

PROGRAM MANAGEMENT ISSUES WITH FIELDING, RESETTING DIGITAL SYSTEMS

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**PROGRAM MANAGEMENT ISSUES WITH FIELDING, RESETTling DIGITAL
SYSTEMS**

by

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Army transformation and the requirement to support two major combat operations simultaneously has placed a burden on the Army's ability to generate equipped, trained, and ready combat power on a reliable non-exhaustive cyclic model. The Army Force Generation Model (ARFORGEN) has done a great deal to alleviate that stress by dictating timelines for equipping, training, deploying, and resetting of combat units. However, when dealing with information systems that have an ever evolving capabilities timeline, the ARFORGEN process results in units deploying with information technology capabilities that may be several years old. To preclude that from happening, and to provide the best possible solution in a timely manner, Program Managers of Army Digital Systems have created innovative tools and procedures to augment the ARFORGEN Process and deliver the best possible information technology system of systems to combat units. These tools include forward presence, database managers, and an Army wide collaborative process that provides constant upgrade, even through the deployment timeline.

PROGRAM MANAGEMENT ISSUES WITH FIELDING, RESETTling DIGITAL SYSTEMS

On October 7, 2008 the Army Chief of Staff, GEN George Casey gave a speech at the Association of the United States Army annual conference that focused on the lack of balance within today's Army. After seven years of continuous warfare, the Army was unable to meet the demand for combat forces. Additionally, the pre-September 11th peacetime support systems were unable to meet the demands of repeated deployments.¹ GEN Casey outlined four imperatives that he wanted the Army to focus on in order to regain balance across the force and better posture itself for continued combat. These four imperatives were sustaining our soldiers and families, preparing soldiers for the current fight, resetting units upon their return, and continuing to transform to meet the demands of the 21st century.

As a tool to better manage the balance of its total force and to ensure compliance with the Army Chief's imperatives, the Army phased out its long-standing Time Phased Force Deployment model and adopted the Army Force Generation Model (ARFORGEN).² ARFORGEN is a business process for building and employing combat power.³ The ARFORGEN model is extremely successful at providing combat units for the rotational deployment pool, but it fails in providing a timeline that allows Information Technology (IT) Program Manager's (PM) with the best timeline to support those units before they deploy. The three year, three phased approach to ARFORGEN is not congruent with the pace of change of information technology systems and digital systems Program Managers are forced to adapt to new "just in time" fielding and training techniques to provide the best capability to deploying forces. These new

techniques and the tools developed to support them have enabled Program Managers of digital systems to support ARFORGEN in a new creative manner.

The ARFORGEN model synchronizes resources, requirements, funding, personnel, training, and all other components that must come together to deploy a combat Brigade. At the heart of ARFORGEN is the redesign of the Army from a Division focused force to a force centered around plug and play combat Brigades. These smaller expeditionary units allow for rapid assembly and timely equipping and training. Based on a three year sequential approach, ARFORGEN takes a unit through three phases of readiness, with each phase lasting for one year and culminating in a unit that is worldwide deployable during its year resident in the final phase. The three phases of the ARFORGEN Model are: Reset/Train, Ready, and Available. Units enter the Reset/Train Force Phase after returning from a deployment. Their mission here is to reconstitute, reset equipment, receive new equipment, assign new personnel, and train to achieve the required capabilities necessary to enter the Ready Force Pool. Units in this pool are available to support civil authorities for national emergencies.⁴ As will be discussed later, it is this phase and the need to equip and train a unit two years prior to its deployment availability that causes the ARFORGEN Model to fail at providing our units with the best information technology assets available.

The second phase of the ARFORGEN Process is when a unit completes manning, equipping, and training and enters the Ready Force Pool. Here units conduct mission preparation and collective training for anticipated future missions. Units in this phase are prepared to execute collective training events such as Field Training Exercises (FTX), Mission Readiness Exercises (MRX) and potential rotations through the National and

Joint Readiness Training Centers. Additionally, units in this phase are eligible for deployment to unanticipated contingencies or other operational requirements in support of a real world mission.

