A Theory of Winning
Abstract
The recent proliferation of efforts to redefine the meaning of "winning" has led to a wide variety of conclusions. Most efforts implicitly or explicitly assume that a revised concept of winning is required by two major developments: (1) the capability of nations to wage general nuclear war; and (2) the apparent trend to limit current and future wars to avoid the destruction that would result from a general nuclear war. It is the purpose of this thesis to determine what the concept of winning really is, and to what extent the concept is useful when applied to military conflicts in the modern international world. Experience in three conflicts sheds some light on winning. In World War II, the political objective of unconditional surrender also became a military objective. It was clearly stated, and the point of winning was readily apparent. But had the atomic bomb not been available, achievement of the unconditional surrender of Japan would have resulted in high personnel losses; a conditional surrender might have been acceptable, and attainable, at much lower cost. In the Korean War, political objectives were twice changed because of the capabilities of the military forces employed. Limitation of the war resulted in an armistice, which even now leaves a confrontation of military forces in place, thus blurring the concept of military victory. In the current war in Vietnam, political objectives and political considerations restrict even more the choice of feasible military strategies. Here, the dominance of the political objective requires such a change in the nature of military objectives, that winning in the classical sense is no longer applicable. The thesis concludes that a definition of winning in terms of the attainment of objectives is valid and useful. As the dominance of political objectives rises, they may shadow the importance of military objectives to such an extent that concern with military victory in certain situations is meaningless speculation.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Apr 08, 1966
- Accession Number
- ADA498099
Entities
People
- Charles O. Eshelman
Organizations
- United States Army War College