

CHALLENGING THE NEED FOR DEMOCRACY AS A NATIONAL INTEREST

BY

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**CHALLENGING THE NEED FOR DEMOCRACY
AS A NATIONAL INTEREST**

by

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ABSTRACT

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The United States should continue to support, shape, and encourage democracy around the world. However, the U.S should continue to engage by assisting the growth of freedom but without demanding democratization from nations and leaders. The U.S. should not elevate democracy pursuit as a “battle cry” which then serves to make us a lightning rod for accusations of hypocrisy and double standards, ultimately diminishing the message of democracy and the legitimacy of the United States. Instead, it should consider returning to a more humble posture and refrain from positioning itself as the world’s savior through the establishment of democracy.

CHALLENGING THE NEED FOR DEMOCRACY AS A NATIONAL INTEREST

Americans continually pursue the ideals of democracy set by our founding fathers more than two centuries ago. Because of our pursuit and implementation of the ideals, freedoms, values and culture of democracy, the global opinion of the U.S. historically has been good. However, it is one thing for America to pursue its version of democracy in America, but from a strategic communication perspective others perceive it as heavy handed and imperialistic when we say to the world that you too must be democratic in order to make the world safe for Americans. Furthermore, when we fail to operate democratically outside our borders, we experience setbacks that sully our reputation internationally and subsequently degrade our ability to successfully pursue our strategic national security objectives.

American support for the pursuit of democracy around the world is not new, having gradually crept into the lexicon of our national interests since just after the turn of the 20th century under President Woodrow Wilson. The U.S. forms of supporting the growth of global democracy served us well until the terrorist attacks and national tragedy of September 11, 2001. Following that fateful day, the national strategic objective to implement democracy around the world became strict dogma in the name of making the world safer.

Given the challenges we face alongside our international neighbors such as climate change, renewable energy, water shortages, etc. we must be cognizant of their perceptions of the U.S. since they “shape how and whether other countries engage with the U.S.”¹ We must examine whether since 2002 the overt posturing to bring about democracy around the globe has hurt our reputation thereby degrading our ability to

achieve our core national interests of security and prosperity. To do this requires consideration of how democracy became a national interest and analysis of the correlation between the pursuit of democracy since 2002 and the decline of global public opinion about the U.S.

History of our National Interests

*The Early Republic Era.*² The United States established itself and its national interests with the Declaration of Independence. Following the Declaration and leading up to the U.S. Constitution, three of our founding fathers, Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay, wrote the 85 Federalist Papers from October 1787 to August 1788. These leaders implemented our nation's earliest form of government strategic communication by publishing papers to inform and influence the American people to support ratification by writing extensive explanations of the U.S. Constitution. In these papers, they outlined the importance of our national interest in security and prosperity. More than 230 years ago, our nation's founding documents laid out the ideals and rights for security, prosperity, equality and freedoms. Our national interests became intertwined as part of our Constitutional Rights under the provisions written in the Bill of Rights, which provides the individual freedoms Americans enjoy today.³

Even more than two centuries ago, our founders knew the task of pursuing our vital interests would be complicated and tied to the international community. Amy Zegart wrote in *The National Interest* that:

American foreign-policy attitudes have always been famously contradictory, embracing both Hobbes and Locke in a tense grip. The Founders were at once deeply suspicious of human nature and wildly optimistic about their American democratic experiment. "If men were angels, no government would be necessary," wrote (James) Madison in Federalist 51.⁴

America's founders recognized the challenge of the reality of power and the dichotomy of trying to wield it both pragmatically and idealistically in the pursuit of universal ideals. Zegart further noted that:

The Framers combined their deep suspicions of the human nature of man, the role of power and the inevitability of conflict with a dreamy optimism about the universality of American values and the righteousness of the American cause. "The world has its eye on America," wrote Alexander Hamilton. "The influence of our example has penetrated the gloomy regions of despotism." Hamilton looked forward to the day when American democracy would be blessed and imitated by the world. This uncomfortable duality—mixing both interests and ideals, pessimism and hope, stability and revolution—has always been part of America's DNA.⁵

