

Combating Terrorism Through Jerusalem

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Subject Area Strategic Issues

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Title: Combating Terrorism Through Jerusalem

Author: Major Stuart C. Lankford, USMC,

Thesis: A mutually acceptable peaceful resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will significantly reduce international Islamic terrorism by removing the decades-old source of hatred affecting the general Muslim global population, thereby drastically reducing, or eliminating, the critical support system Islamic terrorists require.

Discussion: Based on historic and religious arguments, both Arabs and Jews claim the Holy Lands in and around Jerusalem and have established various holy sites and places of worship in areas controlled by modern-day Israel. This continued struggle stirs hatred and contempt in the Muslim community and provides inspiration for multitudes of violent terrorist acts against Jews and the western world. Islamic fundamentalists, with a "radical" view of Islam, subscribe to terror, intimidation and destruction as a means to achieve their desired goals, and most often cite the Arab-Israeli crisis as their main motivation and recruiting slogan, calling on all Muslims to join in Jihad to expel the infidel invaders. The most prolific fundamentalist is Usama Bin Laden, who has repeatedly referred to Israel's "occupation" to justify his attacks and call others to join his fight. In order for fundamentalists to sustain terrorist operations, they must have a support base and maintain a constant recruiting effort. This support base provides critical support in the means of intelligence, transportation, safe haven, financial and equipment support. Seeking specific types of individuals, they target the unemployed, uneducated and frustrated men who are less likely to challenge the fundamentalist's very selective interpretations of the Quranic texts. By eroding the support groups, terrorists will lose their freedom of movement and anonymity. Several diplomatic attempts to resolve the peace process over the last 15 years have failed to make dramatic progress. However, with the death of Palestinian Yasser Arafat, new opportunities are available. Currently, Israel is attempting a unilateral withdrawal from certain settlements to cede control back to the Palestinian Authority. In the past several months, these diplomatic efforts have appeared to encourage Palestinians, reflecting a decrease in terrorist acts against Israelis, and significant popular support for peaceful resolution. A peaceful resolution will reduce terrorism over the short term because Palestinians will have an independent state and an open economy. Over the long term, Muslims throughout the world will realize the lasting peace in Palestine and Israel, and the majority will accept the resolutions outcomes, thereby eliminating the fundamental terrorists call to arms over Israeli "occupation."

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Recommendation: It is clear that now is the time to act in order to achieve a lasting peaceful solution. The United States must eliminate the perception of favoritism towards Israel and enact genuine aid and support programs to benefit the Palestinians. However, the U.S. must not take a heavy-handed approach and taint the process. It is up to Palestinians and Israelis to decide what is acceptable. By taking an indirect approach, the U.S. can encourage international investment in business and economic programs, reducing the Palestinian support base, and show the Muslim world our desires for true peace.

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Table of Contents

	<i>Page</i>
MMS COVER SHEET.....	i
DISCLAIMER.....	ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	iii
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.....	v
LIST OF TABLES.....	vi
PREFACE.....	vii
INTRODUCTION	1
THE CURRENT DILEMMA	2
MUSLIM TERRORISM.....	4
Strategy	6
Jihad	8
Terrorist Support.....	10
Israeli Motivator.....	12
Usama Bin Laden.....	15
Hamas	18
THE PEACE PROCESS.....	19
A New Roadmap to Peace	22
Recent Progress.....	23
Obstacles to Peace	26
Israelis in Palestinian Land	27
Security Fence.....	29
Jerusalem.....	29
Political Will	30
Assumptions for Suitable Peace.....	30
SHORT VERSUS LONG TERM AFFECTS.....	32
METHODS TO STEM ISLAMIC TERRORISM.....	33
Call it an Insurgency	34
Successful Diplomacy Means Failed Insurgency	36
Revealing the True Nature of Insurgent Violence	39
RECOMMENDED STRATEGIES ON ISRAEL AND INSURGENCIES.....	39
Long-Term Approach by Their Objectives.....	40
Working Through Moderates.....	42

International Support	43
Going After Support Bases	43
CONCLUSION.....	45
APPENDIX A: ILLUSTRATIONS.....	47
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	52

Illustrations

	<i>Page</i>
Figure 1. Israel after UN Partition, 1947	A-1
Figure 2. Israel after First War Armistice, 1949	A-1
Figure 3. Israel and Occupied Territory Today	A-1
Figure 4. The Gaza Strip.....	A-2
Figure 5. Israeli Settlements, West Bank and Gaza.....	A-3
Figure 6. West Bank Security Fence.....	A-4
Figure 7. West Bank Security Fence Detail.....	A-5

Table

	<i>Page</i>
Figure 8. Palestinian Terror Attacks since 08 February 2005	A-5

Preface

The origins of this paper started with a genuine interest in the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, and an overwhelming curiosity why the peace process has not been solved. Add to that my growing interest in Islamic terrorism due to the events of the twenty-first Century, and I wanted to discover more. From my western, filtered education, I always saw the Palestinians as terrorists and weaker peoples refusing to realize when they were beaten by a superior military power. However, understanding that my education revolved solely around the military battles of the Arab-Israeli crisis, I wanted to understand more about the diplomatic efforts. As I prepared research and write the paper, I realized the inextricable link between the crisis and world Islamic terrorism today, and really wanted to determine how powerful that link was in drawing the every-day Muslim into the issue. Finally, realizing my decidedly western viewpoint and education thus far, I wanted to understand the Palestinian perspective and see what Israel was doing to block the process.

I would like to thank both Doctor Norman Cigar and Colonel J. D. Walker for the time and efforts editing my paper, narrowing my focus and helping me keep my opinions and going in positions as unbiased as possible. Doctor Cigar's additional assistance locating research materials proved invaluable. Lastly, I would like to thank Command and Staff College for providing the opportunity to complete the Masters Degree program.

Introduction

Terrorism has taken on a renewed importance throughout the international community. From South East Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Europe to the Americas, civilians are no longer safe from the threat of terrorism. All members of the military community also suffer from the threat of the terrorism, and militaries can no longer afford to go into combat focusing solely on the armed combatant as the antagonist. For today and tomorrow's asymmetrical battlefield, it is critical for military commanders and planners to know what motivates terrorists and enables them to act as barriers to freedom and democracy. Though established terrorist groups refer to varying reasons for their struggle, one of the most active groups of Islamic terrorists claim to be following Allah's divine instruction in the Quran. When looking deeper into the terrorists' complaints, one of the most significant sources of anger for Muslims appears to be the struggle between the Palestinians and the Jewish Nation of Israel. The existence of a Jewish state in previously controlled Muslim lands has been a source of hatred for Islamic terrorists for over a generation. The widespread anger with Israel in the Muslim world provides Islamic terrorists with a significant motivation that draws Muslims from all walks of life into terrorist activities or to support these activities. If Arab, Western, European and Israeli diplomats neutralize one of the greatest sources of Islamic hatred if they can peacefully resolve the Arab-Israeli crisis. My paper will show that a mutually acceptable peaceful resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will significantly reduce international Islamic terrorism by removing the decades-old source of hatred affecting the general Muslim global population, thereby drastically reducing, or eliminating, the critical support system Islamic terrorists require.

The Arab-Israeli peace process is quite relevant for both civilian and military personnel, due to its direct link to terrorism. As a major source of motivation for terrorist support and attacks, it behooves military personnel to learn more about the Islamic terrorists' motivations and direct/indirect links to Israel. The current lack of resolution between Palestine and Israel presents a major problem for the international and military communities. The continued failure to resolve the conflict serves to embolden current and future terrorists, while demonstrating a continued purpose/need for terrorism due to failed diplomacy.

In order to demonstrate the direct relationship between Palestine, Israel and Islamic terrorism and the ultimate positive effects of a successful peace process, this paper will clarify the background of the problem, in order to show the foundations of Islamic terrorism and its direct link to Israel's policies in the region. Next, I will analyze the previous attempts at Peace through the Oslo Accords in the early 1990's, the Camp David Accords in 2000 and the most recent Road Map to Peace agreed to in 2003. Ultimately, this paper will illustrate how a successful peace process will stem Islamic terrorism and recommend specific actions by the United States and the international community to ensure and sustain an Arab-Israeli peace process in order to reduce Islamic terrorism.

The Current Dilemma

The areas currently known as Israel, Lebanon, Jordan and Syria have seen conflict since well before the birth of Jesus Christ and the advent of the Christian religion. Based on historic and religious arguments, both Arabs and Jews claim a right to the Holy Land

and have established various holy sites and places of worship in areas controlled by modern-day Israel.

In 1918, the Ottoman Empire was defeated and divided up into Iraq, Palestine and Syria as British and French mandates. The French later divided Syria, also creating Lebanon. The British divided Palestine into two states, which created Jordan.¹ In 1917, British Foreign Secretary Lord Balfour issued a declaration promising a "Jewish homeland" to gain Jewish assistance during WWI. After WWII, the United Kingdom ceded control of Palestine to the United Nations, who created the Palestinian Partition Plan in 1947, which allowed for an Arab and a Jewish State. Ongoing hostilities intensified between the Jewish settlers and the Arab Palestinians. Egypt, Palestine's closest Arab neighbor to the south, was quick to join the efforts to remove Jews from the perceived Arab land.

The Arab nations surrounding Israel waged war against Israeli several times, ultimately losing even more territory to Israel. In 1948 and 1967, the Arab nations suffered resounding defeats, and reached an operational 'draw' in 1973. As a result of the 1967 Six Day War, Israel occupied the entire Sinai Peninsula and Egypt lost control of the Suez Canal. Israel's new territory was four times the size of the original United Nations Plan.² Israel ultimately returned the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt after several years of negotiations, but Israel continued to occupy territories previously belonging to Lebanon, Syria and Jordan (Refer to Appendix A, figures 1 through 3 to view maps depicting Israel's territorial expansion).