The third and final phase of the ARFORGEN model is the deployment availability phase. Here a unit is considered fully equipped, trained and rehearsed to execute its primary mission. Although for most PMs, equipping the unit was accomplished up to two years prior in phase one of the model, it is in this phase and throughout the deployment phase that IT Program Managers must be delivering and training their equipment. This late fielding and constant updating are necessitated because of the rapid technology advancements of today's IT systems. Information Technology Program Manager's can not just field a system in phase one and forget about it. The pace of change of other network systems, the need for interoperability, and basic laws of computer processing, such as Moore's Law⁵, require constant involvement and interaction between units and the IT Program Manager's to keep those units on the leading edge of network capability.

Although the ARFORGEN Model is not best suited for timely delivery of Information technology and network systems, it does do an excellent job of managing the total force Army and synchronizing many efforts to achieve ready units for a combat deployable timeline. Additionally, the synchronous flow of a unit through cogs and phases accomplishes several things beyond unit readiness. This model provides for stability and reduced uncertainty for soldiers and their families, it provides a macro level management of all Army units to ensure the Army remains in better balance, and it provides a way to manage those units to allow for distribution of resources to the right

place at the right time. Inserted below is pictorial representation of the ARFORGEN Model to better illustrate the flow an Army Unit⁶:




Figure 1.

Of the four imperatives outlined by General Casey and supported by the ARFORGEN Model, only the first, sustaining our soldiers and families is not directly related to the mission of Army Information Technology Program Manager's. The other three imperatives of preparing soldiers for the current fight, resetting units upon their return, and continuing to transform to meet the demands of the 21st century are exactly inline with a Program Manager's primary mission. An Army Program Manager is chartered by the Army Acquisition Executive to manage the cost, schedule and performance of his assigned program in accordance with the laws and regulations set

forth in the Department of Defense Acquisition manuals. However, the bottom line for Program Manager's is to deliver the best capability possible to units entering the fight. Acquiring that capability is the easy part. Fielding, training and sustaining it within the parameters of the ARFORGEN Model are the source of very challenging expectations. For Information Technology Program Manager's, for reasons already alluded to, the ARFORGEN model is not structured to support the timely delivery of technologies and therefore has caused an adaptation within the IT PM community. That adaptation has manifested itself in the implementation of three new tools that better allow PMs the flexibility of supporting units throughout all three phases of the ARFORGEN Model and not just during phase one (equipping). These modifications to the equipping, fielding and training pieces of the ARFORGEN model have allowed program managers of digital systems to significantly improve their support to combat Brigades. Although designed as a model to generate combat power beyond the scope of just acquisition issues, these changes made by a select group of Program Executive Offices and Program Managers has made the model successful across all domains. The three aforementioned tools are Integrated Field Support, Unit Set Fielding Model, and Single Interface to the Field.

Integrated Field Support is a joint initiative shared by Communications Electronic Command (CECOM) Life Cycle Management Center, Army Materiel Command (AMC) and the Program Executive Offices (PEO) that serve as the Program Manager's higher Headquarters. Like transformation of Army combat units, sustainment and support to those units has also undergone a modularity transition. This transition encompasses both the organizational structure as well as the forward footprint of sustainment personnel. Prior to modularity, logistics support was primarily a rear echelon endeavor

with support reaching down only to Divisional levels. Army's were staffed in Garrison with a Field Support Commander with subordinate Logistics Support Elements and both the Corps and Division levels. These organizations were garrison focused and in the event they did deploy, they deployed as stand alone entities dislocated from and disconnected with the combat forces they were supporting. Logistics was a reach back function with support pulled from depots and support bases. In 2003, prior to the onset of modularity, CECOM had approximately 400 field support personnel within its entire organization⁷. Modularity and support to the ARFORGEN Model has dramatically changed that situation.

