

NATIONAL SECURITY RECRUITING: JOINT AND INTERAGENCY

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

NATIONAL SECURITY RECRUITING: JOINT AND INTERAGENCY

by

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ABSTRACT

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NATIONAL SECURITY RECRUITING: JOINT AND INTERAGENCY

You can't wring your hands and roll up your sleeves at the same time.

—Pat Shroeder

As America's standing in the world and relative power has arguably diminished since the Gulf War², we face a crisis in the development of talented national security professionals capable of rising to our future challenges. As noted in the November 2008 Project on National Security Reform (PNSR), "[a] crisis of talent, along with a depreciation of and decrease in quality, is coming."³ On 17 May 2007, President Bush signed Executive Order 13434 on National Security Professional Development. The key policy provision of the order states "it is the policy of the United States to promote the education, training, and experience of current and future professionals in national security positions (security professionals) in executive departments and agencies..."⁴

Developing future generations of national security professionals will place demands on all aspects of our development systems, not least of which is our recruiting capability. In order to ensure a constant throughput of trained and qualified cadre, we ought to be more concerned about the quality of our initial hire force and our capability to recruit. Experiential expertise cannot be hired directly out of our best educational and training institutions. The pragmatic understanding of what works is critical to implementing our national security policy. It is the purpose of this paper to demonstrate that the process of recruiting for our national security professional is a missing linchpin in our strategy of developing our fullest capability.

The PNSR studied 106 cases of national security decision making and highlighted "trends that influence success of [the] US government's response to national

challenges”.⁵ The PSNR identified the “3-D’s” involved in national security: 1) Defense, 2) Diplomacy, and 3) Development.⁶ How well each of these individual areas is able to meet current and likely requirements for our national security is key to our survivability. “The US national security system finds it easier to mobilize resources for hard power assets... than for soft power capabilities.”⁷ Even when civil-military cooperation exists at the strategic level, the insufficient funding and staffing of non-Department of Defense (DoD) agencies engaged in international affairs make operational integration difficult to achieve”.⁸

Within individual agencies, a trend exists where self-preservation concerns often negate effective outcomes in the overall national security system. A related problem is that human resource systems are solely agency-focused. “Small bureaucratic bodies...have trouble recruiting the best and brightest people despite the importance of their missions, because career paths-especially opportunities for advancement- are naturally limited”.⁹ While many reasons exist for the services to delay considering joint recruiting efforts¹⁰, exigent circumstances and senior joint leadership concepts¹¹ are moving us toward the inevitable: joint and interagency recruiting.

The first “great leadership” concern we need to address is: Who do we serve¹²? This is a key question requiring emphasis at all echelons within our national security framework. For some inexplicable reason, while officers assigned to the national security profession all take the exact same oath of office, each individual becomes culturally nuanced by the Department for which they serve. This cultural dichotomy manifests itself between the common understanding of our responsibility to “support and defend the Constitution” and a competitive requirement to “well and faithfully discharge

the duties of the office upon which [they] enter". The "PNSR...found that the overarching national security culture is very weak...[while] system subcultures resident in departments and agencies...are very strong".¹³ Senior leadership within our national security system is also bifurcated between trained, culturally attuned leaders who develop within systems and political appointees who develop largely externally.

Even among our smallest armed force, every Coast Guardsman, from junior enlisted to flag officer is considered a leader; empowered as part of the team.¹⁴ These leaders are developed systematically during their tenure in the organization to inculcate the culture of their team. In comparison within our other departments, a significantly greater proportion of senior leaders are political appointees. At the highest echelon of our national security system, President Kennedy had 286 political appointees in 1960, while President Bush had 3,361 officers to fill in 2001. This almost twelve-fold increase in senior leader transition tends to exacerbate cultural misgivings toward interagency cooperation.¹⁵ Comparing three departments reveal the following:¹⁶

Total # of Employees	# of Political Appointees	# of career SES Employees
Department of Defense 3,000,000	52 require Senate Confirm (57,692 employees per)	351 (8547 employees per)
Department of State 30,266	193 require Senate Confirm (156 employees per)	921 (32 employees per)
Department of Homeland Security 138,000	18 require Senate Confirm (7666 employees per)	91 (1516 employees per)

Table 1.

For an organization almost 1% the size of the Department of Defense, the State Department has 73% more political appointees and almost 62% more career Executive Service personnel. In terms of per capita management focus, there is tremendous opportunity for growth in leadership doctrine within the Department of State based solely on the apparent requirements for Senior management. This system of apparent mismanaged focus further creates significant turmoil with a lack of continuity during transitions between administrations.