¹ Bernard Lewis, The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror (New York: The Modern Library, 2003), xvii.

² Hamdy Sobhy Abouseada, The Crossing of the Suez Canal, October 6, 1973 (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, 2000), 3.

On November 22, 1967, the United Nations (UN) issued Resolution 242 calling Israel to withdraw from "territories occupied in the recent conflict." The resolution underscored "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war," and "the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from acts of force." Resolution 242 also called for a "just settlement of the refugee problem." Israel formally accepted the resolution, but refused to withdraw from Palestinian lands.³

The remainder of the 20th Century was consumed with attempts to resolve the Arab-Israeli crisis, both peacefully and through force. It is this continued struggle that stirs hatred and contempt in the Muslim community and provides inspiration for multitudes of violent terrorist acts against Jews and the western world (Europe and America).

Muslim Terrorism

Muslims draw their inspiration for life through immersion in their religion of Islam. Islam is a demanding religion and a demanding way of life. Islam not only provides for religious instruction but also covers civic and governmental duties. Plainly put, Islam is a blueprint for life, for the individual, the family, the tribe or clan, the nation and the world. For those who subscribe to Islam, they typically see themselves as Muslims before their national identity. In a recent survey conducted in six Arab nations, more respondents identified themselves as Muslims first than by their nationality. Two countries, Egypt and Lebanon were outside the norm, where the majority identified

³ "Fourth Arab-Israeli War, 1973," History of the Middle East Database,
<http://www.nmhschool.org/tthornton/mehistorydatabase/1973_fourth_arab.htm>.

themselves as Muslims after their own nationality.⁴ More fundamental interpretations see Islam as a religion subdivided into nations, instead of many nations practicing the same religion. The "Nation of Islam" is defined as the Ummah, which refers to all Muslims everywhere, as one collective body, transcending national boundaries.⁵ Using this rationale, Islamic terrorists try to encourage Muslims of all nations to rally under an Islamic cause, instead of pursuing separate national agendas. Unfortunately, there are still very active Islamic terrorist organizations that may not follow a unified Islamic cause, but are still ruthless and deadly in pursuit of their national agendas.

Muslims believe that Islam is the perfection of both the Jewish and Christian religions. Viewing the three religions as a natural progression, the first Jews were truly God's people, but they went astray by worshipping idols, conducting immoral acts and living in sin. God sent Jesus to enlighten and bring them back to God. The Jewish believers rejected Jesus' message, and the newly formed Christians also went astray, veering away from God's true message. As a result of both previous attempts going astray, God chose the Prophet Mohammed to bring the final enlightenment. In this light, Muslims view Islam as the final presentation of God's true message, and therefore more perfect than either Judaism or Christianity. Ironically, at the introduction of Islam, both Jews and Christians were seen as "people of the book," and permitted to stay in their original homes, provided they chose to convert to Islam or to pay fees to the Muslims. The Quran actually states that there shall be no compunction to religion, but that Muslims should fight against those who do not embrace the true faith, unless they pay a tribute

⁴ Khaled Dawoud, "Arab Opinions," YaleGlobal Online, 30 July 2004, <<http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/article.print?id=4305>>.

⁵ Michael Vlahos, Culture's Mask: War and Change after Iraq (Laurel, MD: Johns Hopkins University, 2004), 20.

(known as "jizya").⁶ However, as a result of the inevitable conflicts over territories between the Christians and Muslims, and the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine, Islamic fundamentalists view Christians and Jews, especially, with particular disdain.

For the purposes of this paper, it is imperative that we define the particular Islamic terrorist threat. As with any belief system or ideology, there is a group that follows a very strict interpretation of the laws. It is this group of Muslims and their "radical" view of Islam that subscribes to terror, intimidation and destruction as a means to achieve their desired goals. These Muslims believe there is only one proper way to be right with Allah, and that is their way. Their Islamic Law leaves no room for error as to proper behavior and duty, and advocates violence in order to convert or eliminate those who will not follow the more radical interpretations of Islam. For the remainder of the paper, I will refer to this group as fundamental Islamists, or fundamentalists, which includes not only the terrorists, but also those zealots who actively support terrorist activities. As a reminder, most Muslims are not fundamentalists; most fundamentalists are not terrorists; but most terrorists targeting the United States and Israel are Muslims. While there are other terrorist groups with religious affiliations outside of Islam, or even secular causes, this paper focuses on the Islamic terrorist.

Strategy

Even though terrorists are violent, ruthless and might sometimes appear disparate and unorganized, they do have fundamental strategic goals and follow basic strategies. Islamic terrorists are no different. Some specific goals include expelling or destroying the infidel presence in Muslim holy lands (focused on Israel and the U.S.), eliminate corrupt Islamic regimes, restore Islamic order and establish an Islamic state. The basic

⁶ N. J. Dawood, The Koran (Suffolk: Penguin Books, 1974), 323, 361.

terrorist strategy is to 1) Establish a dramatic event that brings authority and legitimacy to the movement by creating national or international recognition; 2) to fight against the infidels and occupiers in support of the larger movement; 3) and to advance the course of history by drawing the target of their aggression into Muslim homelands in an attempt to unite the local population to defend itself against the foreign invaders. For Islamic terrorists, the strategy is apparently working. According to some opinion polls taken immediately after September 11, 2001, the general public in most Muslim countries was sympathetic for the victims of the World Trade Center twin towers and felt American anger was justified. However, more recent surveys taken throughout Muslim countries now that America military forces and government agencies are active in the Middle East reflects a growing approval of suicide bombings and terrorist efforts to remove foreign invaders (infidels).⁷

Analyzing the first part of the strategy, it is easy to see how Islamic terrorist acts over the last ten years have effectively gained international recognition through events like Khobar Towers, the USS Cole and September 11, 2001. Islamic terrorists have also pursued other methods to increase and maintain legitimacy. Within Islam, the fundamentalists gain legitimacy because Islamic tradition requires the Muslim community to stand up and engage in Jihad (Holy War) in order to protect the Nation of Islam (the Ummah). Fundamentalists further interpret Jihad to be an individual duty. American forces are in the Middle East and Israel is occupying the perceived Palestinian State. Another fundamentalist tactic is to make the enemy, either Israel or America, do things that run counter to Jewish/Christian stated ideals, goals and beliefs.⁸ For example,

⁷ Vlahos, Terror's Mask: Insurgency within Islam, 44.

⁸ Vlahos, Terror's Mask: Insurgency within Islam, 4.

this includes torturing Prisoners of War (POW), targeting religious sites or killing innocent civilians, which happens frequently in Israel and on the battlefields of Operation Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom.

It is clear to see how Islamic terrorists are fulfilling the second and third strategies, actively engaging in terrorist acts as the fighting arm of the Islamic renewal and attempting to unify the Ummah to defend itself. In the Israeli region, terrorists have successfully drawn Israeli forces into Palestinian and Muslim territories through rocket and mortar attack, operating terrorist cells and ambushing Israeli Defense Forces. Hoping to create a great holy war with the infidels, the course of Islamic history could progress to the defeat of the unholy invaders and lead to the further expansion of Islam, according to the Islamic terrorist's design.

Jihad

One of the foundations of the Islamic terrorist movement is the practice of, and justification for, Jihad. Jihad is permitted by the Quran under multiple circumstances. Two specific instances where Islamic Law states it is lawful to wage war includes against infidels and corrupt Muslim governments, or apostates. Fundamentalists consider Jihad a religious duty. According to classical Muslim jurists, there are two basic types of Jihad, offensive and defensive.⁹ Islamic terrorism strives for the defensive Jihad, where they believe drawing the enemy into Muslim countries will encourage the Muslim population as a whole to take up arms against the foreign invaders. In a defensive Jihad, protecting the Nation of Islam becomes the obligation of every able-bodied Muslim and therefore the fundamentalists expect all Muslims to fight.¹⁰ Following along the lines of Jihad

⁹ Lewis, 31.

¹⁰ Lewis, 31.

justifications, fundamentalists not only seek to destroy infidels, but they also seek to eliminate corrupt Muslim regimes. Taking these two goals together, Islamic terrorists are only a part of a larger Islamic movement, which is a quest for renewal. The Muslim version of renewal is one of an entire Islamic order restored back to a "rightly guided" way of life. Within that renewal, terrorism is only one part.¹¹ The renewal's goal is to bring all of those Muslims who have gone astray back to the true meaning of Islam, or to destroy them. According to the fundamentalists interpretations of Islamic Law, those who oppose a return to the true meaning of Islam, that "rightly guided" way of life, are an enemy of Islam, and will be treated as infidels. Any infidels who represent outside interference to this renewal will be subjected to Jihad. Any renewal led by fundamentalists will not be a gentle one.

Understanding the political aims of the Islamic renewal is critical to undermining the fundamentalists' attempts to control the reform. The Nation of Islam is trying to go through an inner healing. The majority of Muslims, not just the fundamentalists, feel that the Nation of Islam has strayed too far from true Islam, however not every Muslim believes the path of violence is the only path to achieve reform. There are far more Muslims who are not willing to take up arms against infidels or actively support terrorist activities. For the purposes of this paper, this group will be referred to as moderates. Moderate Islamists also seek to renew the Muslim world, but they reject the path of violence or Jihad, and aim to renew it through Islamic reinterpretation.¹² Moderate Islamic leaders typically are highly educated and selectively receptive to western ideas, but they still feel that the western society has fallen from it's own religion. The moderate

¹¹ Michael Vlahos, Terror's Mask: Insurgency within Islam (Laurel: Johns Hopkins University, 2002), 41.

¹² Vlahos, Culture's Mask: War and Change after Iraq, 19.

Islamic population can become one of the methods to reduce Islamic terrorism, which will be discussed later in the paper.

