Blinded by Doctrine: Lessons Learned from the Luftwaffe
Abstract
This paper will conduct an analysis of the failure of the Luftwaffe during World War II (1939-1945) and identify lessons learned for the United States Air Force. The analysis will address lack of vision and institutional inflexibility in crafting air power doctrine, as well as explore the ensuing systemic mismatch of doctrine and strategy that characterized the performance of the Luftwaffe in World War II. The primary factor in the Luftwaffe's failure was Germany's decision to develop a tactical air force lacking strategic effect. This choice would yield dire consequences once Luftwaffe leaders found themselves in a prolonged war of attrition, even while they remained persistently committed to an air power doctrine designed for rapid, decisive combat operations pursuing annihilation. The study of this failure may identify areas that the U.S. Air Force should avoid in its formulation of doctrine to meet projected air power challenges in the 21st century. Simply, in the current volatile strategic environment, the U.S. Air Force must adapt relevant doctrine and pursue flexible transformation to meet the unconventional threat at hand while maintaining America's dominance against traditional challenges.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Mar 19, 2009
- Accession Number
- ADA499214
Entities
People
- Brian D. Spino
Organizations
- United States Army War College