

TRANSFORMATION, A STRONGER ARMY RESERVE

BY

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ABSTRACT

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Since the creation of the Army Reserve in 1908, the Army Reserve has been a key component of the National Military Strategy of the United States. The Army Reserve is going through a major transformation designed to enhance its capability to provide trained and ready personnel and units when called upon to deploy. This paper will review the evolution of the Army Reserve and how it was created as a supplementary force under the Total Force Policy. Next, this paper will examine the Army Reserve's response to previous conflicts and how the transformed Army Reserve will respond.

TRANSFORMATION, A STRONGER ARMY RESERVE

The men and women of the U.S. Army Reserve epitomize what is best about America; it is an honor to serve with them. It is humbling to see the support our Families give to their Soldiers; for while it is the Soldier we recruit, it is their Families that we retain. It is also a privilege to work with the civilian employers who support our Soldiers in their communities; they continue to motivate us to find solutions for managing a shared workforce. Together, our Army Reserve Soldiers, their Families and employers are the strength of the Nation.

—Lieutenant General Jack C. Stultz
Chief, U.S. Army Reserve

Today's Army Reserve serves our Nation during an era of persistent conflict – a role unforeseen when the Army Reserve originated on April 23, 1908 as the Medical Reserve Corps. One hundred and sixty civilian physicians comprised this first strategic reserve, one that could be ordered by the Secretary of War to active duty during a time of national emergency. The use of the Army Reserve increased with the implementation of the Total Force Policy in 1973. Today's Army Reserve is one of its most battle-tested and experienced forces since its creation. More than 182,000 Army Reserve Warrior-Citizens have been called to duty since the 9-11 terrorist attacks. More than 41,000 have been mobilized more than once. Some 23,000 Soldiers are mobilized and deployed in more than a dozen countries around the world, to include Iraq and Afghanistan, and the United States.

A century later, the Army Reserve is now a diversified operational force with an authorized end strength of 205,000.¹ This paper will review the Total Force Policy and how the Army Reserve has responded when called for a conflict or crisis. This paper will also review the Transformation of the Army Reserve and examine how the Army Reserve will reset and rebuild readiness for future operations and transform to better

meet the demands of the future. Finally the paper will conclude by providing recommendations that will enable success of the Army Reserve in the future.

Evolution of the Army Reserve

The U.S. Army Reserve traces its beginnings to April 23, 1908, when Congress passed Senate Bill 1424. This act authorized the Army to establish a reserve corps of medical officers. The Secretary of War could order these officers to active duty during time of emergency. This was the nation's first federal reserve. Four years later, a provision of the Army Appropriations Act of 1912 created a Regular Army Reserve, a federal reserve outside the Medical Reserve Corps.

Following Mexican revolutionary Francisco "Pancho" Villa's 1916 raid into the United States and Brig. Gen. John J. Pershing's subsequent punitive expedition after him into Mexico, relations between Mexico and the United States deteriorated to the point where U.S. troops were sent to the United States' southern border in preparation for a potential war that fortunately did not take place. These troops included some 3,000 Army Reserve Soldiers, which was almost 70 percent of the entire Army Reserve. This was the Army Reserve's first mobilization.

As the Army expanded for World War I, so did the Army Reserve. In all, about 80,000 enlisted Reservists and almost 90,000 officer Reservists served in the first World War. They served in every division of the American Expeditionary Force, whether those divisions were Regular Army, National Guard or National Army. The National Army was the combined conscript and volunteer force that was formed by the United States War Department in 1917 to fight in World War I. The National Army was disbanded in 1920

and all personnel who had held ranks in the National Army were reverted to Regular Army status.

As it was for the entire Army, the inter-war era was a tough time for the Organized Reserve (as the Army Reserve was known from 1920 to 1952). Few enlisted men served. There was no pay for unit drill. There was no retirement plan. During the 1930s, training dollars were so hard to acquire, less than 30 percent of Reserve officers attended annual training in any year of that decade. The lowest year was 1934, when only 14 percent went to annual training.