Today's information technology field support is a forward based logistics operation with soldiers and civilians embedded at every echelon. AMC and CECOM still head the support chain, but based on needed technical expertise, acquisition personnel are now very much critical players. In traditional program offices, once an item was material released and fielded to the unit, the PM was removed from the support chain. In today's wartime acquisition, especially in the ever evolving IT arena, this is not the case. Army level organizations are still staffed with Field Support Commanders, but the composition of the logistics team supporting that commander at Army level has changed. The core level management team includes a reset lead, an integration cell and a new entity called a Left Behind Equipment (LBE) lead. As we are now and most likely will remain an Army at war, the LBE lead is responsible for the transition of equipment that will remain in theater from one organization to the next. This is especially critical for IT equipment that is essential for maintaining the existing deployed network.

The integrated field support structure at the Corps level has also evolved with modularity and the need to keep pace with the IT revolution. To support this ever changing environment and to provide oversight to the major field support changes at Division and Brigade Level, the Army has created Colonel level board select commands known as Army Field Support Brigades (AFSB). These AFSBs are regionalized and have the requirement to transform acquisition, life cycle logistics, and technology functions and capabilities and to provide the operational commander and the senior logistics commander the means to integrate the full scope of logistics support from the tactical to the national strategic level.⁸ This meshing of logistics and acquisition in field support organizations is in large part do to the complex nature of IT systems and the need for forward deployed support.

It is this need for forward expertise that has driven the real transformation to field support at the Division and Brigade Levels. Every Division now has an embedded Logistics Support Element (LSE) that is commanded by a Lieutenant Colonel who works directly for the regionalized AFSB Commander. As part of the LSE staff, there is a trail boss from the acquisition community who is directly responsible for managing the flow of new equipment and new equipment training into this Division. This trail boss is often an Acquisition Major or a civilian from the acquisition community that has a direct link back through the parent PEO to each of the supporting PM offices. Similarly, there is a Reset Liaison Officer that is task organized to the Division LSE from the parent CECOM organization. The third major change at Division LSE level is the addition of program contracted field service representatives (CFSR) that brings PM sponsored and funded technical expertise to the Division level. This CFSR is less item specific than the CFSRs

that now reside at Brigade and he serves as a general support expert to resolve as needed specific issues that can not be resolved by those CFSRs down at Brigade level.

The last piece of evolving integrated field support is the creation of the Brigade Logistics Support Team (BLST). A BLST team is headed by a Major that is embedded in every combat brigade. Working directly for that Major are the component specific CFSRs that technically support and troubleshoot IT systems as needed. The complexities of today's tactical networks necessitate the need for contracted support as far down as brigade and battalion level. For the first time in Acquisition Corps history, these BLST Majors are often Acquisition Officers who bring with them the knowledge and reach back into parent program management offices to assist in keeping pace with evolving technology. Like logisticians, the current force information technology Acquisition Officer is often a forward deployed entity. The combination of field support personnel, both logisticians and acquisition, as far down the echelonment as a combat Battalion has driven the integrated field support change from the 400 personnel mentioned above in 2003, to 2550 CECOM employees in field support roles today⁹.

The evolution of integrated field support is critical in assisting IT Systems Program Offices in meeting the phased timeline of the ARFORGEN Model. As already mentioned above it has already resulted in the embedding of a reset lead and reset liaison officers throughout the echelonment of support. The reset of digital equipment is a comprehensive process as today's Army is a network centric force and not much moves on the battlefield that is not linked directly to the network. Getting each one of those entities in line for reset that include cleaning, overhaul, new internet protocol addressing, rebuilt databases, and so on takes quite a bit of prior planning and

management. The reset leads embedded in the units begin that process long before the unit concludes its rotation in the combat zone. Reset planning, with no impact on the unit involved with the fight, begins as soon as the unit deploys. This planning and process development, made feasible entirely by the integration of field support personnel, has assisted IT systems in trying to be compliant with the ARFORGEN timeline. Equipment is constantly managed and adjusted throughout the three year cycle, long before its' designated reset window and is continually updated until combat ready.