A significant problem in our current talent management is that even with our most highly visible positions overseas, there is institutional inertia and risk aversion in providing our Commander in Chief with the most accurate information and most pragmatic recommendations. "If Ambassadors cannot compel compliance, why should they generate high-profile interagency fights that create addition(al) friction, injure their reputations, and perhaps lead to their recall."¹⁷ This reticence directly challenges the candor and reliability of key subordinate leader input to our national security decision makers.

The desired end-state ought to ensure... "the right talent is recruited, retained, and allocated to the highest priorities... getting the right people in the right place at the right time requires a cadre of national security professionals who move among the agencies and occupy positions for which interagency experience is a prerequisite."¹⁸

Our next "great leadership" concern is to determine: What is our core strength?¹⁹ Each of our national security components own unique capabilities that are the foundation of their expert powers. "Considering the relative youth of the All Volunteer [Military] Force (AVF), the success of the DoD in moving from a conscripted force is

impressive. The result, unmistakably revealed in the Persian Gulf War of 1991, is a military stronger by far than any other in the world. Events since that war continue to prove the efficacy and resilience of the volunteer military. Over the course of a single decade, the DoD brought a uniformed work force of more than two million employees into the Information Age and took on a whole new set of peacetime missions and responsibilities, all while downsizing by about one-third, cutting costs dramatically, and responding successfully to crises, wars, and other sizeable operations all around the world".²⁰

In terms of who is best positioned within our National Security system to recruit, the numbers speak for themselves. The Department of Defense allocated \$127M in FY07, \$114.7M in FY08 and has \$121.9M budgeted in FY09 for Officer Acquisition. Similarly, the Department spent \$500.6M in FY07, \$563.1M in FY08 and is expected to spend \$645.9M this fiscal year on Recruiting and Advertising.²¹ For this price tag, DoD successfully brought in 184,841 active duty and 134,896 reserve/National Guard enlisted personnel (total of 319,737 enlisted) in FY08²² and 16,486 officers.²³ The Army alone has almost 8000 recruiters positioned in 1661 recruiting stations worldwide.²⁴ In addition, access to the diverse post-secondary career market is available in approximately 1091 colleges and universities nationwide through Army Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) programs.²⁵

The variance in talent within our national security system is onerous: according to one source, the Department of Defense (the first of our 3 "D's" identified in the PNSR) has 2,049,000 employees, Department of Homeland Security has 162,000 employees, Department of the Treasury has 110,000 employees, the Intelligence Community

(including the office of the Director of National Intelligence) has 60,000 employees, and the Department of State [DOS] (the second of our 3 “D’s” in the PNSR) has 24,000 employees.²⁶ Even if we include the fielded force of 7,876²⁷ volunteers in the Peace Corps and an optimistic fill of 2,000 vacancies in its newly established Civilian Response Corps and add the fewer than 2000 employees in the US Agency for International Development; the only agency mentioned thus far solely dedicated to development (the third of our 3 “D’s”), the State Department will “swell” to fewer than 35,000 potential National Security professionals.²⁸

Within State, the department’s Peace Corps recruiting effort is managed out of 11 regional recruiting offices with irregularly scheduled recruiting events in neighboring states. DOS also relies upon a concept of Ambassadors-in-Residence²⁹ based out of 16 pre-designated universities to assist in their “national” recruiting and outreach efforts. The newly established Civilian Response Corps interestingly enough is a reserve component made up of “regular federal employees: doctors and lawyers, engineers and agronomists, police officers and public administrators, men and women whose skills are vital to the success of stabilization and reconstruction missions, and who would volunteer for additional training and be available in the event of a crisis.”³⁰

While the Department of State may not have a challenge filling its ranks routinely, it does have challenges in training, recruiting, and operationalizing these current high demand, low density manning requirements for the Civilian Response Corps. Of the 2000 person requirement listed above, only a small fraction have deployed since its inception. In addition, the training for this Corps consists of three separately developed one-week seminars spaced over a 4 month time frame. Even the crème de la crème

position within the State Department: the Foreign Service Officer, receives only 7 weeks³¹ of classroom training before moving overseas and expected to engage effectively as a diplomat.

In contrast to the transparency of DoD and DOS, the recruiting process for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is necessarily even more compartmentalized and centralized. For an average college student desiring to serve in this agency, little more is available than the website and the promise of up to a year of processing the application³². Annual new hire requirements are unavailable to the applicant or the researcher but the CIA did recruit on 212 college campuses in 2006.³³ While one might ask first if an agency responsible for clandestine services truly needs a robust and open recruiting process, we might also ask how more effective such an organization could be if its outreach was extended by 81% by including only the expansion into current schools with ROTC departments.