One training opportunity for Organized Reserve officers did contribute significantly to the success of one of President Franklin D. Roosevelt's key New Deal programs. Between 1933 and 1939, more than 30,000 Organized Reserve Corps officers were involved in running 2,700 Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) camps.² The CCC program provided jobs to unemployed young men across the country. The CCC also provided extra money to Organized Reserve officers, as well as giving them organizational and training experience they would soon use again when the nation began to build up its armed forces for the Second World War. As World War II neared, the Organized Reserve was mobilized again and provided significant forces needed to build the huge Army necessary to defeat Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan.

Five years after victory in World War II, the Army Reserve was needed again. In 1950, the Army Reserve was called upon to rebuild the dangerously weak U.S. Army during the Korean War. The Korean War saw more than 400 Reserve units (240,000 soldiers) called to active duty to serve in Korea, at home and elsewhere in the world.

The large number reflected the Army's need for organized, trained personnel in a short period of time.

Army Reserve Soldiers were mobilized for the Berlin and Cuban Missile Crises of the early 1960s but the next combat test for the Army Reserve Soldiers came during the Vietnam War. President Lyndon B. Johnson's administration opted for only a small Reserve and Guard mobilization in 1968.³ For the Army Reserve, this meant a call-up of 42 Army Reserve units with fewer than 5,000 Soldiers. Of these, 35 units and 3,500 Soldiers deployed to Vietnam.⁴ The Vietnam War changed the paradigm of how wars would be fought using the Reserve Components. The war was similar to previous wars in that it was a war that required a large active force but different in that it lasted longer than previous wars of the 20th Century. It took three years after the commitment of major combat units in Vietnam in 1965 to authorize a limited Vietnam War call-up.⁵ Initially, President Lyndon Johnson decided against using the reserves, and there was no large scale mobilization although Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara recommended to the President a call-up of 235,000 Reservists in July 1965.⁶ President Johnson explained to the National Security Council (NSC) his rational and approach to confronting the Vietnam War. President Johnson believed calling up the Reserves would be regarded as an escalation in posture, leading to North Vietnam asking its allies for help resulting in increased aid and a build up to major war. Not wanting an escalation in Southeast Asia, President Johnson decided against a major use of the Reserves.

When President Johnson made the decision not to call-up the Reserves in 1965, he denied his administration one of the most important benefits of mobilizing the

reserves – to mobilize the country behind the war. The communities where there were Army Reserve units were very supportive of their men and women in uniform. The Army Reserve unit had become an integral part of the community in much of small town America and these true citizen-soldiers were very much in the mainstream of community life and consciousness. The Army Reserve soldiers were the everyday workers at all levels of the community and only seen by the community as soldiers during the soldiers' monthly two day weekend drill.

The President was concerned of perceptions and responses from communist supporters (China and Soviet Union) of Vietnam surrounding a mobilization. Deciding against a major use of the Reserves would prove difficult to contain communism around the globe with just active forces. Many in the Army had hoped and continued to plan for a major mobilization, which never occurred. The President and General William C. Westmoreland, the US Commander in Vietnam, did not want to mobilize the Reserves at the beginning of the Vietnam War but both later wanted a limited mobilization. As several world events unfolded in 1968 which included the seizing of the USS Pueblo by the North Koreans, the Tet Offensive in Vietnam, and intelligence reporting of a possible crisis in Berlin, President Johnson ordered the mobilization of select Reserve Components. According to General Westmoreland, the Tet Offensive "had at last presented the right opportunity" for calling-up the Reserves. General Westmoreland now believed with the additional strength and removal of the old restrictive policy, the US could deal telling blows physically and psychologically well within the time frame of the reservists' one-year tour.⁷ Under the old restrictive policy, Armed Forces Act of 1952, a Presidential declaration of national emergency was required before Reserve

components could be ordered to active duty. After the war it was realized the lack of a major mobilization caused problems resulting in finding ways to include the Reserve Component as part of future conflicts. In addition, with all the funding allocated for the war and the current economic conditions there was also a need for the reduction of military expenditures. The Total Force Concept was introduced as the solution.