America's first president, a man of unparalleled confidence and humility, seemed to innately understand his role as a representative of the people and the significance of leading our nation and government. George Washington's actions and words to his staff, the legislature, the nation and foreign nations clearly communicated his intent. He understood the role and value of strategic communication by demanding the government speak with one voice and communicating what he was doing.⁶ Moreover, although he also understood the inevitable need for international relations in the global community, he understood the value of their opinions. He cautioned for a "decent respect for the opinions of mankind."⁷ He recognized the United States could not isolate itself from the rest of the world and knew we would have to be involved internationally, but that they should not automatically rule our actions. He advocated taking into account global opinions beforehand. His successor, Thomas Jefferson continued the same foreign policy labeled as isolationism by stating we should avoid "entangling alliances."⁸ While foreign policy remained, for many presidencies, within that framework, it did not mean the absence of international relations; rather, foreign relations continued on many levels and grew in varying degrees based on economic and world events.

In general, presidents for several decades carried on their tendency toward isolationism in foreign policy, but incrementally grew internationally engaged, both defensively and offensively. James Monroe boldly established his doctrine by warning other countries not to set their sights on America's western front or the nations to its south in Latin America. This defensive nature stood for nearly seventy-five years until President Theodore Roosevelt in 1901. A significant shift was growing within American leadership beliefs and hubris about our role in the world when Roosevelt came into power.

*Progressive Era.*⁹ Theodore Roosevelt believed in a form of imperialism and added an offensive dimension to extending the Monroe doctrine in his Roosevelt Corollary by proclaiming in his autobiography that we must "act not justly but generously towards the weak."¹⁰

Roosevelt wanted to engage more internationally and comprehended the paradox of overstepping our bounds of capability resulting in being viewed as not living up to our promises. He recognized the incongruence of promising too much and not delivering on those promises. Thus, he said, "the only rule was to promise little and faithfully keep every promise."¹¹ His often-quoted proverb "speak softly, but carry a big stick and you will go far," advocated the importance of strong military power to use if needed, but proposed using other elements of power first to achieve limited goals.

While Roosevelt was the first president to seek more proactive international relations, it appears that Woodrow Wilson in his tenure as president is the first leader to use the term "democracy" more overtly as part of our foreign policy. Wilson said the main goal of World War I should be to end militarism and make the world "safe for

democracy," not merely to defend American ships. He promised that the United States would fight to ensure democracy, self-government, the rights and liberties of small nations, and an international peace organization that would end war forever.¹²

Despite this early pronouncement for the state of democracy, as an internationalist he believed in the international community working together and the "mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike." When he sought Senate ratification of the Versailles Treaty, containing the Covenant of the League of Nations, and asked, "Dare we reject it and break the heart of the world?"¹³

Wilson's vision for the world would transform international relations and usher in a new era of world peace through the League of Nations, open to membership by all democratic nations. This new world body would be in charge of disarmament and the dismantling of colonial possessions. Most importantly, the League would hold power over all disputes among its members. Understanding the need to gain support for the league's establishment he sought to convince the American people to pressure the Senate Republicans to pass the treaty. Wilson took his strategic communication tour on the road to rally the nation to his cause. He covered 9,981 miles with speeches in twenty-nine cities.¹⁴

Convinced that democracy was gaining strength throughout the world, Wilson was eager to encourage the process. Wilson declared "that the United States hoped to cultivate the friendship and deserve the confidence of the Latin American states, but he also emphasized that he believed just government must rest upon the consent of the governed."¹⁵ The prospect of being free to conduct their own affairs without American

interference delighted Latin Americans, but Wilson's insistence that their governments must be democratic undermined the promise of self-determination. The military occupations in Haiti and the Dominican Republic that followed failed to create the democratic states that were their main objective. In 1916, Wilson practiced an old-fashioned form of imperialism by buying the Virgin Islands from their colonial master, Denmark, for \$25 million.¹⁶ We must note how almost 100 years ago we experienced the negative impact of communicating the United States' desire that evolving countries' governments must be democratic. Our attempts to force the evolution were perceived internationally as heavy handed and ultimately failed, damaging the reputation and credibility of the America. .