In contrast to the Department of State, within the Department of Defense, even the newest Soldier will receive at least 10 weeks of Basic Training and additional Advanced Individual Training before being deployed with their unit into an overseas assignment. Most importantly, each of these Soldiers will receive constant values training reinforced daily during their initial entry into the Army. Each will immediately be responsible to their “buddy” team and held accountable for each other during training and real world deployment. Each will also have at least a partial understanding of how to defend themselves in a hostile situation at home or abroad.

Results within departments show the Defense Department as remarkably flexible. “...[I]n addition to their traditional duties, today’s military [must] also take on the

role of diplomats, humanitarians, and rebuilders.³⁴ Likewise, the intelligence community (IC) requires employees with such critical skills as scientific and technical expertise and advanced foreign language capabilities. The IC faces challenges in recruiting and retaining high-quality talent to meet these requirements and “has not adapted well to the diverse cultures and settings in which today’s intelligence experts must operate.”³⁵ “[The] tasks facing diplomats [have] also broadened. They must now operate not only in foreign ministries but also in liaison with diverse non-governmental organizations; in villages...where violence is not an anomaly but an accepted part of daily life. Staffing deficiencies at the State Department are...compounded by the need to fill war-zone positions while many on the current workforce remain untrained on how to work in harm’s way.”³⁶ One long held view indicated that the Department of State needs an additional 1,079 positions for training, transit and temporary needs and another 1015 to fill vacancies at home and abroad.”³⁷

A noted strength from the PNSR, “career diplomats tend to see the world in terms of day-to-day problems to be coped with by clever mediation. Longer-term strategy, much less solutions, are impossible to formulate because of the large number of factors that are quite virtually impossible to predict and harder to control.”³⁸ Clever mediation may be a culturally developed strength; but how more effective might that attribute be if co-developed simultaneously with a capacity for strategy and problem solving?

How we reward our various departments may be a source of leverage for co-opting institutional inertia and changing future leader behaviors. Pay for performance plans are already in effect in the Department of Defense (since 2007 with NSPS) and

Department of Homeland Security. In May 2009, 10 of 16 intelligence agencies will implement the National Intelligence Civilian Compensation Program with the entire Intelligence Community becoming compliant in FY2010. The Department of State, Department of Treasury, and Justice Department are also planned to begin similar compensation programs in FY2010. In a hopeful view of potential within the system, “You get the behavior that you reward.”³⁹

A key imperative for resilient national security performance is the development of a unified national security workforce and culture. In essence, “a workforce that shares a common culture and is able to navigate established departmental and professional cultures... Building that workforce requires an effective recruitment process...”⁴⁰ In an effort to build the common values for a National Security Professional Corps, would not the military service provide the best starting point? The Navy⁴¹ and Marine Corps⁴² both espouse the values of “Honor, Courage, and Commitment”. The Air Force emphasizes the core values of “Integrity First, Service Above Self and Excellence in All We Do”.⁴³ The Coast Guard values Honor, Respect and Devotion to Duty⁴⁴. The Army is perhaps most inclusive with Loyalty, Duty, Respect, Selfless service, Honor, Integrity, and Personal courage.

In terms of the interagency, the State Department values are stated as Loyalty, Character, Service, Accountability and Community.⁴⁵ The Central Intelligence Agency values are stated as Service, Integrity and Excellence⁴⁶, remarkably similar to the Air Force’s espoused values.

If the Army can be seen as the most capable and resourced recruiting force of the services, it can also be seen as the best prepared to rapidly adapt to meet the

common values of our other services in hopes of developing a common culture for recruiting among the interagency.

