

¹⁶ Adrian St. John, "Russia and Red China - Mutual Nemesis", U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 87, No. 8, pp 48-57.

¹⁷ Kai-Uwe von Hassel, "Organizing Western Defense," Foreign Affairs, Jan. 1965.

It would be equally fallacious to bicker over whether Red China's power is factual or vocal. Many consider that Red China is still in the middle of a long struggle to come out of feudal darkness. Others counter with the view that production of enriched uranium rather than the expedient use of plutonium for her first atomic tests portends a surprisingly advanced technology.¹⁸ Both cases, however valid, are somewhat beside the point. Her masses are today sufficiently awakened, united, aggressive and capable of causing war anywhere on the Asian mainland and pursuing it at length with the hope of removing Western influence from Asia. That in itself is enough for now. And the next 15 years will hardly produce a decline in her assets or ambitions.

Thus, while the term "Sino-Soviet Bloc" has been dropped from fashionable usage, there remains a formidable Chinese-Russian Entente in the uneasy classical sense, within which both parties will continue to use different means to achieve equally imperialistic objectives within their respective (as yet not gravely competing) spheres of influence.

The impact of the Sino-Soviet schism on the U.S. is patent. The USSR will endure as the primary threat to U.S. security and global interests. While probably avoiding military confrontation, it will exploit every political and technological device to demean the stature of the U.S. The People Republic of China will endure as the most active threat to U.S. interests in Asia, and to a lesser degree in other regions. It will have fewer compunctions about confronting the U.S. militarily, especially at her borders.

¹⁸ Leonard Beaton, "The Chinese Bomb," Survival, Vol. 7, No. 1, Jan.-Feb. 1965, p. 2.

The most serious consequences of the Sino-Soviet split will not be felt until the U.S. is either cajoled (or forced by circumstances) into a major accommodation with one or the other. The deranging effect such an event would have on whatever U.S. collective security system then exists, would be difficult to overstate. In any event, the Sino-Soviet dispute will by no means represent a diminishing threat to world peace, nor, indeed, will it lend stability to the worldwide power structure now evolving.

DISORDER IN THE NEW ORDER (USSR V. U.S.)

The aftermath of an era of bipolarity will be anything but neat. Indications are that polycentrism may well break down to something called "descentrism". The years leading up to 1980 will be highlighted by a "...diffusion of power centers, not dissimilar to the pattern of power distribution in the 1930's...Both the USSR and the U.S. will remain in the first rank...However, during the next 15 years, the military and political cohesiveness of alliances led by the U.S. and the USSR will loosen and probably disappear as relevant factors in international affairs."¹⁹ By 1980, "... there will be no political union between Western Europe and the United States...Western Europe will tend to be an accomplice in the foreign policy of the U.S., but often Western European nations will restrain, modify, or even contradict American plans."²⁰ Similarly, the Soviet Union will have lost its ideological grip on East European states and will find those states carrying on considerable and not always comforting intercourse with non-communist nations.²¹ Neither the U.S. nor the USSR will particularly relish seeing the strength of their respective alliances becoming so diluted. The U.S. will continue to remind itself that the USSR precipitated a world-wide anti-western movement and a 20-year hot/cold war which required the U.S. to undertake an unprecedented defense effort and a \$76 billion aid program involving alliances with 42 nations.²²

¹⁹Bendix Corporation, The World Environment to 1980, p. III-3.

²⁰Syracuse Research Corporation, op. cit., p. 104.

²¹Bendix Corporation, op. cit., p. III-4.

²²"How Helpful Are U.S. Allies?", U.S. News & World Report, 13 Sept. 1965, p. 50.

The USSR will not easily forget that the U.S. sought to thwart the Soviet Union's natural growth with a band of hostile nuclear bases which required the USSR to develop vast defensive systems at the expense of improving the welfare of the Russian people. Both nations will continue to recognize their vulnerability to each other, with or without their weakening alliances. Both will continue to compete fiercely in technology and space, seeking an extra margin of deterrence.

On the other hand, as time goes on much more will be made of American-Russian growing political maturity and wealth, their unanimity of views on foreign policy issues, and their mutual responsibility for world order and progress. Many will regard such factors as a suitable basis for at least a platonic family relationship. However, no formal announcement to this effect can be expected prior to 1980. It is more likely that, during the next 15 years, both the U.S. and the USSR will be struggling to determine which is the more important and realistic asset: their collective deterrent or their individual detente.

Initial answers will probably be sought among the undercurrents now surfacing in Europe.

EUROPE V. THE USSR

The third most important cluster of power will of course continue to be Western Europe, with Germany, France and the UK still in the vanguard. However, by 1980 it will be difficult to identify Western Europe as a cohesive entity or as a repository of collective power. This circumstance will occur as a result of either of two significant and somewhat contradictory trends now in operation.

The first of these trends, a move toward broader economic cooperation, indicates that the present sharp line between West and East Europe will be blurred by an economic lacework stretched into most of the existing satellite countries. Stronger economic ties between communist and non-communist nations will unquestionably provide an element of stability. It is visualized, however, that such stability will also serve a Soviet purpose. As these East-West ties become mutually profitable, the need for a strong Western defense posture against the East will seem less and less vital to most European nations. Since Soviet interest will be best served by a NATO Alliance which is inert (if not dead), the USSR will probably accommodate this trend toward East-West economic cooperation and stability, at least to the extent that East European nations continue to maintain some political allegiance to the Soviet "Commonwealth". Thus, barring a renewal of Soviet truculence, the NATO Alliance over the years can be expected to take on the appearance of a loose contingency plan to

to oppose the USSR itself rather than a formally integrated defense structure against the entire East.

The second major trend in Europe is a deep nationalistic movement bound to lead to widespread political disunity. Despite the stronger economic links being forged throughout the continent, "political unification in Europe is doubtful during this time period...A resurgence of nationalism in Europe...will work against political consultation and cooperation."²³ In an environment of nationalistic drives (already set in motion by DeGaulle), it takes no clairvoyance to foresee France and Germany once again in stern competition, with:

- France striving for the dominant role in Western Europe and perhaps seeking a more concrete understanding with the USSR to secure that role;
- Germany unwilling to remain permanently hemmed-in, subservient, divided, and atomically impotent;
- Other continental states recoiling in apprehension and looking for bilateral accords to secure their own national interests and safety;
- The USSR appreciating dissention in the Western Alliance, but guarding against the likelihood that French intransigence will intensify German militance; and
- The U.S. trying to respect West Germany's concern without totally alienating France, rupturing the Alliance, and rendering West Europe even more vulnerable to the USSR.

²³ Bendin Corporation, op. cit., p. III-3

Even if historical Franco-German animosity does not again reach the pitch described, it is evident that the force of nationalism and the exaggerated reactions it produces will engender an increasing level of tension in Western Europe during the 1970's. For these reasons, it appears that neither the trend toward nationalistic disunity nor the trend toward economic expansion offers a favorable outlook for the Western Alliance. Instead, the probability is high that by 1980:

- NATO, if still in existence, will be a loose arrangement.
- Europe will be in a serious struggle to achieve a balance of power within itself and independent of the power factor and influence of the U.S.
- Peaceful re-unification of Germany will not have occurred.
- The USSR will be viewing the restlessness of Europe with the interest of a potential heir.

ASIA V. RED CHINA

The next most important center of power, paranoia and pandemonium will continue to lie in Asia. Red China, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia and the wobbly nations of South and Southeast Asia all have conflicting interests which will defy peaceful settlement anytime during the next 15 years and which will almost inevitably result in the use of force until solutions to basic social and geographical problems are found. To assess the historical complexity of today's situation there and visualize its future effects, one need only tick off the deep-rooted enmity involved in disputes between South Korea v. North Korea and Japan; North Vietnam v. South Vietnam; Cambodia v. Thailand; Pakistan v. India; Indonesia v. Malaysia; and Red China v. Tibet, India, Taiwan, Korea, and Mongolia, etc. Manifestly, another decade of cease-fires (Korea, Kashmir, probably South Vietnam and elsewhere) will amount only to clamping lids on boiling pots without reducing the source of heat. Since much of that heat will continue to emanate from Red China, attention here will be focused on the trends affecting that state.

It belabors common knowledge to cite that Red China's objectives include the establishment of Chinese hegemony over all portions of Asia south of the USSR, the removal of Western influence from that area, and the assumption of leadership in an Afro-Asian-Latin American "communist guerrilla movement" to encircle the "cities" of Western Europe and North America. ²⁴

²⁴ Lin Biao, speech "Long Live The Victory Of The People's War", Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 3 Sept. 1965, p. 22.

Now that Red China is ensconced in the nuclear club it would surely seem apparent that she will attempt to achieve those objectives by increasingly militant policies and brazen moves. In certain respects, the next 15 years will probably bear this out. However, those reasonably informed on China²⁵ foresee a careful distinction developing between Red China's image as a World Power and her actual capabilities to perform like one.

By 1980, Red China--a political entity for barely 30 years--will still be in difficult straits because of obvious population and economic problems. Nevertheless, her enormous human energies will by then be harnessed more effectively and she will be diligently expanding her scientific and technological base for the prestige value such advancement will afford. By 1980, Red China's nuclear capability will include adequate numbers and delivery means to cover most important cities in the Asian hemisphere, and limited means of extending this capability to other continents.²⁶ However, still lacking realistic retaliatory or second-strike effectiveness, her nuclear strength will tend to be used largely for power play purposes as a part of China's plan to assert herself as a major force in international affairs.

²⁵Bendix Corporation, op. cit., p. III-5.

²⁶Peter Braestrup, "McNamara Warns NATO of Chinese Atom Threat," The New York Times, 16 Dec. 1965, p. 1, cites US Defense Secretary as pointing out that Red China, despite a "near famine" economy, is spending 10% of their GNP on defense. Article also reports Mr. McNamara as expecting Red China to have "several dozen" medium range missiles deployed by 1976, along with initial deployment of intercontinental ballistic missiles which could hit Europe or the United States.