*Depression and World Conflict Era:*¹⁷ Following Wilson, several presidents emphasized domestic issues (and rightfully so given the U.S. dire economic conditions) and continued their isolationism in foreign policy until World War II thrust the U.S. onto the international stage to assist in the defeat of the Axis powers. Before the war, Franklin D. Roosevelt recognized the vital role of international engagement and laid out the plan for the United Nations. A skilled communicator, he is credited with being a master at "spinning the press"¹⁸ and shaping his image. He created the Fireside Chats designed to inform, educate and influence the American people. In his Fireside Chat 16: On the Arsenal of Democracy (December 29, 1940), "Roosevelt appeals to the nation to provide more material support to Great Britain. The President argues that the best way to stay out of the war and preserve national security is to aid the Allied forces, establishing the United States as the "arsenal of democracy."¹⁹

His successor, Harry S. Truman, concluded WWII and strongly believed in internationalism with U.S. leadership. He sought to continue the development of the international body now known as the United Nations nearly 30 years following the first efforts. The Truman doctrine finally and obviously shifted America's disposition away from isolationism. He believed that America had a set of global responsibilities and told Congress in his first presidential address after Roosevelt's death, "responsibility of a great state is to serve and not dominate the world."²⁰ He tempered his ideals to lead with restraint and respect for other nations.

He spoke to the U.N. a couple weeks later about the imperative of international engagement but with humble restraint. Truman said:

Man has learned long ago that it is impossible to live unto himself. This same basic principle applies today to nations. We are not isolated during the war. We dare not become isolated in peace. All will conclude that in order to have good neighbors, we must also be good neighbors. That applies in every field of human endeavor.²¹

Within months of taking office, Truman oversaw the end of WWII. America's global popularity was high as she helped nations and institutions rebuild. Nearly two years after the end of the war, Truman addressed Congress and said that once again the United States must "support free peoples."²²

In March 1947, in an effort to rally support from Congress to provide financial support to Greece and Turkey he urged:

I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures. I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way. I believe that our help should be primarily through economic and financial aid, which is essential to economic stability, and orderly political processes...The free peoples of the world look to us for support in maintaining their freedoms.²³

*Social Change and Soviet Relations Era.*²⁴ The blending of our own ideals and supporting our international neighbors that share the same ideals continued for another 50 years while trying to stop the growth of communism. Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, Carter and Reagan faced the communist threats by supporting legitimate and sometimes illegitimate powers with mixed success. While recognizing the critical link between democracy and peace, none of these presidents explicitly called for the promotion of democracy to serve as a national interest. While they desired democracy and knew it served as the centerpiece to long-term success for transition to peace, their actions strategically communicated a respect for the sovereignty of other nations and instead leveraged the pursuit of democracy abroad in a support role rather than a dominating one.

*Globalization Era.*²⁵ President George Herbert Walker Bush articulated democracy as a published national interest for the first time by an administration in the 1991 National Security Strategy by seeking, with allies, to “promote democratic change in the Soviet Union.” It also stated the need to build an international community of mutual support by seeking to “strengthen and enlarge the commonwealth of free nations that share a commitment to democracy and individual rights” and to bring “democracy in a Europe, whole and free.”²⁶ Furthermore, it detailed that the U.S. was reorganizing its economic and security assistance to focus on five major challenges with the first as “promoting and consolidating democratic values”²⁷ through leveraging U.S. programs to foster the universal goals of political choice, human rights and self-determination.

In general, America’s worldwide popularity was good²⁸ and many praised George H.W. Bush for his success in leading U.S. foreign relations/policy as an open-minded

intellectual, recognizing the need to exhibit respect and humility. Bush's dedication to the balance of values sought to make the U.S. "a kinder and gentler nation" and to "use American strength as a force for good."²⁹ His tenure also witnessed the dawn of the technological age allowing us to "project the power of our ideas to any corner of the world at a moments notice."³⁰

Bush's foray into the role and importance of democracy throughout his NSS gave way to President William J. Clinton boiling down the concept and clearly articulating the promotion of democracy as this nation's third national interest. Clinton titled his report "A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement," strategically communicating to the U.S and international governments his intent for domestic and foreign policy. In the preface of Clinton's 1995 NSS, he concisely states that the goals for the new era are:

- To sustain our security with military forces that are ready to fight
- To bolster America's economic revitalization
- To promote democracy abroad

For the first time in our nation's history, the promotion of democracy abroad takes a front row seat alongside the two founding and enduring national interests of security and prosperity. Clinton's international relations ideology employed the use of diplomatic and economic instruments of power, and like others, reserved the right to use force to protect national interests if needed. However, according to his NSS he promoted democracy as long as it was what the foreign society wanted. "Democracy and economic prosperity can take root in a struggling society only through local solutions carried out by the society itself,"³¹ the Clinton Administration's NSS states. Critics of the

internationalist views warned however, “a crusade on behalf of democracy will overstretch American resources”³² and bog the U.S in untenable foreign relations choices.