One of the main reasons for the renewal is for the Muslim world to try and bring the original leadership structure back to Islam. In 1922, an Ottoman General named Kemal Ataturk gained control of present-day Turkey in a military (secular) takeover, and abolished the sultanate, which was the last of the great Muslim empires. Additionally, in 1924, he also abolished the Caliphate, which was the accepted position as the head of all Sunni Islam, which followed in a line of successors dating all the way back to the Prophet Mohammed. The Caliphate served as the religious and political leader of the Muslim community and as a symbol of unity. The last accepted Caliphate was the Ottoman Sultan in 1918.¹³ Some believe that Usama Bin Ladin has aspirations of becoming the next Caliph.¹⁴

A good example of the fundamentalist mindset is the Introduction to the Al Qaeda Manual, which states that Islamic governments have never, and will never, be established through peaceful solutions and cooperative councils. They are established as they always have been, by pen and gun, by word and bullet, by tongue and teeth. Islam is not just performing rituals, but a complete system: religion, government, worship and Jihad.¹⁵ Another violent example is when a band of Islamic terrorists seized the Great Mosque in Mecca, Saudi Arabia in November, 1979. Fighting off Saudi Security Forces, their declared aim was to "purify Islam" and liberate the holy land of Arabia from corrupt religious leaders and their Western accomplices, like the Saudi government.¹⁶

¹³ Lewis, xvi-xvii.

¹⁴ Lewis, xviii.

¹⁵ The Al Qaeda Manual, US Department of Justice, <<http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/manualpart1.1.pdf>>, 3-8.

¹⁶ Lewis, 82.

Terrorist Support

In order for the fundamentalists to sustain terrorist operations, they must keep a constant recruiting effort going. Seeking specific types of individuals, they target the unemployed, uneducated and frustrated men, made worse by low productivity and the higher birth rates of third world countries. They specifically play on the widening gap of opportunity between Western countries and the Ummah. Fundamentalists feed on the privation and humiliation of the Arab people and the failure of current political attempts to remove the infidels.¹⁷ It is important to understand that fundamentalists are very selective in which Quranic texts they follow, and how they interpret those texts. When the target audience is less educated, specifically on the Quran, there is no challenge to their particular interpretation of the text.

Surprisingly, even though fundamentalists deal in terror tactics and intimidation, they are able to garner significant amounts of support, even from those individuals or groups not willing to terrorize others or who consider themselves as a fundamentalist. First of all, they use the religious obligation of Jihad. Historically, Jihad was seen as the heroic struggle for the Nation of Islam, harkening back to the very beginnings of Islam. The prophet Muhammad used violence and war to establish Islam in the region now known as Saudi Arabia. Many times since the beginnings of Islam, Jihad was used to either expand the influence of Islam, or to repulse infidels occupying Muslim lands. Most Muslims revere these struggles the same way Americans revere their revolutionary beginnings. The Quran provides numerous verses that support taking up the call of Jihad

¹⁷ Lewis, 132.

against infidels. For example the Quran states: "God has promised a reward to those who believe, but distinguishes those who fight with a mighty reward."¹⁸

Another very successful tactic to garner public and private support is enticing their enemies to shoot at innocent civilians. By firing from within the crowd, or within public spaces, an Islamic terrorist is likely to lure the enemy into an immediate retaliation. Even better for the terrorist is to fire rockets or mortars from beside a mosque, school or hospital in the hope of enemy forces using counter battery radar to locate the initial firing position and retaliate with their own indirect fires or aircraft attack. Once the retaliation is complete, the terrorists can take pictures and video clips of the civilian destruction, claiming an unprovoked attack. Ultimately, what the local population sees are innocent women and children dead or maimed at the hands of the infidels. Now, the terrorists can use the dead civilians as another call to defend the homeland, and creates an excellent motivation to provide safe haven, financial support or even overt attacks in the name of the terrorists' cause. Israel, the United States and even other international forces have fallen for this tactic repeatedly.

The Israeli Motivator

Taking these basic Islamic terrorist factors into considerations it is critical to understand how fundamentalists use the Arab-Israeli conflict to incite violence and draw support for their global movement. Outspoken individual personalities and national leaders will refer to the illegal occupation of Muslim holy lands and territory by the Israelis. Very few Muslims are alive today who were born before Jewish settlers were flooding into Palestine, and the subsequent creation of the Israeli state. Most Muslims can vividly recall the military defeats at the hands of the Israelis, which has become a

¹⁸ Lewis, 30.

festering wound after so many attempts to remove the Jews by military force. To make matters worse, the Israelis are occupying lands outside the original international borders created by the United Nations, yet the international community, specifically the United States, appears to favor Israel over Palestine by not even forcing an Israeli withdrawal back to those original boundaries. Additionally, there are Islamic religious leaders who have perverted translations of the Quran to suit their purposes in condemning the Jewish people as a whole. Finally, Usama Bin Laden has repeatedly referred to the Israeli crisis to justify his terrorist activities and organization, Al Qaeda, to the international community.

A significant source of hatred comes from an Egyptian fundamentalist named Sayyid Qutb. He lived in America from 1948 to 1950 and observed the social indecencies, sexuality and materialism of the American public (most notably the supposedly religious followers). He also noticed the conspicuous favoritism towards Israel during the first Arab-Israeli war in 1948. He felt that Israel was an attack on Islam and was appalled at the ignorance of the American public about the situation.¹⁹ He became an outspoken fundamentalist, seeking the removal of the Israelis and a return to true Islam. Most fundamental Islamists consider the conspiracy against Islam to be spearheaded by Israel and Judaism.²⁰ For many others, the resilience of the Palestinian fighters has been a model for other Muslims, as they refuse to submit even when controlled.

The Arab nations have suffered repeated military defeats at the hands of the Israelis, despite the number of Arab nations fighting against Israel. One of the major

¹⁹ Lewis, 76-82.

²⁰ Assaf Moghadam, "Palestinian Suicide Terrorism in the Second Intifada: Motivations and Organizational Aspects," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 26 (2003), 70.

Arab humiliations occurred during the 1967 Six Day War, where the combined Arab countries surrounding Israel were preparing to attack, but Israel launched a preemptive attack and achieved victory in only six days, even though they were the smaller military force. Israel's victory not only embarrassed the Muslim community, but it resulted in Israel's occupation of land outside their internationally recognized borders. In 1973, Egypt and Syria were able to catch Israel by surprise and gain initial tactical military successes, but Israel was able to counter attack and neutralize the earlier Arab tactical successes due to significant help from the U.S. Muslims would like nothing more than to see the Israeli Defense Force and Air Force soundly defeated on the battlefield and forced to surrender.

In one Gaza mosque in 2001, a Sheikh stated in a sermon "The Quran is very clear: The greatest enemies of the Islamic Nation are the Jews....The people who are most hostile to the believers are the Jews."²¹ Ayatollah Khomeini, after his successful Iranian revolution in 1979 declared that America was the "Great Satan" and Israel was America's agent as "Little Satan." Khomeini noted how America was increasing its influence in the Middle East, and he considered both Anwar Sadat in Egypt and Saddam Hussein in Iraq as servants of America for making peace with Israel and making war against Iran, respectively.²² Some Muslim newspaper columnists even attribute the 2001 World Trade Center attack to a Zionist conspiracy intended to draw attention away from Israeli persecution and the murder of Muslims.²³ As recently as 17 March 2005, tens of thousands of Indonesians staged multi-island anti-Israel protest, shouting chants that called Israel and the U.S. the real terrorist, and carried Palestinian flags and banners

²¹ Moghadam, 71.

²² Lewis, 86.

²³ Lewis, 156.

saying "Save Al Aqsa from raid of Jewish." The banners were referring to Jewish militant settler threats to storm the mosque in July as a sign of protest to the Gaza pullout.²⁴

To further illustrate the point, several polls were recently taken gauging the Arab communities' sentiment towards the Arab-Israeli conflict and America. According to a poll conducted by the Arab American Institute in the summer of 2004, America's approval rating in six different Arab countries was less than 20 percent, dropping to 2 percent in Egypt. The predominant explanation for such low ratings was America's foreign policy, especially towards what is seen as an unbalanced policy in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. When asked what America should do to improve its ratings, one of the most common answers was, "Stop supporting Israel." When asked for the most unpopular leaders, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon topped the list by a wide margin.²⁵ In another poll taken in March 2005, Muslims were asked what was the most important issue today for the Muslim world. The majority answer was to provide support to the Palestinian people. Poverty, unemployment and human rights fell well behind the Palestinian concern.²⁶

Usama Bin Laden

The most significant terrorist today is Usama Bin Ladin, the Saudi Arabian-born terrorist who has created the terror network called Al Qaeda. He is a calculating, cold-blooded foe who knows how to use terrorism as a means of promoting his political end. Perfectly in consonance with the fundamentalists, Bin Laden's agenda is to establish a

²⁴ "Indonesians Stage Anti-Israel Protests," [Aljazeera.net](http://english.aljazeera.net/nr/exeres/472af34d-b90c-4eab-89e4-fde8d6a5a8e0.htm), 17 April 2005, <<http://english.aljazeera.net/nr/exeres/472af34d-b90c-4eab-89e4-fde8d6a5a8e0.htm>>

²⁵ Khaled Dawoud.