Total Force Concept

In 1970, while America was still fighting the Vietnam War, plans were made to reduce military expenditures. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird explained the new "Total Force Concept" in a press conference on August 21, 1970.⁸ Laird explained the president's requested reductions of defense expenditures would require reductions in all facets of the active forces and increased reliance on the combat and combat support units of the National Guard and the Reserves. He further stated that "a total force concept (would) be applied in all aspects of planning, programming, manning, equipping, and employing Guard and Reserve forces."⁹ The Total Force Concept called for the U. S. to maintain a smaller active force that would be reinforced by a well-trained, well equipped Reserve Component. The Total Force Concept removed redundant combat support and combat service support functions (units required for sustained operations) from the active forces and placed the support capabilities in the Reserve Component. The Total Force Concept brought a new level of support for the National Guard and Reserves.

General Creighton Abrams, United States Army Chief of Staff, embraced the Total Force Concept and directed the integration of the Army's components to gain much needed ready forces capable of executing missions in times of crisis. The Abrams

Doctrine is interpreted as an expression of General Abrams' determination to maintain a clear linkage between the employment of the Army and the engagement of public support for military operations. General Abrams established this bond by creating force structure that closely integrated Reserve and Active Components. Proponents of the Abrams Doctrine contend dependence on Reserve Components serves as an extra-constitutional tripwire on the presidential use of military power. Many have argued that General Abrams intended to closely integrate the Army Reserve and National Guard with the active Army ensuring that Presidents would never be able to send the Army to war without the Reserves and commitment of the American people. Reservists were "citizen soldiers" and they would provide a strong bond between the military and civil society. Any large-scale mobilization of Reserves would affect communities throughout the country and engage the American people. After becoming Secretary of Defense in July 1973, James Schlesinger adopted the Total Force concept as policy and directed its implementation throughout the services.

War Alignment

In January 1970, the Department of the Army directed the Continental Army Command (CONARC) to improve Reserve Component training and readiness following the Chief of Staff's memo reaffirming the Reserve Component as the principle source of mobilization. CONARC determined an affiliation between active and Reserve units and more mutual support between the two would lead to major improvements in training and readiness; The Affiliation Program was developed in the mid 1970's. Affiliation is a working relationship where the Reserve unit augments rather than replaces an active component unit. The Army liked the cost effectiveness of Affiliation verses keeping

additional units on active duty. Affiliation also provided a means for developing long-term focused training programs. The Department of the Army Master Priority List (DAMPL), a standing order of precedence list for the peacetime distribution of personnel and equipment resources to the Army, was adjusted and resulted in a major restructuring of the Army Reserve's forces in 1976-1979.¹⁰

With the success of this program the Affiliation concept was expanded in 1980 from the 67 Army Reserve units to include every unit in the Army Reserve. The new coined CAPSTONE program sought to further develop the Total Force Policy by integrating reserve components into the war plans.¹¹ The CAPSTONE program aligned Reserve units with the active and Reserve Component units with which they were likely to be deployed. Creating a training and planning relationship that focused upon wartime missions, CAPSTONE left no doubt as to the wartime organization of every unit in the total peacetime force. CAPSTONE became the basis for mobilization planning. The strategy known as "alert-mobilize-train-deploy" became doctrine and provided a basis to effectively plan unit functions such as training and administration. The CAPSTONE program was further revised and updated in 1994 to provide units with detailed information concerning their wartime mission. This new revision for CAPSTONE became the Army WARTRACE Program.

The Army WARTRACE Program is the "deliberate alignment of Army forces (active Army, Army National Guard, and United States Army Reserve) under specified wartime commanders in order to conduct wartime planning in support of U.S. national military strategic strategy."¹² The Army WARTRACE Program was developed to form the basis for unit commanders to enter into cohesive planning associations and provide

training opportunities with designated wartime chains of command. The program provided the Army Reserve with an organizational structure and detailed planning guidance which improved planning for mobilization, deployment and wartime mission accomplishment.