The second tool developed by Program Managers of digital systems to help satisfy the requirements of ARFORGEN is the Unit Set Fielding Model (USFM). The USFM was developed in FY05 as a tool to help mitigate the challenges in the ARFORGEN timeline and still provide the best information technology tools to the soldiers in a timely manner. It is the tool that allows Program Managers to align themselves with a units' road to war timeline and incorporates fielding, training and support throughout the entire timeline. Originally conceived as the methodology for fielding IT equipment, it has been so successful that it has been embraced by the Department of the Army G3, G8, TRADOC, and FORSCOM as the way to field and manage equipment fieldings. The success of USFM has even permeated the Iraqi Army. The fielding of equipment to the 12th Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division, Iraqi Army was accomplished using the USFM. "Through Unit Set Fielding we are building whole brigades then sending them out to various parts of Iraq," said Iraqi Army Col. Abbas, Commander of the Combat Training Center at Besmaya. "USF gives the

noncommissioned officers and privates' time to bond and learn to work together as a unit."¹⁰

The Unit Set Fielding Model grew out of the need to end all disjointed fielding actions and unscheduled disruptions to unit training schedules and quickly became the organized and synchronized answer to this problem. It allowed units that were deploying to either Operation Iraqi or Operation Enduring Freedom the ability to receive and train on a Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) suite of systems through a managed, synchronized process.¹¹ The Unit Set Fielding process focuses specifically on four goals. These goals are as follows¹²:

- Targeting unit fielding windows of opportunity
- Providing a quality systems architecture and data products in a timely manner
- Ensuring all required resources are planned, programmed and executed
- Developing and delivering an integrated, interoperable, and holistic C4ISR capability to Army units in the least disruptive manner possible

Prior to the USFM digital systems PM offices were barraging a unit with unprogrammed hardware and software drops that were further complicated by unsynchronized data products. Additionally PM funding lines were not synchronized to allow all systems to update and stay current at the same tempo. In order to align funding, fieldings, training across PM shops and to further harmonize it with a unit's window of availability, PEOC3T developed an orders based approach to unit set fielding. In January of 2006, the PEO published Unit Set Fielding OPORD 06-002 that directed the actions of all digital PM shops and their support to the ARFORGEN

process. In that OPOD, MG Justice (PEOC3T) issued his intent that when summarized stated that the PEO would have a standardized, synchronized, and coordinated approach to the fielding process. He further stated that it would not be a PEO C3T only effort and that all support to ARFORGEN fieldings were coordinated with HQDA G-3 and G-8, the CECOM community, the US Army Signal Center, and each unit involved in the process. Additionally he drove centrality of systems to ensure the Army Staff understood that capability was achieved through battle command sets and not individual programs, and therefore all funding needed to flow to the PEO PM offices to provide for synchronized delivery of products. His defined end state was to deliver quality systems architecture and data products in a timely manner that were focused on fielding windows of opportunity as directed by Headquarters Department of the Army.

This system of systems approach had impacts throughout the acquisition process. The melding of individual PM shops into capability sets forced the Army G8 office to structure its funding profiles around the capability, rather than the individual products. It forced all digital PM Offices to coordinate and work as part of a team to deliver a synchronized capability. It interjected the IT acquisition community into the Army G3 process of scheduling, fielding and training windows and, more than anything, it allowed the IT community better capability of supporting the ARFORGEN model throughout all the phases. To best support implementation of this process and to best align it with ARFORGEN, the Unit Set Fielding Model was also structured as a phased operation. No longer would IT PMs be relegated to only touching the unit during Phase one of its ARFORGEN cycle. The USFM structured unit contact, supported by HQDA,

across all phases of a units deployment timeline by establishing its own five phased process. The five phases of the USFM are identified as follows:

USF Phase I – Planning: Support during planning for fielding and training.

USF Phase II – Execution: Support during fielding and training operations.

USF Phase III – RSO&I: Support while deploying.

USF Phase IV – Deployment: Support while deployed.

USF Phase V – Reset: Support during the unit's return from deployment.

Each phase is assigned as a main effort to a Colonel level organization within the PEOC3T/CECOM community, and has designated essential tasks and a clearly defined end state as detailed in the aforementioned OPORD 06-002. Although a separate entity is responsible for each phase, much time is spent in transition and overlap between phases. Additionally, since this is a cyclical model, there is constant turnover with at any given time, units dispersed throughout all five phases.