Regardless of the naysayers, Clinton viewed the United States’ role of “engagement” as supporting the spread of democracy primarily through leveraging the international community as evidenced by an expanded NATO; more open, international trade; and a worldwide campaign against drug trafficking.³³ He was “more oriented toward the further development of an international community in which we would play a leading role.”³⁴

The dawn of 21st century saw dramatic changes. President George W. Bush further developed the Clinton administration’s precedent and emphasized the spread of democracy globally as an important component in achieving national security following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Bush labeled his democracy pursuit as the Freedom Agenda linking the spread of democracy worldwide³⁵ to defeating the ideology of hatred³⁶ in order to achieve national security.

Bush inculcated democracy-promotion policy throughout government. He signed a law in 2002 requiring the federal government to file a progress report each year on his freedom agenda, thereby institutionalizing the pursuit and its practices throughout government.³⁷ In 2008, Bush signed National Security Presidential Directive 58: Institutionalizing the Freedom Agenda codifying the policies, practices and programs into a blueprint for furthering the spread of democracy.³⁸

While the institution of democracy rated high around the globe, the act of spreading it received a very different reaction. To many, Bush’s version of spreading

democracy was heavy-handed and arrogant. It “is now seen in the Middle East and elsewhere as a tool of hegemony and domination, pursued by a fearful superpower that has relaxed its own standards of openness and the rule of law at home.”³⁹ Others point to the negative effect it has had on our international reputation and standing.

Advancing democracy may have been the ultimate objective, but we certainly did not choose to achieve it via the strengthening of the global laws or institutions we had once established for just such a purpose. Even if one result of our effort proves to be a net positive in the context of one region, such as the Middle East ... achieving it by placing ourselves above and beyond the influence of global institutions or the rule of law will only serve to seriously damage the international order that we have sought to build since the end of World War II.⁴⁰

As previously detailed, the U.S. historically supported the spread of democracy, economically, diplomatically and militarily albeit with mixed success. For example, the world witnessed the end of the Cold War with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the slow growth of democracies in Eastern Europe, but now more than 20 years later, Russia’s resurgence and muscle flexing are making headlines again and causing worry for freedom in that region. In recent years, our support for democratic elections in Gaza witnessed Hamas representatives now part of the freely elected government, catching the U.S. in a quandary on how to label and treat a democracy with elected “terrorists.” On the other hand, many decades of slow, but forward moving change in Central and South American nations resulted in them enjoying more freedoms and better quality of life. In the 12 countries of South America, democracy has slowly been on the rise since 1959. The information revolution and the spread of education have given ordinary people a much clearer idea about the benefits of democracy and while South American democracy remains shaky in places, it is still stronger than at any time in the continent's history.⁴¹ Latin America's string of successful elections from late 2005 to early 2007,

accompanied by the greatest region-wide economic boom in decades, instilled justifiable feelings of pride and optimism about the state of democracy in the region.

Value of Global Opinions

In recent decades, we have seen an unprecedented decline in the favorability of the United States among foreign publics.⁴² Critics of these findings may say that popularity is unimportant and fleeting since it is just a snapshot reflecting current events. Others may say that it is impossible to be wholly liked since we are seen as a behemoth superpower, which automatically makes you a target for criticism. Both points offer some validity. However, others understand the intrinsic value of knowing our status in the world since it directly relates to our credibility and trust in relation to accomplishing our economic, diplomatic and military objectives. Tracking and analyzing global attitude trends can advise our strategic communication and international actions by first understanding what is behind unfavorable ratings. International relations expert and Harvard Professor Joseph Nye said what we have seen recently, however, is that “too many people around the globe are questioning America’s values, commitment, and competence.”⁴³ There is no question that there is a direct correlation between international perception of the U.S. and favorability ratings. The actions the U.S. take and the words the U.S. speaks provide the foundations for the international community’s perceptions. These activities are messages that represent an important component of national strategic communication efforts and therefore represent America abroad. It therefore makes sense that the U.S. should seriously consider global attitudes about it and what the U.S. is communicating to the rest of the world through its words and deeds.