Now that we've determined our core strengths, our third "great leadership" concern is to determine: What is our core score?⁴⁷ So how well have we done? From a national security systems perspective, the PNSR gives five immediate consequences⁴⁸ resulting from our current emphasis on key leader policy advice instead of key leader management skill. First, departments, agencies and interagency functions are unable to acquire the talent needed to meet system performance demands. Second, scarce resources of education and training are individually focused and thus essentially wasted, rather than directed to achieve a set of systemic career development objectives based on the needs of the organization. Third, the recruitment, assignment, education and training dollars spent, fail to acquire and assure a well prepared workplace for national security assignments. Fourth, civilians are facing growing challenges in operating in unknown situations, and they are often not as well equipped as their military counterparts to perform in contingencies and/or crisis. And perhaps most importantly, there is a tendency to rely on the military to perform in what has historically been civilian roles. These are roles the military is poorly prepared to perform and which communicate a preference for "hard power" to other nations.⁴⁹ As noted by Deputy Secretary of State John D. Negraponte, "For too long, insufficient numbers of trained, prepared and supported civilians have obliged us to resort to the military for such missions more than might otherwise have been necessary."⁵⁰

"Symptomatic of the...problem is the failure of departments and agencies to fill positions for interagency missions quickly and with appropriately qualified personnel,

even when the missions are recognized as high priorities. The experience of establishing PRTs (Provisional Reconstruction Teams), provides the most prominent recent example. Civilian positions remained vacant when individuals completed their tours [and] were not replaced by their home agency. There is a tendency of departments and agencies to allocate personnel only for short rotations”.⁵¹ The PNSR suggests a model for interagency support and cross fertilization of a suggested Department of International Relations:⁵²




Figure 1.

This same model could equally be adjusted to incorporate cross fertilization and expectations from anywhere within our various Departments charged with supporting national security. The key task is setting the common expectation.

At senior levels, while there can be no doubt that the leaders within our current system are highly educated and talented, their collective knowledge, experience, and

management skills are not necessarily ideal for their role as leaders of national security professionals. A cursory review all 19 National Security Advisor's since 1947 reveals that few have had diverse backgrounds in all bases of power at the time of their appointment. If we apply the tenets of Diplomatic, Informational, Military and Economic (DIME) power, we gain the following insight: fully 13 of the 19 worked or trained in some capacity involving diplomacy ranging from Air Attaché (Scowcroft) to Deputy Secretary of State (Clark); only 8 had Informational experience within the intelligence-informational domains ranging from participating in the Psychological Operations board (Gray/Kissinger), to Deputy Director of CIA (Carlucci); as many as 13 had some personal and professional military understanding ranging from being drafted (Kissinger), to appointment as the Chairman of the JCS (Powell); and it is in the Economic domain that we find the greatest shortage of expertise: only 6 had experiential or educational backgrounds ranging from teaching economics at Cornell (Rostow) to achieving an MBA (Powell). Even more telling is the shallow cross fertilization within the subordinate leadership of our national security professional corps where only 9% of Senior Executive Service employees have ever worked outside their own agency.⁵³

There is cultural resistance to integrated political-military command in the field as well as within the psyche of our people. "The American public tends to view war and peace as separate, discontinuous states. So do diplomats and military officers, who are recruited and prepared... in different approaches to problem solving... By training and experience, the soldier seeks certainty and emphasizes victory through force. The diplomat is accustomed to ambiguity and emphasis solving conflicts through persuasion."⁵⁴ As we look for a transformational approach to future threats and

developing greater capabilities, why would we not try to integrate our capacities to persuade and plan for a more effective warrior and diplomat?

And now that we've looked at what we can do, we must now address the last "great leadership" concern of: What actions can we take today?⁵⁵ As America seeks out its role in the next decade, it will need a more robust capability to link its determined national interests (ends) with the capability of finding the right personnel (means) to carry out those interests. The Recruiting Commands of the various services within the DoD provide both science and art of recruiting which are under-understood capabilities that can bridge our future requirements and provide the mechanism (ways) for success.

While the PNSR cites "the segregation of labor in functional organizations that recruit, train and reward their personnel [is] what gives the U.S. government the expertise it needs to accomplish its objectives⁵⁶", and that "homogenizing them in one agency would risk marginalizing their skills in a way that makes each less effective⁵⁷", maintaining organizational focus with integrated recruitment still makes sense. In fact, in an era of likely diminished resources, recruiting ought to be *the* example of Joint functional and Inter Agency cooperation. The PNSR is full of examples of current failure within our national security talent management system and nearly empty of practical solutions to mend the cultural divide.

Before we get too excited in terms of cultural interoperability, it is worthwhile to briefly examine some of the current operational risks within our Army. While there is much capacity within our current Army Recruiting Command, there is also much within the internal recruiting culture that is unfortunately undesirable. First, for both officer and noncommissioned officer (NCO) alike, recruiting is viewed more as a necessary evil

than a career enhancing opportunity. While an NCO may be told they are “Department of the Army-select” to become a recruiter, the average Soldier values duty as a drill sergeant over any other non-Career Management Field (CMF) requirement. Similarly for officers, it has long been advised for active duty junior officers to avoid the “Three R’s”: Recruiting, ROTC and duty supporting the Reserves. Anything that keeps an active duty officer from “operations” in their CMF is viewed as a professional career gamble. A large portion of this discomfort results from an apparent cultural divide: Recruiting is often not seen as “Soldierly” while most other opportunities are easier to assimilate based on common experiences among Soldiers.