Phase I is primarily concerned with planning and entry into the Unit Set Model. It begins with Department of the Army G3 identification of the units identified for deployment according to ARFORGEN. From there PEO organizations will begin contact with the units to arrange the initial new material fielding in briefs and arrange fielding and training schedules. Initial systems engineering details are discussed and network architecture is designed. End state for this phase is a Unit Set Fielding timeline, draft network architecture and a data products development plan. The order also requires a memorandum of agreement to be signed by both the unit set fielding lead and the commander of the unit entering phase I.

Phase II is the fielding execution and commences when system hardware, software, and documentation is delivered to the gaining unit. At that time joint inventory and property book transfer is conducted and new equipment training begins. Once individual training is completed, collective training is conducted and supported by all PMs involved in the fielding process. All data products are tested and verified, and this phase is usually completed with a major supported training event such as a Mission Readiness Exercise or a rotation to the Joint or National Training Center. PM funded contract field service representatives (CFSR) are inculcated into the unit and will accompany the unit through collective training, deployment and reset.

Deployment support is Phase III; it is this phase where the USFM really allows digital PM offices to provide the support needed to work within the confines of the ARFORGEN Model. Operational “wartime” data products are loaded on all systems and are exercised through final exercises and reception, staging, onward movement and integration (RSOI) which usually occurs in theater at an intermediate staging base before entry into the combat zone. End state for this phase is entry into the units wartime area of operations and transition of sustainment from home station to in-theater logistics support.

Support while deployed is Phase IV of the model and it begins once the unit has entered its combat mission, and includes deployed CFSRs who have trained and been embedded with the unit since Phase II. Early in the phase redeployment and reset planning are begun to posture the unit for success during their home station reintegration. Weekly teleconferences are conducted between the unit and all involved in the USFM process to ensure adequacy of support, and to establish a help desk for

any IT or sustainment issues that the unit is unable to resolve. This phase culminates when the unit begins entry into its in theater redeployment station and equipment is staged for shipping or transition as part of the left behind equipment program.

The final phase of the Unit Set Fielding Model is support during reset. This phase begins when the first equipment arrives at its theater redeployment staging area, and includes all activities both here and at the unit's home station upon receipt of shipped equipment. Equipment is managed through reset and returned to Department of the Army reset standards, and the cycle begins again as the unit transitions to Phase I and begins its redeployment planning timeline.

Management of the Unit Set Fielding Process is conducted through Monthly Integrated Process Teams (IPT) meetings that include senior leaders from the PEO and program management offices as well as representation from the Army Staff, logistics agencies and units involved in the process. These IPTs provide the current status of all units involved in the cycle, planning for upcoming fieldings, and synchronization of all assets across all fronts. Additionally, there are bi-weekly update briefings that provide a forum to discuss show stoppers and emerging issues that need to be resolved immediately. These update briefings are conducted at the action officer level and allow free cross talk of information. To help assist in managing the large volume of information generated throughout this cyclic model, the PEO developed and implemented the third of the aforementioned three tools that allow IT PMs to better support ARFORGEN. This third tool is the Single Interface to the Field database.

The proliferation of field support and distribution of units throughout all phases of the Unit Set Fielding Model necessitated the need for a way to organize and manage

the enormous volumes of information. To that end, the Single Interface to the Field (SIF) was developed as a tool to make information available across the entire enterprise. MG Justice, the Program Executive Officer for Command Control and Communications Tactical describes the SIF portal as follows: “The portal is a way for us to standardize information we’re putting out to the field, to capture information and make it available to people in different points in the Unit Set Fielding Cycle”¹³ This portal provides constant, easily accessible information to commanders, logisticians and field support personnel as to the status of any unit anywhere within the Unit set Fielding and ARFORGEN Model.