Having by 1980 achieved at least part of her sought-after global prominence--

"...the diplomatic stature of China will be greatly improved. It will gradually accommodate itself to negotiation and agreement as an equal with other states (a practice completely new to China)...

[By 1980] the PRC will hold an important place in the councils of the United Nations and be marginally contributing to international organizations."²⁷

Outside Asia, the People's Republic of China will operate within the constraints imposed upon a new nuclear power which recognizes that it has also become a new nuclear target. Neither her capabilities nor her chances for success will permit any major military escapades beyond the Asian continent. She will continue to pursue her worldwide revolutionary objectives through subversive means, support of "liberation movements," and "big power" diplomatic pressure. Chinese gains and influence over distant Africa will probably be limited during the next 15 years, and will not necessarily reflect sweeping acceptance of Chinese revolutionary ideology. Such gains will instead depend upon the adroitness and success of her policies in Asia, as well as on the size of unencumbered contributions she is able to make to the target country abroad.

²⁷Syracuse University Research Corporation, op. cit., p. 103.

On the Asian continent itself, bolder attitudes underlying Red China expansionism will continue to collide with U.S.

interests.²⁸ Laying groundwork through political infiltration--

"...China will exercise increasing military weight especially at its borders with Korea, Burma, Thailand, Laos, Vietnam and Mongolia. [By 1930] some or all of these states, and perhaps Cambodia and Malaysia, will have fallen into the Chinese orbit, strongly influenced by or attached to Peking's policy."²⁹

Membership in the United Nations will be fully exploited to identify such actions as "just causes" for removal of Western influence from anywhere in Asia. In this regard, the U.S. will find it increasingly difficult to enlist world support for her continued presence in Asia.

Trade relations between China and Japan will eventually be encouraged by the former and welcomed by the latter, thus reducing Japanese reliance on the U.S., and correspondingly reducing U.S. influence in the Orient. However, an increasingly realistic Japan, with enormous industrial capacity and sophisticated technological capabilities (including nuclear), will act as a counterpoise to any forceful Chinese expansionism.³⁰ Strength to that counterpoise will be somewhat enhanced by a technologically awakened India, by Philippine fear of Chinese takeover, and by whatever long-term persistence the U.S. displays in staying in Asia.

While it is difficult to arrive at a meaningful "summary" of forecasted trends in Asia, China's 1930 world position and reactions might be analogous to those manifested by the USSR during the 1950's when it was breaking through the U.S. containment crust.

²⁸ Bendix Corporation, op. cit., p. III-5

²⁹ Syracuse Research Corporation, op. cit., 103.

³⁰ Bendix Corporation, op. cit., p. III-3.

THE BROWN WORLD V. ITSELF

The region ranging from West Pakistan across North Africa will remain politically volatile for the foreseeable future. Although the area has been relatively quiet in the last few years, the tensions of lingering colonialism, nationalism, pan-Arabism, Arab-Israeli antagonism and East-West competition will continue to flourish in an environment of dynastic quarrels, trigger temperaments and oil-rich extravagance amidst abject poverty. During the next 15 years, the region will be even further troubled by "population growth, overdrawn economic programs, demands for social reform, and the instabilities of government."³¹ Prospects for the solution of all or any of these problems within this time-frame will remain cheerless. Until most Arab nations focus on achieving orderly internal improvements instead of exhausting their energies on the eventual destruction of Israel, the removal of pro-west factions and the sponsoring of grandiose Afro-Asian enterprises--the region will continue to disserve itself as an arena of perpetual conflict.

Most signs point to the probability that Arab states will choose to develop as individual nations rather than as segments of a United Arab world under a Nasser or some facsimile. In attempting to achieve national identity, individual Arab nations will continue to express vacillating disenchantment with the UAR, the USSR and China, as well as with western oil colonialists.

³¹ Ibid.

In effect, no change is anticipated in the Arab propensity for playing the East against the West and benefiting therefrom whenever possible. Meanwhile, sporadic disputes will prevail in the areas as maturing oil-countries seek to nationalize or gain higher profits from their resources, and as non-oil countries seek to bring smaller but lucrative oil-states under their influence.³² The festering problem of the Kurds and the four-sided territorial squabble involving Morocco, Algeria, Spanish Sahara and Mauritania will also contribute their share of friction points.

By 1980, Egypt and Israel will still be the dominant powers in the area, and may well possess nuclear capabilities. A number of Arab states will have moderately improved their domestic status through social reforms and bilateral trade agreements with communist and non-communist nations alike. However, "...the drive for Arab unity, spearheaded by Egypt, will have mixed successes and failures...and the Arab world will not be reconciled with Israel."³³

When combined with all the other unstable elements in the Arab world, the mixture of nationalism and oil promises a low flash point for major conflict at any time during the next 15 years.

³²Ibid.

³³Syracuse University Research Corporation, op. cit., p. 109.

LATIN AMERICA V. THE COLOSSUS

During the next 15 years, Latin America will not produce any power centers of world significance; but Brazil will realize much of its potential importance, and Cuba will continue to warrant nuisance attention. Relations with the U.S. will generally tend to be governed by historical attitudes recalling that the Colossus of The North failed to provide its own Western Hemisphere with a Marshall Plan for development and defense against communism as it did for Western Europe, and instead now resorts to pressure and military intervention to cope with resulting domestic upheavals.

"Latin American regimes will remain politically vulnerable, with rapidly increasing populations constituting a major hurdle to raising the standards of living despite substantial economic growth."³⁴ "Many Latin American states will move closer to socialism, though they will not be allied with communist states."³⁵

"There will be little foreign domination, but the Soviet Union, Communist China [and others] will bid with the U.S. for influence in the area... By 1980, there will be no American, Russian or Chinese-dominated land bases in the Caribbean or Central American states, but [meanwhile] there will be a continuing struggle for ideological leadership, marked by changes of governments, economic assistance agreements, and hostile propaganda... Between now and 1980 there will be many attempts at political subversion in Latin America [some from abroad]... For the most part, the causes of subversion will be local, due to economic protest, social inequality and political tyranny, but they will quickly develop into international issues involving the U.S." ³⁶

³⁴ Bendix Corporation, op. cit., p. III-7.

³⁵ Syracuse University Research Corporation, op. cit., p. 188.

³⁶ Ibid.

These prognostications would indicate that the U.S. will be confronted with increasingly obscure challenges in Latin America as those nations struggle toward their own highly nationalistic, dictatorially controlled and quasi-socialistic forms of government.

It is therefore visualized that the degree of hostility or cooperation which Latin America directs northward during the coming decade will depend largely on the extent to which the U.S. is willing to serve as an anonymous donor to her economy without tampering with her national sensitivity or her traditional right to revolt.

AFRICA V. EVERYBODY

Although no single African nation will emerge as a notable power during the next 15 years, Africa as a whole will acquire an increasingly important role in the world power structure.³⁷ Current trends indicate that while existing European colonies in Africa will for the most part disappear during the next 15 years, erstwhile colonial powers will compete with the U.S., the USSR, and Red China to retain or cultivate varying degrees of influence.³⁸

"There will be close ties to European trade, financial institutions and education, as well as some economic and academic or training connections with the USSR, China and the communist orbits."³⁹

Although a number of African states will achieve a consonance of views on many policy issues outside the continent, the chance of African federation in any consequential form seems remote. It is visualized that nationalistic struggles, internal power plays, disputes over artificial non-ethnic boundaries, tribal conflicts, difficulties in public administration, hastily conceived social programs, and population pressures will all serve to perpetuate conflicts within and between African states.

³⁷ Ibid., p. 110.

³⁸ Bendix Corporation, op. cit., p. III-7

³⁹ Syracuse University Research Corporation, op. cit., p. 110.

"The confrontation between South Africa and black African states will overshadow other events in the area. South Africa will remain under white domination...but probably will be faced with a prolonged guerrilla war supported by the black African states. The outcome may still be in doubt by 1980."⁴⁰

While the foregoing prognostications seem to be a reasonable projection of trends (though perhaps off in timing with respect to South Africa), it is nonetheless apparent that much of Africa's future hinges on the attitudes now being shaped by the major powers toward that region. The following succinct appraisal of current sentiments, as expressed by an Asian, appears applicable:

"In their attitude to that continent and its people, both Europe and Asia are afflicted by a guilt complex --Europe as the main exploiter and Asia as its abettor; and both of them, recovering from the first rude shock of Africa's rapid independence do not know quite where to fit in the new arrival who until yesterday was an outsider....And Africa, uncertain of its own place, tends to draw attention to itself by alternately bawling like a neglected infant, or in its adult moments, treading deliberately on other people's toes or, more aggressively, punching the nearest nose within reach."⁴¹

Most observers of the African scene feel that Africa will continue to serve as both the target and the conscience of the major powers. The manner in which those powers deal with Africa in the next few decades will probably determine the entire nature of conflict for eras to come. Indeed, relations being formed with that continent almost at this moment, will decide whether or not future issues, however minor, remain nationalistic and fairly local, or become racial and global in scope.

⁴⁰ London: *Cooperation*, op. cit., p. III-7.

⁴¹ Frank Moraes, "The Importance of Being Black: An Asian Looks at Africa," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 43, No. 1, Oct. 1964, p. 99.

FORECAST SUMMARY AND APPRAISAL

It is appropriate here to recapitulate the major prognostications offered in the preceding portions of this chapter, relate these predictions to U.S. national policy, and draw certain subconclusions concerning the 1970-1980 world environment impacting on that policy.

The Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Earle G. Wheeler, has provided a compact version of U.S. national policy and national security objectives:

"President Johnson has stated our overall national policy very succinctly in these words:

'Peace is our mission. Security is our obligation. The United States has kept world peace for 19 years--we intend to continue to do so.'