Operation Desert Shield/ Desert Storm

The first opportunity to see the utilization of the Total Force Policy in a combat situation was Operation Desert Shield/ Desert Storm.¹³ Kuwait's request for assistance from the United States, after being invaded by Iraq on August 2, 1990, provided a need for a buildup of forces to demonstrate US resolve in the region. As the President of the United States (POTUS) worked with the United Nations regarding a resolution on Iraq's violation of international law, President Bush authorized the Secretary of Defense to partially mobilize the Army Reserve.¹⁴ Members of Congress wanted to see the Total Force Policy at work while the Secretary of Defense argued there would not be sufficient time to mobilize and train reserve component combat units for the mission.¹⁵

Army Reserve combat support and service support units were mobilized and deployed, to include every truck company in the reserve structure excluding the National Guard divisions.¹⁶ Major Army Reserve units aligned with Third Army, Southwest Asia or had affiliations with other active duty units that were deployed to Saudi Arabia were not called up or mobilized for duty.¹⁷ Other units not aligned but identified to mobilize did not have the requisite personnel readiness level to deploy had to cross-level Soldiers into the unit to make its personnel readiness acceptable. With the problems that ensued it was evident the Total Force Policy did not work as planned.¹⁸

The Army Reserve did manage to increase recognition of its capabilities and inclusion of its roles and missions into major war plans. The Army Reserve expanded its role in contingency planning after the massive call-ups for Operation Desert Shield/ Desert Storm.

Operation Enduring Freedom/ Operation Iraqi Freedom

The importance of the military element of national power increased as a result of the September 11, 2001 attacks. After the President secured the nation from subsequent attacks, he ordered the military to engage the enemy overseas.¹⁹

The Total Force Policy attempted to bring together a well sequenced force on the battlefield but it did not create the flexibility to tailor combat force structure and rapidly deploy forces abroad. As in Operation Desert Shield/ Desert Storm, the Army Reserve had to cross-level personnel and equipment to units that were deploying. The Army Reserve tried to manage the cross-leveling of Soldiers but the personnel readiness of non-deploying units suffered.

The Total Force Policy brought some level of predictability for the employment of Army Reserve units based on timed phased force flow data (TPFFD) but the current uncertain and complex environment has created problems.²⁰ TPFFD is the database that shows the timed phased forces, logistics, and transportation flow for a deployment. Command and control challenges were created as established relationships between active component and Reserve units became non-existent due to modifications of the TPFFD which caused units not to arrive as planned. The mobilization process was modified to tailor requirements to the terrorist attack at home and overseas deployment requirements. The TPFFD should have been the catalyst for a unit to alert, mobilize,

train and deploy but the Request for Forces (RFF) became the standard for requesting capabilities for mobilization and deployment due to problems created by the TPFFD.²¹ The process of requesting a certain capability via RFF is more precise in articulating exact requirements for a given situation. Using the RFF, the Army has been able to adapt to the mobilization process and provide time for units assembled from different parts of the country to train together before deploying.

Transformation

"The Army Reserve of 2008 is vastly different than the Army Reserve of 1908," LTG Jack C. Stultz, Chief of the Army Reserve, said at a ceremony re-enlisting 100 Army Reserve Soldiers in Baghdad on Jan.18, 2008. "The Army Reserve today really is an operational force, an integrated part of the Army."²²

The Army Reserve provides the active Army with combat support, combat service support and training capabilities. Many of these capabilities are either exclusively or primarily in the Army Reserve. To help us build capacity and increase our military effectiveness, the Army Reserve has aligned its needs into four imperatives: to sustain our Soldiers, their families and employers; to prepare our Soldiers for success in current operations; to reset and rebuild readiness for future operations and to transform to better meet the demands of the future.

The Army Reserve continues to improve force structure to meet the demands of current and future operations. Reorganizing command and control structure resulted in more deployable command posts, functional commands and sustainment commands that are streamlined and more efficient than former command and control organizations.