For officers, the average Human Resource professional has grown up in their branch and received numerous accolades for competence in their CMF skills. They may have had experience in ROTC as a young cadet and based on our current high operational tempo with unit manning requirements involving more US Army Reserve skills outside of their own branch. They are at least familiar with officer development (ROTC) and force structure of our Reserve forces. Recruiting however is the most alien and least perceived as desirable of the Three R’s. The irony of this cultural drift is that the ultra-importance of providing quality future Soldiers for our training base to mold into Soldiers and subsequently provide a “pool” of future leadership is not viewed as a priority task by either our enlisted or officer “handlers” within the Human Resources community.

There is also a common belief that NCOs must “check their integrity at the door” once they are assigned to recruiting. This impression is often reinforced within the Army by a culture that tends to accentuate the negative (i.e. “bad” recruiters get more

press than good ones). Improprieties highlighted in the Army Times or local media are not the kind of public relations articles desired by our recruiters or their leadership. Unfortunately, this condition can often result in Soldiers mistrusting instead of engaging the media and more critically, shying away from the populace, while trying to accomplish their mission.

For our young officers, these impressions create a less desirable climate for developing leaders. Why would an officer willingly forego working with highly trained professional NCOs in their common career field to risk a potentially career ending assignment leading newly trained part-time recruiters more concerned with surviving their 3 year hiatus from their chosen career field than becoming tactically and technically competent in a new one?

Ironically these same challenges provide tremendous opportunities to develop strategic leaders and national security professional. All six strategic leader metacompetencies⁵⁸ (identity, mental agility, cross cultural savvy, interpersonal maturity, world-class warrior, and professional astuteness) become forcing functions within recruiting. As one is forced to recruit, their sense of identity in the Army is enhanced tremendously. It is no longer just a job; it is a passionate calling where success depends on the ability to effectively relate to others. Mental agility is required not only in order to understand the constant changes in programs but more importantly in scanning their environment for opportunities to engage the populace. Cross-cultural savvy develops from the need for recruiters to understand other stakeholders in the decision making process of young adults. In this regard, the United States Recruiting Command (USAREC) spends tremendous resources on understanding how to recruit in various

minority and ethnic markets. Interpersonal maturity is developed from close contact with stakeholders outside of the military; teachers, professional businessmen, and other outside influencers. Successful recruiters are, by definition, excellent negotiators of the various interests perceived to impact a young adult's decision to become a Soldier. These skills are easily adaptable to the battlefield where understanding cultural nuance and negotiating friendly effects are needed to create positive effects in "an environment characterized by uncertainty, complexity, rapid change and persistent conflict."⁵⁹ There can perhaps be no greater requirement for interpersonal maturity than the task of filling the initial entry manning needs for the Army and developing a quality pool of potential future leaders on which to base the profession. The world-class warrior competency is manifest in the perception (and hopeful reality) of the recruiter as the local, home town embodiment of the Army. Outside of the national news, the recruiter is the only Soldier most Americans will see in their day-to-day life. Most recruiters will be forced to demonstrate their professional astuteness as a defense mechanism to outsiders (our civilian populace) perceiving otherwise. A recruiter's area of operation is perception-based and a tactical error (publicized recruiter impropriety) can have strategic implications on the trust of recruiters in that area for a long time.

Self selection is a key attribute of the profession of arms; not everyone in America is cut out to be a professional Soldier. Equally true, not every Soldier is cut out to be a Recruiter. During my initial tour of duty in the United States Army Recruiting Command in July 2000, there were "rumors" of a system to help choose future recruiters based on psychological selection criteria similar to what is used during the Special Forces Assessment and Selection (SFAS) course. This tool is partially

designed to assess and identify those quality NCOs who could work well in a team and be adaptive to significant operational constraints and ambiguity. The program within the Recruiting Command was originally termed the Noncommissioned Officer Leadership Skills Inventory (NLSI) in the 2001 timeframe and was designed to develop metrics to understanding what made a successful recruiter. The intent was to assist the human resource community in finding the right NCO for the right job; specifically recruiting and drill sergeant responsibilities.⁶⁰ It was not until April 1st 2008 that the program was mandated Army wide as the Warrior Asset Inventory⁶¹. This disparity in time (8 years) from concept development to implementation ought to be troubling to our human resource professionals. The good news is that the Army is using this system for its recruiting force. The bad news is that no other service does so.