"To implement this policy we have established five specific objectives:

1. To deter or defeat aggression at any level of intensity.
2. To bring about a closer association of the industrialized democracies.
3. To help less-developed areas carry out the revolution of modernization.
4. To assist in the emergence of a genuine world community.
5. To end the arms race and reduce the risk of war." ⁴²

An attempt will now be made to relate the above U.S. policy/objectives to a Forecast summary.

⁴² Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, "How Can Military Strength Best Promote Peace?", The General Electric Forum, Vol. 8, No. 3, p. 16.

Objective: To end the arms race and reduce the risk of war.

Forecast: For the foreseeable future, there will be a severe societal gap in understanding between the highly advanced segment of mankind moving into space and the huge portion of humanity which is still struggling to telescope centuries of earthly progress into a few years. The world of 1980 will be no haven. It will be small, saturated and tense because of obviously increasing pressures of technology, demography and nationalism. To some degree, the use of power will be dampened by a heavier international fabric of economic and social accords, by a stronger UN peace-keeping effort, and by a greater fear of escalation as nuclear proliferation occurs. Nevertheless, a sharp upsurge of nationalism, overshadowing virtually all other forces at work during the next 15 years, will serve as a catalyst for power ventures and will multiply the possibilities of war.

Objective: To assist in the emergence of a genuine world community.

Forecast: With the fairly stable bipolar era already gone, polycentrism will yield to a further diffusion of power centers, reminiscent of the pattern of power distribution of the dangerous 1930's. In the search for short-cuts toward local security or Big Power status, at least half a dozen more nations will develop and brandish nuclear capabilities. Increasingly independent and competitive national attitudes will produce further attenuation of the alliances led by the U.S. and the USSR. Ideological trouble in the enemy camp will continue, but will afford little

comfort to the U.S. and the world. In concert or not, both the Russians and the Chinese will use ideological or nationalistic motives to broaden their dominion at the expense of Western and emerging nations.

Objective: To bring about a closer association of industrialized democracies.

Forecast: By 1980, an economically thriving Europe will have freed itself from any political or military allegiance to the U.S. (and to some degree, to the USSR) and will be the scene of internal struggles for power edges against neighboring countries. The reunification of Germany, still in contention, will be the focal point of mounting European friction.

Objective: To help less-developed areas carry out the revolution of modernization.

Forecast: Latin American countries will be the setting for many attempts at political subversion, locally and from abroad, as they struggle toward social reforms and their own quasi-socialistic or dictatorial types of government. Issues involving the use of U.S. military force, unilaterally or under the OAS, will occur frequently, develop rapidly, and produce anti-U.S. reactions regardless of the issues. Latin American attitudes toward the U.S. will depend largely on the willingness of the U.S. to serve as an anonymous donor to her welfare without tampering with her national sensitivity or her traditional right to revolt. Africa will have several decades of internal strife to survive, with black versus black, black versus colonial white, and black versus other assorted

infiltrating colors. The Revolution of Rising Frustrations will be far from over by 1980. Economic distress and conflicts in Africa will provide the U.S. with infinite opportunities to become politically or militarily embroiled without gain and with almost inevitable damage to U.S. prestige.

In effect, current trends suggest a 1970-1980 world environment which now places the U.S. at a crucial crossroad in policy and strategy. The broad conclusions which can be drawn from such trends are these:

1. The harsh facts of social turbulence, power politics and wily warfare will continue to govern almost all human events and energy.
2. For at least the next 15 years, the USSR will endure as the primary strategic threat to U.S. security and global interests; Red China will endure as the most active tactical threat to Western and neutral holdings in Asia.
3. In the Western world, the imperatives of xenophobic nationalism will eventually undo decades of U.S. effort to foster recovery, collective security, and international cooperation.
4. In the emerging nations, the magnitude of existing disorder will afford more fertile fields for prolonging communist-inspired turmoil than for establishing democratic-inspired stability.
5. In the world as a whole, the U.S. will, by 1980, have made little progress toward attaining its five major objectives.

6. Faced with a split and more unpredictable threat from the East, hampered by attitudes which promise disunity in the West, unable to counter communist subversion of emerging neutrals, and thus far thwarted in achieving real progress toward its advertised national objectives---the United States will move through the next 15 years with its leadership under challenge and its world stature in decline.

The circumstances described in this Forecast are bleak, perhaps overly so. More optimistic analysts would disagree entirely with such a grim assessment of the future. They feel that the future definitely favors the U.S., and cite that "The communists are losing momentum and the Free World is gaining momentum."⁴³ Still others, confusing trends with traditions, resist any hint whatsoever that the supremacy of the U.S. will erode, convinced that the U.S. will simply not stand by and let this happen. It must be agreed that the future often deals rudely with any predictions, pessimistic or optimistic, for both can easily be rotted by subtle currents, or exploded by stunning events. However, the reader should emerge from this unpromising Forecast with one thought: Most of the circumstances depicted in the Forecast are not only possible but indeed quite probable; and bleak probabilities often form the most valid basis for considering alternative future strategies.

⁴³ Roscoe Drummond, "The Forward Thrust of Freedom", op. cit., p. 4.

CHAPTER 4

THE BROAD NATIONAL REQUIREMENTS

NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY - REVITALIZED

Accepting the world conditions depicted in the Forecast portion of the paper as probable, the remainder of this thesis will attempt to determine what type strategy can best cope with those conditions. Initially, however, certain transcendent requirements must be considered. The first of these broad requirements concerns the psychological attitude our nation must adopt to deal with the future, regardless of the strategy decided upon.

For twenty years, the major problem of the world has been security in the nuclear age. The extent to which this riddle has affected our national psyche cannot be overstated. Since 1945, the U.S. has been under the enormous strain of hanging onto a nuclear pendulum which has swung from one extreme to another. From its painful use in 1945 we veered to an equally painful restraint from its use in 1951, then back to an angry promise to use it without hesitation in our Massive Retaliation strategy of 1954. Recognizing the inappropriateness of that strategy to indirect aggression, we have since been swinging to an opposite extreme. At that new straining point, we now find ourselves obsessed with fear of escalation, hypersensitive to world opinion, excruciatingly anxious for peace, distressed by our inability to stabilize an unstable world, confounded by the old "new" problem of insurgency, and still unable to identify war for the traditional power struggle it has always been and will continue to be.

In short, our present reaction to conflict in the world, especially indirect aggression, is not so much one of flexible response as one of perplexed reflex.

This is by no means an indictment of our policy or our policy-makers who, in the final analysis, must be responsive to the public will. Rather, it points to the attitude of a growing body of opinion-molders in the country which tends to wonder "how and why did we ever get involved" and which doubts the value of even fighting, much less winning, a calculated struggle for survival. An expansion of this attitude domestically, coupled with the multiplying difficulties which can be foreseen in U.S. foreign affairs, could prove disastrous to the future security of the U.S.

What then is the psychological requirement? It is three-fold.

First, there is a need to galvanize the nation into an awareness of the insidious nature of the present threat to freedom everywhere, and the obligation each of us has to defend it. In a nation where nearly half the population has been born since WW II, where the other half is steeped in apathy, and where no electrifying Pearl Harbor can be expected, this will be no easy task.

Second, there is a need to swing the pendulum back midway to a point where everyone accepts the fact that the U.S. will be kept in conflict for generations to come, and we may as well learn how to live with it and use it to advantage. For a nation which prefers to see wars wrapped up within the span of a presidential term, this too will not be easy.

The third requirement is best stated in a lengthy but significant quote from a 1959 article in The Washington Post, written by Dr. Walter H. Judd, formerly of the House Committee on Foreign Relations:

"A nation's greatness when assessed in terms of history, is measured by its impact on the course of human events. And a nation's impact on human events is directly proportional to the determination of its people to shape their own environment.

"In terms of the degree of effort being expended by their individual citizens to change history, the U.S. certainly ranks third in the great triumvirate, well behind the USSR and Communist China. The U.S. has spent great quantities of treasure and human resources in all quarters of the globe. This has been done, however, not to change history, but to keep history from changing.

"This infatuation with the status quo has caused a general sterility of political thought. It has created a tendency to accept the compromises of our outlying political positions rather than face the sacrifices that more vigorous alternatives might require. What is probably the most dangerous development of all--it has resulted in the gradual erosion of our individual and national will-to-win.

"...What this amounts to is that the American Team... is playing for what it hopes will be a draw. Meanwhile the Communist team is throwing everything it has into the game to win...The Communists know they are having an impact on history...One side is going to win; the other will be destroyed. Mere containment will not win.

"Much of history is the record of better civilization being overcome by poorer, because the leaders of the latter were tougher and worked harder. All along the communists have had the will-to-win; they did not have the strength. We of the Free World had the strength; but we did not have the will-to-win.

"Victory will go to whichever side first gets both the strength and the will."

Seven years old, the quote still seems appropriate. If use of the word "victory" sounds old-fashioned to the reader, then the quote is all the more applicable to our time.

NATIONAL GOAL - REINTERPRETED

Our national purpose, or the enduring aspirations of the U.S. for the continued development, freedom and well-being of its own people and those of the world, can be stated in many ways. However stated, the ultimate achievement of peace remains the essential tenet of our national purpose.

"Peace is our mission; security is our obligation.
The United States has kept world peace for 19 years--
we intend to continue to do so."

As cited in the Forecast Summary and Appraisal, the above quotation is a 1964 statement by the President of our primary national goal. Little argument can be leveled against the moral worth of such a goal. It is consistent with our American heritage and our hopes for the future. It makes clear that the U.S. seeks nothing but peace and security for the world. But here we might ask the question: Is the world really ready for peace?

The question is not rhetorical. Since World War II, there have been approximately 36 governmental crises, 77 coups/revolts or attempts thereat, 32 civil or guerrilla conflicts, 23 localized battles between nations and 2 major wars in Korea and Vietnam-- for a total of approximately 170 national and international violations of peace.¹ As to the future, the Forecast of events and trends would certainly indicate that our quest for peace may have little genuine meaning to a world still charged with the power politics of growth and expansion.