²³Those reorganized units are tailored to provide increased combat support and combat service support to the Army expeditionary force packages.

The Reserve Components must continue to transition from a strategic reserve to an operational reserve, employed cyclically to add depth to the active force. Over the past six years the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve have been critical to the Army's success as fully integrated and essential parts of the forces that have been conducting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. At the same time, Reserve Components have conducted other missions across the spectrum of operations, both at home and abroad. To regain balance while continuing to meet the operational demands of an era of persistent conflict, the Army must regain strategic depth through the continued transformation of the Reserve Components. The goal is to have Reserve Components that are predictably accessible, manned, equipped, trained, and organized to serve as an effective part of the Joint Force within the framework of Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN), while preserving the concept of service as a "Citizen Soldier."

Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN)

The changed world since September 11th compelled the Army Reserve to transform from the historic strategic force in reserve to an operational force with relevant capabilities to respond to national emergencies and provide the Army with the right forces at the right time wherever needed in the world. One thing that will not change is the Army's reliance on the Army Reserve to provide critical civilian-acquired skills the Army needs to succeed.

ARFORGEN is a process in which units move through defined phases in order to reset, train, achieve mission readiness and be available for deployment. The Army

Reserve applies this process over a five-year cycle.²⁴ The ARFORGEN model enables Army Reserve Soldiers and units to be trained and ready to deploy for 12 months in year five of the ARFORGEN cycle, reducing time at the mobilization station saving time and money. The model incorporates intense specialized training for individuals, leaders and small and large unit missions to build professionalism, expertise and confidence. The model decreases the time away from home and civilian employment so there is less disruption in the lives of Soldiers and their families.

The first phase is the Reset/Train Pool. Units in this pool will remain for up to three years as the units transition from deployment or are short personnel or equipment which renders the unit less than mission capable. When personnel are assigned to the Reset/Train pool, a graduated approach to improvement will be implemented. The first year focus on individual skills. The second year, the level of training increases to collective training at the squad or crew level. The third year of the cycle is completed with an external evaluation and certification at the company or team level. Upon successful completion of the three years in this pool forces are moved into the next phase, the Ready Pool.²⁵

The Ready Pool is a one year period. This phase of ARFORGEN model capitalizes on successes of the ready pool building upon it with a battalion or company external evaluation. The external evaluation will be conducted by one of the Combat Training Centers and will provide validation and the authority to move the unit into the Available Pool.²⁶

After four years of training, development, and validation in the ARFORGEN cycle, the unit is placed in the Available Pool. Units in the Available Pool will be capable of deploying anywhere needed to defend the National Security Strategy.

Inherent in the “one-in-five” rotational model is a predictable training and development cycle that smoothes the resulting turbulence when Soldier-employees are absent from the civilian workplace.²⁷ When our nation needs its citizens to be warriors, communities across the nation will send Soldiers with the skills we need to fight and win wars. In turn, they will return to those communities more mature, better leaders and better followers.²⁸

ARFORGEN is the Army Reserve's partnership with America by providing predictability. Strong relationships with civilian employers of the Army Reserve Soldiers enhance Soldiers readiness and positively impact retention. It is imperative and vitally important that the Army Reserve and the local community work together to build on the talents and skills of the Reserve Soldier. ARFORGEN helps employers plan training and professional development activities, and families can plan for buying or building a house or for having children. In the ARFORGEN model, a Soldier will be available for mobilization once every five years. This kind of predictability in the mobilization cycle gives Soldiers the ability to plan important aspects of their life including education, career or even marriage.

The ARFORGEN model is still in its infancy stages so it is too early to assess viability. As the units continue to move through the ARFORGEN model The Army Reserve will continue to provide predictability to Reserve Soldiers.