²⁶ "Al Jazeera Public Survey," [Al Jazeera.net](http://www.aljazeera.net/nr/exeres/54A5C1F-20BA-49D4-9F7C-6D59C690B780.htm), 22 March 2005, <<http://www.aljazeera.net/nr/exeres/54A5C1F-20BA-49D4-9F7C-6D59C690B780.htm>>.

pure Islamic state and a Middle East "caliphate" where Quranic laws reign supreme.²⁷ For several years he has clearly labeled Israel as a primary source for his hatred and terrorism, justifying in his mind the call to Jihad. Since the 1990's, he has continually renewed his call for Jihad against "crusaders" and "Zionists", trying to draw as much support as possible. On the matter of religious obligation, Bin Laden gave a speech over the Arabic media on July 18, 2003, stating: "There are people who say that the Jihad does not require the participation of the entire nation; these words are true, but their intent is not. It is true that Jihad cannot be entered by the entire nation today, ...but Jihad continues to be a commandment incumbent personally to every Muslim."²⁸

Usama Bin Ladin frequently refers back to the days of the Christian Crusades and their attempts to regain Jerusalem from the Muslims in the 11th and 12th Centuries. To provide a historical example of Muslim dominance, and motivation to the common Muslim, Bin Ladin refers to the triumphant routing of the Crusaders in 1187, as the Muslims recaptured Jerusalem from nearly one hundred years of Christian occupation.²⁹ In this light, Bin Laden labels the Israelis as Crusaders occupying Muslim lands, and the need to retake the Holy Land. Quoted in the November 1996 issue of Nida al-Islam magazine, Usama Bin Ladin stated: "The evidence overwhelmingly shows Israel killing the weaker men, women and children in the Muslim World...like the recent Qana massacre in Lebanon."³⁰ The Qana massacre occurred when Israeli troops fired an artillery barrage into a UN compound in Qana, Lebanon, 1996. The compound was

²⁷ Don D. Chipman, "Osama Bin Ladin and Guerrilla Warfare," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 26 (2003), 164.

²⁸ "A New Bin Laden Speech," The Middle East Media Research Institute, 18 July 2003, <<http://www.memeri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=subjects&area=jihad&id=sp53903>>, 2.

²⁹ Lewis, 47-48.

³⁰ "Osama Bin Ladin V. The U.S.: Edicts and Statements," Frontline, 2001, <<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladin/who/edicts.html>>.

manned by a Fijian military unit and housed about 800 displaced Lebanese. Over 100 civilians were killed in the apparently unprovoked barrage.³¹

In 1998, Usama Bin Ladin published a declaration for the World Islamic Front for Jihad against Jews and Crusaders, and one primary charge was the Americans serving the Jews, as an attempt to draw attention away from the Jewish occupation of Jerusalem and the murder of Muslims. The declaration stated that it is the individual Muslim's duty to kill Jewish and American civilian and military personnel in any country until the Al Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem is free from their grip.³²

In a letter to America in November 2002, Usama Bin Ladin specifically called the United States to stop supporting Israel in Palestine, where he stressed the sinister role of the Jews. He refers to Palestine's suffering under over fifty years of military occupation by the Jews, and calls the creation of Israel a crime "which must be erased." He goes on to say that the blood pouring out of Palestine must also be equally avenged. Speaking of the Al Aqsa Mosque, he specifically addressed Israeli Prime Minister Sharon's entering the mosque, and Israeli plans to destroy the mosque.³³ Al Aqsa Mosque is a recurring theme for Bin Laden, and hits a particular sensitivity with Muslims. For Bin Laden personally, his father's construction company repaired the mosque in 1967.³⁴ According to Muslim tradition, Al Aqsa Mosque was built near the spot (Dome of the Rock) where the Prophet Muhammad ascended to Heaven to meet Allah, and it later became a center of worship and teaching, and is considered the third most sacred mosques in Islam. After

³¹ "Qana: Massacre in Sanctuary; Eyewitness," *Bint Jbeil*, 19 April 1996, <http://www.bintjbeil.com/e/occupation/robert_frisk_qana.html>.

³² "Osama Bin Ladin V. The U.S.: Edicts and Statements," 4.

³³ "Full Text: bin Laden's 'letter to America'," *Guardian Unlimited*, 24 November 2004, <<http://observer.guardian.co.uk/worldview/story/0,11581,845725,00.html>>.

³⁴ "A Biography of Osama Bin Laden," *Frontline*, <http://www.pbs.org/wgby/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/who.bio.html>>, 1.

the 1967 Six Day War, Israel occupied all of Jerusalem, where the mosque is, and currently threatens the mosque with Israeli Defense Force security positions. As previously stated, Usama Bin Laden is certain that Israel will destroy the sacred mosque if they can get away with it, in order to reestablish Solomon's Temple.

On October 29, 2004, Usama Bin Ladin appeared on video again for the first time in approximately two years. The following is a summary of his call to America to leave the Middle East, and his motivation to attack America:

After the injustice was so much between the United States and Israel against our people in Palestine and Lebanon it occurred to me that we must deal with the towers. In 1982, when the United States gave permission to Israel to attack Lebanon, I looked at the towers that were destroyed in Lebanon, and it occurred to me that we must punish the transgressors. Even after the fourth year after September 11, 2001, Bush is still misleading you, therefore the motivations are still there for what happened to be repeated.³⁵

Hamas

Focusing specifically on Israel and Palestine, it is obvious to see why Palestinian terrorist groups would wage Jihad against Israel. Looking specifically at Hamas (Harakat Muqawama Islamiyya -- the Islamic Resistance Movement), it was formed in 1987 in the wake of the first Intifada in the West Bank and Gaza. While some other terrorist

³⁵ "Transcript of Osama Bin Ladin Video to America, 29 October 2004," CNN, 29 October 2004, <<http://www.cnn.com/2004/world/meast/10/29/binladin.transcript/index.html>> (08 November 2004).

organizations in Palestine are secular, like Fatah, Hamas is a deeply religious group and its members believe the one true path to liberate the land is through armed struggle, "Jihad", and that negotiations with Israel have no role. This is evident from by their formal covenant: "There is no other solution for the Palestinian problem other than jihad. All the initiatives and international conferences are a wasted of time and a futile game." Hamas expects to fully eliminate the Israelis from the Middle East by violent means.³⁶ Another Islamic organization operating in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, called the Muslim Brotherhood, tends to view the loss of Palestine as a curse and a blessing. A curse because Jews are "the dirtiest and meanest of all races," defiling the most sanctified and honored place on Earth (where Allah sent his herald angel and Mohammed took his midnight journey to Heaven. A blessing because the Jews provide strong motivation to Palestinians to "remove the humiliation and veils of submission from Muslim souls."³⁷

Clearly, the fundamentalists' hatred focused on Israel transcends national boundaries and continues to provide significant motivation for active and passive support and to commit terrorist acts. Islamic terrorists continue to justify their actions at the expense of the Arab-Israeli crisis. Additionally, regionalized terrorist groups like Hamas have effectively stymied all attempts at a genuine peace process, thus prolonging an incredibly destructive cycle of violence.

The Peace Process

Starting with the first Arab-Israeli conflict immediately after the creation of Israel almost sixty years ago, the United Nations and independent nations have tried to

³⁶ "What is Hamas?" Palestinian Facts, <http://www.palestinefacts.org/pf_1991to_now_plo_hamas.php>.

³⁷ Ziad Abu Amir, Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza: Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic Jihad, (Bloomington, IA: Indiana University Press, 1994), 26.

successfully broker a peace deal between the Palestinians forced to live under Israeli occupation and control, and the insecure, continuously threatened nation of Israel. The surrounding Arab nations also affected by the creation of Israel were equally a part of the process due to Israel's subsequent expansions into their territories through the course of war. Throughout the nearly six decades of violence and negotiations, levels of terrorism, especially in the immediate region of Israel, have increased and decreased, apparently according to the status of the peace process. Most notably, when the peace process appeared all but broken, a distinct rise in terrorism occurred.

As a result of unofficial, back-channel negotiations, the Oslo Accords in the early 1990's brought an end to a decade of violence and promised a peaceful solution in the years to come. There were two Oslo Agreements, the first taking place in 1993 and the second in 1995. Yasser Arafat, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) leader, and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin signed both agreements. Not only did the agreements lead to relative peace between Palestinians and Israelis, but also to a peace treaty between Jordan and Israel. Israel's going-in position was "withdrawal for security". As a result of the agreements, Israel would pull out of Gaza and selected West Bank settlements in exchange for Palestinian crackdowns on terrorism. Additionally, the Palestinian Authority would be given power over those evacuated settlements, which subsequently allowed for the first-ever national elections in the West Bank for the Palestinians.³⁸ Israel even agreed to slow construction of new settlements. With Israeli troops no longer on security duty in the settlements, and Palestinians going to the ballot box, peace seemed a not so distant reality. Even the international community believed a

³⁸ Robert O. Freedman, The Middle East and the Peace Process: The Impact of the Oslo Accords, (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1998), 1, 36, 37.

significant breakthrough had occurred in the previously stalled peace process. Yasser Arafat even made overt efforts for a brief period to pursue Islamic terrorists attacking Israelis.

Terrorist activities in Israel subsided after the 1993 agreement, when Arafat and his Palestinian Authority were obligated to crack down on terrorism and incitement against Israel. This, of course, was based on the condition that Israel lived up to its obligations from the accord. Ironically, Hamas, which distanced itself from Arafat after the peace accords, increased its activity; but, the aggregate terrorist activity in the region decreased.³⁹ However, as both sides battled internal friction, resistance to the stated goals mounted, and both sides failed to fulfill their obligations, and noted increases in terrorist attacks plagued Israel through the late 1990s.

Unfortunately, as the decade wore on, the peace talks stalled. As the end of President Clinton's final term approached, he attempted to force progress through the Camp David Accords in July 2000. While the Israelis were willing participants to the meeting, Yasser Arafat and the PLO delegation were not. The Palestinians felt that they were being dragged to Camp David under Israeli and American pressure, who both had a sense of urgency due to re-election timetables. During the Summit, Israeli President Barak promised three Jerusalem-area villages to the Palestinians, but deferred the decision indefinitely due to West Bank violence.⁴⁰ As a result of the failed progress from the accords, and perhaps as an attempt to further stall peace talks, Palestinian terrorist attacks significantly increased as they declared an *infitada*, or popular uprising, against Israel.