The first step in implementing and enforcing compliance with the SIF began with the establishment of a Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Information Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) Support and Operations Center (SOC). The SOC functions as the 24/7/365 operations hub for all C4ISR systems existent within the ARFORGEN process. To accomplish this mission, they provide overarching support to all unit level train ups and field exercises preceding deployment, and continue to interface with embedded contract fields service representatives during deployment. Their familiarity with the acquisition process and the program managers of the digital systems allows them to have reach-back into the program offices to affect rapid response and support to field critical issues. Additionally, the SOC is staffed with personnel from Army Material Command that helps bridge that gap between acquisition and logistics, and help manage getting the right problems to the right people at the right times. To enable clear lines of authority, and to best serve all customers and clients the

SOC established modules on the Single Interface Portal pertinent to different phases and applications across the ARFORGEN timeline. Those modules are as follows:

- Exercise Module – This is a detailed list of all unit exercises, to include rotations through the respective Combat Training Centers. It provides dates, coverage responsibilities, key personnel, phone numbers, support infrastructure, and a synchronized matrix of key events and timelines.
- Field Support Module – Provides a listing of all forward support personnel, to include Contracted Field Service Representatives, their contact information, and the system they support. This one-touch database allows sorting by system, region, application, etc.
- Incident Reporting Module – This module allows visibility across the network to any incidents that need immediate attention within the system of systems environment. It further tracks incidents and provides a reference database to similar issues and resolution steps for potential recurring incidents.
- SIGTRACKS module – is designed for initiating and tracking logistics issues that impact operations and unit set fielding. This reaches out beyond the scope of C4ISR program offices and ties the Army Materiel Command structure to unit success throughout deployment.
- Software Management Module – in a systems of systems environment this module plays a key role in helping to manage and synchronize software drops for independent software applications. It denotes key dates and software freeze timelines to ensure compliance and establish control within the system of systems.

- Training Management Module – this provides army staff input and alignment of key training dates and provides unit access with links to all army doctrinal training manuals and serves as an online library for systems support packages.
- Unit Set Fielding Module – a web based calendar tool that provides overview by region, unit, and application and a synchronization matrix to align fieldings, support, and reset events.
- Weapon Systems Portfolio – a web based catalog of user's manuals for all C4ISR applications, as well as links to help desks for troubleshooting or advice into an applications performance.

The management of the SIF and the eight modules that comprise it is accomplished by SOC personnel resident at both the Central Technical Support Facility at Fort Hood, Texas and their forward support assets resident at regional locations in support of each unit. Regional Digital Support Engineers were established to manage the contractor footprint at each unit and provide regular data to the SIF database. These Digital Support Engineers establish one on one relationships with the soldier customer and assist in managing and tracking all necessary field service contractors that are in support of each of the digital systems that comprise the Army's tactical network. Bi-monthly Video Teleconferences are conducted to ensure synchronization and support throughout all phases of Unit Set Fielding and ARFORGEN.

Conclusion

Army modularity and continued involvement in two major combat operations has necessitated the Army's transition from a time phased deployment process to an Army

Force Generation model that is structured to provide the right units with the right equipment and training at the right time for deployment in the Global War on Terror. ARFORGEN has placed a management structure and process to force generation and has done a fantastic job of aligning issues such as fielding, training, rest, reset, deployments and taking care of troops and their families. Although a very effective tool, it falls short of the mark in terms of providing our deploying combat forces with the best information technology tools in a timely and efficient manner. These shortcomings are not necessarily a product of the ARFORGEN Model, but rather are a result of the natural progression of technology and the need to provide information technology tools as a last minute resource in order to maximize technology development timelines. As a result, program manager's of network centric information management systems were forced to come up with creative and innovative ways to deliver the best product throughout all phases of the ARFORGEN timeline. The three tools that the information technology program offices developed are making a difference on how units equip, train, deploy and reset in today's world of rapid deployments.

