Deterrence as the Cornerstone of a Counter-Terror Strategy
Abstract
This paper offers the option of deterrence as opposed to preemption as part of a broader counter-terror strategy. It by no means proffers that this course of action is the only one that may or may not be feasible, but it does take a hard line approach to solving a seemingly unsolvable problem by a means that many have forsaken. In order to deter, one must be willing to punish. A nation must be willing to accept a certain amount of world condemnation for its actions. If a nation is not steadfast in its belief and assertions to punish those who violate the clear boundaries established, then deterrence is nothing more than an empty threat or a bluff, and one's enemies will continue to whittle away at your way of life and defenses. If a nation questions its own authority as a world power to hold others accountable, then it must also be willing to abdicate its responsibility and be prepared to subject itself to someone else's authority to establish the boundaries and hold your nation subservient to them. You either make the rules or you live under those who do; it is that simple.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Mar 01, 2009
- Accession Number
- ADA498392
Entities
People
- Daniel E. Stoltz
Organizations
- United States Army War College