³⁹ "What is Hamas?"

⁴⁰ Deborah Sontag, "Quest For Mideast Peace: How and Why It Failed," New York Times, 26 July 2001, 4.

A New Roadmap to Peace

Today, Israel is still reeling from the effects of the declared intifada. However, in the last four years, more progress has been made towards peace, most specifically with the creation of a 'Road Map' for peace, brokered by Israel, the PLO, the United States, Russia, the European Union and the United Nations. President Bush first announced the concept of the Road Map in June 2002, waiting until April 2003 to release the actual plan. The road map is a goal-oriented, performance based plan with specific milestones for each phase. The goal of the current Road Map was a final settlement by 2005. The basic tenets required a two-state solution, dedicated to a comprehensive end to violence and terrorism. The Road Map is broken down into three main phases:

Phase I: Requires an end to terrorism and violence and a normalization of Palestinian life. During this phase, both Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization would make dedicated efforts to rebuild Palestinian institutions in order to rebuild organization, civil society and an economy for the Palestinians. Critical to this phase was an effective Palestinian Security Force that would crack down on terrorists and strictly enforce cease-fire regulations. Additionally, Israelis must freeze Jewish settlements that were expanding in Israeli-occupied Palestinian territories.

Phase II: Stipulates the drafting of a Palestinian Constitution and establishing provisional state boundaries. During this phase, continued vigilance by the Palestinian Security Force is critical. Further progress for building up institutions is also expected.

Phase III: Seeks a permanent status to the resolution, specifically including internationally recognized borders, a solution to the refugee problem, return of Israeli settlements to the Palestinians and a final agreement on the division of Jerusalem between Israel and Palestine.⁴¹

Recent Progress

Unfortunately, much like each other peace plan, Israel and the PLO did not make it out of Phase I. Almost daily terrorist attacks continued, which always evoked retaliatory strikes by the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) and Air Force (IAF). In a bid to restart negotiations and increase the Israeli security situation, the current Israeli Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon, developed a plan for unilateral action that would have Israel pull out of settlements in the Gaza Strip and five settlements in the West Bank by the summer of 2005. The Prime Minister hopes to show Israel's dedication to the peace effort and inspire the PLO to live up to its obligations in the Road Map.⁴²

Most recently, both Israel and Palestinians have taken further steps to restart the peace process. With the death of Yasser Arafat and the election of Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, diplomatic discussions have restarted. Prime Minister Sharon and President Abbas met in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt for a summit to discuss cessations of violence against each other. Additionally, President Abbas has restarted negotiations with groups like Hamas in an attempt to suspend violence against Israelis. The top Hamas leader publicly stated in January 2005 that Hamas would stop its attacks

⁴¹ "Full Text of The Middle East Road Map," Christian Science Monitor, 08 May 2003, <<http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/0508/p25s01-wome.html>> (08 November 2004).

⁴² "Hamas Offers Truce if Israel Reciprocates," MSNBC News, 25 January 2005, <<http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6775311>>.

if Israel ends "aggression, invasion, assassination and killings," and agrees to release all Palestinian prisoners. He further stated that if Israel met these conditions, Hamas was ready to deal with the pacification issue or a temporary truce.⁴³ While this may seem like a very one-sided offer, the fact that Hamas would consider negotiations and a truce is a significant shift in the Hamas mindset, contradicting their stated charter. This announcement also indicated that President Abbas might be able to negotiate with the primary groups outside of the Palestinian Authority. Additionally, President Abbas initiated the reform of Palestinian Security Services, appointing new leaders in April 2005. This also received words of praise from Hamas: "We hope that these measures will serve as a step in the right direction to impose security and rule of law in the Palestinian territories."⁴⁴

Regarding Prime Minister Sharon's plan to hand over Gaza and West Bank settlements, Palestinian security forces have deployed along the northern and southern Gaza boundaries in an effort to prevent rocket attacks against Israelis and prepare for the eventual turnover.⁴⁵ As an indication of the international community's confidence in future peace progress, both Egypt and Jordan have said they will return their ambassadors to Israel.⁴⁶ Israel has already started releasing some of the Palestinian prisoners, and Israeli and Palestinian security commanders met to coordinate the transfer of the five settlements in and around West Bank cities. Already, as of March 2005, Israeli forces turned over control of Jericho and Tulkarem. The remaining cities in the West Bank will

⁴³ "Hamas Offers Truce if Israel Reciprocates."

⁴⁴ Sakher Abu el Oun, "Palestinian Leader Pledges to Restore Rule of Law," Arab Media Watch, 25 April 2005, <<http://www.arabmediawatch.com/modules.php?name=news&file=2746.htm>>.

⁴⁵ "Hamas Offers Truce if Israel Reciprocates."

⁴⁶ "Israel, Palestinians Announce Cease Fire," MSNBC News, 08 February 2005, <<http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6906348/>>.

transition once President Abbas has shown that Palestinian security forces can ensure no further terrorist attacks occur.⁴⁷ The Gaza pullout was originally scheduled for all Jewish settlers in July 2005, however, Prime Minister Sharon has indicated he may delay until August 2005 to avoid a Jewish holiday in July. He received a major political victory for his pullout plan when a proposal for holding a national referendum on the pullout was overwhelmingly defeated in Israeli Parliament in March 2005. In effect, this was Prime Minister Sharon's final political obstacle to executing the pull out.⁴⁸

Reinforcing the current feelings of optimism towards Palestinian success, two recent polls conducted in March 2005 indicate higher expectations for the peace process. The first poll, conducted by An-Najah University noted that 81% of respondents support giving up operations against Israeli targets since the Palestinian Authority announced reaching a truce with Palestinian factions. 75% still support the ongoing peace process and 89% favor a truce instead of continued violence. Additionally, 70% plan to participate in Palestinian legislative elections scheduled for summer 2005.⁴⁹ The second poll, conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research noted that 84% of Palestinians, and 85% of Israelis, support negotiations on a settlement. Palestinians (59%) believe the current Israeli leadership can achieve peace, while 70% of Israelis feel that President Abbas can achieve a compromisable peace. Most notably, 81% of Palestinians polled support reconciliation today, as opposed to only 67% in June 2004.⁵⁰

⁴⁷ "Israeli Troops Transfer Jericho to Palestinians," MSNBC News, 16 March 2005, <<http://msnbc.msn.com/id/7183904/>>.

⁴⁸ "Green Light for Israeli Gaza Strip Pullout," MSNBC, 28 March 2005, <<http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/7315680/html>>.

⁴⁹ "An-Najah Releases the 11th Palestinian Public Opinion Polls Results." An-Najah University, 20 March 2005, <<http://www.najah.edu/english/news/show.asp?key=165>>.

⁵⁰ "Palestinians and Israelis Disagree on how to Proceed with the Peace Process," MIFTAH.ORG, 16 March 2005, <<http://www.miftah.org/display.cfm?docId=6896&categoryId=2.htm>>.

In the two-month period between the Sharm el-Sheik summit in Egypt and the end of March, the extent of terrorist attacks have dropped significantly (Refer to Appendix A, Figure 8).⁵¹ While a relative peace is developing in the region, any guarantees of true peace are still far from over, and much like the previous attempts at peace, it may not take very many militant Jewish settlers or Palestinian terrorists to break the peace and stall negotiations once again.

Obstacles to Peace

Regardless of what peace plan eventually resolves the dilemma, there are a few key obstacles still remaining to the process. To date, no one peace accord or summit has been able to answer all of the following obstacles. First, Muslims, much like many other cultures, have a long history of seizing land and followers by force, and it is consider part of their rich history. History continually reflects violent methods of expansion and control, vice diplomatic methods. Second, once both sides forge an agreement on the actual boundaries of a Palestinian state and the future Israel, there will be thousands of Palestinian refugees who were promised the right of return or compensation by UN Resolutions. Additionally, thousands of Jews have moved into settlements located in and around formerly owned Palestinian lands, and many have made it clear they will resist resettlement. Lastly, probably the greatest threat to a final peace process is the matter of Jerusalem, and who will gain control of the coveted holy city.

From the Islamic perspective, history has favored the militant method over the peaceful method, dating all the way back to the prophet Muhammad. Fundamentalists are very well versed in the historic traditions and it is not hard to bring up references to

⁵¹ "Bi-weekly Summary Data on Palestinian Terrorism Since the Sharm el-Sheik Summit until April 14, 2005," Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for Special Studies, 14 April 2005, <http://www.intelligence.org.il/eng/pa_t_e/t14apr_05.htm>.

previous battles where a Jihad pushed out the infidel presence through violence. Since that is the most popular and historically recalled method, it is only natural for fundamentalists in the region to return to the violent path. Additionally, the most visible attempts and change are the violent means, which quickly grabs both local and international media and attention, as opposed to the more deliberate, long-term style of diplomatic means. Unfortunately, the uninformed masses typically associate credibility with action and immediate affects, which result in the general population continuing to provide active and tacit support to fundamentalists, vice the diplomats and moderates.

Israelis in Palestinian Lands

Once the Israeli state was created, Palestinians were basically pushed out by the massive Jewish migrations, which started before Israel was even declared a state. The Six Day War further imposed on previously controlled Palestinian lands. Palestinians currently living in the newly occupied Israeli territory became refugees seeking shelter and assistance outside Israeli borders (Refer to Appendix A, Figures 4 and 5). To this date, thousands of Palestinians and their relatives look to the UN Resolutions dictating the 'right of return' for refugees, or appropriate compensation, and expect that even with the adjustment of Israeli boundaries to create a Palestinian state, the refugees still have a legal claim. The major dilemma facing Israel under these conditions becomes one of numerical majority. As a democratic society, Israel would become a Muslim state by virtue of the sheer number of Palestinians living in Israel, eventually outnumbering the Jews.