While all of our services and components are “making mission”, the quality marks of that force have been steadily declining over the last few years. “Quality” marks refer to the ability of an applicant or Future Soldier to test in the upper 50th percentile of the Armed Service Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB). While this standard is useful for judging the temporal academic qualities of Soldiers, it does not quantify the quality of the character of those we bring into our service. If less than 3 of 10 high school students are fully qualified (medically, mentally and morally) to serve in the military, it is incumbent upon the services to find those best able to defend our freedoms. In today's environment, regardless of test score, a young person willing to take on the challenge of learning a new job (military MOS) with the known likelihood of facing armed conflict (current wars in Afghanistan and Iraq), is likely more qualified to become a better citizen for America's future. Defining the “quality” of our force simply based on a single

academic test fails to recognize the positive impact military discipline plays on the future learning capability of these same individuals. Immature youth lacking the skills to study in a civilian environment are better prepared to achieve academically after serving in the military. These same Soldier-Citizens have or will develop the character traits best needed for America's future challenges in diplomacy, leadership, business and national security.

The profession of Recruiting is only now developing a constituency and vying for jurisdictions within the Army. August of 2008 marked the first-ever establishment of an active duty Army recruiter as a Chapter president of the Association of Military Recruiters and Counselors (AMRAC)⁶². With this new found advocacy comes the potential to expand recruiting operations within not only the Department of Defense but also other Departments within our government.

This professionalism of the recruiting effort is a precursor to the hopeful restructuring and mission refinement necessary for the future. Solely within the Army, funding for the recruiting effort is shaped by three separate bureaucracies (Active Army, US Army Reserve and Army National Guard); each of whom have marginal expertise in the field. Outside of USAREC, few civilian or military leaders have robust expertise in recruiting within Accessions Command, Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) or the Army Staff. This deficiency is further exacerbated within the other services, and at the interagency level. Just as a new Joint Profession⁶³ could help solve many of our current woes with the operational and strategic issues of joint warfare, so could the establishment of a cohesive Joint Recruiting Command be the natural initial answer to our future manning needs.

As we look to a future of constrained resources, the Department of Defense must “combine joint capabilities to maximize complementary rather than merely additive effects.”⁶⁴ Recruiting is easily one of the most complementary capabilities within our military.

Public service and national security have been inseparable throughout our history. “Two recent DoD study groups—the Defense Science Board Task Force on Human Resources Strategy (DSB) and the DoD Quality of Life Panel... expressed belief that DoD needs to do more to engage the American public about the importance of public service.”⁶⁵

The future of our national security cannot rest on the shoulders of our military alone. The need for quality (character over academia) young men and women to serve their nation was the topic of discussion by both candidates for President in 2008. The idea of a National Call to Service has been brokered by several of our leaders. On 8 September 2008, President Bush announced a challenge for all Americans to dedicate 4,000 hours or two years of their life to “acts of compassion.”⁶⁶ This ideal will likely fall short of achievement if left to the initiative of the numerous organizations charged with managing the effort. The USA Freedom Corps does not have much more than a website query capability for those interested in volunteering to serve. How more effective could such a program be if these national mission manning requirements were led by a Joint Recruiting Command? How more effective could our State Department be, for example, if the 5 initial entry career tracks, consular affairs, economic affairs, management affairs, political affairs and public diplomacy were centrally managed by a single Command charged with finding the best applicants from across the nation? How

much more effective could the State Department's Civilian Response Corps be if integrated into current DoD Reserve Component recruiting efforts. At minimum, the recognition of comprehensive values as qualities for hiring within the State Department would improve the likelihood of enhanced professional leadership within the organization.