¹Joseph I. Coffey, "A Stable Military Environment," Forbes Corporation Study on Arms Control, July 1965, p. 22.

Consequently, if our goal of peace is to be pursued under the militant conditions visualized, there is a definite need for a more practical, realistic, and aggressive approach.

In essence, we must make it universally understood that while peace is our national goal, we will continue to fight anywhere and at any time we construe our national security, our international interests, or the integrity of free nations to be jeopardized--until that day when all other nations are ready to accept peace as their primary goal.

NATIONAL OBJECTIVES - RECONSIDERED

Before examining possible alternative U.S. strategies for the future, some consideration must be given to our current national objectives as articulated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:²

1. To deter or defeat aggression at any level of intensity.
2. To bring about a closer association of industrialized democracies.
3. To help less-developed areas carry out the revolution of modernization.
4. To assist in the emergence of a genuine world community.
5. To end the arms race and reduce risk of war.

In the previous chapter an attempt was made to relate these objectives to the circumstances forecasted for the next decade. The relation showed that few of the conditions foreseen were conducive to the achievement of, or even substantial progress toward, our national objectives. The reason is worth analysis.

First, the somewhat artificial relation of objectives to probable events assumed that the U.S. would make no major change in its present national strategy of Containment and would undertake no precipitous risks to achieve any particular objective. For example, in helping less-developed areas carry out the revolution of modernization, the forecast visualized no dramatic spurt in U.S. effort at the expense of a probable war effort elsewhere.

²Gen. Charles G. Wheeler, "How Can Military Strength Best Promote Peace?", The National Electronic Forum, Vol. 8, No. 3, p. 16.

A second reason little progress was seen lies in the fact that the five major U.S. objectives are obviously broad and long-ranging. Certainly no appreciable gains toward a genuine world community can be expected within a short 15-year period. However, the absence of any discernible progress under the conditions forecasted should not detract from the validity of the objectives. They are all-encompassing; they are in consonance with our national purposes; and they establish sequential stopping stones toward the goal of peace.

On the other hand, our national objectives must also be fairly definitive. They must provide policy-makers with sufficient guidance to enable them to grapple with untidy questions gnawing at the contemporary world--questions which if answered even partially might influence the immediate course of events in our favor. For instance, what precisely does the U.S. want for itself and the world by 1980? To what extent are we willing to compromise fundamental beliefs to make practical gains over the enemy by that time? How do we reconcile important political principles which are not necessarily compatible, and which must be decided soon? In the emerging world, do we want self-determination or stability? Democracy or diversity? Progressive authoritarianism or chaotic attempts at democracy? Among our diminishing friends, do we want forums for debate or forums for support? Do we go it alone when unsupported, at the risk of condemnation? Reconstruct our faltering alliances or let our leadership subside in the

interests of equal sovereignty? Elsewhere, do we want to build bridges to the East but not to the Far East? Are we prepared to live with one brand of communism while fighting another?

No set of objectives can be expected magically to yield black or white answers to gray questions. Many such issues can be decided only on a country or case basis. Still, it does seem possible and desirable to stake out interim guideposts toward our ultimate objectives--signs which might point to expedient alternate routes. Such interim guideposts or intermediate objectives would also be more decisive and attainable within present life-spans than the distant objectives of "world community" and "peace". Some sense of achievement in pursuing our ultimate national objectives is essential if the nation is to sustain its zeal. Thus, if an objective is to provide policy guidance to all segments of the government, if it is to be decisive and attainable, and if it is to provide a measure of accomplishment, there is a need to re-cast our national objectives--perhaps in the hypothetical form which follows:

* * * * *

3. To help less-developed areas carry out the revolution of modernization.

Intermediate aims:

- To convince Country V that outside military assistance is required to achieve local security against mounting subversive insurgency.
- To establish such politically stable conditions in Country N (under rigid junta leaders if necessary) as will permit resistance to external

exploitation and eventual reestablishment of constitutional processes.

- To assist Region 2 (with emphasis on Countries K and X) to achieve agricultural self-sufficiency prior to broad industrialization; encourage U.S. private investment to assist in gradual development of natural resources.

etc, etc,

* * * *

With tentative national objectives stated in this or some other fashion that identifies not only our idealistic ends but the practical intermediate aims which must be achieved enroute, it then becomes possible to put any proposed strategy to a severe test before its adoption.

SUMMARY OF BROAD NATIONAL REQUIREMENTS

Any U.S. strategy designed for the 1970-1980 period must be geared to the conditions, opportunities and obstacles visualized in that era.

Most importantly, if that strategy is to produce advantage, it must be buttressed by a revitalized nation able to accept its prolonged demands and willing to accept the risks involved in winning a global struggle. The U.S. must recognize that "The will-to-win will not eliminate the perils that are to be our daily lot for years, but it will give us a better chance of overcoming them."³

Secondly, it must be made universally clear that while peace is our national goal, the United States will continue to fight anywhere and at any time we construe our national security, our international interests, or the integrity of free nations to be jeopardized--until that day when all nations are ready to accept peace as their primary goal.

Finally, our national objectives must provide something more clear-cut than the distant ethereal aims of democracy, modernization, community and peace. They must also cite intermediate targets which are practical, realistic and attainable enough to provide a measure of accomplishment and strategic success.

³Raymond Aron, The Century of Total War, p. 368.

CHAPTER 5

ALTERNATIVE U.S. STRATEGIES

THE CHOICES

For a nation with the actual and potential power of the United States, strategic alternatives are many. They are limited only by the extent to which the U.S. chooses to wield that power and accept the costs and risks involved.

Although infinite varieties and combinations can be devised, there are three broad strategic concepts considered plausible of meeting the communist threat under conditions short of general nuclear war. They are: Peaceful Coexistence, Containment, and Roll-Back. This chapter will attempt to analyze their relative effectiveness under the conditions forecasted for the next 15 years.

Underlying all three concepts is of course the determination of the U.S. to maintain an unchallenged capability to deter an all-out thermonuclear war, or should deterrence fail, to bring such a war to a conclusion under circumstances advantageous to the United States. We can therefore exclude this general war consideration as a factor tending to support the adoption of a particular strategy. One concept, Containment, has been the cornerstone of our national strategy for over 15 years.¹ It has been executed with mixed success and failure, depending largely upon whether the attempted communist expansion was overt or covert, and upon what factors are used to measure U.S. success.

¹Library of Congress, U.S. Defense Policies in 1964, p. 19.

While the endurance of that Strategy of Containment cannot be ignored, the intention of this analysis will be to dwell more on its applicability to the future than its record in the past.

All three concepts must be cast against two questions which seem central to the worth of any U.S. strategy for the future:

Under the conditions visualized, will the strategy:

1. Insure the security of the U.S. and its fundamental values and institutions?
2. Alter the course of future events to favor achievement of U.S. national objectives and expansion of the family of free nations?

Although a myriad of other factors are involved in assessing the merit of a proposed strategy, a failure to satisfy conclusively at least one of the basic requirements cited above should cause us to doubt the basic worth of that concept.

PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE

The concept of Peaceful Coexistence envisages a deliberate campaign to reduce East-West tensions and provide an atmosphere of friendly competition for the betterment of mankind--eventually and hopefully leading to peaceful settlement of underlying ideological conflicts.

Strategic effort would be primarily political, involving expanded diplomatic, cultural and economic exchange between the U.S. and communist nations, as well as joint undertakings in technology, space and humanitarian projects. Specifically, the concept calls for:

...rejection of war as a means of solving disputes between states, solution of disputes by means of negotiations, equality of rights, mutual understanding and trust between states, respect for the interests of one another; non-intervention into internal affairs, recognition for every people of its right to solve independently all questions of its country; strict respect of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries; the development of economic and cultural cooperation on the basis of full equality and mutual benefit.²

Although the quotation provides a fair representation of how the U.S. visualizes the concept of Peaceful Coexistence, the quote happens to be from a 1965 address by the Deputy Editor of Pravda, a statement in which he also castigates the U.S. for its intervention in the Congo and South Vietnam.

Consequently, in assessing the merit of the concept, it should be kept clear that deep misunderstanding between the two adversaries as to the real meaning of right and wrong could pose a basic limitation on Peaceful Coexistence as a strategy.

²...W. Henderson, "The Alternative to War", Vital Speeches of the Day, Vol. 31, 1 May 1965, pp. 421-424.

Under the conditions visualized, would a strategy of Peaceful Coexistence insure the security of the U.S. and its fundamental values? Much merit can be attached to the thesis that a positive U.S. peace overture to the communist powers, coupled with abandonment of our present strategy of Containment, would provide greater hope for "world peace." The present detente with the USSR has unquestionably relaxed tension and lends credence to the Peaceful Coexistence concept. If the U.S. adopted such a course and all other nations, communist and non-communist alike, also subscribed and adhered to the pillars of the policy, U.S. security would indeed be assured. However, three very practical factors mitigate against this likelihood. First, the widely publicized statements of the USSR and Red China that they will actively support all "national wars of liberation" are in direct contradiction to the basic precepts of Peaceful Coexistence (even as defined by the USSR). Second, the 20-year old Charter of the United Nations comes as close to being a worldwide pact of peaceful coexistence as yet conceived by man, and it has by no means been adhered to. Third, there is not a single strand of evidence indicating that any nation--big, small, communist, or not--will henceforth forego its own national prerogatives for peace at all costs. Most trends point to the contrary. So long as these three factors prevail, it is doubtful that a strategy of Peaceful Coexistence would insure the security of the United States for very long. On balance, the basic question would have to be answered this way: A strategy of Peaceful Coexistence could insure the security of the U.S., but only if all nations adopted and adhered to an identical strategy.