Israeli-built settlements are another sore topic. As Israel expanded its territories after each war, Jewish settlers moved into the new territories, along with the IDF to

provide for their security. Even in violation of international law, Israel continues to construct settlements. These settlements encroach upon land that Palestinians expect to be a part of their new state. This has created increasing tension as Israel continues to increase the number of the settlements, claiming natural growth as their justification. Of course, there are thousands of Palestinians who see the land where those settlements are built as theirs. Further increasing the tension of the settlements is a recently released report claiming that Israeli government officials secretly funneled public funds to help supply over 400 mobile homes, and to build or expand over 100 West Bank settlement outposts between 2000 and 2004.⁵² Some of these Israeli settlers have lived in their homes for nearly 40 years, and have no intention of leaving their homes and land as a result of some peace process. In April 2005, 20,000 Jewish settlers in the southern Gaza Strip staged a protest to the impending pullout, shouting that a Jew does not expel a Jew.⁵³ Flaming the fires further, during the same time period, thousands of Israelis began moving to a new five-story block of flats in Hebron (West Bank) and plans for new construction on more settlements in East Jerusalem were made public. It is worth noting that the settlements in and around Hebron are not part of the planned West Bank pullout. Prime Minister Sharon even told the Israeli Parliament that their presence in Hebron serves as a strategic Jewish asset.⁵⁴ It is difficult for Israel to further the peace process when Prime Minister Sharon makes assurances to Presidents Bush and Abbas that

⁵² Karin Laub, "Report: Israeli Government Helped Set Up 105 Unauthorized Outposts," The Virginian-Pilot, 10 March 2005, sec. A-17.

⁵³ "Thousands of Israelis Protest Gaza Pullout," MSNBC, 27 April 2005, <<http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/769094/html>>.

⁵⁴ "Thousands of Israelis Flock to Hebron as New Settler Homes Open," Arab Media Watch, 26 April 2005, <<http://www.arabmediawatch.com/modules.php?name=news&file=2749.htm>>.

settlement construction will halt, yet more Israelis are moving into the West Bank, and more settlements are under construction.

Security Fence

Going hand-in-hand with Israeli settlements is the construction of the Israeli security fence between Palestinian controlled West Bank areas and Israel (Refer to Appendix A, Figures 6 and 7). Israel began constructing the physical barrier in an effort to block terrorists from access to Israeli targets. Prime Minister Sharon claims that the security fence is a temporary structure, and is not meant to affect the actual borders of the eventual Palestinian state, but Palestinians see it otherwise. The international community has called for a halt to further construction, but Israel has continued development. In several areas, the fence travels deep into the West Bank to include more disparate Israeli settlements. Further exasperating Palestinians is the apparent reluctance by the international community to take actions against Israel for the security fence construction (especially the United States).

Jerusalem

Probably the most divisive barrier to peace is the city of Jerusalem. Jerusalem holds sacred religious sites for Jews, Muslims and Christians. Through the course of history churches, synagogues and mosques have been built, destroyed and rebuilt, frequently on the same spot. Jerusalem is considered the City of David from Old Testament times, and was the site of the first temple built by the Jews; it is also the site of the Dome of the Rock and the Al Aqsa Mosque held sacred by Muslims. Jerusalem was once divided between Jordan and Israel, with West Jerusalem under Israeli control, and East Jerusalem under Jordanian control. After the Six Day War in 1967, Israel gained

control of East Jerusalem. At the juncture of East and West Jerusalem is one structure that both religions claim as sacred and built by their respective followers. Currently, both Israel and the future Palestinian state want Jerusalem for a capital.

Political Will

Each of these previous barriers in isolation can de-rail the peace process. Taken together, no peace process can ever hope to overcome such barriers. Critical to the whole process is a willingness to reach political compromise on both sides. And that is the current hurdle both sides are struggling with. Israel made assurances about pullout schedules and the settlements involved, yet Israel is now delaying to process. Prime Minister Sharon claims this is due to continued Palestinian terrorist attacks. As such, he stated over Israeli radio "We will not be committed to the roadmap until the Palestinians respect their commitment to stop terrorism."⁵⁵ President Abbas claims that Israel has failed to meet their obligations for the pullout and cite the continued settlement construction and expansion. This apparent lack of political wills to drive through the process, most notably in the month of April 2005, has taken its toll, showing a marked increase in Palestinian terrorist activity.⁵⁶

Assumptions for Suitable Peace

Taking these basic barriers to peace into account, there are a few basic assumptions necessary to illustrate a solution's positive impact on reduced terrorism. First of all, no peace process will ever work without the consent of a majority of each population (Israel and Palestine). Therefore, aside from the minority extremists

⁵⁵ "Israel not Bound by Roadmap Until Palestinian Violence Ends: Sharon," Arab Media Watch, 21 April 2005, <<http://www.arabmediawatch.com/modules.php?name= news&file=2736.htm>>.

⁵⁶ "Bi-weekly Summary Data on Palestinian Terrorism Since the Sharm el-Sheik Summit until April 14, 2005."

(fundamentalists), both sides will need to see and understand the benefit to the end of violence and hatred against each other, and agree to the new state boundaries for Palestine and Israel. Second, in determining the boundaries of the new Palestinian state, an acceptable solution for the refugees and the settlement evacuations is included. More than likely, Palestinian refugees will choose compensation instead of the right of return, and, undoubtedly, much of that compensation will come from the international community.

Next, Jerusalem will become equally divided between Muslim and Jewish holy sites, with the likely boundary including the shared wall between the contested holy site of the Jewish Wailing Wall and the Muslim Al Aqsa Mosque. This appears to be the only suitable solution even though both sides would prefer the entire city. It is clear that neither side will cede control of the entire city, so if leaders on both sides can truly commit their governments and populations to peace, both will have to compromise. Once before, prior to the 1993 Oslo talks, Prime Minister Rabin and Yasser Arafat tacitly agreed to a plan that would turn the city of Jerusalem over to the Vatican, giving the latter the authority to control the city, whereby creating a neutral broker, allowing both Israel and Palestine to appoint a mayor, and claim the town as a religious capital.⁵⁷

In order to maintain initial peace between the new boundaries, an international force will perform the security duties, while the IDF and new Palestinian Security Force will take care of internal security and assist the international force. Lastly, there will be a core of both Jews and Muslims who will never accept a divided holy land/Jerusalem, and

⁵⁷ Joel Bainerman, "Secret Deals and the Future of Jerusalem," Joshua Communications, <<http://www.iahushua.com/jq/jew.htm>>.

will attempt to incite violence; but they will be in the minority. Taking these assumptions into consideration, the bigger issue of reducing Islamic terrorism must be addressed.

SHORT VERSUS LONG TERM AFFECTS

When considering the affects of a permanent peace process, it is important to realize the distinction between the short term and long term affects. The Arab-Israeli conflict has been such a rallying point for Jihad against the Jews that an acceptable agreement will immediately relieve significant pressure. Palestinians, who now have their own state, and Israelis whose security has stabilized could only feel the initial benefits of peace. When the Palestinian public is heard throughout the international Muslim community rejoicing at peace, freedom to elect local officials, freedom of movement from their homes to work, freedom from IDF patrols and benefiting from all the economic growth that will come with their newly opened borders and industry, regional terrorism will decrease and the popular support base will no longer support terrorist "disruptions" to a new Palestinian state's progress.

The international community, especially Muslim, would likely be skeptical of lasting peace, and may still view Israel with particular disdain, thus continuing to support international terrorist activities. However, as the initial peace stabilized over time, the international Muslim community would realize that both Israel and Palestine have come to accept each others sovereignty, thus withering their motivation to support international terrorism, and forcing terrorists to eliminate the Arab-Israeli crisis as a recruiting tool. And, they may still feel they have a vested interest in the well being of Palestine and the holy Islamic sites in Jerusalem. Once these sweeping changes have had a chance to take effect in Palestine, other Muslim countries will remember that this was primarily a

dispute between Palestine and Israel, and if Palestine is now happy with the peace, the rest of the Muslim countries should be. This major shift in attitude will certainly not hit every Muslim, specifically those fundamentalists waging a campaign of terror and reform, but their likely pool of recruits and supporters will dry up, thus significantly reducing international Islamic terrorism. The Muslim community is ready for the advantages of a more open society and individual freedoms. During the spring of 2004, twenty-two Arab League members unanimously endorsed a "commitment to pursue reform and modernizations by consolidating democratic practice, by enlarging participation in political and public life and by fostering the role of all components of civil society." ⁵⁸

METHODS TO STEM TERRORISM

You will never be able to turn the true fundamentalists, since they are too far gone; the Islamic terrorists embrace hardship, adversity and sacrifice. But you can erode their popular support and dry up the pool of general population Muslims who agree to participate in violent means of reform, vice peaceful ones. The support base really becomes the key target for combating terrorism. By attacking terrorism indirectly through the support bases, you can significantly reduce their ability to sustain terrorist activities without risk of compromising themselves and the terrorist leadership. The general population allows terrorists to move freely throughout the population without fear of compromise to legal authorities. These support bases provide safe havens, lodging, financial and material support, and allow terrorists to store weapons and equipment. Whether it is through intimidation or through ideological sympathy, supporters are

⁵⁸ Nir Boms and Michael Meunier, "About Arabs, Numbers and Democracy: How do Arabs Really Feel About U.S. Policy in the Middle East?" In The National Interest, October 2004, <<http://www.inthenationalinterest.com/articles/october2004/october2004boms.html>>.

willing to risk compromise themselves in order to assist the terrorists. The diversity and variety of ethnicities, wealth, age, sex and profession provides support networks that may infiltrate into the highest levels of local and state government, industry and private sectors. As a result, terrorists retain incredible flexibility for means of travel, payment, weapons and equipment purchase, and recruitment. This diverse network also provides an invaluable intelligence collection network for potential targets as well as counter terrorist actions by legal authorities. Probably most important is the complex command and control network created through the vast support base. Terrorist cell leadership is capable of sending messages through multiple layers of support, frequently crossing international borders, which prevent legal authorities from tracking the source while also preventing the terrorist from knowing his true chain of command, in the event of capture or compromise.