Army Reserve Expeditionary Force (AREF)

The Army Reserve is currently transforming to an Expeditionary Force that supports the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) Model and complies with transformation initiatives of the National Military Strategy (NMS).²⁹ The AREF is a major institutional response to the changing nature of war and a significant departure from historical Army mobilization and management models that had not contemplated sustained Reserve deployments as an essential feature of military campaigns.³⁰ The AREF is a modular force that is packaged for missions to ensure the right size and type forces are ready, properly equipped and can deploy with minimal delay. Once AREF is fully implemented it will allow the Army Reserve to mobilize forces at a higher state of readiness than in its history. Funding will be programmed and provided to units for personnel training and equipment will be based on established timelines as set forth in the ARFORGEN model.³¹

Implementation

The Army Reserve is repositioning the Army Reserve's structure from its Table of Distribution and Allowance (TDA) organizations (nondeployable units) into Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) organizations (deployable units.) These changes are in line with Decision Point 57 of the Army Campaign Plan, which addressed the overall reduction of TDA structure in an effort to convert it to an operational force structure.




Figure 1. Regional Readiness Commands (Pre October 2008) Source: United States Army Reserve Command (USARC) Transformation Briefing.

The Army Reserve provided command and control to all its units through eleven Regional Readiness Command (RRC) TDA structures scattered across the continental United States as shown in Figure 1. The RRCs' mission was to provide command, control and support to all Army Reserve units located within its designated area of responsibility.

The Army Reserve will disestablish the RRCs. USARC determines the disestablishment date, but all must disestablish by 15 Sep 2011, which is a BRAC Statutory mandate.



Figure 2. Army Reserve Command and Control Source: United States Army Reserve Command (USARC) Transformation Briefing.

The Army Reserve will transfer command of operational forces from RRCs to Operational and Functional Command Headquarters. Figure 2 shows the location of all Operational and Functional Command Headquarters. The Operational and Functional commands now inherently provide training and readiness oversight functions for their subordinate units. Successful major change management initiatives can often take 5 to 7 years to create what is needed to ensure success. The Army Reserve has committed its resources towards aggressively pursuing the required change to support a more expeditionary force.

Operational Commands provide command and control for more than one type of deployable unit. For example, the 377th Theater Support Command (TSC) will provide command and control of Transportation, Quartermaster, and Ordnance units.

Functional Commands provide command and control of “like” units. For example, all Military Police (MP) units will be aligned to 200th MP Command.³²




Figure 3. Army Reserve Regional Support Command: United States Army Reserve Command (USARC) Transformation Briefing.

The Army Reserve will establish four Regional Support Commands (RSCs). Figure 3 shows the location of the RSCs and the region of responsibility. The RSC will provide base operations (BASOPS) support to Operational and Functional Commands within its geographic Area of Responsibility (AOR). The RSC will manage all Operations and Maintenance Army Reserve (OMAR), Reserve Personnel, Army (RPA), Military Construction Army Reserve (MCAR), and other appropriations for which requirements are justified as allocated by USARC and Office of Chief Army Reserve (OCAR). The RSC will supervise all USAR Area Maintenance Support Activity (AMSA) within its AOR and provide facility support to all United States Army Reserve (USAR) units within its AOR. The RSC will also provide “Peacetime Housekeeping” support to

USARC Direct Reporting Commands (DRC) within area of responsibility.³³ These four RSCs will relieve Operational and Functional Commands of facility/garrison type functions and allow these commands to focus on unit readiness training.

The shift from the twelve two-star Regional Readiness Commands to one and two-star Operational and Functional Commands enables the Army Reserve to source more operational units from space savings as a result of reductions in headquarters structure throughout the Army Reserve. The Army Reserve continues to pursue the most comprehensive transformation of its forces since the early years of World War II. Army Reserve Transformation produces evolutionary and revolutionary changes intended to improve Army and joint force capabilities to meet current and future full-spectrum requirements. The Army Reserve will be better poised and more efficient to carry out its mission to support future joint operational requirements.

The Transformation of the Army Reserve is currently ongoing and no major issues have been reported. After the realignment of command and control to the Operational and Functional Commands the tracking of unit readiness will be more accurate. A Headquarters will not have to go to multiple Regional Commands to get status of units. Since all like units will fall under the same Headquarters the Commander will have a better assessment of like units. It will also give the Commander a better understanding of units with equipment, personnel and training shortages so resources are provided to correct the issue.