Inherent in this proposal is the recognized need for a comprehensive application and testing (medical and mental) to ensure each agency's variables are included. The advantages to non-Defense organizations are two-fold: greater access to America's labor pool nationwide and better education of departmental-specific opportunities to many who would otherwise not consider governmental or volunteer service. To the Defense Department, the additional menus for potential career opportunity create greater likelihood of the recruiter to build trust and confidence among the populace. The enhanced ability to engage "hometown America" is vital to both our military and national security interests. The Army Recruiting Information Support System (ARISS) currently links an Army recruiter in one of hundreds of geographically dispersed and culturally diverse portions of the nation with our national requirements. Each service has a similarly based system that could readily be integrated in the joint environment to achieve synergy of effort. The Army Recruiting Command has also been at the forefront of migrating from a sales-based doctrine to one of a leadership/counseling-based focus. Beyond the "numbers" of contracts written or Soldiers assessed, the focus from filling quotas to providing a professional career counseling service also separates the Army from the other challengers for dominance in recruiting. While we currently focus on recruiting a Soldier "for life", the same process could easily be adapted to

focus on recruiting the future national security professional for a lifetime of service in the military, diplomatic, intelligence or commerce departments. This transformational change in doctrine is best accomplished at the US Army Recruiting and Retention School (RRS) where arguably the most dynamic and robust Knowledge Management programs exist compared to the other services.

The challenges of the next generation will be daunting. Finding the leaders to take responsibility and action in every discipline of our national security will require our best efforts. We will better our odds at finding the right leaders for our future if we capitalize on our current recruiting capability and expand it to meet the needs of a National Call to Service supporting our national security. Finding the professionals capable of meeting the future leadership requirements of our National Security system will require us to target talent across our nation, throwing the broadest possible net and then purposefully developing them within a comprehensive, inclusive system. The future is bright, but only if we turn up the pressure on our institutions to perform and reform. It is not the intent of this paper to imply it will be easy, only that it must be done; and the sooner we recognize it, the sooner we will gain momentum over our current level of apathy.

Endnotes

¹ Marcus Buckingham, *The One Thing You Need To Know... About Great Managing. Great Leading, and Sustaining Individual Success*; Free Press, NY 2005 p. 134-140 Note: the four key areas of this paper: "whom we serve", "what is our core strength"; "our core score": and "actions we should take today" are chapter sections within this book and provide the shell for analysis used herein.

² Project on National Security Reform (PNSR): *Forging a New Shield*; Center for the Study of the Presidency, 26 November, 2008. p. 100 http://www.pnsr.org/data/files/pnsr_forging_a_new_shield_report.pdf

³ PNSR p. 724

⁴ www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/eo/eo-13434.htm

⁵ PNSR p. 155

⁶ Ibid p. 166

⁷ Ibid p. 165

⁸ Ibid p. 165

⁹ Ibid p. 167

¹⁰ Lieutenant Colonel Cynthia A. Brown, USAF; "Joint Recruiting...Is the Time Right?" Strategic Research Project, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050, 15 March 2008

¹¹ Capstone Concept for Joint Operations Version 3.0 15 January 2009

¹² Marcus Buckingham, *The One Thing You Need To Know... About Great Managing. Great Leading, and Sustaining Individual Success*; Free Press, NY 2005 p. 146

¹³ PNSR p. 353 and Christopher Jon Lamb, James Douglas Orton, and Rei Tang, *Organization and Management Theory Analysis of the U.S. National Security System*,|| (Washington: The Project on National Security Reform) 14 April 2008.

¹⁴ PNSR p. 355

¹⁵ Ibid p. 364

¹⁶ Joel D. Aberbach and Mark D. Peters, *The Executive Branch, American Institutions of Democracy*, Oxford University Press 2006, p. 254

¹⁷ PNSR p. 568

¹⁸ Ibid p. 495

¹⁹ Marcus Buckingham, *The One Thing You Need To Know... About Great Managing. Great Leading, and Sustaining Individual Success*; Free Press, NY 2005 p. 163

²⁰ *Transforming the Ranks: Transforming the U.S. Military Personnel System*, ed. Cindy Williams; Chapter 4: *The War for Talent in the Private Sector*; Thomas M. Strawn, 2004, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, p. 70 [note: see also *Hope is not a Method: What Business Leaders Can Learn from America's Army*", Gordon R. Sullivan and Michael V. Harper, New York, Broadway Books, 1996]

²¹ See: www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/defbudget/FY2009/fy2009_m1.pdf (p. 22)

²² Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, News Release No. 861-08, 10 October 2008

²³ See: http://www.defenselink.mil/prhome/PopRep_FY06/pdf/AppendixB.pdf (note: statistic is from FY2006; latest year for which statistics were published electronically) p. 26

²⁴ Statistics from United States Army Recruiting Command (USAREC) Command brief 1st Quarter FY08.

²⁵ See:
<http://www.goarmy.com/rotcFindSchools.do;jsessionid=5EFBA8756627D3775BF1EF399C328209> (note: these numbers reflect only Army ROTC programs but are suggestive of current reach within the US population).