Would a strategy of Peaceful Coexistence alter the course of future events to favor achievement of U.S. objectives and expansion of the family of free nations? The answer to this is almost self-evident. Even if the U.S. and all other major powers honestly adhered to the principles of Peaceful Coexistence, the U.S. would be unable to influence the future in any way. By definition, Peaceful Coexistence calls for non-intervention into the internal affairs of other nations. As in the past, this precept could be construed by other powers as just reason to oppose any attempt on the part of the U.S. to thwart local aggression or subversion of a small country, or as legitimate grounds to forestall U.S. efforts to develop that country as a free nation. Under such circumstances, the U.S. would be incapable of achieving two of its five national objectives without deviating from the principles of Peaceful Coexistence or abandoning the strategy completely and causing other major power to do likewise. Even under the more pragmatic strategy of Containment, the Forecast indicates little hope of the U.S. achieving its objectives. Peaceful Coexistence cannot be expected to achieve in conference what cannot, apparently, be achieved in battle.

In effect, Peaceful Coexistence is not a strategy the U.S. or any major power can adopt unilaterally and still achieve stated national aims. If one major power attempts to adhere to a course of Peaceful Coexistence while another pursues its own objectives, good or bad, the basic premise of the whole concept breaks down.

It must be adopted simultaneously by all nations, and be adhered to scrupulously by all nations. Realistically then, Peaceful Coexistence is not so much a strategy as it is a wishful world condition based on universal trust--a condition which may be reached in some future eon when the forces of nationalism and expansionism are spent. But not today.

CONTAINMENT

As cited earlier, the overall strategy of the U.S. for the past 15 years or more has been Containment. When conceived, the strategy called for preventing communist aggression and curbing the expansion of communist influence into areas not then under communist control, using whatever method or degree of force was required. The concept was based on the premise that the communist world, confined within its own frontiers, deprived of expansionist opportunities needed to nourish a totalitarian system, and subjected to its own ideological fallacies, would eventually abandon its objective of world domination. Conceptually, the U.S. adopted this course of action shortly after World War II.³ It insisted on withdrawal of Soviet forces from Iran in 1946, resisted communist attempts to take over Greece in 1947, devised the Marshall Plan and NATO in 1947 and 1949 for the economic and military security of Western Europe against communism, continued shaping a band of alliances with free nations on the periphery of the Sino-Soviet Bloc (NATO, CENTO, SEATO), and opposed overt communist aggression in Korea in 1950. Later demonstrations of the strategy took place at Taiwan and Lebanon. The most current and obvious manifestation of the Containment strategy is Vietnam.

³Library of Congress, U.S. Defense Policies in 1964, p. 19: "General of the Army George C. Marshall explained the U.S. position in 1951 in these words: 'For the last 5 years our supreme policy has been to curb the communist aggression and, if possible, to avoid another world war in doing so.....There can be, I think, no quick and decisive solution to this global struggle short of resorting to another world war. The cost of such a conflict is beyond calculation. It is, therefore, our policy to contain communist aggression in different fashions and in different areas without resorting to total war, if that be possible to avoid.'"

Future application of the strategy is suggested by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, thusly:

"...the ability of our friends and allies in the Far East to attain any lasting political, economic or social improvement will depend in a large measure on the containment of Red China, particularly her aggression via the route of subversive insurgency."⁴

Before analyzing Containment as a strategy for the future, we should note some important points concerning its past. The logic underlying the strategy is unassailable. When communist aggression is stopped and contained, it cannot spread. However, as with any defensive or reactive strategy, its success depends upon an ability to detect the threat early, along with the capability and resolution to meet that threat. In the past, where the threat was clear or militarily blunt and the U.S. chose to exhibit its determination (as in Greece and Korea), the strategy of Containment worked. However, where the threat was ambiguous and aggression was indirect (as in Castro's takeover of Cuba and Moscow's takeover of Castro), the strategy not only failed to contain communism within Eurasia, but permitted serious penetration of our own hemisphere. The strategy also failed where there was a question as to U.S. capabilities or determination to carry it out (as in the Chinese seizure of Tibet), or where unacceptable risks of general war seem to be involved (as in Hungary revolt).⁵

⁴Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, "How Can Military Strength Best Promote Peace?" The General Electric Forum, Vol. 8, No. 3, p. 19.

⁵"Vietnam: The Problem of Candor," Newsweek, 24 Jan. 1966, p. 24: "The President seemed content to present the war as something akin to a crusade in defense of a small and powerless nation... But, quite obviously, the U.S. does not react forcibly whenever and wherever freedom is menaced by Communism--as was demonstrated in Hungary, East Germany and Tibet."

More importantly, the strategy failed to address the problem of how to keep pro-Western nations from drifting toward Moscow-Peking-oriented neutralism, as in the case of a number of nations in Asia, the Middle East and Africa.

Despite demonstrated shortcomings in the application of the strategy, the concept of Containment may still have particular value in coping with the conditions visualized for the future, and this shall now be examined.

Under the conditions visualized, will the strategy of Containment insure the security of the U.S. and its fundamental values? From the outset, it must be recognized that any strategy must operate under the remote but nevertheless present threat of all-out nuclear war. Largely because it has been backed by a powerful strategic nuclear deterrent, the strategy of Containment has not precipitated such a war, and it is not likely to do so in the future, if pursued in the same fashion. In this one sense, Containment will contribute to the future security of the U.S., or at least not place the nation in direct jeopardy of a nuclear attack. There remains some question, however, as to whether Containment can block the more subtle and erosive threats to U.S. security at home, and to the values and hopes of freedom the U.S. has germinated abroad. This doubtful aspect of Containment can be removed only if the U.S. executes the strategy with more perception than it did in Vietnam and Laos in 1954, more vigilance than it did in Cuba in 1957, more adroitness than it did in the Bay of Pigs in 1960, and more force than it now seems to be exerting in Vietnam.

This is a big order; but the Forecast indicates that large deliveries must be forthcoming if widening gaps in the Containment barrier are to be shored. On the positive side, the dynamic and politically imaginative execution of a Containment strategy could provide a vital "second line of defense in depth" in the Philippines, Malaysia, India, Africa and South America-- while the strategy is being applied with broader military force on the first line, the rimlands of Asia. Use of the strategy in this general way might, without inordinate risk, forestall some of the serious inroads communist subversive aggression promises to make into Free World territory during the coming decade.

The basic question, then, can be answered this way: Containment is a strategy compatible with the moral righteousness the United States characteristically attaches to a purely defensive posture; it is consistent with the "limited objective" philosophy governing power politics in the nuclear age; and it can insure the security of the United States for the time being-- but only if the strategy is carried out more thoroughly and more forcefully.⁶ This possibility will be looked into more closely, later in the paper.

⁶George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy, 1900-1950, p. 126. Kennan, one of the principal architects of the Containment strategy had this to say: "communist society may well contain deficiencies which will eventually weaken its own total potential. This would of itself warrant the U.S. entering with reasonable confidence upon a firm policy of containment...with unalterable counter-force at every point where they show signs of encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful and stable world."

Under the conditions visualized, will the strategy of Containment alter the course of future events to favor the achievement of U.S. national objectives and expansion of the family of free nations? In the sense that a more airtight execution of the strategy might postpone or blunt some of the unfavorable consequences with otherwise can be foreseen, it can be said that a Containment strategy could theoretically alter the future. But generally, the defensive characteristics of Containment make it likely that even improved application of the strategy will barely permit the U.S. to hold its own. For example, if the NATO Alliance loosens as predicted, a stronger effort to contain the USSR can hardly be accomplished by beefing up Greece and Turkey so long as Cyprus animosity continues unhealed. A stronger effort to contain Red China can hardly be accomplished by strengthening both India and Pakistan so long as those two peripheral nations have no common bond. A stronger effort to contain Red China by strengthening Thailand may have little meaning if our strategy does not keep the flanking nations of Burma and Cambodia from falling under Peking control by a combination of Chinese affection, subversion and nuclear blackmail. Containment must be virtually absolute if the compression is to achieve the desired deteriorating effect on the communist world. In short, a defensive strategy with a porous defense might afford temporary security; but it will scarcely reverse unfavorable trends or provide the time and momentum needed to enable the U.S. to achieve such ambitious objectives as a "closer association of industrialized democracies, modernization, and world community."

The foregoing should not be regarded as blithe dismissal of the worth of Containment as a national strategy. It has bought us time; and history may prove that time was crucial in stifling the extreme militance of the USSR while the world recovered from World War II and gave rise to dozens of new independent nations. Whether it can similarly hold off Red China until the rest of the world reaches maturity--or at least the maturity visualized in our national objectives--seems more questionable.

What is certain, however, is that the concept of Containment, even if not pursued as the overall future strategy, can nevertheless be applied effectively in certain areas and at certain times as an "economy of force" tactic. Therein may lie its real future value.

ROLL-BACK

The Roll-Back concept visualizes a Western strategy designed to push the frontiers of communism back within the national boundaries of the USSR and Red China with the ultimate aim of inducing their leaders to abandon the goals of continued expansionism and world domination. The concept is espoused by those who believe that Containment enforced over the long term will not achieve the same aim, and that an offensive strategy rather than a defensive one is required to defeat international communism. It is a proposition often misunderstood by supporters and opponents alike, and therefore requires a bit more examination. The more vociferous advocates of Roll-Back support their contention with substantially the following claim:

"We must consider the communists as people who live among us with an irrational world view--an irrational attitude toward the world and men. So that communists, as long as they are organized and have power, will disturb world peace... There can be no peace in the world until the communists as organized power have been reduced to impotence."

Opponents of Roll-Back often voice their denunciation of such a strategy this way:

"A military roll-back, as an alternative, would in all probability spell thermonuclear war if applied to Central Europe. And it would call for readiness--in the case of Southeast Asia --⁷ to fight wars that might escalate and spread."

⁷Gerhart Niemeyer, "Strategy for the Future", The General Electric Forum, Vol. 6, No. 2, p. 29.