As the support base is so critical to the terrorist movement, they become the focus of the counter terrorism message. The first step in swaying the population is to label the movement what it really is: and insurgency. While some would claim this step only adds legitimacy to the movement, when Islamic terrorism is so advanced, and seen throughout the globe, labeling them as criminals shows naivety and will not reveal the true intentions of the larger movement, which is critical to swaying the support base. Second, highlight the successes of diplomacy and the failures of terrorism to produce lasting political changes. Lastly, reveal the truly barbaric and indiscriminate nature of the terrorists.

Call it an Insurgency

When looking at the terrorist threat, it is important to identify its true nature and subsequent development. Terrorism, in isolation, is just a criminal act, hardly something

for nations to mobilize and go to war over. After all, how do you attack the terrorists? They do not come out in formation and battle toe to toe. Instead, they hide in shadows as cowards, striking out at unarmed civilians, women and children with the intent of striking fear and terror into the hearts of the population. As savage as this may sound, it becomes a component of a larger movement.

Terrorism with a political agenda seeking revolution, similar to the Islamic renewal, is an insurgency. By virtue of these terrorist acts, culturally and socially woven into the larger movement of Islamic reform, it cannot be viewed in isolation; it must be treated as an insurgency.⁵⁹ It is a political fight. What is the insurgency? It is a quest for Islamic purification and renewal. For obvious political reasons, America and its allies cannot declare war on the Nation of Islam, or on a violent Islamic renewal. However, just like the Arab-Israeli peace process had long-term political aims, so does the Islamic Renewal. Looking deeper into the Islamic renewal, it is not just fundamentalists who feel the Ummah has gone astray. The Islamic moderates also feel the Muslim community must be brought back to a rightly guided light, but they do not advocate violence and terror as the method.

This moderate group is the key to battling the insurgency, as this group provides the majority of the support base for terrorism. In Israel, Hamas could operate largely because of the support it received from the PLO, fundamentalist Palestinians and average, every-day Palestinians. By achieving peace with Israeli through diplomacy, vice terror, those middle ground moderates came to understand the futility of continued violence and

⁵⁹ Vlahos, Terror's Mask: Insurgency within Islam, 1-3.

would no longer provide the support for terror. Moderate Islamists outside of Palestine can provide the same influence.

To defeat an insurgency, you must strip it of its authority and replace it with another authority, or decimate every living insurgent and their supporters. The French tried the latter technique in Algeria, and achieved short-term success, but were eventually forced to leave Algeria due to the repercussions. For the insurgents to win, all they have to do is survive. If the insurgents can survive, they have denied the established authority's goal, which decreases the authority's credibility and support base.⁶⁰ By the virtue of surviving, the insurgents gain credibility as the established authority loses theirs.

Successful Diplomacy Means Failed Insurgency

To counter any claims that diplomacy has failed to resolve the Arab-Israeli Peace Process, insiders and outsiders must understand that the insurgents have repeatedly interfered with the Peace Process. No peace process had a chance to proceed, violence-free. The respective governments successive failures relate directly to the continued terror attacks over the past several years. Additionally, both governments were not truly prepared to bring all the necessary concessions to establish lasting peace, so they allowed political parties to also sabotage the process. However, with a suitable peace now established, that would underline both governments' willingness to take the realistic approach and establish a lasting peace, negating the insurgent's attempts to control the outcome.

A mutually acceptable peace plan could easily reveal the failures of the fundamentalist approach. Using a Palestinian example, point out that the Al Fatah Islamic movement brought 20% of Palestinians to an Islamic identity. Hamas then

⁶⁰ Vlahos, Terror's Mask: Insurgency within Islam, 4.

hijacked the modest achievements of Al Fatah and radicalized Islamic fervor in to terrorism, but still failed to bring about success, even with Hamas' program of terror.⁶¹ Despite the Palestinian terrorists' path of terror from 1967 until now, they have not achieved their stated goals of Israeli defeat and removal from the region. Islamic terrorism uprisings in Algeria and Egypt during the 1990's and in Syria in the early 1980's failed to remove the current government, and only succeeded in slaughtering tens of thousands in the process. In Afghanistan, the Taliban may have succeeded in rising to power, but could not effectively lead the country, and were easily defeated by military power, even though they had the support of Usama Bin Laden, himself.⁶²

Al Qaeda does not appear to be winning the fight. Their acts of terror achieved the goal of bringing infidels into Muslim home lands, but multinational forces toppled the Taliban Government in Afghanistan, and the average Muslim has only experienced martyrdom and defeat, even if they did not want to be directly involved in the fight to begin with. Al Qaeda is already losing favor with Muslims in Iraq. Mouwafak al-Rubaie, Iraq's National Security Adviser, noted how Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi's group provided little help during the final assault on Fallujah by coalition forces. Zarqawi and his group fled Fallujah and let the Iraqis face the attack alone. He also noted that that Bin Ladin's-style Islam had already failed in Egypt, which is a more homogenous society, and failed in Afghanistan when it had a state, and will fail in Iraq.⁶³ Exposing these types of characteristics of Islamic insurgents, and their overly idealistic goals, will help average Muslims realize what the fundamentalists will attempt in other Muslim countries.

⁶¹ Vlahos, Culture's Mask: War and Change after Iraq, 21.

⁶² Vlahos, Terror's Mask: Insurgency within Islam, 18-21.

⁶³ "Is Bin Ladin Hijacking Iraq's Insurgency?" Fox News, 12 January 2005, <<http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,144111,00.html>> (12 January 2005).

Fundamentalists have shown that they can alienate a society through their excessive violence, but they cannot take and maintain control of a state. That is what the fundamentalist movement Hamas in Israel was, and what other fundamentalist strategies are when using excessive force: nothing but campaigns of terror.

Revealing the True Nature of Insurgent Violence

By further analyzing terrorism, the international community could better identify the flaws and destructive nature of the fundamentalists, the true nature of the Islamic insurgent threat, and show successful strategies for other nations to counter that threat. The Muslim world must understand the pure ruthlessness of the fundamentalist. It does not matter if you are an infidel or a Muslim. It is perfectly acceptable to sacrifice Muslims to destroy infidels. But it is not the innocent mothers and children (now dead) that are hailing themselves as martyrs; it is the fundamentalists who, conveniently, are still alive. In 1998, when terrorists bombed two American Embassies in Africa, over 200 Muslims were killed in order to kill 12 Americans.⁶⁴ The same can be said for all the bombings going on in Iraq right now, or the attacks on the World Trade Center towers in 2001; do the Islamic terrorists care that they are killing innocent Muslims? Sunni Muslim insurgents were blamed for a recent suicide bombing in Iraq that killed dozens of Muslims during Friday prayers at a local mosque in Baghdad, Iraq. One bystander injured by the blast stated, "Those Osama Bin Laden followers, they did this because they hate Shiites. They are afraid of us. They are not Muslims, they are infidels."⁶⁵

As stated earlier, the support base is the key to reducing terrorism. By focusing these revelations about the true nature of the insurgency towards the support base, the

⁶⁴ Lewis, 149.

⁶⁵ "At Least 27 Killed in multiple Baghdad Blasts," MSNBC News, 18 February 2005, <<http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6913272/>>.

insurgents lose their recruiting power. To put it more plainly, if the insurgents succeed in conducting a regime change, who is going to lead that particular nation? Do Muslims want to be ruled by insurgents with a perverted interpretation of their sacred text? Using Bin Ladin's and other fundamentalists' logic, a democracy means that the population is responsible for putting leaders into power, and therefore should be held responsible for the leader's failures. Therefore, if the citizens of country have any say in who the government officials are, and then those officials or administrators do not observe the "proper" laws of Islam, an Islamic terrorist can justify attacking civilians by claiming the civilian is responsible for electing an apostate. If that is the case, should the people in Turkey be murdered? Where does the fundamentalists' justification for murder stop?

RECOMMENDED STRATEGIES ON ISRAEL AND INSURGENCIES

By analyzing the impact of an Arab-Israeli peace, and considering the previous methods to stem terrorism, we can determine multiple strategies for turning popular support away from the Islamic fundamentalists both in Israel and the international community. America and the international community must take a long-term approach to solving the insurgency. It is also critical to realize that it is not America's problem to solve; in other words, it should be an internal change away from fundamentalism, not an externally imposed fight. In order to facilitate that attitude, the U.S. must appear more neutral in the international community, especially with respect to the Arab-Israeli crisis. In a fight between Islamic fundamentalists and moderates, our allies are definitely the moderates, so it is imperative that the U.S. provides support to moderate efforts to gain legitimacy. Another key step to defeating the international insurgency is by involving the

international community in the process. Finally, America must actively go after the insurgents' support bases.