²⁶ PSNR p. 202

²⁷ www.peacecorps.gov/index.cfm?shell=learn.whatispc.pctoday accessed 13 December 2008. It should be noted that the Peace Corps successfully recruited a total of more than 190,000 volunteers since its inception in 1960 but this works out to an average of less than 4000 total volunteers annually.

²⁸ See: http://www.bestplacetowork.org/BPTW/rankings/agency.php?code=AM00&q=scores_small

²⁹ See: <http://careers.state.gov/resources/diplomats.html#school> (in comparison to the diversity offered by 270 ROTC programs nationwide, DOS efforts are somewhat anemic)

³⁰ See: <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2008/07/107083.htm> (interestingly these same skill sets are organic with in DoD under most reserve component Civil Affairs

³¹ Department of State website

³² See: <https://www.cia.gov/careers/jobs/how-to-apply.html> (accessed 13 December 2008)

³³ Business Week 2006 Best Places to Launch a Career. CIA was noted as No. 32 in the survey at: http://www.businessweek.com/careers/bplc/companies_32.htm

³⁴ Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. *The Defense Science Board Task Force on Human Resources Strategy* Washington: Department of Defense, 2000 (<http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/humanresources.pdf>)

³⁵ The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction. *Report to the President* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2005) <<http://www.wmd.gov/report>>

³⁶ PSNR p. 340

³⁷ Ibid p. 340

³⁸ Ibid p. 404 and Barry Rubin, *Secrets of State: The State Department and the Struggle Over U.S. Foreign Policy*, (Oxford University Press, 1985) p. 148

³⁹ PSNR p. 344

⁴⁰ Ibid p. 485

- ⁴¹ See: http://www.navy.mil/navydata/navy_legacy_hr.asp?id=193
- ⁴² See: http://www.marines.com/main/index/making_marines/culture/traditions/core_values
- ⁴³ See: http://www.usafa.af.mil/core_value
- ⁴⁴ See: <http://www.uscg.mil/leadership/values.asp>
- ⁴⁵ <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/28778.pdf>
- ⁴⁶ <https://www.cia.gov/about-cia/cia-vision-mission-values/index.html>
- ⁴⁷ Marcus Buckingham, *The One Thing You Need To Know... About Great Managing. Great Leading, and Sustaining Individual Success*; Free Press, NY 2005 p. 174
- ⁴⁸ PNSR p. 366
- ⁴⁹ Ibid p. 366
- ⁵⁰ <http://www.africom.mil/getArticle.asp?art=1959>
- ⁵¹ PNSR p. 345
- ⁵² Ibid p. 590 (Figure 26)
- ⁵³ Ibid p. 349
- ⁵⁴ Ibid p. 282
- ⁵⁵ Marcus Buckingham, *The One Thing You Need To Know... About Great Managing. Great Leading, and Sustaining Individual Success*; Free Press, NY 2005 p. 181
- ⁵⁶ PNSR p. 259
- ⁵⁷ Ibid p. 260
- ⁵⁸ Leonard Wong and Don M. Snider, *Strategic Leadership of the Army Profession, The Future of the Army Profession*, 2nd ed. McGraw Hill Custom Publishing, 2005. p.611
- ⁵⁹ Capstone Concept for Joint Operations Version 3.0 dated 15 January 2009, p.2
- ⁶⁰ This concept was briefed by the USAREC CSM, CSM Wells to the TRADOC CSM, CSM Sparks on Jan 7, 2007.
- ⁶¹ see ALARACT 094/2008
- ⁶² See: <http://www.ngob.net/gazette/gazetteaug08.pdf> (accessed 12 October 2008)
- ⁶³ Don M. Snider and Jeffrey Peterson, *Opportunity for the Army: Defense Transformation and a New Joint Military Profession, The Future of the Army Profession*, 2nd ed. McGraw Hill Custom Publishing, 2005. p. 248

⁶⁴ Capstone Concept for Joint Operations Version 3.0 dated 15 January 2009, p. 24

⁶⁵ Evaluating Military Advertising and Recruiting, Theory and Methodology; National Research Council Committee on the Youth Population and Military Recruitment—Phase II, Paul R. Sackett and Anne S. Mavor ed., The National Academies Press, Washington DC, 2004. p. 122 (Note: the editors also highlighted that “More values-oriented advertising that stresses the virtues of patriotism, self-sacrifice, and service to country would serve that purpose.”

⁶⁶ See http://www.usafreedomcorps.gov/about_usafc/newsroom/speeches_dynamic.asp?ID=1991)