Integrated field support has for the first time tied together the program managers who deliver product with the contractors that produce them as well as with the logisticians and field service representatives that support. This field support team has enabled IT program managers to expand their role beyond the confines of phase I (the equipping phase) and better provide and support equipment all ARFORGEN phases, to include deployment. Additionally, the Unit Set Fielding Model and the Single Interface to the Field have allowed for management on a grand system of systems scale and ensured synchronicity and timeliness of all integrated products. As information

technology and the proliferation of networked entities continues to permeate our combat units and shape the way we fight, the reliance on tools that help manage systems and provide for timely delivery will continue to rise in importance. As was often talked about in the 1990s, Network Centric Warfare is now a part of every combat operation and the tide will continue to grow, as will the need to support, train, and maintain currency on the every evolving information technology systems.

Recommendation

The adaptations made to the ARFORGEN model by digital program managers has resulted in a better process throughout the equipping, training and supporting phases. This modification has resulted in constant contact with the unit and the incorporation of technical expertise to assist deploying and deployed commanders. Additionally, it has more closely engaged AMC with the soldier customer and pushed sustainment forward directly into the combat units. Although extremely successful, this process of modifying the ARFORGEN process and developing tools to support has not yet been adopted by the bulk of the Acquisition Corps. I recommend that the Army Acquisition Executive take a look at how all program managers are supporting ARFORGEN and the current fight and as needed, introduce them to the processes developed by the information technology community.

A large percentage of our Acquisition Corps senior leadership is still conducting business as usual within the acquisition community by paying more attention to a set of rules and regulations then responding to the needs of our Army at war. The ARFOGEN Model was the Army's attempt to get all cogs within the organization synchronized to deliver combat ready Brigades on a specified deployment timeline. The modifications to

that model, spelled out in this paper, allow even the most challenged program offices to work within the model to deliver equipment and equally as important, provide support to deploying units. For years now, the idea of acquisition reform has been bantered around by senior leaders and the press. For the most part, the discussions center on changing the regulations in order to provide a faster process of getting programs through the necessary bureaucratic pentagon wickets. Although absolutely needed, as the regulations are geared toward supporting vehicular platform programs, this paper proposes and recommends that we as an Acquisition Community worry less about the process and start worrying more about the product. Getting equipment rapidly into the hands of soldiers and supporting it with acquisition expertise throughout the entire deployment process needs to become our primary focus. It is embarrassing that after seven years of combat, we still have Program Management Offices that are more concerned about the process than the product. It is the job of the Acquisition Corps to provide the best materiel possible and to support that equipment as needed. These suggested modifications to the ARFORGEN process allow that to happen and they should be employed across all acquisition organizations. This is not only a blueprint for how to change to support ARFORGEN, but maybe also a wake up call to focus on that support and the products needed by our soldiers.

Endnotes

¹ http://www.arcent.army.mil/includes/state_of_the_army.pdf

² www.stormingmedia.us/cat/sub/subcat269-4.html

³ Military Information Technology, "Integrating Systems of Systems into Combat Formations", October, 2008

⁴ Addenda E Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) Process 2008 U_S_ Army Posture Statement

⁵ http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/M/Moores_Law.html The observation made in 1965 by Gordon Moore, co-founder of Intel, that the number of transistors per square inch on integrated circuits had doubled every year since the integrated circuit was invented. Moore predicted that this trend would continue for the foreseeable future.

⁶ Diagram extracted from a briefing entitled “Army Team C4ISR Overview and Support to ARFORGEN”, Session 1, Land War Net Conference, 19 Aug 2008.

⁷ Extracted from briefing entitled “Army C4ISR Sustainment Challenges”, Session 6, Land War Net Conference, 21 Aug, 2008.

⁸ FMI 4-93.41 (FM 63-11), Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington DC, 22 February 2007, p 1-1.

⁹ Extracted from briefing entitled “Army C4ISR Sustainment Challenges”, Session 6, Land War Net Conference, 21 Aug, 2008

¹⁰ http://www.mnf-iraq.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=20875&Itemid

¹¹ C4ISR Unit Set Fielding (USF) Process in Support of ARFORGEN Information Paper, prepared by Jay Herod, PEOC3T, 30 May 2008.

¹² Ibid, 30 May 2008.

¹³ Military Information Technology, “Integrating Systems of Systems into Combat Formations”, October, 2008, p.30.

