Was the Surge Strategy Right?
Abstract
The decrease in violence and the recent successes enjoyed in Operation Iraqi Freedom are presumably due to the "surge strategy" that was implemented by the Department of Defense. This research project examines whether or not the increase in American Soldiers in Iraq was actually needed. The author argues that the "Sons of Iraq" program (or "Sahwa") was the major contributing factor to the successes in Iraq (along with other parts of the so-called surge strategy). Determining whether or not the surge in American combat power strategy enabled the Sahwa to be effective, or if the Sahwa would have been effective without the increase in troops is important. If the additional American combat power was not needed in Iraq, those forces could have been better used in other parts of the world, such as Afghanistan, or they could have been assigned greater dwell time (meaning that they would have been better trained and less stressed), and the defense supplemental budget could have been either decreased or spent on other priorities. If the Sahwa alone could have been effective in achieving the success now seen in Iraq, what should the military strategy have been to enable this result?
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Mar 12, 2009
- Accession Number
- ADA498043
Entities
People
- Bruce Antonia
Organizations
- United States Army War College