⁸Arnold Wolfers, Ibid.

Although Roll-Back requires a more audacious and cunning approach than Containment, it lies somewhere between the extreme options quoted above. The concept does not envisage swashbuckling use of overt military force to liberate the communist satellites or even to display the breadth of U.S. power. But neither does it allow vacillation or concern for world opinion where the use of such force becomes necessary or where force will secure strategic advantage with acceptable risk.

In general, Roll-Back entails a quiet, determined, and not altogether moral, attempt to undermine the communist structure. The broad courses of action usually associated with Roll-Back are these:

1. Assumption of the initiative, even if deceptive, in all dealings with communist powers.
2. Execution of a political, economic, psychological and ideological offensive, unencumbered by moral restraints.
3. Exploitation of every opportunity to widen the rift between Moscow and Peking, disengage satellite nations from their control by ruse, and discredit communist leaders in the eyes of their own people.
4. Use, wherever feasible, of unconventional warfare and all other coercive means short of inciting the USSR to initiate nuclear war.
5. Application of broad conventional military force, instantly, at the first signs of communist aggression, or at the first hint of mobilized opposition to our Roll-Back action.

Plainly, Roll-Back would involve more of everything-- opposition and risks as well as opportunities and rewards. Its adoption as a U.S. national strategy would require the most tightly drawn political judgment, easily proposed but painfully decided. Whether the concept is even worth proposing depends upon its applicability to the future and its ability to satisfy the basic questions of security and achievement of national objectives.

Under the conditions visualized, will Roll-Back insure the security of the U.S. and its fundamental values? It goes almost without saying that a strategy which would raise the stakes would also place U.S. security in greater doubt, especially if pursued on a worldwide basis. It could generate tension and increase not only the possibility of conflicts but the frequency and intensity of them. Irrational responses could easily result from any mistakes made while carrying out a bold strategy which is essentially covert. Political guile and military subterfuge, if not alien to our national character, are definitely not the most pronounced American skills. For evidence, one need go no further than a reminder on the U-2 incident and the Bay of Pigs. Detection of future devious efforts and use of unconventional techniques would invite claims of U.S. aggression, damage U.S. prestige, incur loss of U.S. supporters and would deface the very values of international decency the U.S. ultimately seeks to secure. The Free World would become increasingly skeptical of the true policies and aims of the U.S. and would attach hypocrisy to even the purest U.S. undertakings to help them.

On the other hand, it should be remembered that the U.S. is frequently charged with interference, authoritativeness, subterfuge and aggression--regardless of how docile and benevolent its international conduct may actually be. If so, the question then arises: Would the adoption of a bold strategy make the U.S. any less secure than the bold strategic course the U.S. is already accused of having taken? The situation in Vietnam illustrates the point. The U.S. regards its efforts there as Containment. Considering that the communists were on the verge of seizing full control of South Vietnam, subsequently broadened U.S. efforts--in communist eyes--were probably part of an aggressive roll-back scheme. Even though escalation is prevalent at this writing, the U.S. is no more secure by virtue of calling it Containment, or no less secure by virtue of the communists calling it Roll-Back. In effect, U.S. security depends not so much on the label we apply to a broad strategic concept as it does on the specific actions and attitudes both we and the enemy adopt in any given situation. Another example would be useful. If through deft political and economic overtures and through psychological appeal to its almost Latin ethnical background, the U.S. were peacefully able to wean Rourmania from Moscow, it is difficult to see how such action would suddenly bring the U.S. and the USSR to the brink of nuclear war and thus imperil the security of the U.S. Even if the U.S. employed unsavory techniques to dislodge a pro-communist government in some African nation in the hopes of channeling its nationalistic

in a healthier direction, it is doubtful that communist response would directly endanger U.S. security. Certainly, many negative consequences could develop by undertaking actions of this type under a Roll-Back strategy. At the same time, positive consequences might also emerge from occasional success. An occasional publicized blunder does not mean the U.S. is totally inept in the politics of war. The point being made here is that the term Roll-Back is not synonymous with Failure, nor is it synonymous with Peril.

On balance, we must conclude that a Roll-Back strategy executed with mixed gains and failures would not insure the security of the United States; but neither would it automatically endanger that security. The next decade promises continuing turmoil. Absolute security in such an environment may well be illusory for both the weak and the powerful. If so, the central issue becomes one of deciding whether U.S. purposes can best be served by seeking greater security now with the hope of gains later, or by seeking greater gains now with the hope of security later.

Will Roll-Back alter the course of future events to favor achievement of U.S. national objectives and expansion of the family of free nations? In the final analysis, this basic question can be answered only by determining what roll-back action is visualized, where, and toward what objectives.

Initially, however, a perusal of certain general considerations concerning Roll-Back as a broad strategy, might be useful. As opposed to a defensive posture, the adoption of a strategy based on initiative would quite obviously enable the U.S. to exert a greater degree of influence on the future. Whether or not that influence would favor achievement of our ultimate national objectives would depend upon the relative success of the specific actions taken. But one factor remains clear: The Roll-Back circumstances created by the U.S. surely can be no worse than the roll-back circumstances which will be created by the communists if they continue to hold the initiative. Assuming that the Forecast portion of this paper is at least partially valid, several major trends must be counted as unfavorable to the U.S. and to attainment of its five national objectives. The trend toward worldwide aggression through communist subversive insurgency will not simplify our efforts to deter or defeat such aggression, nor will it help us achieve an end to the arms race. The trend toward increased nationalism and diffusion of power centers will hardly engender a closer association of industrialized democracies or help bring about a genuine world community. The trend toward greater political and social turmoil in the emerging nations will make it almost impossible to help them become free and modern nations so long as the communists succeed in achieving dominion over them. The U.S. cannot be expected to make any substantial progress toward such objectives until these trends are reversed and other more hopeful trends are exploited. Such actions seem infeasible so long as the nation remains essentially defensive

in its psychology and strategy. There is considerable evidence to suggest that where the U.S. asserts itself boldly, the communists tend to retrench, and the future can be altered.⁹

If so, an assertive Roll-Back strategy might well force communist retrenchment on a broader scale, or at least create conditions more conducive to bringing our national objectives within reach.

Asia, for example, offers opportunities for the entire gamut of Roll-Back actions--political, economic, psychological, and covert and overt military operations. Although individually hazardous, Roll-Back actions in communist areas could be initiated without direct threat to U.S. security if undertaken before Red China acquires an operational nuclear capability, and if undertaken in a manner not impairing the direct security of the USSR. The success of a Roll-Back strategy applied to Asia would not necessarily guarantee smooth sailing straight into Peking; but it could be counted on to divert Red China's attention from global expansionist ambitions and at the same time support Soviet contentions that communist aims cannot be achieved militantly.¹⁰

⁹ Roscoe Drummond, "The Forward Thrust of Freedom," The General Electric Forum, Vol. 8, No. 3, p.5: "There is no reason for defeatism...the Marshall Plan rescued the entire continent of Europe from the overhanging threat of communism. The American-British airlift saved West Berlin...President Kennedy struck from the hands of Nikita Khrushchev the instrument of nuclear blackmail in Cuba...This is a considerable record of risking and winning."

¹⁰ Max Frankel, "Red China Hints Party-Army Rift", The New York Times, 26 Jan. 1966, p. 1: "A strong suggestion that the Chinese Communist party is having some difficulty in controlling the army has been broadcast by Peking. The statement hints that not all military men share the party's confidence in the nation's ability to cope with a war against the United States. According to the broadcast, the party is vigorously demanding obedience from the army and acceptance of the party's tactical and strategic doctrines."

Similarly, in those Western Hemisphere, Middle East and African nations which are being conditioned for communist control, certain Roll-Back actions might afford the best chance to thwart aggression by nipping it in its early stages. In East Europe, however, Roll-Back would have more limited application. Surely, attempts at military Roll-Back action in any form, would yield more damage than good. Nationalistic trends already taking shape suggest that Roll-Back is gradually taking place with little (or at least not publicly visible) external assistance. In the more politically advanced environment of East Europe, conditions for achieving U.S. objectives would be best created by limiting Roll-Back actions to current economic, cultural and psychological efforts to penetrate the Iron Curtain. In other areas where nations are able to maintain a progressive course relatively independent of communist influence, a Roll-Back strategy would of course have little meaning.

In effect, Roll-Back as a possible national strategy can be summed up this way:

- A Roll-Back strategy executed with mixed success and failure would not insure the security of the U.S.; but neither would it endanger that security if carried out with judgment.
- Roll-Back would enable the U.S. to create broadened opportunities to achieve national objectives by assuming the initiative in certain geographical areas; but it does not have worldwide application.
- Adoption of Roll-Back as a national strategy would require acceptance of some risk to prestige and local security now in order to achieve positive gains leading to achievement of national objectives and greater security later.

THE ALTERNATIVES COMPARED

An attempt has been made in the preceding paragraphs of this Chapter to examine the long-term merit of three broad strategic concepts, each in isolation--Peaceful Coexistence, Containment and Roll-Back. By eliminating many of the imponderables considered, and by carving the three concepts down to rudimentary table form, some uncluttered and straightforward comparisons can be made:

CONCEPT:	Peaceful <u>Coexistence</u>	Containment	Roll-Back
(APPROACH):	(Passive)	(Reactive)	(Active)

CRITERIA

1. Will the concept insure security of the U.S. and its fundamental values?	<u>DOUBTFUL.</u> Depends on the integrity of the communists.	<u>YES.</u> If breakthroughs are prevented or crushed.	<u>POSSIBLE.</u> If brinkmanship with the USSR is not carried too far.
2. Will the concept alter the course of future events to favor achievement of US objectives & expansion of family of free nations?	<u>NO.</u> Concept leads to US isolationism with a clear field for communist subversion.	<u>NO.</u> Concept is addressed status quo & holding the line.	<u>YES.</u> Initiative afford the possibility of new gains for Free World in some areas.
3. Major risks involved?	Little risk of war; great risk of loss of free world nations if communists deceive U.S. during "peace"	Considerable risk of both expanding war and loss of territory where defense is porous.	Great risk of war; but less risk of loss of territory.