According to the 2008 Pew Global Attitudes Project anti-Americanism grew during the last decade most notably because of the perceived double standards and hypocrisy of U.S. policies and ideals versus actual practices. Interestingly, the Pew reports consistently show that while the U.S. as a country and government are unpopular for its policies and practices abroad, the international community has much faith in America's system of government, its citizens and underlying ideals.⁴⁴ The actions the U.S. takes are an important way to strategically communicate with the world. More than 80 years ago President Teddy Roosevelt said, "We cannot expect other nations to hold us harmless unless in the last resort we are able to make our own words good by our deeds."⁴⁵ Clearly, there is a strong correlation between U.S. words and the opinions of those at which it aims its deeds.

Global Public Opinion Since the Freedom Agenda

The year 2002 saw the start of the overt freedom agenda narrating U.S. foreign policy including increased resources to execute the policies and subsequent programs. Six years later the U.S. suffers from multi-year, global anti-Americanism. Global perception of the U.S. translates into its ability to be trusted and credible in order to wield influence. According to the 2007 Pew Global Attitudes Project, anti-Americanism has been extensive since 2002.⁴⁶ Foreign audiences view U.S. presence in Iraq and Afghanistan negatively, so naturally this affects their opinions of the U.S. However, studies also show that the U.S. presence in the Middle East is not the only contributing factor to their concerns.⁴⁷ These studies detail how foreign audiences negatively perceive many of our foreign policies, such as selectively condemning nations for

human rights violations, while taking a softer approach with violating countries of greater economic or strategic importance such as China and Saudi Arabia.

Since the U.S. leads the democracy charge, it must consider the message it sends when its words are vastly different than its deeds. The Bush administration established numerous programs intent on helping people live freely, but those efforts were soured when the U.S. selectively adhered to its own ideals, labeling the U.S. as hypocritical. The United States' slow transparency of the Abu Ghraib abuses, waterboarding and slow Guantanamo processing isolate the U.S. as an easy target for criticism for exceptional and unilateral decision-making. The U.S.'s double standards and hypocrisy in its words versus how it continued to support foreign theocratic and totalitarian states make it less credible and trustworthy in foreign eyes.

Challenging the Need for Democracy as a National Interest

Almost no one challenges the presumption that democratic nations are more peaceful. However, the U.S. must challenge the assumption that the pursuit of democracy abroad must be a vital national interest in order to achieve it. If democracy were not elevated to a national interest would the American people lose interest in supporting the spread of freedom through its policies, institutions and programs? Must Americans have democracy as a stated goal in order to support it? Would the American people no longer support using the military when needed in the name of people's freedom or upholding democracy? Given America's history in fighting for and protecting its freedom and that of the many peoples and nations globally, it is reasonable to think America will continue to do the same in the future. It is reasonable to assume that Americans and America will continue to hold true to its founding values of freedom,

human rights and justice. Therefore, if Americans are known as fighting for and supporting democracy and freedom since the dawn of their country, then perhaps it can be more powerful if left as a core value that underscores who the U.S. is and what it stands for rather than undermining its reputation with it as a stated national interest . In fact, the American people rated the pursuit of democracy abroad as dead last in a 2006 poll on foreign policy priorities.⁴⁸ If the American people do not view it as a priority and the global community views the U.S. bullying in the name of democracy as suspicious, perhaps the U.S. should examine the way it actually implements democracy to include communicating its intent. Prior to 2002 and the Freedom Agenda, America promoted and supported democracy for more than a century and maintained a positive level of global popularity around the globe.⁴⁹ However, in 2002, the U.S. dramatically changed its level and tone of the pursuit of democracy and consequently saw its popularity plummet.