Recommendations

Congress must provide funding to fill the personnel and equipment requirements of the AREF. This funding will also ensure soldiers receive required skills training in a

timely manner. As the AREF continues to develop, additional training days must be funded to allow forces to train and maintain readiness. A onetime initial funding for the additional training days will assist forces to reach an acceptable level of readiness. Funding for equipment of forces in the training pool must be available to set the forces on the correct path in the ARFORGEN model. Failure to fully fund resetting the force, to include people and equipment, hinders the Army Reserve ability to perform its responsibilities.

The active Army must ensure Army Reserve forces required for missions are drawn from the available pool and not cross-leveled from other pools in the model. Transitioning forces from the Train/Reset or Ready pools will only cause disruption in the ARFORGEN model and create planning and sourcing problems for future missions.

Congress should combine the various mobilization authorities into one authority. The President should have call-up authority to mobilize the Reserve Components in the strength and length of time required without being limited to personnel caps and time limitation. The services could manage the number of mobilized reservists to reduce the possibility of overextending the Reserves. Allowing for early call-up could enhance the overall planning process.

The Army Reserve has been a key contributor in the nation's defense during its 101 year history. During all major wars and conflicts the Army Reserve has responded with trained and ready units. In the future, the alert to deployment timeline will be reduced significantly. The Army Reserve is leaning forward with the transformation to the AREF which will make the Army Reserve a stronger component of the Army.

Conclusion

The Army Reserve has been an important factor in the National Security Strategy and Military Strategy of the United States throughout its history. Employed extensively in World War I, World War II and the Korean War, the Army Reserve was used in a very limited manner during the Vietnam War. Many leaders realized the error of not properly using the reserves in Vietnam and created a policy to include the reserves in future conflicts known as Total Force Policy. The Total Force Policy, implemented in 1973 by the Department of Defense and incorporated by the Department of the Army, ensured the reserves would be called up in times of major crises. The policy provided the Army reserve funding and focus to better prepare its personnel and units to supplement active forces. Although the policy created the force by providing funding and plans for use of the Army Reserve, the active Army did not employ forces as originally conceived.

Total Force Policy has been used twice since its implementation. The policy planned for the utilization of Army Reserve units based on a pre-developed plan and timetable. Operation Desert Shield/ Desert Storm showed unanticipated timelines and requirements required deviating from policy procedures. The Army Reserve responded to the Army's changing requirements by realigning personnel and equipment and building the force required.

Operation Enduring Freedom/ Operation Iraqi Freedom showed similar shortcomings in preplanned timelines and unanticipated requirements developed during mobilization. The Army created the RFF as a means to request capabilities and for components to tailor forces. The RFF included a timeline dictating when forces would flow into theater. Although the Army did not use its established Total Force planning

procedures, the Army Reserve provided the necessary forces and validated it was still a significant element of the Army.

The AREF will be a more relevant contributing force for the active component because it will provide a more organized and trained force for mobilization. The AREF will allow the Army Reserve to improve its significance to the active component and the nation as a part of a Forces package deployed on short notice around the world.

Army Reserve transformation is improving the Army Reserve's ability to execute and support protracted operational requirements. Sustained resources to continue this transformation will improve the readiness of non deployed Army Reserve forces, reduce stress on Army Reserve Soldiers, their families and employers and improve the readiness of Army Reserve equipment and facilities.

Without the immediate and sustained provision of adequate funding for training and equipping the Army Reserve, the ability to meet pre-mobilization training and mobilization objectives under the ARFORGEN process will be put at risk. Training on obsolete equipment is ineffective and wasteful.

The transformation of the Army Reserve will better align Army Reserve units with the Army Campaign Plan and modularity transformation initiatives. A more streamlined, adaptive and responsive Army Reserve force designed to fulfill joint and expeditionary requirements at anytime makes the Army Reserve stronger and an integral part of any future Army operation.

Endnotes

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