Several general observations can be derived from the table and the analyses which preceded it:

1. No single strategic concept answers the two basic questions conclusively and affirmatively; and none of the concepts are without considerable risk.

2. Peaceful Coexistence would provide the least security and afford the least promise of genuine success in achieving U.S. objectives in a hostile future environment. The concept would hang heavily on communist good faith, a poor guarantee. However, Peaceful Coexistence may have continued utility as a tranquillizing tactic.

3. Containment will afford maximum security without great risk, until eroded by the dilution of U.S. alliances and the increasing number of penetrations indicated in the future. This would tend to curtail whatever progress toward U.S. objectives might be made outside the purview of a defensive strategy. Thus, the continued use of Containment as our overall strategy must be weighed against Time.

4. Roll-Back would come closest to satisfying the two basic requirements; but it is not applicable globally and would require an enlightened national approach toward risks and ruses.

5. A strategic concept combining the most positive aspects of Containment and Roll-Back, coupled with Peaceful Coexistence tactics, may afford the U.S. the best possible means of altering the unfavorable trends confronting the nation.

CHAPTER 6

THE REQUIRED U.S. NATIONAL STRATEGY

WHAT TO DO

The facts of power which govern the world cannot be ignored in our strategy. In the last 25 years the United States gave 450 billion dollars and 409,000 lives to help win a global war it did not start, and then gave 227 billion more dollars and 55,319 more lives trying to salvage peace and create a better world.¹ In return for unprecedented philanthropy it sought neither territory nor dominion--only cooperation. During that time two major powers have instead devoted their full energies to defeat the United States by insidious means and ultimately control the globe. Considerable progress has been made toward that end. Determination and ambition now infuse the enemy; doubt and apathy now immobilize much of the Free World; and disorder and anxiety now beset the vulnerable nations wavering in between. The future portends more of the same. If the United States wants to alter that future for itself and others, U.S. purpose and strategy must promptly turn the communist threat toward the communist world itself. The national strategy proposed in this chapter attempts to reckon with nothing less than these simple facts.

¹ Lawrence H. Smith, "Monetary Costs to the USA of WWII, WWII and Korean War," Congressional Record - Appendix, 1954, p. A4314, places cost of WWII at \$449.6 billion and Korean War at \$150.3 billion. "How Helpful Are U.S. Allies", U.S. News & World Report, 13 Sept. 1965, p. 50, places cost of post-WWII U.S. foreign aid at \$76 billion. Thus, foreign aid plus Korea War comes to \$226.3 billion. "America's Wars", Veterans Administration Information Pamphlet, June 1963, p. 2, places WWII dead at 409,000 and Korean War dead at 54,000. "Korea and Vietnam," U.S. News & World Report, 6 Dec. 1965, p. 8, places Vietnam dead at 1,319 up to that date. Total deaths for Korea and Vietnam, thus far: 55,319.

The principal immediate purpose of the United States during the next 15 years must be to overcome the threat which now imperils the solidarity and security of the Free World, and establish an environment more conducive to the achievement of U.S. ultimate national objectives. Although other political and social factors present obstacles to peaceful world progress, the primary threat is posed by the expansionist aims of USSR, Red China, and other satellite leaders, under the ideological guide of communism.

To achieve its immediate purpose before that threat assumes unmanageable proportions, the United States must:

1. Abandon its traditionally moralistic attitudes toward the enduring power struggle underway.²
2. Be sensitive to, but not captive of, world public opinion.³
3. Remind itself that unchivalrous routes to security may have to be followed before noble works in social progress can be undertaken.
4. Rediscover that the essence of strategy is to dislocate the enemy's balance and take the line of least expectation.⁴

²George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy, 1900-1950, p. 54 and p. 90.

³Roscoe Drummond, "The Forward Thrust of Freedom," The General Electric Forum, Vol. 8, No. 3, p. 7.

⁴B.H. Liddell Hart, Strategy: The Indirect Approach, p. 420.

5. Substitute a new national strategy of "Attainment" for the present strategy of Containment; substitute a new military strategy of "Progressive Force" for the present strategy of Flexible Response.*

6. Expand its power base to support execution of a strategy of initiative.

7. Assume a political-economic-psychological-military offensive aimed at communist vulnerabilities, before global power conditions no longer permit such an offensive.

8. Accept the costs and the leadership risks which will always be inherent in the fight to preserve a free society.

*Author's Note: Although used to simplify reference to the strategy proposed in this paper, no special meaning should be attached to the terms "Attainment" and "Progressive Force." The U.S. should henceforth avoid use of any descriptive label which might publicly disclose its strategic intent or suggest that its strategy is an inflexible pillar of national policy. If necessary to identify US strategy with foreign nationalistic causes or with aspirations of emerging nations, U.S. purposes could be validly, yet humbly, described as a "Force for Freedom" strategy.

HOW TO DO IT

To alter the conditions of the next decade as visualized in the Forecast portion of this thesis, the U.S. national strategy outlined below, is proposed. For clarity, the strategic concept will be phrased in directive form.

A. GENERAL:

The five basic long-range objectives of the United States are reaffirmed. At present, the national strategy of the United States is Containment of communism, supported by a military strategy of Flexible Response. Henceforth, the national strategy of the United States will be Attainment, supported by a military strategy of Progressive Force. The change in strategy is not one of rhetoric, but of substance. U.S. strategy is revised to allow the United States greater initiative and broadened opportunities to defeat or disrupt the expanding communist threat. The revised strategy is intended to afford increased flexibility in dealing with the varied form that threat is now taking, and to create conditions during the next decade more conducive to the eventual attainment of U.S. national objectives. Five premises underlie this revision in national strategy:

1. The assessment that prior to 1980, Red China may have a sufficiently operational nuclear capability to believe it can blackmail all of Asia and its littoral archipelagos into submission or subjection to its influence.

2. The certainty that any further communist gains in Asia will lend credence and impetus to the feasibility of successful subversion in other areas.

3. The conviction that the communist thrust in Asia must be reversed; and that such reversal must take place while Sino-Soviet relations are tense and before Red China's nuclear capability has matured.

4. The probability that the USSR will neither risk all-out nuclear war nor fully support Red China in any attempt to resist U.S. actions in that area.

5. The requirement that the U.S. must maintain a superior offensive and defensive deterrent to general war, backed by the capability and determination to wage and conclude such a war (should it occur) on terms advantageous to the United States.

B. CONCEPT:

The U.S. will execute a strategy of Attainment, supported by a military strategy of Progressive Force. In concert with its Allies, or independently if necessary, the U.S. will undertake progressively forceful measures aimed at exploiting communist vulnerabilities in the political-economic-psychological-military fields, with the objective of reversing the expansionist thrust of international communism. The strategy visualizes the gradual application of certain aspects of the Roll-Back concept in those areas where offensive techniques are feasible; certain features of Containment in those areas where a defensive posture is nonetheless essential; and certain facets of "Peaceful Coexistence" where cooperative attitudes would be advantageous to U.S. interests.

Strategic emphasis, however, will be placed on those efforts designed to:

1. Wrest the initiative from the communist world.
2. Exploit existing and potential dissident factors between and within each nation dominated by communist leadership.
3. Undertake offensive politico-military measures calculated to expand the Free World by all means short of inciting the USSR to initiate all-out nuclear war.
4. Create a condition where communist leadership is more preoccupied with the sanctity of its own territory and the survival of its own regime than with opportunities for expansion.
5. Insulate developing nations from communist influence and make those nations aware that the United States, in its struggle for universal freedom and social well-being, represents the only valid revolutionary movement.
6. Institute a massive educational program in the U.S. for emerging nation students and military officers with leadership potential; establish a foundation for developing freedom-oriented future generations worldwide.
7. Identify the United States as an active Force for Freedom.
8. Deceive communist regimes as to the true and immediate strategic intentions of the United States.

C. BROAD STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES:

1. Global:

Where possible, strengthen and broaden U.S. alliances making such concessions to foreign national prestige as will not seriously prejudice the effectiveness of the alliance or the security of the U.S.

Continue strong support of the United Nations; however, undertake regional or unilateral efforts toward mediation of fundamental issues on which the UN has become immobilized.

Prepare to accommodate seating of Red China in the UN, first exacting maximum quid pro quo on U.S. objectives in Asia.

2. Asia:

Undertake Roll-Back actions in those rimland areas under communist control or influence (presently North Korea, North Vietnam, Eastern and Northern Laos, Southern and Northeastern Thailand, and portions of Burma). Unconventional, para-military and psychological warfare will be conducted. Penetration and subversion will be directed at pro-communist populations. Deception and terrorist techniques will be applied against communist officials with the object of destroying governmental unity/control and neutralizing capabilities to project communist influence into contiguous areas.

Convince the USSR that U.S. intentions go no further than removal of Peking influence from these areas.

Enhance U.S. military capabilities in contiguous areas to insure preparedness for expanded conventional hostilities.

Develop broader system of floating bases in Asian waters to project U.S. power inland as required.

Establish alternative arrangements for containment positions in the Philippines, Malaysia, India and Pakistan.

3. Middle East and North Africa

Maintain and strengthen containment posture to protect U.S. interests in this area.

Undertake political, economic and psychological measures to counteract communist influence in the Arab World and improve its social structure; support nationalistic movements not aimed at territorial aggrandizement.

Seek early solution to Kurdish and Arab-Israeli dispute, avoiding pre-settlement favoritism toward either side.

Where feasible, underwrite or negotiate transfer to the U.S. of UK holdings in the Indian Ocean and the Middle East to prevent power vacuums in the event of UK withdrawal.