The Pursuit of Democracy

Challenging the concept of promoting democracy does not mean that democracy around the world is not important or even suggests that the U.S. should not pursue its spread. In fact, the U.S. should continue to support, shape, and encourage democracy around the world. However, the U.S should engage in the pursuit of assisting the growth of democracy and freedom but without demanding democratization from nations and leaders. The U.S. should not elevate democracy as a “battle cry” which then serves to make it a lightning rod for accusations of hypocrisy and double standards, ultimately diminishing the message of democracy and the legitimacy of the United States. Instead, it should consider returning to a more humble posture and refrain from positioning itself

as the world's savior through the establishment of democracy. Joseph Nye characterized U.S. current actions in the world when he spoke to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the implementation of smart power in April 2008, "Our staying power has a great deal to do with whether we are perceived as a bully or a friend. Humility increases greatness, it does not weaken it."⁵⁰

It is logical to think that many countries and its citizens would react negatively to another country telling them how to govern themselves. It becomes even more problematic when the U.S. sets out to tell others how to live, yet do not live up to its own promises or ideals, thus losing trust and credibility, a crucial ingredient in having influence. Nye went on to say to the Senate:

When our words do not match our actions, we demean our character and moral standing and diminish influence. We cannot lecture others about democracy while we back dictators. We cannot denounce torture and waterboarding in other countries and condone it at home. We cannot allow Guantanamo Bay or Abu Ghraib to become symbols of American power.⁵¹

In the most recent National Security Strategy dated 2006 President George W. Bush outlined our national interests as physical security, economic well-being and the spread of democracy. The first two interests have been with the country since it began and it has not experienced the international ire that polls reveal today. Analyzing global opinions and attitudes reveal the biggest change of opinion came when the U.S. decided to overtly pursue democracy around the world regardless of what those nations thought, wanted or needed.

Strategic Communication Conclusion and Recommendations

The 43rd U.S. presidential leadership change in January 2009 signaled to the world that the U.S continues to stand strong for democracy and freedom. The

inauguration speech set a tone of respect and humility for other nations while reinforcing U.S. commitment and strength in achieving its goals. The President referenced the universal ideals of peace and dignity thereby communicating to the globe the U.S. policy to support others and defend ourselves while respecting and working together as international partners. Noticeably, the speech did not contain the word “democracy” once.

A look into the past 100 years shows the U.S. stood strong to support and promote democracy without demanding it be another country’s form of government. However, since September 11, 2001 many nations viewed the U.S.’s promotion of democracy via the freedom agenda as more forceful and self-righteous bullying. In an age of global politics, this kind of reputation will only serve to damage the trust and credibility that the U.S. must have to wield influence. This negative reputation undermines the U.S.’s ability to achieve security and prosperity since both are inextricably linked to its global neighbors. Therefore, in order for the U.S. to achieve its vital national interests, it must recognize it has overstepped its bounds in implementing and communicating the promotion of democracy with too strong of a hand and should return to a more respectful and humble tone. In order to improve the United States’ standing in the world which ultimately ensures its ability to provide for security and prosperity it should:

1. Cease to communicate the pursuit of democracy as a core national interest.
2. Continue to lead the growth of freedom and democracy by supporting them with international programs and policies but without proselytizing democracy so loudly. The “charge” for democracy overshadows and steals the narratives

of other good U.S. work and efforts since many nations view our freedom agenda suspect due to our damaged reputation.

3. Communicate that the pursuit of democracy is challenging and imperfect and that the U.S. also falls short sometimes. Provide education on processes, roles and even the imperfections of a democracy to demonstrate democratic ideals including transparency in a democracy and to demonstrate that the U.S. can face up to its own failings simultaneous to seeking corrections.

Countries throughout the globe still desire the United States to serve as the world leader despite the U.S.'s diminished reputation during the last decade. Many opportunities abound for the U.S. to re-establish its leadership position with global issues such as the economic crisis, terrorism, climate change and renewable energy. Leading the effort to solve these challenges multilaterally offers rich opportunities to rebuild international relationships and improve U.S. credibility while living its founding ideals and values and ensuring its future of security and prosperity.

Endnotes

¹ Victoria Esser, "Can social networking fix U.S. image?" Politico.com, February 4, 2009, <http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0209/18353.html> (accessed February 5, 2009).

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