Long-Term Approach by Their Objectives

First and foremost, this effort requires a long-term approach by America, equivalent to the Muslims' approach. Recent administrations have lost any long-term focus due to politics and bureaucratic organizations. Instead of being worried about the prospects for reelection and the impact on a partisan economic or domestic policy, we need a bipartisan approach that will transcend election timetables. Currently, one of America's greatest political weaknesses is trying to assign arbitrary rules, limits and timelines for a successful peace process based on American-style values and democracy, vice a regional-styled approach. The influence of politics and election cycles was evidenced by the American and Israeli attempts to push the previously mentioned Camp David Accord in 2000 and then-President Clinton's party-imposed pressure to make one final attempt at recognizable progress. A long-term approach towards Israel and the Palestinians would include more farsighted bargaining over eventual political boundaries, the ceasing of settlement construction and the status of Jerusalem. While it is important to continue to show progress, it is not imperative that every aspect of the negotiations be resolved at one summit. Instead, the U.S. should be more than supportive of smaller, more incremental steps with the understanding of the eventual goals. General Anthony Zinni, Sr. (Ret.), former Central Command Combatant Command and political advisor to President Bush, has noted that for a lasting peace process to succeed, it must be done incrementally over time, not through large summits. The greatest advances will be made

through bilateral negotiations.⁶⁶ This might also alleviate some pressure to hold high visibility, multinational summits where the focus can easily shift to political banter and photo opportunities instead of concrete advancements.

The solution must occur internally, Israelis and Palestinians have to come to their own terms while the international community provides the necessary support. Of note, the Oslo Peace Accords largely took place outside the direct purview of the United States.⁶⁷ The Middle East is not ours (the United States') to win or lose; it is only our job to assist those wanting a peaceful solution. However, without U.S. involvement, Palestinians say there is little hope. One Palestinian official who asked not to be identified stated: "Unless the US is really going to play the role of the neutral and fair arbiter, Israel will simply have no incentive to abide by its obligations."⁶⁸ The U.S. has an unprecedented opportunity to show the international community its true resolve, and legitimacy, towards lasting peace by enacting more equitable offerings to the Palestinian peoples. Americans are clearly seen as favoring Israelis, which undermine their attempts to assist the process. By providing more equitable financial, economic and security aid and assurances to the Palestinians, the U.S. could regain some international legitimacy. Additionally, by penalizing both Palestinians and Israel for not abiding by stated peace process objectives, American will be seen as more impartial, and Israel would have greater pressure to abide by negotiated agreements.

One final observation provided by the Arab-Israeli process is America must realize change in the Middle East does not have to mean an American agenda; we are

⁶⁶ Anthony Zinni, Sr., interview with Stuart Lankford, Command and Staff College, 24 February 2005.

⁶⁷ "The American Role in the Oslo Process," American Embassy Tel Aviv, 06 December 2001, <<http://www.usembassy-israel.org.il/pulish/mission/amb/120601.html>>, 1.

⁶⁸ Nicole Gaouette, "Roadblocks on The Road Map to Middle East Peace," Christian Science Monitor, 08 May 2003, <<http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/0508/p12s02-wome.html>>, 1.

seen as the intruders and any Islamic government established under United States coercion will be seen as puppets or apostates. We are the external barrier to internal reform.⁶⁹

Working Through Moderates

In order to legitimize our efforts, we must work through the moderates without appearing heavy handed, so not to taint their credibility. Part of that comes from not interfering with the moderates' interpretation of the Quran, or with their stated goals for internal renewals. It is important to highlight the differences between the Islamic fundamentalists' interpretations and those of the moderates. For example, while the Quran does advocate Jihad, the Prophet Mohammed specifically stated that Muslims were to treat prisoners well, and that God has forbidden killing women and children.⁷⁰ The Quran also calls suicide a mortal sin, which earns eternal damnation. Fundamentalists have loosely translated this to omit sin and damnation. In the opinion of one Middle East scholar, there are no places in the basic text of the Quran that enjoin murder and terrorism.⁷¹ It is important to identify that fundamentalists will reject or accept a Quranic text based on its usefulness to their cause. In today's global world, a moderate Islamic reinterpretation of Islamic Law is the more appropriate method. Equally important, America must legitimize the efforts of the moderates on both sides of the equations.

President Abbas has made rapid improvements in the negotiations since taking office in January, and has already deployed security forces to support the transition of settlement control back to Palestinians in Gaza and parts of the West Bank.

⁶⁹ Vlahos, Culture's Mask: War and Change after Iraq, 21.

⁷⁰ Lewis, 33.

⁷¹ Lewis, 38-39.

Understanding that it will take time for President Abbas to convince hard-line factions within Palestine, including the Hamas, America must be patient and support his efforts to bring these other groups to the negotiation table. On the Israeli side, America must not be quick to side with Israel during disputes, but remain firm in pressuring Prime Minister Sharon to pull the moderates to his side.

International Support

In October 2004, the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1566 was introduced by Russia and passed unanimously by the Security Council, which finally established an internationally recognized definition of terrorism, and calls all states to prevent and punish all acts of terrorism and those who support terrorists.⁷² Now that an official definition and obligation is in the international community, America can use its diplomatic influence to encourage non-Muslim, and less fundamental Muslim, states to crack down on terror networks within their own borders.

With the success of an Arab-Israeli peace, America can then capitalize on previous support given to Muslims countries. America and her allies came to the aid of Kuwait in her time of need. Albania, Kosovo and Bosnia all benefited from American and Allied intervention. Even Afghanistan in 1979 and the 1980's, along side Usama Bin Ladin, America assisted in the defeat and expulsion of the Soviet Union. Most recently, Indonesia is received over millions of dollars in disaster relief from the United States alone.

Going After Support Bases

⁷² "UN Security Council Resolution 1566," MidEast Web, 08 October 2004, <<http://www.medesat.org/1566.htm>> (08 November 2004).

Critical to sustaining an insurgency are those support groups and bases. Even Muslims not considered violent or fundamentalists will provide safe haven or financial support for a brother Muslim who is fighting the infidel, if there is not another option available. By pushing American aid to the moderate groups, they can effectively compete with the fundamentalist recruiting efforts, yet the moderates can advocate change without thousands of martyrs and orphaned children. In December 2004, America pledged \$20 million dollars to help boost the Palestinian economy.⁷³ By sending our financial support to the moderate groups, we eliminate financial incentives to support the fundamentalists and begin to build loyalties. During President Bush's State of the Union address he notified Congress that he will be asking for \$350 million for Palestinian economic, security and political reform and support. Additionally, the current administration reprogrammed \$40 million for quick impact programs to aid education, youth programs, private sector development and health care. And, the administration plans to seek \$150 million in the fiscal year 2006 budget for economic assistance in the West Bank and Gaza Strip for Palestinian reconstruction and economic efforts.⁷⁴ Once the economic, financial and quality of life benefits from these incentives are established more moderates will discontinue their support to the fundamentalists, and potentially identify those who continue to support the fundamentalists, if not locations and identities of active terrorists. Additionally, information received through U.S. all-source intelligence should be shared with the moderates to allow them to prosecute fundamentalists, thus enhancing their own credibility inside Palestine and Israel.

⁷³ "U.S. Gives \$20 Million to Palestinian Authority," MSNBC News, 08 December 2004, <<http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6678187/>>.

⁷⁴ "U.S. Assistance to the Palestinians," U.S. Department of State, 07 February 2005, <<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/41870.htm>>.

The Arab-Israeli conflict provides another example of what to avoid when dealing with insurgents if you are trying to win over the support bases. Avoid getting pulled down to insurgents' level so they can discredit your authority or stated goals. When Algeria was attempting to gain independence from France from 1954-1962, the French hunted down every possible Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN) member and broke their terror network through savage torturing and interrogations. Even though the French broke the network, they had devolved into what they were hunting.⁷⁵ And even though they met with temporary success, they had clearly turned the general population against the French, and the resistance returned only a couple years later. As long as Israel reduces itself to firing on crowds and villages, knowing the likelihood of civilian casualties, the Hamas movement will use those images as fuel for up and coming terrorists or support groups. As long as America is seen as an extension of Israel's violent retaliations, America will have no chance of winning any popular support, so it is imperative for the U.S. to influence Israeli military actions, and strongly admonish them when Israel does retaliate.

By using these techniques to a long-term approach, and working through the moderate population, you can turn the general population support bases away from the insurgency. The aspects of international support and legitimacy cannot be overstated. Clearly, the most thorough and long lasting approach to stem the Islamic insurgency, indirectly, is through converting their support bases to a more moderate viewpoint.

Conclusion

The continued Arab-Israeli crisis will continue to serve as a primary motivator for terrorist acts and recruiting supporting efforts. However, through a successful peace

⁷⁵ Vlahos, Terror's Mask: Insurgency within Islam, 5.

process, it is clear that the loss of that motivating factor will significantly reduce the insurgent support bases' willingness to harbor, aid and provide for insurgent activity. When analyzing the potential ripple effect of a mutually agreed peace settlement for Israel and Palestine it is clear how the international community can use their peace as a model for further peace and unravel the myth of terrorism and fundamental actions as the only solution to achieving peace. While there might be other opportunities to reduce international Islamic terrorism through diplomacy to prevail, without a peaceful settlement in Israel, Islamic terrorism will continue to permeate international boundaries. Accordingly, it is imperative for the United States and the international community to re-think current strategies towards the Middle East and use all means of national power to push both Israel and Palestine back to the negotiating table and re-engage the Road Map.

In most countries in the region, there are plenty of people who share our values, are sympathetic to the threat of terrorism and want our way of life; they want freedom.⁷⁶ Most Muslims are not fundamentalists; most fundamentalists are not terrorists; but most terrorists are Muslims. As more and more militaries deploy and become involved in the web of Islamic fundamentalists, it is critical to better understand what motivates fundamentalists and how they can control and dominate potential allies.

⁷⁶ Lewis, 164.

APPENDIX A



Figure 1. Israel after UN Partition, 1947



Figure 2. Israel after First War Armistice, 1949




Figure 3. Israel and Occupied Territory Today

APPENDIX A




Figure 4. The Gaza Strip

APPENDIX A




Figure 5. Israeli Settlements, West Bank and Gaza

APPENDIX A




Figure 6. West Bank Security Fence

APPENDIX A




Figure 7. West Bank Security Fence Detail




Figure 8. Palestinian Terror Attacks since 08 February 2005

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