4. Sub-Sahara Africa:

Undertake political, economic, psychological and cultural measures to improve social conditions and prevent communist influence in drifting neutral nations; support nationalistic movements not aimed at territorial aggrandizement.

Provide strong economic support to potential U.S. allies with whom arrangements can be made for containment positions in the event of communist inspired conflict.

Adopt de facto attitude toward transient governments (regardless of form) during local political upheavals, provided they are not Moscow/Beijing inspired.

Undertake subversive roll-back actions and support overthrow of those governments clearly aligning themselves with Moscow/Peking.

Where possible, remain aloof from essentially racial or anti-colonial conflicts; where mandatory, provide support to nationalist movement in negotiations.

Direct all efforts toward developing region as an open economic market with friendly relations toward the U.S.

5. Latin America:

Undertake gradual and protracted roll-back actions in Cuba aimed initially at building popular support of insurgency campaign by exiled Cubans, followed by a fully organized and U.S. supported effort to dislodge the communist governmental echelon with minimum bloodshed.

Convince other Cuban target nations in Latin America that U.S.-supported OAS forces are available and essential to help suppress communist insurgency and restore local security.

Undertake (in concert with Canada if possible) a major political, economic, psychological and cultural program to improve the social and economic structure in Latin American countries without exacting quid pro quo.

Adopt de facto attitude toward transient governments (regardless of form) during local political upheavals, provided they are not Moscow/Peking/Havana inspired.

Direct all efforts toward developing the region as a open economic market with friendly relations toward the U.S.

6. Europe:

Generally, U.S. political attitudes will follow "Peaceful Coexistence" concept; U.S. military posture will follow Containment concept; and U.S. economic strategy will follow Roll-Back concept.

Cultivate detente with USSR as a means of widening Sino-Soviet breach, insuring minimum intervention against U.S. roll-back actions in Asia, and causing USSR to lower barriers to East Europe.

Strengthen NATO Alliance, making such concessions to European nationalistic trends as will not seriously prejudice the effectiveness of the deterrent or the security of the U.S.

Maintain strong containment posture; impose no reduction of U.S. force levels or take no other action which could lead to a military vacuum in Central Europe.

Publicly oppose, but diplomatically offer no opposition to German development of an independent nuclear capability as a counterpoise to France and the USSR.

Exploit all opportunities to bring Spain into NATO and Yugoslavia closer to the West.

Continue to press for German reunification, but accept its improbability until greater political unity throughout Europe occurs.

Undertake economic, psychological and cultural penetration of East Europe as a means of rolling-back Moscow influence over Bloc nations; urge West Europe to expand its efforts in this regard with a view toward developing all Europe as a stable economic entity with community of interests.

D. STRATEGIC POLICY STATEMENTS

The foregoing concept recognizes that there are two kinds of strategies: stated strategies and action strategies; and it is the action strategies that usually determine the course of events.

"Containment" will continue to be the stated strategy of the U.S.

"Attainment" will be the action strategy of the U.S.

THE MILITARY IMPLICATIONS

There is no way to disguise the obvious fact that any U.S. strategy which calls for assumption of the offensive against the enemy must be backed by a broader U.S. power base than now exists. No inexpensive, temporary or technological short-cuts appear feasible. The military framework of the U.S. must be beefed up virtually in all departments. The posture statements which follow make no attempt to specify the force levels required, this being beyond the scope of the paper. However, current trends in warfare coupled with the demands of the strategy proposed would suggest at least a one-third expansion of the entire U.S. military structure for an indefinite period. Even if the U.S. does not adopt a more active strategy and continues to respond to frequent "wars of national liberation" under a Containment strategy, an expansion of U.S. military forces appears inevitable. Accordingly, the United States must take action to:

- Resist foreign and domestic pressures to withdraw forward deployments and bases and, instead, position stronger U.S. combat forces in peripheral areas to galvanize weakening alliances with on-site military power. Additionally, a network of floating bases stocked with combat equipment should be expanded to cover those critical areas where forward deployment of U.S. forces becomes politically infeasible.

- Expand unconventional warfare forces and capabilities, and reverse current trends toward encumbering special forces with nation-building tasks. Commanders of unified commands must be provided with increased UW means to train and assist indigenous forces in carrying out aggressive roll-back actions and clandestine operations in their respective areas.

- Provide a substantial increase in general purpose forces and associated strategic mobility means, to cope with the possibility of concurrent large-scale limited war situations in widespread theaters. Combat and combat support capabilities on land, sea and air must be broadened well beyond those which now exist.

- Direct force development efforts in hardware and training toward featherweight gear, decentralized operations, airmobile small-unit tactics, jungle and urban fighting, population control, area specialization, air logistics, improved strategic mobility means, extended air cover, high speed patrol craft operations in restricted waters and anti-submarine warfare.

- Provide vulnerable emerging nations with assistance and materiel which will enhance their internal security and be compatible with local skills. Undertake vast expansion of the current military education program for allied officers who show national leadership potential. This is a vital long-term investment.

- Gear future deployment plans to the requirement for maintaining sizeable forces on-site in peripheral areas for an indefinite period to guarantee successful roll-back actions.

- Maintain national mobilization capabilities in continual readiness.

By developing the military posture outlined above, and only by developing that posture soon, can the U.S. hope to execute the type of strategy needed to alter the unfavorable power conditions visualized in the 1970-1980 period. If such posture and strategy requirements are met, and if these are undergirded by a resolute will-to-win, the United States can confidently proceed to neutralize militant communism as a threat to the Free World.

"It is the law of nature common to all mankind, which no time shall annul or destroy, that those who have more strength and excellence shall bear rule over those who have less."

-- Dioysius¹

¹Florus, The History of the Roman Empire, Preface to Book I.

THE RISKS

As indicated in the summary to the previous chapter, a strategy that encompasses deceptive roll-back measures and involves the application of progressively forceful actions against the enemy cannot help but incur great risk of war and expanding conflict. The risk of precipitating all-out nuclear war with the USSR would probably remain remote unless the soil of Mother Russia became endangered. The risk of all-out nuclear war with Red China would also be remote, provided the strategy was executed before she acquired the capability to wage one. Nevertheless, under the proposed strategy, the possibility of bitter large-scale conventional conflict would remain. The charges of Pax Americana and imperialism would certainly be leveled at the U.S., especially if the U.S. were waging two or more military conflicts concurrently. But would not the same charges and the same possibilities of multiple war exist if the U.S. continued pursuing its Containment strategy with determination?

The proposed strategy, particularly in Asia and Cuba, uses the enemy's own methods to carry the war back into territory he now believes is inviolable and non-negotiable. This could indeed expand the scope and intensity of conflict. Loss of men, loss of national prestige, and loss of moral support are clearly at risk. However, if the United States does not accept these three risks now, it will later have to accept three others: loss of nations, loss of national purpose, and loss of its morally unassailable ultimate objectives.

The options seem clear. The time for decision seems at hand.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In the last 25 years, the U.S. has fought 2 major wars, has lost nearly a half-million lives, and has given two-thirds of a trillion dollars to secure peace and create a world of free nations. Both aims have been frustrated by aggressive communism, and the United States is again reluctantly at war. We now find ourselves in dread of escalation, hypersensitive to world opinion, excruciatingly anxious for peace, distressed by our inability to stabilize an unstable world, confounded by the ancient problem of insurgency, and still unable to adjust ourselves to the protracted power struggle destined to take place for some time to come.

Authoritative forecasts for the period through 1960 indicate that mounting forces of technology, demography, nationalism and expansionism will cause the world of 1960 to be small, saturated, tight-fisted and tumultuous. Multipolarity and alliances will tend to dissolve gradually into a diffusion of power centers similar to the power distribution pattern prior to World War II. Prognostications point to continued subversive aggression by Red China with the likelihood that Korea, some or all of the states of Southeast Asia, and perhaps Malaysia will have fallen into the Chinese orbit. The emerging nations will continue to be characterized by marginal progress and perpetual conflict, some of the conflicts offering high probability of U.S. military involvement.

Faced with a split and more unpredictable threat from the East, hampered by attitudes which promise disunity in the West, unable to counter communist subversion of emerging neutrals, and thus far thwarted in achieving progress toward its national objectives--the United States will move through the next 15 years with its leadership under challenge and its world stature in decline.

Even if prognosticated conditions prove only partially valid, the future worth of Containment as our national strategy can be questioned. As a reactive strategy, Containment affords the U.S. very few positive opportunities to alter the course of future events to favor achievement of overall U.S. national objectives.

An analysis of the future effectiveness of three possible strategic approaches (Peaceful Coexistence, Containment and Roll-Back) indicates that none of these concepts can, individually, insure the security of the U.S. and at the same time enable the U.S. to alter an unfavorable future. However, a national strategy encompassing the most positive aspects of all three concepts would offer the U.S. greater long-term promise of both security and progress.

Rather than continue with a national strategy of Containment backed by a military strategy of Flexible Response, the U.S. should adopt a national strategy of "Attainment" backed by a military strategy of "Progressive Force." This shift in strategy would enable the United States to:

- Apply a Roll-Back concept in communist-held peripheral areas in Asia before Red China can cover those gains with an operational nuclear blackmail capability, and while Sino-Soviet relations are still severely strained.
- Cultivate "Peaceful Coexistence" attitudes toward the USSR to nourish the Sino-Soviet split, sustain the detente, and permit gradual economic inroads into East Europe.
- Maintain a Containment posture in West Europe and other critical defense areas essential to the security of the United States.

To achieve its objectives, the U.S. requires a galvanized national will-to-win, a positive strategy of Attainment, a bold military strategy of Progressive Force, an expanded power base to execute those strategies, and a renewed determination to accept the costs and risks inherent in Free World leadership. Only if the U.S. acquires these things, and acquires them soon, can it confidently undertake the task of reversing the communist thrust and creating conditions more conducive to an expansion of the community of free nations.

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